The political scene in Burundi after two years of crisis

Date: 01-08-2017
Contents

1 Introduction .....................................................................................................................................................3
2 Methodology ....................................................................................................................................................5
3 Internal structure and democratic workings of the parties and political figures .............................................6
3.1 Presentation of the main figures in Burundi politics ............................................................................. 6
3.2 A state party that is part of a disordered political class ........................................................................ 7
3.2.1 Party Structures ..................................................................................................................................... 7
3.2.2 Party Operations .................................................................................................................................... 9
3.2.3 Source of financing .............................................................................................................................. 10
3.3 Interviews with parties showing the persistence of “identity” memberships .................................... 11
3.4 Internal democracy of the parties put to the test by authoritarian management .............................. 15
3.5 Effective participation by youth and women continues to be problematic ........................................ 17
4 Strategic plan, vision and stances on current issues ...........................................................................................19
4.1 Some parties constantly mobilising and others cooped up among themselves ................................. 19
4.2 Parties’ lack of vision and the weakness of their platforms and ideologies ........................................ 20
4.3 At the core of the crisis: the legitimacy of institutions and the 2020 elections .................................. 20
4.4 Concurrent dialogue processes diversely valued ................................................................................ 21
5. Interactions with other groups and political parties, the Ministry of the Interior and the CENI ..................23
5.1 Interactions with the other political parties ........................................................................................ 23
5.2 Tense relations with the CNDD-FDD .................................................................................................... 23
5.3 A highly criticised Ministry of the Interior ........................................................................................... 24
5.4 A National Electoral Commission (CENI) denounced by most of the parties ...................................... 25
6. Specific features of the main political parties and figures .............................................................................26
6.1 The CNDD-FDD..................................................................................................................................... 26
6.2 The FNLs .............................................................................................................................................. 29
6.3 The UPRONA ........................................................................................................................................ 30
6.4 The Sahwanya FRODEBU ..................................................................................................................... 31
6.5 The MSD .............................................................................................................................................. 32
6.5 The CNARED......................................................................................................................................... 33
7. Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................................35
Annex I List of persons interviewed...................................................................................................................36
Annex II List of persons queried for additional information or to confirm same...........................................37
Annex III Table of acronyms ............................................................................................................................38

2
1 Introduction
The Burundian head of state, Nkurunziza, ran for a third term of office in April 2015. This plan was
contested by the opposition, by civil society and by some in his own party, and opposed by a majority
of Burundians.1 It has caused renewed violence in Burundi that has profound consequences for the
Burundian political scene. This finding spurred the Burundi Leadership Training Program (BLTP) and
the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD) to commission a study on the current
standing of political parties. The research was done at the high point in the crisis, marked at the end
of 2015 by regular conflicts in a number of districts of the capital city between armed groups not clearly
identified and police forces, accompanied by serious violations of human rights. The study was
published in April 2016 in a context where the crisis seemed to be undergoing a change, specifically
involving a decrease in the violence. This followed the end of small arms fire resounding in the city of
Bujumbura, a change in the procedures of the security forces - who were more discrete in their actions,
and a return to a semblance of normal activity in the capital city, up to that point the focal point of the
conflict. However, the causes and the multi-faceted fallout for most of the sectors of Burundian society
are still quite present.

One year after this initial diagnostic analysis, the political situation has undergone a number of
developments. The government in power has eliminated all forms of overt domestic protests. It has
total control over the security of the entire country and has tightened its grip on all institutions. It is
specifically moving towards greater authoritarianism. That is characterized, among other things, by
suppressing democratic processes and freedom of speech, and by tightening up the texts of various
laws.2 At the same time, it has managed to decrease the influence of international pressure by taking
advantage of the contradictions, divisions and ambivalent pronouncements of international and
regional organizations involved in initiatives seeking to resolve or, at least, stem the crisis in Burundi.
It has nevertheless not succeeded in lifting the economic sanctions whose dire effects on the
Burundian economy are ever more visible. In contrast, the armed opposition has moved outside the
country.3 The National Council for Compliance with the Arusha Agreement on Peace, Reconciliation
and the Rule of Law (CNARED in French), the opposition’s main basis of reference, has been steadily
weakened by the defections and contradictory stances of some of its members. There are two types
of dialogue in play. The external dialogue promoted by international partners has reached a dead end.
In contrast, the internal dialogue has already led to the creation of a legislative mechanism for revising
the constitution, approved by some ten political parties and seeking, among other things, to unblock
limits on presidential terms of office and call into question the Arusha Agreement. The fragmentation
and repression aimed at opposition political parties have continued, sometimes causing changes in
leadership in some groups. All of these developments, and their repercussions - often negatively
affecting the internal situation - have given rise to a need for an updated analysis of the political
situation in order to understand the new forces at work. The goal of this study is thus to promote
understanding by BLTP and NIMD of current political conditions in light of the forces at work in the
crisis currently facing Burundi. This dissection of the main parties and political agents should, in

1
In late 2014, according to a survey conducted by Afrobaromètre from 28 September to 11 October of that year
on governance, democracy and the economic situation, 62% of Burundians supported limiting presidential
terms of office to two terms. However, the same survey showed the CNDD-FDD very far in the lead in terms
of intended votes.
2
In particular, the law on foreign non-governmental organizations and non-profit associations.
3
It has nevertheless conducted occasional operations inside Burundi, targeting mainly political officials or the
forces of law and order at the national or local level.
3
particular, evaluate their structure, operations and internal democratic procedures, who their real
decision-makers are, the role of youth and women in those parties, their strategic plans, what they
envision for current challenges, and the interactions within and between them, as well as their
relationships with the Ministry of the Interior and the Independent National Electoral Commission
(CENI in French).

4
2 Methodology

In terms of methodology, the Terms of Reference demanded that the study be conducted based on a
series of interviews, mainly with people in charge of the parties covered by the survey. Also, that it be
based on other sources of information within those groups and academic figures who could shed light
on the subject of the study. In addition, recommendations called for collecting and/or consulting all
pertinent documents written about the present political context and the political parties themselves,
specifically in terms of how they work, their societal objectives and their political platforms. Thus,
thirteen groups and their members were initially involved in this survey: the National Council for the
Defense of Democracy (CNDD), the National Council for the Defense of Democracy and Democratic
Defense Forces (CNDD-FDD), the National Liberation Force (FNL) wing of Jacques Bigirimana, The FNL
members of the Amizero y’Abarundi coalition of Agathon Rwasa, the Front for Democracy in Burundi
(FRODEBU) Nyakuri, the Sahwanya FRODEBU, the Movement for Solidarity and Democracy (MSD), the
Movement for Citizen Re-empowerment (MRC), the Party for National Renewal (PARENA), the Union
for Peace and Democracy (UPD), the Union for National Progress (UPRONA), and the two wings of the
UPRONA who are members of the Amizero y’Abarundi coalition.

Despite various impediments4 and the reluctance of some parties to release information about their
internal activities in a context where a number of them are nearly dormant and others are hesitant to
respond to these types of surveys, the study staff were able to interview all of the parties and persons
involved in the study. As might be expected, the level of honesty and sincerity of the responses seemed
to vary depending on how sensitive the questions were, the respondents’ knowledge of democracy
and their willingness to participate in this sort of exercise. In order to deal with situations where the
people interviewed were clearly manipulating or obscuring certain facts, which could thus lead to
misperceptions about their party, additional, informal interviews were set up for some groups where
problems with truthfulness were to be expected. Furthermore, a mid-point assessment on progress of
the study, with the BLTP, NIMD and the main consultant for all of the survey, led to certain adjustments
in the objective of the study and amendments concerning the agents and parties to be targeted. The
National Coalition for Change (Rassemblement national pour le changement - RANAC) and the Patriots
for Development Party (PPD) - Girijambo, were thus surveyed following this working meeting. Finally,
the study is divided into four major sections, each with specific parts, organized as follows:

 Internal structure and democratic workings of the parties and political figures

 Presentation of the political parties

 Structure, organization and operation of the political parties
 Geographic areas and public audiences
 Internal democratic workings
 Roles of youth and women

4
Problems obtaining certain contacts, difficulty reaching some persons in charge and political parties,
appointments with no-shows or postponements, and other obstacles, such as a series of talks in Arusha during
the period of the interviews.
5
  Strategic plan, vision and stances on current challenges

 Plans for expanding the party in terms of public mobilization

 Stances on the matter of the third presidential term of office and the 2020 elections
 Stances on interior and exterior dialogue

 Interactions with other groups and political parties, the Ministry of the Interior and the
CENI

 Interactions with the other political parties and the wings and trends within them, and the
possibility of unifying the wings
 The nature of their relationships with the party in power
 The nature of their relationships with the Ministry of the Interior
 The nature of their relationships with the CENI

 Specific features of the main political parties and figures

3 Internal structure and democratic workings of the parties and

political figures

3.1 Presentation of the main figures in Burundi politics

The current political situation is dominated by the CNDD-FDD, which has been in power for more than
a decade. Emerging from an armed rebellion comprised mainly of Hutus, it came to power in 2005
after the first democratic elections held since the civil war (1993-2003). The big loser in that election
was the FRODEBU, which held the reins of government when it took place. The FRODEBU had easily
won the first elections after the inauguration of democracy in 1992. However, its victory was eclipsed
by a putsch carried out in October 1993 by a largely Tutsi army opposed to the political and ethnic
groups in power. As a result, the UPRONA, the sole party from 1966 to 1992 and largely Tutsi, had
gradually gained a predominant position in government institutions, favoured especially by the new
putsch in 1996 and the various agreements on power sharing5 before ceding management of the
transition to the FRODEBU in 2003. The above-mentioned 3 parties held the prominent roles in the
political realm and the various institutional crises during the first two terms of the CNDD-FDD.

Added to these groups are the FNL’s, stemming from the oldest Hutu rebel group, the party for the
liberation of the Hutu people (PALIPEHUTU) and the MSD, an urban party rooted in the opposition that

5
The governance convention of 1994, the internal partnership of 1998, and the Arusha agreement on peace and
reconciliation of 2000.
6
appeared more recently on the political scene. The PARENA and the MRC, two parties with Tutsi
majorities were set up, respectively, by the former head of state, Jean-Baptiste Bagaza (1976-1987)
and a former minister from the transition period, Epitace Bayaganakandi. Both were members of the
UPRONA, as were a large part of their followers. They subsequently rose up in vigorous opposition to
the former single party, mostly due to the personal animosity of their leaders to Pierre Buyoya, a
former head of state (1987-1993, then 1996-2003), often considered by his critics to be the strong man
behind the UPRONA.6 The other feature these parties have in common is their close identification with
their founder.

The CNDD of Léonard Nyangoma, the leader of the rebel group with the same name, which
subsequently became the CNDD-FDD, is the result of a split during the main armed rebellion in 1998.
Since he had taken part in the Arusha negotiations, he joined the institutions in 2001. From 2005 to
2010, he was a member of the parliamentary opposition. In contrast to the FRODEBU, the UPRONA
and the MRC - the other parties with seats in the national assembly, he has never sided with the party
in power. Since 2010, he has ceased to be part of the institutions and is still part of the opposition.
According to certain observers, the UPD is an offspring of the CNDD-FDD.7 He gradually moved over to
the opposition due to the growing influence on that party of Hussein Radjabu, former chairman of the
party in power and currently one of its fiercest opponents. In so doing, his position on the political
chessboard varied depending on the various split-offs and reunifications of the party.

