ROMUALDEZ V.

COMELEC, 11 December 2000

DOCTRINE: The “void-for-vagueness” of facial challenge test means that law is facially
invalid if it lacks comprehensible standards that the men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.

FACTS:
Petitioner Carlos Romualdez, was running as a candidate for Congress in the 2 nd District
of Leyte in the 2001 elections. Prior to the petitioner’s filing of candidacy, private respondent
Dennis Garay filed a complaint before COMELEC Burauen, Leyte, charging petitioners with
violation of Sec 261 (y)(2) and (y)(5) of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 12 of the Voter’s
Registration Act (RA 8189).
Garay contended that the petitioner and his wife, Erlinda Romualdez made false and
untruthful representations in violation of Section 12 of RA 8189 by indicating therein that they
are residents of San Jose Street, Burauen, Leyte, when in in fact, they are still residents and
registered voters of Quezon City; and that knowing fully well said truth, intentionally and
willfully, did not fill the blank spaces in said applications corresponding to the length of time
which they have resided in Burauen, Leyte. On the other hand, the petitioners contended that
they intended to reside in Buarauen, Leyte and took actual residence in Burauen, Leyte for 5
years.
COMELEC charged the petitioners with violations of Section 10(g) and (j), in relation to
Section 45(j) of the RA 8189. The petitioners contended that Section 45 (j) of the RA 8189 was
void for being vague as it did not refer to a definite provisions of the law, the violation of which
would constitute an election offense.

ISSUE:
Whether criminal statute may be facially challenged considering the void-for-vagueness
doctrine.

RULING:
The facial invalidation or an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal statutes is not
appropriate. The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.
However, this Court has imposed certain limitations by which a criminal statute, as in the
challenged law at bar, may be scrutinized. In our jurisdiction, only statutes on free speech,
religious freedom and other fundamental rights may be facially challenged. Under no case may
ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge. Indeed, an "on-its-face" invalidation of
criminal statutes would result in a mass acquittal of parties whose cases may not have even
reached the courts. Such invalidation would constitute a departure from the usual requirement of
"actual case and controversy" and permit decisions to be made in a sterile abstract context
having.
CORPUZ V. PEOPLE
(G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014)

DOCTRINE: Incremental penalty The last sentence of Article 315 states that “if such amount
exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum
period, adding one year for each additional PhP 10,000, but the total penalty which may be
imposed shall not exceed twenty years.”The last sentence is called an incremental penalty, where
the punishment to be meted out to a convict increases as the amount involved in estafa gets
higher. In the case at bar, given that the value of the property taken amounted to a total of PhP
98,000, Corpuz was convicted to serve imprisonment to a total of 18 years, in addition to the
fines imposed. Beyond the numbers In ruling for the constitutionality of the assailed RPC
provision, the Court explained that it has no authority to modify the range of penalties, as such
would constitute judicial legislation. What the legislature’s perceived failure in amending the
penalties provided for in the said crimes cannot be remedied through the Court’s decision.
FACTS: The complainant, Tangcoy, entrusted certain jewelries amounting to PhP 98,000 to
Corpuz for the purpose of selling them. Tangcoy waited for Corpuz to remit the sale proceeds or
return of the jewelry but Corpuz failed to do so. The trial court convicted Corpuz, which was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Corpuz contended that the
penalty imposed upon him by the court a quo . Thus, he asked the Court to suspend the
execution of the sentence or amend the same to accord respect to his constitutional rights.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA violates the equal protection clause and the prohibition against
oppressive and cruel punishment.

HELD:
The question of constitutionality raised by the petitioner is one of first impression. Hence, the
case was referred to the court en banc for resolution. Amici curiae were invited to give
comments on the said question. Dean Jose Manuel Diokno of the De La Salle College of Law
shared that the provision imposing an incremental penalty for the crime of estafa is
unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause. He provided a table outlining the rate
of inflation from the 1932, the year the RPC was enacted, up to the present time. Diokno
interposed that at the current rate of inflation, the fair rate for the incremental penalty would be at
1:100—meaning that the fair rate for an additional year of imprisonment at the current time
should be pegged at PhP 100,000.
It must be noted that estafa is categorized as a crime against property. This implies that the
gravity of the crime is determined by the value of the object or money swindled. At the time
when the RPC was enacted in 1932, the value of the peso was considerably higher compared to
its present value, wherein devaluations may have been caused by inflation. Thus during that
period, an additional year of imprisonment for every PhP 10,000 that exceeded the price of PhP
22,000 could be considered as fair punishment for the crime of estafa. Transposing this to the
prevailing currency levels, Corpuz would then serve a sentence similar to a person who swindles
several millions of pesos. The provision for an incremental penalty for every Php10,000 creates
absurdity. Further, the aggregate length of Corpuz’ sentence, which is 18 years, is almost equal
to the penalty imposed for the crime of homicide. This leads to a somewhat unreasonable
situations wherein a crime against property is on equal footing with penalties for crimes against
persons. Ultimately, these provisions do not need to be voided or declared unconstitutional, as
people who transgress the law must be meted out with penalities. However, the issues raised in
Corpuz reveal the necessity to revise the RPC in order for the penal code to truly reflect the
current conditions and avoid penalties shocking to conscience. While our justices may be great
mathematicians and social scientists, it is not for the Court to quantify the wisdom of our laws,
lest this result to judicial activism.
JOSE “JINGGOY” P. EJERCITO ESTRADA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
G. R. No. 217682; July 17, 2018
DOCTRINE:
“An ex post facto law is a law that either: (1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of
the law that was innocent when done, and punishes such act; or (2) aggravates a crime, or
makes the crime greater than it was when committed; or (3) changes the punishment and inflicts
a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; or (4) alters the
legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offense; or (5) assumes to regulate civil rights and
remedies only, but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right for an act that was lawful
when done; or
(6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become
entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of
amnesty.”
Facts:
The whistleblowers (Luy et.al.) executed a Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay in which
they revealed the details of the Pork Barrel Scam that involved the misuse or illegal diversion by
certain legislators of their Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) in connivance with
Janet Lim Napoles. The NBI conducted its investigation and resolved to file in the Ombudsman
verified criminal complaints against petitioners and other legislators. The Ombudsman then
requested to the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) to conduct financial investigations of
the bank accounts of the petitioners and others. In the process of inquiring into Estrada’s
accounts, the AMLC filed a Supplemental Ex Parte Application for the bank inquiry to be
conducted on Estrada’s wife, which the Court of Appeals granted. During Estrada’s bail hearings
in the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution presented an AMLC financial investigator who testified
on the AMLC Inquiry Report, which Estrada sought to suppress and was denied by the
Sandiganbayan.
Issue: Does the amendment of Section 11 of RA 9160 allowing ex parte application for the bank
inquiry violate the proscription against ex post facto laws?
Ruling:
No. Petitioners reliance on Republic v. Eugenio Jr., wherein the Supreme Court declared that
the proscription against ex post facto laws should be applied to the interpretation of the original
text of Section 11 of R.A. No. 9160 because the passage of said law "stripped another layer off
the rule on absolute confidentiality that provided a measure of lawful protection to the account
holder." Accordingly, the Supreme Court held therein that the application for the bank inquiry
order as the means of inquiring into records of transactions entered into prior to thepassage of
R.A. No. 9160 would be constitutionally infirm, offensive as it was to the ex post facto clause of
the Constitution. Petitioner’s reliance on the above-stated ruling is misplaced. Unlike the passage
of R.A. No. 9160 in order to allow an exception to the general rule on bank secrecy, the
amendment introduced by
R.A. No. 10167 does away with the notice to the account holder at the time when the bank
inquiry order is applied for. The elimination of the requirement of notice, by itself, is not a
removal of any lawful protection to the account holder because the AMLC is only exercising its
investigative powers at this stage. Indeed, R.A. No. 10167, in recognition of the ex post facto
clause of the Constitution, explicitly provides that "the penal provisions shall not apply to acts
done prior to the effectivity of the AMLA on October 17, 2001."
Ophelia Hernan vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 217874; December 5, 2017

Doctrine: “when exceptional circumstances exist, such as the passage of the amendatory law
imposing penalties more lenient and favorable to the accused, the Court shall not hesitate to
direct the reopening of a final and immutable judgment, the objective of which is to correct not
so much the findings of guilt but the applicable penalties to be imposed.”
Facts:
Petitioner Hernan was found guilty of Malversation of public funds. The decision has became
final and executory on June 26, 2013. On July 26, 2013, accused filed an Urgent Motion to
Reopen the Case with Leave of Court and with Prayer to Stay the Execution.
Issue: Whether or not the case may be reopened for further reception of evidence.
Ruling:
No, but the instant case was nevertheless reopened ONLY to modify the penalty imposed in view
of the enactment of an amendatory law favorable to the accused.
The recent passage of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10951 which accordingly reduced the penalty
applicable to the crime charged herein.
Thus, in order to effectively avoid any injustice that petitioner may suffer as well as a possible
multiplicity of suits arising therefrom, the Court deems it proper to reopen the instant case and
recall the Entry of Judgment dated June 26, 2013 of the Sandiganbayan, which imposed the
penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to eleven (11) years, six
(6) months, and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor, as maximum. Instead, since the amount
involved herein is P11,300.00, which does not exceed P40,000.00, the new penalty that should
be imposed is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, which has a prison term
of two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day, to six (6) years.
The Court also held that when exceptional circumstances exist, such as the passage of the instant
amendatory law imposing penalties more lenient and favorable to the accused, the Court shall
not hesitate to direct the reopening of a final and immutable judgment, the objective of which is
to correct not so much the findings of guilt but the applicable penalties to be imposed.
IN RE: CORRECTION/ ADJUSTMENT OF PENALTY PURSUANT TO REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 10951, IN RELATION TO HERNAN V. SANDIGANBAYAN,
EMALYN MONTILLANO y BASIG, Petitioner.
G.R. No. 240563, August 14, 2018
JARDELEZA, J:

Doctrine:
. The general rule is that a judgment that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to
correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that
rendered it or by the highest court of the land. When, however, circumstances transpire after the
finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable, the Court may sit en banc
and give due regard to such exceptional circumstance warranting the relaxation of the doctrine of
immutability. The same is in line with Section 3(c), Rule II of the Internal Rules of the Supreme
Court, which provides that cases raising novel questions of law are acted upon by the Court en
banc.

Facts:
Petitioner Elbanbuena was charged of falsification of malversation of public funds.
On August 10, 2000 his ruling became final and executory. On January 2003, Elbalbuena
started serving his sentence. On August 29, 2017 RA 10951 was promulgated which reduces
the penalty imposed thereon. OSG approved through its comment that petitioner may
invoke RA 10651.

Issue:
Whether or not R.A. 10951 is applicable to the case which has become final and
executory?

Ruling:
YES. For as long as it is favorable to the accused, said recent legislation shall find
application regardless of whether its effectivity comes after the time when the judgment of
conviction is rendered and even if service of sentence has already begun. The accused, in these
applicable instances, shall be entitled to the benefits of the new law warranting him to serve a
lesser sentence, or to his release, if he has already begun serving his previous sentence, and said
service already accomplishes the term of the modified sentence.
G.R. No. 210612
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ERVIN Y. MATEO

Doctrine: “Unlike the specific amendments introduced by RA 10951 to the penalties on estafa
committed by means of bouncing checks, as defined under Article 315 (2)(d) and amended by
Republic Act No. 4885 and Presidential Decree No. 818, nowhere in RA 10951 was it clearly
shown that the legislature intended to repeal or amend the provisions of PD 1689.”

FACTS: Private complainants’ made investments with MMG with an agreement that the
investors will be earning 2.5% monthly interest income from the capital they have invested. The
complainants thereafter received several post-dated checks covering their investments, but when
they tried to deposit the checks, their banks informed them that these were dishonored because
MMG's accounts were already closed. Accused, being the President of MMG, together with the
other officers, were charged of the crime of syndicated estafa. Both the RTC and CA found
accused guilty of the crime of syndicated estafa penalized under Article 315 of the RPC, in
relation to PD 1689 and was sentenced the penalty of life imprisonment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the amendatory provisions of RA 10951 applies to the present case.

HELD: No. The amendments under RA 10951 were passed with the primary objective
of adjusting the amounts or the values of the property and damage on which a penalty is based
for various crimes committed under the RPC, including estafa. Section 85 of RA 10951 makes
mention of PD 1689 as one of the laws which amends Article 315 of the RPC. On the other hand,
it should be considered that PD 1689 is a special law which was enacted for the specific purpose
of defining syndicated estafa and imposing a specific penalty for the commission of the said
offense. The first paragraph of PD 1689 penalizes offenders with life imprisonment to
death regardless of the amount or value of the property or damage involved, provided that a
syndicate committed the crime. Moreover, from the provisions of RA 10951, there appears no
manifest intent to repeal or alter the penalty for syndicated estafa. If there was such an intent,
then the amending law should have clearly so indicated because implied repeals are not favored.
Dungo v. People
July 01, 2015

Doctrine:
The crime of hazing RA 8049 is a mala prohibita. The act of hazing itself is not inherently
immoral, but the law deems the same to be against public policy and must be prohibited.
Accordingly, the existence of criminal intent is immaterial in the crime of hazing. Also, the
defense of good faith cannot be raised in its prosecution.

Facts:

Marlon Villanueva was a neophyte of the Alpha Phi Omega fraternity, scheduled to undergo
initiation rites.
Dungo and Sibal, as members of the said fraternity transported Villanueva to a resort for the
conduct of his initiation. Due to the injuries sustained by Villanueva, he was pronounced dead at
the hospital.

Issue:
Whether or not the absence of proof of intent to kill the victim will affect the liability of the
accused.

Ruling:
No. The crime of hazing under R.A. No. 8049 is malum prohibitum.
Violation of hazing law was made malum prohibitum to discount criminal intent and disallow the
defense of good faith.
Recognizing the malum prohibitum characteristic of hazing, the law provides that any person
charged with the said crime shall not be entitled to the mitigating circumstance that there was no
intention to commit so grave a wrong.
G.R. No. 192330 November 14, 2012

ARNOLD JAMES M. YSIDORO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Facts: The ombudsman charged Mayor Ysidoro before the SB a violation of illegal use of
public propertry (technical malversation) under Article 220 of the
Revised Penal Code.1 This case is about a municipal mayor charged
with illegal diversion of food intended for those su ffering from malnutrition to the beneficiaries
of reconsideration projects affecting the homes of victims of calamities. The crime of technical
malversation as penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code4 has three elements: a)
that the offender is an accountable public officer; b) that he applies public funds or property
under his administration to some public use; and c) that the public use for which such funds or
property were applied is different from the purpose for which they were originally appropriated
by law or ordinance.

Issues: Whether or not good faith is a valid defense for technical malversation.

