G.R. No.

L-13403 March 23, 1960

RAMON E. SAURA
vs.
ESTELA P. SINDICO

Ramon E. Saura and Estela P. Sindico were contesting for nomination as the official
candidate of the Nacionalista Party in the fourth district of Pangasinan in the congressional elections
of November 12, 1957. On August 23, 1957, the parties entered into a written agreement bearing the
same date, containing among other matters stated therein, a pledge that —

Each aspirant shall respect the result of the aforesaid convention, i.e., no one of us shall
either run as a rebel or independent candidate after losing in said convention.

In the provincial convention held by the Nacionalista Party on August 31, 1957, Saura was elected
and proclaimed the Party's official congressional candidate for the aforesaid district of
Pangasinan. Nonetheless, Sindico, in disregard of the covenant, filed, on September 6, 1957, her
certificate of candidacy for the same office with the Commission on Elections, and she openly and
actively campaigned for her election. Wherefore, on October 5, 1957, plaintiff Saura commenced this
suit for the recovery of damages. Upon motion of the defendant, the lower court, in its order of
November 19, 1957, dismissed the complaint on the basis that the agreement sued upon is null
and void, in that (1) the subject matter of the contract, being a public office, is not within the
commerce of man; and (2) the "pledge" was in curtailment of the free exercise of elective franchise
and therefore against public policy. Hence, this appeal.

SUPREME COURT

We agree with the lower court in adjudging the contract or agreement in question a nullity.

Among those that may not be the subject matter (object) of contracts are certain rights of individuals,
which the law and public policy have deemed to exclude from the commerce of man. Among them
are the political rights conferred upon citizens, including, but not limited to, once's right to vote, the
right to present one's candidacy to the people and to be voted to public office, provided, however,
that all the qualifications prescribed by law obtain. Such rights may not, therefore, be bargained
away curtailed with impunity, for they are conferred not for individual or private benefit or
advantage but for the public good and interest.

Constitutional and statutory provision fix the qualifications of persons who may be eligible for certain
elective public offices. Said requirements may neither be enlarged nor reduced by mere agreements
between private parties. A voter possessing all the qualifications required to fill an office may, by
himself or through a political party or group, present his candidacy without further limitations than
those provided by law.

Every voter has a right to be a candidate for public office if he possesses the qualifications
required to fill the office. It does not necessarily follow that he can be the candidate of a
particular political party. The statute provides when and how one may be a candidate of a
political party. If he cannot fill the requirement so as to be the candidates of the political party
of his choice, he may still be a candidate at the general election by petition. The right of the
voter to vote at the general election for whom he pleases cannot be limited.

In the case at hand, plaintiff complains on account of defendant's alleged violation of the "pledge" in
question by filing her own certificate o candidacy for a seat in the Congress of the Philippines and in
openly and actively campaigning for her election. In the face of the preceding considerations, we
certainly cannot entertain plaintiff's action, which would result in limiting the choice of the electors to
only those persons selected by a small group or by party boses.

Appellant likewise cites and quotes a portion of our ruling in Monsale vs. Nico, 83 Phil., 758; 46 Off.
Gaz., 210, to the effect that it is not incompetent or a candidate to withdraw or annul his certificate of
candidacy. This is not in point, for while we stated there that he may do so, there being no legal
prohibition against such a voluntary withdrawal, it does not follow, nor did we imply anywhere in the
decision, that in case there is any agreement or consideration for such a withdrawal, said agreement
or consideration should be held valid or given effect.

Wherefore, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.
 G.R. No. L-21624 February 27, 1968

SEGUNDO SANTOS
vs.
SECRETARY OF LABOR, RAOUL M. INOCENTES,

Segundo Santos was, for a number of years, employed as Labor Conciliator I (Regional
Office No. 4) of the Department of Labor. His monthly pay was P259/month.

On August 24, 1960, he was extended an appointment (promotion) as Labor Conciliator II

(Regional Office No. 3, Manila) with compensation per annum of P3,493, vice Juan Mendoza, Jr.,
resigned. This appointment, effective September 1, 1960, was approved by the Commissioner of
Civil Service on May 14, 1962, and released to the Department of Labor on May 25, 1962.

In June of 1962, respondent Secretary of Labor appointed Ricardo Tiongco, one of the
respondents, to the same position of Labor Conciliator II. 1

Petitioner's demand for the revocation of respondent Tionco's appointment and payment to
him (Santos) of salary differentials was rejected by respondent Secretary of Labor.

From the foregoing events stemmed the present petition for mandamus filed on August 20,
1962 three days before Santos actually retired from the service which was an August 23, 1962. 2 The
petition prays, inter alia, that respondents be commanded to nullify the appointment of Tiongco, and
to uphold as legal and existing petitioner's appointment, as Labor Conciliator II, from September 1,
1960; and that the salary differentials aforesaid be paid petitioner. Respondents seasonably
answered the petition.

Before the case could be tried on the merits that is, on February 14, 1963, Santos died. A
motion to substitute the "Estate of Segundo Santos, deceased." represented by Rodolfo Santos, one
of the heirs, was filed. This triggered a move on respondents' part to seek dismissal of the case.

