CASE DIGEST

GENERAL PRINCIPLE

1. JUANITO R. RIMANDO vs COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 176364 September 18, 2009

FACTS:

On July 13, 2001, herein private respondent lodged a Complaint with the COMELEC, accusing
Jacinto Carag, Jonry Enaya and herein petitioner Juanito R. Rimando of violating Section 2,
paragraph (e) and Section 3, paragraph (d) of COMELEC Resolution No. 3328 in relation to
Section 261, paragraph (s) of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 32 of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 7166.

As President and General Manager, respondent Rimando is aware of this requirement as

shown in the records that he actually applied for an exemption from the Committee on Firearms
and Security Personnel of the Commission. However, said application was denied on the
ground that it lacked the endorsement of the CSG Director as evidenced by the
recommendations made by the Law Department.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Rimando can be held liable therefor

HELD:

SEC. 261. Prohibited Acts. — The following shall be guilty of an election offense:

(q) Carrying firearms outside residence or place of business. — Any person who, although
possessing a permit to carry firearms, carries any firearms outside his residence or place of
business during the election period, unless authorized in writing by the Commission [on
Elections]: Provided, That a motor vehicle, water or air craft shall not be considered residence
or place of business or extension thereof.

This prohibition shall not apply to cashiers and disbursing officers while in the performance of
their duties or to persons who by nature of their official duties, profession, business or
occupation habitually carry large sums of money or valuables. This section was subsequently
amended under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7166, the Synchronized Election Law of 1991, to read:

SEC. 32. Who May Bear Firearms. — During the election period, no person shall bear, carry or
transport firearms or other deadly weapons in public places, including any building, street, park,
private vehicle or public conveyance, even if licensed to possess or carry the same, unless
authorized in writing by the Commission. The issuance of firearm licenses shall be suspended
during the election period
In any event, there is likewise nothing in R.A. 7166 that expressly penalizes the mere failure to
secure written authority from the COMELEC as required in Section 32 thereof. Such failure to
secure an authorization must still be accompanied by other operative acts, such as the bearing,
carrying or transporting of firearms in public places during the election period. All told, petitioner
should be absolved of any criminal liability, consistent with the doctrine of nullum crimen, nulla
poena sine lege - there is no crime when there is no law punishing it.

2. ORIEL MAGNO, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 96132 June 26, 199

FACTS:

Oriel Magno, lacking fund in acquiring complete set of equipment to make his car repair shop
operational, approached Corazon Teng, Vice President of Mancor Industries. VP Teng referred
Magno to LS Finance and Management Corporation, advising its Vice President, Joey Gomez,
that Mancor was willing to supply the pieces of equipment needed if LS Finance could
accommodate Magno and and provide him credit facilities. The arrangement went on requiring
Magno to pay 30% of the total amount of the equipment as warranty deposit but Magno couldn't
afford to pay so he requested VP Gomez to look for third party who could lend him that amount.

Without Magno's knowledge, Corazon was the one who provided that amount. As payment to
the equipment, Magno issued six checks, two of them were cleared and the rest had no
sufficient fund. Because of the unsuccessful venture, Magno failed to pay LS Finance which
then pulled out the equipment .Magno was charged of violation of BP Blg. 2 (The Bouncing
Checks Law) and found guilty.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Magno should be punished for the issuance of the checks in question

HELD:

Under the utilitarian theory, the "protective theory" in criminal law, "affirms that the primary
function of punishment is the protective (sic) of society against actual and potential
wrongdoers." It is not clear whether petitioner could be considered as having actually committed
the wrong sought to be punished in the offense charged, but on the other hand, it can be safely
said that the actuations of Mrs. Carolina Teng amount to that of potential wrongdoers whose
operations should also be clipped at some point in time in order that the unwary public will not
be failing prey to such a vicious transaction.

Corollary to the above view, is the application of the theory that "criminal law is founded upon
that moral disapprobation . . . of actions which are immoral, i.e., which are detrimental (or
dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human
society. This disappropriation is inevitable to the extent that morality is generally founded and
built upon a certain concurrence in the moral opinions of all. . . . That which we call punishment
is only an external means of emphasizing moral disapprobation the method of punishment is in
reality the amount of punishment," Thus, it behooves upon a court of law that in applying the
punishment imposed upon the accused, the objective of retribution of a wronged society, should
be directed against the "actual and potential wrongdoers." In the instant case, there is no doubt
that petitioner's four (4) checks were used to collateralize an accommodation, and not to cover
the receipt of an actual "account or credit for value" as this was absent, and therefore petitioner
should not be punished for mere issuance of the checks in question. Following the aforecited
theory, in petitioner's stead the "potential wrongdoer", whose operation could be a menace to
society, should not be glorified by convicting the petitioner.