Held:

Criminal intent is not an element of technical malversation. The law punishes the act of diverting
public property earmarked by law or ordinance for a particular public purpose to another public
purpose. The offense is mala prohibita, meaning that the prohibited act is not inherently immoral
but becomes a criminal offense because positive law forbids its commission based on considerati
ons of public policy, order, and convenience. It is the commission of an act as defined by the law
and not the character or effect thereofthat determines whether or not the provision has been viola
ted. Hence, malice or criminal intent is completely irrelevant.
EVANGELINE PATULOT Y GALIA, PETITIONER, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.

G.R. No. 235071, January 07, 2019

Doctrine: When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even
if they are punished by a special law. Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established
with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed.

Facts: In two separate Informations, Patulot was charged with child abuse under RA 7610 after
committing acts of child abuse upon minors AAA and BBB, three years old and two months old,
respectively, by throwing on them boiling oil, thereby inflicting upon said victims-minors
physical injuries. Patulot denied the allegations, contending that there was no intention on her
part to harm AAA and BBB as she intended on committing physical injuries against CCC, the
mother of the minors. The RTC found that while Patulot may not have intended to cause harm on
AAA and BBB, her negligence nonetheless caused injury on them, and that RA 7610 is a special
law such that intent is not necessary for its violator to be liable. The CA affirmed the decision of
the RTC but ruled that the RTC was amiss in finding it unnecessary to determine intent merely
because the act for which Patulot stood charged is punishable by a special law and that the index
of whether a crime is malum prohibitum is not its form, that is, whether or not it is found in the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) or in a special penal statute, but the legislative intent.

Issue: Whether or not Patulot can be convicted of child abuse despite her claim of absence of
intention to harm AAA and BBB.
Ruling: YES.
Patulot cannot argue that in the absence of intention on her part to harm AAA and BBB, she
cannot be convicted of child abuse because she merely intended on committing physical injuries
against CCC. In the case of Mabunot vs. People, the Court has ruled that when the acts
complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are punishable
by a special law. Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established with the other elements
of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed.
In the instant case, Patulot’s criminal intent is not wanting for as she expressly admitted, she
intended on pouring hot cooking oil on CCC and as such, even granting that it was not her
intention to harm AAA and BBB, she was performing an unlawful act. She cannot, therefore,
escape liability from the same in view of the settled doctrine mentioned in Mabunot that a person
incurs criminal liability although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
LONEY, REID and HERNANDEZ, Petitioners, vs. PEOPLE, Respondent.

Doctrine: Two (or more) offenses arising from the same act are not "the same" — if one
provision [of law] requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not.
Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes,
prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both
offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an
essential element of the other.

FACTS: Marcopper had been storing tailings from its operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian,
Marinduque. At the base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to the Boac and Makalupnit
rivers. It appears that Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at the tunnel’s end. In a few days,
the Mt. Tapian pit had discharged millions of tons of tailings into the said rivers. The Department
of Justice separately charged petitioners with violation of Water Code of the Philippines National
Pollution Control Decree, Philippine Mining Act and Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
("RPC") for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property. Petitioners moved to quash
the Informations on the following ground that the information were "duplicitous" as the
Department of Justice charged more than one offense for a single act

ISSUE: Whether all the charges filed against petitioners should be quashed for duplicity of
charges and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property should
stand.

HELD: NO. A single act or incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct and
unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for more than one
offense.24 The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional prohibition that no person shall be twice
put in jeopardy of punishment for "the same offense." Here, double jeopardy is not at issue
because not all of its elements are present.

In P.D. 1067 (Philippines Water Code), The gravamen of the offense here is the absence of the
proper permit to dump said mine tailings. One can be validly prosecuted for violating the Water
Code even in the absence of actual pollution, or even [if] it has complied with the terms of its
Environmental Compliance Certificate, or further, even [if] it did take the necessary precautions
to prevent damage to property.

In P.D. 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), the gravamen is the pollution itself.

In R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act), the additional fact that must be established is the willful
violation and gross neglect on the part of the accused to abide by the terms and conditions of the
Environmental Compliance Certificate.

On the other hand, the additional element that must be established in Art. 365 of the Revised
Penal Code is the lack of necessary or adequate precaution, negligence, recklessness and
imprudence on the part of the accused to prevent damage to property. Moreover, the offenses
punished by special law are mal[a] prohibita in contrast with those punished by the Revised
Penal Code which are mala in se. Consequently, the filing of the multiple charges against
petitioners, although based on the same incident, is consistent with settled doctrine.
ARSENIA GARCIA VS COURT OF APPEALS

DOCTRINE: Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised Penal
Code. When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if
they are punished by a special law. Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established with
the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. On the other hand, in crimes
that are mala prohibita

FACTS:

Herein petitioner was accused of having acted in conspiracy with other member so of the
board of canvasser, of reducing the votes received by a Senatorial Candidate named Aquillino
Pimentel in violation of republic act 6646. During the Trial in the Regional Trial Court, the
petitioner was the only accused convicted of the crime while the other members of the board of
canvassers were all acquitted. The case was appealed to the court of appeals by the petitioner
arguing that the regional trial court erred on its decision since there was no manifestation that the
petitioner acted with intent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Republic Act 6646 is a case of mala prohibita or mala inse, particularly
the act of reducing, and adding the votes.

HELD:

The provisions of Republic Act 6646 is a case of Mala Inse. If the provisions of the this
act will be construed as mala prohitiba , all the acts in violation thereof including errors in
counting due to fatigue will be considered criminal offenses. In this case petitioner likewise
admitted that she was the one who prepared the COC (Exhibit A-7), though it was not her duty.
To the mind of the court, preparing the COC even if it was not her task, manifests an intention to
perpetuate the erroneous entry in the COC.
LIANG VS PEOPLE [GR NO. 125865]

DOCTRINE: Slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement
because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of
official duty.

FACTS:
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in
1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was
charged before the MeTC of Mandaluyong City with two counts of oral defamation. Petitioner
was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioner’s bail, the MeTC
released him to the custody of the Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge
received an “office of protocol” from the DFA stating that petitioner is covered by immunity
from legal process under section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine
Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB in the country. Based on the said protocol
communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the
prosecution dismissed the criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration which was
opposed by the DFA. When its motion was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari
and mandamus with the RTC of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the
latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for reconsideration
was denied, the petitioner elevated the case to the SC via a petition for review arguing that he is
covered by immunity under the Agreement and that no preliminary investigation was held before
the criminal case.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner’s case is covered with immunity from legal process with
regard to Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Gov’t.
(2) Whether or not the conduct of preliminary investigation was imperative.

HELD:
(1) NO. The petitioner’s case is not covered by the immunity. Courts cannot blindly adhere to
the communication from the DFA that the petitioner is covered by any immunity. It has no
binding effect in courts. The court needs to protect the right to due process not only of the
accused but also of the prosecution. Secondly, the immunity under Section 45 of the Agreement
is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the acts must be done in “official capacity”.
Hence, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because
our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official
duty.
(2) NO. Preliminary Investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such
as this case. Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked only when
specifically granted by law. The rule on criminal procedure is clear that no preliminary
investigation is required in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC.
G.R. No. 181409 February 11, 2010
INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE CARUNGCONG,
represented by MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG, as Administratrix, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and WILLIAM SATO, Respondents.
DOCTRINE:
In dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity.The rule applies when the court is faced with two
possible interpretations of a penal statute, one that is prejudicial to the accused and another
that is favorable to him. The rule calls for the adoption of an interpretation which is more
lenient to the accused
FACTS:
Mediatrix G. Carungcong, in her capacity as the duly appointed administratrix of petitioner
intestate estate of her deceased mother Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong, filed a
complaint-affidavit for estafa against her brother-in-law, William Sato, a Japanese
national.
William Sato, through fraudulent misrepresentations, was able to secure the signature and
thumbmark of my mother on a Special Power of Attorney whereby my niece Wendy Mitsuko
Sato, who was then only twenty (20) years old, was made her attorney-in-fact, to sell and dispose
four (4) valuable pieces of land in Tagaytay City. Said Special Power of Attorney, copy of which
is attached as ANNEX "A" of the Affidavit of Wendy Mitsuko Sato, was signed and
thumbmark[ed] by my mother because William Sato told her that the documents she was being
made to sign involved her taxes. At that time, my mother was completely blind, having gone
blind almost ten (10)
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sato is covered by the exemption from criminal liability provided under
Article 332
RULING:
NO.
When estafa is committed through falsification of a public document, however, the matter
acquires a very serious public dimension and goes beyond the respective rights and liabilities of
family members among themselves. Effectively, when the offender resorts to an act that breaches
public interest in the integrity of public documents as a means to violate the property rights of a
family member, he is removed from the protective mantle of the absolutory cause under Article
332. The allegations in the Information show that the falsification of public document was
consummated when Sato presented a ready-made SPA to Manolita who signed the same as a
statement of her intention in connection with her taxes. While the falsification was consummated
upon the execution of the SPA, the consummation of the estafa occurred only when Sato later
utilized the SPA. He did so particularly when he had the properties sold and thereafter pocketed
the proceeds of the sale. Damage or prejudice to Manolita was caused not by the falsification of
the SPA.
Zafra v. People, 25 April 2012 (pro reo)

Doctrine:
“In our constitutional system, basic and elementary is the presupposition that the burden of
proving the guilt of an accused lies on the prosecution which must rely on the strength of its own
evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. The rule is invariable whatever may be the
reputation of the accused, for the law presumes his innocence unless and until the contrary is
shown. In dubio pro reo.”

Facts:
The prosecution charged Zafra and Marcelino with violation of Section 11, Article II of RA No.
9165 before the RTC of Bulacan. The prosecution’s lone witness, SPO4 Apolinario Mendoza
(SPO4 Mendoza) conducted surveillance in front of a sari-sari store in Bulacan, due to reported
drug trafficking in the area. SPO4 Mendoza saw Zafra and Marcelino holding shabu, while
Daluz was holding an aluminum foil and a disposable lighter. Seeing this illegal activity, SPO4
Mendoza single-handedly apprehended them. The RTC Bulacan convicted Zafra and Marcelino
for the crime of possession of shabu. Zafra and Marcelino appealed; but the CA affirmed in toto
the RTC Decision.

Issue: Whether the prosecution proved petitioners’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt or not.

Ruling: No.
During the cross examination, SPO4 Mendoza failed to be consistent with his earlier testimony
and pointed to Daluz as the one holding shabu with a handkerchief in his hand and Zafra as the
one in possession of drug paraphernalia. These inconsistencies are not minor ones, and,
certainly, not among those which strengthens the credibility of a witness. Possession of drug
paraphernalia vis-à-vis shabu, are two different offenses under RA No. 9165. That Zafra was
holding drug paraphernalia and not shabu is material to this case, to the accusation against him,
and to his defense.

SPO4 Mendoza was the lone arresting officer, who brought the petitioners to the police station,
who himself marked the confiscated pieces of evidence sans witnesses, photographs, media, and
in the absence of the petitioners. His colleagues were nowhere. And, worse, he was the same
person who took custody of the same pieces of evidence, then, brought them on his own to the
crime laboratory for testing. No inventory was ever done; no inventory was presented in court.

The solo performance by SPO4 Mendoza of all the acts necessary for the prosecution of the
offense is unexplained and puts the proof of corpus delicti, which is the illegal object itself in
serious doubt. No definite answer can be established regarding the question as to who possessed
what at the time of the alleged apprehension. More significantly, we are left in doubt whether
not the two sachets of shabu allegedly seized from the petitioners were the very same objects
offered in court as the corpus delicti.
JAMES IENT v. TULLETT PREBON
GR No. 189158 January 11, 2017
Doctrine:
Pro Reo Principle
Penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. When
there is doubt on the interpretation of criminal laws, all must be resolved in favor of the accused.
Rule of Lenity
The rule applies when the court is faced with two possible interpretations of a penal statute, one
that is prejudicial to the accused and another that is favorable to him. The rule calls for the
adoption of an interpretation which is more lenient to the accused
Facts:
Petitioner Ient is an officer of Tradition Asia, a corporation engaged inter-dealer broking
business, who went to the Philippines for expansion and diversification. Tullett Prebon, also an
inter-dealer broker, filed a Complaint-Affidavit against the officers/employees of the Tradition
Group for violation of the Corporation Code specifically under Sections 31 and 34 alleging that
they orchestrated mass resignation of its entire brokering staff in order for them to join Tradition
Philippines together with some of its directors who transferred from Tullett to Tradition.
The main bone of disagreement among the parties in this case is the applicability of Section 144
(Violations of the Code) of the Corporation Code to Sections 31 (Liability of Directors, Trustees
or Officers) and 34 (Disloyalty of a Director) of the same statute such that criminal liability
attaches to violations of Sections 31 and 34.
Issue:
Whether or not, criminal liability attaches when Sections 31 and 34 of the Corporation Code is
violated?
Ruling:
The Court held that after a meticulous consideration of the arguments presented by both sides,
the Court comes to the conclusion that there is textual ambiguity in Section 144; moreover, such
ambiguity remains even after an examination of its legislative history and the use of other aids to
statutory construction, necessitating the application of the rule of lenity in the case at bar.
There is no provision in the Corporation Code using similarly emphatic language that evinces a
categorical legislative intent to treat as a criminal offense each and every violation of that law.
Consequently, there is no compelling reason for the Court to construe Section 144 as similarly
employing the term "penalized" or "penalty" solely in terms of criminal liability.
The Corporation Code was intended as a regulatory measure, not primarily as a penal statute.
Sections 31 to 34 in particular were intended to impose exacting standards of fidelity on
corporate officers and directors but without unduly impeding them in the discharge of their work
with concerns of litigation.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LARRY ERGUIZA
G.R. No. 171348, November 26, 2008
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Doctrine : Equipoise doctrine is the rule which states that when the evidence of the
prosecution and the defense are so evenly balanced the appreciation of such evidence calls for
tilting of the scales in favor of. the accused.

FACTS:

Appellant Larry Erguiza was charged and convicted of the crime of rape he committed
against AAA. The version of the Prosecution is that when AAA’s short pant was hooked on the
fence, she was grabbed and raped by the accused. On the part of the defense, he claimed that he
never leaved their house and his wife will give birth, his claimed was corroborated by his
witnesses.
On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. Aggrieved by the
decision, appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the prosecution’s evidence failed to establish the guilt beyond reasonable
doubt of Larry Erquiza.

