Yap Tua v.

Yap Ca Kuan
27 Phil. 579 | G.R. 6845 | September 1, 1914
Johnson, J.

Doctrines:
1. The mere fact that the testator executed a former will is no proof that she did
not execute a later will. The testator has a perfect right, by will, to dispose of her
property, in accordance with the provisions of law, up to the very last moment of her life. She
has a perfect right to change, alter, modify, or revoke any and all of her former wills and to
make a new one. Neither will the fact that the new will fails to expressly revoke all former
wills, in any way sustain the charge that she did not make the new will.

2. One who makes a will may sign the same by using a mark, the name having been written by
others. If writing a mark simply upon a will is sufficient indication of the
intention of the person to make and execute a will, then certainly, the writing of a
portion or all of her name ought to be accepted as a clear indication of her
intention to execute the will.

3. Knox’s Appeal – “The man who cannot write and who is obliged to make his mark simply
therefor, upon the will, is held to “sign” as effectually as if he had written his
initials or his full name. It would seem to be sufficient, under the law requiring a
signature by the person making a will, to make his mark, to place his initials or all or
any part of his name thereon.”

4. While the rule is absolute that one who makes a will must sign the same in the presence of
the witnesses and that the witnesses must sign in the presence of each other, as well as in the
presence of the one making the will, yet, nevertheless, the actual seeing of the
signatures made is not necessary. It is sufficient if the signatures are made
where it is possible for each of the necessary parties, if they desire to see, may
see the signatures placed upon the will.

Facts:
On August 23, 1909, one Perfecto Gabriel, representing the petitioner, Yap Tua, presented a
petition in the CFI of the City of Manila, asking that the will of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong
(Tomasa) be admitted to probate, as the last will and testament of Tomasa, deceased.

It appears that the said Tomasa died in the City of Manila on August 11, 1909. Accompanying
said petition and attached thereto was the alleged will of the deceased. It appears that the will
was signed by the deceased, as well as Anselmo Zacarias, Severo Tabora, and Timoteo Paez.

On September 29, 1909, the CFI ordered that the last will and testament of Tomasa be allowed
and admitted to probate. The will was attached to the record and marked “Exhibit A”. The court
further ordered that one Yap Tua be appointed as executor of the will, upon the giving of a
bond, the amount of which was to be fixed later.

On February 28, 1910, Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu appeared and presented a petition,
alleging that they were interested in the matters of the said will and desired to intervene.

1. the will dated the August 11, 1909, and admitted to probate by order of the court on the
September 29, 1909, was null, for the following reasons:
 a. because the same had not been authorized nor signed by the witnesses as the law
prescribes;

b. because at the time of the execution of the will, the said Tomasa was not then
mentally capacitated to execute the same, due to her sickness (tuberculosis) (as
testified to by Rufino Papa, a physician, one of the witnesses of the respondents).

c. because her signature to the will had been obtained through fraud and illegal
influence upon the part of persons who were to receive a benefit from the same,
and because the said Tomasa had no intention of executing the same.

2. before the execution of the said will, which they alleged to be null, the said Tomasa had
executed another will (marked “Exhibit 1”), with all the formalities required by law, on
August 6, 1909.

Several witnesses were presented to prove each side’s claims.

The CFI reached the conclusion that the last will and testament of Tomasa, which was attached
to the record and marked as Exhibit A, was the last will and testament of the said Tomasa and
admitted it to probate and ordered that the administrator therefore appointed should continue
as such administrator.

Respondents’ contentions:
 The will (Exhibit A) was executed by the deceased Tomasa Yap Caong with the intervention
of any external influence on the part of other persons.

 The testator had no clear knowledge and did not know what she was doing at the time of
signing the will.

 The signature of the deceased Tomasa Yap Caong in the first will, Exhibit 1, is not identical
with that which appears in the second will, Exhibit A.

 Exhibit A was not executed in accordance with the law.

Issue 1:
Was there any undue influence when the will was executed by now deceased Tomasa?

Ruling:
NO. The CFI found, by a preponderance of evidence, that no undue influence had been
exercised over the mind of the said Tomasa.

While it is true that some of the witnesses testified that the brother of Tomasa, one Lorenzo, had
attempted to unduly influence her mind in the execution of he will, upon the other hand, there
were several witnesses who testified that Lorenzo did not attempt, at the time of the execution of
the will, to influence her mind in any way.
Issue 2:
Was the testator of sound mind at the time of the execution of the will? – YES.

Ruling:
YES. While the testimony of Dr. Papa is very strong relating to the mental condition of Tomasa,
yet, nevertheless, his testimony related to a time perhaps twenty-four hours before the execution
of the will in question (Exhibit A).

Several witnesses testified that at the time the will was presented to her for her signature, she
was of sound mind and memory and asked for a pen and ink and kept the will in her possession
for ten or fifteen minutes and finally signed it.