Amizero y’Abarundi is a coalition of independents, comprised of the Agathon Rwasa FNL and the
UPRONA of Charles Nditije, both ejected from their parties in favour of wings that are more conciliatory
to the government. This unnatural alliance between two former enemies was the result of a marriage
of convenience, not without its calculated interests, on the part of both parties, to take part in the
2015 elections. It will not survive political pitfalls for long, and even if divorce has yet to be pronounced,
the couple is on shaky ground. The RANAC includes various political parties and transfers from the
Sahwanya-FRODEBU, while the PDP-Girijambo was set up by fugitives from the CNDD-FDD after the
2015 electoral crisis.

3.2 A state party that is part of a disordered political class

3.2.1 Party Structures

The parties surveyed are organized in an almost identical manner, with entities comprised of
community and hill communities, along with a central unit, in the case of the groups surveyed. Some
parties claim they have entities at the lowest administrative level, the cell. In general, these entities
have the same powers, except that their scope is proportional to their geographic footprint. The

6
There is currently a belief, partially fomented by the CNDD-FDD, that Pierre Buyoya pulls the strings within
the CNARED, especially since Nditije was president of the opposition’s platform.
7
This plan was apparently devised to offset an eventual rejection of approval of the CNDD-FDD as a political
party in order to oppose its participation in the 2005 elections, and members and supporters of the former
rebel movement had to join the UPD.
7
highest-level or decision-making body of these parties is a structure that represents the various entities
and its name varies from one party to another. They are most often called congresses and meet on a
predetermined periodic basis, with the intermediate entities providing implementation of the party’s
decisions and everyday operations. These latter entities are often known as policy offices or executive
committees. They usually have an equivalent at the decentralized level (provincial or community
executive committee, etc.). This pyramid structure also includes consultative bodies and affiliated
movements in some parties. Although it is a common feature of all the parties, it has specific features
in some parties, and the CNDD-FDD has a Council of Advisers with broader powers than the other
entities. These include the national representation subdivided into various secretariats, each with its
own jurisdictions. The party is presided over by the head of state who dictates the party’s major
decisions to the extent that the party congress is often limited to rubber-stamping its decisions despite
the semblance of a voting process when decisions are made.

On paper, the organization of several parties seems quite cumbersome due to the large number of
bodies and entities at the various levels, and one may well question whether they work effectively,
given their often superfluous nature (many parties have a plethora of consultative bodies), and that’s
not counting the risk of overlapping. The following shows the basic structure of the political parties:

Name Level
National congress National
National executive committee National
Party presidency National
Party oversight body or National
national secretariat
Provincial executive committee Provincial
Community executive Communal
committee
Hill community executive Hill community
committee

8
3.2.2 Party Operations

In terms of the operations of the political parties, they derive largely from the stance taken on the
issue of the third presidential term. They also derive from their role in the protest movement following
the forced passage by the government and, subsequently, their willingness to accept or contest the
legitimacy of the regime in power and the institutions that emerged from the 2015 electoral process.
In other words, their freedom to manoeuvre and operate is proportional to how close they are to the
government. How the political parties operate is also a function of their effective presence in the field,
their propensity to be a real or assumed threat to the hegemony of the CNDD-FDD (the case of the
Rwasa wing FNLs) and their plans for action and mobilization in light of future political event timelines,
and especially election dates. Many parties admit they are operating on a reduced scale or in a state
of sluggishness. A number of them have gone underground and are no longer visible in Burundi. This
is the case of the MSD, whose activities have been moved outside the country. The Ministry of the
Interior’s decision to suspend the MSD’s activities for six months on 4 April 20178 at least had the merit
of making the situation crystal clear. These parties often communicate with their members using
modern, encrypted means of communication, such as WhatsApp or Telegram. Some of them have
even set up internal chat groups using these media (between senior officials and/or between some
members), thus making the dissemination of information quick and easy. Most of the opposition
parties limit their activities to the capital city, where their national level representatives live. Said
actions are usually conducted discretely or even secretly.9

The entities at the provincial and community levels have been reduced to near forced paralysis. In the
case of some parties, their activists have been somewhat left to their own devices in the absence of
directives or clear instructions about how to proceed, for those less well equipped in terms of
communication. The constant arrests of their sympathizers and the cruelty to which they are subjected
have spurred a number of party head offices to stop operating out in the open. This leads one to
wonder about whether certain parties are operating at all, even at the level of their central bodies.
Some seem to exist only in the form of their representatives. Likewise, some parties seem not to
hesitate to use the excuse of shrinking space for political action to justify apathy that is probably caused
more by continuing disenchantment of their electorate at the base. In fact, faced with the risk of having
their very low draw on the public exposed, a number of political parties, including the most prominent
ones, seemed to fear the test of the 2015 elections, even in a somewhat healthier political climate.10

However, other political groups, albeit few in number, are continuing daily actions, often taking to the
streets, while others continue to work out of sight. The CNDD-FDD, the official UPRONA, the Jacques
Bigirimana-wing FNLs and the FRODEBU-Nyakuri are part of this set of groups who are operating
normally. Lastly, the BLTP’s programmes developed for the political parties, even if poorly capitalized
on for the time being, and, to a lesser extent, the process of dialogue with the exterior, are two of the
initiatives that enable those most weakened by the problematic political and civil liberties context to
maintain a certain level of activity, at least at the level of their bodies and affiliated movements. The
recent meetings held by executive officers and committees from several of the parties surveyed were
thus motivated mainly by the matter of exterior dialogue. While some political groups are already
preparing for the next round of elections, others (such as the UPD, CNDD and PARENA) have run up

8
This suspension of the MSD was officially justified by the fact that the party chairman was the leader of an
armed movement.
9
This is the case at least for parties such as the MSD and the Agathon Rwasa FNLs.
10
Interviews.
9
against critical problems of re-organization, or even survival, given the present delicate political
situation. Certain opposition parties also have to deal with the dispersion and exodus of their
members, who have had varying degrees of luck settling in their new host countries, and the
remoteness of their leaders, who have had to go into exile.11

Names of parties and political figures Ability to operate12

CNDD **
CNDD-FDD *****
FNL - Bigirimana wing ****
FNL - Rwasa wing *
FRODEBU Nyakuri ****
Sahwanya FRODEBU **
MRC ***
MSD * (Operations suspended)
PARENA ***
RANAC ***
UPD **
Official UPRONA ****
UPRONA - Nditije wing **
UPRONA - Ngayimpenda wing ***

3.2.3 Source of financing

In terms of the parties’ sources of financing, the law on political parties imposes certain restrictions,
especially concerning external sources.13 Invariably, all of the parties mention member contributions
and, for some, donations and inheritances. Only the UPRONA recognizes its assets as a source of
financing, in contrast to the CNDD-FDD, which makes no disclosure. Many parties have attempted to
start activities to generate revenue, but they currently consider themselves to be handicapped by
present pressures and the poor overall economic situation. In this respect, the MRC based its hopes
on promoting activities among rural populations that would generate revenue in a number of
provinces through some of its projects. This focus is an integral part of its platform, and is also a topic
of mobilization benefiting it.14 In terms of contributions by members or supporters, a number of
parties, however, admit that they generate very little money from this means since their electorate is
extremely poor. The official UPRONA recently instituted a mandatory contribution of 10% of the
salaries of its managing staff. It would be interesting to know just how feasible this measure is for a
party not involved in the issues and thus without much leverage over its members. This rule also holds
within the CNDD-FDD for all of the top party officials.15 It is probably rigorously applied but more and

11
The leaders of the Sahwanya FRODEBU, CNDD, MSD, UPD and one of the wings of the UPRONA live in
exile. The MSD has hundreds of supporters who have been imprisoned or killed. A large number of its
militants have fled to neighbouring countries.
12
The number of asterisks represents the ability to operate
13
Articles 19 and 40 of law 1/16, of 10 September 2001, amending the law of 2003, concerning the organization
and operations of political parties.
14
The inclusion of export products such as Stevia and quinoa in several provinces forms part of this plan.
15
Interviews with leadership staff and transfers in the CNDD-FDD.
10
more problematic for many of these persons who are constantly being squeezed for other more or less
mandatory contributions, such as for social infrastructure or development.16 In this respect, the CNDD-
FDD generates a major amount of money from these contributions exacted by various means. There
is also a widespread practice consisting in making the attribution of jobs in various government sectors
contingent on the withdrawal of a set percentage of one’s salary, which is devoted to the party.17
However, its largest revenues come from various kick-backs on the extraction of resources (minerals,
gold, etc.), controlling government contracts 18 and the receipt of funds frequently in hidden,
fraudulent manners stemming from some of the more profitable sectors of the economy.19 In this
respect, the party in power seems to be investing in various business affairs, specifically the financial
sector.20

3.3 Interviews with parties showing the persistence of “identity” memberships

Most of the parties interviewed claim to be established nationwide. Some based their responses on
the geographic scope of the circumscriptions (administrative areas) covered by their lists of electors in
2015. The table below shows the number of municipalities covered by the lists of parties and political
figures sent to the CENI in preparation for the community level elections of 2015.

Parties and political figures Number of municipalities covered in 201521

CNDD-FDD 119
MSD 119
Amizero y’Abarundi 119
FRODEBU-Nyakuri 116
UPRONA 116
ADC-Ikibiri22 106
FNL of Jacques Bigirimana 89
MRC 86
UPD 81
RANAC 46

16
http://www.iwacu-burundi.org/cibitoke-grogne-suite-aux-contributions-obligatoires/
17
Various interviews.
18
Various interviews, including former head officials of the CNDD-FDD.
19
“Corruption in Burundi: A problem of collective action and a major challenge to governance,” Dr. Gervais
Rufyikiri. Working paper. 2016/2017. Burundi ranks 159th out of 176 countries in Transparency
International’s 2016 corruption perceptions index”.
https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/corruption_perceptions_index_2016
20
Interview with a person in the financial market.
21
Since the new administrative redistricting, there are 119 municipalities in Burundi.
22
The Sahwanya FRODEBU, PARENA and CNDD were registered for the elections as part of the ADC-Ikibiri
coalition.
11
Source: CENI

In this respect, only the CNDD-FDD and MSD parties, and the Amizero y’Abarundi coalition, provided
lists for all of the circumscriptions in Burundi at the community level. Since this is done under
conditions of severe political restrictions, it is hard to assess at present the actual reach of some parties
whose freedom of movement and freedom to hold meetings have been squelched by the repressive
apparatus of the government since, in particular, the entire country has been taken over by
government police forces/troops and by the youth movement of the CNDD-FDD, the Imbonerakure
(“the foresighted”), also including those excluded from the party.23 Clearly, actions obstructing the
activities of opposition political parties are not a new phenomenon since they were developed
throughout the 2nd term of office of president Nkurunziza. This substantially expanded control of the
land by the CNDD-FDD to the detriment of the other parties.24 It has thus taken on an even more radical
and violent dimension since the beginning of the crisis. The party in power is unquestionably
established throughout all of Burundi, even if its popular support is relatively weak in many
municipalities, especially those with a Tutsi majority or in rural Bujumbura, the stomping grounds of
the Rwasa FNLs, which claims to have hill community advisers throughout the entire country. However,
this assertion is hard to verify given the particular nature of voting in the hill communities.25 Its base is
especially large in the Rusizi plains, including the capital city and rural Bujumbura.