The court, on April 10, 1963, dismissed the petition without costs. Hence, this appeal on
purely questions of law.

1. The threshold question is this: May the Estate of Segundo Santos, deceased, be
substituted in place of petitioner herein?

SUPREME COURT:

Public office is a public trust. 3 It is personal to the incumbent thereof or appointee

thereto. In this sense, it is not property which passes to his heirs. None of the heirs may replace him
in that position. It is in this context that we say that the Estate of the deceased Segundo Santos may
not press Santos' claim that he be allowed to continue holding office as Labor Conciliator II. Actio
personalis moritur cum persona.

But jurisdiction of the court had attached before the death of Santos. That jurisdiction
continues until the termination of the suit. It is true that what is left is a money claim for salary
differentials. But death will not dislodge jurisdiction on that money claim — it subsists. Resolution of
this question depends upon the right of Segundo Santos to the position of Labor Conciliator II.

We rule that the Estate of the deceased Segundo Santos may be substituted for him in the
present proceedings. We do so now. 1äwphï1.ñët

2. We go to the merits.

Stripped of unnecessary details, the facts are: On August 24, 1960, petitioner, a second grade
eligible, was appointed Labor Conciliator II at an annual compensation of P3,493 effective
September 1, 1960. As far as salary is concerned, no law, rule or regulation has been violated.
Because, an annual pay of P3,493 is well within the range provided for second grade civil service
eligibles. 4

Respondents challenge the legality of petitioner's appointment as Labor Conciliator II. They
say that such appointment is within the prohibition set forth in the memorandum circular of the Civil
Service Commission, thus: "Employees should not be assigned or promoted to positions the initial
rate of the salary allocation of which exceed the maximum allowable for their eligibility."
Respondents likewise aver that it was because of this circular, that the appointment of petitioner as
Labor Conciliator II was recalled on September 7, 1961. The circular was not violated.
 And the withdrawal of petitioner's appointment is not a proven fact. What the record clearly
discloses is that the original appointment of petitioner as Labor Conciliator II was not taken out of the
Civil Service Commission; it was approved by the Commissioner of Civil Service on May 14, 1962
and released to the Secretary of Labor on May 25, 1962.

More important now is that the defense of recall has been abandoned by respondents. The
case was ready for trial below. They did not go to trial. Instead, they thought it advantageous to them
— upon petitioner's death — to submit their case on their motion to dismissed solely on legal
grounds, namely, that the death of petitioner extinguished the controversy, and that the remaining
claim for damages is ancillary to mandamus and is also abated by death.

The money claim here involved, however, descended to Santos' heirs. And, as we have earlier
in this opinion stated, his Estate may prosecute that claim to its conclusion.

It will not be in harmony with our sense of justice to return this case to the court below — at
this stage — just to allow respondents to prove their defense of recall of petitioner's appointment.

Respondents had a choice: To go to trial on the merits upon the issues raised in their answer;
or, seek to overthrow petitioner's case on legal issues. They did elect the latter. They cannot be
permitted once again to return to the lower court for a trial on the merits. 5 Suitors should not normally
be allowed to gamble with court proceedings in the hope of obtaining beneficial results. It is unfair
that this case should, on respondents' choice, be made to bounce from the lower court to this Court,
and back to the lower court and perhaps only to be appealed once again to an appellate court. The
ensuing delay, increased cost of litigation, and trouble and anxiety and harassment to be caused to
the adverse party, the wastage of the courts' time — these are reasons potent enough to support
this view.

At all events, petitioner's right to salary differentials and the duty to pay him are both clear.
Civil Service approval completed petitioner's appointment, 6 clinched the case for him.

Upon the view we take of this case, we vote to reverse the order of the Court of First Instance
of Manila dated April 10, 1963, and to direct the Secretary of Labor and the corresponding Cashier
to pay the Estate of the deceased petitioner Segundo Santos the sum of P761.68.

No costs. So ordered.
 G.R. No. L-30057 January 31, 1984

BRUNO O. APARRI, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and LAND AUTHORITY, the latter in substitution for REMEDIOS O.
FORTICH, as Chairman, ANGELINO M. BANZON, RAFAEL B. HILAO, VALERIANO PLANTILLA
and SEVERO YAP, as members of the Board of Directors of the defunct National
Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA), respondents.

FACTS:

On January 15, 1960, private respondents (as members of the Board of Directors of the defunct
National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration created under Republic Act No. 1160,
approved June 18, 1954 — NARRA) approved the following resolution:

RESOLUTION NO. 13 (Series of 1960)

RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, to appoint Mr. Bruno 0. Aparri, as General

Manager of the (NARRA) with all the rights, prerogatives and compensation
appurtenant thereto);

RESOLVED FURTHER, as it is hereby resolved, to inform the President of the

Philippines of the above appointment of Mr. Aparri

Pursuant thereto, private respondent Remedies O. Fortich, in her capacity as Chairman of the
NARRA Board, appointed petitioner Bruno O. Aparri as reflected in the following letter:

The power of the Board of Directors of the NARRA to appoint the general manager is provided for in
paragraph (2),Section 8, Republic Act No. 1160 (approved June 18, 1954), to wit:

