Cambridge University Press

Gabon: A Neo-Colonial Enclave of Enduring French Interest
Author(s): Michael C. Reed

Source: The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Jun., 1987), pp. 283-320
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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The Journal of Modern African Studies, 25, 2 (1987), pp. 283-320
Gabon: a Neo-Colonial Enclave of

Enduring French Interest
by MICHAEL C. REED*
FRENCH culture, economy, and polity have long dominated the small
African country of Gabon. The French control of the colonial era,
which reached its nadir in the I898-1930 period of the brutal
'concessionary companies', has been replaced, since independence in
I960, by an insidious rapprochementwith Paris, fashioned by Gabon's
leadership. A French journalist long familiar with the continent has
written, 'Gabon is an extreme case, verging on caricature, of neo-
colonialism'.1
The clearest recent example of French domination was the
aftermath of the I964 coup d'etat against the authoritarian President,
Leon M'Ba, of the Fang ethnic group. Although this popularly
supported military intervention had been quickly and bloodlessly
successful, it was immediately reversed, without even an official
Gabonese request for assistance, by French troops flown in from Dakar
and Brazzaville. Once back in power, M'Ba was more repressive than
ever. Months of student and labour demonstrations followed, though to
no avail, and Gabon has been 'tranquil' ever since.
The French could not afford to lose the francophile M'Ba. As he lay
dying of cancer in a French hospital, they groomed his successor, Albert-
Bernard Bongo, who became President in I967. Bongo comes, not by
chance, from Gabon's south-east, where large deposits of strategic
uranium and manganese are found. He is a political 'outsider' from
one of Gabon's smaller ethnic groups, the Bateke, but has been able,
nevertheless, to neutralise the power of the northern Fang who
dominated Gabonese politics until M'Ba's death. In September 1973
the President announced his conversion to Islam and adopted the name
of El Hadj Omar Bongo.
Gabon's political stability since I964 has been achieved at the price
of a rigid single-party system (founded by Bongo in 1968) and a weak
* Doctoral Candidate, Department of
Anthropology, University of Washington, Seattle. The
author undertook fieldwork in Gabon during I983-5, including one year in the small town of
Ndjole, a capitale departementalewith a population of 3,000-4,000.
1 Pierre Pean, Affairesafricaines(Paris, 1983), p. 20. This journalist offers a scathing analysis of
franco-Gabonese collusion in hiegholaces.

284 MICHAEL C. REED
opposition forced into exile in Paris. All the while, 600 French
paratroopers, along with an air-force unit that includes Mirage V and
Jaguar jet-fighters (most of whose pilots are French), have been
permanently stationed at Camp de Gaulle near the capital of
Libreville, a clear warning to any would-be rebels in Gabon's thinly
populated interior. Under a 1960 franco-Gabonese agreement, 125
French officers assist the Gabonese military. Bongo's distrust of his
countrymen is such that the core of his 6oo-strong Presidential Guard
consists of some 60 Moroccan soldiers, the remainder being entirely
Bateke.1 In effect, Bongo remains secure only with the protection of
metropolitan soldiers, foreign mercenaries, and trusted fellow tribes-
men.
Bongo is reckoned to be one of black Africa's wealthiest leaders. He
resides in an immense, fortified palace along the bord de la mer in
Libreville, which is said to have cost $800 million to build and which
was completed in time for Bongo to host the I977 O.A.U. summit. The
palace required Italian marble which was flown to Libreville, and the
conference hall alone cost $23 million.2 Government expenditures for
the summit represented about three-quarters of the entire I977
national budget. As a result, inflation soared and the World Bank and
the I.M.F. insisted that Gabon adopt an austerity programme
beginning early in I978.3
Located in western equatorial Africa, Gabon is half the size of
France, with a population of probably less than one million.4 It has the
highest G.N.P. per capita in sub-Saharan Africa, $4,250, but this is a
misleading figure: in 1975, three of Gabon's nine Provinces- Estuaire,
Ogooue-Maritime, and Haut-Ogooue, which contain the urban-
industrial centres of, respectively, Libreville, Port-Gentil, and France-
ville-Moanda-Mounana - received 63 per cent of the state's revenue. It
was estimated that 'The money income of an inhabitant of Libreville
is about twenty-two times that of a traditional agriculturalist'.5
The country's prosperity, achieved chiefly since the I970s through
oil exports, has come at the expense of the Gabonese themselves, who
(London), 26, 30 October 1985, p. 7.
1 'Gabon: Bongo's security', in AfricaConfidential
2 David Lamb, The Africans(New York, I984), p. 99.
3 Nevertheless, it was reported that Bongo borrowed $i-2 million from Citibank in 1979 to
purchase a Beverly Hills mansion for his two daughters studying in Los Angeles at the University
of California; 'Gabon: Bongo's worries', in AfricanConfidential,
2I, 13 February I980, p. 7.
4 Most experts believe that the Government's I981 figure of I-3 million is inflated. The
population has been put at 800,000 by a recent United Nations census, and at only 645,000
according to the World Bank in I980. See 'Gabon: three different population figures', in Africa
Diary (New Delhi), 21, 22-8 October 1981, pp. I0707-8.
5 Paul Michaud, 'Gabon: dynamic television', in WestAfrica(London), 3590, I986, p. 1308;
and Pierre Pean, 'Le Gabon h l'heure du petrole', in JeuneAfrique(Paris), 755, 27June 1975, p. 22.

ENDURING FRENCH INTEREST IN GABON 285
are remarkably uninvolved in any indigenous private commercial
sector. Economic diversification has failed in Gabon. Big business and
technology are controlled by the French, while le petit commerceis
conducted by immigrant Africans from Cameroun, Nigeria, Guinea-
Conakry, and Senegal. Gabonese smallholder agriculture has been
almost totally neglected by the regime. Ambitious Gabonese have little
choice but to work in the swollen state administration.
The building of the expensive trans-Gabon railway, started in 1974,
is now nearly finished. It will undoubtedly increase the exports of
the capital-intensive wood and mining industries. Unfortunately, the
project has used primarily foreign skilled labour, and the railway seems
unlikely to induce agricultural marketing. If anything, it is accelerating
the already advanced rural-to-urban flight.
Through it all the French have remained ubiquitous. They arrived
on the coast during the I84os and had ascended the rivers into the
interior by the century's end. By the early igoos French mission schools
were training a small Gabonese elite which, even when anti-colonialist,
was consistently pro-French. Even the rival nationalist political parties
which emerged during the I950s were remarkably francophile and
modest in their demands.
In fact, Gabon has never produced a tradition of radical anti-French
politics despite the harsh colonial legacy. The Gabonese are considered
some of the most proficient French speakers in Africa. The school
system is French-styled. Even the small opposition Mouvementpour le
redressementnational is based in France, despite its condemnation of
Gabon's neo-colonial subservience.1
Early in the I9g6os there was established in Gabon what is called
Le Clan des Gabonais, a clandestine web of Gabonese officials, French
intelligence agents, members of the discredited Gaullist Serviced'action
civique, mercenaries, and businessmen. Le Clan remains firmly estab-
lished in Gabon today:
A bastion of the extreme-right and hardline Gaullists, the businessesit controls
in Gabon are often the cover for other sundry activities, such as arms-trading,
mercenary recruiting and counterfeit currency dealings.2
Bongo himself is a fascinating politician who is now, after 19 years of
rule, one of black Africa's senior leaders despite the fact that he is only
1 See Sophie Bessis, 'Gabon: une crise de croissance', in JeuneAfrique,I094, 23 December I
981,
p. 25; Mark Doyle, 'Daily Coffee With PresidentBongo', in WestAfrica,3408, 29 November 1982,
pp. 3073-4; and 'Gabon: much ado about nothing', in AfricaConfidential, 24, 13 April 1983, pp.
7-8.
2 Pean, Affairesafricaines,
pp. I29-65, discusses Le Clan in detail. See also 'Gabon: French
disconnection', in AfricaConfidential,
23, I7 March 1982, p. 6.

286 MICHAEL C. REED
5'. One of the few scholarly attempts to analyse his regime argues that
he is essentially an African 'autocrat': a non-ideological pragmatist, a
statist, a mercantilist, an economic nationalist.1 Bongo has, with
French assistance, shrewdly developed Gabon's natural wealth, and as
observed by Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg:
In important ways the country remains an economic state to be managed
rather than an arena of politics... [Bongo] is not unlike a growing number of
other non-socialistAfrican rulerswho have opted for a kind of neo-mercantilist
growth strategy aimed at siphoning off as much profit as possible from foreign
investment without frightening investors away. Gabon's undeveloped rich
natural resources make this stratagem a particularly practical and plausible
one.
It is only a slight exaggeration to suggest that the 'state' under autocracy
of the African type is more the ruler's private domain than the public realm;
he conducts himself and is treated like the proprietor of the state. Autocratic
'proprietorship' frequently resultsin a 'bureaucratic management' approach.2
This article will attempt to place Bongo within the sequence of

twentieth-century Gabonese politics which, on the whole, as explained
by David Gardinier, have been 'influenced by personal, regional, and
ethnic interests rather than by issues or ideologies'.3 The power locus
during the pre-independence period was in French West Africa, where
Felix Houphouet-Boigny, Leopold Senghor, Sekou Toure, and others
were active. Gabon often followed behind, having become part of the
under-funded and under-populated French Equatorial Africa in
January 1910. Nevertheless, by the I950s, with post-war colonial
reforms, Gabonese politics were relatively open and competitive. Soon
after independence this democratic inclination was killed by M'Ba and
then Bongo.
1 Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, PersonalRulein BlackAfrica:prince,prophet,autocrat,

tyrant(Berkeley, I982), pp. 143-5 and I56-9. Though their analysis of Bongo is brief and makes
little use of available sources, they understand him well. Other 'autocrats' considered are Felix
Houphouet-Boigny of C6te d'Ivoire, Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroun, Kamuzu Banda of Malawi,
and Mobutu Sese Zeko of Zaire.
2 Ibid. pp. I43, 156, and 159-
3 I am particularly indebted to David E. Gardinier, HistoricalDictionary of Gabon(Metuchen,
N. J., I98 ), for the long period preceding Bongo's Presidency. See also Virginia Thompson and
Richard Adloff, The EmergingStatesof FrenchEquatorialAfrica(Stanford, 1960), pp. 343-84; John
Ballard, 'Four Equatorial States', in Gwendolen M. Carter (ed.), NationalUnityandRegionalism in
ontheOgooue
EightAfricanStates(Ithaca, I 966), pp. 321-35; Brian Weinstein, Gabon:nation-building
(Cambridge, Mass., 1966); Charles F. Darlington and Alice B. Darlington, AfricanBetrayal(New
York, I968); Gilbert Comte, 'La Republique du Gabon: treize annees d'histoire', in Revue
franfaised'etudespolitiquesafricaines(Paris), June I973, pp. 39-57; and Elikia M'Bokolo, 'French
Colonial Policy in Equatorial Africa in the I940S and I950s', in Prosser Gifford and Wm Roger
Louis (eds.), The Transferof Powerin Africa: decolonization, Ig40-i960 (New Haven, 1982), pp.
I73-210.

