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Abhidharmakosa-Bha Ya of V: Asubandhu
Abhidharmakosa-Bha Ya of V: Asubandhu
of VASUBANDHU
Volume IV
Abhidharmakosa-Bha~ya
of VASUBANDHU
The Treasury of the Abhidharma
and its (Auto) commentary
-
Translated into French lYy
Louis DE LA VALLEE Pouss1N
Volume IV
1729328
First Edition: Delhi, 2012
Translated from L' Abhidharmakosa de Vasubandhu
First edition 1823-1931, Paris, Paul Geuthner
Second edition 1971, Bruxelles, Institute Belga des Hautes Etudes Chinoises
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Volume IV
• Bibliography
o A. Selected primary sources (Sanskrit, Pali, Chinese, TibetanJ
o Indices
o Selected secondary sources
• Indices
o Sanskrit-English Index-Glossary
o English-Sanskrit Index-Glossary
o Gathiis and Karikas
o Fragments of Sutras and Sastras
o Name Index: Siitras, Books, Scholars, Schools, etc.
Chapter Nine:
(Pudgalaprati~edhaprakara,:ia)
t
Outline of Chapter Nine:
Treatise of the Refutation of the Person
(Pudgalaprati~edhaprakara,:za)
TREATISE OF THE
REFUTATION OF THE PERSON
(Pudgalaprati~edhaprakara1Ja )2
or
1.2. Vasubandhu's middle way argument for his theory of persons; 9 F 231-32
[Question:] - How do we know that the expression [abhidhii.na] "self' [iztman; i.e.,
person] is only a provisional designation for a stream of aggregates and that it [does
not refer to something else,] does not exist as an independent or separate self? 10 { 9 a}
[Answer:] - We know this because no proof establishes the existence of a self
independent or separate from the aggregates:
1. no proof by means of direct perception [pratyak~a],
2. no proof by means of inference [anumana]. 11
If the self were a substance or real entity [dravya], separate like other entities
[bhii.va], 12 it necessarily would be attained (i.e., known) (1) by the apprehension of
direct perception as are the objects of the five sensory consciousnesses and of mental
consciousness [mental faculty (manas)] 13 or (2) by the apprehension of inference, as
are the five sense-faculties [indriya] which are subtle matter. <232>
In the case of the five Sf"nse-faculties, they are indeed known through inference: It is
common knowledge that, despite the presence of the general causes, an effect does
not occur if certain specific causes are absent: [for instance,] for the sprout [ankura]
to be able to arise, not only water, earth and human effort are necessary, but also the
seed. - Likewise, [for instance, in the case of the blind and the deaf], although the
general causes-the presence of an external object, mental application, etc.-are
present, the blind and the deaf do not see or hear, whereas the non-blind and the non-
deaf do see and hear. [We can thus infer that] the specific causes of the visual or
auditory consciousness must be absent among the former but present among the
latter: these [specific causes] are the sense-faculties, material sense-faculties made of
invisible and impalpable matter, and known only through inference. 14
[On the other hand,] as for [the existence of] a self which is independent or separate
from the aggregates, there is no direct perception or inference [to prove it]. We know
therefore that a self as a substance or real entity does not exist.
2. Vasubandhu's Objections to the Viitsfputrfyas' theory of persons 2525
[Vasubandhu:] - 1. If the person is a real entity, it will be other [anya] than the
aggregates, because its nature exists [then] on its own [svabhavatvat], since each of
the aggregates is other than the others; [in that case], either
i. it will be produced by causes [kara1Ja] [and then it will not be eternal as you
say, and you will have to state its causes]; or else;
ii. it will be unconditioned (asarriskrra): and this is a non-Buddhist false doc-
trine (tfrthikadrftiprasarigal:i); if it were unconditioned, the person is not
able to "function" [or "be affected by anything or produce effects"] (niJ:ipra-
yojanatva). 20
It is thus fruitless to believe that the person is a real entity.
2. But if you admit that the person exists only on the level of a provisional designa-
tion, you abandon your doctrine and you side with our opinion.
2.1.2. Vasubandhu's objection from the point of view of the cau~al reference
principle; 24 F 233-34
[Vasubandhu:] - What an obscure statement (andhavacana) [that the person neither
exists as a real entity nor as a provisional designation]! What does the expression "in
reliance upon" (upiidiiya) mean?
1. If you explain [that a person is conceived] "in reliance upon aggregates"
(skandhiin upiidiiya) 25 as meaning "on the condition that aggregates have been per-
ceived" (skandhan alambya; iilambya = grhftvii, apekfya), 26 you end up saying: "The
i
provisional designation person occurs by taking the aggregates as an object"; [~ut] I
I
this means to recognize that the person is a word or conception referring only to I
J
the aggregates [and not to an independently existent person]; just as the provi'-
sional designation milk occurs taking only the constituents of milk, color, etc., as its
object. <234>
2. Vasubandhu's Objections to the Vatsfputrfyas' theory ofpersons 2527
2.u. The Vatsfputrfyas' fire and fuel reply: three basic theses; 21 F 234
[Viitsiputriyas:] - [The way milk is conceived] is not the way we conceive the person
and its relationship with the aggregates, but rather [we conceive the person] in the
way the world conceives fire [iigni] and its relationship with fuel [indhana].
1. The world conceives fire "in reliance upon fuel" (indhanam upiidiiya) { 10 a} :28
it does not conceive fire independent or separate from fuel.
2-3. The world believes that fire cannot be conceived if it either is or is not other
than fuel. 29 - If fire were other than fuel, the fuel [in burning material] would not
be hot. - If fire were not other than fuel, "what is burned" would be "what bums" it.
[Vasubandhu:]- [But these are mere conventional definitions]. The very things
I want to know with precision are: (1) what is the thing called what is burned and
(2) what is the thing called what burns it? <235>
[VasubandhuNii.tsiputriyas:] - It is commonly said that (1) the thing to be burned,
which is not burning [but can bum], wood [ka:jfha], etc., is called what is burned or
fuel; 30 (2) the thing which performs the action of burning [the wood, etc.], being
bright, intensely hot, blazing, is called what burns it or fire. By means of the latter,
i.e., the fire, [it is commonly said that] the series which constitutes the former,
i.e., the fuel, is ignited (idhyate = dfpyate) and reduced to ashes (dahyate = bhasmf-
kriyate);31 by means of the fire it is brought abo~t that each moment of existence of
the series (sarritati) of fuel differs from the preceding moment. - [Now analysis
/ shows that] fire and fuel are both composed of eight real entities; 32 yet fire arises in
dependence upon (pratftya) fuel, just as sour milk [dadhi] and vinegar [sukta] arise in
dependence upon milk [k:jfra] and wine [madhu]. This is why it is commonly agreed
tI:iat [fire is conceived] "in reliance upon fuel". {10 b}
[Vasubandhu:] - [First objection:] If this were the case, then fire is other than fuel,
because their time-periods are different (bhinnakala): first there is fuel and then fire.
[So] if your person exists in reliance upon the aggregates as fire exists in reliance
upon fuel, you would have to admit, [second objection:] that, arising in dependence
on the aggregates, it is other than the aggregates and, moreover, [third objection:]
[contrary to your view that a person is not impermanent,] that it is impermanent
(anityas ca prapnoti), [since the person arises in dependence upon aggregates].
2.1.s.1. The Vatsfputrfyas' own analysis and definition offire and fuel
(according to Vasubanphu) & Vasubandhu's three objections; F235-37
[Vii.tsiputriyas: Second definition: 33 ) - (1) The heat (u~man)--one of the elements,
namely, that kind of tangible which is heat-present in the burning thing, wood,
etc., 34 is fire [agni]; (2) the other three elements [i.e., earth, water and wind], which
conjointly arise with it [sahajata], are the fuel [indhana] [in reliance on which fire is
conceived]. Therefore your comments on the precedence of fuel do not hold.
[Three objections:]
[Vasubandhu:] - [Fir.st objection:] - But [according to this analysis] fire and fuel,
arising at the same time, are [still] "other" (anyatva), since their defining characteris-
tics are different (lak:jaJJ.abhedat). 35 <236>
The meaning that you attribute to the expression "in reliance upon" has again not
been explained. 36 Since fire and fuel are generated at the same time, how can one say
that fire is conceived in reliance upon fuel?--
2. Vasubandhu's Objections to the Vatsfputrfyas' theory of persons 2529
[Second objection:] - [-if the analyses are correct,] fire, which is one of the elements
of the object which is burning, does not have fuel, which is the other elements of the
said object, as a cause, since all these elements were generated at the same time, each
from its own separate cause. But neither can one say that the designation or con-
ception.fire had fuel as a cause (or object), since this des~gnation or conception is
applied to fire, the tangible "heat".37
If the Vatsiputriyas would say: - The expression "fire is conceived in reliance upon
fuel" is taken in the sense that fire coexists with fuel (sahabhava) or has fuel as its
basis (asraya). 38
[Vasubandhu:] - That is to say that the person coexists with the aggregates or has the
aggregates as its basis: (1) this then admits that it is other than the aggregates.
(2) And logic also claims that, just as fire does not exist when fuel is absent, so the
person does not exist without aggregates. You do not accept these conclusions; there-
fore your explanation is worthless. { 11 a}
[Vatsiputriyas:] - I have shown (F 234, line 15) that fire is not other than fuel
because, in this hypothesis, fuel would not be hot.
[Vasubandhu:] - [Third objection:] - What is the intrinsic nature of "hot"?
1. If hot were to be defined as being the tangible "heat", (namely, the element fire,)
as has been done above, then fuel itself will not be hot, (since fuel is the burning
object [i.e., the three elements] without the tangible "heat"). <237>
2. If one were to understand by hot that which is associated with heat (i.e., if one
accepts that fuel is called hot because of its association with heat), then this is the
reason that things, [even if] other (than "heat", which is hot by its intrinsic nature,)
are called hot: yet only the tangible "heat,, is designated by fire; all that is associated
with this tangible is designated by hot. To think thus is to admit that fuel is called
hot, but then again it is other than fire or the tangible "heat". 39
The Vatsiputriyas are thus not justified in saying that "fire is not other than fuel
because fuel [in burning material] is hot\'.
[Second objection:] - The person, (the active component of the "reliance" [upadiiya],)
would be the same as the aggregates, (the passive component of the said "reliance"):
no logical reasoning would be able to establish the non-sameness.
2.1.5.3. The conclusion of Vasubandhu 's critique of the fire and fuel reply; F 237
The thesis of the Vii.tsiputriyas, that the person is conceived in reliance upon the
aggregates in the same way [in which they believe] that fire is conceived in reliance
upon fuel, cannot be rationally established in any hypothesis. 40
We are left with the fact that person is a simple provisional designation of the aggre-
gates.
2.5. The Viits'fputr'fyas' account of how we are known to exist by the six
consciousnesses; F 238-44
[Vasubandhu:]-Another point. By which of the six consciousnesses-visual, audi-
tory, olfactory, gustatory, tactile and mental consciousness-is the person perceived
(upalabhyate )?
[Viitsiputriyas:] - [It is perceived or known to exist] by the six consciousnesses.
[(l) Knowledge thesis:] - When the visual consciousness cognizes color and shape
(rupa = the body), it indirectly cognizes [prativibhavayati] the person [in dependence
upon them],49 and then we can say that the person is known to exist by means of the
visual consciousness.
[(2) Primary object non-otherness thesis and (3) primary object non-sameness thesis:]
- But the relationship of the person with color-shape is not describable as being the
same or other.
Likewise for the other consciousnesses: when the mental consciousness cognizes the
factors (dharma) (i.e., thought and thought-concomitants), it is aware of the person
[in dependence upon them]; the [person] is known therefore to exist by means of the
mental consciousness, {12 a} but its relationship with thought-thought-concomitants
is not describable as being the same or other. <239>
2532 Treatise of the Refutation of the Person (Pudgalaprati(fedhaprakara,:za)
2.s.1. Vasubandhu 's first objection to the account: the objection from
knowledge of the existence of milk; F 239
[Vasubandhu:] - It follows from this explanation that the person, just like milk
[k(ffra], etc., exists solely as a provisional designation. When the visual consciousness
cognizes the color of milk, it is aware of milk [in dependence upon it]: the milk is
then known to exist by means of the visual consciousness, but one cannot say that the
milk is the same as its color or other than its color. 50
Likewise for odor, taste and tangible: [for example,] the tactile consciousness cog-
nizes the tangible; from which there is the awareness of milk [in dependence
upon it]; the milk is then known to exist by the tactile consciousness, without
one being able to say that milk is the same as the tangible or other than the tang-
ible.