3. LITO CORPUZ, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 180016 April 29, 2014

FACTS:

Information was filed against Lito Corpuz for the crime of estafa, wherein said Danilo Tangcoy is
engaged in the business of lending money to casino players, that on May 2, 1991 petitioner Lito
Corpuz approached him and offered to sell his jewelry pieces in a commission basis in which
DaniloTangcoy agreed. He then gave Lito Corpuz several jewelries that has an aggregate value
of P98,000 as evidence by a receipt. Both agreed that within sixty days Lito Corpuz shall remit
the proceeds of the sale or if unsold shall return the same. Lito Corpuz then promised to pay the
value of the said items. On the information filed by Danilo Tangcoy it was said that Lito corpuz
with an intent to defraud said Tangcoy misappropriated, misapply and convert such jewelries
into his personal used. Herein, Lito Corpuz filed a not guilty plea butthe Regional Trial Court
ruled in favor of Tangcoy and sentenced Corpuz guilty of the crime of estafa and to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment under the indeterminate sentence law of 4yrs and 2mons to 14yrs and
8mons.Lito Corpuz appealed to the Court of Appeals where it denied the appeal and ruled the
same.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC and CA erred in their ruling and that the punishment was harsh

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that indeed the petitioner Lito Corpuz was guilty of the crime of estafa.
In its decision about the punishment the Supreme Court stated that there seems to be a
perceived injustice brought by the range of penalties, but the high court said that they modify the
penalties for that would constitute judicial legislation and that such duty does not belong to the
court but to the legislature. Other Justices has their own opinion as to the punishment, some
concurs with the ponente, others invoked the art 5 of the RPC that in cases of excessive
penalties the court shall render the proper decision and shall report to the chief executive the
reasons that such said act should be made subject of legislation and without suspending the
sentence. Justice Carpio in his dissenting opinion said that the first paragraph of article315
should be held unconstitutional as it is against article 19(1) of the Constitution and that
according to the universal declaration of human rights" torture, cruel, degrading and inhuman
punishment should be ban", the Philippines was one of the approving State/community during
the UDHR and although is a non binding instrument, such UDHR forms part of the Philippine
law for it is a generally accepted principle of international law.

4. NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO vs. ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM

G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014

FACTS:

Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland. They were
blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their marriage bond
ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. Thereafter,
Norma and her son came home to the Philippines. According to Norma, Ernst made a promise
to provide monthly support to their son. However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in
the Philippines, Ernst never gave support to Roderigo. Respondent remarried again a Filipina
and resides again the Philippines particulary in Cebu where the petitioner also resides. Norma
filed a complaint against Ernst for violation of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to
support his minor child with petitioner. The trial court dismissed the complaint since the facts
charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he being an
alien.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his
unjustified failure to support his minor child

HELD:

In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength in
petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the
New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of
public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory,
subject to the principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations." On this score, it is
indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with
petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the
Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged
against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired
upon his arrest.

Finally, we do not agree with respondent’s argument that granting, but not admitting, that there
is a legal basis for charging violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case, the criminal liability
has been extinguished on the ground of prescription of crime52 under Section 24 of R.A. No.
9262, which provides that:
SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. – Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in
twenty (20) years. Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.

The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a
continuing offense,53 which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the
crime charged in the instant case has clearly not prescribed.

5. AAA vs. BBB

G.R. No. 212448, January 11, 2018

FACTS:

AAA and BBB were married on August 1, 2006 in Quezon City. Their union produced 2 children.
In May 2007, BBB started working in Singapore as a chef, where he acquired permanent
resident status in September 2008. This petition nonetheless indicates his address to be in
Quezon City where his parents reside and where AAA also resided from the time they were
married until March 2010, when AAA and their children moved back to her parents’ house in
Pasig City.

AAA claimed, albeit not reflected in the Information, that BBB sent little to no financial support,
and only sporadically. This allegedly compelled her to fly extra hours and take on additional jobs
to augment her income as a flight attendant. There were also allegations of virtual
abandonment, mistreatment of her and their CCC, and physical and sexual violence. To make
matters worse, BBB supposedly started having an affair with a Singaporean woman named
Lisel Mok with whom he allegedly has been living in Singapore. Things came to a head on April
19, 2011 when AAA and BBB had a violent altercation at a hotel room in Singapore during her
visit with their kids. As can be gathered from earlier cited Information, despite the claims of
varied forms of abuses, the investigating prosecutor found sufficient basis to charge BBB with
causing AAA mental and emotional anguish through his alleged marital infidelity.

A warrant of arrest and hold departure order were issued but BBB continued to evade arrest.
Consequently, the case was archived. However, on November 6, 2013, an Entry of Appearance
as Counsel for the Accused With Omnibus Motion to Revive Case, Quash Information, Lift Hold
Departure Order and Warrant of Arrest was filed on behalf of BBB. The motion to quash was
granted on ground of lack of jurisdiction (acts complained of had occurred in Singapore).

