Set 1

1. Q: What is the concept of Remedial Law? Distinguish between substantive law and
remedial law. (2006 Bar)

A: Remedial law is a branch of public law which prescribes the procedural

rules to be observed in litigations, whether civil, criminal, or administrative, and in
special proceedings, as well as the remedies or reliefs available in each case.
Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights and
obligations, the violation of which gives rise to a cause of action. On the other hand,
remedial law prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtaining redress for their
invasion. (cf. Bustos v. Lucero, 81 Phil. 540, 650 [1948])

2. Q: In rendering a decision, should a court take into consideration the possible

effect of its verdict upon the political stability and economic welfare of the nation?
(2003 Bar)

A: No, because a court is required to take into consideration only the legal
issues and the evidence admitted in the case. The political stability and economic
welfare of the nation are extraneous to the case. They can have persuasive influence,
but they are not the main factors that should be considered in deciding a case. A
decision should be based on the law, rules of procedure, justice and equity. However,
in exceptional cases the court may consider the political stability and economic
welfare of the nation when these are capable of being taken into judicial notice of
and are relevant to the case.

3. Q: Agatha filed a complaint against Yana in the RTC in Makati City to collect
P350,000.00, an amount representing the unpaid balance on the price of the car Yana
had bought from Agatha. Realizing a jurisdictional error in filing the complaint in
the RTC, Agatha filed a notice of dismissal before she was served with the answer of
Yana. The RTC issued an order confirming the dismissal. Three months later, Agatha
filed another complaint against Yana based on the same cause of action this time in
the MeTC of Makati City. However, for reasons personal to her, Agatha decided to
have the complaint dismissed without prejudice by filing a notice of dismissal prior
to the service of the answer of Yana. Hence, the case was dismissed by the MeTC. A
month later, Agatha refiled the complaint against Yana in the same MeTC. May Yana
successfully invoke the Two-Dismissal Rule to bar Agatha’s third complaint? Explain
your answer. (2017 Bar)

A: No. Yana cannot successfully invoke the TwoDismissal Rule. In order for
the Two-Dismissal Rule to apply, Sec. 1, Rule 17 requires that both dismissals
through plaintiff’s notices were made by a competent court. Moreover, in Ching v.
Cheng (G.R. No. 175507, October 8, 2014), the Supreme Court ruled that the following
requisites should concur for the Two-Dismissal Rule to apply:
 1. There was a previous case that was dismissed by a competent courts;
2. Both cases were based on or include the same claim;
3. Both notices for dismissal were filed by the plaintiff; and
4. When the motion to dismiss filed by the plaintiff was consented to by the
defendant on the ground that the latter paid and satisfied all the claims of the former.

In this case, the Makati City RTC had no jurisdiction over the first complaint
which was dismissed through Agatha’s notice, because it is below its jurisdictional
amount of at least P400,000.00. Therefore, the Two-Dismissal Rule cannot be
successfully invoked in this case.

4. What are the requisites for an intervention by a non-party in an action pending in

court? (2000 Bar)

A: The requisites for Intervention are:

a. Legal interest in the matter in controversy; or
b. Legal interest in the success of either of the parties; or
c. Legal interest against both; or
d. So situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition
of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof;
e. Intervention will not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the
rights of original parties; f. Intervenor’s rights may not be fully protected in a
separate proceeding (Acenas v. CA, G.R. No. 107762, August 29, 1995; Sec. 1,
Rule 19).

5. Q: AX, a Makati-bound paying passenger of PBU, a public utility bus, died

instantly on board the bus on account of the fatal head wounds he sustained as a
result of the strong impact of the collision between the bus and a dump truck that
happened while the bus was travelling on EDSA towards Makati. The foregoing
facts, among others, were duly established on evidence-inchief by the plaintiff TY,
sole heir of AX, in TY’s action against the subject common carrier for breach of
contract of carriage. After TY had rested his case, the common carrier filed a demurrer
to evidence, contending that plaintiff’s evidence is insufficient because it did not
show (1) that defendant was negligent and (2) that such negligence was the proximate
cause of the collision. Should the court grant or deny defendant’s demurrer to
evidence? Reason briefly. (2004 Bar)

A: No. The Court should not grant defendant’s demurrer to evidence because
the case is for breach of contract of carriage. Proof that the defendant was negligent
and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the collision is not required.
(Arts. 1170 and 2201, NCC; Mendoza v. Phil Airlines, Inc., G.R. No. L- 3678, February
29, 1952; Batangas Transportation Co. v. Caguimbal, G.R. No. L-22985, January 24,
1968; Abeto v. PAL, G.R. No. L-28692, July 30, 1982)
6. Q: Ms. A filed a complaint for damages against Ms. B, alleging that Ms. B
negligently caused the demolition of her house's concrete fence, the top half of which
fell on the front portion of Ms. A's car and permanently damaged its engine. In her
answer, Ms. B denied any personal liability for the damage caused to Ms. A's car,
averring that she merely acquiesced to the advice of her contractor, XYZ Construction
Co., to have the concrete fence demolished. Thus, damages, if any, should be
collected from it. Thereafter, Ms. A filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings,
alleging that Ms. B's statement in her answer is actually a negative pregnant. Ms. B
opposed the motion, reiterating her defense in her answer which purportedly
rendered judgment on the pleadings improper. Ms. B also moved for the dismissal of
the case on the ground of non-joinder of XYZ Construction Co., which she alleged is
an indispensable party to the case.