Indeed, milk is not fourfold: 51 thus it is not [the same as] color, odor, taste, tangible;
but, on the other hand, one cannot suppose that the milk is not made of [or is other
than] these four.
The conclusion is imperative: one designates a collection [samasta] of aggregates by
person, metaphorically, just as milk means a collection of color, odor, etc. They are
merely provisional designations or conceptions without reality. 52
2.s.2.1. The Vatsfputrfyas' reply from inexplicable perception & Vasubandhu 's
objection; F 240
[Vatsiputrfyas:] - Just as the person and color-shape [i.e., the objects of perception]
cannot be said either to be or not be other than one a!}other, so the perception of the
· person and the perception of color-shape cannot be said either to be or not be other
than one another.
[Vasubandhu:] - This point of view will oblige you to say that-the perceptions,
like [their objects, a person and color-shape, cannot be said either to be or not
be other than one another], and being thus inexplicable [avaktavya], they are not
part of the category of conditioned phenomena (see Section 2.2: F 237): but you
do not admit this thesis, since, for you, every perception is a conditioned phenome-
non.
[Third objection:]
[Vatsiputriyas:] - We said that the person is perceived by the six consciousnesses. 62
[Vasubandhu:] - But if it is perceived by the visual consciousness, the person, just as
color-shape, .is other than sound; if it is perceived by the auditory consciousness, the
person, just as sound, is other than color-shape. And so on.
[Fourth objection from sense-faculties encounters: 63 ]
[Vasubandhu:] - Moreover, your thesis [that each of the six consciousnesses per-
ceives a person] is contradictory to the Sutra. The Sutra [Sense-organs passage]
says:
Brahmin, each of the five sense-faculties (i.e., the eye, ear, nose, tongue
and body) has its own domain (gocara) and object (vi1aya). Each of them
encounters (anubhavati) its own domain and its own object,64 and does not
encounter the domain and object of the others.
But the mental faculty encounters the domain and object of the first.five
sense-faculties, and the latter take recourse in the mental faculty [to give rise
to a conception of the objects they encounter]. 65 <243>
Or else, would you state, in agreement with the sutra, that the person is not the object
(vi~aya) (of the five sense-faculties)?
In this case, the person is not cognized (by the five sense-faculties): you are contra-
dicting your own system.66
sense-faculty of the eye, etc., this siitra means the mental consciousness which is
induced and dominated by the eye, etc. 69 <244> In fact, the mental consciousness
which is isolated-that is to say, which is not induced and dominated by one of the
five material sense-faculties but only by the mental faculty-[seeking its own domuin
and object,] does not seek the domain and object of the five sense-faculties, but only
the sense-sphere of factors (dharmiiyatana). Thus the $afprli1Jakopama does not
contradict the siitra previously quoted.
2.s.4. Vasubandhu 's objection to the account from its incompatibility with the
Buddha's enumerations of objects that are known to exist; F 244
[Vasubandhu:] - The Fortunate One has said:
Bhiqus, I declare to you all the factors (dharma) which should be penetrated
(abhijfteya) and completely known (parijfteya) (unhindered path [iinantarya-
miirga], path of liberation [vimuktimiirga]), namely: the eye, color-form,
visual consciousness, visual contact, the sensation which arises conditioned
by contact of the eye, whether unpleasant, pleasant and neither-unpleasant-
nor-pleasant, ....
And so on until:
the sensation which arises conditioned by the contact of the mental faculty.
[He concluded:]
These are all the factors which should be penetrated and completely
known. 70
This text teaches us that the factors (dharma) to be penetrated and completely known
are only those enumerated. The person, however, does not appear in this list: there-
fore, it is not susceptible to being cognized (vijneya). This is because_the understand-
ing (prajnii) by means of which one penetrates or completely knows has the same
object (vi~aya) as the ordinary consciousness (vijniina) {14 b}. 71
2.s.s. Vasubandhu 's objection to the account from its incompatibility with the
Buddha's teaching on the selflessness of a sense-faculty of perception;
F244
[Vasubandhu:] - [The Vatsiputriyas] who maintain that the eye sees the person
should understand that the eye sees just that which is real in the person, (namely,
color-form: likewise for the other five sense-faculties). By saying that they see a self
in what is not a self, they fall into the abyss of bad views. 72 <245>
2. Vasubandhu's Objections to the Viitsfputrfyas' theory ofpersons 2537
2.6.1. The Vatsfputrfyas should not reject the authenticity of these siitras;
F 251-52
[Vatsiputriyas:] - These texts [grantha] are not to be accepted as authoritative
[pramii~a], because they are not read by our school [nikiiya] [or: because they are not
included in our collection of sutras (nikiiya)].
[Vasubandhu:] - What then is the authority in your system, (1) only your school [or
collection of sutras] or (2) the words of the Buddha [buddhavacana]?
1. If it is your school [or collection of sutras], then the Buddha is not your master,90
and you are not the sons or daughters of the Siikya.
2. If it is the word of the Buddha, why do you not recognize the authority of these
texts?
[The Viitsiputriyas:] - The alleged texts are not the authentic words of the Buddha,91
because our school does not read them [or: because they are not included in our
collection of sutras].
[Vasubandhu:] -That is not a good reason.
[Viitsiputriyas:] - How so? <252>
[Vasubandhu:] - Because all the other schools read these texts [or; because these
texts are included in all other collections of sutras], 92 and because these texts do not
contradict (1) other sutras or (2) the philosophical truth93 (dhannatii). And so, when
2540 Treatise of the R_efutation of the Person (Pudgalaprati~edhaprakara,:ta)
you are so bold as to bluntly reject these texts as being the words of the Buddha by
saying: "They are not authentic because we do not read them [or; because they are
not included in our own collection of sutras]", this is only pure impudence contrary to
all good sense.
Therefore, it is not in a self or because of a self that one recognizes a self, but only in
the factors (dharma) which are not a self and which one falsely imagines to be a
self.99 [Thus all this is simply clinging to the selfless as a self.]
4. Another sutra [whose authority they accept] 100 says also:
All those who have remembered, do remember, or will remember their vari-
ous previous births, remember only the five appropriative aggregates.
Therefore, a person does not exist.
[Vatsiputrlyas:] - But the same sutra says: {17 a}
In a previous birth, I [ahal?l] had a visible form (color). 101
[Vasubandhu:] -This statement means to point out that the noble ones capable of
remembering their previous lives remember the various characteristics of their
stream in these lives. But the Buddha does not mean that he perceives a real person
(pudgala) possessing, in a previous birth, such and such a visible form, etc: for to
think in this way would be to lapse into the afflicted view of self (satkiiyadrf!i). Or
else, if that is the significance of this statement, the only recourse is to reject it as
non-authentic. 102 <254>
We conclude that the sutra, when it attributes the possession of a visible form, etc., to
a self, has a "person existing as a provisional designation or by way of conception"
[prajfiaptisatpudgala] in view; just as one speaks of a "heap" [rasi] which, as a mere
[collection of parts], has no unity, or a "current of water" [dhara] which, as a mere
succession [of waters], has not permanence. 103
2542 Treatise of the Refutation of the Person (Pudgalaprati:jedhaprakara,:ia)
[Vasubandhu: 106 ) - 1. We would reply that the person (pudgala) wiUthen be per-
manent or eternal [nitya; siisvata] if it does not perish when the thought [within
the continuum of aggregates called a person] perishes, a thesis which contradicts
your theory of a person of whom one cannot say that it is permanent or impermanent.
<255>
2. As for us, we do not say, (as the Mahasiirpghikas do,) that the Buddha is omnis-
cient in the sense that he knows all the factors (dharma) at one and the same time, 107
but rather in the sense that the word "Buddha" designates a certain stream and that to
this stream belongs this unique capability so that-by merely directing his thought-
there occurs immediately a non-mistaken knowledge of the object in regard to any-
thing he wishes to know: one therefore calls this stream by the name "Omniscient
One". 108 One moment of thought is not capable { 17 b} of knowing everything. On
this point, we have a stanza:
Just as fire [iigni], by the capacity [samartha] of its streani [saf!1tana], is
thoughtto be able to burn all things [one after another], so the [Buddha's]
omniscience [sarvavid] is asserted, because there is knowledge of all things
one after another [asakrt]. 109
[Viitsiputrlyas:] - How do you establish that the expression "Omniscient One"
should be taken to mean a stream and not a particular self with a knowledge of all
things?
[Vasubandhu:] - It is spoken of in Scripture, about the Buddhas of the past, present
and future (atftiidivacaniit). For example the stanza:
Buddhas of the past, Buddhas of the future and Buddhas of the present
destroy the sorrows [sokaniisa] ofmany.11°
But, in your system (see Section 2.2), the aggregates [skandha] e)':ist [as causally
conditioned factors] in the three periods o( time and the person (pudgala) does not.
{xxx} <256>
moments therefore receive the name bearer of the burden. 113 - Therefore, the person
is not a real entity. <258>
[samudaya]; just as the world speaks [metaphorically] of one grain of sesame seed
[tila], of one grain of rice [ta,:i~ula], one heap [rasi], one word [vacana] [when
referring to collections of elements] .118
3.4.2. Vasubandhu's second reply from birth & the debate about the birth of
persons; F 259-61
[VasubansJhu:] - Moreover, [if they accept this passage as a statement of doctrine
that requires no interpretation,] since the sutra attributes birth (utpattimattva) to the
person (pudgala), it would therefore be "conditioned" (sarµskrta), [which is contrary
to their own view].
[Vatsiputriyas: birth thesis:] - When the sutra refers to the person, the word "is
born" [utpadyate] does not have the same meaning as when one says that the aggre-
gates come to be [priidurbhiiva]. For the aggregates to come to be means to exist
after having been non-existent. Of the person, however, it is said that it is born
because, at a particular moment, the person acquires or appropriates [upiidiina]
different aggregates, 119 (for example, the mental faculty [manas] of a human instead
of the mental faculty of an animal).
Likewise, in the world, (1) when a certain person acquires a certain knowledge
[vidyii], one says that a sacrificer or priest [yiijiiika] is born, that a grammarian
[vaiyakara~a] is boni; (2) when a layman acquires certain marks [linga], one says
that a bhik~u or mendicant [parivriijaka] of a certain school is born: by these expres-
sions one does not mean that there really was "birth" of a sacrificer, of a mendi-
cant.120
Likewise, again, (3) when a different bodily state is acquired, one says that an old
man [vfr,:ia] is born, that a sick man [vyiidhita] is born;
[Vasubandhu'sfour replies to the birth thesis:]
[1. The Scriptural reply:]
This explanation of the phrase: "One person is born into this world" has been contra-
dicted by the Fortunate One in the Sutra of the Ultimate Emptiness (Paramartha-
sunyatasutra), 121 in which he says: <260>
0 bhik~us, there is action; there is retribution; 122 but, apart from the cal!sal
production of the factors (dharma) (which give the impression of a perma-
nent agent), one does not perceive an existing agent that lays down these
aggregates and that takes up other aggregates. 123
3. The Viitsfputrfyas' Objections to Vasubandhu's own Theory of Persons 2547
3.4.3. Vasubandhu's third reply from otherness of the aggregates & its
debate; F 261-62
[Vasubandhu:] - In case they would say that [the person is not the same in existence
as the aggregates, since] the aggregates are five in number, but the person is single,
this is then to admit that the person is other than the aggregates.
[Viitsiputriyas:] - [No.] Your position is very similar, for you say that the fun-
damental material elements [bhata], earth, etc., are four and that the derivative ma-
terial form (upiidiiyarupa}-color, for example-is single, but that, nevertheless,
derivative material form is not other than these fundamental material elements. 128
<262>
[Vasubandhu: First response:] -This objection does not contradict us, but con-
tradicts the scholars [i.e., Buddhadeva], whose thesis is that derived material ele-
ments are nothing but the four [fundamental material] elements (bhutamiitrika-
pak~a).129
[Second response:] - But, to adopt, [for argument's sake,] this thesis which you
wrongly attribute to us, we would then say that just as derived material elements
would be nothing but the four elements, so the five aggregates, [contrary to your own
theory,] would be nothing but the person (pudgala).