On March 15, 1962, the same Board of Directors approved the following resolution:

RESOLUTION NO. 24 (Series of 1962)

WHEREAS, the Chairman of the Board has transmitted to the Board of Directors
the desire of the Office of the President Malacanang, Manila, to fix the term of
office of the incumbent General Manager up to the close of office hours on March 31,
1962, in accordance with the provision of Section 8, sub-section 2 of R.A. No. 1160;

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, that the Board of

Directors hereby fix, as it is hereby fixed, the term of office of the incumbent
General Manager of the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation
Administration (NARRA) to March 31, 1962

Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction with the then Court of First
Instance of Manila praying to annul the resolution of the NARRA Board dated March 15, 1962, to
command the Board to allow petitioner to continue in office as General Manager until he
vacates said office in accordance with law.

When the case was still pending decision in the lower court, Republic Act No. 3844, otherwise
known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, took effect. The said law abolished the NARRA and
transferred its functions and powers to the Land Authority. Consequently, the then Court of First
Instance of Manila rendered judgment, finding "that this case has become academic by reason of the
approval of the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844) and thereby dismissing the
instant petition”

Court of Appeals:

On appeal to the then Court of Appeals, the appellate tribunal affirmed the decision of the
lower court. in dismissing the petition for mandamus.

In the light of the foregoing facts, it is evident that Bruno O. Aparri accepted the
position of General Manager without fixed term and his appointment is, in essence,
terminable at the pleasure of the appointing power which, in this case, is the Board of
Directors.

Considering that the term of office of the General Manager of the NARRA is not fixed
by law nor has it been fixed by the Board of Directors at the time of his appointment
 although it had the power to do so, it is obvious that the term of office of herein
petitioner Bruno O. Aparri expired on March 31, 1962 and his right to hold the said
office was thereby extinguished. In other words,

Bruno O. Aparri cessation from office invokes no removal but merely the expiration
of the term of office which was within the power of the Board of Directors to fix.

The motion for reconsideration was denied.

SUPREME COURT:

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the then Court of Appeals.
The only legal issue sought to be reviewed is

ISSUE:

whether or not Board Resolution No. 24 was a removal or dismissal of petitioner without cause.

RULING:

WE affirm. WE hold that the term of office of the petitioner expired on March 31, 1962.

A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given
period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested
with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercise by him for the benefit
of the public ([Mechem Public Offices and Officers,]

Sec. 1). The right to hold a public office under our political system is therefore not a natural right. It
exists, when it exists at all only because and by virtue of some law expressly or impliedly creating
and conferring it (Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64).

There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to hold
office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and
tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary (42 Am. Jur. 881).

The National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) was created under Republic
Act No. 1160.

Paragraph 2, Section 8 of Republic Act 1160 expressly gives to the Board of Directors of the NARRA
the power "to appoint and fix the term of office of the general manager ... subject to the
recommendation of Economic Coordination and the approval of the President of the Philippines".

By "appointment" is meant the act of designation by the executive officer, board or body, to whom
that power has been delegated, of the individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office
(Mechem op. cit., Sec. 102).

When the power of appointment is absolute, and the appointee has been determined upon, no
further consent or approval is necessary, and the formal evidence of the appointment, the
commission, may issue at once.

Where, however, the assent or confirmation of some other officer or body is required, the
Commission can issue or the appointment is complete only when such assent or condition is
obtained.

To constitute an "appointment" to office, there must be some open, unequivocal act of appointment
on the part of the appointing authority empowered to make it, and it may be said that an
appointment to office is made and is complete when the last act required of the appointing authority
has been performed. In either case, the appointment becomes complete when the last act required
of the appointing power is performed.

The petitioner was appointed as general manager pursuant to Resolution No. 13 of the Board of
Directors. A careful perusal of the resolution points out the fact that the appointment is by itself
incomplete because of the lack of approval of the President of the Philippines to such
appointment. Thus, We note that Resolution No. 13 states:

xxx xxx xxx

 ... RESOLVED FURTHER, as it is hereby resolved, to inform the President of the
Philippines of the above appointment of Mr. Aparri (p. 2, rec.).

Presumably, the Board of Directors of the NARRA expected that such appointment be given
approval by the then President. Lacking such approval by the President as required by the law (par.
2, Sec. 8 of R.A. 1160), the appointment of petitioner was not complete.

The petitioner can, at best, be classified as a de facto officer because he assumed office "under
color of a known appointment or election, void because the officer was not eligible or because there
was a want of power in the electing body, or by reasons of some defect or irregularity in its exercise,
such ineligibility, want of power, or defect being unknown to the public" (State vs. Carroll, 38 Conn.
449, 9Am. Rep. 409).

However, such appointment was made complete upon approval of Resolution No. 24 (series of
1962-approved March 15, 1962) wherein the President submitted to the Board his "desire" to fix the
term of office of the petitioner up to the close of office hours on March 31, 1962. The questioned
resolution corrected whatever requisite lacking in the earlier Resolution No. 13 of the respondent
Board. Resolution No. 24, approved by the respondent Board and pursuant to "the desire of the
President" legally fixed the term of office of petitioner as mandated by paragraph 2, Section 8 of
Republic Act 1160.