RULING:

No. The Supreme Court finds that there is testimonial evidence that contradicts the
findings of the RTC and CA on the basis of which no conviction beyond reasonable doubt could
arise. It is the unrebutted testimony of a credible defense witness. The testimony of Joy Agbuya
casts doubts as to the possibility of rape having taken place as narrated by complainant. In
addition, the testimony of a disinterested defense witness, Juanita Angeles corroborated the alibi
of appellant. The testimony of Joy will show that complainant could not have been raped because
Joy waited for complainant when her shorts got hooked to the fence and thereafter both went
home together and separated at their Aunt Beth’s house. It shows that no untoward incident,
much less rape, was committed by appellant at the time and place that complainant had testified
on. Unfortunately on the part of the prosecution they failed to rebut the testimony of Joy. The
failure on the part of the prosecution to rebut the testimony of Joy bolsters the defense evidence,
that no rape happened. As to the testimony of the hilot, Juanita Ageles, that appellant was with
her from 5:10 PM and never left his house from that time until his wife gave birth will also
substantiate by clear and convincing evidence the alibi of the appellant.

The Supreme Court facing with two conflicting versions I guided by the equipoise rule.
Thus, where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations,
one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his
guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support
a conviction. The equipoise rule provides that where the evidence in a criminal case is evenly
balanced, the constitutional presumption of innocence tilts the scales in favor of the accused.
G.R. No. 190889 January 10, 2011
ELENITA C. FAJARDO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Doctrine: For violation of Illegal Possession of Firearms, a distinction should be made between
criminal intent and intent to possess. While mere possession, without criminal intent, is sufficient
to convict a person for illegal possession of a firearm, it must still be shown that there was
animus possidendi or an intent to possess on the part of the accused.

Facts:
In response to the complaint of concerned citizens residing at Barangay Andagao, Kalibo, Aklan,
that armed men drinking liquor at the residence of petitioner were indiscriminately firing guns,
the Provincial Intelligence Special Operations Group (PISOG) were instructed by Provincial
Director to proceed to the area. Upon arrival thereat, they noticed that several persons scampered
and ran in different directions. A warrant was served on petitioner. During the search, they found
and was able to confiscate Two (2) pieces of Short Magazine of M16 Armalite Rifle; Thirty five
(35) pieces of 5.56 Caliber; and Fourteen (14) pieces of Caliber 45 pistol. A criminal information
for violation of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8294, was filed against
them. Petitioner however disowned the confiscated items. She refused to sign the
inventory/receipt prepared by the raiding team, because the items allegedly belonged to her
brother, Benito Fajardo, a staff sergeant of the Philippine Army.
Issue: Is the contention of the petitioner in disowning the confiscated items will negate liability for
violating PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294 (Illegal Possession of Firearms)
Ruling:

Yes. The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition and what the law requires is merely possession which includes not only actual
physical possession but also constructive possession or the subjection of the thing to one's
control and management. But is the mere fact of physical or constructive possession sufficient to
convict a person for unlawful possession of firearms or must there be an intent to possess to
constitute a violation of the law? This query assumes significance since the offense of illegal
possession of firearms is a malum prohibitum punished by a special law, in which case good
faith and absence of criminal intent are not valid defenses.

In the present case, a distinction should be made between criminal intent and intent to possess.
While mere possession, without criminal intent, is sufficient to convict a person for illegal
possession of a firearm, it must still be shown that there was animus possidendi or an intent to
possess on the part of the accused. Criminal intent here refers to the intention of the accused to
commit an offense with the use of an unlicensed firearm. This is not important in convicting a
person under PD 1866. Hence, in order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the decree,
it is sufficient that the accused had no authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he
intended to possess the same, even if such possession was made in good faith and without
criminal intent. Thus, although there is physical or constructive possession, for as long as the
animus possidendi is absent, there is no offense committed.We find that petitioner was neither in
physical nor constructive possession of the subject receivers. The testimony of SPO2 Nava
clearly bared that he only saw Valerio on top of the house when the receivers were thrown. None
of the witnesses saw petitioner holding the receivers, before or during their disposal.
Dumayag vs. People
November 26, 2012

PROXIMATE CAUSE: Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred.
FACTS: On 1995, at Magtalisay, Sangat, San Fernando, Cebu, a passenger bus, driven by
petitioner, collided with a tricycle driven by Genaya, resulting in the death of four (4) persons
and causing physical injuries to five (5) others, who were all passengers of the tricycle. At the
time of the mishap, the tricycle was overtaking a Mitsubishi pick-up when it collided with a
passenger bus coming from the opposite direction. Petitioner was charged before the MTC with
reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide for the deaths of Genaya, Alfanta, Israel,
Amante; and with reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries sustained by 5
passengers, and damage to property. In his defense, petitioner testified that he was familiar with
the road since he had been traversing it for around 20 years, and posited that the accident would
not have taken place at all if the tricycle driver had not attempted to overtake another vehicle and
occupied his lane. MTC found him Guilty, which RTC and CA affirmed.
ISSUE: If indeed petitioner was negligent, reckless and imprudent when the mishap litigated,
whether or not said negligence, recklessness and imprudence, was the proximate cause of the same.
RULING: No, In order to establish a motorist's liability for the negligent operation of a vehicle,
it must be shown that there was a direct causal connection between such negligence and the
injuries or damages complained of. Thus, to constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act
must be something more than a mere negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle, and a willful
and wanton disregard of the consequences is required. After going over the records of this case,
the Court is unable to sustain the findings of fact and conclusion reached by the courts below.
The totality of the evidence shows that the proximate cause of the collision was the reckless
negligence of the tricycle driver, who hastily overtook another vehicle while approaching a
blind curve, in violation of traffic laws. The immediate and proximate cause being the
reckless and imprudent act of the tricycle driver, petitioner should be acquitted.
People v. Villacorta, 07 September 2011 (Proximate Cause)
Doctrine:
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the
wounds inflicted upon him by the accused.(P v. Cardenas, supra)
FACTS OF THE CASE:
In this case, immediately after Cruz was stabbed by accused Villacorta in the early morning of
January 23, 2002, Cruz, was rushed and treated as an outpatient at the Tondo Medical Center.
On February 14, 2002, Cruz was admitted to the San Lazaro Hospital for symptoms of severe
tetanus infection where he died the following day, on February 15, 2002.
Orlito Villacorta was charged with and convicted for Murder for the death of Danilo Salvador
Cruz before the RTC Branch 70 of Malabon which was affirmed on appeal by the Court of
Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the wound inflicted by Orlito Villacorta was the proximate cause of death of
Danilo Salvador Cruz.
The Court defines the meaning of proximate cause as that cause, which in natural and continuous
sequence unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which
the result would not have occurred.
The Court finds that there had been an interval of 22 days between the date of the stabbing and
the date when Cruz died of tetanus on February 15, 2002.

RULING:
The court deduced that Cruz’s stab wound was merely the remote cause, and it’s subsequent
infection with tetanus might have been the proximate of Cruz’s death. The infection of Cruz’s
stab wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later on between the time Cruz was
stabbed to the time of his death.
The decision of the RTC and Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside finding the accused
guilty of Slight Physical Injuries and maltreatment under Art. 266(1) of the RPC.
G.R. No. 205228
July 15, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff and Appellee,

vs.
ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON, LEAN ADRIANO @ DENDEN, ABBA SANTIAGO y
ADRIANO, JOHN DOE AND PETER DOE, Accused,
ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON, Accused-Appellant.

“El que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado: He who is the cause of the cause is the
cause of the evil caused”

Facts:

Adriano was charged with two (2) counts of Murder. On or about March 13, 2007, around 8:00
o'clock in the morning, in Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, the above-named accused, conniving
together, willfully shot several times one Ofelia Bulanan and one Danilo Cabiedes resulting in
their deaths. According to the prosecution, four (4) armed men then alighted a Corolla and
started shooting at the driver of a CRV, who was later identified as Cabiedes. During the
shooting, a bystander, Bulanan was hit by a stray bullet. Later, both Cabiedes and Bulanan died
from fatal gunshot wounds. After trial, the RTC convicted Adriano. The RTC rejected Adriano's
defense of alibi on the ground that it was not supported by clear and convincing evidence. RTC
convicted Adriana of murder for the death of Cabiedes and homicide for the death of Bulanan.

Issue:

Whether or not Adriano should also be charged of murder for the death of Bulanan

Ruling:

Yes, in the case at bar, the prosecution has established the concurrence of the elements of murder:
(1) the fact of death of Cabiedes and Bulanan; (2) the positive identification of Adriano as one of
perpetrators of the crime; and (3) the attendance of treachery as a qualifying aggravating
circumstance and use of firearms and abuse of superior strength as generic aggravating
circumstances.

Adriano is guilty of the death of Bulanan under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, pursuant to
the doctrine of aberratio ictus, which imposes criminal liability for the acts committed in
violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom.

May treachery be however appreciated in aberratio ictus? Yes, although Bulanan's death was by
no means deliberate, the court adhered to the prevailing jurisprudence pronounced in People v.
Flora, where the Court ruled that treachery may be appreciated in aberratio ictus. The Court, due
to the presence of the aggravating circumstance of treachery, qualified both killings to murder.
PEOPLE V. UMAWID, 09 June 2014

DOCTRINE: Aberratio ictus is mistake in the blow. It is a manner or incurring criminal liability
according to Paragraph 1, Article 4, Revised Penal Code. A circumstance that neither exempted
an offender from criminal responsibility nor mitigated his criminal liability.

FACTS:
Vicente Ringor was staying with his 2-year old granddaughter, Maureen Joy Ringor at
the terrace of their house. Suddenly, Umawid appeared and started attacking Vicente with a
panabas while the latter was able to evade Umawid’s blows, nevertheless hit Maureen on her
abdomen and back, causing her instantaneous death. Thereafter, Umawid went to a nearby house
where his nephew, Jeffrey was awaken and saw his uncle charging at him with his panabas.
Jeffrey rushed inside the house but Umawid was able to prevent Jeffrey from closing the door of
the house. Jeffrey crouched and covered his head with his arms to shield him from Umawid’s
impending attacks. Umawid delivered fatal hacking blows to Jeffrey, causing the mutilation of
the latter’s fingers.
Umawid set up the defense of insanity by presenting the testimonies of Dr. Quincina and
Dr. Juliana to bolster his claim. Dr. Quincina testified that he evaluated Umawid’s psychiatric
condition and found that the latter was manifesting psychotic symptoms. However, he could not
tell with certainty whether Umawid was psychotic at the time of the commission of the crimes.
While Dr. Juliana failed to testify on Umawid’s mental state since she merely referred the latter
to another doctor for further evaluation. It held that by invoking the defense of insanity, Umawid
had, in effect, admitted the commission of the crimes but nevertheless pleaded to be exonerated
from criminal liability. However, he failed to prove by clear and positive evidence that he was
actually insane immediately preceding the time of the commission of the crimes or during their
execution.

ISSUE:
Whether there is mistake in the blow in Maureen’s death

RULING:
Yes. The Court observes that Maureen’s death is a case of aberratio ictus or mistake in
blow, given that the fatal blow therefore was only delivered by mistake as it was actually Vicente
who was Umawid’s intended target. Under Article 4 (1) of RPC, criminal liability shall be
incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended. In this regard, Umawid’s single deed actually resulted in the: (a)
Attempted Murder of Vicente; and (b) Consummated Murder of Maureen. This may be classified
as species of complex crime defined under Article 4829 of the RPC. However, considering that
the information charged him with the Murder of Maureen, Umawid cannot be convicted of a
complex crime because to do so would be violative of his right to due process. An accused
cannot be convicted of an offense unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information.
The Court hereby finds Umawid guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Murder and
Frustrated Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of the RPC.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ARMANDO GEMOYA AND RONILO TIONKO

DOCTRINES: Mistake in the identity of the victim is either be “error in personae” (mistake of the
person), or “aberratio ictus” (mistake in the blow), is neither exempting nor mitigating.
The Facts: The neighborhood of Barrio Malagamot, Panacan, DavaoCity were awakened by a
commotion. Armando Gemoya and Candelario Aliazar, together with their relatives,Ronilo and Rolly
Tionko, went towards the house of Irene Lantapon. They were armed with pipe, wood, and and
improvised bow and arrow locally called “Indian Pana”. Addressing a group of people who were
huddled together, Ronilo stopped and demanded an explanation for what happened to his brother-in-law.
They replied that nothing happened to him and advised them to go home. Ronilo ignored them and the
four went to the house of the Alferezes and they saw Wilfredo Alferez standing by the road waiting for a
taxi. The four rushed at him, Ronilo beat him with a cylindrical wood, Rolly with a pipe, while
Candelario held his arms behind him, Armando aimed his “Indian pana” at Wilfredo and the latter was
hit on his left chest. Edgardo and his daughter, Rosalie Jimenez rushed to his aid but Rosalie was hit on
the left ear by Armando, then the four ran away. Wilfredo was brought to the hospital but he died upon
arrival while Rosalie, on the other hand, was declared out of danger. The RTC found Armando and
Ronilo guilty of murder and frustrated homicide.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred in convicting Armando and Ronilo of the crime of frustrated
homicide for the wounding of Jimenez???
RULING: YES. The hitting of Rosalie was accidental as the second “Indian pana” was meant for
Wilfredo. The intent to kill Rosalie is absent. However, they are still liable for the consequences of their
felonious act. Mistake in the identity of the victim, which may either be “error inpersonae” (mistake of
the person), or “aberratio ictus” (mistake in the blow), is neither exempting nor mitigating. They cannot
therefore escape the criminal liability resulting from the injury suffered by Rosalie. NOTE: Gemoya is
entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
GUILLERMO WACOY vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
R. No. 213792; June 22, 2015
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
DOCTRINE:
“Article 49 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines only apply where the crime committed is
different from that intended and where the felony committed befalls a different person (error in
personae) and not to cases where more serious consequences not intended by the offender result
from his felonious acts (praeter intentionem.)”
Facts:
Guillermo Wacoy and James Quibac were charged with Homicide before the Regional Trial
Court of Benguet for the death of Elner Aro. According to the Benito, the prosecution’s witness,
he saw Wacoy kick Aro twice in the stomach and Quibac hit Aro on the same spot. This led to
Aro being hospitalized and during his operation, it was discovered that he sustained an injury to
his ileum. He died after being taken out of hospital. The Regional Trial Court convicted Wacoy
and Quibac with Death Under Tumultuous Circumstances. On appeal, it was modified by the
Court of Appeals to Homicide.
Issue:
Are Wacoy and Quibac guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.
Held:
Yes. The CA correctly held that Wacoy and Quibac' s act of mauling Aro was the proximate
cause of the latter's death; and as such, they must be held criminally liable therefore, specifically
for the crime of Homicide. Likewise, Wacoy’s contention that they should be meted with the
penalty of slight physical injuries in its maximum considering that that is their original intent in
pursuant to Article 49 of the Revised Penal Code is untenable considering that jurisprudence
instructs that such provision should only apply where the crime committed is different from that
intended and where the felony committed befalls a different person (error in personae); and not
to cases where more serious consequences not intended by the offender result from his felonious
act (praeter intentionem.) It is well-settled that if the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the
malefactors, intent to kill is conclusively presumed. In such case, even if there is no intent to kill,
the crime is Homicide because with respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal law looks
particularly to the material results following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor responsible
for all the consequences thereof.
People vs. Arpon
G.R. No. 229859; June 10, 2019

Doctrine: “Motive is not an essential element of a crime and hence the prosecution need not
prove the same. As a general rule, proof of motive for the commission of the offense charged
does not show guilt and absence of proof of such motive does not establish the innocence of the
accused for the crime charged such as murder. In murder, the specific intent is to kill the
victim.”