The ancient masters have already explained this difficulty. There was once a ven-
erable one (bhadanta) named Niigasena, possessing the three clear knowledges
(vidyii; vii. 45), the six superknowledges (abhijnii; vii. 42) and the eight liberations
. (vimok~a; viii. 32).
At that time, King Milinda approached the elder [sthavira] and said::... "Venerable
one, I have come to ask you a question. But mendicants. [srama!la] like to talk a lot
[bahubollaka]: 132 Can we agree that the venerable one will answer quite plainly to the
questions which I will raise?"
Niigasena accepted his request and the King asked: - "Is the living being the same as
the body or either than the body?"
Niigasena replied: - "There is no good reason to answer this question."
[King Milinda:] - "But venerable one, haven't we just made an agreement that you
will answer quite plainly? Why do you sidestep the question and not answer?"
[The Elder Niigasena:] - "O great king, I would like to ask you a question. But kings
like to talk a lot [bahubollaka]: Can we agree that the King will answer quite plainly
to the question which I will raise?"
The King consented and Niigasena asked: - "Do the mango trees in the King's palace
give sweet fruit or sour fruit?"
And the King answered: - "But there are no mango trees in my palace."
Niigasena protested just as the King had protested: - "But great king, haven't we
[just] made an agreement that you will answer quite plainly? Why do you sidestep
the question and not answer?"
The King said: "But since there are no mango trees in my palace, how could I answer
t~at they give sweet fruit or s~ur fruit?"
[The Elder Niigasena:]..::: "Likewise, 0 King, since the living being does not exist,
therefore one cannot answer your question and say that it is the same as the body or
other than the body." 133 <264>
We can now understand why the Fortunate One has not settled the question of the
sameness or non-sameness of the living being and the body.
3s'.1. The Vatsfputrfyas' objection: the Fortunate One should have answered
if the person did not exist & Vasubandhu 's reply; F 264-66
[Viitsiputrlyas:] - But, if the "inexplicable" (avaktavya) person (pudgala) does not
exist, why does the Fortunate One not answer that the living being (jfva) does not
ultimately exist?
2550 Treatise of the Refutation of the Person (Pudgalaprati~edhaprakara,:ia)
Those who accept the existence of the self are pierced by the teeth of afflic-
ted views; those who do not acknowledge the conventional [sami:rti] self
drop their wholesome [kusala] actions, their young. 139
And again:
Since a real living being (jfva) does not exist, the Fortunate One does not say
that the living being is or is not other than [the body]; neither does he say
that the living being does not really exist, fearing that someone would think
that it does not even exist as a provisional designation [prajiiapti]. 140
The presence [of the aggregates that are the] good [subha] and bad [asubha]
effects [of actions] in the stream of the aggregates is called the living being
(jfva): if the Fortunate One were to teach that the living being does not exist,
[someone could think that he taught the view that] the effects would not
exist there. 141 { 4 b}
And if the Fortunate One does not teach that the so-called living being is a
mere provisional designation [prajiiaptimiitra] for the aggregates [skandha],
it is because he sees that the questioner is not capable of understanding the
teaching of emptiness [sunyatii]. 142
Therefore it is because the Fortunate One takes into account the mode of
thinking or state of mind [iisayiipek,sya] of Vatsa that, asked whether a self
does or does not exist, he did not answer. But if the self were to exist, why
would he not have answered that it exists? 143 <267>
3.s.2. Vasubandhu 's account of the Fortunate One's silence on the remainder
of the fourteen questions; 144 F 267-68
[The four questions whether the world is eternal,' etc:]
[Vasubandhu:] - The Fortunate One does not answer the four questions of whether
the world (loka) is eternal, [not eterp.al, both or neither): 145 again, this is because he
takes into account the mode of thinking or state of mind of the questioner.
1. If the questioner were to equate the world (loka) with the self (iitmqn), the four
alternatives [that
i. the world is eternal,
ii. the '-3/0rld is not eternal,
iii. the world both is and is not eternal,
iv. the world neither is nor is not eternal,]
would be incorrect, since the self does not ultimately exist.
2552 Treatise of the Refutation of the Person (Pudgalaprati~edhaprakara,:ia)
2. If the questioner were to equate the world (loka) with [the collections of aggre-
gates that comprise] cyclic existence [saf!?siira], the fol.Jr alternatives would again be
incorrect:
i. if cyclic existence were eternal, no one could attain final nirva,:ia [pari-
nirva,:ia];
ii. if it were not eternal, all could attain final nirva,:ia through spontaneous
annihilation and not through effort;
iii. if it were both eternal [in some of its parts] and non-eternal [in others], then
some could not attain final nirva,:ia and others -would attain it spontane-
ously;
iv. if one were to say that the world (loka), in the sense of cyclic existence
(saf!?siira), neither is nor is not eternal, then that would mean to say that
sentient beings both attain and do not attain final nirvii,:ia: a contradiction in
terms.
Indeed, final nirvii,:ia is possible through [making an effort to traverse] the (noble)
path; therefore, none of these four categorical answers are acceptable. {5 a} This
case is like that of the naked Jain listener [nirgranthasriivaka] who, holding a spar-
row [ca{aka] in his hand behind his back, asked the Buddha if this bird was dead or
alive; the Buddha did not answer, 146
[The four questions whether the world does come to an end, etc:]
[Vasubandhu:] - The four questions as to whether the world is infinite (anantaviin),
i.e., whether it does, [does not, both does and does not, or neither does nor does not]
come to an end, has the same meaning as the four questions concerning the eternity
of the world, 147 and therefore present the same flaw. <268>
How do we know that "the infinity of the world" should be understood in this sense?
The non-Buddhist (tfrthika) mendicant Uktika [or Muktika], 148 after having asked
the Fortunate One the same four questions about infinity, [and was given the same
response,] used a roundabout means in order to repeat his question, asking: "Does
the whole world attain liberation by the (noble) path, or only a part of the world?" 149
Ananda then said to him: "You have already asked the Fortunate One this question.
Why do you repeat it by changing the words?"
[The four questions whether the Tathagata exists after death, etc:]
[Vasubandhu:] - If the Fortunate One did not answer the four questions as to whether
the Tathii.gata exists after death, [i.e., whether he,does, does not, both does and does
not, or neither does nor does not exist after this_,] this is again because he took into
3. The Vatsfputrfyas' Objections to Vasubandhu's own Theory of Persons 2553
account the mode of thinking or state of mind of the questioner, since the latter
understands by Tathiigata a "self' liberated from ·defilements. <269>
3.5.3. Vasubandhu 's objection: the Viitsfputyrfyas cannot account for the
Buddha's silence about his existence after death; F 269---70 ·
3.5.3.t. Vasubandhu 's demonstration that the Buddha did not answer the
question concerning his existence after death because the questioner
assumed that the Buddha was a self; F 269-70
[Vasubandhu:] - 1. If the Viitsiputriyas answer that the Fortunate One states nothing
about whether the Tathiigata exists after death because he knows [of the existence of]
the person 153 (pudgala) before the persons' final nirva,:ia, but he does n~tknow [of
the existence of the; person] ,after [the person's final nirva,:ia], (i) that would then be
out of ignorance that the Tathagata does not make any declaration about whether the
Tathiigata exists after death-to speak in this way is to deny the omniscience 154 of the
Master. (ii) Much rather, one should believe that, if the Fortunate One refrains from
any declaration, it is because the "self' that the questioner is aiming at when speak-
ing of the Tathiigata does not ultimately exist. <270>
2. But if the Viitsiputriyas say that the Fortunate One knows [of the existence of]
the person after the person's final nirvtitJa, even though he does not make a statement
on this subject, and that the person exists although not being the object of a
declaration of the Fortunate One-we take it as established that the Vatsiputriyas
accept that the person (pudgala) is eternal or permanent.
2554 Treatise of the Refutation of the Person (Pudgalaprati~edhaprakara,:ia)
If the Vatsiputriyas say that this point "whether the Fortunate. One does or does not
know that the person [exists after the persons' final nirva,:ia"] is also inexplicable,
they are then moving toward saying that everything is inexplicable and that one
cannot say that the Fortunate One either is or is not omniscient. 155
[Vasubandhu:] - How does the person (pudgala) wander in cyclic existence (saTJ'l-
sara)? Would you say that this wandering consists of abandoning old aggregates
[skandha] and taking up new aggregates? But we have shown [in Section 3.4.1,
above F 259] that this explanation is unacceptable.
The good explanation is simple: we say of the fire which bums a jungle that it moves
although it is only momentary fires, because the latter constitute a continuum; like-
wise, the constantly renewed aggregates in concert receive, metaphorically, the name
sentient being; thus, supported by thirst or craving, the collection of aggregates called
a sentient being wanders in saTJ'lsii.ra. (Compare iii. 18; above F 260, note).
there would arise in them passionate fondness [sneha] for the self and for "mine" or
things pertaining to a self. The Fortunate One says, indeed:
Whosoever adheres to a self, adheres to "mine" or things pertaining to a self.
Adhering to mine or things pertaining to a self, they become attached to the
aggregates as if they were the self and mine or things pertaining to a self.
Therefore, there would be the afflicted view of self (satkayadr~ti; v. 7) among the
Buddhas; they would be fettered by strong passionate fondness for the self and for
"mine" or things pertaining to a self; they would be very far from liberation. 162 <273>
[Viitsiputriyas:] - Passionate fondness for the self does not occur in regard to the
self. Let us explain: When one recognizes a self in what is not the self, just as the
non-Buddhists do, one experiences passionate fondness for this alleged self; but,
when one sees the self in that which truly is the self, i.e., in the inexplicable person
(pudgala), in the way that the Buddhas do, no passionate fondness occurs toward the
self.
[Vasubandhu:] -This view has no foundation. The Viitsiputriyas, without any shadow
of reason, introduce the sickness of heresy into the teachings of the Master. 163
3.10. Vasubandhu's claim to present the middle way between the extreme
theories propounded by the Vatsfputrfyas and Niigiirjuna; F 273
Therefore, a tumor offalse theories (concerning the existence of a person) has grown
within (the body of) the teachings (of the Buddha).
1. Some cling to [the existence of] the inexplicable person (pudgala) [and so fall
into the extreme view of eternality].
2. Others, [the followers of Nagarjuna, who deny that the aggregates themselves
exist, undermine the only foundation upon which persons can be said to exist. Hence,
since they] cling to the non-existence of·all the factors (dharma), [they fall into the
extreme view of annihilation]. 164
[Therefore, our view, that a person is real by way of a provisional designation and yet
is a collection of aggregates, is the true middle way. 165 ]
3. The non-Buddhists claim that a self [atman] is another real entity [in addition to
those which comprise the aggregates].
All these doctrines are inaccurate and present the same fault in that they do not lead
to liberation.
4. The Viitsfputrfyas' and Non-Buddhists' Objections to Vasubandhu's Theory 2557
the cow-stream. Here there is no single real entity called either "Caitra" or "cow".
But the Caitra-stream has no relation of "owner" or "master" [svamibhava] and
"what is owned" other than that between a cause and its effect [hetubhava].
1. If they regard Devadatta as a real self [iitman], we have discussed and refuted
this theory, [or: (how does the use of the example support the belief that there is a
self, since) they will be assuming (the truth of) the very thing they seek to establish].
2. If they regard Devadatta as a fictive self [or: what the world.calls a man
(puru,\'a)] and not as a single real entity, then Devadatta is only the name which one
gives to the stream of conditioning forces (sal!lskiira). Thus, in the same way that one
can say that such and such a Devadatta walks, in that way we can say that Devadatta
apprehends (an object).
4.s. The opponents' objection: Ifwe are not selves, we cannot walk &
Vasubandhu 's reply; F 279-80
[Opponents: 182] - How can Devadatta walk [if he is not a self]?
