Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 69 (2021) 104337

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Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries

journal homepage: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jlp

3-D dispersion model for simulation of accidental toxic gas releases in a

metropolitan area
Mimi Min a, Junyong Park b, Chankyu Kang c, **, Seungho Jung a, *
a
Ajou University, Department of Environmental and Safety Engineering, Worldcupro 206, Yeongtong-gu, Suwon, Gyeonggi-do, 16499, Republic of Korea
b
Ajou University, Department of Mechanical Engineering, Worldcupro 206, Yeongtong-gu, Suwon, Gyeonggi-do, 16499, Republic of Korea
c
Hankyoung National University, School of Social Safety System Engineering, Chungang-ro 327, Anseong-si, Jungang-ro, 17579, Republic of Korea

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: Computational fluid dynamic (CFD) simulations were performed to assess the potential chlorine leak scenario in
Toxic gas the super-urban area of South Korea, where the human population density is very high and numerous buildings
Dispersion exist near operational water treatment facilities. Flame acceleration simulator (FLACS) was used to predict the
Computational fluid dynamic (CFD)
consequence from accidental chlorine releases out of one of the water treatment facilities for the nearby area
Chlorine
Geometry
having a size of 5 km × 3 km approximately. The ability to precisely implement 3-D geometries is crucial for a
Human fatality rates successful 3-D simulation. Thus, a method was proposed to rapidly and accurately implement geometry by
Physical barrier importing computer aided-design (CAD) files provided by a government agency, and processing them using Auto
CAD and MicroStation software programs. An accidental release from an 18-ton tank was simulated with three
different wind directions to determine the expected evacuation distances. Results from the study showed that the
endpoint distances varied depending on the density and arrangement of the buildings. Moreover, we employed
physical barriers with varying heights for mitigating the effects of toxic gas releases and simulated how effec­
tively they decreased the concentration of released chlorine.

Because of the chlorine’s hazards, studies using human and labora­

1. Introduction
Several kinds of chemicals, corresponding to about 296,000, are used
worldwide, and these chemicals make our daily life convenient but also
act as a real threat (Stephenson, 1977). As a result of the 2016 chemical
statistics survey in South Korea, 558,590,000 tons of 16,874 chemicals
were distributed at 21,911 workplaces. Compared with 2014,
manufacturing volume increased by 16.9% (54,560,000 tons), import
volume by 8.8% (26,030,000 tons), and export volume by 15.5% (18,
930,000 tons), respectively, and total distribution increased by 12.4%
(Ministry of Environment, South Korea, 2018). Among them, chlorine
accounts for 10% of all the chemicals manufactured globally, and it is
widely used in water treatment facilities, as well as in industrial and
manufacturing applications (Kim and Byun, 2014). In water treatment
facilities, chlorine is added to drinking water through a chlorination
process to disinfect and kill bacteria, and chlorine is provided as com­
pressed elemental gas, sodium hypochlorite solution (NaOCl) or calcium
hypochlorite (Ca(OCl)2) (National research council(US) safe drinking
water committee, 1980).
tory animals were conducted prior to World War I (Sylvia, 2015). When
exposed to high doses of chlorine gas, it acts as a direct-acting stimulant
that affects the respiratory system, causing irritation and tissue damage
that can lead to death (Hoylw and Svendsen, 2016). Although the exact
mechanism of cytotoxicity is unknown, chlorine toxicity is believed to
be mediated by oxidant properties and hypochlorite ions. As such,
chlorine is highly toxic when inhaled, so special handling is required.
However, toxic exposures to humans was caused by accidental chlorine
leakage and intentional chlorine release (Agabiti et al., 2001;
Deschamps et al., 1994). The most serious threat to intentional chlorine
release was related to attacks on industrial storage facilities or rail cars
during transportation. For example, fatal chlorine spill from rail cars
occurred in Texas in 2004. In addition, nine people died and 72 people
were hospitalized from the similar accidents in Graniteville, South
Carolina in 2005 (Wenck et al., 2007).
Since water treatment facilities are mainly located in downtown
areas, when chlorine is released from these facilities, the damage can
spread to even general citizens and residents. Therefore, special atten­
tion should be paid to facilities that use chlorine gas, especially when