The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes
that an officer may hold an office. According to Mochem, the term of office is the period during which
an office may be held. Upon the expiration of the officer's term, unless he is authorized by law to
hold over, his rights, duties and authority as a pubic officer must ipso facto cease (Mechem, op. cit.,
Secs. 396-397).

In the law on Public Officers, the most natural and frequent method by which a public officer ceases
to be such is by the expiration of the term for which he was elected or appointed. The question of
when this event has occurred depends upon a number of considerations, the most prominent of
which, perhaps, are whether he was originally elected or appointed for a definite term or for a
termdependent upon some act or event ... (Mechem op. cit., Sec. 384).

It is necessary in each case to interpret the word "term" with the purview of statutes so as to
effectuate the statutory scheme pertaining to the office under examination.

In the case at bar, the term of office is not fixed by law. However, the power to fix the term is vested
in the Board of Directors subject to the recommendation of the Office of Economic Coordination and
the approval of the President of the Philippines. Resolution No. 24 (series of 1962) speaks of no
removal but an expiration of the term of office of the petitioner. The statute is undeniably clear. The
courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words (Hondoras
vs. Soto, 8 Am. St., Rep. 744).

The reason for the rule is that the legislature must be presumed to know the meaning of words, to
have used words advisedly and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found
in the statute (50 Am. Jur. p. 212).

Removal entails the ouster of an incumbent before the expiration of his term (Manalang vs.
Quitoriano, 50 O.G. 2515). The petitioner in this case was not removed before the expiration of his
term. Rather, his right to hold the office ceased by the expiration on March 31, 1962 of his term to
hold such office.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. Nos. 95275-76 July 23, 1991

SIXTO DE LA VICTORIA, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HEIRS OF GENOVEVA S. MEDINA represented by FAUSTINO
MESINA, JR., JUAN ALAO and VICTOR S. MESINA, respondents.

Constante P. Pimentel, et al. for petitioner.

Regulo M. Bantasan for the Intervenor Aquilino Cantiga, Jr. Sixto, Brillantes, Jr. for Heirs of
Genoveva S. Mesina.
Evergisto B. Escalon for respondents Juan Alao and Victor S. Mesina.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

This petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order assails the order of the
Commission on Elections En Banc (COMELEC, for short) which allowed the substitution of the heirs
of a deceased candidate as protestee in the election protest filed by her rival for the office of
municipal mayor of Albuera, Leyte, in the local elections on February 1, 1988, and allowed the same
heirs to appeal the decision of the Regional Trial Court declaring her rival (the protestant and herein
petitioner), as the actual winner in that election.

The contenders for the mayorship of Albuera, Leyte in the special local elections held on February 1,
1988 were petitioner Sixto De la Victoria who obtained 5,093 votes, the late Genoveva S. Mesina
who obtained 5,103 votes, and Loly C. Fian who garnered 982 votes. On February 3, 1988, the
Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Mesina as the duly elected municipal mayor of Albuera,
Leyte. Elected and proclaimed vice-mayor was her running-mate, Aquilino Cantiga, Jr.

In due time, the defeated mayoral candidate, De la Victoria, filed two pre-proclamation cases (SPC
Nos. 88-560 and 88-614) in the COMELEC but even while they were still pending in the commission,
he filed on October 21, 1988 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 14 in Baybay, Leyte, an
election protest Ex Abundante Cautela against Mesina (docketed as Election Protest No. B-44) with
claims for damages, attorney's fees, and costs. Mesina filed an Answer with counterclaims for
damages and attorney's fees.

On July 22, 1989, Mesina died and was substituted as protestee by her Vice-Mayor, Aquilino
Cantiga, Jr., who assumed the mayorship by operation of law. Neither Mesina's heirs (the private
respondents herein), nor her counsel informed the trial court about her death.

On May 16, 1990, De la Victoria withdrew from the COMELEC En Banc, his pre-proclamation
complaints (SPC Cases Nos. 88-560 and 88-614). The COMELEC granted his motion.

On June 18, 1990, the incumbent Mayor, Aquilino Cantiga, Jr., filed in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) a verified "Petition to Intervene" in the election protest of De la Victoria.

On June 20, 1990, De la Victoria filed a "Manifestation/Motion" waiving his claim for damages and
costs against the deceased protestee, Mesina. The trial court granted the motion (p. 389, Rollo).

On June 22, 1990, counsel for Mesina filed a Notice of Death and Motion for Substitution of the
deceased protestee by her heirs, and requested that his motion be set for hearing on July 2, 1990.

De la Victoria opposed the motion for substitution on the ground that the heirs of Mesina are not the
"real party in interest" and that since he (De la Victoria) had waived his claim for damages against
the deceased, her heirs have no more right to intervene in the case or have been "erased from the
picture altogether".

On July 2, 1990, the trial court noted the Motion for Substitution filed by the heirs of Mesina and
ruled that De la Victoria's waiver of his claim for damages against the said protestee rendered the
Motion for Substitution without basis in law, or moot and academic.