183
[Vasubandhu: ) - "Devadatta" is only a homogeneous or unbroken [abhinna] stream
of conditioning forces (sal!lskiira), momentary factors replacing one another without
interruption and, broadly speaking, similar to each other. -The foolish common
people [biilaLsee within this stream, or rather, under this stream, one thing, namely a
sentient being with a body, which would be the cause of the fact that this stream
arises in different places, the cause whose efficacy makes the successive moments of
the existence of the body of Devadatta occur in different places. - In truth, however,
the "walking" of Devadatta is simply the fact of the arising of the stream of bodily
aggregates in different places; the cause of this fact, i.e., the previous moment of the
stream, receives the name "walker". <280>
It is in this sense that we say that Devadatta walks, which designates a walk quite
similar to that of a flame LJviilii] or of sound [sabda]: the flame moves, the sound
travels, i.e., the fire-stream and the sound-stream move fr?m
one place to another. 184
Likewise, (1) the world says that Devadatta apprehends (vijiiniiti) because they think
that this complex which is Devadatta causes a consciousness (vijfiiina) {9 a} [to arise
in their own stream and ca:iz this arising "apprehending" an object]; and (2) the
noble ones themselves @rya), in order to conform to conventional expressions
[vyavahiira], express themselves in this manner, which is inexact.
[Vasubandhu: First account: 185 ] - It does nothing at all; very simply, it arises through
similarity to or receives a form like that of [siidrsyeniitmalabhad] its object. Just as
we say that the effect or fruit [kiirya)] although it does nothing, 186 conforms to its
cause or seed, reproduces the cause or seed, because it arises through similarity to or
receives a form like that of its cause or seed, 187 in the same way we say that con-
sciousness (vijfiiina), although it does nothing or does not carry out any function
toward the object, apprehends its object because it arises through similarity to
or receives a form like that of its object. <281> This "similarity" or "conformity"
[sadrsya] of the consciousness consists of the fact that [consciousness] has the aspect
of the object or the discernible form possessed by·the object [tadiikiiratii]. 188 Because
of this "similarity" or "conformity", we say that consciousness apprehends its object,
which is only one of its causes: the sense-faculty is also a cause of the consciousness,
but one does not say that consciousness apprehends its sense-faculty because con-
sciousness does not grasp an aspect or discernible form of the sense-faculty.
[Second account:] - This manner of speaking: "Consciousness apprehends [the
object]" [vijfiiinaf!I, vijiiniiti], [implying that consciousness is an agent,] may also be
justifiable from another point of view. Successive moments of consciousness arise in
regard to the object: the previous moment is the cause of the later moment; [in a
stream of consciousness,] consci~usness is therefore the cause of consciousness; 189 it
is therefore called agent (kartr) since it is the cause. 190 Similarly when we say that a
bell rings. 191
[Third account: First analogy:] - We might also say that consciousness apprehends
the object, attributing to the consciousness the activity of "apprehending" similar
to the way we attribute the activity of "moving" to the flame [of a butter lamp]
fpradipa]. When one says that "the flame [of the butter lamp] moves" fpradfpo
gacchatz1, the moving of the flame consists of the following: "Flame [of the butter
lamp]" is the name applied metaphorically to the uninterrupted stream of moments of
the flame which one considers, wrongly, as a "unity". When one of these successive
moments arises in 1 place other than the preceding moment, we say that the lamp
moves: but there exists no "mover" apart from and distinct from the moments of the
flame. Likewise, metaphorically we apply the expression "consciousness" (vijfiiina)
to a stream of thoughts [citta]: {9 b} when a moment of thought arises in !elation to
a different or new object, one says that consciousness apprehends this object. 192
[Second analogy:] - Just as it can be said that "color exists (bhavati), arises, endures
(ti~fhati)", without there being an "agent of existing" (bhavitr), ari "agent of arising",
an "agent of enduring", distinct from what is called its existence, etc., 193 so this can
be said of consciousness [when we say that consciousness apprehends an object].
<282>
4. The Vatsfputrfyas' and Non-Buddhists' Objections to Vasubandhu's Theory 2565
[The Opponents: 194] - If the (subsequent) consciousness (vijfiiina) arises from (the
immediately preceding) consciousness and not because of a self (atman),
1. why is the (subsequent) consciousness not always exactly the same as the
(immediately preceding) consciousness, or '
2. why do different [kinds of] consciousnesses not [always] arise in a fixed
I
order. [kramaniyama], as do the sprout [ankura], stem E!Ui~]. leaf [pattra],
etc?19s .
[Vasubandhu:] - 1. Let us answer the first question: - [The (subsequent) consciou-
sness is not always exactly the same as the (immediately preceding) consciousness,]
because everything which is produced through causes (i.e., conditioned phenomena
[saJ?ZSkrta]) presents the characteristic of Jduration-change" [or being different in
kind from moment to moment] (sthityanyathatva; ii. 45c [F 229]); this is the intrinsic
nature [svabhava] of conditioned phenomena(sa,µskrta): in the stream which they
form, the subsequent necessarily differs from the immediately preceding. If it were
otherwise,;having entered into meditation [dhyanasamahitana1?Z]-the body [kaya]
and thought [citta] being always the same [sadrsa], t9-d successive moments of the
stream being the same-the practitioners would not by themselves [svaya'!Z] emerge
from [vyutthana] meditation. 196
2. As for the second question: - [On the one hand,] the /sequence of [kinds of]
thoughts [citta] is subject to a fixed 01der. 197 If such and"such a thought should arise
after such and such a thought, it wjlf arise after this thought. 198 <283>
On the other hand, thoughts o:Vthe same kind· [tulyakara] are able to produce either
the same or different [ki1?Zci4 [kinds of thought] because of different [kinds of] gotra
(i.e., seed). 199 For exa111ple, [in the mental streams of a wandering mendicant and lay
person,] the idea ofa "woman" [strfcitta] 200 might be immediately followed [-in the
wandering mendi~ant who, for the sake of;safeguarding his vow of chastity, has
meditated on the repulsiveness of the fei;nale body-] by the idea of "disgust"
[vidu~a~acitta] for the body [kaya] of this woman, and [-in the lay person who has
met the woman's husband, son and daughter-] by the idea of "husband, son and
daughter," fputradicitta]. At a later time, the idea of "woman" might reappear in the
changing mental stream [of the wandering mendicant and the lay person]. 201 This
second idea .of "woman" will have the capacity to produce the idea of "disgust" for
her body [in the wandering mendicant] or the idea of "husband, son and daughter"
[in the lay person], {10 a} according to whether it has the one or the other of these
2566 Treatise of the Refutation of the Person (Pudgalaprati~edhaprakara,:ia)
ideas for its gotra; i.e., as its seed; but not when it would not have such [different]
seeds. 202
The Tfrthika 's first reply to the root objection: the reply from
different conjunctions; F 284-86
[Vasubandhu:] - These schofars209 explain (1) the different kinds of thoughts and
(2) the absen<;e of a fixed order of their production in dependence µpon the differ-
ent [conjunct1ons (sal?lyogavise.,s'a) 210 ], i.e., the different ways the self [iitman] is con-
joined with the internal organ (manas). 211 <285>
. [Vasubandhu 's first objection to the reply from different conjunctions: the
objection from the otherness of conjunction:]
This explanation does not hold [since a self and an internal organ, both of which are
permanent, cannot be conjoined in different ways unless the conjunction between
them is something other than them].
But no type of conjunction has been proved [by them] to be other [than the self and
the internal organ]. 212
namely, that the self [and the internal organ] are delimited or localized in separate
places (iitmana~ pwicchedaprasanga~). 216 (Whence it will follow that the self is not
omnipresent: this contradicts your system [that the self pervades the body and that an
internal organ is present in the body]. 217) <286>
The Tfrthika 's second reply to the root objection: the reply
from partial conjunctions & Vasubandhu's objection from
partlessness and non-difference; F 286-87
[Vasubandhu:] - On the other hand, you cannot say that [a different kind of thought
arises from a self] when the int~rnal organ is in conjunction with a part [of a self]
[pradesasarrzyoga], 219 for according to you, the self is a partless entity. <287>
22
°Even if there could be a conjunction between [a part of] the permanent self and
an always unchanging internal organ (mc:inas), how do you explain the difference of
"conjunction" [sarrzyogavise~a] (necessary for the difference of thoughts), [since the
parts of the self are not different]?
The Tfrthika 's third reply to the root objection: the reply from
the influence of different impressions on conjunctions; F 287-89
[Vasubandhu:] - Would you say that the difference of "cognition" [buddhivise~a]
arises under the influence of the difference of "conjunction" [sarrzyogavise~a] of
the self and tl;le mental organ, which arises under the influence of the difference of
"impressions" [sarrzskiiravise~a]?221
4. The Viitsfputrfyas' and Non-Buddhists' Objections to Vasubandhu's Theory 2569
[The Tfrthikas' repJy from the need for a basis of cognitions and impressions
& Vasubandhu's objection from the lack of physical resistan9eand a separate
place:]
You will say no doubt that the thoughts, just like the impressions (sarriskiira), exist
because of the self: this is just a claim. without proof. <288>
You will insist, saying that the self [must exist], since it is their basis (iisraya).
I ask you to explain, using an example, the nature of this relationship of the support-
ing and the supported. But the thought (vvhich the impressions influence) and the
impressions themselves are not supported by the self in the way a wall [ku{i'ya] sup-
ports a picture [citra] or a boyv-1 [ku~4a] supports fruit [badara]. Indeed, [if this were
the case,] you would have to accept
1. that there is contact through phy_!!i_c,.al obstruction [pratighiita] (between the
self and the thoughts-imprsessi6ns),
2. that [the self and the thoughts-impressions] would exist in separate places
[yuta], just like the picture and the wall and the fruit and the bowl. 224
[The Tfrthikas' reply from earth as the basis of its sensible qualities &
Vasubandhu 's objection from the non-otherness of earth and its sensible
qualities:]
You say that you do not understand the basis which the self provides for the thoughts-
impressions in the way [that the wall supports a picture, etc.], but [you maintain that]
the self supports the thoughts-impressions in the same way that the earth, [in your
system,] supports [its special q~irlities:] odor, [color, taste, tangible]. .
We are delighted with this comparison, for it establishes the non-existence of the
self. Because, just as one cannot notice the existence of earth (na upalabhyate) inde-
pendently of odor, etc.-what is designated by the word "earth" is only a collection
of odors, etc.-in the same way the:re is no self that is other than the thoughts-
2570 Treatise of the Refutation of the Person (Pudgalaprati~edhaprakara!Ja)
[The Tfrthikas' reply and objection from earth's possession of sensible quali-
ties & Vasubandhu's objection from the need to distinguish different collec-
tions of sensible qualities:]
[Opponents:] - But, if there is not a certain thing "earth" which is other than [its
sensible qualities] odors, etc., { 11 b}, how can one designate certain odors, etc., as
being possessed by earth: "the odor, the taste of earth"? <289>
[Vasubandhu:] - One expresses oneself in this way with the view of distinguishing;
in other words, one wants to indicate that certain [collections of] odors, tastes, etc.,
are what is called "earth" and not other [collections of] odors or tastes which are
other things, such as "water". Likewise, when we say "the body of a wooden statue",
we are indicating that this thing is of wood and not of baked clay, [but not because
the wooden statue is other than its body]. 225
The Tfrthika 's fourth reply to the root objection: the reply
from the influence of different impressions on the self; F 289
[Opponents:] -The [different kinds of] cognitions arise from the self, [conjoined
with an internal organ, because the self] is under the influence of the difference of
"impressions" [saf!lskiiravise~a ].
[The Tfrthikas' reply from the influence of a stronger impression & Vasu-:-
bandhu's objection from the continuous production of the same cogni-
tion:]
[Opponents:] - [Not all cognitions arise simultaneously from the self,] because the
strongest impression blocks [pratibandha] the other [impressions, i.e., the weaker
ones,] from producing their effect.
[Vasubandhu:] - But then the strongest impression should always produce its [own
kind of] effect [to the exclusion of any others].