AAA’s motion for reconsideration was denied so she sought direct recourse to the Supreme
Court via petition for review under Rule 45 on pure question of law. In the main, AAA argues
that mental and emotional anguish is an essential element of the offense charged against BBB,
which is experienced by her wherever she goes, and not only in Singapore where the extra-
marital affair takes place; thus, the RTC of Pasig City where she resides can take cognizance of
the case. In support of her theory, AAA specifically cites Section 7 on Venue of R.A. 9262 and
Section 4 on liberal construction of the law to promote the protection and safety of victims of
violence against women and their children.

In his Comment, BBB contends that the grant of the motion to quash is in effect an acquittal;
that only the civil aspect of a criminal case may be appealed by the private offended party, and
that the petition should be dismissed for having been brought before the Court by AAA instead
of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) as counsel for the People in appellate proceedings.
BBB also asserts that the petition is belatedly filed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the rtc has jurisdiction over psychological abuse under r.a. 9262 when
committed through marital infidelity and the alleged lillicit relationship took place outside the
philippines

HELD:

In Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262, venue undoubtedly pertains to jurisdiction. As correctly pointed
out by AAA, Section 7 provides that the case may be filed where the crime or any of its
elements was committed at the option of the complainant. While the psychological violence as
the means employed by the perpetrator is certainly an indispensable element of the offense,
equally essential also is the element of mental or emotional anguish which is personal to the
complainant. The resulting mental or emotional anguish is analogous to the indispensable
element of damage in a prosecution for estafa, viz:

The circumstance that the deceitful manipulations or false pretenses employed by the accused,
as shown in the vouchers, might have been perpetrated in Quezon City does not preclude the
institution of the criminal action in Mandaluyong where the damage was consummated. Deceit
and damage are the basic elements of estafa.

The estafa involved in this case appears to be a transitory or continuing offense. It could be filed
either in Quezon City or in Rizal. The theory is that a person charged with a transitory offense
may be tried in any jurisdiction where the offense is in part committed. In transitory or continuing
offenses in which some acts material and essential to the crime and requisite to its
consummation occur in one province and some in another, the court of either province has
jurisdiction to try the case, it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the case
will exclude the others x x x[.]35

What may be gleaned from Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262 is that the law contemplates that acts of
violence against women and their children may manifest as transitory or continuing crimes;
meaning that some acts material and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation
occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another. In such cases, the court
wherein any of the crime's essential and material acts have been committed maintains
jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same
excludes the other. Thus, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly
tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed.36
It is necessary, for Philippine courts to have jurisdiction when the abusive conduct or act of
violence under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 in relation to Section 3(a), Paragraph (C) was
committed outside Philippine territory, that the victim be a resident of the place where the
complaint is filed in view of the anguish suffered being a material element of the offense. In the
present scenario, the offended wife and children of respondent husband are residents of Pasig
City since March of 2010. Hence, the RTC of Pasig City may exercise jurisdiction over the case.

Certainly, the act causing psychological violence which under the information relates to BBB's
marital infidelity must be proven by probable cause for the purpose of formally charging the
husband, and to establish the same beyond reasonable doubt for purposes of conviction. It
likewise remains imperative to acquire jurisdiction over the husband. What this case concerns
itself is simply whether or not a complaint for psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 may
even be filed within the Philippines if the illicit relationship is conducted abroad. We say that
even if the alleged extra� marital affair causing the offended wife mental and emotional
anguish is committed abroad, the same does not place a prosecution under R.A. No. 9262
absolutely beyond the reach of Philippine courts.

6. ARNULFO a.k.a. ARNOLD JACABAN, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 184355, March 23, 2015

FACTS:

P/SInsp. Ipil Dueñas of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force filedan application for
Search Warrant before Branch 22 of the Cebu RTC, to search the residence atJ. Labra St,
Guadalupe. The warrant was issued. Around July 16,1999, 12:45 AM, in Cebu City, a raid was
done on the premises, where illegal firearms and ammunition (slightly different from the items
listed in the warrant).

According to the raiding officers, the search warrant was served to the petitioner, who was
inside the residence with his wife and other ladies. Upon receipt of the warrant, the officers
allege the petitioner became angry and denied having committed anything illegal, but was in
turn assured he need not worry if the raiding officers do not find anything. During the search,
one of the officers found a .45 caliber pistol in the ceiling. The petitioner allegedly rushed from
the living room to the bedroom, and grappled for the possession of the gun. When the search
concluded, the seized items were inventoried and taken back to the team’s office along with the
arrested petitioner. Later (2002) a certification held that the petitioner is not licensed to possess
any of the firearms or ammunition seized.

The defense presented the petitioner’s wife (Felipenerie Jacaban) as a witness. She alleged
that the policemen conducted a raid in the house of Gabriel Arda, the petitioner’s uncle. She
alleged that she fetched the appellant from his house, since the officers were looking for him.
She claims that the recovered pistol was pledged to her father by a policeman. She also claims
that during the whole of the raid, her husband the petitioner merely observed and did not
protest. Both the RTC and the CA found the petitioner guilty of the crime charged.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of the crime charged

HELD:

The essential elements in the prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions are: (1) the existence of subject firearm; and, (2) the fact that the accused who
possessed or owned the same does not have the corresponding license for it.11 The unvarying
rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition.12 What the law requires is merely possession, which includes not only actual
physical possession, but also constructive possession or the subjection of the thing to one’s
control and management.