The UPRONA, the FRODEBU Nyakuri and the FNLs of Jacques Bigirimana claim they cover the entire
country. However, none of these parties has provided electoral lists in all of the municipalities, even if
the first two have covered almost all of the territory. Also, their popular base is questionable given the
fragmentation of their party and, above all, the flight of part of that base to other wings or tendencies
of their party, as shown by the results obtained in 2015, at least for the UPRONA and the FNLs, both
of which campaigned openly. The first got only 30% of the vote it obtained in 2010, even though it was
the only Tutsi party in the running. The second sank below 2%, the outcome that would have allowed
it to have a seat in the national assembly. The FNLs thus obtained less than 10% of their outcome in
the previous elections! The main base of the FRODEBU-Nyakuri was in the Kirundo province, the home
land of its former chairman, Jean Minani, but it is hard to talk of a substantial foothold that will last.
Otherwise, the government’s renewed control of this party through (re)nyakurisation (a neologism
derived from Kirundi, the national language, and French, intended to mean ‘division’ in the figurative
sense), following manoeuvres by the Ministry of the Interior has, it seems, reduced the influence of
this party. The party has, furthermore, had to renew its provincial entities since many of their members
opposed the political directions of the new leadership.

The national scope of the MSD, as claimed by one of its leaders, is impossible to verify under present
conditions where the party no longer operates in Burundi due to the repression to which its members
were subjected because of their active role in opposing a third presidential term.26 It mainly had a base
in urban areas and a few provinces, based on the results of the 2010 elections. It is thus doubtless part

23
https://www.hrw.org/fr/news/2017/01/19/burundi-des-attaques-perpetrees-par-des-membres-de-la-ligue-des-
jeunes-du-parti-au
24
See Africa Crisis Group report no. 192, “Burundi: Bye bye Arusha”. 25 October 2012.
25
Hill community elections are not supposed to be done under the emblems of the political parties.
26
The Ministry of the Interior suspended all of the MSD’s activities on 4 April 2017.
12
of the political groups that might have seen their electorate grow between 2010 and 2015.
Furthermore, it is the only party that provided an approximate estimate of its members,27 essentially
based on the number of membership cards distributed and the total number of members of party
entities, from the policy office to the hill communities subject to census taking.

The UPD estimates it has a nationwide base, but this is countered by the mapping of the results of the
2010 elections and the extent of its lists provided in 2015. The Sahwanya FRODEBU has seen its
electorate dwindle for many years.28It would be surprising to see this tendency radically reversed since
the last elections, even if the party did not effectively take part in them,29 given the problems with
internal cohesion and renewal of its leadership. Except for the province of Cibitoke, the RANAC may
be said to have nationwide support. Its membership base is, however, highly questionable given the
result it obtained in 2015. The MRC admitted to having a support base mainly in 5 provinces: Mwaro,
Muramvya, rural Bujumbura, Bujumbura township and Bubanza. It also says it has a base that is largely
Tutsi which, de facto, considerably reduces its geographic coverage. The PARENA claims to have
nationwide coverage. However, it is highly probable that its popular base is much smaller, not to say
insignificant, given the sluggishness of its activities, as noted by its main manager. This factor is
combined with the growing disenchantment of its initial electorate in favour of other groups, mainly
including the MSD,30 which is one of the political parties least likely to endure. In this respect, a number
of parties admitted to having problems renewing their leadership, and even their base electorate, as
in the case of the CNDD. In contrast, some parties, such as the MSD and the Rwasa FNLs,31 are
characterized by the youthfulness of their base and thus have an initial set of strengths to make
headway on the Burundi political scene, despite the occasional inherent weakness in some of them.
The following table attempts to illustrate the standard profile of the party members, sympathizers and
political figures covered by the scope of the study.

27
More than 113,000, according to François Nyamoya.
28
In 17 years, the electorate of this party entirely collapsed, decreasing from 72% of the votes in the 1993
legislative elections, to 25% during the municipal elections in 2005, and reaching only 5% of the vote in the
municipal elections in 2010.
29
It participated as part of the ADC Ikibir coalition, but the latter boycotted the voting. That decision to run as
part of a shared platform may represent a certain level of weakness.
30
In 2005, the PARENA was the number 1 party in some districts of Bujumbura with Tutsi majorities, where the
MSD got most of its votes in 2010.
31
It is riskier to speak of the CNDD-FDD which, as the dominant political power in Burundi, obviously has a
large youth electorate given the demographics of the country. In fact, its true popularity among young people
today makes one wonder, given the accumulated frustrations of a young generation severely affected by
unemployment, under-employment, school drop-outs, as well as being unoccupied and with serious economic
difficulties.
13
Political parties or figures Stated standard profile Comments
CNDD Educated people with a long True to a certain extent, but
history of employment with a base in the province of
Bururi and especially in the
municipality of Songa, the
birthplace of Léonard
Nyangoma. Few young people.
CNDD-FDD The entire population Especially in rural areas and in
the working population (by
necessity?). Low draw among
intellectuals.
FNL RWASA Young people (implicitly Hutu) Major portion of
of all classes and professions, disenfranchised (mostly
including the unemployed. The youth), especially on the Rusizi
farmers. plane and in rural Bujumbura.
Few intellectuals.
Jacques Bigirimana FNL Farmers
FRODEBU-Nyakuri Young people
Sahwanya FRODEBU - Basic supporters from the start
of the FRODEBU and some
youth attracted by the
ideology and personality of
Ndadaye.
MSD Youth and progressives from all Large portion of youth and
ethnic groups urban resident with a minimal
level of education.

MRC Intellectuals from the public Strong base in Mwaro and

and private sectors, and young Muramvya
people
PARENA Teachers, civil servants, pupils Middle-age Tutsi adults who
and students are undying supporters of the
former head of state, JB
Bagaza.
UPD Young adults Most of the Muslim faith
Official UPRONA Management level persons and Few youth in the base, and
young people from all ethnic mostly from a single ethnic
groups group.

14
3.4 Internal democracy of the parties put to the test by authoritarian management

The previous study examined the internal democracy of the parties in a context where recent events
of that time could provide better means of verification, or at least a semblance of it given the very
recent period of elections. The make-up of the electoral lists for the various votes and the means of
naming heads of political party entities thus served as a way to evaluate the internal democracy of
these political groups. However, since then, the fact that most of the political parties are in hibernation
and are unable to hold meetings at certain levels has hindered any evaluation of the conditions of
internal democracy in the political parties. Out of all the parties and groups surveyed, only three were
able to freely hold a conference in the period of time since the last survey: the CNDD-FDD, the RANAC
and the official UPRONA. This shows the contrast between the political parties in terms of how free
they are to operate.32 However, the internal democracy of these parties depends on many factors,
including historical ones, based among other things on the reasons for their creation (seeking funding
from the government vs opposing the current administration) and growth (government party vs
opposition party), their initial character (rebellion vs party with a democratic culture), and the
generational and sociological profiles of their managing entities.

All of the parties make the same statements on this matter: that they follow the rules on how they
operate, beginning with a nearly irreproachable internal democracy founded, among other things, on
free and transparent internal elections for their managing entities and sometimes the existence of
mechanisms for verifying and managing disputes in order to defuse and settle differences of opinion.

Thus, given the periods that usually separate the convocation of two conferences by a single party, the
executive office or committee and the party’s representatives or leaders end up de facto being the
true leaders of their political group. In this respect, some parties are subject to tensions, and even
conflicts, between these two entities due to power struggles and interest seeking. This is the case with
the UPRONA, which is a member of Amizero y’ Abarundi, to the point that it has now broken up into
two new wings. This political group regularly holds consultations on matters related to the dialogue
facilitated by a gradual decrease in the members of its executive office.33 However, the leaders of the
two conflicting wings of the opposition movement of the UPRONA: the Nditije and Ngayimpenda
wings, are not unanimous about their method of governance, deemed by some to be authoritarian.34
Other parties admit that discussions within their entities are often conflicting and sometimes may even
cause frustrations over the final positions adopted (Sahwanya FRODEBU). The strong-arm and/or
authoritarian methods used by some party leaders are also criticized by some of their current or past
members (Hussein Radjabu for the UPD and Jacques Bigirimana for the FNLs). Although Nyangoma’s
leadership is touted by some members of its executive committee, transferees from the CNDD
denounce his having confiscated all the power for himself and his disinclination to compromise. The
imposition of a mandatory 10% salary contribution within the UPRONA and the CNDD-FDD, although

32
One opposition branch of the UPD held a conference on 18 March 2017. It is not yet clear whether it was
approved by the Ministry of the Interior.
33
Of the 71 people who comprised this office in 2009, only thirty are still present in Burundi. Some have left,
some have died, and some 20 have joined the official wing of the UPRONA. Interviews.
34
Interviews.
15
more limiting in terms of the groups targeted by the latter, indicates how decisions are made since this
measure seems to be little appreciated by the people concerned.

The Agathon Rwasa branch FNLs obviously have tremendous difficulty operating. In recent months,
they have even been the preferred target of the repression affecting those political parties outside the
circle of CNDD-FDD satellite parties. This repression is generally in the form of brutal arrests (including
by the Imbonerakure), often followed by roughing up, disappearances and sometimes extra-judicial
executions.35 The FNLs seem, however, to agree at the level of their managing bodies whenever
needed. The suspension of the party’s general secretary thus followed a decision made by the political
office and executive committee, meeting jointly at the home of the leader of this political group.
Nevertheless, it is not clear that all important decisions result from such agreement, and Rwasa’s grip
on its group, and the myth surrounding his person, doubtless run counter to transparency, dialogue
and the search for a consensus as the mode of governance for decision making. Since the MSD is
basically operating underground, it is hard to evaluate the status of internal democracy in that party.
It had, however, set up internal primaries at the various levels in order to make up the 2015 electoral
slates in a process which seems to have been highly transparent and proof of democratic credibility.
Since nearly all of its senior officials went into exile, major decisions seem most often to be made by
agreement, and the party president is even often in the minority.36 Thus, the pair of Alexis Sinduhije
and François Nyamoya, respectively chairman and general secretary of the MSD, often act jointly in
order to stop those most in a hurry.37 Of all the parties, the CNDD-FDD is the one where operations
and internal activities have no impediments. Its limitations and constraints are basically related to
factors inherent to the party, specifically the party’s own internal dictatorship. In this respect, it
constantly holds meetings at its various levels. That said, the means of operation and decision making
of its very powerful Council of Advisers is anything but transparent.