4. The Viitsfputrfyas' and Non-Buddhists' Objections to Vasubandhu's Theory 2571
4.s. The Vaise#kas' objection: A self is needed as a basis for thoughts &
Vasubandhu's reply; F290
[Vaise~ikas:] - One cannot do without a self. Memory (smrti), the impressions (sa1J1-
skiira), etc., 227 are the category (padiirtha) called quality (gu~a); these qualities
must necessarily have a category called substance [dravya] for their basis (iisraya),
and from among the nine substances (earth [prthivi], water Uala], fire [tejas], wind
[viiyu], space [iikiisa], time [kiila], spatial direction [dik], self [iitman] and internal
organ [manas]), it is the self, because it is inadmissible that memory and the other
mental qualities could have a substance other than the self (namely, earth, etc.) for
their basis since the self alone is intelligent.
[Vasubandhu:] - But the existence of the category quality is not yet established. You
say that memory, the impressions, etc., are included in the category quality (gu~a)
and are not substances [dravya]: we do not agree; we think that everything which
exists (vidyamiina) is a "real entity" [dravya]. The siitra says:
The fruit of the religious praxis [sriima,:zyaphala] consists of six real entities
[dravya], [namely, the five pure aggregates (skandha) and cessation due to
deliberation (pratisa1Jlkhyiinirodha)] (vi. 51). 228
It is also not established that memory, etc., has the self for its basis, {12 a} because
we have already investigated [and rejected] the idea of a basis [see Section 4.7;1
(F 287ff.)].
4.9. The Vaise~ikas' objection: Without a self there is nothing for the sake
of which action is undertaken & Vasubandhu's reply; F 290-91
[Vaise~ikas:] - If the self does not really exist, what is the goal or reason [artha] for
undertaking actions [karmiirambha]?
2572 Treatise of the Refutation of the Person (Pudgalaprati$edhaprakarar;a)
[Vasubandhu:] -The goal or reason for undertaking actions is expressed as: "I
[ahal!l] would be happy and not suffer."
[Vaise~ikas:] - What do you mean by "I"?
[Vasubandhu:] - It is that of which one speaks when one says "I", it is the object of
the "idea of I", the "I-maker", [or: the object of the "mind that conceives an I"]
(ahal!lkaravi$aya ). <291>
[Vaise~ikas:] - What is this object (vi$aya)?
[Vasubandhu:] - [It is] the stream of the aggregates (skandhasal!ltana), because
it is to the aggregates-to one's body, sensations, etc.-that one becomes attached
[sneha] [and not to a self]; because the "idea of I" or "the mind that conceives an I"
arises toward the same things relative to which there is the idea [buddhi] of white and
other similar ideas: is it not commonly said: "I am white, black, old, young, thin,
fat"? What is regarded as white, etc.--evidently the aggregate color-shape (rupa)-is
the same as what is regarded as being the "I" [or as being the object of the "idea of
I"]. The "self' [atman] which the Vaise~ikas accept is different from that [i.e., the
body] which is white, etc., [or: these attributes are not recognized (by the Tfrthikas)
to belong to a seif]; therefore, also, the "idea of I" pertains to the individual aggre-
gates and not to any "self' which the Vaise~ikas imagine.
4.9.2. The Vaise~ikas' objection: Vasubandhu's reply does not ena!Jle him to
explain why "I" is not applied to the bodies of others & Vasubandhu 's
explanation; F 291
[Vaise~ikas:] - If the "idea of I" has [only] color-form and the other aggregates for
its,,cognitive object [alambana] [and not a self], why is it that this idea does not arise
in regard to the color-form of others?
4. The Viitsfputrfyas' and Non-Buddhists' Objections to Vasubandhu's Theory 2573
4.11. The Vaise~ikas' objection: Sensations cannot exist unless there is a self
as a basis from which they arise & Vasubandhu 's reply; F 292
[Vaise~ikas:] - If there is no self, what is the basis within which suffering [du~kha]
and pleasure [sukha] occur?
[Vasubandhu:] - There is a basis (asraya) within which pleasure or suffering occurs,
just as flowers [pu~pa] occur in trees [yr~a] and fruits [phala] occur in the forest
[vana]. 231 Andthe basis in question is any one of the six internal sense-spheres
(ayatana), the sense-sphere of the eye, etc. 232 This has been explained in the first
chapter (AKB i. 45).
4.12.1. Vdsubandhu's reply to the objection that the existence of a self cannot
be denied because a self is needed as an agent of actions; F 293-94
[Vasubandhu:]- What is meant by "Devadatta"?
1. If a self (iitman) is meant, then the example is worthless since the self is not
established.
2. If the collection or complex of the five aggregates [paiicaskandhaka] is meant,
then Devadafta is indeed an agent, but he .is not "an independent agent and creator of
actions". 236
Action (karma) is threefold, 237 i.e., bodily action [kiiya], vocal action [viin], mental
action [manas]. Among these, that which produces bodily action is the thought
acting on the body; the thought which gives rise to bodily action is dependent,
moreover, on its causes and conditions [svakiira,:ia]; these causes and conditions
depend, in tum, on their causes and conditions: in all this there is riot a single entity,
a "producer" dependent on itself or, in other words, there. is no independence
[sviitantrya]. For everything that exists arises in dependence upon causes and condi-
tions fpratyaya].
4. The Vatsfputrfyas' and Non-Buddhists' Objections to Vasubandhu's Theory 2575
The "self', as you understand it, does not depend on causes and conditions; further-
more, it does nothinj, its causality [karatzatva] cannot be assumed: it is, therefore,
not an independ~nt agent. Nowhere does one perceive an agent that c_onforms to your
definitio~ ''Those who have independent power [or, those who are a-(causally) inde-
-fJernlent (cause),] are called agent." <294>
[One might define the agent newly and say;] that which is called the agent of acer-
tain action is-amongst all the causes of the action-that which is the principal cau;se
[pradhanaf!t kara~af!t] of this action. - But even if we were to define the agent in this
way, your "self' is not an agent even in this sense. 238
What is, indeed, the principal cause of the genesis of bodily action? 239 Memory (of aq
object) (smrti) causes a predilection or a desire for action (in relation to this object}
(chanda = kartukamata) to arise; from predilection [which is the principal cause of
bodily action] proceeds initial inquiry (vitarka); from initial inquiry proceeds effort
(prayatna), which triggers off a [movement in the] wind (channels) (vayu) which
starts up bodily action.
In this process, what activity is to be attributed to the "self' of the Vaise~ikas? This
self is certainly not the agent of bodily action {13 b}.
Vocal and mental action are explained in the same way.
4.12.2. Vasubandhu 's reply to the objection that the existence of a self cannot
be denied because a self is needed as a subject that experiences the
results of actions; F 294
[Vasubandhu:] - It is said in vain that the "self' experiences the effect[of action]
(see Section 4.12), becau;,e it perceives the effect: the "self' has no role in perceiving
the effect; and the self does not appear among the causes which prodµce conscious-
nesses (vijfiana) [by means of which the effects are perceived,] as we have demon-
strated above (see Section 4.3). 240 <295>
4.14. The Vaise#kas' objection: A past action cannot produce a future effect
if there is no self & Vasubandhu's reply; F295-300
· [Vaise~ikas:] - If there is no self, how can a past action which has perished produce
an effect in the future? 242
If one says that the seed produces the fruit, this is because the seed, through a str~am
of intermediaries, projects the capability [samarthya] in the flower of producing
the fruit. 247 If the capability of producing the fruit, a capability which occurs in
the flower, did not have the seed as its original cause-(for its antecedent [purva]), the
flower would not have produced a fruit of the same sort [as the fruit that produced
the seed itself].
Likewise, it is said, indeed, that the effect arises from the action, but it does not arise
from the action which has perished nor does it originate immediately from the action
itself. Indeed, the effect arises from the culminating moment in the evolution of the
stream which has its origin in the action.
By/"'stream" (saf!ltii.na) we mean the material and mental aggregates (skandha) suc-
ceeding one another without interruption in a line [or: this "stream" is the occur-
rence of a sequence of thoughts (uttarottaracitta)] having action for its original cause
(for its antecedent [parva]). The successive moments of this line are different: there
is, therefore, evolution (paril;iama), a transformation of the stream. Since the last
moment of this evolution possesses a culminating or. distinctive capability, the power
of immediately producing the effect, it is distinguished, in this respect, from the
other moments; it is therefore called distinctive characteristic (vise~a), culminating
moment of the evolution.
For example, thought at death (mara~acitta), when it is "associated with grasping"
(sa-upiidana), possesses the capacity to produce a new existence [punarbhava]. -
This thought has many actions of all kinds for its antecedents: nevertheless, it is the
capability projected by a weighty [guru] action248 which informs (or qualifies) the
last thought; in the absence of a weighty action, it is the capability projected by a
recent [asanna] action; in the latter's absence, [it is the capability projected] by a
habitual [abhyasta] action; in the latter's absence, [it is the capability projected] by a
former action or action of a previous life [parva]. 249 <297> { 14 b} There is a stanza
(by Rahula): 250
(1) Weighty [guru] action, (2) recent [asanna] action, (3) habitual [abhyasta]
action, (4) former [parva] action: among actions [which produce rebirth] in
saYflsdra, these four ripen in this order.
When the capability (samarthya) which produces the ripened effect, a capability
projected by the ripening cause [vipakahetu], has produced its effect, this capability
is abolished. 251 <298>
On the contrary, the capability which produces an effect of equal outflow, a capabil-
ity projected by a homogeneous cause (sabhtighetu), does not perish by the produc-
tion of its effect:
1. when it is defiled (kli~ta), this capability perishes through the capability of
the counter-agent (pratipak~a);
2. when this capability is not defiled [akli~fa], it perishes through parinirva1_1a,
which involves the abolition of the stream, both material form (rilpa) and
thought (citta).
take place which will mak;e the pip of the new fruit (kesara) red. But the red pip
when planted,, will not give rise again to a red pip.
Likewise, the ripened effect of an action d~s not produce a new ripened effect. 256
<300>
To the extent of my knowledge, I have summarily and roughly shown the effect of
actions.
The Buddhas alone know [completely] how the stream, when impregnated [adhi-
vasita] by actions of diverse nature and capability, evolves in such a way that,
arriving at a particular stage, it produces such and such an effect. {15 b} There is a
stanza:
Action, the impregnations [bhavana] caused by action, the entry into the
activity of this impregnation, the effect resulting from it, no one, except the
Buddha, knows all this fully with certainty. 257
2580 Treatise of the Refutation of the Person (Pudgalaprati~edhaprakaraf_la)
IN THIS SOOK ONE WILL FIND JUST A LITTLE SIT OF INSTR..UCTION FOR.
THE USE OF INTELLICENT PEOPLE: [>,... LITTLE SIT OF] POISON, ONCE IN
THE WOUND, WILL SP~EAD EVER..YWHER..E SY ITS OWN POTENCY. 260
Endnotes to Chapter Nine
The question was asked whether the Pudgalavadins are Buddhists: Yasomitra is very clear
[WOG.699.4f.]: na hi VatsTputrTyiiz:iiirp. muktir ne~yate bauddhatviit: "It cannot be asserted that
they cannot attain liberation, since they are Buddhists." (See F 232, note). Conflicting opinion
on ix, F 273 (Hsi.ian-tsang, T. 29, 156c25) and in the final stanzas where the Pudgalaviidins are
listed among the non-Buddhists (tfrthika) .
.Lcan-skya hu-thug-tu expresses a very widespread opinion by saying that the five schools of
the Mahasiirp.mitTya who accept that the "I" is a "person" cannot be considered as Buddhist
(Wassilief, p. 270).
Siintideva (Bodhicaryiivatiira, ix. 60): "The followers of [the doctrine of] the person, the non-
Buddhists within [the Buddhist system] (antascaratfrthika), accept a self (iitma11) called person
(pudgala), and say that this self is not the same as the aggregates (skandha), nor is it other than
the aggregates: otherwise one could see that they enter the non-Buddhist system." -They
themselves claim to be Buddhists (saugatammanya).