* Corresponding author.
** Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: lovesme@ajou.ac.kr (M. Min), bogussoft@ajou.ac.kr (J. Park), safetyfirst@hknu.ac.kr (C. Kang), processsafety@ajou.ac.kr (S. Jung).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jlp.2020.104337
Received 31 July 2020; Received in revised form 22 October 2020; Accepted 24 October 2020
Available online 2 November 2020
0950-4230/© 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
M. Min et al.
Nomenclature
βv volume porosity
ρ Density (kg/m3 )
k turbulent kinetic energy (J/kg)
ε turbulent dissipation rate (J/kg ⋅s)
uj velocity component in corresponding direction (m/ s)
μ viscosity coefficient (N ⋅s/m2 )
cμ c1ε c2ε c3ε adjustable constants
y+ dimensionless wall distance
Tdose toxic dose
Probit toxic probit
Pdeath probability of death
erf error function
CNo,x concentration without barrier at x meter
Cy,x concentration of y meter barrier at x meter
installed or used. Hanna et al. (2012, 2016) conducted a study on the
diffusion behavior of chlorine leaks through Jack Rabbit experiments to
assist in emergency resonse decisions and planning. Yoo and Choi
(2019) developed a real-time risk analysis tool based on geographic
information system (GIS) in Ulsan where high-population density resi­
dential houses and industrial clusters are adjacent. Throughout this
study, an emergency evacuation plan with risk assessment was able to
predict the allowable toxic concentration in neighboring areas or
buildings when an chlorine gas leak occurred. Soman and Sunsararaj
(2015) dealt with a site emergency response plan to prepare for chlorine
release that could occur in the chlorine manufacturing industry.
In order to examine the effects of building densities or heights on
toxic gas dispersion in downtown terrains, the actual building topog­
raphy was implemented as a 3-D model and applied to the flame ac­
celeration simulator (FLACS) to simulate their effects. In a previous
study, Hanna et al. (2006) described the Madison square garden located
in Manhattan and simulated five computational fluid dynamic (CFD)
models, including the FLACS, to show that the results of the CFD
simulation were consistent with the patterns of winds and turbulence
observed in the area. Hanna et al. (2009) and Yang et al. (2017) also
simulated the actual accidents that occurred in Festus and Gumi,
respectively, to show that the respective influence varies and the dam­
age patterns are consistent with each other. Over the last 10 years,
studies on dispersion modeling that considers the effects of geographic
features, such as buildings, forests, and obstacles, have been actively
conducted (Tauseef et al., 2011; Pontiggia et al., 2011). Hsieh et al.
(2013) showed that the presence of an obstacle and/or complex terrain
has a significant influence on the dispersion of the dense gas. Liu et al.
(2016) studied the effect of two hypothetical topographies on the source
profile, wind velocity, and height of the buildings on the dispersion
profile. Sklavounos and Rigas (2004) studied the turbulence phenomena
occurring in flow regions with obstacles using CFX. Lim et al. (2017)
simulated concrete walls of 3 m, 6 m, and 9 m height and examined their
mitigation effects. The concrete walls were used as a way to reduce
damage when toxic gases are released. They used the ANSYS FLUENT,
among the CFD models, when HF and chlorine gases were released.
Mukherjee et al. (2017) proposed the use of water spray as a way to
mitigate damage caused by the release of toxic gas and also studied how
to design the water spray more efficiently.
In a toxic gas release accident, the release can happen quickly and
spread with large enough quantities, which can make catastrophic
consequences occur to the local community. CFD modeling of toxic gas
dispersion provides valuable information such as toxic concentrations
around the leak point, time arrivals of the gas, directions of the flow, and
consequences of nearby area. And so far, CFD modeling has been widely
used to study toxic gas dispersion of outdoor such as in urban areas with
2