Many parties have to deal with external influences and interference. It is thus public knowledge that
the UPD, seemingly a creation of the party in power, is really run by Hussein Radjabu, the former
chairman of the old rebel movement and currently involved in the armed opposition. The parties close
to the CNDD-FDD are subjected to injunctions by those in power in some of their decisions on stances.
The CNARED itself undergoes pressure from external agents during certain decisions, but without thus
being under their tutelage.

Lastly, evaluating the existence of a democratic culture and practices within the political parties is
therefore hindered by the current restrictions on the political realm. This situation de facto
compromises their internal activities and thus reduces the means available for any evaluation based
on recent, concrete examples.

35
On this subject, read especially the ITEKA 1st quarter 2017 human rights report.
36
Interviews. This change, if confirmed, merits emphasizing. The chairman of the MSD is known to be
unpredictable and impulsive, traits that have often been an embarrassment to the rest of the party’s
leadership.
37
Interviews.
16
3.5 Effective participation by youth and women continues to be problematic
Despite the efforts made by some groups (specifically the official UPRONA, the MSD and the Agathon
Rwasa FNLs) to ensure better representation and participation by their youth in the managing entities,
the political class in general suffers from a problem of generational renewal38 and the apparent
absence of a clear vision the means and ways to ensure greater social and economic inclusion for young
people who are more and more disenfranchised by the lack of opportunities for employment and
personal growth. There are obviously a few parties whose base electorate is particularly young. In
addition, some political group leaders are themselves still young adults, such as the chairmen of the
FRODEBU-Nyakuri and official UPRONA parties. However, this representation has a hard time coming
up with concrete projects and leaves one wondering about their effective participation in decision
making within the managing entities. A number of parties refer to plans drawn up in their platform for
young people, but are nevertheless unable to sketch their outlines. Others admit that young people
are not granted due participation in both managing entities and in their platforms. Some parties have
justified their tabling of certain draft plans intended for their younger members due to the political
and security conditions, in which many have already paid a high price due to the crisis. This effectively
brings to mind the very active role of young people in the escalating violence that characterized the
early months of the crisis, and their use, or even manipulation, by some parties for rudimentary tasks.
A few party leaders thus note that including more young people in their leadership is one of their
challenges. Nevertheless, most of the parties have a youth commission as part of their managing
entities. In the case of others, this takes the form of a youth movement or league. Unfortunately, the
CNDD-FDD’s youth commission is often mentioned because of the many sacrifices it has exacted
throughout the country since the beginning of the crisis.39

Based on advances in the law on gender and pressures brought to bear by the women’s inclusion
movement, women are now more represented within party managing entities. Several parties claim
that they have more women than the quotas required by law. Nevertheless, of the 15 groups or parties
covered by the survey, only one political group is led by a woman, the UPD. This under-representation
of women at the head of the parties, and even of the main civil society organizations, partially explains
the low number of women who participated in the Arusha talks.40 Several political parties (CNDD, MSD,
Agathon Rwasa FNL) have included the principle of parity in their platforms. The MSD is reputed to
have made up electoral slates with an equal number of men and women during the municipal elections
in 2015. The Sahwanya FRODEBU is apparently changing its statutes due to pressure by women
members so that the party complies with the international legal framework and includes the principle
of parity. Most of the parties surveyed have a women’s commission. Some, such as the CNDD-FDD or
the UPD, have a women’s league. Most of the political groups claim that their platform includes a
major plank on women’s issues. Some (MSD) admit, however, that women are still under-represented
in their managing entities. They attribute that specifically to the strong influence of socio-cultural
factors. Others, while recognizing the legitimacy of greater representation and participation for
women, emphasize merit and/or skills as criteria for them to attain management-level positions. In

38
A rather flagrant phenomenon in the UPRONA, involving its opposing wings, and in the Sahwanya
FRODEBU, the CNDD, the MRC and the PARENA.
39
In this respect, the United Nations has even characterized it as a militia.
40
During the session in February 2017, of the 33 major figures invited, only 2 were women, and one of them
was the general secretary of the UPD.
17
other words, the effective participation of women in party activities and the country’s political scene
is still problematic.

18
4 Strategic plan, vision and stances on current issues

4.1 Some parties constantly mobilizing and others cooped up among themselves
In terms of their plans for expansion via mobilization of the populace, restrictions on political activities
and government repression continue to hamper the activists of some opposition parties and are clearly
putting a number of political groups in serious danger in their attempts to continue pursuing a visible
plan of popular mobilization. In this respect, there is a very clear line differentiating the CNDD-FDD and
its satellite parties from those that opposed the third presidential term of office or that have adopted
a critical stance on the legitimacy of the government in power. The former continue to operate
nationwide and are working to increase their supporters, especially via weekly public meetings in
favour of the party in power and regular forays into the field for their allied political groups. However,
in contrast, the opposition parties are laying low. Most of them have given up on their attempts at
popular mobilization. Their activities are essentially confined to the capital city or a few urban centres
in the form of discrete meetings of their managing entities. Only two of these parties said they are
continuing mobilization activities in the provinces based on clandestine local propaganda. These are
the FNLs and the UPD. The latter has adopted door-to-door tactics and is pursuing its campaign through
clandestine actions. In fact, this party has lost its chairman and spokesperson, both of whom were
assassinated at the outset of the crisis. Since then, it has preferred not to hold public meetings.
However, according to one of its officials, this new option was not dictated by constraints and
restrictions clearly imposed on them, but stems more from risk prevention measures. As for the
Agathon Rwasa FNLs, their strategy is based specifically on mobilization activities conducted in secret
by their elected members in the hill communities. However, this work in the shadows is not trouble
free, given the number of arrests carried out among the supporters of the FNLs during recent months.41
The home base of Rwasa is apparently under continuous surveillance.
As for the Nyakuri FRODEBU and the Jacques Bigirimana wing FNLs, the former states that it does not
yet have a clear plan and is initially focusing on internal re-organization of the party, in particular by
setting up its internal entities at all levels. It will thus be up to the hill community committees to carry
out the work of mobilization once a plan has been drawn up. The FNLs have also entrusted this task to
the decentralized cell units in the provinces.

As for the CNDD-FDD, it uses various strategies that combine the carrot and the stick. In the first case,
a certain number of people, most often of a high rank or embodying a certain symbolism,42 may be
approached or brought in by showing them the various advantages of their joining, re-joining (when it
involves former members) or conversion (for the supporters of other parties). Mass propaganda
continues, however, to be the strategy most often used. In contrast, the party may have recourse to
strong-arm methods and work via a range of coercive means that range from threats and intimidation
to violent actions that may include executions. In this respect, some persons subjected to legal
proceedings, or administrative or financial sanctions in their realm of work, have been obliged to join
the party (temporarily?) in order to save their necks. Thus, since access to public sector jobs is limited
to only members of the CNDD-FDD, and access to certain basic services is primarily for their partisans,
meaning the Bagumyamabanga (those who keep things secret), membership in the party is, for many,
dictated by need or pressures, at least for those who are the least well equipped in terms of skills and

41
http://www.arib.info/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=16443&Itemid=1
42
The elderly parents of Pancrace Cimpaye, the spokesman of the CNARED and one of the main opposition
figures, were thus recruited by the CNDD-FDD, accompanied by a great media event.
19
references.

4.2 Parties’ lack of vision and the weakness of their platforms and ideologies
The political parties are supposed to bring together people who share the same values, ideas, opinions,
and interests in order to advance those factors to influence public policy and, in the best of all worlds,
be able to put them in practice in order to gain positions of power in elections. As in many African
countries, there is a burgeoning number of political parties on the Burundi political scene43 which, in
most cases, do not represent any of the ideological lines of thinking or major economic doctrines. Very
often, these parties have been built around personal and opportunistic interests, or regional, ethnic
and clan identities, the desire for revenge, certain myths, the memories of former political figures no
longer living, or even persons with a certain public renown acquired in a variety of manners. These
parties are more rarely based on declared slates of principles or values that are truly incorporated and
need to be outlined in platforms to be promoted in the light of public opinion. There is thus a lack of
clear, documented platforms for most of the political parties, or some confusion in how they state
their visions or societal plans. Very few parties were thus able to provide their platforms. Some claimed
they were confidential and others said they were currently being updated.44 It is therefore hard to
understand the foundations of membership in some political parties. The result is that voters are very
confused about the political offerings of these parties. There is also a propensity among many Burundis
not to join societal projects or programmes, but rather join up with people with whom they feel certain
affinities. This partially explains the low level of fidelity in many parties. Political migrations as a means
of operation of their leaders, and the fragile nature of alliances and coalitions between political parties,
of which opportunism and/or “full-belly” politics – per the Cameroonian definition,45 constitute the
other explanatory causes.

4.3 At the core of the crisis: the legitimacy of institutions and the 2020 elections

The crisis that resulted in 2015 from the forceful takeover of the head of state quickly radicalized the
positions of parties already under tension due to the perspective of new general elections.
Preparations for those elections had been criticized as being partisan and deficient. This situation was
mainly focused on the matter of the third presidential term of office, in regard to which two groups
were immediately differentiated. On one side were those opposed to a new incumbent candidacy,
comprised of a group of political parties (PARENA, MSD, FRODEBU Nyakuri, Sahwanya FRODEBU,
CNDD, UPRONA-Nditije wing and the rebellious factions). They took the lead in driving the campaign
against this new term of office, while sharing the same points of view. On the other side were the
CNDD-FDD and its allied parties (FNL Jacques Bigirimana, UPRONA). The former pulled out all the stops
on its party machinery and employed government security forces to impose the incumbent candidacy.
Moreover, the parties that openly and sometimes violently opposed the third term of office, all
subsequently members of the CNARED, maintained their stances. An exception was the Nyakuri
FRODEBU which, due to crafty manoeuvres by the Ministry of the Interior, changed its management

43
More than 50 political parties.
44
Only the CNDD and MRC parties provided me with their programs.
45
Jean-François Bayart, “The state in Africa: ‘full-belly’ politics,” Paris, Fayard, 1989
20
and stance on the matter.46

Without in so doing recognizing the legitimacy of the electoral process and the institutions derived
from it, the Agathon Rwasa FNLs have made an about-face and become part of the institutions
submitting to government requests in order to join the national assembly. Mostly motivated by a
concern for political and financial survival, and fearing for its own physical safety, the leadership of the
FNLs has justified its decision by embarrassed explanations that demonstrate the difficulty of making
consistent choices and the weakness of most of the political class in terms of resources and ideology.
It has, moreover, found itself at odds with a large part of its base actively engaged in the battle against
the third term of office. The MRC is implicitly always opposed to the third term of office through its
affiliation with the CNARED, but is rather discrete in its commitment. As for the UPD, it claims it is still
committed to the matter “with all possible vigor”. In contrast, the parties that supported the candidacy
of Nkurunziza have maintained their positions and, in some cases, with notable zeal (FNL Jacques
Bigirimana). They have, furthermore, become part of government institutions or entered high civil
service positions, except for the Nyakuri FRODEBU, which made a late entry into the movement of the
party in power. In terms of the 2020 elections, the parties opposed to a third presidential term of office
hold relatively consequential positions. For them, accepting the 2015 elections is out of the question
since the resulting problems have to be resolved. However, some of them, while maintaining that
stance on principle, admit they are preparing for the eventual occurrence of these elections. They thus
state they are including the various possible scenarios, even early elections, in their plans. The Rwasa
FNLs and the UPD are among such cases. The position of the PARENA is less transparent. It could take
a stance if the exterior dialogue results in compromises on the political system and on the basic rules
governing the elections. The same is true of the Sahwanya FRODEBU, which is not totally impervious
to this option if a propitious political environment is created, especially involving a transitional
government. This party also mentions the possibility of early elections. In contrast, the CNDD-FDD is
already preparing for the 2020 elections. The UPRONA’s goal is to do better than in 2015 and gradually
set up a plan for that, based mainly on fund raising (opening a blocked account and mandatory
contributions by its members), and on reuniting those of its members who are dispersed throughout
the various wings. In February 2017, the Nyakuri FRODEBU called a meeting of its national steering
committee for this purpose. In contrast, the Bigirimana wing FNLs say they have not yet addressed the
issue and are still concentrating on strengthening their committees at the base.