CandrakTrti (Madhyamakiivatiira; vi. 86): "The non-Buddhists (tfrthika) speak of a person
(pudgala), etc.; seeing that the person and other assumed principles do not have any activity,
the Buddha declares that thought alone is active." - To say "the non-Buddhists" is a general
way of speaking; for there are Buddhists ("sectarians of this Dharma") who accept the person
(pudgala). From a certain point of view (rnam pa gcig tu na = ekaprakiire,:ia), they are not
Buddhists, for, like the non-Buddhists, they do not understand the meaning of the teach-
ing exactly. Therefore, this designation [of non-Buddhists] extends to all. - It is said in the
Ratniivalf: "The world-with the S iirp.khyas, Vaise~ikas, Nirgranthas-believes in the person
(pudgala), in the aggregates (skandha), in other principles. Let us ask [the world] whether it
teaches the means to pass beyond existence and non-existence [or else: if it passes beyond
affirmation and negation of existence] .... Therefore those who believe in the aggregates
(skandha), etc., should be considereo to be outsiders (biihya)." [We see that the followers of
the aggregates (skandhaviidin), that is to say, the orthodox Buddhists of the small vehicle
(hfnayiina) are, like the followers of the person (pudgalaviidin), excluded from the True Doc-
trine].
griihi ... [WOG.81.13f.]: "Having seen visible forms by the eye, they do not apprehend the
signs ... ". - Since the eye sees, therefore the person (pudgala) sees through the eye = yasmac
cakfut, pasyati tasmat pudgalas cak1u1a pasyati. - See below F 244 (note).
In the Vyiikhyti, in regard to iii. 43a, the two hypotheses that Vasubandhu attributes "death"
(cyuti) to thought (citta) or to the person (pudgala) are accepted.
In words that Vasubandhu would approve of, Buddhaghosa, in his Manorathapurai;z'i, i. 95, ex-
plains why the Fortunate One speaks of the person (pudgala), although the person does not
exist.
Lodro Sangpo (LS): As for a brief discussion of chapter 9, see Dhammajoti's Summary.
i. La Vallee Poussin's sources for his translation:
La Vallee Poussin (LVP) states in his entry note to chapters 7-9:
The translation of this final part of the Kosa is based on P!tramiirtha' s and Hsiian-
tsang 's versions, not to mention Yasomitra's commentary, which has been given a
great deal of space in the footnotes, and also the numerous pieces of information by
Saeki Kiokuga. For the ninth chapter, the work of Stcherbatsky (translation and foot-
notes; 1920) and a manuscript version of Paramiirtha's text by Father Louis van Hee
have been very helpful.
resembles a Vedic theory than any theory of persons held within the other Indian Buddhist
schools." On the other hand, Duerlinger sees his own work as taking Vasubandhu's extended
discussion of the Pudgalavadins' theory of persons into careful analytical consideration while
suspecting that Vasubandhu believed that the Nyaya-Vaise~ika objections to the Buddhist
non-self system may have "led the Pudgalavadins to reject the sort of interpretation of the
Buddha's theory of persons presented by Vasubandhu and to substitute a theory that ... closely
resembles the one held by the Nyaya-Vaise~ikas". (See IBTP.14f. in our Electronic Appendix
for Duerlinger's brief discussion of the theory of persons of the Nyaya-Vaisesikas, and refer-
ences to its source materials.)
Priestley himself in this regard states (PuB.215f.) that it is possible that the founders of the
Pudgalavada were influenced by some of the non-Bud~hist traditions which taught the reality
of the self, but sees the difficulty with this explanation that "we have no way, as far as I can
see, of establishing the extent of such an influence, or even whether it actually occurred.~'
After qualifying this latter remark, he comments: "That such an influence was a signifi-
cant factor in the development of Buddhism is no more than a guess, though I think a fairly
reasonable <;>ne .... We need to recall also that the Pudagalavadin doctrine of the indeterminate
self is different from almost all of the non-Buddhist doctrines which might be supposed to
have influenced it. It is only certain passages in the Upanishads and certain traditions of their
interpretation that resemble what I have proposed as the real position of the Pudgalavada....
The fact is that we do not know what the Buddha taught. Since the record of his teachings was
somewhat ambiguous, there was room (and perhaps a need) for a number of interpretations,
a number of schools. We have no bas.is, as far as l can see, for assuming that any of the schools
arose as a result of non-Buddhist influence, though some of them may have."
For further details consult Priestley's and Duerlinger's books. Both scholars are aware of the
speculative character of their interpretations, which is largely unavoidable due to the scant
textual sources regarding the Pudgalavada, as we will see below in our endnote (to Section 2)
on the Vatsiputriyas. Even though these two interpretations are different-not only due to their
different views in terms of content but also since their focus is different, for example,
Duerlinger has a close look at all the particular arguments presented in the ninth chapter of the
AKB whereas Priestley focuses on the reality of the pudgala within all texts of the Pudgala-
vadins, without singling out a particular one-they are both ve~y useful and informative in
their different strengths. Neither of them attempts to cover all the doctrines of the Pudgalavada
school.
As for my endnotes, they evolved through various stages and included at some point substan-
tially more referrences to Duerlinger's work, but since Duerlinger's book is readily available,
I have decided in the end to eliminate many of his comments to specific arguments so that the
overall thrust and flow of LVP's translation and endnotes is not interrupted too much. As
for Priestley, for similar reasons, I have abstained from representing many of his "twists and
turns". Instead I have attempted to focus on a few key passages and to provide general back-
ground material.
Abhidharmakosakiirikii has the outstanding merit of deciding once for all the controversy
regarding the exact character of its ninth chapter, called the Pudgalanirdesa [which was sup-
posed to be all in prose], as consisting of thirteen verses, ... ". But Hirakawa, in his introduc-
tion to the Index to the AbhidharmakosabhiifYa (1973; IA.XXXII), writes: "The Kosa is
divided into nine chapters, but the composition of the ninth chapter, Pudgalaprati!Jedha-
nirdesa-kosasthiina, is different from the former eight chapters. The former eight chapters
consist of the kiirikii and bha!Jya, but the ninth chapter lacks the kiirikii. V.V. Gokhale points
out thirteen verses in the ninth chapter, but if one sees the Kosa-bhii!Jya published by
P. Pradhan, it is clear that they are not the kiirikiis. So it is more appropriate to consider that
the Kosa is actually complete with eight chapters and that the ninth chapter is the appendix."
On: this point, we have followed Hirakawa in our translation.
v. The Buddha's theory of persons, and the purpose and structure of the ninth chapter:
In Duerlinger's Introduction (p. 8), he states:
The Buddha formulated his theory of persons as a part of his theory about what
causes suffering and how to destroy this cause. His theory is that the root cause of
suffering is that persons give assent to a naturally occurring false appearance of
themselves as selves and that they can eliminate this assent by meditating on the
selflessness of persons. [ ... ]
It seems clear that Vasubandhu composed the Refutation primarily for the purpose of
purging Buddhism of what he_took to be the Pudgalaviidins' heretical interpretation
of the Buddha's theory that persons are not selves .... He then devotes the last part of
the work to replies to the Nyiiya-Vaise~ikas' objections to his theory.
Chapter 9 (mainly following Duerlinger) is structured in five sections:
1. Vasubandhu's theory of persons; F 230
2. Vasubandhu's objections to the Vatsiputriyas' theory of persons; F 232
3. Vasubandhu's replies to the objections of the Viitsiputriyas; F 254
4. Vasubandhu's rep\ies to the objections of the Viitsiputriyas and Tirthikas; F 273
5. Concluding verses; F 300-1
However, Duerlinger thinks that in the entire Section 4, Vasubandhu replies mainly to the ob-
jections of the Nyiiya-Vaise~ikas. Thus we can summarize:
In Section 1, Vasubandhu presents briefly his own theory of persons which claims that the
person does not exist as a self (atman) that is other or independent or separate, but does
exist as a provisional designation referring to_ the stream of the collections of aggregates
which are real entities (dravya) (i.e., bodies and thoughts).
In Section 2, Vasubandhu argues against the theory of persons of the Viitsiputriyas who
claim that the person (pudgala) is neither the same as the aggregates (skandha) nor other
than them, and which does, nevertheless, ultimately exist.
In Section 3, Vasubandhu primarily replies to objections of the Viitsiputriyas against his
own theory of persons but also "dismisses, in a single sentence (3.10), the thesis of Niigiir-
juna, the founder of the Miidhyamika school of Indian Buddhism, that no phenomena
ultimately exist, as an adequate basis for a theory of persons" (IBTP.viii).
2588 Treatise of the Refutation of the Person (Pudgalaprati~edhaprakara,:ia)
In regard to the false or mistaken view of a self and how it comes about, Duerlinger clarifies
(IBTP.31f.): "Vasubandhu seems to assume that we are, from a conventional point of view,
wholes of parts. Although the parts of these wholes are in fact identifiable independently of
the wholes, the wholes themselves are not identifiable independently of their parts. Our parts
he believes to be the aggregates in the collections of aggregates that are the causal basis
of the conception of ourselves. The aggregates in these collections, he assumes, exist in a
beginningless causal continuum perpetuated by the mistaken view of a self. When we con-
ceive ourselves, who are wholes of parts, he believes, [i] we falsely appear to ourselves to
be wholes that are identifiable independently of our parts and [ii] our parts falsely appear to be
identifiable in dependence upon the wholes of which they are parts. As a result of assenting to
the first false appearance, we acquire the false idea of 'I', and as a result of assenting to the
second false appearance, we acquire the false idea of 'mine'. The false ideas of 'I' and 'mine'
are what, together, are called the mistaken view arising from a perishable collection of aggre-
gates (satkiiyadr~{i)."
LS: Pradhan: skandhasal'fltiina eviitriu;lprajnaptil'fl.
Duerlinger (IBTP.112) thinks that Section 1 is the only place in the Refutatio,n where "self'
(iitman) refers to a conventionally real person, whereas in all other places "self' signifies a
person who possesses an independent identity, as also understood in terms like aniitman, iitma-
dr~ti, iitmagriiha.
6
LS: I.e., the "self' (iitman) or person as Vasubandhu conceives it cannot be identified
independently of a collection of aggregates.
LS: See Section 2.1 and 2.1.1 for more details on prajnapti and dravya, and their transla-
tions.
LVP: On this subject, the stanza of Stotrakiira (= Matrceta, Takakusu, 1-tsing, p. 156):
siihal'flkiire manasi na samal'fl yiiti janmaprabandho
niihal'flkiiras calati hrdayiid iitmadr~{au ca satyam I
anyab siistii jagati ca yato niisti nairiitmyaviidf
niinyas tasmiid upasamavidhes tvanmatiid asti miirgab 11
As long as the mind (manas = citta) is accompanied by the conception of "I" (ahal'fl-
kiira), the stream of rebirths (janmaprabhandha) cannot be stopped; the conception
of "I'' is not removed from the heart (hrdaya) as long as there is the view (dr~ti) that
there is a self (iitman). Now, in the world there is no master who teaches the non-
existence of the self (nairiitmyav,iidin), except you. Thus, there is, outside of your
doctrine, no other path of liberation.
Compare the stanzas attributed to the Acarya, Bodhicaryiivatiirapancikii, 492: yab pasyaty
iitm[ina,ri tasyiiham iti siisvatab snehab I snehiit sukhe~u tr~yati tr~~ii do~iif!lS tiraskurute ... .
Also $a<;ldarsanasal'flgraha, 193.
Likewise, Candrakirti, Madhyamakiivatiira, vi. 120 (cited Madhyamakavrtti, p. 340): "Seeing
through understanding (prajnii) that all defilements (klesa) and all faults (do~a) come from the
afflicted view of self (satkiiyadr~ti), and being aware that the object of this view is the self
(iitman), the practitioners (yogin) deny the self."
LS: Duerlinger refers to this argument as an abbreviated statement of the central argument
2590 Treatise of the Refutation of the Person (Pudgalaprati~edhaprakara,;a)
of Vasubandhu 's theory of persons. He states (IB TP .126) that this argument consists, in fact,
of two arguments:
l. the first (which is spelled out in Section 1.2) being the no-self argument avoids an
eternal transcendence theory of persons and states "that the object of the conception
of ourselves is known not to be a self because no phenomenon in the collection of
phenomena that causes us to be conceived is known, by means of direct perception or
correct inference, to be a self';
2. the second (which is implicitly implied in Section 1.2) being the ultimate existence
argument avoids a nihilism theory of persons and states "that the object of the con-
ception of ourselves is known to exist because the phenomena in the collection of
aggregates that is its causal basis are known to exist by means of direct perception or
correct inference".