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 69 (2021) 104337
multiple obstacles and building structures (Shen et al., 2020). Further­
more, CFD simulations can assist emergency response decisions and
planning when hazardous materials get released in many situations.
(Pontiggia et al., 2009).
The purpose of the present study was to carry out a more realistic
dispersion modeling that reflect the effects of actual obstacles, such as
buildings, when a toxic gas release accident occurs in downtown areas
where the human population density is the highest and buildings are
concentrated. Therefore, it is expected that the results of these studies
provide practical information to establish the site emergency response
plan to prepare for the risks associated with toxic gas leakage and
dispersion in urban areas where residential apartments and high-rise
buildings are concentrated adjacent to factories handling chlorine-
related facilities.
2. Methodology
2.1. Geometry implementation
To simulate a CFD model, detailed 3-D building data are necessary.
To that end, the FLACS generally implements geometry using the CASD
object option. However, to study large downtown terrains where
numerous buildings are concentrated, as observed in the present study,
methods to rapidly implement the geometry are necessary. In addition,
accurate geometry implementation is also important because the core of
successful application of the CFD is to accurately evaluate the effect of
the turbulence generated by obstacles (Tauseef et al., 2011). In recent
years, several techniques have been developed to provide data sources
to build up geometries, which are mostly based on airborne sensors such
as digital aerial cameras, and LiDARs. One is a 3D stereoscopic view
image obtained using an aerial digital camera for plotting (Pontiggia
et al., 2010). However, this method is expensive and time consuming
because it requires too specific equipment. Auto CAD and MicroStation
were devised in the present study.
In order to implement the 3-D geometry, CAD drawings from the
Korea National Spatial Data Infrastructure Portal (www.nsic.go.kr) were
downloaded. These CAD drawings contained information on landmarks,
such as roads, farmland, and rivers. Using Auto CAD 2016, only building
information was retained and all other information were discarded by
clicking the ‘off’ option. Thereafter, 2-D drawings were converted into 3-
D figures, with reference to the story buildings shown on the drawings,
and the figures were subsequently converted into a file (. dgn) that can
be utilized in FLACS using MicroStation. The file was later imported into
CASD to complete the geometry. This method could greatly reduce the
existing geometry implementation time, as well as reduce the errors that
might occur when the geometry is generated as a CASD object. The
method is also expected to be very helpful to CFD studies in which actual
terrains ought to be described in simulations.
2.2. Target facility
In the present study, some landmarks in the downtown of Seoul, such
as buildings, houses, and subway stations, which accommodates several
unidentified people, and has a facility where chlorine is actually used,
were considered as the subjects. Additionally, how river or buildings
affect simulations could be easily assessed due to the presence of the Han
River, which flows within a radius of 4 km, as well as the myriad of
concentrated facilities, such as subway stations, apartments, elementary
schools, and parks. Based on these facilities, a 4900 m (width) × 2800 m
(length) × 200 m (height) space was considered.
An empty space, visible at about 100 m below the release point in the
diagonal direction, was used, and the space represented the Han River.
The region was identified as an empty space because the FLACS still had
a shortcoming of being unable to implement the reactions when chem­
icals came into contact with water and diagonal lines after being
released. Therefore, it was assumed that the flow rate of the river and the
M. Min et al. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 69 (2021) 104337