4.4 Concurrent dialogue processes diversely valued

Dialogue within the country has been, and is, resented by all of the parties opposed to a third
presidential term of office. It is characterized as a ruse and perceived as being manipulated by the
government in its efforts to gain approval of the constitutional amendments rejected by the national
assembly in early 2014 and to bury Arusha. Rwasa itself is highly critical of such dialogue. It deems that
the proposals deriving from it were dictated by the government. In contrast, parties close to the CNDD-
FDD have taken part in it. This party, in fact, favours domestic dialogue “because everyone has a say”
over external dialogue, where “only those who are invited can take part”. In addition, it considers any

46
A declaration signed by the leadership of the Sahwanya-FRODEBU on 20 May 2017 on the
sociopolitical situation in Burundi after the outcome of a meeting of the national delegates council
led to confusion since it recognized President Nkurunziza as “the only legitimate representative of
the Burundi nation.”
21
dialogue dealing with all of the matters of concern to the country rather than the Arusha process -
“essentially based on the matter of power sharing,” to be more legitimate.

As for external dialogue, it is officially accepted by all of the groups and parties covered by our study,
including the CNDD-FDD. However, that party is critical of such dialogue and its participation is
contingent on certain prerequisites concerning the composition of the delegations and the agenda. In
contrast, the UPRONA, the FRODEBU-Nyakuri and the Jacques Bigirimana wing FNLs consider this
process to be extremely important because of its inclusiveness and the participation of political figures
in exile. That said, a number of parties believe that such dialogue has not yet really gotten under way.
Some also take part without really believing in it. Those same parties are simultaneously preparing
other alternatives, including taking up arms in order to force the government into real negotiations.
While recognizing the need to give the opposition in exile a voice, the Sahwanya-FRODEBU is working
to bring this process back in-country47 since, in its opinion, not all of the issues can be resolved in
Arusha. This dialogue is thus built on inclusive negotiations, the creation of a propitious environment,
improvements on the guarantees set up by those who signed Arusha, and on strict compliance with
that agreement and with the constitution.

Nevertheless, many groups and parties base their hopes on external dialogue despite their various
recriminations. Their complaints mainly concern the quality of the facilitator, viewed by many as
incompetent, partial, and part of the crisis. They especially blame his weakness, the very controversial
stance he took during his visit to Bujumbura in December 2016, and the sway of the executive secretary
of the East African Community (EAC), Libérat Mpfumukeko, over the organization and the progress of
the work. In the eyes of most of the parties, Benjamin Mkapa was a default choice whom they will
unfortunately have to learn to live with. Nevertheless, positions concerning him are divergent, even
within the CNARED. Some no longer trust him, in contrast to the Sahwanya-FRODEBU, which is fairly
tolerant of him. However, the opposition parties all demand that this facilitator be backed by other
international organizations such as the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN), and supported
by a team of experts. They demand that the executive secretary of the EAC be removed from the
process, and that there be greater commitment by heads of state in the region. In terms of the various
contributions made to this process of dialogue, a number of parties have expressed their positions in
the form of a memorandum, or made contributions sent to the facilitator through diverse
channels.48Others deem that, given its current state of progress, it has not really gotten under way. In
any event, matters concerning dialogue are one of the main concerns of the political parties and groups
we surveyed, largely due to the challenges it poses. It was, moreover, one of the sources of tension
within the CNARED and some political parties, and caused an internal split within the Nditije wing of
the UPRONA.

47
This point of view also seems to be shared by the UPRONA, the Rwasa FNL group and the RANAC.
48
In particular, a delegation from the CNARED sent a note on its proposals for resolving the crisis the Ugandan
head of state, Yoweri Museveni, the leader facilitator for the Burundi crisis, the day after a meeting with him
in early February 2017.
22
5. Interactions with other groups and political parties, the Ministry
of the Interior and the CENI

5.1 Interactions with the other political parties

In general, the interactions between political parties depend on their positions either as part of the
movement supporting the presidential party or in the opposition. The first group: the CNDD-FDD, the
official UPRONA, the FRODEBU-Nyakuri and the Jacques Bigirimana FNL, all claim to have good
relations with all of the political groups, including the opposition groups, and the latter clearly express
contrary opinions. The party in power claims it has not abused any group. It responds with categorical
denials to the many complaints and recriminations about it from a number of parties. It attempts to
adduce as proof of this the visits made to a number of party leaders by the new general secretary of
the CNDD-FDD. The government UPRONA states it has given instructions to strengthen relationships
with the other political parties above and beyond any eventual differences of perspective. The
FRODEBU-Nyakuri deems that it has no particular problems with the other political groups, and the
Jacques Bigirimana wing FNL believe they have good relations with the other parties.
The leaders of Rwasa’s FNL state that they are in regular contact with Ngayimpenga’s wing of the
unrecognized FNL and argue that they may soon attempt to reactivate their coalition. However, the
FNL Rwasa has little to no relations with other political parties. Rwasa himself argues that the
opposition often acts irresponsibly and blocks any real attempt to work in partnership. On the other
hand, many leaders of the opposition are very critical of Rwasa, claiming that he is inconsistent and
incoherent in his political position. For many of them, his decision to integrate the government was a
clear betrayal.
However, the bell tolls quite differently when one queries the opposition groups, especially those who
were on the front lines in the first months of the electoral crisis. In general, they maintain essentially
the same relationships with the parties of similar political persuasion through platforms of which they
are a part. The parties who are members of the CNARED are quite unanimous in saying that they give
priority to their relationships with the groups who are members of that platform. Those relationships
are positive despite the fact that there may be differences of opinion on some matters, such as the
strategy to follow or the matter of dialogue according to the Sahwanya FRODEBU. Those that are still
present in Burundi, such as the MRC and the UPD, say that the frameworks for discussion offered by
the BLTP allow them to talk to the other political parties. A number of these groups believe that their
relationships with the government’s satellite parties are rather muddled. The RANAC has close
relationships with the opposition parties, even if it is not part of the radical opposition. In terms of the
various wings of the oppositional UPRONA, the Ngayimpenda faction sometimes talks to the parties
present in country, even if the problem is, in its view, that some of them have “gone to ground”. The
Nditije faction essentially maintains relations with the groups that are members of the CNARED.

5.2 Tense relations with the CNDD-FDD

We can distinguish three categories of parties in terms of their relationships with the CNDD-FDD.
Those that have good relationships and, not surprisingly, this includes the parties close to the
government. Next are the parties that say they have no relationships and/or special problems with the
CNDD-FDD. Lastly, we have those whose relationships with the presidential party are characterized as

23
very bad. The first group includes the UPRONA, the Jacques Bigirimana FNL and the FRODEBU-Nyakuri.
The last of these claims to have some viewpoints similar to those of the CNDD-FDD.
According to the chairman of the PARENA, those relationships are non-existent, even if, in a fashion,
the former rebel movement is keeping an eye on him.49 The MRC, too, does not really have contacts
with the CNDD-FDD. However, it admits that its group has not been disturbed since 2015. In addition,
the current general secretary of the party in power attended the final end-of-mourning ceremonies
for Epitace Bayaganakandi, the founder and former chairman of the MRC. The RANAC has no particular
problems with the CNDD-FDD, which occasionally invites it to its activities.
The other opposition parties are unanimous in stating that their relationships with the group in power
are “very bad”. For the MSD, things have been this way since its founding.50 The Sahwanya-FRODEBU
says the same thing. Its vice chairman is, moreover, the defendant in four cases before the courts.51 As
for the UPD, this group concedes that it has good relationships with the CNDD-FDD’s supporters but
that its relationships with the party as an institution are poor. It notes that its chairman and
spokesperson were assassinated in 2015 which, in its opinion, says it all. The CNDD talks of conflicting
relationships and the harassment of its supporters by Imbonerakures in the provinces. The
Ngayimpenda faction has no relationships with the party in power but the leader of this wing added
that he was nevertheless disturbed four times. Nditije is in forced exile. And, lastly, while Rwasa’s
faction of the FNL has integrated the government through its Amizero Y’abarundi coalition, its
relationship with the ruling party and the state remains tenuous. Representative of the party evoke
the government’s refusal to grant the group legal recognition. In government, the party considers itself
as an opposition group, which is often harassed by the authorities. Party representative also claim that
the CNDD-FDD controlled state obstructs their ability to operate freely by arbitrarily arresting their
members. Clearly, all of the opposition groups that have very well-established stances on the
legitimacy of the government have problems with the presidential party, except for those that are
laying low on the matter. The FNLs owe their treatment more to their perception as a potential
challenger to the party in power in upcoming elections.

5.3 A highly criticized Ministry of the Interior

Most of the opposition parties make no distinction between the Ministry of the Interior and the CNDD-
FDD, and thus share the same view of their relationships with that institution. They consider it illogical
and unjust to entrust its management to a person, and to personnel under his orders, who are entirely
devoted to the party in power and thus subject to its injunctions. Those are at least the opinions
expressed by the MSD, the CNDD, the Sahwanya FRODEBU, the 2 wings of the UPRONA outside the
institutions, the Agathon Rwasa wing FNLs and the UPD. The last of these nevertheless admits to having
good relations with certain senior officials of the ministry in contrast to the institution itself. In this
respect, it complains about invitations sent by the ministry to a former official of its party who has

49
He offers as evidence the repeated obstructions of his [work at?] the Bank of the Republic of Burundi (BRB)
in order to bring it up to standards in terms of salary grades and their resulting benefits.
50
As a reminder, Alexis Sinduhije, the chairman of the party, was once put in prison and has been subject to
several extradition attempts. François Nyamoya, the general secretary was put in prison twice. In both cases,
it was related to political documents.
51
He was even sentenced to a year in prison for one of these cases, and is amazed that the sentence has yet to be
enforced. The current party chairman was put in prison once
24
since been excluded from the group during meetings with the political groups in an attempt, in his
opinion, to legitimate him as a party official. That same person was responsible for the meeting of a
conference held in the name of the UPD on 18 March 2017. That event could open the way for
(re)nyakurisation of the UPD if, perchance, that conference were to receive the blessing of the Ministry
of the Interior. The parties separated into wings or different factions likewise attribute their
nyakurisation to the ministry. The CNDD claims that it, too, was twice subject to such attempts. The
same goes for the MRC, which discontinued its participation in the forum of parties supervised by the
ministry and denounced the latter’s tendency to want to impose its points of view. For the time being,
the RANAC has no special problems with the actions of the ministry, despite delays in the procedures
to approve it as a political group.