Facts:

Arpon and Lanante were charged with the crime of Murder for stabbing Rodolfo without any
warning with the use of bladed weapons, inflicting mortal wounds, thereby causing the direct and
immediate death of said victim.

Accused-apellant's argued that he should be acquitted since the prosecution had not established
motive as to why he would attack and kill Rodolfo.

Issue: Whether or not the accused should be acquitted since the prosecution failed to established
motive as to why he would attak and kill Rodolfo.

Ruling:

No. Motive is not an essential element of a crime and hence the prosecution need not prove the
same. As a general rule, proof of motive for the commission of the offense charged does not
show guilt and absence of proof of such motive does not establish the innocence of the accused
for the crime charged such as murder. The history of crimes shows that murders are generally
committed from motives comparatively trivial. Crime is rarely rational. In murder, the specific
intent is to kill the victim.
EDUARDO P. MANUEL, PETITIONER, VS. PROMULGATED: PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
G.R. 165842 NOVEMEBER 29,2005
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Doctrine:
Ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law.
Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.

Facts:
Petitioner was charged with bigamy but maintains that he did so with no malice as he
thought his first marriage was nullified since he had no contact with his first wife for 20 years
after imprisonment due to estafa. Petitioner also contends that he was not aware of Article 41 of
the family code whoch declares there is a need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death of
the absent spouse to enable the present spouse to marry. OSG maintained, the private
complainant's knowledge of the first marriage would not afford any relief since bigamy is an
offense against the State and not just against the private complainant.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner can be charged with bigamy despite

Ruling:
Yes. The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married
the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid
defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal
intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know
the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
G.R. No. 162540
GEMMA T. JACINTO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Doctrine: “The requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an
offense against persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its
accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate or
ineffectual.”

FACTS: Baby Aquino gave the accused a postdated check in the amount of ₱10,000.00 as
payment for the former’s purchases from Mega Foam to which the accused was an employee.
The check was not remitted to Mega Foam but instead deposited in the bank account of the
accused’s brother-in-law, which was later found to have been dishonored. Upon discovery of the
owner of Mega Foam, a complaint was filed and an entrapment operation was then conducted by
NBI agents. The accused was arrested and both the RTC and CA found her guilty of the
crime of qualified theft.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of qualified theft.

HELD: No. In the case at bar, the accused unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to
Mega Foam, but the same was apparently without value, as it was subsequently dishonored.
Hence, the accused is guilty only of an impossible crime as defined and penalized in Article 4(2),
in relation to Article 59, both of the RPC, because of the factual impossibility of producing the
crime. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature
one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical
impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.
In this case, were it not for the fact that the check bounced, the accused would have received the
face value thereof, which was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous
circumstance of the check being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the time, that
prevented the crime from being produced.
INTOD vs. CA
G.R. No. 103119

Doctrine:
Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his
control prevent the consummation of the intended crime.

Facts:
Intod went to Salvador Mandaya’s house and fired gunshots at his bedroom. Unknown to them,
Mandaya was not in his bedroom.
RTC convicted Intod of attempted murder, but he contends that he is only responsible for an
impossible crime.

Issue
Whether petitioner is guilty of impossible crime only.

Ruling:
Yes. In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The impossibility of accomplishing the
criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act penalized by itself.
In the case at bar, the factual situation presents physical impossibility which rendered the
intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised
Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime.
G. R. No. 160188 June 21, 2007

ARISTOTEL VALENZUELA y NATIVIDAD, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. COURT OF APPEALS
NACHURA, respondents.

Facts: Aristotel Valenzuela and Jovy Calderon were sighted outside the Super Sale Club in SM
by Lorenzo Lago, a security guard who was then manning his post at the open parking area of
the supermarket. Lago saw Valenzuela, who was wearing an ID with the mark “Receiving
Dispatching Unit (RDU)” who hauled a push cart with cases of detergent of “Tide” brand and
unloaded them in an open parking space, where Calderon was waiting. As Lago watched, he
proceeded to stop the taxi as it was leaving the open parking area and asked Valenzuela for a
receipt of the merchandise but Valenzuela and Calderon reacted by fleeing on foot. Lago fired a
warning shot to alert his fellow security guards. Valenzuela and Calderon were apprehended at
the scene and the stolen merchandise recovered worth P12,090

• RTC: guilty of consummated theft

• CA: Confirmed RTC and rejected his contention that it should only be frustrated theft since
at the time he was apprehended, he was never placed in a position to freely dispose of the articles
stolen.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner Valenzuela is guilty of frustrated theft.

Held: No

 It is frustrated “when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would
produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by
reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.”

Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code (Elements of Theft):

1. that there be taking of personal property - only one operative act of execution by the
actor involved in theft
2. property belongs to another
3. taking be done with intent to gain - descriptive circumstances
4. taking be done without the consent of the owner - descriptive circumstances
5. taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons
or force upon things - descriptive circumstances.

The court held that theft is produced when there is deprivation of personal property by one with intent to
gain. Thus, it is immaterial that the offender is able or unable to freely dispose the property stolen since
he has already committed all the acts of execution and the deprivation from the owner has already ensued
from such acts. Therefore, theft cannot have a frustrated stage, and can only be attempted or
consummated.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FERNANDO "Ando" COSTALES and FERNANDO RAMIREZ (at-large),
accused. FERNANDO "Ando" COSTALES, accused-appellant.
G.R. Nos. 141154-56 January 15, 2002
Doctrine: Where there is nothing in the evidence to show that the wound would be fatal if not
medically attended to, the character of the wound is doubtful; hence, the doubt should be
resolved in favor of the accused and the crime committed by him may be declared as attempted,
not frustrated murder.
Facts: Accused Fernando “Ando” Costales and Fernando Ramirez where charged with the
murder of Miguel Marcelo and the frustrated murder of Crispina Marcelo alleging that the two
accused barged into the house of the victims, shot Miguel in the head, then Crispina, on her right
chest which caused her to bleed and lose consciousness. The RTC found Costales guilty for the
murder of Miguel Marcelo and only for the attempted murder of Crispina Marcelo.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC erred in convicting the accused for attempted murder only.
Ruling: NO.
In the case of People vs. Dela Cruz, the Court ruled that the crime committed for the shooting of
the victim was attempted murder and not frustrated murder for the reason that his injuries,
though no doubt serious, were not proved fatal such that without timely medical intervention,
they would have caused his death.”

In the case at bar, the trial court explained that the failure of the prosecution to present a medical
certificate or competent testimonial evidence showing that Crispina would have died from her
wound without medical intervention, justified the accused’s conviction for attempted murder
only.
PEOPLE VS JUGUETA

DOCTRINE: when various victims expire from separate shot, such acts constitute separate and
distinct crimes

FACTS:

Ireneo Jugueta y Flores (appellant) was accused, together with Gilbert Estores and Roger
San Miguel, of using firearms to shoot on the house occupied by the family of Norberto Divina.
Two of the children of Norberto, namely, Mary Grace (13 years old) and Claudine (3 1/2 years
old), died from gunshot wounds. Norberto Divina, his wife Maricel Divina and children
Elizabeth and Judy Ann Divina, both minors, were not hit.
Appellant Jugueta was charged with the Double Murder of Mary Grace Divina and
Claudine Divina, both minors. The crime was alleged to have been committed with treachery,
evident premeditation, in the dwelling of the offended party, and the accused taking advantage of
nighttime to facilitate the commission of the offense. He was also charged, together with Gilbert
Estores and Roger San Miguel, with Multiple Attempted Murder, for the shooting attack on the
other family members of Norberto Divina, who fortunately, were not hit.

ISSUE:

Whether complex crime under Article 48 of RPC exists in this case

HELD:

A different rule governs where separate and distinct acts result in a number killed.
Deeply rooted is the doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shot, such acts
constitute separate and distinct crimes.
Appellant and the two others, in firing successive and indiscriminate shots at the family
of Norberto from their respective firearms, intended to kill not only Norberto, but his entire
family. When several gunmen, as in this case, indiscriminately fire a series of shots at a group of
people, it shows their intention to kill several individuals. Hence, they are committing not only
one crime. What appellant and his cohorts committed cannot be classified as a complex crime
because as held in People v. Nelmida, " each act by each gunman pulling the trigger of their
respective firearms, aiming each particular moment at different persons constitute distinct and
individual acts which cannot give rise to a complex crime.
IVLER VS HON. MODESTO [G.R. No. 172716]

DOCTRINE: Prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the
number or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the
penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting
of charges under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first level court.

FACTS: Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler was charged before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) reckless imprudence
resulting in slight physical injuries for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce; and (2)
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property for the death of respondent Ponce’s
husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle. On September 7, 2004, Ivler
pleaded guilty to the charge in reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries and was meted out
the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, Ivler moved to quash the Information of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property for placing him in jeopardy of second
punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Ivler’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in
the information charging him with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property

HELD:
The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the RTC. Petitioner’s conviction in the case of reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries bars his prosecution in criminal reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide and damage to property.
1) Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime; its Consequences on Persons and Property are Material Only
to Determine the Penalty. Quasi-offenses penalize “the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the
dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible,” unlike willful offenses which
punish the intentional criminal act. These structural and conceptual features of quasi-offenses set them
apart from the mass of intentional crimes.
2) Prior Conviction or Acquittal of Reckless Imprudence Bars Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi- offense. Once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not
be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi-offense of criminal negligence under
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if
intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act,
not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty,
it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious
result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the
same, and cannot be split into different crimes and prosecutions.
3) Article 48 Does Not Apply to Acts Penalized Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. Article 48
is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two
categories:
(1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its
operation light felonies); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The
legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties,
will only serve the maximum of the penalty for the most serious crime. In contrast, Article 365 is a
substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but the mental attitude behind the act, the
dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, a single mental attitude regardless of the resulting
consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences.
Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences.Article 48 is
incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-
offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies; or (2) an offense
which is a necessary means for committing another.
Prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or severity
of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under
Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under
Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first level court.
G.R. No. 184926 April 11, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.
EDMUNDO VILLAFLORES y OLANO, Accused-Appellant.
DOCTRINE:
The felony of rape with homicide is a composite crime. A composite crime, also known as a
special complex crime, is composed of two or more crimes that the law treats as a single
indivisible and unique offense for being the product of a single criminal impulse.
FACTS:
The victim was Marita, a girl. When her very young life was snuffed out by strangulation
on July 2, 1999, she was only four years and eight months old. She had been playing at the rear
of their residence in Bagong Silang, Caloocan City in the morning of July 2, 1999 when Julia,
her mother, first noticed her missing from home. Following the clairvoyant’s direction, they
found Marita’s lifeless body covered with a blue and yellow sack inside the comfort room of an
abandoned house about five structures away from their own house. Her face was black and blue,
and bloody. She had been tortured and strangled till death.
The ensuing police investigation led to two witnesses, Aldrin Bautista and Jovy Solidum,
who indicated that Villaflores might be the culprit who had raped and killed Marita. The police
thus arrested Villaflores. On July 7, 1999, the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City filed in the RTC
the information charging Villaflores with rape with homicide.
the RTC convicted Villaflores of rape with homicide, holding that the circumstantial
evidence led to no other conclusion but that his guilt was shown beyond reasonable doubt. On
intermediate review, the CA affirmed the conviction
ISSUE:
Whether or not RTC and the CA gravely erred in finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape with homicide because the State did not discharge its burden to prove
beyond reasonable doubt every fact and circumstance constituting the crime charged
RULING:
The court concur with the RTC and the CA.
In resolving to convict Villaflores, both the RTC and the CA considered several circumstances,
which when "appreciated together and not piece by piece," according to the CA, were seen as
"strands which create a pattern when interwoven," and formed an unbroken chain that led to the
reasonable conclusion that Villaflores, to the exclusion of all others, was guilty of rape with
homicide.
The duly established circumstances we have considered are the following. One of those is
when Aldrin Bautista and Jovie Solidum saw Villaflores holding Marita by the hand (akay-akay)
at around 10:00 am on July 2, 1999,28 leading the child through the alley going towards the
direction of his house about 6 houses away from the victim’s house. Another is when Solidum
passed by Villaflores’ house at about 3:00 pm of July 2, 1999 and heard the crying and moaning
(umuungol) of a child coming from inside and at about 7:00 pm of July 2, 1999 Solidum saw
Villaflores coming from his house carrying a yellow sack that appeared to be heavy and going
towards the abandoned house where the child’s lifeless body was later found.
Desmoparan v. People, 27 March 2019 (R.A. No. 10951 and Art. 48)

Doctrine:
“The penalty of imprisonment in the crime of estafa under RA 10951 is now lighter than the
penalty of imprisonment for falsification of commercial documents. Applying then the
provisions of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code for the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of commercial documents, the penalty for the graver offense should be imposed in
the maximum period.”

Facts:
Desmoparan applied for a salary loan in the amount of P105,000.00 from Cebu CFI Community
Cooperative -Dumaguete City Branch (CFI). He misrepresented himself to be an employee of
the City Engineer's Office, by using the name "Rodulfo M. Cordura," to Chiyenne Mirasol
(Mirasol), loan clerk of CFI. However, on March 16, 2012, the real Rodulfo Cordura (Cordura)
went to CFI to verify the information that somebody had fraudulently applied for a salary loan
using his name and qualifications. Desmoparan was eventually apprehended and was charged
with estafa through falsification of commercial documents. RTC of Negros Oriental found him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt and CA denied his appeal. SC found him guilty for estafa
through falsification of commercial documents.

Issue: Whether the penalty imposed under RA 10951 should be given a retroactive effect.

Ruling: Yes.
Desmoparan is found guilty of the complex crime of estafa through falsification of commercial
documents since the crime of falsification was established to be a necessary means to commit
estafa.

The penalty of imprisonment in the crime of estafa under RA 10951 is now lighter than the
penalty of imprisonment for falsification of commercial documents. Applying then the
provisions of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code for the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of commercial documents, the penalty for the graver offense should be imposed in
the maximum period. Thus, the penalty for falsification of commercial documents should be
imposed in the maximum period, being the more serious crime than estafa. However, the penalty
of fine of not more than Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) under the old law should be imposed
because this is more favorable to the petitioner than the penalty of fine of not more than One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) under the present law.