a. Is Ms. A's motion for judgment on the pleadings proper? Explain. (2019 Bar)

A: Yes. When an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the

material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading, judgment on the pleadings is
appropriate. The rule is stated in Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules of Court. In this
relation, jurisprudence dictates that an answer fails to tender an issue it does not
comply with the requirements of a specific denial as set out in Section 8 and 10, Rule
8, resulting in the admission of the material allegations of the adverse party’s
pleadings.

As such, it is a form of judgment that is exclusively based on the submitted

pleadings without the introduction of evidence as the factual issues remain
uncontroverted as in the case of Ms. B. (Government Service Insurance System v.
Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc., G.R. No. 165585, November 20, 2013).

7. Q: What are the grounds for judgment on the pleadings? (1999 Bar)

A: The grounds for judgment on the pleadings are: (a) where an answer fails to
tender an issue, or (b) otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s
pleading. (Sec. 1, Rule 34)

8. Q: Katy filed an action against Tyrone for collection of the sum of P1 million in the
RTC, with an ex parte application for a writ of preliminary attachment. Upon posting
of an attachment bond, the court granted the application and issued a writ of
preliminary attachment. Apprehensive that Tyrone might withdraw his savings
deposit with the bank, the sheriff immediately served a notice of garnishment on the
bank to implement the writ of preliminary attachment. The following day, the sheriff
proceeded to Tyrone’s house and served him the summons, with copies of the
complaint containing the application for writ of attachment, Katy’s affidavit, order of
attachment, writ of preliminary attachment and attachment bond. Within fifteen (15)
days from service of the summons, Tyrone filed a motion to dismiss and to dissolve
the writ of preliminary attachment on the following grounds: (i) the court did not
acquire jurisdiction over his person because the writ was served ahead of the
summons; (ii) the writ was improperly implemented; and (iii) said writ was
improvidently issued because the obligation in question was already fully paid.
Resolve the motion with reasons. (2005 Bar)

A: The motion to dismiss and to dissolve the writ of preliminary attachment

should be denied.

The fact that the writ of attachment was served ahead of the summons did not
affect the jurisdiction of the court over his person. It makes the writ, unenforceable
(Sec. 5, Rule 57). However, all that is needed to be done is to re- serve the writ. (Onate
v. Abrogar, G.R. No. 197393, February 23, 1985)

Further, the writ was improperly implemented. Serving a notice of

garnishment, particularly before the summons is served, is not proper. It should be a
copy of the writ of attachment that should be served on the defendant, and a notice
that the bank deposits are attached pursuant to the writ. (Sec. 7[d], Rule 57) Also, the
writ was improvidently issued if indeed it can be shown that the obligation was
already fully paid. The writ is only ancillary to the main action (Sec. 13, Rule 57). The
alleged payment of the account cannot serve as a ground for resolving the
improvident issuance of the writ, because this matter delves into the merits of the
case, and requires full-blown trial. Payment, however, serves as a ground for a
motion to dismiss.

9. Mandamus Q: Petitioner Fabian was appointed Election Registrar of the

Municipality of Sevilla supposedly to replace the respondent Election Registrar
Pablo who was transferred to another municipality without his consent and who
refused to accept his aforesaid transfer, much less to vacate his position in Bogo
Town as election registrar, as in fact he continued to occupy his aforesaid position
and exercise his functions thereto. Petitioner Fabian then filed a petition for
mandamus against Pablo but the trial court dismissed Fabian’s petition contending
that quo warranto is the proper remedy. Is the court correct in its ruling? Why? (2001
Bar)

A: Yes, the court is correct in its ruling. Mandamus will not lie as it is a remedy
that applies only where petitioner’s right is founded clearly in law, not when it is
doubtful. Pablo was transferred without his consent which is tantamount to removal
without cause, contrary to the fundamental guarantee on non-removal except for
cause. Considering that Pedro continued to occupy the disputed position and
exercised his functions therein, the proper remedy is quo warranto, not mandamus.
(Garces v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114795, July 17, 1996)
10. Q: A was arrested on the strength of a warrant of arrest issued by the RTC in
connection with an Information for Homicide. W, the live-in partner of A filed a
petition for habeas corpus against A’s jailer and police investigators with the Court
of Appeals.

a. Does W have the personality to file the petition for habeas corpus?

b. Is the petition tenable? (1998 Bar)

A. a. Yes. W, the live-in partner of A, has the personality to file the petition for
habeas corpus because it may be filed by “some person in his behalf.” (Sec 3, Rule
102)

b. No, the petition is not tenable because the warrant of arrest was issued by a
court which had jurisdiction to issue it. (Sec. 4 Rule 102)