On July 17, 1990, the trial court promulgated a decision in the Election Protest No. B-44, declaring
the protestant, De la Victoria, as the duly elected Mayor of Albuera, Leyte, by a margin of 134 votes
over the deceased protestee, Genoveva S. Mesina.
Two days later, on July 19, 1990, the heirs of Mesina appealed to the COMELEC by a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain the trial court from rendering a
decision in Election Protest No. B-44 or conducting further proceedings therein.

On July 20, 1990, the heirs of Mesina filed in the trial court a Notice of Appeal. De la Victoria filed an
"Urgent Motion to Disregard Notice of Appeal" on the ground that the heirs had no standing in the
case as they failed to appeal the July 2, 1990 Order of the trial court denying their motion for
substitution. The trial court in its Order of July 23, 1990, denied the Notice of Appeal and ordered its
expulsion from the record of the case. It held that the intervenor, Vice-Mayor Cantiga, who
succeeded the deceased protestee by operation of law, not the "heirs" of the deceased, is the "real
party in interest" in the continuation of the election protest after the demise of the protestee.
Moreover, upon the waiver by De la Victoria of his claim for damages against Mesina, the latter's
heirs had no more legal interest to defend in her behalf.

On July 24, 1990, De la Victoria filed a motion for execution of the trial court's decision. It was
granted by the court on July 25, 1990. Promptly, on the same day, De la Victoria was sworn into
office as the duly elected Mayor of Albuera.

As earlier mentioned, the heirs of Mesina appealed that decision to the COMELEC by a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction (SPR
No. 9-90). In his Comment on the petition, De la Victoria adverted to the decision dated July 17,
1990 of the trial court which became final and executory when no appeal was taken therefrom.

On the same date, the COMELEC denied the heirs' application for a temporary restraining order
(TRO), but set the case for hearing before the COMELEC En Banc for "preliminary determination of
the sufficiency of the allegations in the main issue raised by said respondents-heirs."

De la Victoria opposed the petition.

On August 6, 1990, the heirs filed in the COMELEC another petition

for certiorari and mandamus (SPR No. 11-90), praying that the execution of the decision of the trial
court in Election Protest No. B-44 be stopped.

On August 8, 1990, De la Victoria assumed office as Mayor of Albuera, Leyte.

On August 13, 1990, the COMELEC issued a status quo Order directing De la Victoria to answer the
petition in SPR No. 11-90, and setting the petition for preliminary injunction for hearing on August 23,
1990.

On September 27, 1990, the COMELEC set aside the trial court's Order dated July 2, 1990 denying
the motion for substitution of the heirs of the deceased protestee, and the Order dated July 23, 1990
which denied due course to the Notice of Appeal of the heirs from its decision dated July 17, 1990. It
declared the writ of execution null and void and ordered the elevation to it of the records of the case
pursuant to Rule 22 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure (on appeal from election protest decided
by trial courts of general jurisdiction).

De la Victoria has come to us for relief through this petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order (TRO) where the main issues raised are: (1) whether the heirs of the
deceased protestee in an election protest may be considered as real party-in-interest even if the
vice-mayor has been allowed to intervene and the protestant had waived his claim for damages and
costs in the proceedings; and (2) whether said heirs may appeal the decision in the election protest
(EPC No. B-44).

After careful deliberation, the Court is persuaded that the answer to both questions is no.

The late Genoveva Mesina's claim to the contested office was not in any sense a transmissible right
that devolved upon her surviving spouse and her children (herein private respondents) after her
death. "Public office is personal to the incumbent and is not a property which passes to his
heirs" (Santos vs. Secretary of Labor, 22 SCRA 848). Private respondents' only interest in the
outcome of the case is limited to no more than their interest in defending her against the
protestant's claim for damages and costs (which the protestant, herein petitioner, has already
waived). They may no longer prosecute her own counter-claim for damages against the protestant
for that was extinguished when death terminated her light to occupy the contested office of mayor of
Albuera, Leyte.

Vice Mayor Aquilino Cantiga's accession, by operation of law, to the position of Municipal Mayor
upon the death of Mesina on July 22, 1989, automatically made him the real party-in-interest in
the election contest for his right to hold the office of municipal mayor is in jeopardy of being
lost should De la Victoria win Ms protest.
This ruling was reiterated in Unda vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 94090, October 19, 1990):

Now under the Local Government Code, the vice-mayor stands next in line of succession to
the mayor in case of a permanent vacancy in the latter's position. Upon the death of the
protestee mayor in the case at bar, petitioner, as then incumbent vice-mayor, succeeded by
operation of law to the vacated office and is ordinarily entitled to occupy the same for the
unexpired term thereof. The outcome of the election contest necessarily and primarily bears
upon his right to his present position and he is the person directly concerned in the fair and
regular conduct of the election in order that the true will of the electorate will be upheld. His
status as a real party-in-interest in the continuation of said case cannot thus be disputed.
(Emphasis supplied.)