SC modified the indeterminate sentence imposable on Desmoparan so that the minimum term
should, come from the penalty next lower in degree which is arresto mayor, maximum, to prision
correccional, minimum (4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months), and the maximum term
should come from prision correccional, medium, to prision correccional, maximum, in its
maximum period (4 yeeirs, 9 months and 11 days to 6 years).
PEOPLE v. LUZVIMINDA S. VALDEZ,
GR Nos. 216007-09
December 8, 2015

Facts: Two State Auditors of the Commission on Audit conducted a post-audit of the
disbursement vouchers of the Bacolod City Government. Among the subjects thereof were the
reimbursements of expenses of private respondent Valdez , a former mayor of Bacolod City.
Consequently, Valdez was charged with eight cases and half were for the complex crime of
Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents.
Since the Ombudsman recommended "no bail", Valdez caused the filing of a Motion to Set
Aside No Bail Recommendation arguing that the three cases are bailable as a matter of right
because no aggravating or modifying circumstance was alleged.
Petitioner countered that the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL) is inapplicable as the attending
circumstances are immaterial because the charge constituting the complex crime have the
corresponding penalty of reclusion perpetua. Since the offense is punishable by reclusion
perpetua, bail is discretionary.
Issues: Whether an accused indicted for the complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru
Falsification of Official/Public Documents involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00 is
entitled to bail as a matter of right?
Ruling: The Court ruled that the appropriate rule is to grant bail as a matter of right to an accused
who is charged with a complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of
Official/Public Documents involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00.
For the complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public
Documents involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00, the "prescribed penalty" is reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. After trial, should the commission of such
crime be proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, the "imposable penalty" is
reclusion perpetua in view of the RPC mandate that the prescribed penalty of reclusion temporal
maximum to reclusion perpetua shall be applied in its maximum.
If the complex crime of Malversation thru Falsification be imposed in its maximum period, there
is no doubt that, in case of conviction, the penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua. The cases,
however, are still at their inception. Criminal proceedings are yet to ensue. This is not the proper
time, therefore, to call for the application of the penalty contemplated under Article 48 by
imposing the same in its maximum period.
For purposes of determining whether a person can be admitted to bail as a matter of right, it is
the imposable penalty prescribed by law for the crime charged which should be considered and,
not the penalty to be actually imposed.
Principles:
The time-honored principle is that penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and
liberally in favor of the accused. When there is doubt on the interpretation of criminal laws, all
must be resolved in favor of the accused. Since penal laws should not be applied mechanically,
the Court must determine whether their application is consistent with the purpose and reason of
the law.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. PATRICK JOHN MERCADO Y ANTICLA
G.R. No. 218702, October 17, 2018
CAGUIOA, J:

Doctrine : In a complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually

committed, they constitute only one crime in the eyes of the law as well as in the conscience of
the offender. Hence, there is only one penalty imposed for the commission of a complex crime.

Facts:

Patrick John Mercado was accused of hitting with baseball bat and pouring gasoline into
the bodies of his aunt Alicia Mercado-Lusuriaga and her live-in partner, Evelyn Santos thereby
causing upon them third degree burns which directly caused their instantaneous death and the
burning of [the] victim's house.

The Regional Trial Court convicted Mercado of the crime of Double Murder. The RTC
ruled that the crime committed was the complex crime of Double Murder – instead of two counts
of Murder – and sentenced him with the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The CA, however,
modified the penalty imposed on Mercado from a single count of reclusion perpetua imposed by
the RTC to two counts of reclusion perpetua for each of the murders he committed.

Issue :

Whether or not the Court of Appeals is proper to modify the penalty to be imposed on
Mercado.

Ruling :

The ruling of the CA is erroneous. The correct penalty on Mercado was imposed by the
RTC as the crime committed is a complex crime, there being only a single criminal act that
resulted in the commission of multiple crimes. Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes.— When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for
the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
G.R. No. 223443-44 November 28, 2018
Albert G. Ambagan vs. People of the Philippines

Doctrine: In order that a Delicto Continuado or Continuous Crime to exist, there should be
"plurality of acts performed separately during a period of time: unity of penal provision
infringed upon or violated and unity of criminal intent and purpose, which means that two or
more violations of the same penal provision are united in one and the same intent leading to the
perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim."

Facts: The Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of Amadeo, Cavite issued Resolution No. 57, Series of
1998, declaring Balite Falls a tourist spot, barangay park, and a reserved area. The resolution was
issued to preserve Balite Falls as a potential source of potable water. Located near Balite falls is
a lot and an ancestral house which was owned Revina C. Lumandas . Councilor Marlon Ambion
(Ambion) informed Revina that the municipal government planned to temporarily rent their
ancestral house for office purposes. Revina agreed as the house was then vacant. A project will
also be undertaken near Balite Falls which includes the property of Calixto Lumandas (Calixto),
cousin of Revina. Sometime in February 2008, the house on the subject lot was demolished,
while the property of Calixto was levelled. Thereafter, Revina and Calixto saw construction
activities being done on their property . Two separate complaints were filed by Revina and
Calixto, against the petitioner before the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon for violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and misconduct. The Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon dismissed the case
for misconduct. However, the petitioner was charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019, as amended, in two separate Informations, Petitioner contends that he should be charged
only for a single offense, which is in the nature of a continuous crime.

Issue: Whether or not the contention that the crime committed is in the nature of continuous
crime (Delito Continuado) is correct
Ruling: Yes. In Gamboa v. CA, the Court defined delito continuado, or continuous crime as a
single crime consisting of a series of acts arising from a single criminal resolution or intent not
susceptible of division. In order that it may exist, there should be "plurality of acts performed
separately during a period of time: unity of penal provision infringed upon or violated and unity
of criminal intent and purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal
provision are united in one and the same intent leading to the perpetration of the same criminal
purpose or aim." According to Cuello Calon, for delito continuado to exist there should be
a plurality of acts performed during a period of time; unity of penal provision violated; and unity
of criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal
provisions are united in one and same instant or resolution leading to the perpetration of the same
criminal purpose or aim. Padilla views such offense as consisting of a series of acts arising from
one criminal intent or resolution. The two (2) Informations charging the petitioner for violation
of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 are strikingly identical except with respect to the name of the
property owner, TCT No., affected area, and its value. The place, time, and manner of the
commission of the offense are the same. The petitioner in the performance of the alleged
criminal act is impelled by a singular purpose– the realization of the Balite Falls development
project. Consequently, the acts alleged in the two (2) Informations constitute only one offense
which should have been consolidated in one Information.
Fransdilla vs. People
April 20, 2015

CONSPIRACY: In the eyes of the law, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. For an accused to be
validly held to have conspired with her co-accused in committing the crime, her overt acts must
evince her active part in the execution of the crime agreed to be committed.
FACTS: On 1991, accused Fransdilla, together with three (3) other persons, robbed the house of
Lalaine Yreverre. Lalaine indentified 3 suspects, to which she inquired from Cuanang, one of the
suspects, about their lady companion. Thereafter, Lalaine, together with the police officers went
to the house of Fransdilla, where the latter admitted to the crime and posited that she was only
following the instructions of the other suspects. RTC convicted Fransdilla and her co-accused of
Robbery, and as to Fransdilla, the RTC ruled that several facts and circumstances either proved
by the Prosecution or admitted by the Defense established her having conspired with her co-
accused in committing the offense charged. She elevated the case to the CA and contented that
the Prosecution did not establish her having conspired with the other accused in committing the
robbery, she also reiterated such contentions here stating that the State's formal offer of evidence
did not include any reference to any evidence specifically incriminating her, CA however
affirmed RTC’s decision.
ISSUES: Whether or not Conspiracy of Fransdilla with her co-accused was established beyond
reasonable doubt.
RULING: Yes. Their review of the records of the trial reveals that contrary to Fransdilla's
contentions, the State competently and credibly established her active participation in the
execution of the robbery through Lalaine's testimony detailing her specific acts.
Fransdilla's non-presentation of her defense, despite her being directly incriminated by
Lalaine, denied the Court her explanation for her specific overt acts of complicity in the
robbery and thus rendered the incriminating evidence unrefuted. By this the Court simply
means that Fransdilla did not discharge her burden of evidence, which is "the duty of a party to
start and continue giving evidence at any stage of the trial until he has established a prima facie
case, or the like duty of the adverse party to meet and overthrow that prima facie case thus
established.
P v. LUDOVICO PATRIMONIO BANDOJO, JR. AND KENNY
JOY VILLACORTA ILETO, 17 October 2018 (Conspiracy)

DOCTRINE:

Proof of conspiracy need not be based on direct evidence, because it may be inferred from the
parties’ conduct indicating a common understanding among themselves with respect to the
commission of the crime.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The accused were arrested in an entrapment operation conducted by the NBI agents while
waiting for AAA and BBB. The accused were positively identified in Court by AAA with Kenny
Joy as the one who recruited and accompanied AAA when she had to engage in sexual activities
in exchanged for money and Ludovico as the one who accompanied her when they proceeded to
the hotel for the same kind of illicit transaction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused Ludovico Bandojo, Jr. and Kenny Joy Ileto conspired in committing
Qualified Trafficking in Person.

RULING:

The Court enumerated the following elements of conspiracy:1) two or more persons come to an
agreement; 2) the agreement concerned the commission of a felony, and 3) the execution of the
felony was decided.

Through their concerted efforts, accused appellant facilitated the prostitution of AAA, a minor
where she was made to render sexual services in exchanged for monetary considerations. Proof
of the conspiracy need not be based on direct evidence, because it may be inferred from the
parties’ conduct indicating a common understanding among themselves with respect to the
commission of the crime. Neither is it necessary to show that two or more persons met together
and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or objective
to be carried out. The conspiracy maybe deduced from the mode or manner in which the crime
was perpetrated; it may also be inferred from the acts of the accused a joint or common purpose
and design, concerted action and community of interest.

Taken all together, the foregoing circumstances reveal a joint purpose, design and concerted
action in committing the crime of Qualified Trafficking in Person.
G.R. No. 210434
December 05, 2016

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHRISTOPHER ELIZALDE Y

SUMAGDON AND ALLAN PLACENTE Y BUSIO, Accused-Appellants.

Doctrine: “Direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy, as it can be presumed from and
proven by the acts of the accused pointing to a joint purpose, design, concerted action, and
community of interests.”

Facts:
Accused-appellants Christopher Elizalde y Sumagdon and Allan Placente y Busio, together with
their co-accused Arcel Lucban y Lindero, Allan Dela Peña, Alden Diaz, and alias Erwin were
charged with the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide for detaining
and depriving, with the use of firearms and threats, Letty Tan y Co of her liberty and against her
will, for the purpose of extorting a P20,000,000.00 ransom as a condition for her release, by
shoving her inside a red Toyota Lite Ace van, then later transferring her to a jeepney where she
was eventually found dead with gunshot wounds after an armed encounter with police
operatives. Only appellants Elizalde and Placente as well as Dela Pena were arrested while the
rest remain at-large. Upon arraignment, they all pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
Antonio identified both Elizalde and Placente as the persons who were involved in the
kidnapping of Letty. The appellants denied the allegations by giving their own alibis and denied
that they knew each other.

The RTC found appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of
kidnapping for ransom with homicide and found the presence of conspiracy shown by Placente's
act of poking a gun at Antonio, while Elizalde and their cohorts dragged Letty into the van.

Issue:
Whether or not there was conspiracy in the commission of the crime charged

Ruling:
Yes, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. When conspiracy is established, the
responsibility of the conspirators is collective, not individual, rendering all of them equally liable
regardless of the extent of their respective participations. As aptly held by the CA, the
community of criminal design by the appellants and their cohorts is evident as they each played a
role in the commission of the crime. While appellant Placente and companions pointed their guns
at Antonio, Elizalde and companions simultaneously dragged Letty into their van. Thereafter,
they demanded ransom money as a condition for her release, which, however, never materialized
due to a shootout that sadly led to her death. Consequently, therefore, appellants are equally
liable for the crime charged herein.
PEOPLE V. ESPERANZA, 19 June 2017

DOCTRINE: Conspiracy is not a harmless innuendo to be taken lightly or accepted at every

tum. It is a legal concept that imputes culpability under specific circumstances. As such, it must
be established as clearly as any element of the crime. The quantum of evidence to be satisfied is,
we repeat, beyond reasonable doubt.

FACTS:
An Information was filed charging accused-appellant Roberto Esperanza Jesalva alias
"Robert Santos", Ryan Menieva and Junie Ilaw alleging that accused, conspiring together,
feloniously with intent to kill with evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of
superior strength, attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of Amel
Ortigosa, by then and there stabbing him with a sharp bladed instrument hitting him on the chest,
causing his untimely death.
Accused-appellant denied any participation in Ortigosa's stabbing. He claimed that on the
night of the incident, he was waiting for his sister on the corner of Dupax Street. While waiting,
he saw and heard people running and shouting which caused him to leave the place. RTC and
CA held that appellant is liable for murder as he conspired with the other accused.

ISSUE:
Whether there is conspiracy

RULING:
No. To determine if accused-appellant conspired with Menieva and Ilaw, the focus of the
inquiry should necessarily be the overt acts of accused-appellant before, during and after the
stabbing incident. In this case, no evidence showing that appellant was purposely waiting for
Ortigosa at the time and place of the incident and that Menieva and Ilaw were on standby,
awaiting for accused-appellant's signal. In this case, all that accused-appellant did was to stare
and point at the victim and his companions. These, however, are not crimes Mere knowledge,
acquiescence or approval of the act, without the cooperation and the agreement to cooperate, is
not enough to establish conspiracy.
Even if the accused were present and agreed to cooperate with the main perpetrators of
the crime, their mere presence does not make them parties to it, absent any active participation in
the furtherance of the common design or purpose. In this case, while accused-appellant's
presence and act of pointing at the victim and his group may mean he approved of the crime or
that he was ready to assist his co-accused, absent any other overt act on his part, there is no
conspiracy. Prosecution must establish conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt. A conviction
premised on a finding of conspiracy must be founded on facts, not on mere inferences and
presumption. The accused- appellant ROBERTO ESPERANZA JESAL VA alias "Robert
Santos" is acquitted on reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
People vs. Salga (2018)
G.R. No. 233334, July 23, 2018
DOCTRINE: Robbery with homicide is a special complex crime that requires the concurrence of the following
elements, namely: (1) the taking of personal property belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use
of violence or intimidation against a person; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of
homicide, as used in its generic sense, was committed. A conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the main
purpose and objective of the malefactor, and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must
precede the taking of human life but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery. A special complex
crime, also known as a composite crime, is composed of two or more crimes but is treated by the law as a single
indivisible and unique offense for being the product of one criminal impulse. It is a specific crime with a specific
penalty provided by law, and differs from the compound or complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code.