As for the party in power and its allies, they all give the ministry a thumbs-up, although the Jacques
Bigirimana FNLs complain they are often confused with the Rwasa faction due to the continued misuse
of their name by the former rebel leader.
In general, our perceptions do not differ from those expressed on the subject of relationships with the
CNDD-FDD, and the opposition groups tend to lump it together with the Ministry of the Interior.

5.4 A National Electoral Commission (CENI) denounced by most of the parties

The national electoral commission is perceived in various ways according to the cleavages within the
political class. The parties that follow in the wake of the government have nothing more to say about
it, although the official UPRONA adds that it would like to help set up a more consensual CENI. That
desire bears witness to some extent to the perception that the current commission lacks credibility. It
is, moreover, due to be replaced during an upcoming session of parliament, according to a number of
people we talked with. Nevertheless, most of the political groups say they have not had any particular
contact with the electoral commission since the last elections - managed by it, which, in their view,
were a disaster. The CENI is thus very badly viewed by the opposition in general, including the PARENA,
the MRC and the Agathon Rwasa FNLs. Overall, the opposition is calling for the CENI to be replaced by
an independent, impartial and competent commission. Some parties also complain they are no longer
invited to the commission’s activities.52

52
The CNDD and the PARENA.
25
6. Specific features of the main political parties and figures

6.1 The CNDD-FDD

The CNDD-FDD was the source of the founding of the FRODEBU.53 However, it quickly cast off the new
party to the point of becoming one of its adversaries, starting at the time of the resistance movement.
The rebel movement sought to overthrow the dominance of the “Hima Tutsi”54 in favour of a
democracy with a Hutu majority. Brutal, not to say violent, in its rhetoric and practices during the initial
years of the armed struggle,55 it gradually changed its policy of mobilization to embrace a more
moderate and unifying line of speech.56 Despite its strong-arm and coercive methods, even with
population groups it was supposed to protect, it maintained close contact with rural areas throughout
all the war years. Once in power, it would maintain this close contact with the farmers and initiate
social welfare measures that were very well received by the public in question and specifically by the
poorest among them.57 In contrast to previous regimes, which were highly centralized in Bujumbura,
the provinces have become the focus of various governmental actions and the president himself
spends most of his time there. This desire to maintain close contact with the rural areas is due to the
fact that the CNDD-FDD has a large peasant component, to a certain populism and to the party in
power’s problematic relationship with the capital city, seen for a long time now as a bastion of hostility
to it.58 Described by some as a movement of the masses, that party reflects to some extent Burundi of
the hinterland. Its officials are drawn from rural areas and, in many cases, have little education and are
mostly Hutus. They have also long maintained an aversion to intellectuals (educated persons), and this
difference has been a source of tensions since the time of the armed resistance.59 Running operations

53
After the putsch of 1993, given the national and international outcry caused by this renewed forced entry
and the risks of widespread conflict, the army and some “invisible” civilian putsch participants returned power
to the FRODEBU. Nevertheless, the FRODEBU lost real control due to the gradual transfer of certain
prerogatives to other parties, including the UPRONA. In addition, it was especially aware that it could not
govern without real authority over the defence and security forces, comprised essentially of Tutsis. That is what
motivated it, despite its official position of dominance in the institutions, to found the CNDD (its initial name) in
1994 in order to foment “popular resistance” in the interest of obtaining negotiations for a true overhaul of the
army and the restoration of democracy.
54
The Himas are a subgroup of the Tutsi and the origin, most notably, of the 3 heads of state during the years of
the military regime, i.e. Micombero, Bagaza and Buyoya. CNDD-FDD propaganda thus associated them with
those years of government and demonised them. Even today, that sector of the population embodies every
evil in the opinion of many officials of the party in power.
55
“Failure of the transformation of the CNDD-FDD from the rebel movement into a political party: a question of
balance between change and continuity.” Dr Gervais Rufyikiri. Working paper/December 2016. University
of Antwerp.
56
“The CNDD-FDD in Burundi: the path from armed struggle to political conflict.” Willy Nindorera. Berghof
Transitions Series N°10.
57
Free primary schooling and medical care for children under age 5 and for deliveries of babies.
58
It must be noted that Bujumbura votes fort he opposition. In addition, the capital is home to a significant Tutsi
population and hosts a large number of intellectuals. These are 3 reasons for hostility towards the city.
59
“Failure of the transformation of the CNDD-FDD from the rebel movement into a political party: a question of
balance between change and continuity.” Dr Gervais Rufyikiri. Working paper/December 2016. University
of Antwerp.
26
has nevertheless required recourse to, and assistance from, the Hutu intelligentsia and has favoured
the entry of Tutsi officials into the party.
The ten years of armed struggle had a major effect on the practices of the CNDD. This former rebel
group has difficulty shedding the methods it adopted during the armed resistance: cultivating secrecy,
obsession with plotters, the use of intimidation, force and violence as a means of governance, etc.60
Since it has come to power, the party in government has been under the influence of four generals
who act behind the scenes.61 They interfere in party management and public affairs with the excuse
that they spilt their blood to liberate the country and thus must be the true foundations of the party
and beneficiaries of how public assets are managed. The trademark name they have taken on,
Abarugwanye (those who fought), or Benumugambwe (the party owners) – in contrast to
Banyamugambwe (party activities in the broad sense), is very meaningful in this respect. This
interference in politics is especially motivated by their desire to protect and promote the interests of
the party, of their ethnic majority and of president Nkurunziza in dealing with rivalries and various
personal ambitions. Nevertheless, some of them are more motivated by their own material and
financial interests.62 This group is all powerful, and is feared by party leaders and even by the
institutions.63 As an example, in 2016, the naming of the new party general secretary during a
conference was preceded by an election behind closed doors of an electoral body comprised basically
of some ten generals in order to edge out the current occupant of that position in favour of the
influential general Bunyoni.64 This group sometimes even has a voice that prevails over the Council of
Advisers,65 whose membership is currently carefully screened.66 The current Minister of Public Security
is one of the key figures in this occult circle. His sway might have increased after the disappearance of
the most powerful member of the group, general Adolphe Nshimirimana, who was killed in an ambush
in August 2015, but his very obvious personal ambitions may eventually put him in a tight spot with
the head of state.
This group also includes the president’s current chief of staff, Gervais Ndirakubuca, otherwise known
as Ndakugarika (“I’ll kill you”), who is in charge of police matters. The rest of the group is comprised of
the head of the National Intelligence Service, Etienne Ntakarutimana, the assistant director general of
the national police, Godefroid Bizimana, the chief of staff of the president’s civil cabinet, Gabriel
Nizigama, and the commander of the national defense forces, Prime Niyongabo. The general secretary

60
Persistence of the practice of beatings as a way to punish recalcitrant civil servants is an illustration of this.
Interviews.
61
In accordance with the law, members of the defense and security forces are obliged to be apolitical and thus
not belong to any political party
62
In this respect, the most renowned person among them, and the one with the most connections, is Bunyoni.
63
Interviews with high-level officials.
64
Interview with a high-level official..
65
Thus, in 2015, after a meeting of the committee of experts where the president of the republic was left in the
minority in attempting to impose his candidacy at the next party conference for the presidency, this group
threatened those opposed to his wishes to run for a new term of office within that body and ordered that
Nkurunziza be chosen during a conference to be held a a time when the wave of resistance had been
repressed. Interviews with former members of the Council of Advisers.
66
They are officially named by the party conference but more likely chosen by the head of state himself, the new
members of the Council of Advisers are basically family members or people who owe a lot to Pierre
Nkurunziza, such as Joseph Ntakarutimana, a Tutsi who is the assistant general secretary of the party. The
other members are: Evariste Ndayishimiye, Zénon Ndaruvukanye, treasurer of the CNDD-FDD, and
Révérien Ndikuriyo, president of the Senate.
27
of the party, Evariste Ndayishimiye, is also a member. Others may be part of it, including the president
of the Senate, Révérien Ndikuriyo. However, the power of the main counsellor for communication at
the president’s office, Willy Nyamitwe, is limited to the policy and diplomatic spheres.67 It seems that
membership in this group, which is not entirely united and whose composition may vary over time, is
mainly motivated by the position one occupies in the high-level security administration, one’s career
path, the aura of the period of armed resistance, one’s closeness to the head of state, and one’s ability
to carry out the most sensitive missions, including violent ones.68 However, the major and most
powerful figure in the party is Pierre Nkurunziza himself, whose power has been strengthened since
the major purge within the party and the latest rewriting of the party rules. His position as the chairman
of the Council of Advisors, combined with his extensive powers as head of state, give him the final say
in a party that has become rather blended into the government.69
The authoritarian and violent nature of the CNDD-FDD, its nepotism, and lack of dialogue and the
absence of any adversarial debate within it, and the diversity of origin of its members,70 are largely
responsible for the multiple tensions and splits that have affected the party since it was founded. The
last internal crisis in 2015 rid the party of most of its moderate elements and of many of its
intellectuals. It ended up strengthening the circle of generals and accentuating the militarization of the
regime. In fact, in addition to the official forces of law and order, clearly controlled by the party in
power, its youth organization has become a militia that now patrols the entire country and imposes its
will and its strong-arm tactics on the general public.71
The most likely outcome today is that this general trend will continue if the balance of power within
the party is not reversed which, based on the evidence, does not seem to be forthcoming. There is,
however, a hidden discontent among party officials over the course of action chosen by the
government. The extent of this is hard to assess given the nature of the CNDD-FDD. Furthermore, the
obvious desire of the head of state to run for a fourth term of office is very unpopular, even among
some powerful members of the regime. Lastly, certain officials are well aware that the current
worsening of the country’s economic conditions could be harmful to the entire party.72
In conclusion, the CNDD-FDD’s ideology, given that it has held the reins of power for over a decade
and is thus accountable for public policies adopted during that time, has become entirely extreme and
is evolving towards a system that is borderline with totalitarianism, based among other things on an
obsession with maintaining power, combined with a rather narrow-minded notion of development
that tends to give priority to the construction of visible infrastructure. This particular focus enables it
to easily quantify its results or accomplishments for the purposes of propaganda, to the detriment of

67
Younger brother of the current Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alain-Aimé Nyamitwe, Willy Nyamitwe has
nevertheless been able to name a number of people to key positions. He has, however, made a number of
enemies within the circle of generals when they saw him as an increasing threat to their power.
68
Interviews with former very highly placed officials of the country.
69
An expression borrowed from Stef Vandeginste, a Belgian university professor and expert on Burundi.
“Burundi: between the consociative model and its implementation.” Africa of the Great Lakes. 2007-2008
yearbook.
70
Some differences of positions taken during the resistance are still in effect. They mainly concern seniority in
the party, whether or not one belongs to the military wing, to an ethnic group, to certain regions of origin, etc.
71
http://www.jeuneafrique.com/depeches/426528/politique/burundi-imbonerakure-outil-de-repression-regime/
72
Interviews with CNDD-FDD officials.
28
the quality of services provided and real efforts to provide for the well-being of the country’s
population.

6.2 The FNLs

The FNLs are another movement that grew out of the armed resistance. They derive from the oldest
Hutu rebel group, the PALIPEHUTU. Moreover, the CNDD-FDD and the FNLs rubbed shoulders during
the war years and were sometimes even adversaries. Initially much more extreme in its essentially
ethnic pronouncements, this former rebel group founded its ideology on commemorating the memory
of a painful past through a somewhat selective and Manichean interpretation, and the need for a social
contract between the Hutus and the Tutsis based on forgiveness. The FNLs have thus long upheld a
cult to the memory of the bloody events of 1965, 1969 and 1972, during which purges vitiated the
Hutu intelligentsia or even led to mass killings, often described as genocide in the case of 1972. The
latter, a tragic episode in Burundi’s history, also favoured some degree of the mobilization within the
CNDD-FDD, of which some officials were orphaned following those events. As in the case of some
millennial movements in Europe, the FNLs’ doctrine, or at least that of its leaders, is also based on the
belief that their movement is messianic and thus has policies, actions and decisions that are divinely
inspired. This aspect was partially responsible for the high levels of discipline and abnegation of their
supporters and combatants during the war years.73
However, the former rebel movement’s entry into civil and political realms due to its transformation
into a party was not without its problems. On one hand, it has only partially been incorporated into
state institutions.74 This has left most of the political officials without jobs or financial resources. In
fact, many of them have very little education and the few intellectuals were victims of the series of
purges during the period of armed resistance. In addition, the FNLs have had to accept their new status
as a political party and come to grips with all of the rules and adaptations that imposes. In particular,
this means abandoning certain rallying cries of mobilization, temporarily removing ethnicity from their
platform (albeit only officially) and changes in their party structures formerly based on a highly
authoritarian and hierarchical political and military rebel group. Lastly, the FNLs were shaken by new
internal schisms promoted by the government and the Rwasa faction was dispossessed of its party.
However, the various attempts to draw the two together were not successful. Although the historical
leader of the FNLs believes that this process of reunification will be irreversible with time, the depth
of the differences of opinion of both factions seems to rule out this outcome, at least in the current
political context.
The change from a warlord into an opposition figure, and then into political officials and good
shepherds seems to have suited Agathon Rwasa, now fitted out with proper manners and an articulate,
moderate platform, at least during its interviews or public appearances. Ethnicity is no longer part of
its platform and it has substantially changed its rhetoric, now basically focused on the problems of
governance, corruption, human rights violations (sic) and promoting democratic principles. The
fundamental question, however, is whether this new vision is really thought out, adopted and
communicated to all of its officials, supporters and sympathisers.75 In one sense, the FNLs have
maintained a certain cult of secrecy and underground propaganda to the extent that one must wonder

73
Interviews.
74
See Africa Crisis Group Briefing no. 63, Burundi: How to successfully incorporate the FNLs, 30 July 2009.
75
In 2010, it was accused of championing the incomplete emancipation of the Hutus from Tutsi domination by
organisations of civil society and certain political parties. See “Burundi: ensuring a credible election process”
Africa Crisis Group report no. 155 , 12 February 2010.
29
whether the peasants and poorer socio-economic groups in urban areas that are Hutus, their popular
base, are entitled to this same platform. In another sense, the fact that their leaders returned to hiding
for a few years, the frustrations the party has accumulated since its return to civil society, and
pressures its members have been victims of since the beginning of the crisis, could feed a desire to
reactivate the armed faction, assuming that it has disappeared. In any event, despite the ambiguities
in its platform and policy positions, Rwasa has managed to maintain a certain popularity among the
rural populations. In contrast, it has had so little success in winning over the intellectual elite that its
party lacks qualified personnel. After trying to symbolize Hutu awareness and being overtaken in this
domain by the CNDD-FDD, the FNLs would like to be the embodiment of change in the face of a
tyrannical government steeped in corruption and nepotism. And yet, have they entirely turned over a
new leaf to fit in with the new political circumstances and signs of the times? Lastly, the FNLs are
closely tied to the person of Agathon Rwasa. Were he to disappear or be killed, that would severely
compromise the political future of this movement that has nevertheless been in existence for nearly
three decades.

6.3 The UPRONA

The UPRONA is the oldest of the parties still active since it was the political group that fought for the
country’s independence. This is a mobilization tool still used by its senior officials that might seem
obsolete. Long the only party (1966-1992) and then a co-manager of government on a nearly
continuous basis (1994-2003), it has subsequently been the main ally of the successive administrations
(2003-2017). This cultivation of the government in power and of a role in managing public assets has
warped its officials and elites, most of whom are still largely motivated by schemes to obtain jobs and
potential benefits.76 In fact, the UPRONA’s past record in government institutions makes it one of the
parties with the most skilled personnel, even if many have gradually moved off to join other political
groups. However, the quality of its staff is barely evident in the form of innovative and attractive
platforms, especially any directed to youth who are much less in tune with an ageing party little
concerned about the worries and basic needs of the general public.
For some twenty years now, the UPRONA has continuously had to deal with internal tensions, largely
caused by its difficulty in adopting a consistent set of policies and clear positions on various timely
matters and challenges, and due to its position in government institutions. In one sense, it is caught
between its desire to clearly affirm certain principles of an ideology it pretends to defend, that is,
protecting the rights and interests of the Tutsi minority, compliance with quotas in government
institutions, combating impunity and the struggle to obtain stipends and revenues from the
management of public contracts. In actual fact, claiming such foundations would condemn it to
assuming the status of an opposition party since the CNDD-FDD came into power. In another sense, in
its desire to embody the meritorious succession of the ideals of prince Rwagasore, founder of the party
and the main figure behind Burundi’s achieving independence: a unified party that surpasses identity
issues and defends the principles of equality and full development for all, the UPRONA claims it
represents all ethnic groups whereas it simultaneously takes on a certain ethnic awareness. These
various factors explain the successive crises the UPRONA has undergone for two decades, where the
first internal split in 1996/1997 was the result of the leadership wanting to set up a partnership with
the FRODEBU, a group that party hard-liners considered “genocidal”, and above all, initiation of the
process of negotiations with the CNDD-FDD.

76
“Burundi: ensuring a credible election process” Africa Crisis Group report no. 155 , 12 February 2010.
30
The current splits within the UPRONA also derive from these contradictions, and at the level of the 2
opposition wings represented by Charles Nditije and Evariste Ngayimpenda. Both are divided, among
other things, on the question of its participation (current or future?) in government institutions.77
Things have become even more complicated today with the official wing’s extremely close relations
with the CNDD-FDD. This faction of the party is attempting to recover its traditional base. It does not
plan to hold discussions for reunification of the party with senior officials of the opposing factions
unless it has the upper hand after winning over to its side most of the bases of the other 2 wings. In
addition, the mutual bitterness and hatred of some leaders of the adversary factions, especially
between the president of the official UPRONA and Evariste Ngayimpenda, are not likely to facilitate
that process, even if the former could be replaced at any moment.78 In contrast, the Nditije faction,
whose contacts with the official wing of his party have been cut off, is talking to the Ngayimpenda
wing. Mediation is apparently under way in an attempt to bring viewpoints closer and overcome
differences. However, until now, this party has always been able to resolve its internal crises and spring
back, but is now faced with competition from a number of other parties that are also playing the same
ethnic card or attempting to draw away its electoral base.79 One of the reasons for its ability to
maintain a certain level of representation nationally during recent elections could be found in more
subjective considerations. In many families, mainly in less politicized rural areas, voting for the
UPRONA has been carried down from father to sons since the time of independence!
In contrast to a number of parties that have been important on the political scene in the last 20 years,
the UPRONA has the advantage of not having its destiny tied to a few individuals, or even to a single
person. Obviously, a number of figures have been especially important in the life of the party over the
past two decades, but they subsequently saw their power reduced (Therence Sinunguruza), withdrew
from party management bodies and entities for various reasons (Pierre Buyoya) or have simply
vanished (Jean-Baptiste Manwangari). However, people who held very high positions in government
institutions (head of state, 1st or 2nd vice president, prime minister) often continue to be heard,
although one must not over-emphasize their roles. In this respect, the struggles for influence and the
power plays within the UPRONA are much more open than in other parties.

6.4 The Sahwanya FRODEBU

The FRODEBU was created by a group of Hutu leaders and academics, mostly based in Rwanda and
imbued with leftist ideals. Melchior Ndadaye, a brilliant intellectual, was its first chairman and in that
respect, was named the party’s candidate in the presidential election of 1993. In contrast to the CNDD-
FDD and the FNLs, this party had qualified personnel and was able to develop a consistent political
platform based on democratic ideals and values. It was thus able to recruit most of the Hutu leaders
as well as a certain number of Tutsi intellectuals at the outset. The assassination of its principal leaders,
including its charismatic leader, Melchior Ndadaye, in 1993, its problematic and even controversial
management during the period of joint administration with the UPRONA (1994-1996, then 1998-2005),
the attraction of the armed faction for many in the Hutu majority and the internal tensions and
struggles within the party drastically reduced its initial attractiveness. Despite its platform focusing on
promoting democracy and human rights, its movement into government business has tarnished its
image. The party led the last phase of the transition (2003-2005), marked by cases of corruption where

77
Interviews with various members and officials of the various wings of the UPRONA.
78
Even though he has spent his career in the UPRONA, Abel Gashatsi does not have the same renown and sway
as the managers of the competing wings. Interviews.
79
Interviews.
31
some of its officials were implicated but, in contrast to the CNDD-FDD, its staff were largely confined
to the capital city and a bit out of touch with rural populations. Lastly, it was accused of having backed
the UPRONA’s management during previous administrations when the latter was directing the
transition. This explains in part its disastrous losses in the 2005 elections.
Since then, the party has been struggling to adopt the principles of Melchior Ndadaye, who had
generated so many hopes and very high popular membership given his inspiring policies on democracy,
human rights and, to some degree, ethnicity. However, since the CNDD-FDD came to power, the
FRODEBU has had to deal with various dilemmas and several times took ambiguous and contradictory
stances due in part to the attractiveness of jobs and the feather-bedding by some of its officials after
the years of transition. It was thus caught several times between wanting to participate in government
institutions or being an opposition party. It was also undermined by leadership quarrels and ego
contests between its main leaders: Léonce Ngendakumana, Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, Domitien
Ndayizeye and Jean Minani, and weakened by the actions and destabilizing manoeuvres of the party
in power (nyakurisation of the party, recruitment of some of its officials by means of various offers and
promises, harassment of its leaders and supporters at the base). The result was a split in the party and
general disenchantment of its base electorate, mainly in favour of the FNLs of Agathon Rwasa. Clearly,
a number of initiatives were taken in an attempt to reunify the party, but they all failed. Since then,
various persons have adopted extreme positions and the chances of reuniting the party have been
snuffed out for the time being. In this respect, the nyakurisation of the FRODEBU-Nyakuri excludes any
hope of such a possibility.
In the opinion of one of its main leaders, one of the causes of the disenchantment of a large portion
of its voter base is its ideology of promoting both dialogue and compromise to resolve Burundi’s
various crises, and the pacifist option, even in the most unacceptable situations. This case should be
viewed with caution, since this party called for violence with half-couched words during the election
campaign of 2010.80 We should also add to that the party’s contradictory stances, inconsistent
platform and various concessions during various situations in the past. All this has affected the
credibility of the FRODEBU as an alternative factor. Furthermore, the problems of renewing its leaders,
obviously not without their good qualities, but perceived as embodying controversial past
management, also contribute to the current weakness of this political group.