Once the prosecution evidence indubitably points to possession without the requisite authority
or license, coupled with animus possidendi or intent to possess on the part of the accused,
conviction for violation of the said law must follow. Animus possidendi is a state of mind, the
presence or determination of which is largely dependent on attendant events in each case. It
may be inferred from the prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the
surrounding circumstances.

Here, the prosecution had proved the essential elements of the crime charged under PD 1866
as amended by RA 8294. The existence of the seized firearm and the ammunitions was
established through the testimony of PO3 Sarte. There was an inventory of the items seized
which was made in the presence of the petitioner and the three barangay tanods who all
voluntarily signed the inventory receipt. PO3 Sarte identified all the seized items in open court.

It was convincingly proved that petitioner had constructive possession of the gun and the
ammunitions, coupled with the intent to possess the same. Petitioner's act of immediately
rushing from the living room to the room where SPO2 Abellana found a calibre .45 and grappled
with the latter for the possession of the gun proved that the gun was under his control and
management. He also had the animus possidendi or intent to possess the gun when he tried to
wrest it from SPO2 Abellana.

7. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. RICKY HIJADA y VILLANUEVA

G.R. No. 123696, March 11, 2004

FACTS:

Appellants Ricky Hijada y Villanueva (Ricky), Danilo Alcera y Alfon (Dante) and Rodelio Villamor
y Rabanes (Rodel) were charged with the crime of Robbery with Multiple Homicide before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, under the following information:
The undersigned accuses RICKY HIJADA Y VILLANUEVA @ RICKY, DANILO ALCERA Y
ALFON @ DANTE and RODELIO VILLAMOR Y RABANES @ RODEL of the crime of
ROBBERY WITH MULTIPLE HOMICIDE committed as follows:

That on or about the 14th day of September, 1992 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-
named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, with
intent to gain and by means of violence and intimidation against persons, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob the residence of FILONILA TUPAZ located at No. 32
Pantaleona Street, Don Jose Subd., Brgy. Commonwealth, Quezon City in the following
manner, to wit: on the date and place aforementioned, accused, pursuant to their conspiracy,
went to the residence of said FILONILA TUPAZ and then and there hogtied FILOMENA
GARCIA and ROSEMARIE DIAZ and thereafter carted away the personal properties.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court a quo admitted and considered evidence that may be considered as
"fruit of the poisonous tree.

HELD:

Appellants argue that the extrajudicial confession of Dante is inadmissible in evidence because
it was secured in violation of his constitutional rights. They point to the fact that his extrajudicial
confession was made without the assistance of counsel. Although the police claimed that Dante
had waived his constitutional rights, they argue that the waiver was invalid because it was not
made in the presence of counsel, as shown from the testimony of Rolando Aguilar:

The Office of the Solicitor General, however, posits that while confessions extracted without the
assistance of counsel are useless in a court of law, there are instances where the constitutional
procedures do not apply. In People v. Cabiles, for instance, the Court admitted into evidence an
uncounselled verbal confession of an accused to the victim. In People v. Andan, the conviction
of the accused for rape with homicide was affirmed based on an uncounselled confession to the
mayor and the news reporters. The Court therein considered the confession as one that was
made to a confidant and not to a law enforcement officer and, thus, not deemed in response to
any interrogation. In People v. Domatay, the Court held that the accused’s confession to a radio
reporter is not covered by the prohibition because the bill of rights are primarily addressed to the
State and does not concern itself with the relation between private individuals. Lastly, in People
v. Faco, it was held that uncounselled statements made to a policeman, not as a police officer
but as a trusted confidant of the accused, are admissible.
 8. JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 148560 November 19, 2001

FACTS:

Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080
(An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA 7659,wishes to
impress upon the Court that the assailed law is unconstitutional for it abolishes the element of
mensrea in crimes already punishable under RPC.

ISSUE:

Is plunder, a crime punishable under a special penal law, mala in se which requires the element
of mensrea?

HELD:

The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunders is a heinous offense implies that it is a
malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are
mala in se37 and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially
since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be
absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of
the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to
the inherent wrongness of the acts. To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659,
the amendatory law of RA 7080, on constitutional grounds. Suffice it to say however that it is
now too late in the day for him to resurrect this long dead issue, the same having been eternally
consigned by People v. Echegaray38 to the archives of jurisprudential history. The declaration
of this Court therein that RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the State,
and becomes, by necessary effect, assimilated in the Constitution now as an integral part of it.

Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of officials in high
places which have shaken its very foundation. The anatomy of graft and corruption has become
more elaborate in the corridors of time as unscrupulous people relentlessly contrive more and
more ingenious ways to bilk the coffers of the government. Drastic and radical measures are
imperative to fight the increasingly sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical and economically
catastrophic looting of the national treasury. Such is the Plunder Law, especially designed to
disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption which, if left unchecked, will spread
like a malignant tumor and ultimately consume the moral and institutional fiber of our nation.
The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament to the will of the legislature to ultimately eradicate
this scourge and thus secure society against the avarice and other venalities in public
office.These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered history of this nation, few issues of
national importance can equal the amount of interest and passion generated by petitioner's
ignominious fall from the highest office, and his eventual prosecution and trial under a virginal
statute. This continuing saga has driven a wedge of dissension among our people that may
linger for a long time. Only by responding to the clarion call for patriotism, to rise above
factionalism and prejudices, shall we emerge triumphant in the midst of ferment.
 9. KHOSROW MINUCHER, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 142396 February 11, 2003

FACTS:

Violation of the “Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,” was filed against Minucher following a “buy-bust
operation” conducted by Philippine police narcotic agents accompanied by Scalzo in the house
of Minucher, an Iranian national, where heroin was said to have been seized. Minucher was
later acquitted by the court .Minucher later on filed for damages due to trumped-up charges of
drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo.

Scalzo on his counterclaims that he had acted in the discharge of his official duties as being
merely an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration of the United States Department of
Justice. Scalzo subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that, being a
special agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to
diplomatic immunity. He attached to his motion Diplomatic Note of the United States Embassy
addressed to DOJ of the Philippines and a Certification of Vice Consul Donna Woodward,
certifying that the note is a true and faithful copy of its original. Trial court denied the motion to
dismiss.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity

HELD:

A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as
long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state. The
consent of the host state is an indispensable requirement of basic courtesy between the two
sovereigns. Guinto and Shauf both involve officers and personnel of the United States,
stationed within Philippine territory, under the RP-US Military Bases Agreement. While evidence
is wanting to show any similar agreement between the governments of the Philippines and of
the United States (for the latter to send its agents and to conduct surveillance and related
activities of suspected drug dealers in the Philippines), the consent or imprimatur of the
Philippine government to the activities of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency, however,
can be gleaned from the facts heretofore elsewhere mentioned. The official exchanges of
communication between agencies of the government of the two countries, certifications from
officials of both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the United States Embassy, as
well as the participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the "buy-bust
operation" conducted at the residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo, may be inadequate
to support the "diplomatic status" of the latter but they give enough indication that the Philippine
government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of
agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency. The job description of Scalzo has
tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and, after having ascertained
the target, to inform local law enforcers who would then be expected to make the arrest. In
conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-
bust operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher,
Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties.

All told, this Court is constrained to rule that respondent Arthur Scalzo, an agent of the United
States Drug Enforcement Agency allowed by the Philippine government to conduct activities in
the country to help contain the problem on the drug traffic, is entitled to the defense of state
immunity from suit.

10. JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 125865 January 28, 2000

FACTS:

Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994,
for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was
charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City with two counts of
grave oral defamation. According to the ADB Administrative Tribunal Report released in 1996,
Ms. Cabal reported that Mr. Liang had called her a bitch and insinuated that she was a thief1.
Thereafter, petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing
petitioner’s bail at P2,400.00 per criminal charge, he was released to the custody of the Security
Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge received an office of protocol from the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal
process under Section 45 of the ADB Headquarters Agreement between the ADB and the
Philippine Government. Acting based on such protocol communication, the MeTC judge without
notice to the prosecution dismissed the two criminal cases. Subsequently, the RTC of Pasig City
set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier
issued. After the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner elevated the case to the
Supreme Court via a petition for review invoking that he is covered by immunity under the
Agreement.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner Liang, as an official of the ADB, is immune from our criminal
jurisdiction under Section 45 of the ADB Headquarters Agreement

HELD:

First, courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the DFA that
petitioner is covered by any immunity. The DFA's determination that a certain person is covered
by immunity is only preliminary which has no binding effect in courts. In receiving ex-parte the
DFA's advice and in motu propio dismissing the two criminal cases without notice to the
prosecution, the latter's right to due process was violated. It should be noted that due process is
a right of the accused as much as it is of the prosecution. The needed inquiry in what capacity
petitioner was acting at the time of the alleged utterances requires for its resolution evidentiary
basis that has yet to be presented at the proper time.1 At any rate, it has been ruled that the
mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the dropping of the charges.

Second, under Section 45 of the Agreement which provides:

Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article experts and consultants
performing missions for the Bank shall enjoy the following privileges and immunities:

a.) immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity
except when the Bank waives the immunity.

the immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the acts was
done in "official capacity." It is therefore necessary to determine if petitioner's case falls within
the ambit of Section 45(a). Thus, the prosecution should have been given the chance to rebut
the DFA protocol and it must be accorded the opportunity to present its controverting evidence,
should it so desire.

Third, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because
our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official
duty. The imputation of theft is ultra vires and cannot be part of official functions. It is well-settled
principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever
damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of
his authority or jurisdiction. It appears that even the government's chief legal counsel, the
Solicitor General, does not support the stand taken by petitioner and that of the DFA.