chemical reaction occurring when the toxic gas and the river met did not
affect the toxic gas release or dispersion. The 3-D geometry of the (5)
building used in the present study is shown in Fig. 1.
Since the main wind direction of Seoul city is northwesterly wind,
When there is a wall or obstacle near the boundary of the flow field,
and most chemicals are characterized by rapid dispersion along the main
the turbulence kinetic energy or dispersion rate changes rapidly to show
wind direction after being released, the geometry was implemented
the highest value. The viscous force of the plane closest to the wall
mainly in the south-east direction from the facility selected for the
surface is dominated by the inertial effect. The function of the wall is
release of the gas.
used to model the effect on the wall on some points at certain distances
from the wall.
2.3. Model for the numerical analysis
A dimensionless wall distance is defined by:

The FLACS uses a governing equation for compressive flows with a ρ∁1/4 1/2
μ k y
logical structure to apply the finite volume method to the three- y ​+= (6)
μ
dimensional Cartesian coordinate system to derive the results. In addi­
tion, it uses the k-ε model for turbulence behavior analysis. where, y is the distance from the point on the wall to the next wall, and
Transport equation for turbulent kinetic energy: the point on the wall was defined as the point near the wall where the
∂ ∂ ( ) ∂
(
μeff ∂k
) transfer equation can be solved.
(βv ρk) + β j ρu j k = βj + βv pk − βv ρε (1)
∂t ∂xj ∂xj σk ∂xj
2.4. Using a grid to assess the structural analysis in the gas release
Transport equation for the dissipation rate of turbulent kinetic
simulations
energy:
( )
∂ ∂ ( ) ∂ μeff ∂ε ε2 A mesh is necessary for structural analysis in gas release simulations.
(βv ρε) + βj ρuj ε = βj + β v pε − C 2 ε β v ρ (2) In the FLACS, however, the analysis is conducted with the concept of a
∂t ∂xj ∂xj σε ∂xj k
grid instead of a mesh. The accuracy of the simulation strongly depends
*βv : Volume porosity. on diverse simulation parameters, being of particular importance the
The turbulence could be analyzed with the k-ε model and the eddy grid resolution (Schleder et al., 2014). Thus, more dense grids are
viscosity model, which uses two transfer equations for turbulent kinetic created at locations that require more accurate analysis. In the present
energy and the dissipation of turbulent kinetic energy. study, grids were densely created at the point where the gas was released
Following the Boussinesq eddy viscosity assumption, an eddy vis­ and in the surrounding areas. However, they were loosely created at
cosity could be used to model the Reynolds stress tensor as follows: areas that were relatively far away from the foregoing point. The
( ) detailed information is shown in Table 1 and Figs. 2–4. Table 2 shows
′u ′ ∂ui ∂uj 2 the details of three scenarios.
− ρui j = μeff + − ρ kδij (3)
∂xj ∂xi 3

The constants used in the modeling of the Reynolds stress tensor are 2.5. Assumptions and scenarios
as follows. (Launder and Spalding, 1983).
The duration and flow rate of toxic gas release are the main variables
(4) that determine the dispersion range when a toxic gas is released. We

In the Prandtl-Schmidt numbers, σϕ compares the diffusion of the Table 1

variable in the question to the dynamic viscosity. Total number of grids used in the simulation.
The turbulent Prandtl-Schmidt numbers are: Working direction X Y Z Total

Control volumes No 670 460 50 15,410,000

Fig. 1. The 3-D geometry used for the simulation.