On the procedural aspects of the case, we find the following observations of the Solicitor General in
his Consolidated Comment dated January 8, 1991, to be well taken:

. . . respondent COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the
[private respondents'] petitions for certiorari filed in SPR Nos. 9-90 and 11-90 filed on August
6, 1990 to set aside the final and executory decision of the trial court promulgated on July
18, 1990, far beyond the 5-day period allowed by [Section 22, Rule 35] Comelec Rules of
Procedure, (p. 410, Rollo.)

Respondent COMELEC further gravely abused its discretion by issuing a "permanent" and
final injunction to prevent the execution of said final and executory Decision dated July 17,
1990 of the trial court, without the required bond contrary to its own Rule 30, Section 4,
COMELEC Rules of Procedure. (p. 411, Rollo.)

However, these issues have been rendered moot and academic by the COMELEC's order of
January 23, 1991 dismissing the "reinstated" appeal of the private respondents, for failure to file their
Appellant's Brief on December 9, 1990, the last day for filing the same, their Motion for Extension of
Time to File said Appellant's Brief having been previously denied by the COMELEC for being a
prohibited pleading under Section 1(c) of Rule 13 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, in relation
to Section 9(b) Rule 22 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, The COMELEC's dismissal order
reads:

Consequently, the dismissal of the herein appeal case pursuant to the Comelec Rules of
Procedure renders the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Leyte, Branch XIV dated July
17, 1990, as FINAL AND EXECUTORY.

On January 28, 1991, petitioner De la Victoria reassumed the office of Mayor of Albuera, Leyte.

WHEREFORE, finding merit in the petition for certiorari, the same is hereby GRANTED, with costs
against private respondents. The proclamation of Sixto de la Victoria as mayor of Albuera, Leyte, is
1âwphi1

upheld.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 124374 December 15, 1999

ISMAEL A. MATHAY JR., in his capacity as MAYOR OF QUEZON CITY, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, EDUARDO A. TAN, LOURDES M. DE
GUZMAN, MANUEL CHUA, ANSELMO MATEO, CHRISTOPHER SANTOS, BUENAVENTURA
PUNAY, ENRICO BANDILLA, FELINO CAMACHO, DANTE E. DEOQUINO, JAIME P. URCIA,
JESUS B. REGONDOLA, ROMUALDO LIBERATO, CESAR FRANCISCO, WILLIAM PANTI, JR.,
MICHAEL A. JACINTO and CESAR DACIO, respondents.

G.R. No. 126354 December 15, 1999

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ISMAEL A. MATHAY, JR., respondents.

G.R. No. 126366 December 15, 1999

ISMAEL A. MATHAY, JR., in his capacity as MAYOR OF QUEZON CITY, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and SANDY C. MARQUEZ, respondents.

FACTS:

During his term as Mayor of Quezon City, Mr. Brigido R. Simon appointed private
respondents to positions in the Civil Service Unit ("CSU") of the local government of Quezon
2

City. Civil Service Units were created pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 51 which was
allegedly signed into law on November 15 or 16, 1972.

On February 23, 1990, the Secretary of Justice rendered Opinion No. 33, stating that
Presidential Decree No. 51 was never published in the Official Gazette. Therefore,
conformably with our ruling in Tanada vs. Tuvera the presidential decree is deemed never "in
3

force or effect and therefore cannot at present, be a basis for establishment of the CSUs . . . ."
4

Civil Service Commission issued Memorandum Circular No. 30, directing all Civil Service Regional
or Field Offices to recall, revoke and disapprove within one year from issuance of the said
Memorandum, all appointments in CSUs created pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 51 on the
ground that the same never became law. Among those affected by the revocation of appointments
are private respondents in these three petitions.

For Quezon City CSU employees, the effects of the circular were temporarily cushioned by the
enactment of City Ordinance No. NC-140, Series of 1990, which established the Department of
Public Order and Safety ("DPOS").

Despite the provision on absorption, the regular and permanent positions in the DPOS were not filled
due to lack of funds for the new DPOS and the insufficiency of regular and permanent positions
created.

Mayor Brigido R. Simon remedied the situation by offering private respondents contractual
appointments for the period of June 5, 1991 to December 31, 1991. The appointments were
renewed by Mayor Simon for the period of January 1, 1992 to June 30, 1992.

On May 11, 1992, petitioner Ismael A. Mathay, Jr. was elected Mayor of Quezon City. On July 1,
1992, Mayor Mathay again renewed the contractual appointments of all private respondents effective
July 1 to July 31, 1992. Upon their expiry, these appointments, however, were no longer renewed.

The non-renewal by Quezon City Mayor Ismael A. Mathay, Jr. of private respondents' appointments
became the seed of discontent from which these three consolidated petitions grew.

We discuss the merits of the petitions of Mayor Ismael A. Mathay, Jr. jointly.

G.R. No. 124374 and G.R. No. 126366

After the non-renewal of their appointments, private respondents in these two petitions appealed to
the Civil Service Commission. The CSC issued separate resolutions holding that the reappointment
of private respondents to the DPOS was automatic, pursuant to the provision on absorption in
Quezon City Ordinance No. NC-140, Series of 1990, and ordering their reinstatement to their
5

former positions in the DPOS. Petitioner brought petitions for certiorari to this Court, to annul the
6 7

resolutions but, in accordance with Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, the petition were
referred to the Court of Appeals. As stated, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petitions
for certiorari.

In the instant petition for review, petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that
respondent Civil Service Commission has the authority to direct him to "reinstate" private
respondents in the DPOS.

SUPREME COURT:

We agree with petitioner.

The law applicable is B.P. 337 or the old Local Government Code and not the Local Government
Code of 1992 which became effective only on January 1, 1992, when the material events in this
case transpired.

Applying the said law, we find that the Civil Service Commission erred when it applied the directives
of Ordinance NC-140 and in so doing ordered petitioner to "reinstate" private respondents to
positions in the DPOS. Section 3 of the said Ordinance is invalid for being inconsistent with B.P.
337. We note that Section 3 of the questioned Ordinance directs the absorption of the personnel of
the defunct CSU into the new DPOS. The Ordinance refers to personnel and not to positions.
Hence, the city council or sanggunian, through the Ordinance, is in effect dictating who shall occupy
the newly created DPOS positions. However, a review of the provisions of B.P. 337 shows that the
power to appoint rests exclusively with the local chief executive and thus cannot be usurped
by the city council or sanggunian through the simple expedient of enacting ordinances that
provide for the "absorption" of specific persons to certain positions.

In upholding the provisions of the Ordinance on the automatic absorption of the personnel of the
CSU into the DPOS without allowance for the exercise of discretion on the part of the City Mayor,
the Court of Appeals makes the sweeping statement that "the doctrine of separation of powers is not
applicable to local governments." We are unable to agree. The powers of the city council and the
8

city mayor are expressly enumerated separately and delineated by B.P. 337.

The provisions of B.P. 337 are clear. As stated above, the power to appoint is vested in the local
chief executive. The power of the city council or sanggunian, on the other hand, is limited
9

to creating, consolidating and reorganizingcity officers and positions supported by local funds. The
city council has no power to appoint. This is clear from Section 177 of B.P. 337 which lists the
powers of the sanggunian. The power to appoint is not one of them. Expressio inius est exclusio
alterius. Had Congress intended to grant the power to appoint to both the city council and the local
10

chief executive, it would have said so in no uncertain terms.

By ordering petitioner to "reinstate" private respondents pursuant to

Section 3 of the Ordinance, the Civil Service Commission substituted its own judgment for that of the
appointing power. This cannot be done. In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that the
11

Civil Service Commission's power is limited to approving or disapproving an appointment. It does not
have the authority to direct that an appointment of a specific individual be made. Once the Civil
Service Commission attests whether the person chosen to fill a vacant position is eligible, its role in
the appointment process necessarily ends. The Civil Service Commission cannot encroach upon the
discretion vested in the appointing authority.

The Civil Service Commission argues that it is not substituting its judgment for that of the appointing
power and that it is merely implementing Section 3 of Ordinance NC-140.

The Ordinance refers to the "personnel of the CSU", the identities of which could not be mistaken.
The resolutions of the Civil Service Commission likewise call for the reinstatement of named
individuals. There being no issue as to who are to sit in the newly created DPOS, there is therefore
no room left for the exercise of discretion. In Farinas vs. Barba, we held that the appointing
12

authority is not bound to appoint anyone recommended by the sanggunian concerned, since the
power of appointment is a discretionary power.

When the Civil Service Commission ordered the reinstatement of private respondents, it technically
issued a new appointment. This task, i.e. of appointment, is essentially discretionary and cannot be
13

controlled even by the courts as long as it is properly and not arbitrarily exercised by the appointing
authority.
In Apurillo vs. Civil Service Commission, we held that "appointment is essentially a discretionary
power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested." 14

The above premises considered, we rule that the Civil Service Commission has no power to
order petitioner Ismael A. Mathay, Jr., to reinstate private respondents.

Petitioner similarly assails as error the Court of Appeals' ruling that private respondents should be
automatically absorbed in the DPOS pursuant to Section 3 of the Ordinance.

In its decision of March 21, 1996 the Court of Appeals held:

It is clear however, that Ordinance No. NC-140, absorbing the "present personnel of
the Civil Security Agent Unit" in the DPOS was earlier enacted, particularly on March
27, 1990, thus, private respondents were still holders of de jure appointments as
permanent regular employees at the time, and therefore, by operation of said
Ordinance private respondents were automatically absorbed in the DPOS effectively
as of March 27, 1990. (Emphasis ours.)
15

The decision is based on the wrong premise.

Even assuming the validity of Section 3 of the Ordinance, the absorption contemplated therein is not
possible. Since the CSU never legally came into existence, the private respondents never held
permanent positions. Accordingly, as petitioner correctly points out, the private respondents'
16

appointments in the defunct CSU —

were invalid ab initio. Their seniority and permanent status did not arise since they
have no valid appointment. For then to enter the Civil Service after the revocation
and cancellation of their invalid appointment, they have to be extended an original
appointment, subject again to the attesting power of the Civil Service Commission.

Being then not members of the Civil Service as of June 4, 1991, they cannot be
automatically absorbed/reappointed/appointed/reinstated into the newly created
DPOS. (Emphasis ours).