Fourth, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent, assuming
petitioner is such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the
case of an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic
agent in the receiving state outside his official functions. As already mentioned above, the
commission of a crime is not part of official duty.

11. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PANFILO M. LACSON

G.R. No. 149453 April 1, 2003

FACTS:

Before the court is the petitioner’s motion of reconsideration of the resolution dated May 23,
2002, for the determination of several factual issues relative to the application of Sec. 8 Rule
117 of RRCP on the dismissal of the cases Q-99- 81679 and Q-99-81689 against the
respondent. The respondent was charged with the shooting and killing of eleven male persons.
The court confirmed the express consent of the respondent in the provisional dismissal of the
aforementioned cases when he filed for judicial determination. The court also ruled the need to
determine whether the other facts for its application are attendant.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the time-bar in said rule be applied prospectively or retroactively.

HELD:

Time-bar should not be applied retroactively. Though procedural rules may be applied
retroactively, it should not be if to do so would work injustice or would involve intricate problems
of due process. Statutes should be construed in light of the purposes to be achieved and the
evils to be remedied. This is because to do so would be prejudicial to the State since, given that
the Judge dismissed the case on March 29,1999, and the New rule took effect on Dec 1,2000, it
would only in effect give them 1 year and three months to work instead of 2 years.

At that time, they had no knowledge of the said rule and therefore they should not be penalized
for that. "Indeed for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for
the accused alone." The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the State
and the accused. It should not be emasculated and reduced by an inordinate retroactive
application of the time-bar therein provided merely to benefit the accused. To do so would
cause an injustice of hardship to the state and adversely affect the administration of justice. To
require the State to give a valid justification as a condition sine qua non to the revival of a case
provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused before the effective date of the
new rule is to assume that the State is obliged to comply with the time-bar under the new rule
before it took effect. This would be a rank denial of justice. The State must be given a period of
one year or two years as the case may be from December 1, 2000 to revive the criminal case
without requiring the State to make a valid justification for not reviving the case before the
effective date of the new rule. Although in criminal cases, the accused is entitled to justice and
fairness, so is the State.

12. SUSAN GO vs. FERNANDO L. DIMAGIBA

G.R. No. 151876 June 21, 2005

FACTS:

Dimagiba issued Go thirteen checks that were subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
the reason “Account Closed”. Go lodged a complaint against Dimagiba for violating B.P. 22 in
the MTCC of Baguio City (Branch 4) which convicted the respondent on July 16, 1999 for 13
counts of violation of the law a quo. Dimagiba was also ordered to serve 2-month imprisonment
for each count and a fine of 1,295,000 pesos.

Dimagiba appealed in Baguio City RTC Branch 4 on May 23, 2000, but the latter denied the
appeal. Having no further appeal in CA, Branch 4 issued a Certificate of Finality of the Decision
on February 1, 2001. The MTCC issued an Order directing the arrest of Dimagiba for the
service of his sentence and a Writ of Execution for the enforcement of his civil liability. Dimagiba
filed a Motion for Reconsideration on February 27, 2001, praying to recall the Order of Arrest
and a Modification of the Final Decision, arguing that only the penalty of fine shall be imposed
on him. The MTCC denied the motion. Dimagiba was arrested on September 28, 2001.
Dimagiba filed a Petition of Habeas Corpus in Baguio City RTC Branch 5. The court ordered the
immediate release of the respondent and ordered Dimagiba to pay 100,000 pesos in lieu of his
imprisonment. The court justified this modification by invoking the SC ruling on Vaca v. Court of
Appeals and Supreme Court Administrative Circular (SC-AC) No. 12-2000, which allegedly
required the imposition of only a fine instead of imprisonment for BP 22 violations, provided that
the accused was not a recidivist or a habitual delinquent.

The RTC held that this rule should be retroactively applied in favor of Dimagiba. It further noted
that (1) he was a first-time offender; and (2) the civil liability had already been satisfied through
the levy of his properties. Petitioner Susan Go elevated the case to the Supreme Court
assailing the order a quo.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the SC-AC No. 12-2000 deleted the imposition of the penalty of imprisonment if
a fine has already been imposed

HELD:

"Petitioner's reliance of our ruling in Ordoñez v. Vinarao that a convicted person is entitled to
benefit from the reduction of penalty introduced by the new law, citing People v. Simon, is
misplaced. Thus, her plea that as provided for in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, SC
Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 as modified by SC Admin. Circular No. 13-2001 should benefit her
has no basis.

"First. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 is not a penal law; hence, Article 22 of the Revised
Penal Code is not applicable. The circular applies only to those cases pending as of the date of
its effectivity and not to cases already terminated by final judgment. "Second. As explained by
the Court in SC Admin. Circular No. 13-2001, SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 merely lays
down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It does
not amend B.P. Blg. 22, nor defeat the legislative intent behind the law. SC Admin. Circular No.
12-2000 merely urges the courts to take into account not only the purpose of the law but also
the circumstances of the accused -- whether he acted in good faith or on a clear mistake of fact
without taint of negligence -- and such other circumstance which the trial court or the appellate
court believes relevant to the penalty to be imposed."

