Baluchistan

INTRO

Least developed regions are facing the issue of insurgency Xinjiang, East Turkamanistan Islamic Movement,
Afghanistan Issue, Somalia

Increasing literacy, access to information through social media, greater exposure of Baloch students
studying in Punjab, Islamabad and Sindh, active nationalist politics and the CPEC discourse are some recent
factors that have deepened awareness of Baloch socioeconomic and political grievances.

Balochistan Liberation Army’s attacks on security forces in Nushki, Panjgur and Kech districts

Mari Bugti and Mengal are the only opposing factions

1. Baluchistan- Conflict Ridden Land and Unfortunate nation

a. Six operations: 1948, 1958(Khan of Kalat), 1962, 1973(Bhutto Dissolved NAP govt (30k Army
personnel and 6k Baluch Insurgents) and 2004 is still going on
b. Baluchistan Provincial status 1970
c. Highest Mortality rate
d. Drinking water 85 % don’t have clean water
e. More than half its population lives in poverty
f. According to unific 60% to 70 % children out of school
g. 47% stunted growth
h. Least number of hospitals
i. Missing persons
j. Trawler MAFIA
2. Two Factors for the current dire situation in Baluchistan: Economical and Political.
a. Political
i. Lack of Political inclusiveness
ii. dominance of governance affairs by the security establishment
iii. Unable to complete assembly tenure: Power Politics
iv. Out of 16 governments since 1970 in Balochistan, rare have been those who could
complete their terms
v. In the entire parliamentary history, a single party has never achieved a two-third
majority in the provincial assembly. which remain beholden to the interests of their
political allies.
vi. assembly members are ‘electables’ who switch political loyalties to mainly advance
their own interests
vii. ideologically-deprived political associations
 viii. dynastic politics ensure the constant supply of ‘electables’ and a large number of
politicians who do not get questioned over their performance, political ideals and
affiliations.
ix. Islamabad also gets blamed for remote-controlling the affairs of the provincial
assembly and cherry-picking those who form the provincial government, undermining
true democratic growth
x. The local sardari system has also remained an obstacle in the way of development of
the province. The Baloch usually follow their local sardars known as 'tumandars'.
Those sardars have established their own fiefdoms with their own system of justice.
xi. The sardari system was formarlly abolished by the System of Sardari (Abolition Act of
1976), which prescribed three years' punishment to anyone exercising sardari.
xii. So called Provincial autonomy
b. Economical
i. Revenue is divided on the basis of three criteria population, size of territory and
socio-economic backwardness. Pakistan the revenue is distributed among the
federating units predominantly on the basis of population
ii. sidelining of common Baloch folk from mega development projects
3. How to build back better Baluchistan
a. Govt has to shed Punjab-Centric Image and transition towards more inclusive outlook
b. Elite-centric appeasement strategy hasn’t translated into improved standards of living for the
people
c. The socioeconomic dev of the smaller provinces, especially areas like ex-Fata and
Balochistan.
4. Where to Start
a. Firstly, political reconciliation and peace-building must be the foremost priority
b. Low-scale but ongoing ethnic insurgency in southern Balochistan, as well as sectarian and
religiously motivated militancy concentrated in northern and central Balochistan. The later
requires shift in our national security policy and foreign policy. Our security thinkers need to
appreciate that durable peace in Balochistan and KP cannot be established without peace in
Afghanistan. Our current Afghan policy is more likely to turn Afghanistan into a battleground
for yet another regional proxy war.
c. Further, we need to play a balancing act in our ties with Iran and Saudi Arabia, rather than
tilting in favour of the latter. Lastly, no tolerance should be shown towards sectarian and
religiously motivated militant outfits.
5. repressive measures and cosmetic development packages have both failed Resurgence of violent
conflict proves that a security-centric approach alone cannot deliver peace. Here is what needs to be
done:
a. The government should prepare a comprehensive strategy for reaching out to Baloch
insurgents. This strategy should entail the engagement of credible political voices to lead
negotiations and implement CBMs such as stopping military operations, withdrawing the FC
 from certain areas, releasing all Baloch missing persons and compensating the families of
those killed extrajudicially. Mere offers of amnesty or exhortations to abandon violence
won’t work.
b. The military establishment’s support is a must for the proposed reconciliation efforts to
make headway. The military needs to appreciate that a hard approach alone will ensure only
temporary peace at best and that a low-level insurgency can continue almost indefinitely no
matter what security measures are taken. The low-level violence is enough to put the state
on the defensive, draw international attention and unsettle foreign investors. Moreover, the
state should also be willing to abandon patronage of the cadre of artificial leaders it has
propped up. These people are the main beneficiaries of the conflict and, therefore, have an
interest in its continuation.
c. Previous efforts to reconcile Baloch insurgents failed because a) repression went hand in
hand with reconciliation efforts, and b) those leading the process had little credibility or
freedom to make meaningful offers.
6. Secondly, Baloch concerns regarding control over their natural and coastal resources must be
addressed. In this respect:
a. A powerful parliamentary committee led by a credible Baloch parliamentarian should be
constituted to ensure the effective implementation of Articles 172(3) and 158 of the
Constitution. Balochistan must be given its due share in the ownership, management, and
revenues of federally owned oil and gas companies. The province’s concerns with regard to
pricing, taxation and distribution of its natural gas must be addressed
b. Ownership of the Saindak copper-gold project may be transferred to the Balochistan
government as committed under the Aghaz-i-Haqooq-i-Balochistan package
c. The Reko Diq agreement should be made public. The establishment of a refinery in the
province should be ensured. A Chagai foundation with a corporate management and board
must be established. At its disposal must be CSR funds, two per cent of the company’s
profits, 2pc of federal profits and half of the royalty payments to ensure the socioeconomic
uplift of the local community.
d. As far as CPEC is concerned, Islamabad must shift to a more inclusive development approach
prioritising the basic rights, dignity and development needs of the local people, respecting
the marine ecosystem and promoting local livelihoods.
7. Thirdly, measures are needed to alleviate poverty and mitigate the adverse impact of fencing the
border on livelihoods.
a. A formal border trade gateway with all allied facilities and necessary trade logistics is
necessary in each district along Balochistan’s borders with Iran and Afghanistan
b. Balochistan’s share of the Benazir Income Support Programme may be increased to 10pc at
least. Its current share is around 4pc, which is even less than Balochistan’s share in the total
population.
c. Diagnosis of the Baluchistan issue is the need of the time
d. Baluchi should be considered equal to other Pakistani
 e. Proper true representation: Real representatives were not allowed to be the part of the
parliamentary system.

f. Resource distribution not cosmetic measures: sui in 1952 and for first thirty years no gas for
Baluchistan on the pretext that first gas should be supplied to industry. In 1984 sui gas was
supplied to Quetta owing to state institution presence. Current situation is still abysmal, only
six district out of 36 districts.

“Coming events cast their shadows before”, said Campbell.

Balochistan conflict has been in the limelight because of the threats of growing insurgency in the region

he Baloch form about 50 per cent of the total population of the province and the situation remains volatile
primarily in the Baloch areas.

https://www.dawn.com/news/1692738/the-many-shades-of-balochistan-politics

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uzyV_hPASxg

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J7z0JTaWK08

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9lbH8rq2c-k

https://www.dawn.com/news/1692738/the-many-shades-of-balochistan-politics

https://www.dawn.com/news/1686071

Balochistan calamity - Newspaper - DAWN.COM

Reconciliation in Balochistan? - Newspaper - DAWN.COM

Whispers from Balochistan - Pakistan - DAWN.COM

Balochistan: the foreign hand? - Pakistan - DAWN.COM