3
M. Min et al. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 69 (2021) 104337

Table 2 high rates because it will be trapped in the obstacle and will have to go
Three scenarios used for the simulation chlorine release. around the obstacles which are mainly buildings. As a result, the toxic
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 gas dispersion rate and stay-time are expected to be much different.
Therefore, in the present study, preliminary simulations were carried
Leak size (hole diameter) 10 cm 10 cm 10 cm
Tank pressure 100 psig 100 psig 100 psig out to compare the toxic gas dispersion patterns with geographic fea­
Temperature 25 ◦ C 25 ◦ C 25 ◦ C tures. Accordingly, a total of three scenarios were assumed: (a) chlorine
Release rate 225 kg/s 225 kg/s 225 kg/s release in the northerly direction, which had the shortest endpoint dis­
Total mass release 18,000 kg 18,000 kg 18,000 kg tance, (b) chlorine release in the westerly direction with the longest
Weather condition Class F Class F Class F
Wind speed 1.5 m/s 1.5 m/s 1.5 m/s
endpoint distance, (c) chlorine release in the northwesterly direction,
Main wind direction NW 310◦ W 270◦ N 360◦ which is the main wind direction of Seoul.
On the other hand, chlorine toxicity is well known and its toxic
concentration for inhaling threshold for emergency evacuation is 3 ppm
as used US EPA(Environmental Protection Agency), Korean NCIS well as
assumed a toxic gas release of 180,00 kg chlorine from the facility. In the in this paper for the endpoint distance concentration. ERPG 1,2,3 con­
present study, it was assumed that the entire 18,000 kg of chlorine centrations are 1, 3, 10 ppm respectively and their definitions are as
would be released due to an accident as worst case scenario. Not only follows in the box;
accident but also a terrorist attack can be a cause of release. A release Where, US EPA is defined for ERPG 1 and ERPG 2 as follows.
rate of 225 kg/s, as used by Hanna et al. (2009), was adopted for a
comparison reason. In other words, it was assumed that a total of 18000 • ERPG 1: maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed
kg of chlorine would be released over 80 s at a rate of 225 kg/s. There are nearly all individuals could be exposed up to 1 h without experi­
some assumptions behind such as. encing other than mild transient adverse health effects or perceiving
a clearly defined objectionable odor
• The hole in the tank assumed to be circle with diameter 4inch and • ERPG 2 is the maximum airborne concentration below which it is
tank pressure assumed to be 100 psig, tank and ambient tempera­ believed nearly all individuals could be exposed up to 1 h without
tures are assumed to be 25 ◦ C experiencing or developing irreversible or other serious health ef­
• Liquid chlorine got discharged once the leak hole is made fects that could impair their abilities to take protective action.
• Pool boiling would occur right after the discharge which would make
the discharged liquid chlorine become gas 3. Results and discussion
• To maintain the leak rate as 225 kg/s, there is no varying discharge
rate(kg/s) 3.1. Dispersion results

Atmospheric stability grade F and a wind speed of 1.5 m/s, which are
used as the worst case scenario (weather) for dispersion in terms of the
endpoint distance defined by the National Institute of Chemical Safety
(NICS), were used. When a toxic gas is accidentally released, it is ex­
pected to escape quickly along the main wind direction, and if there is an
obstacle, such as a building, the toxic gas will not be able to escape at
The results of the simulations on the dispersion of released chlorine
gas showed that the endpoint distance of toxic gas are along the main
wind direction, as shown in Fig. 5, which was consistent with the
assumption set at the beginning of the study. Also, from Table 3, it was
observed that the endpoint distance and the arrival time of the toxic gas
differed according to the wind directions. This is because the chlorine

Fig. 2. The x-direction of the grid.

4
M. Min et al. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 69 (2021) 104337

Fig. 3. The y-direction of the grid.

Fig. 4. The z-direction of the grid.

gas was dispersed rapidly in the Han River basin, which was represented
by an empty space in the geometry and, all layouts are different each
other as reflected the real city. When wind blows from North, the
dispersion is hindered and gas can be contained in between buildings.
That’s why the endpoint distance for scenario 3 is the shortest compared
to other scenarios.
These results were consistent with findings of previous studies,
which indicated that building geometry affect urban air quality in CFD
simulations (Kwak et al., 2015). These results are important and should
be referred to when urban emergency response plans are established.
In addition, the present study identified differences in the speed and
trapping of toxic gas released from the downtown area when the gas
passed through the concentrated area of buildings, as well as when the
gas passed through terrain with no building. This enabled finding not
only the endpoint arrival distances of toxic gases but also the exposure
times of areas located between buildings. Therefore, the findings of the
present study were expected to provide more realistic information for
the prediction of and preparation for the risks of toxic gas release and
dispersion in cases where a facility is operated in areas where apart­
ments and buildings are concentrated in the neighborhood.