FACTS: On February 14, 2010, around 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon the house of one Joan Camille Zulita was
robbed amounting to P34,000.00 from the vault and her Samsung E590 cellphone worth P6,000.00. she alleged that
after the gunmen left her room she later on heard a gunshot from outside the house. Catalina Arcega, the house
helper was later on discovered seriously wounded in her head. Catalina Arcega was still conscious when she was
brought to a nearby hospital. However, she was not operated on because the hospital demanded a downpayment
before proceeding with the surgery, thus, Arcega was brought to a public hospital in Cagayan de Oro City for
medical attention. Unfortunately, she died the following day. RTC and CA convicted both accused of robbery with
homicide.

ISSUES: WoN John’s conviction was proper. YES. Joan positively identified John as one of the three persons who
had entered their home and taken possession of her phone and money, and househelper Catalina Arcega was killed
in the course or on the occasion of the robbery. Without question, the intent to rob the Zulitas preceded the taking of
human life. We do not find any weakness in the credibility of Joan as a witness. Nothing was presented by John to
show that Joan had evil motives or ill will towards him as to falsely or unfairly incriminate him in the commission of
the heinous crime of robbery with homicide. Neither did John adduce anything by which her testimony could be
otherwise discredited. We further find no violation of John’s rights in relation to the out-of-court identification of
him made by Joan. Under the totality-of-the-circumstances test, Joan’s out-of-court identification of John satisfied
the foregoing standards. It is hardly disputed that Joan had the actual opportunity and enough time to see John by
face during the incident, from the time he entered the victims’ property until he approached and ordered her to keep
quiet and to get the keys to her mother’s safety vault. In that span of time, her full attention was riveted to the
startling incident that posed extreme threat to her own life. Given the antecedents, her identification of him as one of the
robbers
– whether out-of-court or in-court – was well-founded, positive, and totally reliable.

WoN Ruel’s conviction was proper. NO. The lower courts and the Prosecution gave too much weight and emphasis
to the fact that Constancio had seen Ruel speeding away on the motorcycle with John and another person on board.
The scene, to a detached observer, was certainly far from unequivocal, for it was openly susceptible to various
interpretations, including some that would not implicate Ruel in the commission of the robbery with homicide. For
one, there is the possibility that Ruel only happened to pass by, and that John and the other person – both of whom
Ruel most probably knew – only asked to ride tandem with him. Such possibility, even if highly probable, was still
innocent without a clear showing of his deeper involvement in the criminal enterprise. Verily, the guilt of Ruel could
not be fairly deduced from scrutinizing just one or two particular circumstances, for the law demanded a
combination of several circumstances that together paint a convincing picture of his being the author of the crime.

WoN the Prosecution credibly established the conspiracy between John and Ruel. NO. Joan, although present at the
scene of the crime, never identified Ruel as part of the group of robbers. In fact, no witness placed him at the crime
scene during the entire period of the robbery. If we have always required conspiracy to be established, not by
conjecture, but by positive and conclusive evidence, then it was plainly speculative for the CA to count Ruel as the
fourth member of the group of robbers and even to name him as the robbers' lookout outside the house despite the
absence of evidence to that effect. On the contrary, the records bear out that only Constancio saw Ruel, but such
sighting of Ruel was after the robbery when he was already driving the green motorcycle with John and another
person on board. This was not the overt act necessary to make Ruel a part of the conspiracy. The community of
design to commit an offense must be a conscious one; and that conspiracy transcends mere companionship. Hence,
mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge of, or acquiescence
in, or agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation
in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ESTRILLO ESCOBAL
GR. No. 206292; October 11, 2017
DOCTRINE:
“Mere passive presence at the scene of the crime does not implicate one who is not shown to have
conspired with another in killing the victim.”
“Unlawful aggression is the indispensable requisite in self-defense. There must be a showing that
the victim posed a real peril on the life or personal safety of the person defending himself.”
“Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony, and decide to commit it; hence, the agreement concerning the commission of the
crime must be shown to precede the decision to commit it.”
“Express conspiracy is one which requires proof of an actual agreement among all the co-
conspirators to commit the crime. An implied conspiracy, on the other hand, exists when two or
more persons are shown to have aimed their acts towards the accomplishment of the same
unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, although apparently independent,
were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association and a
concurrence of sentiment.”
Facts:
Estrillo Escobal and Melvin Abano were found guilty of murder for the killing of SPO1
Fernando Gaabucayan, Jr. The Regional Trial Court found the two to have conspired in the
killing of the victim with treachery and found Escobal to have shot the victim while Abano did
nothing to prevent the shooting. On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the conviction of the
two and modified the amount of awarded damages.
Issue:
Are the accuseds’ guilt proven beyond reasonable doubt?
Held:
As to Escobal yes, his claim of self-defense is untenable considering that he failed to prove
that the victim was the unlawful agressor. However, since the prosecution failed to establish the
existence of treachery to qualify the killing into murder, the felony committed by Escobal is
Homicide.
As to Abano no considering that his presence in the scene of the crime did not establish his
conspiracy to kill SPO1 Gaabacuyan. Mere passive presence at the scene of the crime did not
constitute proof of concerted action between him and Escobal. Knowledge of, or acquiescence
in, or agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy, absent any
active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common
design and purpose.

People vs. Amar

G.R. No. 194235; June 08, 2016

Doctrine: “Conspiracy must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.”

Facts:

On October 21, 2002, the five accused-appellants, together with a John Doe was charged with
kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended for the purpose
of extorting money in the amount of Fifty Million Pesos Philippine Currency (P50,000,000.00).

Accused-appellants, on the other hand, contend that they were made to believe they were merely
escorting Jimmy, a VIP, during his vacation in Ilocos Norte; that Jojo orchestrated the
kidnapping to get money and left the unwitting accused-appellants to suffer the consequences.

Issue: Whether or not all of the accused-appellants be held liable with kidnapping for ransom.

Ruling:

Yes. There exist conspiracy among all five accused-appellants hence, all of them are equally
liable as principals for the crime of kidnapping for ransom.

Our following explication on conspiracy in Mangangey v. Sandiganbayan is significant in the

case at bar: There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy must be proven as convincingly as
the criminal act itself - like any element of the offense charged, conspiracy must be established
by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

In this case, the ascertained facts abovementioned and the encashment of the contract payment
check obtained through the falsified certificate of inspection prove the commission of the crime.
Wandag's guilt has been proven with moral certainty. As co-conspirators of Wandag, petitioners
are equally guilty, for in a conspiracy, every act of one of the conspirators in furtherance of a
common design or purpose of such a conspiracy is the act of all.
DANDY L. DUNGO AND GREGORIO A. SIBAL, JR., PETITIONERS, VS. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
G.R. 209464 JULY 01, 2015
Doctrine:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8049 or the Anti-Hazing Law of 1995 posits that fraternal
contract should not be signed in blood, celebrated with pain, marred by injuries, and perpetrated
through suffering.
.
Facts:
Petitioners Dungo and Sibal were charged with violating RA 8049 because they
induced Marlon Villanueva to be present during his induction rites at Alpha Phi Omega
fraternity.

Together with 20 other unnamed members of the fraternity, the hazing was done at a
resort which resulted to the death of the victim. Petitioners argue that they cannot be
convicted of a crime not stated in the information.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners were guilty beyond reasonable doubt?

Ruling:
Yes. Even if there was no evidence that Dungo and Sibal participated to bodily assault
and harm the victim, it was irrefutable that they brought Villanueva to the resort for their final
initiation rites. Clearly, they did not merely induce Villanueva to attend the final initiation rites,
but they also brought him to Villa Novaliches Resort.

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8049 or the Anti-Hazing Law of 1995 posits that fraternal contract
should not be signed in blood, celebrated with pain, marred by injuries, and perpetrated through
suffering.
G.R. No. 179943
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARLON ALBERT DE LEON

Doctrine: “If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts,
though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of
personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no
actual meeting among them to concert means is proved. That would be termed an implied
conspiracy.”

FACTS: A hold-up was committed against the employees of a gasoline station which also
resulted to the subsequent death of said gasoline station’s security guard. Eduardo Zulueta, one
of the gasoline boys, identified the accused as one of the robbers who poked a gun at him. The
accused, however, alleged that he only hitched a ride on the robbers’ vehicle and never left the
same and was not able to do anything because he was overwhelmed with fear. Both the RTC and
CA found the accused guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide having acted in conspiracy
with other malefactors. Accused, however, argued that the prosecution failed to prove that he
was a co- conspirator.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is a co-conspirator in the commission of the crime charged.

HELD: Yes. Witness Eduardo Zulueta testified that accused was one of the robbers who poked a
gun at him. Therefore, it can be inferred from the role the accused played in the commission of
the robbery, that a conspiracy existed and he was part of it. To be a conspirator, one need not
participate in every detail of the execution; he need not even take part in every act or need not
even know the exact part to be performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. Each
conspirator may be assigned separate and different tasks which may appear unrelated to one
another but, in fact, constitute a whole collective effort to achieve their common criminal
objective. Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators.

PEOPLE VS. DELIMA

G.R. No. 222645

Doctrine:
There is an implied conspiracy if two or more persons aim their acts towards the accomplishment
of the same unlawful subject, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently
independent, are in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association
and a concurrence of sentiment and may be inferred though no actual meeting among them to
concert means is proved.

Facts:
Jose, a witness, saw Michael and Allan, together with three other assailants, ganging up on
Ramel. When the assailants saw Jose, three of the five assailants scampered away while the
Michael and Allan continued to beat Ramel. While Allan was stabbing Ramel, Michael was
holding the victim by his pants.
Michael and Allan, together with their co-accused, were charged with murder for the death of
Ramel Mercedes. And was proven to have conspired with each other to kill Ramel.
Accused argued that conspiracy was not proven because their actions do not establish that they
were motivated by a common desire.

Issue:
Whether conspiracy was established in this case

Ruling:
Yes. There is an implied conspiracy if two or more persons aim their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful subject, each doing a part so that their combined acts,
though apparently independent, are in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of
personal association and a concurrence of sentiment and may be inferred though no actual
meeting among them to concert means is proved. The essence of conspiracy is unity of action
and purpose.
In this case, it is readily apparent that Allan and Michael's concerted action was towards the
common purpose of hurting Ramel after they ganged up on him together with three other
unidentified malefactors. Then, accused-appellants were mutually motivated by the desire to kill
Ramel after Allan stabbed Ramel while Michael held the latter by the legs. Their concerted
actions cannot be brushed aside as separate and distinct because Michael continued to hold the
victim while Allan stabbed him several times.
G.R. No. 206437, November 22, 2017

LEANDRO CRUZ, EMMANUEL MANAHAN, ALRIC JERVOSO, Petitioners,

v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Facts: Manahan et al were charged with Qualified Theft the accusatory portion of which reads:
On the month of October, 2003, in the City of Makati whereas they hold a key position in the
company as such have access to the Warehouse and enjoying the trust and confidence reposed
upon them by complainant, with grave abuse of confidence, intent to gain and without the
knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, take, steal, and carry away the stock products held in the warehouse amounting to
1M belonging to Prestige Brands.

Issue: W/N they were guilty of Qualified Theft

Held: the following elements of Qualified Theft are (a) there must be taking of personal
property, which belongs to another; (b) such taking was done with intent to gain, and without the
owner's consent; (c) it was made with no violence or intimidation against persons nor force upon
things; and (d) it was done under any of the circumstances under Article 310 of the Revised
Penal Code, which circumstances include grave abuse of confidence.48

Put in another way, in order for petitioners to be found guilty of Qualified Theft, the prosecution
must prove with moral certainty that Prestige Brands lost its personal property by petitioners'
felonious taking49 thereof or by their acts of depriving Prestige Brands of its control and
possession without its consent.50

However, the prosecution miserably failed to discharge its burden. Wherefore, Manahan et al
are acquitted on the ground that their guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Their
immediate release from detention is hereby ordered, unless other lawful and valid grounds for
their further detention exist.
JOSE “JINGGOY” ESTRADA, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Respondents.
GR NO. 148965 February 26, 2002
Doctrine: In the American jurisprudence, the presence of several accused in multiple
conspiracies commonly involves two structures: (1) the so-called “wheel” or “circle” conspiracy,
in which there is a single person or group (the “hub”) dealing individually with two or more
other persons or groups (the “spokes”); and (2) the “chain” conspiracy, usually involving the
distribution of narcotics or other contraband, in which there is successive communication and
cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate business operations between manufacturer
and wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and consumer.
Facts:
Petitioner was among the respondents in one of the Information filed by the Ombudsman against
then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada for the crime of plunder under RA 7080. All the accused
named in the Amended Information in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d), thru their individual acts,
conspired with former President Estrada to enable the latter to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-
gotten wealth. As the Amended Information is worded, however, it is not certain whether the
accused in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) conspired with each other to enable the former President to
amass the subject ill-gotten wealth. Petitioner now contests the charge against him for alleged
offenses, and with alleged conspirators, with which and with whom he is not even remotely
connected.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is liable for conspiracy to commit plunder.
Ruling: NO. Petitioner cannot be penalized for the conspiracy entered into by the other accused
with the former President, however, he is liable for the predicate acts he allegedly committed in
conspiracy with the former President whose design was to amass ill-gotten wealth amounting to
more than P4 billion. The gravamen of the conspiracy charge therefore is not that each accused
agreed to receive protection money from illegal gambling; rather, it is that each of them, by their
individual acts, agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and
acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former President Estrada.
From a reading of the Amended Information, the case at bar appears similar to a “wheel”
conspiracy. The hub is former President Estrada while the spokes are all the accused, and the rim
that encloses the spokes is the common goal in the overall conspiracy, i.e., the amassing,
accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.
ARROYO, Petitioner, vs SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.

Doctrine: The Court recognized two nuances of appreciating conspiracy as a means to commit a
crime. The wheel conspiracy occurs when there is a single person or group (the hub) dealing
individually with two or more other persons or groups (the spokes). The spoke typically interacts
with the hub rather than with another spoke. In the event that the spoke shares a common
purpose to succeed, there is a single conspiracy. However, in the instances when each spoke is
unconcerned with the success of the other spokes, there are multiple conspiracies.

The chain conspiracy exists when there is successive communication and cooperation in much
the same way as with legitimate business operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then
wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and consumer. This involves individuals linked together
in a vertical chain to achieve a criminal objective. Once the State proved the conspiracy as a
means to commit a crime, each co-conspirator is as criminally liable as the others, for the act of
one is the act of all. A co-conspirator does not have to participate in every detail of the execution;
neither does he have to know the exact part performed by the co-conspirator in the execution of
the criminal act. Otherwise, the criminal liability of each accused is individual and independent.

FACTS: The Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan former President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo (GMA) and PCSO Budget and Accounts Manager Aguas (and some other officials of
PCSO and Commission on Audit for conspiracy to commit plunder.

The information reads that: During the period from January 2008 to June 2010 or sometime
prior or subsequent thereto, accused, all public officers commit an offense in relation to their
respective offices and taking undue advantage of their respective official positions, authority,
relationships, connections or influence, conniving, conspiring and confederating with one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate acquire,
directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of
PHP365,997,915.00, more or less, [by raiding the public treasury].

ISSUE: Whether or not the State sufficiently established the existence of conspiracy among
GMA, Aguas, and Uriarte.

HELD: NO. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony, and decide to commit it. When conspiracy is a means to commit a
crime, it is indispensable that the agreement to commit the crime among all the conspirators, or
their community of criminal design must be alleged and competently shown. In terms of proving
its existence, conspiracy takes two forms. the express form, which requires proof of an actual
agreement among all the co-conspirators to commit the crime and implied conspiracy exists
when two or more persons are shown to have aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of
the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently
independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association
and a concurrence of sentiment. GMA points out that all that the State showed was her having
affixed her unqualified "OK" on the requests for the additional CIFs by Uriarte. She argues that
such act was not even an overt act of plunder because it had no immediate and necessary relation
to plunder by virtue of her approval not being per se illegal or irregular.
G.R. No. 169084 January 18, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MELANIO DEL CASTILLO y
VARGAS, HERMOGENES DEL CASTILLO y VARGAS, ARNOLD AVENGOZA y
DOGOS, FELIX AVENGOZA y DOGOS, RICO DEL CASTILLO y RAMOS, and
JOVEN
DEL CASTILLO y ABESOLA, Accused-Appellants.
DOCTRINE: In order for self-defense to be appreciated, the accused must prove by clear and
convincing evidence the following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;
(b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself.20 On the other hand, the requisites of
defense of strangers are, namely: (a) unlawful aggression by the victim; (b) reasonable necessity
of the means to prevent or repel it; and (c) the person defending be not induced by revenge,
resentment, or other evil motive.
FACTS:
The eyewitness version of Perfinian recalled that the accused surrounded their victims
during the assault; that Arnold stabbed Graciano on the stomach with a bolo, causing Graciano to
fall to the ground; that Rico hacked Graciano with a bolo; that when Victor tried to escape by
running away, Hermogenes and Felix pursued and caught up with him; that Felix hacked Victor;
and that when Sabino ran away, Melanio and Joven pursued him. while PO3 Aguda and his
fellow officers recovered two shorts, a shirt, and a knife - all blood-stained from Melanio’s house
in Bulihan. Going next to the house of Hermogenes, Winifreda del Castillo, the latter’s wife,
turned over the bolo of Hermogenes. They learned that prior to the killings, Melanio had been
fuming at being cheated in a cockfight, and had uttered threats to kill at least three persons in
Bulihan.
The Defense offered the testimonies of the accused and Winifreda. The accused admitted
being in Bulihan at the time of the incident, but denied liability. Arnold and Joven invoked self-
defense and defense of strangers, while Melanio, Hermogenes, Rico and Felix interposed denial.
Winifreda corroborated the testimonies of Arnold and Joven.
the RTC convicted the accused of murder, but appreciated voluntary surrender as a
mitigating circumstance in favor of Hermogenes. the CA affirmed the convictions, correcting
only the awards of damages and the penalty imposed on Hermogenes

ISSUE: Whether or not accused Arnold and Joven should be absolved of criminal liability
becaus they acted in self-defense and defense of strangers

RULING: NO.
In self-defense and defense of strangers, unlawful aggression is a primordial element, a
condition sine qua non. If no unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is established, self-
defense and defense of strangers are unavailing, because there would be nothing to repel.
Arnold and Joven did not adequately prove unlawful aggression; hence, neither self-defense
nor defense of stranger was a viable defense for them. We note that in addition to the eyewitness
account of Perfinian directly incriminating them, their own actuations immediately after the
incident confirmed their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the CA and the RTC rightly
rejected their plea of self-defense and defense of stranger, for the nature and the number of
wounds sustained by the victims were important indicia to disprove self-defense.
People v. Olarbe, 23 July 2018 (self-defense and defense of stranger)

Doctrine:
“The accused who shows by clear and convincing evidence that the death of the victim arose
from the need for self-preservation in the face of the victim's deadly unlawful aggression, and
there was a reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the same, is entitled
to acquittal on the ground of self-defense in the absence of any indication of his having provoked
such unlawful aggression. In self-defense and defense of stranger, the circumstances as the
accused perceived them at the time of the incident, not as others perceived them, should be the
bases for determining the merits of the plea.”

Facts:

On 8 May 2006 at around 12:30 o'clock midnight, OLARBE voluntarily surrendered to police
officers at the Police Station of Luisiana, Laguna. OLARBE informed them that he happened to
have killed Romeo Arca (Arca) invoking self-defense. RTC pronounced him guilty of murder as
charged and the CA affirmed the conviction of Olarbe. Olarbe’s appeal before the SC submitted
that it was erroneous to reject his pleas of self-defense and defense of stranger because he had
killed Arca to save himself and his common-law wife from the latter's unlawful aggression; that
his use of the victim's gun and bolo to repel or stop the unlawful aggression was necessary and
reasonable; and that the killing was consequently legally justified.

Issue: Whether or not Olarbe is entitled to the justifying circumstances of self-defense and
defense of stranger.

Ruling: Yes.

Olarbe invoked self-defense and defense of stranger under Article 11of the Revised Penal Code.
The indispensable requisite for either of these justifying circumstances is that the victim must
have mounted an unlawful aggression against the accused or the stranger. Without such unlawful
aggression, the accused is not entitled to the justifying circumstance.

SC found that Arca committed continuous and persistent unlawful aggression against Olarbe and
his common-law spouse that lasted from the moment he forcibly barged into the house and
brandished his gun until he assaulted Olarbe's common-law spouse with the bolo. Although Arca
sustained several wounds, the majority of the wounds were lacerations whose nature and extent
were not explained. The lack of explanations has SC the means to fairly adjudge the
reasonableness of the means adopted by Olarbe to prevent or repel Arca's unlawful aggression.
Lastly, the absence of any showing that Olarbe had provoked Arca, or that he had been induced
by revenge, resentment or other evil motive has been equally palpable. SC deem to be
established, therefore, that the third elements of the justifying circumstances of self-defense and
defense of stranger were present.

With Olarbe being entitled to the justifying circumstances of self-defense and defense of a
stranger, his acquittal follows.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MAYINGQUE
G.R. No. 179709
July 6, 2010
Doctrine: The rule consistently adhered to in this jurisdiction is that when the accused admitted
that he was the author of the death of the victim and his defense was anchored on self-defense, it
becomes incumbent upon him to prove the justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the
court.
The rationale for this requirement is that the accused, having admitted the felonious wounding or
killing of his adversary, is to be held criminally liable for the crime unless he establishes to the
satisfaction of the court the fact of self-defense.

Facts:
Mayingque was indicted for the murder of a certain Edgardo who sustained 12 wounds in the
head, neck and chest, eight of which had been fatal.
For the Defendant, the death of Edgardo was only a self-defense. According to him, Edgardo
invited him to drink with them but he declined. His refusal irked Edgardo, who warned him not
be a toughie and hit him with a lead pipe and a wooden club (dos por dos), injuring his left chest.
Fortunately, he was able to pick up a small knife from a table used for peeling the mangoes, and
stabbed Edgardo on the head, neck and chest with the knife.

He did not report the incident to the police, and, instead, went home and did not anymore
submit himself for medical attention, because his wounds were only slight.

Issue:

Whether or not, Mayingque’s self-defense be qualified as justifying circumstance?

Held:

No. The Court held that the 12 injuries of the victim belie the self defense of accused Toribio
Mayingque.
The nature, number and location of the wounds sustained by the victim belie the assertion of
self-defense since the gravity of the said wounds is indicative of a determined effort to kill
and not just defend. The number of wounds was established by the physical evidence, which
is a mute manifestation of truth and ranks high in the hierarchy of trustworthy evidence.
The presence of a large number of wounds on the victim’s body negated self-defense, and
indicated, instead, a determined effort to kill the victim.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JONATHAN TICA Y EPANTO
G.R. No. 222561, August 30, 2017
PERALTA, J.:

Doctrine : To invoke self--defense successfully, there must have been an unlawful and
unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the accused, who was then forced to inflict
severe wounds upon the assailant by employing reasonable means to resist the attack.

Facts:
Jonathan Tica y Epanto (Tica) was indicted for Murder defined and penalized under
Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). In his arraignment, Tica pleaded "Not Guilty" to the
offense charged in the Information. He admitted killing Eduardo Intia (Intia), but put up the
justifying circumstance of self-defense; hence, reverse trial ensued while he was under detention.

The RTC convicted Tica of the crime charged, the requisites of self-defense were not met
to justify the killing of Intia. the CA ruled that Tica failed to discharge the burden of proving his
plea of self-defense by credible, clear, and convincing evidence. It agreed with the RTC that his
testimony is too incredible since it was not only uncorroborated by separate competent evidence
but also extremely doubtful in itself.

Issue :

Whether or not Self Defense is properly invoked.

Ruling:

The Court resolves to dismiss the appeal for failure to sufficiently show reversible error
in the judgment of conviction to warrant the exercise of Our appellate jurisdiction.

Considering that self-defense is an affirmative allegation and totally exonerates the

accused from any criminal liability, it is well settled that when it is invoked, the burden of
evidence shifts to the accused to prove it by credible, clear and convincing evidence. The
accused claiming self-- defense must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of the prosecution. Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when uncorroborated
by independent and competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself.

The essential elements of self-defense are the following: (1) unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim, (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such
aggression, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. To
invoke self--defense successfully, there must have been an unlawful and unprovoked attack that
endangered the life of the accused, who was then forced to inflict severe wounds upon the
assailant by employing reasonable means to resist the attack.
G.R. No. 213273 June 27, 2018
People of the Philippines vs. Leonardo B. Siega

Doctrine: An accused, who pleads self-defense, has the burden of proving, with clear and
convincing evidence, that the killing was attended by the following circumstances: (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent
or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
resorting to self-defense. Of these three, unlawful aggression is most important and
indispensable. Unlawful aggression refers to "an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to
inflict real imminent injury, upon a person." Without unlawful aggression, the justifying
circumstance of self-defense has no leg to stand on and cannot be appreciated.

Facts: Siega was about to enter his house when he heard a sound coming from the feeder road
facing his residence. When Siega turned to the source of the noise, he saw Pacenciano Bitoy
(Bitoy), rushing towards him and shouting at him to get out of his house so that they could end
their grudge against each other. As Bitoy was nearing him, Siega allegedly saw the former
attempting to draw the bolo that was wrapped on his waist. Scared by Bitoy's actions, Siega
immediately grabbed unto the bolo that was then beside him and hacked Bitoy. Siega inflicted
several injuries on Bitoy, before the latter retreated and ran away. Siega then went inside his
house, changed his clothes and surrendered to the authorities. Due to the severity of his wounds,
Bitoy died that afternoon. Accused contends that the act is self defense.
Issue: Whether or not the contention that the act was self defense is correct
Ruling: No. An accused, who pleads self-defense, has the burden of proving, with clear and
convincing evidence, that the killing was attended by the following circumstances: (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent
or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting
to self-defense. Of these three, unlawful aggression is most important and indispensable.
Unlawful aggression refers to "an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real
imminent injury, upon a person." Without unlawful aggression, the justifying circumstance of
self-defense has no leg to stand on and cannot be appreciated. In this case, records disclose that
Siega failed to establish unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, Bitoy. Thus, his claim of
self-defense must necessarily fail. In his version of the incident, Siega claimed that Bitoy came
rushing to his house armed with a bolo. When Bitoy attempted to draw his weapon, Siega picked
up a sharp pointed bolo and stabbed Bitoy several times. However, as duly pointed out by the
RTC and CA, Siega's account of events is belied by the straightforward and credible testimony of
a witness that Bitoy did not carry any weapon at that time. This was corroborated by the fact that
no weapon was recovered from the victim. Moreover, even if the Court were to believe Siega's
version of the events, still, no unlawful aggression can be deduced, because there was clearly no
imminent danger on the person of Siega as would justify his killing of Bitoy. Unlawful
aggression is predicated on an actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger — not merely a
threatening or intimidating action. Bitoy's supposed act of holding a weapon from his waist does
not pose any actual, sudden or imminent danger to the life and limb of Siega.
People vs. Gallonosa
July 17, 2017

Doctrine: SELF DEFENSE: There are three essential elements that must be established by an
accused claiming self-defense: (1) the victim committed unlawful aggression amounting to
actual and imminent threat to the life of the accused; (2) there was reasonable necessity of the
means employed by the accused to prevent or repel the attack; and (3) there was lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the accused claiming self-defense.
FACTS: On 2002, Dante and his common-law wife Maricel while on their way to a wedding
celebration, passed by the house of appellant, his relatives, namely Minda Gallanosa, Augusto
Gallanosa, Sr., Nonito Gallanosa, and Gina Gallanosa, started throwing stones at Dante.
Appellant then ran toward Dante and stabbed him on his left abdomen, causing Dante to fall on
the ground and die, when Nonilon too was stoned by Augusto Gallanosa, Sr. and was later
hacked and appellant continued to stab Nonilon several times. The defense claimed self-defense
because he witnessed Dante attacked and tried to stab Onto, he was also allegedly attacked by
Dante upon arrival that’s why he stabbed Dante with a Bolo thereafter, however the trial court
was able to find an eye witness proving the credibility of the prosecution’s version of Facts.
Thus, The trial court adjudged appellant guilty of two counts of murder, but acquitted Minda
Gallanosa for lack of evidence. On appeal, appellant contended that the trial court erred in
convicting him of murder despite proof of self-defense on his part.
ISSUE: Whether appellant was able to prove self-defense to acquit him in the two counts of
murder.
RULING: No, There are three essential elements that must be established by an accused
claiming self-defense: (1) the victim committed unlawful aggression amounting to actual and
imminent threat to the life of the accused; (2) there was reasonable necessity of the means
employed by the accused to prevent or repel the attack; and (3) there was lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the accused claiming self-defense. Nonilon, who was already kneeling
with his hands raised, was quite helpless when appellant started stabbing him. At that moment,
there was no unlawful aggression on the part of Nonilon which amounts to actual or imminent
threat to the life of appellant. Thus, the first element of unlawful aggression is already lacking in
this case. Also, Appellant's testimony that he "accidentally stabbed" Dante is incongruent with
his claim of self- defense. Unlawful aggression, as an essential and primary element of self-
defense, must be real and imminent and not merely speculative.
People v. Cosgafa, 10 July 2017 (self-defense)

Doctrine:
“Jurisprudence is to the effect that when self defense is pleaded, the accused thereby admits
being the author of the death of the victim, that it becomes incumbent upon him to prove the
justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the Court.”