Because the Circular merely lays down a rule of preference, it serves only as a guideline for the
trial courts. Thus, it is addressed to the judges, who are directed to consider the factual
circumstances of each case prior to imposing the appropriate penalty. In other words, the
Administrative Circular does not confer any new right in favor of the accused, much less those
convicted by final judgment. The competence to determine the proper penalty belongs to the
court rendering the decision against the accused. That decision is subject only to appeal on
grounds of errors of fact or law, or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Another trial court may not encroach upon this authority. Indeed, SC-AC No. 12-
2000 necessarily requires a review of all factual circumstances of each case. Such a review can
no longer be done if the judgment has become final and executory.
In the present case, the MTCC of Baguio City had full knowledge of all relevant circumstances
from which respondent’s conviction and sentence were based. The penalty imposed was well
within the confines of the law. Upon appeal, the conviction was sustained by RTC-Branch 4 of
Baguio City. Eventually, the Decision attained finality. Hence, RTC-Branch 5 did not have the
jurisdiction to modify the lawful judgment in the guise of granting a writ of habeas corpus.

The doctrine of equal protection of laws does not apply for the same reasons as those on
retroactivity. Foremost of these reasons is that the Circular is not a law that deletes the penalty
of imprisonment. As explained earlier, it is merely a rule of preference as to which penalty
should be imposed under the peculiar circumstances of a case. At any rate, this matter
deserves scant consideration, because respondent failed to raise any substantial argument to
support his contention.

13. LUISITO G. PULIDO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 220149, July 27, 2021

FACTS:

Pulido and Arcon were married on September 5, 1983, in a civil wedding at the Municipal Hall of
Rosario Cavite. In 2007, Pulido stopped going home to their conjugal dwelling. Upon
confrontation, Arcon found out that Pulido has an affair with Baleda and they were married on
July 31, 1995.

In December 2007, Arcon filed a bigamy case against Pulido and Baleda. Pulido defended that
both of his marriage was void ab initio. His marriage with Arcon is void due to lack of a marriage
license, and his marriage to Baleda is also void due to lack of a marriage ceremony.

Baleda on the other hand claimed that she only knew Pulido's prior marriage sometime in April
2007 and that she filed a Petition to Annul their marriage before the filing of the bigamy case.
The court even declared their marriage null and void for being bigamous on October 25, 2007.
The trial court convicted Pulido of bigamy but acquitted Baleda. Appeals and motions of Pulido
were likewise denied. The court ruled in reliance with the provision of Art. 40 of the Family
Code. Meanwhile, in 2015, the court in a civil case declared Arcon and Pulido's marriage null
and void. A decree of absolute nullity of their marriage was issued in 2016.

ISSUE:

Whether a Judicial Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is necessary to establish the invalidity of a

void ab initio marriage in a bigamy case

HELD:

The court stressed that the nullity of a void ab initio marriage, being inexistent under the eyes of
the law can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material,
either direct or collateral, in any civil court between parties at any time, whether before or after
the death of either or both the spouses. A void marriage is ipso facto void without the need for
any judicial declaration of nullity. This requirement is necessary under Art. 40, where the law
treated a void ab initio marriage as valid for purposes of remarriage.

Thus, being inexistent from the beginning, the void first marriage does not qualify nor satisfy one
of the essential elements of bigamy which requires the existence of a prior valid marriage.
Logically, there is no first marriage to begin with. As for the retroactive effect of a void ab initio
marriage, there is nothing to annul nor dissolve as the judicial declaration of nullity merely
confirms the inexistence of such marriage. This also explains why the second element of
bigamy which requires that the former marriage has not been legally dissolved or annulled is
wanting in the case of void ab initio prior marriage. The RPC provision regarding bigamy
pertains to contracting a subsequent marriage when a voidable or valid first marriage is still
subsisting.

In the same vein, when the accused contracted a subsequent void ab initio marriage, which is
void other than it being bigamous, it has the effect of not having entered into a subsequent
marriage at all because the same is inexistent from the beginning. Thus, negates the existence
of one of the elements of bigamy which requires that the accused contracts a second or
subsequent marriage. A subsequent judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the second
marriage merely confirms its inexistence. In both instances, the accused may validly raise the
defense of a void ab initio marriage without a judicial declaration of nullity.

ARTICLE 2
 1. THE UNITED STATES, vs. H. N. BULL
G.R. No. L-5270 January 15, 1910

FACTS:

On December 2, 1908, a steamship vessel engaged in the transport of animals named Stanford
commanded by H.N. Bull docked in the port of Manila, Philippines. It was found that said vessel
from Ampieng, Formosa carried 674 heads of cattle without providing appropriate shelter and
proper suitable means for securing the animals which resulted for most of the animals to get
hurt and others to have died while in transit.