Crucial questions must be asked about recent Gabonese history.
How is it that Bongo, a member of the small and marginally important
Bateke ethnic group, has managed to remain securely in power for 19
years? Why was Leon M'Ba, a Fang with a deep sense of ethnic
identity, willing to allow this 'outsider' to succeed him? Why have the
traditionally powerful Fang, who comprise nearly a third of the
population, remained so quiescent since M'Ba's death?
M'Ba was a francophile with a strong personal loyalty to Charles de
Gaulle. The I964 coup humiliated him. Following his return to power,
the dying M'Ba gave way to French demands. One of these was that
Bongo, a young pro-French technocrat, should follow M'Ba to the
Presidency. The French knew that such a succession would permit the
future development, with their guidance, of the strategically important
south-east.
Bongo's ability to stay in power must be credited both to his own
talents and to his pragmatic relations with France. They have used
each other in a cynical, efficient manner. Bongo's wealth, which he has
shared, at least to some extent, with his country's elite, has allowed him
to buy off enemies. On numerous occasions he has invited opponents in
exile to return to Gabon, and has then neutralised them with wealth
and position.
The Fang have a long warrior tradition, yet they have attempted no
rebellion since the I964 coup. Certain of their key leaders, notably the
Prime Minister, Leon Mebiame, have been co-opted by Bongo.
Furthermore, the Fang region is geographically close to Libreville, the
site of France's sizeable military base. Bongo would have no qualms
about sending these troops into the interior at short notice, and flying
times in Gabon are very short. Most of the up-country towns are quite
small (seldom larger than 10,000oooinhabitants) and widely scattered,
offering little opportunity for rebel organisation. In addition, Bongo's
intelligence network, closely supervised by the French, is feared and
effective.
LIBREVILLE: THE GROWTH OF A TINY,
MISSION-TRAINED ELITE
The origin of political activities in Gabon can be traced to the

mission schools. But although there were French Catholic priests as
early as 1776-7, as well as Italian Capuchins (based on Sao Tome and
Principe) at the mouth of the Gabon estuary,l it was not until the next
1 See
Gardinier, op. cit. for his useful discussion of the missions, education, and early political
figures.

288 MICHAEL C. REED
century that these missionary efforts became firmly located. In I842

the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions set up a
joint Congregational-Presbyterian mission at Baraka on the north bank
of the estuary, near the present-day city of Libreville. The French
Congregation of the Holy Heart of Mary established itself just a few
miles west of Baraka in I844, and then merged four years later with the
Congregation of the Holy Ghost, known as the Spiritans. These
European missionaries, although not primarily a teaching order, did
offer elementary education to the Gabonese, as did the Sisters of Our
Lady of the Immaculate Conception who arrived in 1849.
By the I86os French soldiers and administrators, as well as European
commercialists (mostly English and German, and only rarely French),
were moving inland by way of such rivers as the Ogooue and the
Ngounie, closely followed by both Protestant and Catholic missionaries.1
At such places as Ndjole on the mid-Ogooue, the French military post,
surrounded by Gabonese villages whose populations were eager for
commerce, was not far from the English trading factories ofJohn Holt
and Hatton & Cookson, and from a Protestant mission down river at
Talagouga and a Catholic mission directly across the river. These early
pioneers offered a primary education to Gabonese boys, who often
deserted the Church in favour of more remunerative employment as
clerks with the trading factories. This loss of the young to commerce
was a chronic missionary complaint well into the twentieth century.
In I870 the Americans turned over their work to the Presbyterian
Board of Foreign Mission which, during I892-3 and again in 1913,
gave way to the Societe des missions evangeliquesde Paris, mainly because
of the colonial administration's requirement that all secular teaching be
done in French rather than in indigenous languages. This requirement
ensured that the emerging Gabonese leadership would be firmly
francophone as well as probably francophile. Gabon's small, scattered
population was badly deracinated by colonialism (forced labour,
1 Although relatively little has been written about the history of twentieth-century Gabon, the
nineteenth century has received considerable attention, notably by three Gabonese scholars:
Joseph Ambouroue-Avaro, Un Peuple gabonais a l'aube de la colonisation. Le Bas Ogowe au XIXe siecle
(Paris, 198I); Elikia M'Bokolo, Noirs et Blancs en Afrique Equatoriale. Les Socie'tes cotieres et la
penetrationfranfaise (Paris, I981); and Nicolas Metegue N'Nah, L'Implantation coloniale au Gabon.
Re'sistanced'un peuple (Paris, 1981).
See also David Birmingham and Phyllis M. Martin (eds.), History of Central Africa (London,
1983); Christopher Chamberlain, 'Competition and Conflict: the development of the bulk export
trade in Central Gabon during the nineteenth century', Ph.D. dissertation, University of
California, Los Angeles, 1977; Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, Brazza et la prise de possession du
Congo: la mission de l'ouest africain (Paris, I969); Francois Gaulme, Le Pays de Cama, un ancien etat
cotier du Gabon et ses origines (Paris, 1983); Phyllis M. Martin, The External Trade of the Loango Coast,
i576-1870 (Oxford, 1972); and K. David Patterson, The Northern Gabon Coast to I875 (Oxford,
I975)-

regrouping of villages, destruction of religious cults and objects), and

by the accompanying diseases and famines. It was never able to
generate a sizeable indigenous nationalist movement that had the
capacity to overcome extreme French influence. The emerging
politicians have proved to be elitist, non-radical - hints of socialist
sympathy, as in alliances with the West African Rassemblement
democratiquueafricain, never materialised - occasionally anti-colonialist,
and almost always pro-French.
The beginning of Gabonese politics can be dated to I900, when the
Brothers of Saint Gabriel arrived at Libreville to establish the Ecole
Montfort, as well as a similar boys' school in I90I at Lambarene (where
Albert Schweitzer worked intermittently, 1913-65). These missionaries
formed a congregation of professional teachers aided by African
monitors and seminarians. They gave bright Gabonese boys the chance
to earn the brevet ele'mentaire,a level of education higher than the
previously offered certificatd'etudes primaires indigenes. However, their
funds and staff were cut as a result of the 1905 separation of church and
state in France, and this meant that both schools had to close:
Lambarene in 1910 I and Libreville in I 9 I 8.
The small coastal elite was dismayed. The loss of such schools meant
that Gabon again had to become an importer of African administrative
staff from other countries, notably Senegal, Dahomey, Togo, Cam-
eroun, and Nigeria. In addition, in I904 the capital of French Congo
had been moved from Libreville to Brazzaville, a loss of both national
status and influence that was felt bitterly throughout the rest of the
colonial period, particularly since timber-rich Gabon would henceforth
be obliged to help support the poorer territories of Moyen-Congo,
Chad, and Oubangui-Chari.
It was within this context that Gabon's first modern political
organisation was formed in 1918, the Libreville branch of the Ligue des
droits de I'homme,a French civil liberties body that had been founded
elsewhere by civil servants from Gaudeloupe and Martinique. Most
members in Libreville were educated men of the Mpongwe ethnic
group (part of the larger Myene language family), which had lived on
the estuary for centuries, and these Gabonese had been the first to
interact with the West. The foremost Ligue members had received a
Catholic education in Libreville: Jean-Baptiste N'Dende, Francois-
de-Paul Vane (who had spent 13 years working in the Cote d'Ivoire),
and two cousins, Laurent Antchouey and Louis Bigmann, who had
served as non-commissioned officers in the French army in the
Cameroun campaign, an experience common to the Gabonese elite.
The anti-colonialist but not anti-French Ligue had several objectives:

290 MICHAEL C. REED
the return of the schools of the Brothers of Saint Gabriel (accomplished

in 1924); more Gabonese autonomy within the A.E.F. federation; the
defence of traditional land rights; and the abolition of the indigenat
(this lasted until 1946), the repressive legal system reserved for French
subjects.1 The Ligue continued to function until about I930, when a
new issue emerged: the differing interests of franco-Gabonese metis
from those of full-blooded Gabonese.
Another organisation was created just after World War I by Myene
and West African civil servants in Libreville who resented the higher
status of the European cadres. This Associationprofessionelledes agents
indigenesdes cadreslocaux du groupede l'A.E.F. avoided involvement with
the Ligue, knowing that the French administration disapproved of the
latter. During the 1930S it maintained close ties with the Associationdes
fonctionnaires in Brazzaville, a group dominated by three Catholic
Gabonese civil servants who would later become influential politicians:
Jean-Hilaire Aubame, Rene-Paul Sousatte, and Jean-Remy Ayoune.
The broadening influence of Brazzaville on Gabonese politics remained
strong for decades.
The first political party, the Jeunesse gabonaise, was formed around
1922, and like the Ligue, with which it was closely allied, the members
were mainly Myene from Libreville and Port-Gentil. Also outspokenly
anti-colonialist without being anti-French, the Jeunessegabonaisesought
to improve educational conditions and to increase evolueparticipation
in public affairs. Elikia M'Bokolo has said of the period of the I920S
and I930s, 'In Gabon, the small group of mulattoes composing the
Libreville petite bourgeoisie, soon followed by the cultured elite of
Mpongwe and Fang, formed study circles and pressure groups.'2
Two members of the Jeunesse gabonaise, Antchouey and Bigmann,
with financial assistance from the Ligue, created in I922 the monthly
L'Echogabonaise: organed'unionet de defensedes intereitsgene'rauxde I'A.E.F.,
first published in Dakar, Senegal, from 1922 to 1932, and then in Nice,
France, where it was titled La Voix coloniale.The newspaper consistently
condemned forced corveelabour, the indigenat, and the feudal abuses of
the concessionary companies. As a francophile elitist who favoured
assimilation, though he had little concern for the rural masses,
Antchouey was a sophisticated critic of the colonial system. He
favoured pan-Africanism though he was anti-communist, and did not
agree with Marcus Garvey's back-to-Africa movement.
By the 1930s, new factions were emerging which challenged the
1 Gardinier, op. cit. p. 128. 2 M'Bokolo, loc. cit. p. I74.

ENDURING FRENCH INTEREST IN GABON 29I
influence of the coastal Myene. During the previous decade there had
been a growth in the political and economic importance of the
mulattoes (of whom there were then several hundred), and in I933 they
came together, under the leadership ofJoseph-Gaston Walker-Deemin,
one of the few successful non-European lumbermen in Gabon, to form
the Associationamicale des metis in order to help the numerous orphans,
the children usually of French fathers and Mpongwe mothers. In 1938
this Libreville organisation became affiliated to the Amicale des metis de
l'A.E.F., which also had branches in Pointe-Noire, Brazzaville, and
Bangui.
Other Gabonese resented the privileges enjoyed by the metis, and in
October I934 a number of educated Mpongwe, Benga, and Seke of
Libreville formed their own cultural and educational organisation,
Mutuelle gabonaise. Two of its leading lights were Jean-Remy Ayoune
and Francois-de-Paul Vane, an important member of the Ligue who
had organised the Cerclecatholiquein I933 to heighten elite awareness,
and who later, in 1936, helped to form the Comite Mpongwe in an
attempt to protect their traditional land rights. Almost concurrently, in
I935, Jean-Baptiste N'Dende, the first president of the Ligue, co-
operated with Fang elders of Libreville in forming La Voix du pays,
which encouraged co-operative agriculture and fishing. One of the
earliest modern Fang organisations, it opposed Mpongwe, metis, and
French control of the estuary, and it promoted Fang civil servants.
The creation in France of the Vichy regime led by General Petain in
I940 was widely supported in North and West French Africa, whereas
most of the A.E.F. sided with the Free French led by General Charles
de Gaulle, including Aubame, by now a protege in Brazzaville of
Governor-General Felix Eboue. Gabon alone hesitated, the French
Governor, Pierre Masson, deciding in favour of the Free French on 30
August, only to change sides the following day, apparently influenced
by the Bishop of Libreville, Monsignor Louis Tardy, by French
business and Mpongwe elite interests, and by the arrival of Vichy
gunboats. Fighting took place in Gabon between September and
November I940, with the Free French from Moyen-Congo and
Cameroun attacking and eventually defeating the Vichy forces.
I944-60: THE YEARS OF OPEN, COMPETITIVE POLITICS
During the I940S and I950S Gabon was caught up in the larger
process of French decolonisation. After the war the French abolished
forced labour, prestation, travel controls, and the indigenat. With the