5
M. Min et al. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 69 (2021) 104337

Fig. 5. FLACS CFD results from scenario 1 (northwest wind), scenario 2 (west wind), and scenario 3 (north wind), where 1 ppm contours are shown at 30 s.

( )
Table 3 erf (probit − 5)
Pdeath = 0.5 + 1 + √̅̅̅ (9)
ERPG-2 (3 ppm) endpoint distances and the arrival times of each scenario. 2
*ERPG: Emergency Response Planning Guideline.
∫x
End point distance End point distance arrival time 2
erf(x) = √̅̅̅⋅ e − t2 dt (10)
Scenario 1 2323 m 500 s π
0
Scenario 2 3136 m 970 s
Scenario 3 1370 m 710 s
Where c is the concentration of toxic gas (ppm), t is the time, and a,b,
and n are parameters that depend on the gas involved, and values for
3.2. Human fatality rate chlorine are as followings; a: 15.6 b: 1 n:2.
As limitation, the concentrations and fatality rates are for people
The endpoint distances seem very far (max. 3.1 km) and it is almost outdoor not indoor in the paper for purpose of simplicity.
impossible to evacuate people inside the impacted zone which may have Fig. 6 shows the result of simulation of gas release using the formula
over a half million people. This would make the emergency plan very above, when the gas was released according to scenario 1 used in the
ineffective, and unrealistic. The first responder or planner for emergency present study, and was examined at a height of 1.5 m, which is the
situation should seek a better way to save people in the case of release. height of the nose of humans. From this figure, the fatality probability
Therefore urgent evacuation zone prediction using fatality rate instead was found to have reached 37% in just 29 s after the chlorine gas release
of endpoint distance is suggested. The fatality probability from toxic gas was started and the distance would go up to 100 m. 0.1% fatality rate
release depending on the concentration of the gas and the time of release reaches 0.9 km from the source in Scenario 1 and it is the distance to
could be calculated. The FLACS followed the formula as follows to need more attention for evacuation.
calculate the probability (Gexcon, 2017).

( ) ∫t 3.3. Mitigation
Tdose mg/m3 ⋅ minute = cn dt (7)
0 As shown in the simulation results, when a toxic gas is released near
the downtown area, the gas can cause great damage to the nearby areas
Probit = a + b ln(Tdose ) (8)
and residents. Therefore, reduction measures that could minimize the

6
M. Min et al.
Fig. 6. Probability of death by exposure to chlorine gas.
influence of the toxic gas are necessary. In the present study, 3 m, 6 m,
and 9 m high barriers were installed at a distance of 100 m from the
release source, as shown in Fig. 7, to examine the reduction effects
through differences in concentrations at the same point as compared
with that at the scenarios where there was no wall. This 3, 6, 9 m
physical walls have been used in Goldfish experiments(1986) and other
CFD simulations (Lim et al., 2017).
Fig. 8 is a graph that shows changes in concentrations at different
barrier heights and distances from barriers. Tables 4 and 5 show some
areas of chlorine concentrations with different barrier heights and dis­
tances from the barrier as well as the efficiency of concentration
reduction according to different barrier heights.where CNo,x : concen­
tration without barrier at x meter.
Cy,x : concentration of y meter barrier at x meter.
From Table 4, the concentrations decrease quickly in the vicinity of
the leak point, but it doesn’t seem that effective in the far-field. From
Fig. 7. Geometric shape applied with barriers.
7
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 69 (2021) 104337
Table 5, the effectiveness seem very obvious that the higher wall, the
better safety measures. And it is more effective in the vicinity of leak
point, which suggests that this safety measures can more effectively
work in the nearby locations. In addition, using fatality rate instead of
ERPG-2 would help the contingency plan more precisely when having
those physical walls for mitigation in the facility.
4. Conclusions
In order to implement many buildings in a short time, Auto CAD and
MicroStation, which are not conventional methods for FLACS, were
proposed and used to generate the geometry. Thereafter, with a view to
consider the effects of obstacles & wind directions in a mega city like
Seoul, which was replicated identically to the actual geometry helped by
GIS, CFD simulations were carried out. As a result, differences in the
speed and time of the released toxic gas between when the gas passed
M. Min et al. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 69 (2021) 104337