6.5 The MSD

Among the main political parties in Burundi, the MSD is one of the youngest in terms of its existence
and its electorate. It stands out on the political scene due to its urban nature, and the rather special
character and relative lack of political experience of its leaders. The party’s main leaders are city
dwellers most of whom grew up in the capital city, in contrast to most other political leaders. Its
electorate, relatively homogeneous in ethnic terms, is largely comprised of city dwellers with a certain
amount of education. Second, the party’s founder is the former manager of the main private radio
station in Burundi, African Public Radio (RPA), a medium that had high listener-ship and was critical of
the government before it was closed down,81 whereas most political leaders come from the public
sector, from more conformist professions in Burundi or...from the armed resistance movements.
Lastly, the MSD has no original ties to the main groups that stood out on the political scene in recent

80
“Burundi: ensuring a credible election process” Africa Crisis Group report no. 155 , 12 February 2010.
81
Alexis Sinduhije left the management of RPA in 2007 but kept a controlling share in the station until it was
closed down, specifically for the purpose of clandestine propaganda for the political actions of his party.
32
decades (UPRONA, FRODEBU, CNDD-FDD, FNL, etc.).82 In this respect, it is one of the rare parties on
the scene that was not in any way involved in the mass killings of the past (1972, 1988, 1993-2006).
That factor allows it to use to its advantage statements focused mainly on combating impunity, justice
and matters of governance, human rights and democracy. In contrast to other parties that mobilize
based on the same themes, the MSD’s platform, a bit populist, does not don kid gloves when it openly
criticizes the practices of the current government. Its relationship with the government has been very
tense, and even hostile, since its creation. Its approach is sometimes haughty and even irreverent, and
at times brutal, especially when voiced by the party chairman.83 In 2012, Alexis Sinduhije was accused
in a report by UN experts on the Congo of being tied to an armed movement based in the east of that
country, called the National Front for Revolution in Burundi (FRONABU)-TABARA.84 This was also the
party said to be leading the demonstrations and confrontations in the opposing neighbourhoods in
2015.85 Since then, all of its leaders have lived in exile, as have many in its electoral base who took an
active part in the struggle against the third term of office. Alexis Sinduhije is currently suspected of
having recently created an armed faction for the restoration of a state of law (RED)-TABARA.86
The MSD party, as in the case of some other parties, cannot be disassociated from the person of its
founder and chairman, who came up with its fundamental principles and major outlines, even if there
were other contributors to its platforms. Although the party may have gradually developed
transparent mechanisms of internal democracy, it is still highly dependent on the pair of Alexis
Sinduhije and François Nyamoya. According to some reports, the former is the head of the armed
faction,87 while the latter exclusively looks after political and diplomatic matters.

6.5 The CNARED

The CNARED was officially founded during a constitutional assembly held on 31 July and 1st August
2015 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. That assembly named a board of directors and elected as its chairman
Léonard Nyangoma. According to its by-laws, its foundation is “a framework for action and
coordination of political and citizen groups opposed to the illegal and illegitimate third term of office
of Pierre Nkurunziza.” One of the reasons for the founding of the CNARED was thus the desire to
federate all of the political groups, organizations of civil society and the media for a return to the rule
of law, with the objective of speaking with a single voice. The other, underlying motivation was to be
able to be the sole, or at least the main, interlocutor with the government in power and the other
parties involved, in the event of negotiations. This group implicitly has intended to be the only credible
alternative to the CNDD-FDD and eventually the main political movement entering government
institutions in the event of a transition government, or even the sole alternative if the government
collapsed. Needless to say, some of its officials have underestimated the resistance and resilience of

82
We should nevertheless emphasize that this party’s founder and his radio station promoted and carried
publicity for the CNDD-FDD during the 2005 elections at a time when Alexis Sinduhije maintained close contact
with Hussein Radjabu before they broke off their relationship abruptly in 2006 before renewing it later, in
2008, when they found themselves together in the Mpimba central prison.
83
Even in the eyes of some members of the MSD.
84
Mid-term report: Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 21 June 2012, no. S/2012/348.
85
Interviews.
86
He has, moreover, been the target of sanctions in the U.S. for this reason
87
See Africa Crisis Group Report no. 247: “Burundi: the army as part of the crisis”, 5 April 2017, and notes from
the IFRI. The Burundi opposition in exile. Thierry Vircoulon. April 2017.
33
the government and probably were banking since the beginning of the crisis on Nkurunziza leaving
office early due to concentrated pressures.
In fact, the CNARED was initially comprised of all the leaders and main figures in the opposition except
for the Rwasa FNLs, whose new status made their participation in this framework incompatible.
Nevertheless, all of the parties that fought against the third term of office are represented, along with
other smaller groups founded later. However, this heterogeneous amalgamation of parties, political
men and women with highly diversified motivations and ideas, with evident egos and ambitions, and
in some cases riven by conflicts and personal rivalries, did not long outlast such obstacles. Defections
started quickly. Contradicting statements became rife, and the working life of the managing entities
has not yet exceeded a single term. Thus, the fact that they have lasted only nine months jeopardizes
any hope of accomplishments or visible, concrete actions. Nevertheless, the CNARED has managed to
maintain the adhesion of the political groups that are the most representative and the most
determined to continue the fight it has taken on, such as the MSD and the PDP-Girijambo. It remains
to be seen whether this group will withstand the test of time in circumstances where there is still little
hope of negotiations and where the regime in Bujumbura has managed to impose a certain level of
international recognition and shore up its power during the two years of crisis.
The CNARED also has a hard time defining a consistent, common platform, especially in terms of the
tactics to be adopted. It still has tremendous problems getting down on paper a plan that reflects a
social programme and clear and precise directions in the event it is called upon to contribute to real
negotiations. However, the series of defections motivated mostly by unfulfilled ambitions, personal
conflicts and egos, and the recruitment of some people by the government, could enable it to enhance
its cohesiveness and partially achieve its objectives. Lastly, the CNARED will very likely officially pursue
the path of discussions while focusing its efforts more on organizing the armed struggle, with or
without the entities already engaged on that path.

34
7. Conclusion

Two years after the outbreak of the crisis in Burundi due to the desire of its president to run for a third
term of office, the Burundi political scene is striking in its contrast between an all-powerful party in
government with so many activities that it tires out its supporters mobilized everywhere, and political
parties curled in on themselves, many suffering from lethargy. Although the opposition in exile may
frequently take up the cry in an attempt to return Burundi to the centre of attention of the
international community, the less violent and spectacular aspects of the crisis in Burundi, although no
less tragic due to the many nefarious effects on its population, have relegated it to a back-seat on
international agendas. The current dead end in inclusive talks in Burundi, and the president’s desire to
amend the constitution in order to remove the limits on presidential terms of office, could intensify
the crisis and thereby further damage the Burundi political scene.
The electoral crisis of 2010 had already weakened much of the political class. Today, one can’t help
but note how difficult it is to get things back on track. Independently of the current circumstances of
the crisis, the parties lack ideas and platforms, thus favouring their disintegration. In an attempt to
breathe new life into these political groups, the BLTP could specifically step up its training courses for
the parties on the need for, and design of, political platforms, while ensuring that they are indeed
adopted by all. These activities should be intended for their leaders and for the youth and women in
these parties, with the goal over time of promoting greater participation by youth and women in the
interest of renewing their leadership.

35
Annex I List of persons interviewed
Names Parties Title and/or position
Pancrace Cimpaye CNARED Spokesperson
Noël Batungwanayo and CNDD Respectively, member of the
Gaspard Kobako executive committee and
spokesperson
Godeliève Nininahazwe CNDD-FDD National secretary for
administrative, political and
legal matters, and member of
the national assembly
Agathon Rwasa FNL Chairman of the wing of the
FNLs, member of the
Amizero y’Abarundi
coalition and 1st vice
president of the national
assembly
François Bizimana FNL Focal point of the BLTP
Silas Majambere FNL Focal point of the BLTP
Keffa Nibizi FRODEBU Nyakuri Chairman and focal point of
the BLTP
Léonce Ngendakumana FRODEBU Sahwanya Vice chairman
Juvénal Ngorwanubusa MRC Chairman of the party board
of directors
François Nyamoya MSD Secretary general
Zénon Nimubona PARENA Chairman
Onésime Nduwimana PDP & CNARED 2nd chairman of the
CNARED and chairman of
the political board of the
PDP-Girijambo
Gervais Rufyikiri PDP Member and former 1st vice
president of the republic
Aloys Baricako RANAC Chairman
Didace Hakizimana UPD National secretary of the
party board
Abel Gashatsi Official UPRONA Chairman
Charles Nditije UPRONA Chairman
Evariste Ngayimpenda UPRONA Chairman

36
Annex II List of persons queried for additional information or to
confirm findings88

1 Julien Nimbona, university professor and consultant.

2 A member of the political board of the Charles Nditije UPRONA
3 Hermès Niyonzima, permanent secretary of the National Commission for the Coordination of Assistance
Funding (CNCA). Member of the CNDD-FDD
4 A member of the government. CNDD-FDD.
5 A former high-level official. CNDD-FDD.

88
I have also used interviews conducted previously as part of other studies.
37
Annex III Table of acronyms

ADC Alliance des démocrates pour le changement

[Alliance of democrats for change]

BLTP Burundi leadership training program

BRB Bank of the Republic of Burundi

CENI Independent national electoral commission

CNARED The National Council for Compliance with the Arusha

Agreement on Peace, Reconciliation and the Rule of
Law

CNDD National Council for the Defense of Democracy

CNDD-FDD National Council for the Defense of Democracy and

Democracy Defense Forces

EAC East African Community

FNL National Liberation Forces

FRODEBU Front for Democracy in Burundi

FRONABU National Front for Revolution in Burundi

MRC Movement for Citizen Rehabilitation

MSD Movement for Solidarity and Democracy

NIMD Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy

UN United Nations

38