292 MICHAEL C. REED
establishment of de Gaulle's Provisional Government and the Fourth

French Republic in I946, Gabon and other African colonies achieved
the status of 'overseas territories', each of which gained an assembly,
though the resident Europeans retained an exaggerated voting power
(which was abolished in I956). Between 1946 and 1956 the suffrage
was extended to all adult Africans.
The African territories were soon demanding greater powers. A
legislative assembly and an executive council were established in each
by the Loi-Cadre of June 1956. Two years later, with the collapse of
the Fourth Republic, the territories became self-governing albeit not
yet completely independent. In September I958 de Gaulle held a
referendum on the desirability of the French Community, and in
March I959 those territories that wished to join became autonomous
republics within this Community. Full independence came to franco-
phone Africa during 1960, and by the end of the following year the
French Community had ceased to function.
Between I944 and I954 there emerged the two Gabonese political
factions that would compete until independence: the initially left-
leaning political organisations of Paul Indjenjet Gondjout and Leon
M'Ba, backed by the French forestry industry, and the centrist party
created byJean-Hilaire Aubame, which had the support of the missions
and the French administration. These three Catholics were the major
Gabonese politicians of the post-war period.
Gondjout had served in the territorial administration since I928, and
had founded the Cercleamicalemutualistedes evoluesin I943 to encourage
the talents of French-educated Gabonese. Meanwhile in I944 and
I945, three other political organisations were formed in Libreville: the
Comite Fang, initiated by Edouard N'Guema, a supporter of Leon
M'Ba; the Grouped'etudes communistes(G.E.C.), modelled after similar
study groups created in West Africa by Europeans sympathetic to the
Front populaire in France; and the progressive Parti democratiqueafricain
(P.D.A.), which had ties with the G.E.C. as well as with the West
African R.D.A.
The French administration in Libreville had actually encouraged
the formation of the G.E.C., hoping thereby to control leftist politics.
The G.E.C. helped to create the P.D.A. so that candidates from the
latter could stand in the I945-6 French Constituent, French National,
and Gabonese Territorial Assemblies. Shortly after Leon M'Ba became
president of the G.E.C. in I947 it was forced to stop holding meetings
by the French administration, which had already shown hostility
towards the short-lived P.D.A., led by M'Ba, Gondjout, Georges Aleka

Damas, and Emile Issembe, because of their ties with the inter-territorial
R.D.A.
In I947 Leon M'Ba formed the Comitemixtegabonais (C.M.G.), most
of whose members came from the defunct P.D.A. Primarily Fang,
though the 'mixte' of the name alluded to a desire to overcome
tribalism, the new organisation soon became known as the Comitemixte
franco-gabonais, thus emphasising its French sympathies, and replaced
the P.D.A. as the local branch of the R.D.A. In I947 the French
administration, distrusting leftist activity, transferred all Libreville civil
servants who belonged to the G.E.C., and since many were also
members of the C.M.G., this group also suffered, albeit gradually
becoming the focus for opposition to Aubame's U.D.S.G.
M'Ba had had a long, eventful career. Born in 1902, he grew up in
Libreville where the Mpongwe both feared and disdained the Fang
who, migrating southwards from what is now central Cameroun, had
only arrived on the coast early in the nineteenth century. M'Ba became
an expert on traditional Fang law and defended the rights of the
estuary Fang against the Mpongwe. He belonged to both the Ligue and
Jeunesse gabonaise, and in I924 was named Chef-de-cantonin Libreville.
M'Ba encouraged the spread of Bwiti, a syncretic religion gaining
favour among the Fang, in the belief that this could help to revitalise a
society which had been badly demoralised by the colonial experience,1
and his association with this movement earned him the opposition of
the missions, who would thereafter side with Aubame, whose support
was mainly drawn from the northern Fang of Woleu-Ntem. In I933
M'Ba was convicted, perhaps unfairly, of having had a role in a
ritualistic Bwiti murder. He was exiled to Oubangui-Chari for the next
13 years - the first three of which were spent in prison - and returned
to Libreville only in I946. Though not himself a communist, M'Ba
joined the local G.E.C., whose candidate in the November 1946
election for the French National Assembly was defeated by Aubame.
As an orphaned child in Libreville, Aubame had been cared for by
a Catholic priest, an elder brother of M'Ba, who himself helped the
young man to find work in the customs service. Aubame went to
Brazzaville in 1936 and, with a brother of Louis Bigmann, founded a
branch of Mutuelle gabonaise. Active in both the 1944 Brazzaville
Conference and the post-war administration of A.E.F.,2 Aubame was a
1 For Gabon's often harsh colonial
history, see Georges Balandier, Sociologieactuellede l'Afrique
noire(Paris, I955); Weinstein, op. cit.; Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, Le Congoau tempsdesgrandes
compagniesconcessionnaires,i898-9i30 (Paris, I972); and James W. Fernandez, Bwiti: an ethnography
of the religiousimaginationin Africa (Princeton, 1982).
2
See Brian Weinstein, Eboue(New York, 197I), for a description of this era.

294 MICHAEL C. REED
deputy in the French National Assembly between I946 and 1958. In

Paris his brief association with the socialists was followed by an alliance
with the Independantsd'outre-mer,an African parliamentary group led
by Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal and Louis-Paul Aujoulat of
Cameroun.
It has been said of Aubame that his training 'as both a practising
Catholic and a customs official helped to make him an integrated
man, one for whom political power was not an end in itself',1 and it has
been conjectured that if he had become President instead of M'Ba, his
more democratic inclinations might have changed the country's
history. In 1947 Aubame formed the Union democratiqueet sociale
gabonaise (U.D.S.G.), and this later backed his re-election to the French
National Assembly in I95i and I956. The U.D.S.G. also presented
lists of candidates in 1952 and I957 for the Territorial Assembly, and
supported the inter-territorial Parti du regroupement africain (P.R.A.), led
by Mali, which advocated that African nations should be capable of
acting independently of France.
Nevertheless, it was M'Ba who emerged from the February I947
Pahouin Congress in Mitzic (a town in central Woleu-Ntem) with the
reputation of a progressive but authoritarian leader. In I95 I his Comite
mixtegabonais, the R.D.A.'s branch in Libreville, decided to oppose the
alliance with the communists that was being advocated by Gabriel
d'Arboussier, and to side with the more moderate position being taken
by Houphouet-Boigny.
M'Bokolo has written of the growing political moderation in
Gabon during the 1950s. Although determined adversaries, M'Ba
and Aubame were hardly radical in their demands to the French:
[Both] maintained excellent relations with the administration, a rare phen-

omenon in French Equatorial Africa. They spoke with one voice in praise of
Gabon as an 'example of franco-African unity', carrying the desire for
interchange so far as to give responsible posts in their respective parties, and
even places on party slates, to colonials. Furthermore, the fact that both
belonged to the dominant Fang ethnic group, and that M'Ba was leader of
the Mpongwe and other non-Fang groups, served to defuse many potential
conflicts.2
Only in I954, seven years after the founding of the U.D.S.G., was an
effective opposition, the Bloc democratiquegabonais (B.D.G.), formed by
Gondjout (with the help of funds from Roland Bru, an influential
French forester), and this new party managed to publish its own
newspaper, Union gabonaise, during the next seven years. Gondjout had
1 Pean, Affairesafricaines,p. 40. 2 Comte, loc. cit. p. 41.

helped to restore M'Ba's civil rights upon his return from exile, and the
two developed a long-standing political alliance, notably when they
became secretary-general and secretary, respectively, of the
B.D.G.
In 1956 M'Ba was elected mayor of Libreville with the help of the
B.D.G., which thereby scored its first significant victory over the
U.D.S.G. Although the latter won a majority of the votes in the
elections for the Territorial Assembly in March I957, it was the B.D.G.
that managed to secure a majority of the seats, in alliance with the
Independants.This enabled M'Ba first to become Vice-President, and
then in July 1958 to replace the Governor of Gabon as President of the
Government Council, the 'embryonic cabinet' resulting from the
earlier loi-cadre reforms.1
The 1958 referendum on the French Community saw both the
U.D.S.G. and the B.D.G. support membership. The Gabonese valued
co-operation with the French, as explained by M'Bokolo: 'During the
1950os... the new African elite clearly demonstrated its desire to share
responsibility and power, in an amicable and progressive spirit, with
the tutelary authority.'2
In contrast, the approaching national decision prompted Rene-Paul
Sousatte and Jean-Jacques Boucavel to create the Parti d'union nationale
gabonaise in an attempt to unite the southern Gabonese, especially the
Bapounou and Eshira, in expressing their displeasure with the Fang
and Myene control of the U.D.S.G. and B.D.G. This third political
party voted against Gabonese membership in the Community, but was
handicapped by its late formation, as well as by its excessively
heterogeneous membership, including former U.D.S.G. supporters,
trade unionists, 'radical' students, and non-Fang southerners.3 Overall,
Gabon voted I90,334 to 15,244 in favour of the Community, and as
a result became an autonomous republic with a coalition government
headed by M'Ba.
M'Ba believed that Gabon should remain close to France, even
possibly at the expense of independence. According to an official
spokesman for the B.D.G. in January I960:
out of consideration for the present insufficiency of Gabonese administrative
and technical cadres...[M'Ba] would prefer, rather than total and nominal
independence which would plunge the state into neo-colonialism, actual
internal sovereignty which would permit him to prepare himself efficiently for
his international responsibilities.
1 M'Bokolo, loc. cit. p. 20I. 2

Gardinier, op. cit. p. I6I. 3 Mbokolo, loc. cit. p. 203.

296 MICHAEL C. REED
Soon afterwards Paul Gondjout, another leader of the B.D.G., stated:

I affirm my belief that it would be premature now for Gabon to achieve total
independence, for this would precipitate it irreparably into anarchy or, what
would be even worse, into a sort of neo-colonialism.1
However, both the B.D.G. and the U.D.S.G. opposed membership
in a revived A.E.F. federation, and on I3 August I960 Gabon became
an independent republic with Leon M'Ba as President.
L'INTERVENTION FRANpAISE: NEO-COLONIALISM IS BORN
Following independence, M'Ba spent the next three and a half

years securing his rule, alternately allied with and opposed by Aubame,
Sousatte, and Gondjout. The latter, an old ally, proved to be a staunch
opponent of M'Ba's increasingly authoritarian leadership:
As the result of a long period of association with metropolitan deputies, this
second-ranking member of the B.D.G. hierarchy [Gondjout] had brought
back with him a lively and sincere attachment to parliamentary government.
Not without a certain utopian outlook, he believed it possible to transpose to
the tropics the amiable model of western democracies. He also coveted the
presidency of the B.D.G., and this ambition made the growing tendency of
heavy paternalism seem even more insupportable.2
Aubame's differences with M'Ba led to a political crisis. Within the
coalition Government, Aubame had been Minister of Foreign Affairs,
but early in 1963 he was dropped from the Cabinet for refusing to agree
to the formation of a single-party regime, and appointed head of the
Supreme Court, a largely powerless position, in a move designed to
ensure that he lost his parliamentary immunity. Unexpectedly,
Aubame resigned from the Court on Io January I964, thus keeping his
seat in the National Assembly. This was dissolved on 2I January by
M'Ba, who ordered new elections for 23 February. The U.D.S.G.
refused to participate. Such was the setting for that month's military
intervention.
Four French-trained Gabonese officers - Lieutenants Jean Essone,
Daniel Ndo Edou, andJacques Mombo, and Second-Lieutenant Daniel
M'Bene - organised a bloodless coup at around dawn on 18 February
I 964 with the help of some I 50 soldiers.3 M'Ba was made to give a radio
Ibid. p. 20I. 2 Comte, loc. cit. p. 42.
3 See 'Gabon: putsch or coup d'etat?', in AfricaReport(New York), March i964, pp. 12-15;
and Gardinier, op. cit. pp. 58-61. It is reported that several hours before the coup began the
Cabinet Director, Albert-BernardBongo, became aware of abnormal activity among the military,
but apparently not even M'Ba took his warnings seriously. Comte, loc. cit. p. 45, offers this
interesting note.

broadcast announcing his resignation, before being taken to Lam-
barene in the interior, while Aubame was made head of a provisional
government. Apart from widespread public displeasure with the
ostentation of the ruling class, there was a lot of discontent among the
6oo-man Gabonese army, many of whom had, prior to independence,
served in the French army where they had received relatively good pay
and benefits.
On the evening of 18 February, 600 French troops from Dakar and
Brazzaville, under the command of General Kergaravat, began to
arrive at the apparently unguarded airport in Libreville. The
headquarters of the provisional regime was taken over without
difficulty, but the Gabonese military camp at Baraka held out against
air and surface attacks until late the next day, and at least two French
and 25 Gabonese were known to have been killed.
The French intervention took place almost certainly without an
official Gabonese request for aid because the Vice-President, Paul-
Marie Yembit, was away from the capital, touring in the interior, when
the coup took place. According to Gardinier:
The de Gaulle government may have intervened out of friendship for M'Ba.
But it definitely did so to protect French interests, particularly the uranium,
which was essential for securing an independent atomic force, and investments
in petroleum, manganese, iron, and wood. The de Gaulle regime incorrectly
regarded Aubame as less friendly to French involvement in Gabon and more
favorable to increased American involvement, a claim which Aubame
denies.1
There is no doubt that Jacques Foccart, de Gaulle's Secretary-General
for African and Malagasy Affairs, maintained an intelligence network
in Gabon which included two Frenchmen who were involved in
putting M'Ba back in power: Maurice Robert, the head of the African
et de contre-espionnage,and
section of the Servicede documentationexte'rieure
Guy Ponsaille, the personnel director of U.G.P., the state oil company,
and a member of the 'reseaux Foccart'.
The French intervention provoked a great deal of criticism both in
Africa and elsewhere in the world.2 The Assistant Secretary-General of
the African and Malagasy Union, Germain Mba, a Gabonese adminis-
trator, immediately resigned:
Today, dozens of my compatriots have fallen, victims of French bullets,
despite the fact that our revolution took place calmly. The restoration of Leon
M'Ba and of his incapable team by the French paratroopers will not prevent
1 Gardinier, op. cit. pp. 59-60. 2 Comte, loc. cit. p. 46.

298 MICHAEL C. REED
the fall of an humiliating regime which has already been rejected by the entire
Gabonese people.
Mba thereafter formed the Mouvementgabonaise d'action populaire, later
known as the Mouvementde liberation national du Gabon, an ineffective
opposition in exile that failed to find revolutionary support in Algeria
after being expelled first from Brazzaville and then from Leopoldville.1
In the event, over I50 opponents of the regime were arrested. On
1-2 March I964, Gabonese workers and students in Libreville
demonstrated against the M'Ba 'dictatorship', and these protests
spread to the towns of Port-Gentil and N'Dende, and continued into
the summer. In August the trial of the military rebels and of members
of the provisional government opened in Lambarene. Those convicted
were given long-term imprisonments, including Aubame, who was
sentenced to ten years hard labour and ten years banishment.
Meanwhile, the opposition party in Gabon became known as the
Defense des institutionsdemocratiques,and two years later there was still
open dissent and repression in the country:
The numerous manifestations as well as the agitation in the schools
demonstrates, quite to the contrary, that the coup of February 18 was not
solely the hope of 'a few ambitious officers'. Now that it has become
systematic, government repression has rained down upon fonctionnaires,
Catholic and Protestant clergymen, and young university students.2
However, many who had helped to form the B.D.G. were either in
prison or under surveillance, and increasingly organised opposition to
'Le Vieux', as M'Ba was known, was much reduced, especially as most
of the elite dissidents were now abroad. As reported in a francophone
African news magazine:
There does not exist in Gabon a structuredopposition possessing,as elsewhere,
a well-defined ideology. On the contrary, one sees a sickly association of
irresponsibleyoung people, lacking position, scope, and intellect, which drags
its bitterness around from foreign capital to capital. They have lost their
opportunity in Gabon. In their place one finds certain young elements, trained
1 Germain Mba spent some years in Europe working as a journalist until I97I, when
Houphouet-Boigny persuaded Bongo that he should be forgiven. Mba was first made Gabonese
Ambassador to West Germany, but while in Libreville prior to leaving for Tokyo to become
Ambassador to Japan, he was mysteriously murdered (it is assumed, because his body was never
found) on the night of i6 September 197I. Houphouet-Boigny was reported to be furious about
Mba's death, which fuelled the controversy about Bongo's connections with Le Clandesgabonais.
See 'Gabon: l'assassinatde Germain Mba', in JeuneAfrique,560, 28 September 1971, p. 27; and
Pean, op. cit. pp. 5-17.
2
Justin Vieyra, 'Quand Leon Mba s'en ira', in JeuneAfrique,301, I6 October 1966, p. I8.

in Europe and better equipped intellectually, who are already established and
working side by side.1
In August I966 M'Ba was admitted to the Hopital ClaudeBernardin
Paris, and inevitably speculation increased about who would succeed
the dying President. The two main possibilities seemed to be either
Vice-President Yembit, a Bapounou from the south, or Albert-Bernard
Bongo, a Bateke from the south-east who was considered to be M'Ba's
hommede confiance.In November Yembit was replaced by Bongo, and
in February 1967 the constitution was amended so that the Vice-
President would automatically succeed the President in the event of the
latter's disability. M'Ba died on 27 November I967 and Bongo became
President the following day.
The new President had been born in I935 at Lewai, a Bateke village
in the Haut-Ogooue Province. After his secondary and technical
education in Brazzaville, Bongo had entered the colonial adminis-
tration in 1958. During the next two years he was a second-lieutenant
in the French Army of the Air, and between I960 and 1962 he served
in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Gabon. Thereafter his govern-
mental responsibilities had given him a wide range of experience:
Assistant Director of the President's Cabinet, Director of the Cabinet,
Minister of Information, Minister of National Defence, Minister-
Delegate to the Presidency, Minister of Tourism, Commissioner to the
State Security Court, and Vice-President. Known to be shrewd and
hard-working, Bongo is well aware of criticisms that he is too
dependent upon France, accusations that he fends off with biting wit.
As Jackson and Rosberg point out:
It would be a mistake to view Bongo merely as some kind of neo-colonial
'puppet', however. He is a tough politician with a marked belief in
managerialism and an impatience for both politics and socialism (somewhat
like Houphouet-Boigny).2
BONGO S POLITICO-ECONOMIC VIEWS
Even before the death of M'Ba, observers were talking optimistically

of the 'new generation' of young, well-educated Africans who would,
1 Paulin Joachim, 'Le President Leon Mba a Paulin
Joachim: "J'ai les mains blanches et ma
conscience n'a rien a se reprocher"', in Bingo (Paris), 165, October 1966, p. 28.
2
Jackson and Rosberg, op. cit. p. I56.

300 MICHAEL C. REED
it was hoped, soon lead Gabon. Bongo was seen as 'the prototype' of
the kind of leadership needed. Unlike the old-style career politicians,
Bongo appears in his country as a new man, one without stain or blemish... He
detests those alien ideologies which normally come from abroad and which are
certain to irritate the older generation; his objective is to institute an era of
dynamism and of efficiency.
If M'Ba had been called 'Le Vieux', Bongo was to become known,
presumably also with affection, as 'Le Grand Camarade'.l Comte has
described his assumption of power as follows:
By a skilful mixture of fear and seduction... Bongo has known how to

consolidate the system established by his predecessor.The majority of his old
opponents have rallied to his slogan of 'Renovation',and they have learned to
support without ulterior motives a regime in which they have found their
place. As a result of the extreme youth of the new President, the obsessivefear
of an eventual succession no longer troubles anyone.2
'Tribalism' has always been Bongo's betenoire. The fear of ethnically
inspired national disintegration has been a rationale for one-party
politics. As reported in Jeune Afrique, he declared, just before becoming
President, that 'Tribalism and nepotism represent a far greater menace
to our country than does under-development'; and he has called
intellectuals, those bearing disruptive, alien ideas, 'the country's worst
tribalists'.3
Bongo has repeatedly made it clear that 'criticism will be tolerated
only within' the single legal party, the Parti democratiquegabonais
(P.D.G.). This was established in March I968 in order to replace
M'Ba's B.D.G., which, said Bongo,
by the fault of certain of its militants and directorshad become no longer white
as snow. It had, in effect, abandoned its role as the promoter of political union
and had become a factory of nepotism.
When the P.D.G. was founded, Bongo made a statement which sums
up his political philosophy:
Gabon is now well on its way, the hour of renovation has sounded. For me,
that signifies the end of tribalism and of regionalism. Above all, it means the
primacy of the economic over the political.
1 Paulin Joachim, 'Le Gabon fait peau neuve', in Bingo, 17I, April 1967, pp. 26-7, and
'Gabon: coute que coute', in JeuneAfrique,651, 30 June 1973, p. I9.
2 Comte, loc. cit. p. 57.
3 Jos-BlaiseAlima, 'Gabon: la route de fer', in Jeune Afrique,644, I2 May I973, p. 5I, and
'Gabon: deputes et ministres', in ibid. 637, 24 March 1973, p. 20.

ENDURING FRENCH INTEREST IN GABON 30I
Bongo's ideological neutrality - indeed, his repugnance for ideology -

has come to seem almost cynically pragmatic over the years.'
'Neither to the right nor to the left, but straight ahead with Bongo
and Gabon', proclaimed the President in 1974, and four years later,
when seeking increased West German investment, he offered the
following assurance: 'The ideological debate that is taking place in
some African countries is no problem for us.'2 One detects here no trace
of the engage political passion, regardless of how naive, expressed by so
many other African leaders. Bongo has said that 'The Gabonese people
have no need for ideas, for words, for slogans - what they need are
concrete economic and social achievements.' His approach is contrasted
to that of 'a purely ideological utopia imported from abroad and
lacking any tangible permanence'. When the World Bank called the
trans-Gabon railway unviable and refused to loan Gabon money for
this project, Bongo retorted, 'Even if we have to deal with the devil, we
will deal with the devil.' Bongo denies charges of neo-colonialism, and
on many occasions has said that Gabon is nobody's chassegardee, least
of all France's: 'Gabon has no desire to be anyone's milk cow or private
hunting ground.' Fully aware of the attractiveness of Gabon's timber,
oil, and metal wealth to western investors, he compares his nation to a
young woman with too many suitors.3
The regime's modernisation projects have kept Gabon remarkably
open to foreign investment and labour, be it Yugoslavs building roads,
Chinese planting rice, French running companies, Americans dis-
covering oil, or West Africans doing I01 other jobs. Bongo has called
such a policy 'planned and directed liberalism': foreign businesses are
invited to make reasonable, not excessive, profits; Gabonese cadresmust
be integrated into these enterprises; retail commerce should be
indigenised; Gabon must share the ownership of foreign companies.
But these goals, announced as long ago as I974, have seldom been met.
Excessive profits by foreign businesses have frequently prompted
governmental pronouncements and threats. Gabonese personnel are
1 'M. Bongo est mecontent des forces de l'Ordre et appelle ceux

qui critiquent le regime
gabonais des aveugles', in Afriquenouvelle(Dakar), 1246, 24-30 June I97I, p. 7. See also
'Institution d'un parti unique au Gabon par le President Bongo', in ibid. 1076, 21-7 March 1968,
pp. 6-7.
2 Paul Bernetel, 'Foccart, est-ce fini?', in Jeune Afrique,733,
24 January I975, p. 22; and
'Gabon: Bongo seeks Bonn investment', in AfricaDiary, 12-18 March 1978, p. 8911.
3 'M. Bongo est mecontent', loc. cit. p. 7; 'Gabon: Bongo defends "Open Door" policy', in
AfricaDiary,24-30 September I971, p. 5645; Alima, loc. cit. p. 29; and 'Gabon; coute que coiute',
p. 20.

302 MICHAEL C. REED
often acknowledged to be little more than fronts behind which

expatriates do the real work, while immigrant African workers can be
paid lower wages.
While conducting field-work in the small inland town of Ndjole, the
author noted that Africans from Cameroun, Nigeria, Senegal, and
Guinea-Conakry were doing nearly all le petit commerce,including the
sale of food, clothes, shoes, cosmetics, and alcohol, as well as vehicle
repairs and tailoring. The Gabonese, who view themselves as affluent
Africans, seem to disdain commerce and manual labour. Their
occupational dream - often caricatured by the Gabonese themselves -
is to wear a suit and tie, carry a briefcase, and work in an air-
conditioned city office. According to Pean, 'Those Gabonese with
diplomas prefer bourgeois tranquillity and the security of an
administrative job to the anguishes associated with working in a
commercial firm.'l Small wonder that Bongo's ambitions require the
energetic participation of many foreigners.
GABON S RELATIONS WITH OTHER AFRICAN STATES
Bongo's pragmatic capitalism has included relations with both South

Africa and Rhodesia that have not endeared him to other African
leaders. In 1969 Gabon, Malawi, and Madagascar reminded other
governments that South Africa was 'a reality', however unpalatable -
the implication being that attempts should be made to follow Cote
d'lvoire's Houphouet-Boigny in trying to establish a 'dialogue' with
Pretoria. In 1969 Dr Christian Barnard, the heart specialist, and
another South African doctor, arrived in Libreville on a goodwill
mission, a gesture later reciprocated by Gabon.2
Bongo's dealings with the minority white regime in Salisbury earned
him notoriety. In June I975 the Rhodesian radio reported that Gabon
had been responsible perhaps for the major crack in the current U.N.
embargo, having been using a U.S.-purchased DC-8 plane during the
last six years in order to import Rhodesian beef. Gabon also allowed
(and charged) Rhodesia to transport, via Libreville, illegal trade
bound for Western Europe. As late as February 1978 Rhodesian beef,
fruit, and vegetables were being flown twice weekly to Gabon.3
1 Pierre Pean, 'Gabon', in JeuneAfrique,693, 20 April I974, p. 56. Pean's articles were notable
for their candour.
2 'Le President Bongo s'apprete aussi a nouer relations avec l'Afrique du Sud', in Afrique
nouvelle, 1134, I-7 May 1969, p. 7.
3 See 'Gabon and Rhodesia', in Africa Confidential, I6, 20 June I975, p. 8; 'Gabon: violation
of trade embargo on Rhodesia alleged', in Africa Diary, 15, 23-9 July 1975, pp. 7523-4; and
'Sanctions-Busting', in The Economist(London), I I March 1978, p. 64.

Gabon has had occasional disputes with her immediate neighbours,
Equatorial Guinea, Cameroun, and the Republic of Congo. In
September 1962 a fight at a Brazzaville soccer match involving the
Congo and Gabon teams resulted in brutal retaliatory attacks, later
that month, on Congolese living in Gabon. Indeed, many were con-
sequently expelled, as were Gabonese in Congo.1
In August I972 Gabon and Equatorial Guinea disputed the control
of some small, potentially oil-rich islands separating the two countries.
Bongo believed that Equatorial Guinea, with a large Fang population,
might be harbouring some opponents to his regime, and he even
accused President Macias of stirring up the Fang of Gabon's Woleu-
Ntem region.
In November 1976 Gabon closed its border with Cameroun after the
regime in Douala had protested against the construction of a gendarmerie
within its territory. But the two countries could hardly afford not to
settle such a dispute as peacefully as possible, and the border was
reopened early the next month. As many as I0,000oooCamerounians
worked in Gabon, where they dominated le petit commerce,while about
80 per cent of Cameroun's petroleum products came from Gabon
which, in turn, imported much of its food from Cameroun. By I98I it
was reported that the latter supplied almost 75 per cent of Gabon's
food.2
In May 1981 a fight took place during a soccer match at Douala in
which a number of Gabonese players seemed to have received injuries,
although some of these may have been faked. Following the spread of
this news, anti-Camerounian violence occurred in Libreville and Port-
Gentil, with many businesses and homes being pillaged and set on
fire.
One eyewitness told of an angry crowd that surged through an open-air
market, indiscriminately attacking Cameroonians, (Equatorial) Guineans,
Malians and Voltaics. Cameroonians driving taxis were pulled from their
cabs, assaulted, and the vehicles confiscated or simply stolen. Throughout
these events, again according to eyewitnesses, Gabonese police stood aside,
either ordered not to interfere or afraid to do so.3
Cameroun immediately began to evacuate its citizens from Gabon, and
within a few days almost 6,ooo had been airlifted out. (There were at
1 Gardinier, op. cit. p. 96.

2 'Cameroonians Living in Gabon Evacuated', in Africa Diary, 2I, I3-19 August I98I, pp.
I0619-20; also 'Cameroun-Gabon: un riglement sans tambour ni trompette', in Jeune Afrique,
809, 9 July 1976, pp. 26--7.
3 Frederic Mounier, 'Gabon-Cameroun: la guerre du football', in Jeune Afrique, 0o66, Io June
1981, pp. 20-2.

304 MICHAEL C. REED
this date officially 20,000 Camerounians living in Gabon, though the

actual figure was probably closer to 30-40,000.) Gabon simultaneously
recalled about oo00 students who were attending the University in
Yaounde. According to an analysis of this soccer 'war' in West Africa
(London), the consequences were rather more severe for Gabon than
for Cameroun:
Not only does does a sparsely populated Gabon (ca. 700,000 inhabitants)
stand to lose an economically important, hard-working population, but the
affair may, at least in the short run, cause Gabon to forfeit its major foods
import from Cameroon. Despite Gabonese protestations that it seeks to
maintain its 'amicable, fraternal, and good-neighbourly' relations with
Cameroon, and despite its denials that it has 'expelled' the Cameroonians, the
affair has not only poisoned the relatively calm equatorial African air, but also
retarded already lagging attempts to co-ordinate trade and economic
development in the region.1
Bongo's recognition in May I968 of the secessionist state of Biafra (a
step only taken by three other African governments) was indicative of
the kind of external pressures to which Gabon is subject. Both France
and Cote d'Ivoire had welcomed the May I967 declaration of Biafran
sovereignty, not least because this provided an opportunity to reduce
Nigeria's influence in West Africa, and thereafter both de Gaulle's
Secretary for African and Malagasy Affairs (especially) and the
Ivorian President persuaded Bongo to recognise Biafra and thereby,
in effect, to permit Libreville to be used as a staging ground for
resupplying the rebels. According to Pean, 'In this affair, Bongo
evidently had no choice. He owed everything to the systemeFoccart'.2
In July 1968 the first French plane, loaded with munitions, flew from
Libreville to Uli in Biafra, and despite an official reassurance that only
Red Cross flights were involved, it has been estimated that an average
of 20 tons a night of arms and supplies were transported over this route
during the ensuing months of the civil war.3 In addition, however,
mention must be made of Gabon's humanitarian assistance to the
Biafrans, because they fed and cared for the plane loads of children who
were flown out of the war zone. As a matter of fact, as many as 3,600
had been repatriated to Nigeria by February I97I, as a result of an
agreement reached between the two Governments, thanks to the inter-
cession of the President of Cameroun.4.
1 'The Football
Fracas', in WestAfrica, 3335, 29 June 1981, p. I46 I-2.
2 Pean, op. cit. pp. 7I-5. 3 Ibid. p. 76.
4 'Gabon-Nigeria: il suffit de faire le premier pas', in JeuneAfrique,497, I4 July 1970, p. 25;
and 'les petits ex-Biafrais sont tous rentres au Nigeria', in AfriqueNouvelle,1228, 18-24 February
i97i, p. 6.

An even more troubling international dispute occurred between
Gabon and Benin. At the July 1978 O.A.U. summit in Khartoum,
President Matthieu Kerekou of Benin accused Gabon of having been
involved in the January I977 invasion of his country. Bongo denied
these charges, and angrily ordered the expulsion of all Benin nationals
from Gabon, a decision which many observers considered a serious
over-reaction to Kerekou's allegations, especially as these seemed to
have been justified by documents earlier presented to the U.N.
Security Council. 'For Gabon, the departure of I2,000 Beninois, who
played a not negligible role in the country's retail trade, represents a
haemorrhage.'l There is no doubt that the stores of a number of
Beninois in Gabon were sacked and looted, despite the presence of
gendarmeswho had been sent to Lambarene and Ndjole to protect them,
and that the worst incidents took place in Port-Gentil, where a number
were killed.
Meanwhile, the Gabonese were experiencing considerable difficulties
because of the austerity measures taken by the Government following
its exorbitant spending on the July I977 O.A.U. summit. High
inflation had long been a problem in Gabon - Libreville was being
called the most expensive city in the world as early as I9702 - arrd
African commercial retailers had been periodically warned to either
lower their prices or face expulsion, most of them being 'foreign'
Africans from Cameroun, Chad, Senegal, Togo, Nigeria, Dahomey,
and the Central African Republic. In January 1975, at a time of very
high prices, many such commerfantswere attacked in Libreville, at least
one being killed and some 20 injured. The regime responded by
imposing a price freeze on sardines, tinned meat, cooking oil, milk,
and flour, and this caused many sellers to withhold their stocks. Food
became extremely scarce in the towns, and soldiers were brought in to
help when Gabonese farmers were ordered not to sell to foreign
commerfants,a step taken, according to one official, to prove that 'the
Gabonese people know how to farm and how to do business - they are
not lazy'.3
A governmental decree will not turn unwilling, poorly remunerated
1 See 'Gabon: Benin nationals to be

expelled', in AfricaDiary, 17-23 September I978, p. 9180;
'Les Victimes de Khartoum: Gabon-Benin', in Afriquenouvelle,1518, 2-8 August 1978, p. 6; and
Francois Soudan, 'Gabon-Benin: la paix des esprits', in JeuneAfrique,923, 13 September 1978,
pp. 48-9. Pean, Ajfaires africaines, pp. 172-8I, describes this aborted invasion.
2 'Libreville, cite la plus chere du monde, lutte contre la hausse des prix au Gabon', in
Afrique
nouvelle, I I 9 I, 4- I June 1970, p. 6.
3 'Gabon: une vague de xenophobie', in Jeune Afrique, 734, 31 January 1975, p. and
25;
'Gabon; mobilisation contre la hausse', in ibid. 738, 28 February I975, p. 27.
11 MOA 25

306 MICHAEL C. REED
villagers into viable market farmers. During flush times, foreigners

in Gabon are made to feel welcome; when the economy falters,
xenophobia increases. This social logic creates a serious problem in a
rich, underpopulated country like Gabon, where large numbers of
foreign workers are needed. Many expelled Beninois remembered
Gabon as 'paradise lost', a rare opportunity to make money, and a
number have secretly returned by way of Togo and Nigeria, using
illegally acquired passports.1
GABON'S RELATIONS WITH FRANCE
Since the I950s there has existed what is known as Le Clan des
gabonais:
a true clan, whose members are linked by converging interests and by the
common desire to maintain the regime: foresters, oilmen, businessmen,
mercenaries,or those nostalgic for far-right politics. They all take up the same
battle: to conserve this little paradise.2
Le Clan ensures that certain French businesses in Gabon serve as covers
for arms trading, mercenary recruiting, and counterfeit currency
dealing; they also help finance right-wing politics in France.
After World War I, Gabon's wood industry expanded rapidly,
helped by the French who were known as les durs ('tough guys'), not
least because they were so politically influential. For many years this
industry was crucial to the Gabonese economy; indeed, as late as I969
wood products made up 75 per cent of all exports. Only during the
1970S did oil become the key sector, highlighted by the fact that wood
exports had fallen by 1979 to 8*7 per cent of the total.
During the I950s the B.D.G. and the U.D.S.G. were each supported
by a French faction. Roland Bru and the foresters helped M'Ba, while
Luc Durand-Reveille, head of the Chamber of Commerce, supported
Aubame.3 The Loi-Cadreof 1956 threatened to reduce the power of the
foresters, and hence they backed M'Ba in the belief that he was more
amenable to French interests, and went so far as 'to buy' territorial
assembly seats, allegedly for 500,000 C.F.A. each. A number of the
foresters were Francs-mafons,or Freemasons, and M'Ba was persuaded
to join their secret society (with its nineteenth-century bourgeois liberal
origins), and La Ligue droits de l'homme.
Le Clan has developed close ties not only with the Freemasons who
1 Jos-Blaise Alima, 'Gabon: retrouver le paradis perdu', in ibid. 936, 13 December 1978, pp.
77-8. 2 Pan, Afaires africaines, p. 21. 3 Ibid. p. 40.

ENDURING FRENCH INTEREST 307 IN GABON
have two lodges in Libreville today - named Equatorial and Dialogue -

but also with another secret organisation, the NJdjobi (a traditional
Gabonese society commonly found in the south-east) into which all
new ministers must be initiated in the presence of Bongo's father-in-
law. According to Pean: 'These two occult pillars of the system,
African NJsdjobi and European Freemasonry, symbolise the fundamental
duality of power in Gabon.'l
Central to Le Clan has been the Service d'action civique (S.A.C.), a
Gaullist para-military network. Created in the I96os 'as a parallel
source of information and covert action to circumnavigate the existing
French security sources',2 and originally co-ordinated by Jacques
Foccart, its influence diminished under Giscard d'Estaing and has been
even more closely scrutinised by FranCois Mitterrand, albeit active not
only in Gabon but also in the Central Africa Republic, Chad, Djibouti,
the Republic of Congo, and Cote d'Ivoire.
The Gabonese security forces are now almost entirely under French
control. Pierre Debizet, the head of the S.A.C., became Bongo's
security adviser in the late ig60s, while two other Frenchmen, General
'Loulou' Martin, a veteran of Dien Bien Phu, and Colonel Maurice
Marion, are in command of his Presidential Guard, which has been
equipped and strengthened by the formation of the Associationdes amities
franco-gabonaises.The Gabonese secret service, the Centrede documentation,
is also controlled by Frenchmen belonging to S.A.C., being headed by
Colonel Conan (in his seventies), who gained attention by helping to
suppress the U.P.C. nationalist uprising in Cameroun in the I96os,
assisted by Andre Casimir, Debizet's main S.A.C. contact in Libreville,
while interrogations are directed by Lieutenant-Colonel Casterane,
formerly a security man in Senegal.3
It is essential, albeit difficult, to assess the significance of the role
played in Gabon by Jacques Foccart. As Secretary-General of the
French Community and then (after its demise) for African and
Malagasy Affairs until I974, Foccart has been described as 'the most
mysterious of the great Gaullists... unconditionally faithful, in some
respects the General's closest confidant, and quite the most discreet',
having directed his personal intelligence agency, as well as being one of
the leaders of the Gaullist movement.4 Often accused of conducting
clandestine activities in Gabon, little has ever been proved against
1 Ibid. pp. 35-6.

2 France: SAC and Gabon', in AfricaConfidential,
22, 2 September I98I, p. 8.
3 Ibid. 17 March I982, p. 6.
4 Brian Crozier, De Gaulle(New York, I973), pp. 595-6.
11-2

308 MICHAEL C. REED
Foccart, although Pean emphasises what might be described as the

ominous 'legality' of this era:
Always legal, the voice of the Gabonese people was smothered; always legal,,
the evolution of the political system was blocked: in the end, the coup attempt
of I964 succeeded only in installing a leader who was even more 'orthodox';
always legal, French interests in Gabon were permitted to flourish.'
Foccart first visited Africa during a I953 tour with de Gaulle, and
five years later became his chief adviser on African affairs. The General
is known to have recognised two types of African regime: les serieux,
those considered stable and loyal to France; and lesfragiles, those where
French intervention might be necessary, as eventually in Gabon.2 At
the time of the 1961 Algerian crisis, France's Service de documentation
exterieureet de contre-espionnage(S.D.E.C.E.) began developing an in-
creasingly complex intelligence network in francophone Africa, much
of which was later to be overseen by Foccart. When one of the latter's
key men, Maurice Delauney, the French Ambassador in Gabon in
I965-70 and 1975-9, ended his second assignment - only to become
head of the Compagniedes minesd'uraniumde Franceville- Bongo requested
that he be replaced by Maurice Robert, an S.D.E.C.E. operative who
had worked for Elf-Gabon and who had helped to train the Gabonese
secret service. Although members of Giscard d'Estaing's administration
disapproved of a non-diplomat who was believed to be too close to the
'old Foccart network', Bongo's influence prevailed and Robert was
appointed Ambassador. With both he and his predecessor resident in
Libreville, critics of the regime joked that Gabon was 'the only country
in Africa with two white Prime Ministers'.3
Bongo and Le Clan were troubled by the accession of the socialists to
power in France in May I981. Alexandre de Marenches was replaced
as head of S.D.E.C.E. by Pierre Marion, who it was feared would try
'to clean up' that organisation. The members of Le Clan who made
known their opposition to any such changes included: Robert, the
Ambassador to Gabon; Colonel Jean-Pierre Daniel, head of Elf-
Gabon; Martin and Marion of the Presidential Guard; Casimir and
Casterane at C.E.D.O.C.; Jorge Jodim, head of Interbanque, a once-
powerful Portuguese colonialist in Mozambique; and Paul Bory, owner
of the printing house Multipress-Gabon.4Mitterrand's Minister of Co-
1 Pean, Affaires africaines, p. 20. 2 Bernetel, loc. cit. pp. 20-I.
3 13 February I980, p. 7.
AfricaConfidential,
FranCois Soudan, 'Les Espions francais en Afrique', in Jeune Afrique,1112, 28 April 1982,
4
p. 24.

operation and Development, Jean-Pierre Cot, who was enormously
disliked by Le Clan, ordered an investigation of S.A.C., but later re-
signed out of frustration at being unable to liberalise France's relations
with Africa.
The French Government decided in 1981 that Robert should be
succeeded as Ambassador by Robert Cantoni, but the following year he
was replaced by Pierre Dabezies, a socialist with Gaullist sympathies,
as a result of strong representations from Bongo and Le Clan. It seems
that Mitterand's socialist principles were compromised by traditional
French interests in Africa, helped in this process by his trusted adviser,
Francois de Grossouvre.
Two other developments have revealed much about franco-Gabonese

relations. First of all, in October 1983 Pierre Pean, the French
journalist who had worked for the Ministry of Finance in Gabon in
1962-5, published in Paris a highly critical study of Bongo's neo-
colonial relations with France, originally entitled Le Clan des gabonais,
but later changed to Ajaires africaines. Secondly, in December 1983,
French television covered a Paris press conference held by the leaders
of' Morena', thereby provoking Bongo to repeat his insistence that the
French Government curb this opposition in exile. And when the
following month the French channel Antenne2 carried a programme
featuring Morena, Bongo again vigorously denounced France's
toleration of such 'anti-Gabonese' acts.1
Pierre Pean had been in regular contact with the top leaders while
working for the Gabonese Government, and during the I970s he had
written for the magazine Jeune Afrique. His book's publication created
a sensation in France, where it became a best-seller and was widely
reviewed in all the media, which was unusual for a book about Africa.
Originally scheduled for a printing of 0,000ooo copies, this was increased
to 65,000.
President Bongo was furious about the imminent appearance of
Pean's exposein 1983, and tried to persuade him not to publish it, even
threatening the safety of his friends in Gabon, such asJean-Marc Ekoh,
who was then being jailed as a Morena conspirator. After Bongo had
tried unsuccessfully to get the French Government to stop the book's
1 Jean-Paul Guetny, 'Gabon/France: realisme oblige', in JeuneAfrique,121I1, 2I March 1984,

P. 33-

3Io MICHAEL C. REED
publication, he retaliated by imposing a complete media blackout in

Gabon of any news concerning France.
An embarrassed President Mitterrand tried to calm Bongo by
sending personal emissaries to Libreville: the socialist deputy Roland
Dumas (later to become French Foreign Minister) in October, and
FranSois de Grossouvre, Mitterrand's special adviser, in November.
There is little doubt that Bongo was threatening, not for the first time,
to strengthen Gabon's ties with the United States, and by coincidence,
the American destroyer U.S.S. Conolly was then making a goodwill
visit to Libreville, while the U.S. Under-Secretary of State for African
Affairs, Chester Crocker, was holding talks there with Bongo. During
the Ig8os two American oil companies, Amco and Tenneco, had
increasingly competed with the French company, Elf-Gabon, and
Bongo was aware of the discomfiture caused by the inroads being made
by the Americans, who in 1983 surpassed the French as the major
buyers of Gabonese exports.1
What Bongo wanted to know why Morena members were being given
favourable treatment in France, and who was 'behind' the book, which
he clearly assumed to be part of a plot by French socialists. Pean was
certainly in touch with the Cercled'itudes et de recherchessocialiste, which
was known to be hostile to Bongo's regime, calling it 'reactionary' and
'corrupt'. Pierre Marion, while still the head of D.G.S.E., may have
recruited enemies of Bongo and given Pean valuable access to inside
information about Gabon's regime.2
Although Morena has recently been quiet, it announced in August
1985 the formation in France of a 'provisional government' headed by
Max Koumba-Mbabinga,3 and continues to be supported by the
following: (i) the Parti nationalgabonais, a moderate pro-western group
created in March I982 by Paul M'ba Abessolo, a Fang priest; (2) the
Front revolutionnaired'action populaire, a Marxist organisation led by
Parfait Anotho Edowisa, which has close ties with the French Socialist
Party and with Gabonese students in France; (3) the Association des
etudiantsgabonais, a non-Marxist group headed by Andre Obame M'ba;
and (4) a non-political body in France known as Solidarite gabonaise,
1 Jacques Gautrand, 'Gabon-France; la meprise', in fJeuneAfriqueeconomie (Paris), 28, 8

December I983, pp. I5-I6; and Charles Lane, 'American Baksheesh', in The New Republic
(Washington, D.C.), I September 1986, p. I6. In April 1984 the author of this JMAS article was
told by a consultant for Tenneco in Libreville that it was standard procedure for foreign
companies desiring to do business in Gabon to first make sizeable pay-offs to appropriate
ministers.
2 Siradiou Diallo, 'Gabon/France: une crise de plus?', in Jeune Afrique,1196, 7 December
I983, pp. 4I and 43. 3 Africa Confidential, 30 October 1985.

ENDURING FRENCH INTEREST IN GABON 3I I
designed 'to maintain discreet contacts with other African opposition

groupings in Paris and with friendly French organisations'.1
Morena had first emerged towards the end of I98 I, it being probably
no coincidence that Jean-Hilaire Aubame was finally allowed in
October to return to Gabon. In an attempt to neutralise the opposition,
Bongo went so far as to name Aubame an haut conseiller d'etat, the
highest grade of public administrator. Among the Gabonese, Aubame
has long symbolised the democracy that Leon M'Ba had crushed, and
soon after his return a I7-page 'White Book' on the 'mismanagement
of the economy and corruption in Gabon' was circulated among the
Libreville intellectual and diplomatic elite .2 Late in November, tracts
began to be distributed at Omar Bongo University in Libreville which
denounced Bongo and called for democracy, a multi-party system, and
more influence for the large Fang and Bapounou ethnic groups. On
I December 1981 several hundred demonstrators marched to the city's
central bus station with placards saying 'Down with Bongo, I 4 years is
enough...' The Government responded forcefully, and about Ioo of the
protesters were jailed, including the Rector of the University, Jean-
Pierre Nzoghe-Nguema, and his arrest touched off a larger demon-
stration by 2,000 students and members of staff.3 The magazine
Jeune Afrique speculated about the causes of these events:
Frustration on the part of a powerless population which assists, nevertheless,
with the too-rapid creation of an ostentatious bourgeoisie? The discontent of
increasingly educated young people who are unwilling to accept the rules of
a political game in which they are allowed no voice? A horizon darkened by
the realisation that the country's oil production will have to stabilise or
perhaps even decline?4
By April I982 Gabon's secret service was arresting more suspected

Morena members, including Samuel Nguema M'ba, managing editor
of the government-controlled daily newspaper; FranCois Ondo Edou,
head of Radio Gabon; Jean-Baptiste Asse Bekale, a radio journalist;
Jean-Marc Ekoh, one of M'Ba's former ministers; Michael Ovono, a
civil servant; and Marguerite Eye N'keme, a secretary. According to a
report from Gabon:
The fact that senior, and well-paid, members in the media, who had
previously supported President Omar Bongo, had secretly joined forces with
1 AfricaConfidential, 13 April I983, pp. 7-8.

2 Siradiou Diallo, 'Mitterrand, a-t-il besoin de Bongo?', in JeuneAfrique,1090, 25 November
I98I, p. 35; and Africa Confidential, I7 March 1982, p. 5.
3 Bessis, loc. cit. p. 25. 4 Ibid.

3I 2 M1CHAEL C. REED
the opposition is a clear sign that resistance to his rule is bound to grow in the
wake of Francois Mitterrand's election in France.1
In November the trial began in Libreville, in 'remarkably public

conditions', of Morena suspects described by Bongo as 'bitter, jealous
malcontents' and tribalists who threatened national unity. A total of
37 were sentenced, including 13 who received 20 years hard labour.2
The state failed to prove any violent intentions on the part of the
defendants, who argued that by distributing the 'White Book' and the
tracts they were simply trying to encourage political dialogue, and
in March i983, as a sign of clemency, Bongo reduced the sentences,
though some of the accused still faced I5 years in prison.3
Bongo's reputation for being lenient with dissidents was modified in
August i985, when a young Gabonese airforce captain, Alexandre
Mandja Ngokouta, was shot by a firing squad on a Libreville beach in
front of television cameras, three months after the discovery of a coup
plot. The officer, who had apparently acted alone, was a member of a
banned religious sect.4 On I January 1987, however, Bongo granted an
amnesty for all common-law prisoners, save those guilty of man-
slaughter or armed robbery, and was able to declare that 'there were
no more political detainees in the country'.5
I984-7: THE ECONOMY AND MORE XENOPHOBIA
The presidential elections of 9 November 1986 gave the P.D.G. a

majority that was alleged to be as high as 99*97 per cent, prompting
Bongo to explain that 'in Africa, people want one leader, not
several... According to African tradition, the chefis designated one time
and forever'.6 Looking back upon 25 years of African independence,
Bongo observed characteristically that
there has been more progress among those countries governed with re'alisme
than with those who have imported foreign ideologies... In regards to Africa,
t 'Gabon: Bongo's woes', in Africa Confidential, 23, 28 April I982, pp. 7-8.
2
Doyle, loc. cit. p. 3073.
3
'Stamping out Opposition in Gabon', in West Africa, 3409, 6 December I982, p. 3124.
4 'Gabon: Bongo's security', op. cit. p. 6; and Robert Cornevin and Rosamund Mulvey,
'Gabon: recent history', in Africa South of the Sahara, i987 (London, 1986), p. 448.
5 'Gabon: amnesty granted', in West Africa, 3618, 12 January 1987, p. 9 1.
6 Siradiou Diallo, 'Bongo parle a coeur ouvert', in Jeune Afrique, 1353, I0 December I986, p.
14. In fact, most chefs de village were non-hereditary leaders whose often fleeting power depended
upon personal skills, charismatic oratory, and the fickle consensus of a council of elders. Such a
society could be 'democratic' to the point of ineffectualness. Bongo's intepretation of tradition's
precedents is not bound by mere facts.

ENDURING FRENCH INTEREST IN GABON 3I3
all developed countries, be they of the West or of the Eastern bloc, behave as
capitalists. The richer they are, the more egotistical and exploitative they
are. In this world of 'international cooperation', it's really the law of the
jungle.
According to the President, 'industrialisation' and 'serious realism'
were essential if Africa was to be 'saved '.
Unquestionably, Bongo speaks from a wealth of experience and hard
work. His ostentatious lifestyle and bravado are matched by cool
assessments of himself and the world. His mastery of the art of realpolitik,
along with his country's natural wealth, have ensured that the views of
Gabon, despite its small size and population, are treated seriously.
Bongo is a constant traveller, having visited, for example, the People's
Republic of China no less than six times (twice in I974, as well as in
1975, 1977, 1978, and I983). China maintains a large, showy embassy
in Libreville, and trade between the two countries reached a high of
$19.4 million in 1985, a 25 per cent increase on the previous year.2
Bongo has been an important intermediary in the Chadian-Libyan
conflict, and has consulted about it with Colonel Qaddafi. As one
observer noted: 'The path to Chadian reconciliation seems to go more
often through Libreville than through Brazzaville [the political base of
Denis Sassou-Nguesso, then the O.A.U. Chairman] or Addis Ababa
[the O.A.U. headquarters]'. Bongo, though denying charges that he
has tried to 'grandstand' by taking the lead in negotiations, stated
confidently:
Remember that it was I, in effect, who first assembled all the Chadian
protagonists around one table, in Franceville. Having done this, I then asked
the Congolese President to take over, for I am aware of Brazzaville's historical
symbolism [perhaps referring to the 1944 Conference]. This doesn't prevent
me, however, from continuing to receive Chadian groups individually.3
His often unorthodox views of the world are blunt. Although not
convinced of the effectiveness of sanctions against Pretoria, he believes
that 'If South African whites were "smart" they would do as the
Brazilians have done. There, you don't find any blacks in the
government, but you do find them in parliament'. Commenting upon
the recent difficult terms imposed by the International Monetary
Fund, Bongo said: 'Yes, the I.M.F.'s pill is hard to swallow but, in the
1 Ibid. p. 20.
2 'Gabon:
Bongo to China', in West Africa, 3623, i6 February 1987, p. 341.
3 FranSois 'Omar
Soudan, Bongo: le Tchad, Israel, la France et moi', in JeuneAfrique,I310,
12 February I986, p. 42.

314 MICHAEL C. REED
end, it is a necessary evil. One must know how to deal with hard
times.'1
It was the oil boom of 1973-4 which permitted the start of Gabon's
prosperity. Production peaked in 1976, with I I3 million tons, slipped
to 7-6 million tons by I98I, and is expected to remain at about 8-5
million tons annually into the Igg99os.2 By March I986 the price of a
barrel of crude oil had fallen to under $15 - compared with $30 a year
earlier - and by then Gabon had a daily output of 137,000 barrels (80
per cent being drilled offshore), making it O.P.E.C.'s smallest producer.
Nevertheless, oil represents 83 per cent of all exports, worth $69I
million in I984, nearly 65 per cent of total state revenues. At the height
of the oil boom, companies were making profits of $8 a barrel, but by
mid-I985 these were down to $2-3. More and more Gabon has had to
consider the grim reality of 1'apres-petrole.3
Bongo has responded in a determined way. The recurrent and
investment budgets for 1987 have been cut to 360,000 million and
oo00,oo million C.F.A., being decreases of approximately 46 and 65
per cent, respectively, on the previous fiscal year. According to a recent
report, 'for two years... the state budgeting revenues have experienced
a drastic decline, from CFA 630 bn in 1985 to CFA 276 bn in I987'.4
Even so, 'Gabon deserves its reputation for having a well-run economy',
because despite low world prices, it managed to boost production when
the U.S. dollar was strong, almost go per cent of its exports being
denominated in that currency.5 New markets for manganese have been
found in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and France has been
persuaded to buy more at higher prices. In 1984, despite a world steel
recession, there was a 63 per cent investment increase for improving the
productivity of manganese mining.6
Chronic problems remain, notably (i) an outflow of capital resulting
from debt-servicing, foreign company profits, expatriate remittances,
and speculation in more lucrative European markets; (2) agriculture's
continuing malaise; (3) a narrow domestic market; and (4) high salary
1 Siradiou Diallo, 'Bongo parle a coeur ouvert', pp. I8-20.

2 Howard Schissel, 'Gabon: the ups and downs of an open economy', in WestAfrica,3504, 15
October 1984, p. 2078; Paul Hackett, 'Gabon: economy', in Africa Southof the Sahara, i987
(London, 1986), p. 452; and Susan Trail, 'Boosting New Export Earners', in WestAfrica,3548,
26 August I985, p. 1748.
3 Siradiou Diallo, 'Gabon: la baisse du petrole menace l'economie', in JeuneAfrique,1316, 26
12-18 November I985,
March 1986, p. 39; 'Gabon: bid to find more oil', in AfricaConfidential,
p. 12520; and Trail, loc. cit. pp. I748-9.
4 'Gabon: CFA 360 bn budget set', in WestAfrica, 3618, 12 January 1987, pp. 91-2.
5 Schissel, loc. cit. p. 2078. ' Trail, loc. cit. p. I748.

costs, illustrated by the fact that Gabon's minimum wage is twice what
it is in Cameroun.'
The dollar was falling by the end of I985, and it became even more
essential for Gabon to develop alternative export earnings to offset the
inevitable oil decline. The prospects for this happening are mixed, not
least because of the low world demand for uranium. However, the
output of manganese, which had increased by 107 per cent in I984,
was predicted to rise by a further 6-3 per cent the next year. Although
timber production improved by 21I per cent in 1984, with exports up
by 5-2 per cent, a plan to build a 950-ton paper-pulp mill with
Canadian backing was dropped because of low world demand.2 The
forestry industry, which was the Gabonese economy from the I920S
until the I970s, suffered badly thereafter, especially as a result of
competition from Malaysia and Indonesia, but has benefited from the
fall in the value of the C.F.A. franc against the U.S. dollar, and from
the 'opening up' of the interior by the trans-Gabon railway. Forestry
production in 1982 was valued at $150 million, approximately 7 per
cent of total exports and 4-2 per cent of G.D.P.3 As always, okoume'isthe
major species exploited, representing 7 I per cent of output in I984 and
well over half of timber-export earnings, the main markets being
France, Greece, Morocco, and Taiwan.4
Other efforts are being made to create a more diversified production
infrastructure. Work was supposed to begin in 1986 on a 60,00ooomillion
C.F.A. ($I34.5 million) road which would connect Libreville with
Port-Gentil, the country's industrial centre, heretofore accessible only
by boat or plane. At Mitzic, in Woleu-Ntem, a I5,000 million C.F.A.
project by the Hevea Development Company is designed to produce
7,000 tons of rubber a year, and should net 4,500 million C.F.A. ($ I o0 I
million) a year in foreign exchange. By the year 2000, 28,000 hectares
are to be planted.
The contribution of agriculture to Gabon's G.D.P. has fallen from 14
per cent in I 966 to approximately 4 per cent in 1986, one of the smallest
proportions in any African economy. The principal cash crops of cocoa,
coffee, and palm oil represented less than I per cent of export earnings
in I985.5 Most recent Gabonese agricultural planning has focused on
capital-intensive agro-industrial complexes, a fact that 'signifies clearly
1 Schissel, loc. cit. p. 2078. 2 Trail, loc. cit.

p. I749.
3 Howard Schissel, 'Gabon: money in trees', in West Africa, 3512, IO December 1984, pp.
25I6-I 7.
4 'Gabon', in The Economist Quarterly Economic Review.
Congo, Gabon, and Equatorial-Guinea
(London, I985), pp- 39-40. 5 Hackett, op. cit. p. 449.

316 MICHAEL C. REED
that [the Government] has renounced any intention of reviving the

peasantry; rather, wage-earners are to be created'.1 As a result, the
Gabonese countryside has become virtually uninhabited, with a typical
village being described thus:
Formerly the centre of an active social life, it is now barely animated by an
occasional funeral ceremony, and it sinksfurtherinto sad lethargy. Everywhere
one finds the same spectacle of huts which are either closed up or in ruins;
often it is the entire village which has been abandoned. Here and there, no
doubt, as in Woleu-Ntem, one sees attractive new homes, but these are usually
the secondary residences of urbanfonctionnaires and, as such, cannot revivify
the village. If rural flight is a universal phenomenon, in Gabon it has attained,
in an already under-populated context, a critical threshold.2
Despite the continent's worsening plight, Gabon has been described

by Paris-based consultants as presenting investors with risks that are
only described as being 'rather high', compared to others in their
analyses of i8 sub-Saharan states that are 'very high' (Cameroun,
South Africa), 'dangerous' (the Sudan), and 'prohibitive' (Mozam-
bique) .3 This means that French exporters have been 'advised to
take out risk insurance', and that bankers have been told 'not to invest
more than 40 per cent of their Euro-credit loan portfolio, while
potential investors should account for a 50 per cent risk premium'.4
The official completion of the 650 km trans-Gabon railway was
celebrated on 29 December 1986 by Bongo at Franceville, along with
the French Prime Minister, Jacques Chirac, the Congolese President,
Denis Sassou-Nguesso, and Jean-Christophe Mitterrand, son of the
French President and one of the latter's advisers on African affairs.5 In
order 'to demonstrate to his own tribespeople that he had done
something for them', Bongo had ordered that a 40 km extension be
built from Franceville to his rural birthplace, which meant that rails
1 Roland Pourtier, 'La Crise de l'agriculture dans un etat minier: le Gabon', in Etudesrurales
2 Ibid. p. 45.
(Paris), 77, January-March 1980, pp. 44-5.
3 Francois Misser, 'Risk - the Game of International Investment', in African Business
(London), November I986, pp. 57 and 59. The 'Nord-Sud Export Consultants' used the
following seven-point scale for risks: 7, similar to western industrial countries; 6, very low; 5,
moderate; 4, rather high; 3, very high; 2, dangerous; i, prohibitive.
4 In the
category of'financial risk', Cameroun with 4-5 was the best bet, while Gabon, South
Africa, Kenya, and Zimbabwe were next, scoring 3-5. As regards 'Business Environment Risk',
Gabon, C6te d'Ivoire, and South Africa were the most favoured, each scoring 5. In the critical
category, 'Risk of Expropriation and Nationalisation', Gabon was, once again, the 'best', scoring
4-6, just above C6te d'Ivoire. Misser, loc. cit. pp. 57 and 59.
5 Although Bongo prefers to deal with the French droite,even 1'extreime-droite - the French
newspaper, Le Canardenchaine,revealed that Jean-Marie Le Pen had solicited electoral funds - he
burns no bridges, and has long maintained close relations with the socialists. See 'Gabon: money
for takirng', in Africa Confidential, 26, I2, 1985, pp. 7-8.

and heavy equipment had to be flown up-country.' The entire project
had taken over I2 years and nearly $4,000 million to build: six million
trees were felled, 49 bridges constructed, and some 4,000 workers were
employed, including, for the second stage of construction (Booue-
Franceville), 3,400 Africans (two-thirds of them Gabonese, the rest
from Cameroun and Togo), and 400 expatriates. The original I7-
member consortium from Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and
West Germany, known as Eurotrag, was joined for the second stage by
the British firms of Taylor Woodrow and Wimpey International,2
while the British Steel Corporation provided the rails. Bongo boasted
in his celebratory speech, 'We won the bet against Robert McNamara',
the then World Bank President who, in I973, had refused to loan
Gabon money for the project.3
The railway has been astoundingly costly, and 'there is no possibility'
of it 'making an operating profit... In 1984 receipts were only half of
operating costs on the sector open to commercial traffic.' Even now,
with the construction formally over, 'finishing touches' will consume
one-half of the Ioo,ooo million C.F.A. set aside for investment in
Gabon's I987 budget. The agreed 338 km extension from Booue to the
Belinga iron-ore reserves in north-eastern Gabon has been shelved
indefinitely, though it is still planned to build a 66,ooo million C.F.A.
mineral terminal at the port of Owendo, which in three years time
should be able to handle all Gabon's manganese production. It has
been estimated that the railway now requires a state-subsidy of $60
million a year to finance its timber and passenger traffic, and already
'has had to suspend its first-class service for passengers' and 'cannot
employ an adequate staff or payroll to maintain the existing rolling
stock '.4
As a result of these growing expenditures and the reduction of oil
revenues, Bongo is having to institute austerity measures. For example,
civil servants have recently lost 'perks' which constituted one-half of
their salaries, the yearly costs of which had risen between i980 and
I984 from $60 million to $170 million.5 Furthermore, Bongo has told
1 Achim Remde, 'The TransGabonais is
Born', in New African,February 1987, p. 36.
2 For the second
stage of construction, the financial involvement of the member-nations of the
consortium was as follows: France, 39-5%; U.K., 22 %; West Germany, 16-8%; Italy, 12-1 %;
Belgium and the Netherlands, 4-8 % each. See Alison Perry, 'Gabon: coming of the railway', in
West Africa, 3621, 2 February 1987, p. 197.
3 Remde, loc. cit. p. 36; 'Gabon: birthday present', in Africa Confidential, 28, 2, 21 January
1987, p. 8; and Roger Murray, 'Dynamic Projects Keep on Course', in AfricanBusiness,June
1986, pp. 45 and 47. 4 Perry, loc. cit. pp. 198-9.
5 Howard Schissel, 'Gabon: the economic outlook', in AfricaReport,
January-February 1985,
p. 28.

3I8 MICHAEL C. REED
Gabon's wastefully run parastatal enterprises that 'They must clean up

their act or else be privatised', because the state can no longer afford
to subsidise such distribution agencies as CODEV for food and PIZO
for petroleum, not to mention S.N.G.B., which monopolises the
commerce in wood.1l
An ugly result of Gabon's economic austerity has been a recurrence
of xenophobia. Once again, as in 1978, when he impulsively ordered
Benin nationals out of the country, it was the President himself
who took the initiative. In January 1985, speaking at his Palace to
officers of the gendarmerie, Bongo attacked foreigners, including
Lebanese commerfants,West African marabouts and prostitutes, who
were supposedly 'ruining the national economy'. The following day,
Gabonese youths vandalised and looted Lebanese businesses in
Libreville's Mont-Bouet commercial quartier.2
There were estimated to be some 600 Lebanese in Gabon in i985,
some of whom settled there 30 years ago. They have a reputation for
underpricing the competition, causing Bongo to remark in his speech:
'How can it be that a dress which costs I0,000 C.F.A. in Paris sells for
7,000 francs in the Lebanese shops of Libreville?' The Lebanese had
been accused in I979 of bribing Gabonese civil servants, and they are
still resented for their sharp business practices and high commercial
profile. Bongo went so far as to promise gendarmeswho closed Lebanese
businesses that they would receive io per cent of the proceeds.3
Besides provocatively describing the Lebanese as 'voleurs', Bongo
complained of an upsurge of what he called 'le maraboutisme',referring
to the Muslim West African commerfantswho conduct most of the
country's major trading, even accusing them pettily, for example, of
selling unfresh yoghourt. In what was his most irresponsible statement,
Bongo complained of foreign prostitutes:
In the evening we see these painted women, dressed like tramps as if they were
at Pigalle or Saint-Denis... Gentlemen [referring to the officers of the
gendarmerie in the audience], you are authorized to send out trucks to round
[these women] up. Then we will leave them to the army. Once five or six
soldiers have been on top of them, perhaps then they will understand that we
don't tolerate street-walking in Gabon.4
1 'Gabon: birthday present', loc. cit. p. 8; and 'Coup de colere d'Omar Bongo', in Jeune
Afrique, I333, 23 July I986, p. 23.
2 'Gabon:
looting follows Bongo's speech', in Africa Diary, 4-Io June I985, pp. 12336-7. See
also, 'Gabon: les etrangers de Bongo', in Afriquenouvelle,i857, 6- 2 February 1985, pp. 4 and 7;
and Francis Kpatinde, 'Au Gabon on ferme la petite porte', in JeuneAfrique,1332, i6 July 1986,
PP. 30-I. 3 Africa Diary, pp. I2336-7.
4 'Gabon: les etrangers de Bongo', p. 4. It has been estimated that there were perhaps several
dozen foreign prostitutes in Libreville, most of them from Cameroun and Equatorial Guinea.

As noted earlier, foreigners have been welcomed during times of
prosperity, but with an economic downturn, those who have entered
Gabon sans papiers, by the way of la petiteporte, are resented. Since 1986
the Government has required that all foreigners over the age of 16 must
be issued with a new, optically scanned and hard-to-forge cartede sejour,
which is valid for a maximum of only two years and costs 50,000 C.F.A.
(I,ooo F.F.). In order to obtain this document, individuals must give
proof of possessing a legal job, and their employers in Gabon must
supply une cautionde rapatriement- funds for a plane trip back home. In
addition, visas have been made more expensive: a simple 'entry' now
costs 25,000 C.F.A., and a 'permanent' one twice that amount.1
The respected African weekly publication, Jeune Afrique,has made the
following criticism: 'Under the pretext of struggling against various
abuses, once again an African state is handing over certain categories
of foreigners to a quick form of justice which has little regard for
elementary rights of defence.'2 Certainly, it is unconscionable that a
Head of State, speaking before officers of the police, no less, would
make the accusations and give the orders that Bongo did in January
I985. Such judgement and behaviour darkens his entire record.
Contemporary Gabon, while an independent African state, must

also be seen within the context of the larger French political and
lingual world. While English is still spreading everywhere, 'the French
language tends increasingly towards a defensive anxiety born of
imperialist failure', according to a Ghanaian writer: 'Failure not-
withstanding, France has been able to hold on to some shreds of
empire, especially in Africa, chiefly by learning to play the sly imperial
game of indirect rule under its modernised name: independence.'3
The French assert their doctrine offrancophonie, which proposes that
languages can serve two purposes: 1'enracinement, the effort to return to
traditional roots, and l'ouverture,or receptivity to modernity and the
future. Consciously or not, they argue that African languages are fine
1 loc. cit. p. 30. 2 Jeune Afrique, i6July

Kpatinde, I986, p. 7.
3
Ayi Kwei Armah, 'Africa and the Francophone Dream', in WestAfrica,3582, 28 April I986,
p. 884.

320 MICHAEL C. REED
for the first, but that French is essential for the second. This leads to an
inescapable conclusion, according to Ayi Kwei Armah:
Funnily enough, the terrible fate against which the French are fighting, tooth
and nail, with such enthusiastic help from so many African officials and
politicians, is precisely the fate they themselves have imposed on all African
languages in their espace.
In short, the French have condemned African languages (and cultures)
to 'underdevelopment and comparative insignificance sweetened with
syrupy rhetoric'.1 Let it be said that Bongo, more resolutely and more
effectively than virtually any other African leader, has not allowed
either Gabon or himself to be casually 'condemned' to anything.
Intricate ties have bound the Gabonese state and France for more
than 25 years, and it is highly unlikely that these will be broken, at least
in the near future, by either side. Gabon's very identity is inseparable
from France, and the latter's continued claim to 'major power' status,
in which Africa is crucial, requires Gabon's assistance. Although
President Bongo is still a relatively young, vigorous leader, there must
continue to be serious doubts as to whether or not he can cope with the
regime's growing domestic problems and criticisms, let alone such
continuing uncertainties as the reduced revenues likely to be received
from exports, notably oil.
1 Ibid. pp. 884-5.


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Gabon: A Neo-Colonial Enclave of Enduring French Interest

Author(s): Michael C. Reed

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Gabon: a Neo-Colonial Enclave of

This content downloaded from 195.78.109.56 on Fri, 9 May 2014 11:32:37 AM

This content downloaded from 195.78.109.56 on Fri, 9 May 2014 11:32:37 AM

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This article will attempt to place Bongo within the sequence of

1 Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, PersonalRulein BlackAfrica:prince,prophet,autocrat,

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The origin of political activities in Gabon can be traced to the

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century that these missionary efforts became firmly located. In I842

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regrouping of villages, destruction of religious cults and objects), and

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the return of the schools of the Brothers of Saint Gabriel (accomplished

1 Gardinier, op. cit. p. 128. 2 M'Bokolo, loc. cit. p. I74.

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I944-60: THE YEARS OF OPEN, COMPETITIVE POLITICS

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establishment of de Gaulle's Provisional Government and the Fourth

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deputy in the French National Assembly between I946 and 1958. In

[Both] maintained excellent relations with the administration, a rare phen-

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1 M'Bokolo, loc. cit. p. 20I. 2

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Soon afterwards Paul Gondjout, another leader of the B.D.G., stated:

L'INTERVENTION FRANpAISE: NEO-COLONIALISM IS BORN

Following independence, M'Ba spent the next three and a half

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1 Gardinier, op. cit. pp. 59-60. 2 Comte, loc. cit. p. 46.

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BONGO S POLITICO-ECONOMIC VIEWS

Even before the death of M'Ba, observers were talking optimistically

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By a skilful mixture of fear and seduction... Bongo has known how to

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Bongo's ideological neutrality - indeed, his repugnance for ideology -

1 'M. Bongo est mecontent des forces de l'Ordre et appelle ceux

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often acknowledged to be little more than fronts behind which

GABON S RELATIONS WITH OTHER AFRICAN STATES

Bongo's pragmatic capitalism has included relations with both South

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1 Gardinier, op. cit. p. 96.

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this date officially 20,000 Camerounians living in Gabon, though the

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1 See 'Gabon: Benin nationals to be

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villagers into viable market farmers. During flush times, foreigners

GABON'S RELATIONS WITH FRANCE

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have two lodges in Libreville today - named Equatorial and Dialogue -

1 Ibid. pp. 35-6.

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Foccart, although Pean emphasises what might be described as the

1 Pean, Affaires africaines, p. 20. 2 Bernetel, loc. cit. pp. 20-I.

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