Thus he dubs this argument the middle way argument of Vasubandhu 's theory of persons.
Kapstein (RT.350), on the other hand, headlines Section 1.2 as the epistemological argument
for the non-self principle.
10
LVP: Kiokuga cites a commentary on the Vijiiaptimatra, 2, 4:
1. unconditioned phenomena (asarrzskrta) do not exist;
2. that which exists (asti-dharma = bhiiva) is of three types: (i) things known by direct
perception, material form (color), thought; (ii) things like pots and clothes (Ch.: hsien
shou yung fa); (iii) things like the sense-faculties (Ch.: yu tso yung fa);
3. three views of the self: (1) the same as the aggregates, (ii) other than the aggregates,
(iii) neither the same or other.
11
·LVP: Proof from scriptural authority (iigama) is not mentioned because it is included
within inference (anumiina).
12
LVP: Entity= bhiiva; Hsiian-tsang translates (Ch.) yu-fa, which reminds us of the atthi-
dhamma of Buddhaghosa.
13
LVP: pratyalcyarrz upalabdhir iti pratyak~am ity upalabdhivise~aI_latµ I pratyak~axµ tadupa-
labdhiJ:i pratyala/ata upalabdhir ity arthal,i. I atha vii pratyak!iatµ pramiiI_lam upalabhir upa-
labhyate 'naya ity upalabdhii,i. I [WOG.697.21ff.].
On "generic apprehension" (upalabdhi), i, F 30; ii, F 177; Satriilarrzkiira, p. 155.
The object of the mental consciousness is defined by Yasomitra [WOG.698.lf.]: [upalabdhir]
dhartnayatanasya vedanadilak~aI_lasya yogivi~ayasya ca = the perception of the sense-sphere of
factors (dharmiiyatana) (that is to say, sensation [vedanii], etc.) and of things that the yogins
perceive. [Indeed, the mental consciousness of the yogins knows the thoughts and thought-cor.-
comitants of others, vii. 11].
But how can the mental faculty (manas) be apprehended by direct perception (pratyak~am)?
Indeed, the mental faculty (manas) that has just passed away is known by the mental con-
sciousness that immediately follows (i. 17) [LS: I have adjusted LVP's translation]: manasa_s
ca kixµ pratyak~am upalabdhil,i. I samanantaraniruddhaxµ hi mano 'nantarotpannena mano-
vijfianena vijfiayate [WOG.698.2f.].
There is a difficulty here. Some other masters (the Sautrantikas) think that thought is self-
aware or reflexively aware (svasarrzvedya): both the subject (griihaka) and the object (griihya)
Endnotes to Chapter Nine 2591
of the consciousness are directly perceived: raktaqi vii dvi~taqi vii sukhasaqiprayuktaqi vii
du}:lkhasaqiprayuktaqi vii [iv. 49] ity evamadi svasaqivedyatayii [pratyak~am] ity apare I tad
etad dvividhaxp pratyak~axp grahyagataxp griihakagataxp vii [WOG.698.3ff.].
14
LVP: mahar~ipra1,1idhijfianaparicchinnatviid asty eva cak~uriidikam indriyaqi cak~ur-
vijfianadikiira1,1aqi iti I sarve~iim aviviidiic ca [WOG.698.30f.].
See i. 9c (Vyiikhyli, p. 25), 44a. - On "cognition resulting from a resolve" (pra,:,idhijfllina),
vii. 37.
15
LS: 1. Having placed the treatise into its wider context and having distinguished his theory
of persons from that of the Tirthikas who maintain that the self is a substance (dravya) other
than the aggrega_tes, Vasubandhu now focuses on the Viitsiputriyas (i) who maintain that the
person is not other than the aggregates, which distinguishes them from the Tirthikas, but
(ii) who also maintain that the person is not the same as the aggregates, which distinguishes
them from Vasubandhu.
2. Before proceeding further, it might be helpful for the reader who is not familiar with the
tenets of the Pudgalaviida to first read Leonard C.D.C. Priestley's short article'(2005) on The
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy web-site: Pudgalaviida Buddhist Philosophy which is
available on-line: http://www.iep.utm.edu/p/pudgalav.htm.
The article begins by introducing the school of the Pudgalaviida and its history as follows:
The Pudgalaviida was a group of five of the Early Schools of Buddhism, distin-
guished from the other schools by their doctrine of the reality of the self. The group
consists of the Viitsiputriya, the original Pudgalaviidin School, and four others that
derived from it, the Dharmottariya, the Bhadrayii1,1iya, the Siimmifiya and the ~a1,1-
1,1agarika. Of these, only the Viitsiputriya and the Sammitiya' had a large following.
The Viitsiputliya evidently arose about two centuries after the death of the Buddha
(the Parinirvii1,1a). Since the date of the Buddha's death was probably in about 486
BCE or 368 BCE (according to which sources• one follows), the rise of the Viitsi-
putriya school would have been in the early third century or toward the middle of the
second century BCE. According to the Chinese monk Xuanzang (Hstian-tsang), who
traveled in India in the seventh century CE, the Siimmitiya was at that time by far the
largest of the Sriivakayiina schools (or Early Schools), equal in size to all of the other
schools combined; and as the monastic populations of the Sriivakayana and the
Mahayana were roughly the same, the Sammitiya represented about a quarter of the
entire Buddhist monastic populati~n of India. The Viitsiputliya and a branch of the
Siimmitiya survived in India at least until the tenth century, but since the Pudgala-
viidin schools never spread to any great extent beyond the subcontinent, when
Buddhism died out in India, the tradition of the Pudgalaviida came to an end. [ ... ]
The difficulties facing us in investigating the Pudgalaviida are considerable. There is
no living tradition of Pudgalaviida; there are no learned monks to whom we can tum
for interpretations handed down within that tradition. There are very few Pudgala-
viidin texts that have survived, only two of them with anything to say about the self,
and those only in Chinese translations of poor quality. Apart from these, we have
extensive quotations from their texts (but none, unfortunately, dealing with the self)
in an Indian Buddhist work which has survived only in Tibetan, some brief sum-
2592 Treatise of the Refutation of the Person (Pudgalaprati~edhaprakara,:ia)
maries of their doctrines in Tibetan and Chinese translations of Indian works on the
formation of the Sravakayiina schools, and finally criticisms of their doctrines in
works from other schools, some of these fortunately available in Pali or Sanskrit. The
evidence we have is thus quite limited; much of it surviving only in translation, and
some of it from hostile sources. Any interpretation of the Pudgalaviidin doctrine of
the self will necessarily be to a considerable extent a reconstruction, and should ac-
cordingly be regarded as a more or less plausible hypothesis rather than anything like
a definitive account.
Priestley briefly summarizes his article as follows:
It is difficult to reconstruct their understanding of the self.... But there is no doubt
that they affirmed the reality of the self or person, and that with scriptural authority
they held that the self of an enlightened one cannot be described as non-existent after
death, in "complete NirviiQa" (ParinirviiQa), even though the five "aggregates" which
are the basis of its identity have then passed away without any possibility of recur-
rence in a further life. [ ... ]
It seems, then, that they thought of some aspect or dimension of the self as transcend-
ing the aggregates and may have identified that aspect with NirviiQa, which like most
early Buddhists they regarded as an eternal reality. In its involvement with the aggre-
gates through successive lives, the self could be seen as characterized by incessant
change; but in its eternal aspect, it could be seen as having an identity_ that remains
constant through all its lives until it fulfils itself in the impersonal happiness of Pari-
nirviiQa. Although their account of the self seemed unorthodox and irrational to their
Buddhist opponents, the Pudgalaviidins evidently believed that only such an account
could do justice to the Buddha's moral teaching, to the accepted facts of karma, re-
birth and liberation, and to our actual experience of selves and persons.
The article itself discusses the following topics:
i. The problem of the self in Buddhism & the three advantages and two difficulties of
the non-Pudgalavadin schools.
ii. The Pudgiilavadin characterization of the self:
The self as inexplicable or indeterminate in its relation to the five aggregates.
The self as inexplicable or indeterminate in its relation to nirvii,:ia.
The self as constituting a fifth category of existence, i.e., the inexplicable, next
to (a) the phenomena of the five aggregates and of temporal existence in gen-
eral, i.e., the three categories of past phenomena, present phenomena and future
phenomena, and (b) NirviiQa, i.e., an eternal, uncaused reality, as the fourth cate-
gory.
The three ways of conceiving the self:
a. according to the basis [iisrayaprajiiaptapudgala], i.e., aggregates relied
upon in a particular life,
b. according to transition [salikramaprajiiaptapudgala], i.e., aggregates in
their transition between lives,
c. according to cessation [nirodhaprajiiaptapudgala], i.e., final passing away
of the aggregates at death after attaining enlightenment.
The three accounts in regard to whether the self is nominal/conceptual or ulti-
Endnotes to Chapter Nine 2593
mate:
a. conceptual but "true and ultimate" [see next endnote],
b. neither conceptual nor substantial,
c. substantial.
Theraviidins and Sarviistivadins: the two types of truth predicates: ultimate and con-
ventional.
Pudgalaviidins: the self and the three types of truth predicates:
a. ultimate truth fparamarthasatya], i.e., third noble truth;
b. characteristical truth [lak,ra~asatya], i.e., the first, second and fourth noble
truth;
c. practical truth [sal!lvrtisatya], i.e., distinguished forms of speech and behav-
ior inherited through local or family traditions or learned through monastic
training.
iii. Reconstruction of the Pudgalaviidin conception of the self & the analogy of fire and
its fuel.
iv. Pudgalaviidin arguments in support of their conception of the self: (a) appeals to
canonical texts (siitra); (b) arguments on the basis of consistency with acknowledged
fact.
The article ends with a helpful list of references for further reading on the subject.
3. As for the surviving literature of the Pudgalaviidins, Priestley comments (1999; PuB.43f.):
The Pudgalaviidins must have produced a large literature, including their own ver-
sion of the Tripitaka. They are said to have had an Abhidharma in nine parts. [ ... ]
As far as we know at present, only three works have survivfd more or less intact out
of the entire corpus of Pudgalaviidin literature. One of these is the Sarrimitfyanikiiya-
slistra (T 1649; [translator: unknown; date of translation: between 352'-431 CE or
earlier; author and date of composition: unknown]). The others are a general survey
of Buddhist doctrine, the Tridharmakha~rf,aka, surviving in two Chinese translations
(T 1506 [by Gautama Saiighadeva in 382 CE] and T 1505 [by Kumiirabuddhi in 391
CE]; [author of sutra: Vasubhadra; author of commentary: Saiighasena; date of com-
position for sutra and commentary: unknown]), and a work on the Vinaya called the
Vinayadvlivirrisativyakti (by Buddhatriita [date of composition: unknown]; T 1461
[translator: Paramiirtha in sixth century]). By its nature, the last of these has nothing
to offer on the subject of the person or self, and the other two versions of the Tri-
dharmakha~rf,aka deal with it only as one among many other matters to be explained;
but the Sarrimitfyanikiiyasiistra gives us a long discussion of various theories about
the self with an explanation of why the doctrine of the Siixpmitiyas is the right one.
For a more detailed description of the Pudgalaviidin Tripitaka and the Pudgalaviidin Treatises,
see Thich Thien Chau's The Literature of the Personalists of Early Buddhism ([French: 1977)
1999), pp. 19-122, as well as his article "The Literature of the Pudgalaviidins". In this article,
Thich Thien Chau comments that the above mentioned texts reveal "three fundamental topics:
the pudgala, the fifteen s\!condary theses, and the two Pudgalaviidin lists of sriivakas". The
fifteen secondary theses are the following (p. 12):
1. There exists an indestructible entity (avipra~asa).
2594 Treatise of the Refutation of the Person (Pudgalaprati~edhaprakarar,ia)
the Sarviistiviidins and of Vasubandhu (excerpted from her Disputed Dharmas. Early Bud-
dhist Theories on Existence). See also Vasubandhu's discussion of relative and absolute truth
at vi. 4.