The CFI found that there was a preponderance of evidence sustaining the conclusion that
Tomasa was of sound mind and memory and in the possession of her faculties at the time she
signed this will.

Issue 3:
Were the signatures in Exhibit 1 (the first will) and Exhibit A (the second will), identical?

Ruling:
NO. The signature of Tomasa, on her first will (August 6, 1909, Exhibit 1), is not identical with
that which appears in the second will (August 11, 1909, Exhibit A). It may be said:

1. That whether or not Tomasa executed the will of August 6, 1909 (Exhibit 1), was not the
question presented to the court. The question presented was whether or not she had duly
executed the will of August 11, 1909 (Exhibit A).

2. There appears to be little doubt that Tomasa did execute the will of August 6, 1909. Several
witnesses testified to that fact.

The mere fact, however, that she executed a former will is no proof that she did
not execute a later will. She had a perfect right, by will, to dispose of her
property, in accordance with the provisions of law, up to the very last moment
of her life.

She had a perfect right to change, alter, modify, or revoke any and all of her
former wills and to make a new one.

Neither will the fact that the new will fails to expressly revoke all former wills,
in any way sustain the charge that she did not make the new will.

3. It was stated that the signature of Tomasa, in her first will (Exhibit 1), was not identical with
that which appears in her second will (Exhibit A). The inference that she had not signed the
second will and all the arguments of the respondents relating thereto are based upon the
alleged fact that Tomasa did not sign Exhibit A.

However, several witnesses testified that they saw her write the name
“Tomasa.” One of the witnesses testified that she had written her full name.
 The Court is of the opinion, and the Court thinks that the law sustains its conclusion, that if
Tomasa signed any portion of her name to the will, with the intention to sign
the same, that the will amount to a signature.

It has been held time and time again that one who makes a will may sign the
same by using a mark, the name having been written by others.

If writing a mark simply upon a will is sufficient indication of the intention of

the person to make and execute a will, then certainly the writing of a portion or
all of her name ought to be accepted as a clear indication of her intention to
execute the will.

Knox’s Appeal

The Court cited a very interesting case reported in 131 Pennsylvania State, 220 (6 L. R. A.,
353), and cited by the appellees, which was known as “Knox's Appeal.”

In this case, one Harriett S. Knox died very suddenly on the 17th of October, 1888, at the
residence of her father. After her death, a paper was found in her room, wholly in her
handwriting, written with a lead pencil, upon three sides of an ordinary folded sheet of note
paper and bearing the signature simply of “Harriett.” In this paper the deceased attempted
to make certain disposition of her property. The will was presented for probate.

The probation was opposed upon the ground that the same did not contain the signature of
the deceased. That was the only question presented to the court, whether the signature, in
the form above indicated, was a sufficient signature to constitute said paper the last will and
testament of Harriett S. Knox. It was admitted that the entire paper was in the handwriting
of the deceased.

The court said that the man who cannot write and who is obliged to make his
mark simply therefor, upon the will, is held to “sign” as effectually as if he had
written his initials or his full name. It would seem to be sufficient, under the
law requiring a signature by the person making a will, to make his mark, to
place his initials or all or any part of his name thereon.

In this case, the Court thinks the proof shows, by a large preponderance, that Tomasa
Elizaga Yap Caong, if she did not sign her full name, did at least sign her given
name “Tomasa,” and that is sufficient to satisfy the statute.

Issue 4:
Was Exhibit A executed in accordance with law?

Ruling:
YES. Respondents made a strong effort to show that Tomasa did not sign her name in the
presence of the witnesses and that they did not sign their names in their presence nor in the
presence of each other.

Upon that question there is considerable conflict of proof. An effort was made to show that the
will was signed by the witnesses in one room and by Tomasa in another.
A plan of the room or rooms in which the will was signed was presented as proof and it was
shown that there was but one room; that one part of the room was one or two steps below the
floor of the other; that the table on which the witnesses signed the will was located upon the
lower floor of the room.

It was also shown that from the bed in which Tomasa was lying, it was possible for her to see the
table on which the witnesses signed the will.

While the rule is absolute that one who makes a will must sign the same in the
presence of the witnesses and that the witnesses must sign in the presence of each
other, as well as in the presence of the one making the will, yet, nevertheless, the
actual seeing of the signatures made is not necessary.

It is sufficient if the signatures are made where it is possible for each of the
necessary parties, if they desire to see, may see the signatures placed upon the will.

Upon a full consideration of the record, the Court finds that a preponderance of the proof shows
that Tomasa did execute, freely, and voluntarily, while she was in the right use of all her
faculties, the will dated August 11, 1909 (Exhibit A). Therefore, the judgment of the CFI
admitting said will to probate is hereby affirmed.