Fig. 8. Chlorine concentration distribution according to the different barrier heights.

In addition, the Human fatality rates due to released chlorine gas

Table 4
were investigated. Barriers were randomly installed as a way to reduce
Values of the concentrations of chlorine according to barrier heights at certain
the damage, and the effects were simulated. From the results, the
distances in the simulation used this study.
reduction effects when 3 m, 6 m, and 9 m barriers were installed were on
CNo,x − Cy,x
Mitigation effectiveness (%) =
CNo,x
× 100 the average 16.82%, 34.34%, and 40.93% respectively, indicating that
the higher the barrier, the larger the reduction effect. However, since
extremely high barriers may not be feasible to install, considering the
Distance from a wall Concentration (ppm) cost and their appearance, it is recommended to select and install the
X 3m 6m 9m
barriers of heights that fit the circumstance of the plant.
As shown in this study, gas leak accidents in metropolitan areas can
100 m 298.6 209.5 90 104.2
result in many lives and property damage. In this study, only one type of
500 m 41.39 26.76 18.66 15.62
1000 m 8.68 7.17 5.57 4.86 liquefied chlorine gas leakage scenario, one of the types of gas leakage
1500 m 3.76 3.40 2.85 2.54 accidents, was covered. In addition, only the effects of arbitrary 3 m, 6
2000 m 2.20 2.04 1.78 1.61 m, 9 m physical barriers were examined for ways to reduce the damage.
2500 m 1.47 1.38 1.23 1.13 Accordingly, in the future, further analysis of the effects of various types
3000 m 1.07 1.00 0.90 0.84
of barriers will be required. In addition, a follow-up study on chemical
mitigation measures such as water curtain is needed in addition to the
simulation of damage according to the leakage type of representative
Table 5 chemical substances mainly used in urban areas and the physical
Mitigation effectiveness (%) of different barriers.
method to reduce the resulting damage.
Distance from a wall 3m 6m 9m

100 m 29.84 69.86 65.10 Declaration of competing interest

500 m 35.27 54.83 62.32
1000 m 17.24 35.63 43.68 The authors declare that they have no known competing financial
1500 m 10.53. 23.68 34.21
interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence
2000 m 9.09 18.18 27.27
2500 m 6.67 20.00 26.67 the work reported in this paper.
3000 m 9.09 18.18 27.27
Average 16.82 34.34 40.93 Acknowledgement

This work was supported by the National Research Foundation of

through the building concentration area and when the gas passed
through terrain with no building were identified. In particular, it could
be seen that when accidentally released toxic gas passed through a
building concentration area located in a downtown terrain, the gas was
trapped between buildings so that the high concentration was main­
tained, leading to a reduction in the dispersion rate. This enabled finding
not only the endpoint arrival distances of toxic gases but also exposure
times of areas located between buildings.
Therefore, the findings of the present study are expected to provide
more realistic information for the prediction of and preparation for risks
associated with toxic gas release and dispersion in cases where a facility
is operated and in areas where apartments and buildings are concen­
trated within a neighborhood. Although the endpoint of ERPG-2 (3 ppm)
reaches about 3 km, it is more recommended to use 900 m with 0.1%
fatality rate since the exposure time is a lot less than an hour.
Korea (NRF) grant funded by the Korea government (MSIT) (No.
2019R1F1A1063569).
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