This cruelty to animals is said to be contrary to Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine
Constitution. It is however contended that cases cannot be filed because neither was it said that
the court sitting where the animals were disembarked would take jurisdiction, nor did it say
about ships not licensed under Philippine laws, like the ships involved.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court had jurisdiction over an offense committed on board a foreign ship
while inside the territorial waters of the Philippines.

HELD:

When the vessel comes within 3 miles from the headlines which embrace the entrance of
Manila Bay, the vessel is within territorial waters and thus, the laws of the Philippines shall
apply. A crime committed on board a Norwegian merchant vessel sailing to the Philippines is
within the jurisdiction of the courts of the Philippines if the illegal conditions existed during the
time the ship was within the territorial waters - regardless of the fact that the same conditions
existed when the ship settled from the foreign port and while it was on the high seas,

In light of the above restriction, the defendant was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of
two hundred and fifty pesos with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs.

ARTICLE 3
 2. ROGELIO ROQUE, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 193169, April 06, 2015

FACTS:

Petitioner Rogelio Roque was charged with the crime of frustrated homicide, which when he
was arraigned, the petitioner plead “not guilty.” The prosecution averred that on November 22,
2001, while brothers Reynaldo and Rodolfo Marquez were in the house of Bella SalvadorSantos
in Pandi, Bulacan, Rodolfo spotted Rogelio dela Cruz and shouted to him to join them. At that
instant, petitioner and his wife were passing-by on board a tricycle. Believing that Rodolfo’s
shout was directed at him, petitioner stopped the vehicle and cursed the former. Reynaldo
apologized for the misunderstanding but petitioner was unyielding. Before leaving, he warned
the Marquez brothers that something bad would happen to them if they continue to perturb him.
Bothered, Rodolfo went to the house of Brgy. Chairman Tayao to ask for assistance in settling
the misunderstanding. Because of this, Reynaldo, was fetched by dela Cruz and brought to the
house of Tayao, and later on proceeded to petitioner’s house to follow Tayao and Rodolfo who
had already gone ahead. Upon arriving at petitioner’s residence, Reynaldo again apologized to
petitioner but the latter did not reply. Instead, petitioner entered the house and when he came
out, he was already holding a gun which he suddenly fired at Reynaldo who was hit in his right
ear. Petitioner then shot Reynaldo who fell to the ground after being hit in the nape.
Unsatisfied, petitioner kicked Reynaldo on the face and back. Reynaldo pleaded Tayao for help
but to no avail since petitioner warned those around not to get involved. Fortunately, Reynaldo’s
parents arrived and took him to a local hospital for emergency medical treatment. He was
operated on and confined for three weeks.

The defense claimed that on November 22, 2001, petitioner went to the house of Bella on board
a tricycle to fetch his child. While driving, he was cursed by brothers Reynaldo and Rodolfo who
were visibly intoxicated. Petitioner ignored the two and just went home. Later, however, the
brothers appeared in front of his house still shouting invectives against him. Petitioner’s brother
tried to pacify Rodolfo and Reynaldo who agreed to leave but not without threatening that they
would return to kill him. Petitioner thus asked someone to call Tayao. Not long after, the
brothers came back, entered petitioner’s yard, and challenged him to a gun duel. Petitioner
requested Tayao to stop and pacify them but Reynaldo refused to calm down and instead fired
his gun. Hence, as an act of self-defense, petitioner fired back twice. RTC finds the petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated homicide. It was affirmed by the CA in
toto.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the accused petitioner was guilty of the crime of frustrated homicide?

HELD:

In attempted or frustrated homicide, the offender must have the intent to kill the victim. If there
is no intent to kill on the part of the offender, he is liable for physical injuries only. Vice-versa,
regardless of whether the victim only suffered injuries that would have healed in nine to thirty
days, if intent to kill is sufficiently borne out, the crime committed is frustrated homicide (Arts.
263-266). Usually, the intent to kill is shown by the kind of weapon used by the offender and the
parts of the victim’s body at which the weapon was aimed, as shown by the wounds inflicted.
Hence, when a deadly weapon, like a bolo, is used to stab the victim in the latter’s abdomen,
the intent to kill can be presumed (Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, 13TH ED., P. 431).

It is worth highlighting that the victim received two gunshot wounds in the head. Indeed the
location of the wounds plus the nature of the weapon used are ready indications that the
accused-appellant’s objective is not merely to warn or incapacitate a supposed aggressor.
Verily, had the accused-appellant been slightly better with his aim, any of the two bullets surely
would have killed him outright. Also, the intent to kill is further exhibited by the fact that the
accused-appellant even prevented barangay officials from intervening and helping x x x the
bleeding victim. Indeed, the fact that Reynaldo Marquez was miraculously able to live through
the ordeal and sustain only modicum injuries does not mean that the crime ought to be
downgraded from frustrated homicide to less serious physical injuries. After all, as was
mentioned above, what should be determinative of the crime is not the gravity of the resulting
injury but the criminal intent that animated the hand that pulled the trigger.

ALFREDO DE GUZMAN, JR., Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES