THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPERIOR COURT

MERRIMACK, SS. 07-E-0083

LORI DAVIS

V.

TOWN OF DUNBARTON .

ORDER

Lori Davis brings an action under the New. Hampshire Right-to-Know Law.

RSA 91-A. Ms. Davis seeks access to copies of certain financial records from

the Town of Dunbarton which she asserts have been impermissibly denied to· ·

her. Davis also asserts that certain determinations concerning application of

surplus funds to a proposed operating budget had not been accomplished by the

Board of Selectmen at duly noticed public meetings. Those issues relate to

matters involving the Town of Dunbarton's recent budget preparation process.

The Town denies that it has withheld the requested information from Ms .

. Davis. The Town responds that Ms. Davis requested certa·in information and that

the requested information had been provided. Th_e Town also submits that the

issue of applying surplus funds to operating expenses had been considered at a

 meeting by municipal and school district officials scheduled at the request of the

New Hampshire Department of Revenue Administration. The Town states that it

did not understand that gathering to constitute a meeting within the meaning of

the Right-to-Know Law, and,· therefore, had not posted notices of it.

Ms. Davis had apparently attended a budget workshop being held on

January 17, 2007 and had requested a copy of "handouts." This.was a meeting

which the public could attend, but not·participate within. The Town represents

that when the request was made, the Board of Selectmen, who had not yet

reviewed their packages of materials, responded that they did not have any.

During the budget workshop, it appears that the workshop participants

were reviewing a spreadsheet concerning departmental budget requests as well

. .
as the budget requests as submitted by departmen~ heads. The Town

Administrator provided Ms. Davis with a copy of the spreadsheet that was being

utilized. The administrator did not provide copies of other materials that the

workshop participants had, some of which materials are said by the Town to

have included personally written notes of the participants. The Town also

represents that it understood that Ms. Davis had obtained all or a majority of

those other materials, consisting of department head requests, in earlier requests

to the departments. ·Affhe hearing in this _Court, the Town indicated that it has no

objection to providing the spreadsheet back-up material.

In -essence, the Town represents that it had not refused ·to provide

information to Ms. Davis, but that Ms. Davis had ·not requested the correct

documents. In response, Ms. Davis indicates that in previous years she had

L
. .

received the spreadsheet as well as the .department head materials at the

workshop when she asked for the "handouts."

. RSA 91 -A:4, IV of the Right-to-Know Law provides, in relevant part: "Each

public body or agency shall, .upon . request for any public record reasonably

described, make available for inspection and copying any such public record

within .its fil~s -when such tecords are immediately available for such release."

On the ·evidence before the Court, the Court concludes that the parties'

disagreement concerning the· workshop information involves at least some

measure of miscommunication.

Ms. Davis also· submits that the minutes of the Board of Selectmen of the

Town do not reflect any vote or meeting by the Board concerning s_ome $100,000

that was to be transferred from surplus to operating funds. Ms. Davis submits

that consideration of such a transfer should have been reflected in a vote. at a

public meeting.

The Town responds tha_t "two of three of the selectmen, along with the

town 'administrator, the school superintendent, and members of the school board"

had met with the New Hampshire· Department of Revenue Administration

("DRA"), at the request of DRA, and that the meeting with ORA to set .the tax .

rate, where the Selectmen determined to utilize s.urplus funds, had not been

understood to constitute a_"meeting," within the meaning_of the Right-to-Know

Law, that was required to be posted. The Town also submits that Ms. Davis had

been informed that use of the surplus was traditionally incluc,led i~ the Town's

annual report.

3
 It may well be that the Board of Selectmen need not post a public meeting

each time they meet with a State agency or with a third-party. However, absent

other statutory-authorization, the Court is -also not persuaded that the Board of

Selectmen may generally m<:3ke ·determinatio"ns .that would otherwise require a

duly posted meeting, while at the offices of a third-party· agency; and, thereby,

divest the meeting of its public nature.

The following orders are entered:

1. The Court does not conclude that a Right-to-Know Law violation

occurred concerning _the "handouts" at the workshop .

2. The Court conclucles ·that the meeting at which the Board of

Selectmen determined · to apply surplus funds to the operating

budget should have been addressed at a duly noticed public

.meeting.·

3. The Court does not set aside of the actions of the Board of

Selectmen. RSA 91 -A:8, II. However, in the future, the Board of

• I • • I'

Selectmen's determination to seek to apply surplus funds to

operating expenses should be considered at a duly noticed public

meeting.

4. Neither party is assessed counsel fees.

SO ORDERED.

~
\.. ------
4