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The accused-appellants Gio, Jimmy and Allan were convicted of Murder by the RTC of
Tagbilaran City and by the Court of Appeals for the death of Nathaniel Asombrado.
On the 25th day of October, the above named accused-appellants took turns in holding and
stabbing the victim and ran away when the victim fell on the ground. The victim was declared
dead at the hospital. The responding police officers immediately conducted a hot pursuit which
resulted to the accused-appellants’ arrest. During the trial, Gio and Jimmy admitted in open court
that they stabbed the victim but they interposed self-defense. They however averred that Allan
has no participation in killing the victim.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused-appellants killed the victim in self-defense;
Whether or not the accused-appellant were correctly convicted for Murder.

RULING:
The Court enumerated the following elements of self-defense which must be proven with by
clear and convincing evidence, to wit: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;
(2)reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

After a careful review of this case, the Court is satisfied that the RTC as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, correctly ruled that the above-enumerated elements are not present in this case.

For the charge of Murder the prosecution sufficiently proved the elements of Murder which are
(1) a person is killed; (2) the accused killed him; (3) the killing was attended by any of the the
qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) the killing
is not parricide or infanticide.

The qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, the Court finds the same as present.
Abuse of superior strength is present when the attackers cooperated in such a way as to secure
advantage of their combined strength to perpetrate the crime with impunity. Such qualifying
circumstance was perpetrated by the accused when they took turns to stab and maul the victim,
who was alone and unarmed.
PEOPLE VS. NARVAEZ
April 20, 1983

DOCTRINE: The justifying circumstance of self-defense is applicable only if the 3 requirements

are fulfilled. Art. 11(1) RPC enumerates these requisites: Unlawful aggression; Reasonable
necessity of means employed to prevent or repel attack; Lack of sufficient provocation on part of
person defending himself. Here, there was no provocation at all since he was asleep.

FACTS:
Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder (qualified by treachery) of David Fleischer and
Flaviano Rubia. On August 22, 1968, Narvaez shot Fleischer and Rubia during
the time the two were constructing a fence that would prevent Narvaez from getting into his
house and rice mill. The defendant was taking a nap when he heard sounds of construction
and found fence being made. He addressed the group and asked them to stop destroying his
house and asking if they could talk things over. Fleischer responded with "No, gadamit, proceed,
go ahead." Defendant lost his "equilibrium," and shot Fleisher with his shotgun. He also shot
Rubia who was running towards the jeep where the deceased's gun was placed. The CFI ruled
that Narvaez was guilty. Aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation offset by the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. For both murders, CFI sentenced him to
reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs, and to pay for
moral damages.

ISSUES:

WON the court erred in convicting defendant-appellant although he acted in defense of his

rights. RULING:

No. However, the argument of the justifying circumstance of self-defense is applicable only if
the 3 requirements are fulfilled. Art. 11(1) RPC enumerates these requisites:
 Unlawful aggression. In the case at bar, there was unlawful aggression towards
appellant's property rights. Fleisher had given Narvaez 6 months and he should have left him in
peace before time was up, instead of chiseling Narvaez's house and putting up fence. Art. 536 of
the Civil Code also provides that possession may not be acquired through force or intimidation;
while Art. 539 provides that every possessor has the right to be respected in his possession
 Reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent or repel attack. In the case, killing
was disproportionate to the attack.
 Lack of sufficient provocation on part of person defending himself. Here, there was no
provocation at all since he was asleep.
PEOPLE VS CABALQUINTO, 19 September 2006

DOCTRINE: Sec. 44 of RA 9262 similarly provides that confidentiality.—All records pertaining

to cases of violence against women and their children including those in the barangay shall be
confidential and all public officers and employees and public or private clinics or hospitals shall
respect the right to privacy of the victim. Whoever publishes or causes to be published, in any
format, the name, address, telephone number, school, business address, employer, or other
identifying information of a victim or an immediate family member, without the latter’s consent,
shall be liable to the contempt power of the court.

FACTS:
ABC testified that she is the common-law wife of Cabalquinto and that they have four
children namely BBB, CCC, the child-victim AAA, and DDD. At around 8:45PM of November
13, 1998, she was on her way home. Since there is a half-inch gap between the door and the wall,
she peeped through the gap and saw Cabalquinto lying face down making pumping motions on
their daughter, AAA, who was lying underneath him with her panties pulled down. When she
heard Cabalquinto tell AAA to open her legs ("ibuka mo"), she kicked and pounded the door.
Cabalquinto immediately lay down. AAA then stood up and opened the door. ABC entered the
room and confronted Cabalquinto who only denied her accusation. ABC and her daughter AAA
testified during the police investigation, AAA revealed to the police that a similar incident
happened to her on November 8, 1998, the day of her friend’s birthday celebration. Trial court
found the accused guilty of the crime of rape.
The mother of the child abuse victim submitted that confidentiality and the best interest
of the child must prevail over public access to information and pleaded that her daughter’s case,
as well as those of a similar nature, be excluded from the Web Page.

ISSUE:
Whether the identity of the aggrieved party should not be disclosed in line with the right
to privacy and confidentiality

RULING:
Yes. Posting of the full text of decisions in cases involving child abuse on the Supreme
Court Web Page violates the right to privacy of the aggrieved parties. Records of the cases shall
be treated with utmost confidentiality. In order to determine whether the subject matter upon
which the right to privacy being invoked falls within the constitutionally-protected zone of
privacy, it must be shown that the person’s expectation of privacy is reasonable. The Court shall
withhold the real name of the victim-survivor and shall use fictitious initials instead to represent
her. Likewise, the personal circumstances of the victims-survivors or any other information
tending to establish or compromise their identities, as well those of their immediate family or
household members, shall not be disclosed.
G.R. No. 135981
January 15, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
MARIVIC GENOSA, appellant.

Doctrine: “Absent unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete.”

Facts:
Appellant attacked and wounded her husband, which ultimately led to his death. According to the
appellant she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night it was her husband who began
the provocation. The Appellant said she was frightened that her husband would hurt her and she wanted to
make sure she would deliver her baby safely. The Appellant after being interviewed by specialists, has
been shown to be suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome.

The appellant with a plea of self defense admitted the killing of her husband, she was then found guilty of
Parricide, with the aggravating circumstance of treachery, for the husband was attacked while asleep.

Issue:
Can appellant be granted the Justifying circumstance of Self-defense?

Ruling:
No, since self- defense since the existence of Battered Woman Syndrome, which the appellant has been
shown to be suffering in the relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of the woman to kill her
abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-defense.

In the present case, however, according to the testimony of the appellant there was a sufficient time
interval between the unlawful aggression of the husband and her fatal attack upon him. She had already
been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their children's bedroom. During that time,
he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed
had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.

The court reiterated the principle that aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant self-defense. In the
absence of such aggression, there can be no self-defense -- complete or incomplete -- on the part of the
victim. Thus, appellant's killing of her husband was not completely justified under the circumstances.
RUSTAN ANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS
GR. No. 182835; April 20, 2010
DOCTRINE:
“The elements of the crime violence against women through harassment are:
a. The offender has or had sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman;
b. The offender, himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of harassment
against the woman; and,
c. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.
Facts:
Accused Ang and complainant Sagud were classsmates at Wesleyan University in Aurora.
Accused courted the complainant and they had an “on-off” relationship. Complainant learned
afterwards that accused had a live-in partner who he impregnated and thus, she broke up with
him and accused subsequently got married. Sometime in 2005, complainant received a
multimedia message (MMS) from one of the numbers used by the accused, a picture of a naked
woman with the former’s face superimposed on the picture. Complainant received threats from
the accused that he will post the picture he sent to the internet which prompted the complainant
to report the accused to the proper authorities. The Regional Trial Court found Ang to be guilty
of the violation of Section 5(h) of RA 9262 and on appeal, the same was affirmed.
Issue:
Does a single act of harassment already constitute a violation of Section 5(h) of Republic Act No.
9262?
Held:
Yes. Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 9262 punishes “any act or series of acts” that
constitute violence against women and children. This means that a single act of harassment,
which translates violence would be enough. The object of the law is to protect the women and
children. Punishing only violence that is repeatedly committed would license isolated ones.
Dabalos vs RTC
G.R. No. 193960; January 7, 2013

Doctrine: “For RA 9262 to be applicable, it is immaterial whether the relationship had ceased
for as long as there is sufficient evidence showing the past or present existence of such
relationship between the offender and the victim when the physical harm was committed.”

Facts:

Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 5(a) of RA 9262 for using personal violence on
the complainant, by pulling her hair, punching complainant’s back, shoulder and left eye, thereby
demeaning and degrading the complainant’s intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being.

Petitioner averred that at the time of the alleged incident on July 13, 2009, he was no longer in a
dating relationship with private respondent; hence, RA 9262 was inapplicable.
Issue: Whether RA 9262 should be construed in a manner that will favor the accused,
Ruling:
Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262 reads:

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.- As used in this Act, (a) "Violence against women and their
children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is
his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or
illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical,
sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts,
battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. x x x.”

Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the
offended woman, for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the act of violence be
a consequence of such relationship. Hence, applying the rule on statutory construction that when
the law does not distinguish, neither should the courts, then, clearly, the punishable acts refer to
all acts of violence against women with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating
relationship. As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial whether the relationship had ceased
for as long as there is sufficient evidence showing the past or present existence of such
relationship between the offender and the victim when the physical harm was committed.
AAA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
G.R. 229762 NOVEMBER 28, 2018
GESMUNDO, J.:

Doctrine:
In fine, good faith and absence of criminal intent are not valid defenses in offenses
punished under R.A. No. 9262, the latter being a special law.

Facts:
Petitioner is an OFW who is married to private complainant for 19 years. Private
complainant incurred debts during their marriage and had some of their household items
as collateral which sparked the argument between thw two that resulted with petitioner
physically and verbally harming complainant. He was charged and founf guilty by the
RTC with violating Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, or the Anti-Violence Against Women and
Their Children Act of 2004. CA affirmedthe ruling but modified the punishment marking that
petitioners emotional response was a natural reaction of a person who found out that the fruits of
his hard work had been squandered as mitigating circumstances.

Issue:
Whether or not CA erred in applying a mitigating circumstance in?

Ruling:
Yes. In order to be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, the
following elements should occur: (1) there should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to
produce such condition of mind; and (2) said act which produced the obfuscation was not far
removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the
perpetrator might recover his moral equanimity. This circumstance is considered mitigating
because by reason of causes naturally producing powerful excitement in a person, he loses his
reason and self-control, thereby diminishing the exercise of his will power.
The elements for the consideration of the mitigating circumstance are missing. Private
complainant did not commit any unlawful act against petitioner that would cause such a reaction
from him. Private complainant's acts also cannot be considered as providing a legitimate
stimulus justifying petitioner's reaction – where he lost reason and
self-control.
G.R. No. 223477
CELSO M.F.L. MELGAR vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Doctrine: “Under Section 5 (e) of RA 9262, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the
child is considered an act of violence against women and children. Notably, case law instructs
that the act of denying support to a child is a continuing offense.”

FACTS: An Information was filed charging the accused with violation Section 5 of RA 9262 for
committing acts of economic abuse against one AAA, and her minor son, BBB, by depriving
them of financial support. The accused and AAA entered into a compromise agreement and the
criminal aspect of the case was provisionally dismissed. However, a year later, accused sold the
property which was supposed to, among others, answer for the support-in-arrears of his son
pursuant to their compromise agreement. The RTC then revived the criminal aspect of the case
and subsequently found the accused guilty of economic abuse under Section 5 (e) of RA 9262.
The CA affirmed the same.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly upheld the accused's conviction for violation of Section
5 (e) of RA 9262.

HELD: Yes. RA 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence
against women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners, or with
whom the woman has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate,
within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in, inter alia, economic
abuse. "Economic abuse" may include the deprivation of support of a common child of the man-
accused and the woman-victim, whether such common child is legitimate or not. In this case, the
courts a quo correctly found that all the elements of violation of Section 5 (e) of RA 9262 are
present, as it was established that: (a) Accused and AAA had a romantic relationship, resulting in
BBB's birth; (b) Accused freely acknowledged his paternity over BBB; (c) Accused failed to
provide BBB support ever since the latter was just a year old; and (d) his intent of not supporting
BBB was made more apparent when he sold his property which was supposed to answer for,
among others, his support-in-arrears to BBB.
GARCIA VS. DRILON
G. R. No. 179267

Doctrine:

Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.

Facts:
Petitioner Garcia (husband) admitted having an affair with a woman, other than his spouse, and
unconscionably beat up their daughter.

T he RTC found that there was imminent danger of violence against respondent and her children
and issued a series of Temporary Protection Orders under VAWC Law.

Hence, the petitioner challenged the constitutionality of VAWC law on violate the guaranty of
equal protection of the laws, since it favors women over men as victims of violence and abuse.

Issue:
Whether the VAWC law violates the equal protection clause.

Ruling:
No. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.

All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it
must be germane to the purpose of the law; not limited to existing conditions only; and apply
equally to each member of the class.

The non-identical treatment of women and men under RA 9262 is justified to put them on equal
footing and to give substance to the policy and aim of the state to ensure the equality of women
and men in light of the biological, historical, social, and culturally endowed differences
between men and women.
G.R. No. 168852 September 30, 2008

SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES PERFECTO C. TAN and JUANITA L. TAN, Respondents.*

Doctrine: Article 10 of the RPC provides:

ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. – Offenses which are or in the
future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This
Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the
contrary

Facts:

Spouses Tan were married and blessed with 2 kids, Petitioner filed a petition with prayer for the
issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO) against Steven, in conspiracy with respondents,
were causing verbal, psychological, and economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5,
paragraphs (e) (2) (3) (4), (h) (5) and (i) of Republic Act No. 9262.

Issue:
Whether or not respondents-spouses, Perfecto and Juanita, parents-in-law of Sharica, may be
included in the petition for the issuance of a protective order, in accordance with RA 9262.

Held:

Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women and their children'' as "any act or
a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or
against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom
he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without
the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or
suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion,
harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty."

While the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by
marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application
of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC.Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly
provides for the suppletory application of the RPC,

SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal Code and other
applicable laws, shall have suppletory application. (Emphasis supplied)