It is axiomatic that the right to hold public office is not a natural right. The right exists only by
virtue of a law expressly or impliedly creating and conferring it. Since Presidential Decree
17

51 creating the CSU never became law, it could not be a source of rights. Neither could it
impose duties. It could not afford any protection. It did not create an office. It is as
inoperative as though it was never passed.

While the Court of Appeals was correct when it stated that "the abolition of an office does not mean
the invalidity of appointments thereto," this cannot apply to the case at bar. In this case, the CSU
19

was not abolished. It simply did not come into existence as the Presidential Decree creating it never
became law.

At the most, private respondents held temporary and contractual appointments. The non-renewal of
these appointments cannot therefore be taken against petitioner. In Romualdez III vs. Civil Service
Commission we treated temporary appointments as follows:
20

The acceptance by the petitioner of a temporary appointment resulted in the

termination of official relationship with his former permanent position. When the
temporary appointment was not renewed, the petitioner had no cause to demand
reinstatement thereto. (Emphasis ours.)

Another argument against the concept of automatic absorption is the physical and legal impossibility
given the number of available positions in the DPOS and the number of personnel to be
absorbed. We note that Section 1 of Ordinance NC-140 provides:
21

There is hereby established in the Quezon City Government the Department of

Public Order and Safety whose organization, structure, duties, functions and
responsibilities are as provided or defined in the attached supporting documents
consisting of eighteen (18) pages which are made integral parts of this Ordinance.

A review of the supporting documents shows that Ordinance No. NC-140 allowed only two slots for
the position of Security Officer II with a monthly salary of P4,418.00 and four slots for the position of
Security Agent with a monthly salary of P3,102.00. The limited number of slots provided in the
Ordinance renders automatic absorption unattainable, considering that in the defunct CSU there are
twenty Security Officers with a monthly salary of P4,418.00 and six Security Agents with a monthly
salary of P3,102.00. Clearly, the positions created in the DPOS are not sufficient to accommodate
the personnel of the defunct CSU, making automatic absorption impossible.

Considering that private respondents did not legally hold valid positions in the CSU, for lack of a law
creating it, or the DPOS, for lack of a permanent appointment to the said agency, it becomes
unnecessary to discuss whether their acceptance of the contractual appointments constitutes an
"abandonment" or "waiver" of such positions. It escapes us how one can "relinquish" or "renounce" a
right one never possessed. A person waiving must actually have the right which he is renouncing.

G.R. 126354

In this case, petitioner, Civil Service Commission seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of
Appeals of July 5, 1996, which overturned CSC Resolution Nos. 955040 and 932732 and held that
the Civil Service Commission has no authority to compel the mayor of Quezon City to "reinstate"
Jovito C. Labajo to the DPOS.

The standing of petitioner Civil Service Commission to bring this present appeal is questionable.

We note that the person adversely affected by the Court of Appeals decision, Jovito C. Labajo has
opted not to appeal.

Basic is the rule that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest." A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment
22

in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

In Ralla vs. Ralla we defined interest as "material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by
the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or mere incidental
interest." As a general rule, one having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction
23

of the court as a party-plaintiff in an action.

In the case at bar, it is evident that Jovito C. Labajo, not the Civil Service Commission, is the real
party in interest. It is Jovito C. Labajo who will be benefited or injured by his reinstatement or non-
reinstatement.

We are aware of our pronouncements in the recent case of Civil Service Commission v. Pedro
Dacoycoy which overturned our rulings in Paredes vs. Civil Service Commission Mendez vs. Civil
24 25

Service Commission and Magpale vs. Civil Service Commission. In Dacoycoy, we affirmed the
26 27

right of the Civil Service Commission to bring an appeal as the aggrieved party affected by a
ruling which may seriously prejudice the civil service system.

The aforementioned case, however, is different from the case at bar. Dacoycoy was an
administrative case involving nepotism whose deleterious effect on government cannot be over
emphasized. The subject of the present case, on the other hand, is "reinstatement."

We fail to see how the present petition, involving as it does the reinstatement or non-reinstatement
of one obviously reluctant to litigate, can impair the effectiveness of government. Accordingly, the
ruling in Dacoycoy does not apply.

To be sure, when the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission were brought before the Court of
Appeals, the Civil Service Commission was included only as a nominal party. As a quasi-
judical body, the Civil Service Commission can be likened to a judge who should "detach himself
from cases where his decision is appealed to a higher court for review." 28

In instituting G.R. No. 126354, the Civil Service Commission dangerously departed from its role as
adjudicator and became an advocate. Its mandated functions is to "hear and decide administrative
cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal, including contested appointments and
to review decisions and actions of its offices and agencies," not to litigate.
29

Therefore, we rule that the Civil Service Commission has no legal standing to prosecute G.R. No.
126354.

WHEREFORE, the petitions of Ismael A. Mathay in G.R. No. 124374 and G.R. No. 126366 are
GRANTED and the decisions of the Court of Appeals dated March 21, 1996 and January 15, 1996
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The petition of the Civil Service Commission in G.R. No. 126354 is DISMISSED for lack of legal
standing to sue. The assailed decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated July 5, 1996 is
AFFIRMED.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.