2. Priestley explains that the Buddhist schools other than the Pudgalavii.dins identified what
is ultimately true with what is determinate, with factors (dharma) that are simply themselves
and different from other factors, and thus made logical consistency the fundamental criterion
for reality. In this way, whatever is more than itself or other thari itself is not in the strict sense
self-identical (PuB.21 lff.):
For the other schools, that the self, whether simple or not, was neither the same as
the aggregates nor different from them showed clearly that it was unreal. It was not
simply that it was dependent; all of the created dharmas, which most of these schools
held to be real, were likewise dependent on their causes and conditions. That a
dharma depended on something else would not have to imply any lack of integrity; it
was what. it was, absolutely distinct from its cause and conditions. But something
indeterminate in its relation to other things could not be simply what it was, since it
was not wholly different from what it depended on. And something not simply and
purely itself was surely unteal. [ ... ]
Entities such as the pudgala, which they take to be simply conceptual groupings of
real dharmas, are indeterminate in relation to their constituents precisely because
they are the constituents themselves (they are not something different from their
constituents) taken not individually but collectively (they are not exactly the same as
their constituents). There is never anything but the dharmas in reality, but we create
the appearance of further entities by grouping them in various ways. The indetermi-
nacy of such conceptual entities, the fact that in this limited sense* they are not
amenable to logic, is the mark of their unreality.
* It "is" a limited sense, for although groups are indeterminate in relation to their own mem-
bers, they are not indeterminate in relation to most other groups and "their" members. In
this way they are not only amenable to logic; they are the very stuff of logical discourse.
What are these groups, after all, but sets?
Put differently, Vasubaridhu claims (see IBTP.49f.) that everything that exists is either (1) a
real entity separate from other real entities, or (2) a provisional entity which can be entirely re-
duced in existence to real separate entities. The Pudgii.lavii.dins reject the Vaibhii.~ikas' view
that we do not exist at all if an entity is not part of these two categories, and they add to these
two categories a third ontological category, which is neither the one or the other: (3) entities
without being separate real entities or identities. They claim that this third category of enti-
ties exists ultimately. The primary ontological dispute concerning the existence thesis of the
Pudgalavii.dins concerns, therefore, the nature of existence.
3. See our Section 2.1 also in relation to Vasubandhu's Section 2.1.1 on the "inexplicable"
as well as in ·relation to Section 2.2 where Vasubandhu briefly discusses the Pudgalavii.din's
fivefold classification of "objects to be known". In our endnotes to these two sections we will
also briefly address the Pudgalavii.din doctrines of the three conceptions and the three truths,
which are not discussed-at least not explicitly-by Vasubandhu.
17
LS: The term pudgala is used by Vasubandhu in three different contexts (IBTP.113). It
2598 Treatise of the Refutation of the Person (Pudgalaprati~edhaprakarm;ia)
can refer either (1) to a person that is considered by the Pudgalaviidins to exist without being a
separate identity, or (2) to a self (atman) that is considered by the Tirthikas to exist with a
separate identity, or (3) to a person that Vasubandhu considers to exist as a provisional desig-
nation.
18
LVP: Viitsiputrlyii Aryas iiµmatiyiil_i I anena vitathiitmadr~tinivi~tatvalak~a~o hetur an-
aikiintika iti darsayati I na hi viitsiputrly~iiip. mok~o ne~yate bauddhatviit I atha vii prakpak~a-
virodhal_i I siipak~filo 'yaip. pak~o nasty iitmii ity anena darsayati [WOG.699.3ff.].
It must be one of two things. - The Viitsiputrlyas believe in a certain kind of real self: now,
they are Buddhists, and one cannot deny that they attain liberation: therefore, the author has
been wrong in saying that a false view of self (vitathiitmadr~ti) creates an obstacle to libera-
tion. Or else, the thesis which denies the self is false.
On the inexplicability (avaktavyatii) of the person (pudgala), see, for example, Madhyamaka-
vrtti, 283.
19
LVP: riipiidivad bhiiviintararµ ced dravyatafi I k~friidivat samudiiyas cet prajiiaptitafi I [see
WOG.699.9ff.].
Color, sound, etc., are distinct things (bhinnalak~ai:ia); milk, house, army are complexes of
color-taste-odor-tangible, of straw-wood, of elephants-horses-chariots, and not separate things
(bhiiviintara): milk is nothing other than color, etc.
Compare Satriilarµkiira, xviii. 92: prajiiaptyastitayii viicyafi pudgalo dravyato na tu.
20
L VP: Yasomitra cites the stanza of Dharmakirti:
var~iitapiibhyiirµ kirµ vyomnas carma~y asti tayofi phalam I
carmopamas cet so 'nityafi khatulyas ced asatphalafi I
Sarvadarsana, p. 10 (1858); Nyiiyaviirttika, ii. 1, 5, Tiitparya, 164; in Slokaviirttika: khatulyas
ced asatsamafi; Nai~karmyasiddhi, ii. 60, etc.
If the person (pudgala) is unconditioned (asarµskrta), eternal, unmodifiable, it is like space, it
is as though it were non-existent. Only that which is "capable of performing a function"
(arthakriyii) and which is momentary (yat sat tat k~a~ikam) exists: a Sautriintika thesis; for the
Vaibhii~ikas, unconditioned phenomena (asarµskrta) (i.e., space and the two cessations, i. 5c)
exist.
21
LS: 1. As for our passage, Pradhan.461.20-22 has:
naiva hi dravyato. 'sti niipi prajiiaptitafi I kirµ tarhi Iiidhyiitmikiinupiittiinvartamiiniin
skandhiinupiidiiya pudgalafi prajiiapyate I
L VP translates this important section: "Je dis que le Pudgala est; je ne dis pa qu 'ii soit une
entite; je ne dis pas qu'il existe seulement en tant que designation des elements (skandha):
pour moi la designation 'Pudgala' a lieu par rapport aux elements (skandhiin upiidiiya) actuels,
intemes, assumes."
Duerlinger translates this section (IBTP.73): "[But the Pudgalaviidins assert that] a person is
not substantially real or real by way of a conception, since he is conceived in reliance upon
aggregates that pertain to himself, are acquired, and exist in the present."
Kapstein translates (RT.351): "But it is neither substantial nor conceptually constructed. -
What then? - Depending upon the bundles (skandha) which are inwardly held now, the person
Endnotes to Chapter Nine 2599
is conceptually constructed."
2. Three accounts of the person: Priestley, in his web-article, writes:
We might expect that the Pudgalaviidins, who held that the self is real, would [in
contrast to the other schools who understood the self to be a merely conceptual entity
in the sense that it was simply the diverse phenomena of the five aggregates com-
prehended for convenience under a single term such as "self'' or "person"] insist that
the self is not merely conceptual or nominal, but substantial. [i] But in fact they
seem to have regarded the self, at least initially, as conceptual, though "true and ulti-
mate". [ii] A later source represents them as maintaining that it is neither conceptual
nor substantial, and [iii] still later sources, ascribe the view to them that the self is
indeed substantial. The difference in these accounts may be the result of confusion in
our sources, but it is certainly possible that the Pudgalaviidins gradually modified
their position under the pressure of criticism from other schools.
As for the first account, in the SiiTJ1mitfyanikiiyasiistra and the Tridharmakhai:ufaka, the earlier
Pudgalaviidins claim that the pudgala is both (1) "true and ultimate" and yet (2) concep-
tual; Dhammajoti writes that, in the Pudgala-skandhaka, the second chapter of the Vijfiiina-
kiiyasiistra, the Pudgalaviidins (Viitsiputrlya and Siimmifiya) confirm a question whether
the pudgala is apprehended "as something true and ultimate" (saccikat{haparamatthena; cf.
sacikat(ha-parama,rhena puggalo upalabbhati in Kathiivatthu) (SA.IV.91f.):
In the true and absolute sense the pudgala is perceivable (upalabhyate), realizable
(siik~iitkriyate), exists (m1if; Sllf!l,Vidyatelvidyamiinaldrsyate?) and is well observed
(~1,r; sa'!ldrsyate?). Hence there is definitely the pudgala.
Priestley's second account, maintaining that the person is neither conceptual nor substantial,
refers to our present Section 2.1.1 of the Abhidharmakosabhii~ya (see the different translatrons
of this section above),
As for the third account, Priestley (PuB.87) states that the Mahiiyiinasutriilankiira (92) and
later works, i.e., the Madhyamakahrdaya (3.92), the Madhyamakiivatara (6.146), the Cheng
weishl lun (T 1585, lc16ff.) and the TattvasaTJ1grahapafijikii (on TS 349; DS ed. 165.14ff.)
ascribe to the Pudgalaviidins the view that the pudgala is indeed substantial (dravya). This
"suggests that they may have abandoned the attempt to establish a third ontological category
besides the substantial and 'the conceptual, and tried instead to expand the notion of the sub-
stantial to include an entity whose relationships were indeterminate" (PuB.100).
Priestley comments (PuB.101):
What remains constant throughout the various accounts of the Pudgalaviidin's doc-
trines is their insistence that the pudgala or self is "true and ultimate", and its rela-
tion to the five aggregates is indeterminate. When confronted with the question of
whether it is conceptual or substantial, they waver ....
Priestley then_ proceeds to give an initial interpretation of the pudgala, which he withdraws
later:
They maintain that it is "true and ultimate" in the special sense that its existence and
functions are not reducible to those of its constituents; its relation to the five aggre-
gates is indeterminate because, although it is not reducible to them, neither is it
2600 Treatise of the Refutation of the Person (Pudgalaprati~edhaprakara1J,a)
independent of them. The pudgala or self of each individual is thus single, a unity
formed by a particular combination of the five aggregates and persisting through
all the changes of its impermanent constituents: it is the author of its own deeds and
continues as the enjoyer of their results.
In his "Recapitulation" chapter, he comments (PuB.198):
Our initial interpretation, that the pudgala is simply the five aggregates taken to-
gether as a conceptual whole which, as a whole, is not strictly reducible to the aggre-
gates of which it consists, was based [cf. PuB.80-101] on a few passages in one of
our Pudgalavadin sources, the Siirrimitfyanikiiyasiistra, and in Harivarman's Tattva-
siddhi. We were also influenced by the explanation of the nature of the pudgala
which the Pudgalavadin is represented as giving in Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakosa-
bhii~ya, although he denies that the pudgala is either conceptual or substantial.
But he retracts this interpretation due to certain problems that he thinks arise from it (in
particular in relation to pudgala in Parinirva:r;ia; see Section 2.2) and replaces it with a new
interpretation-where the pudgala "is supported by its aggregates but does not consist of
them"-that is "an attempt to explain the doctrine of the pudgala in a way that would be con-
sistent with [the account of the pudgala in Parinirvai:ia] and also, of course, with the evidence
upon which our initial interpretation was based" (PuB.200).
For the twists and turns of his discussion, see his chapters "The Reality of the Pudgala",
"Truths" and "Pudgala as Conceptual", "Misgivings", "Concepts", "The Pudgala as Image"
and "The Pudgala as Fire", which he summarizes in his "Recapitulation" chapter (pp. 187-
207).
3. As for Duerlinger, he states (IBTP.133) that the denial that we are a real entity or a pro-
visional designation is a variant of the Pudgalavadins' inexplicability (avaktavya) thesis, name-
ly, that the person is neither the same as nor other than the aggregates in reliance upon which it
is conceived and named.
Having denied that the person is either a real entity (dravya) or provisional designation (pra-
jnapti), the Vatsiputriyas need to explain now in what sense they still think that the person is
"ultimate and real" and what marks it off from a dravya and prajiiapti as understood by the
Vaibh~ikas and Vasubandhu, whence their claim that persons are ultimately existent entities
without separate identities (IBTP.20) and the aggregate-reliant identity thesis.
4. L VP does not explain his translation "we do not say that it exists only as a provisional
designation of the aggregates" versus "we do not say that it exists as ... ", but Duerlinger points
out (IBTP.20f.) that the Pudgalaviidins do not deny that persons are conventional realities
when they say that they are neither a real entity nor a provisional designation, since they have
a more expanded understanding of conventional realities than Vasubandhu:
The reason for their denial is that they believe that conventional realities may be
either substantially established or inexplicable, and that persons are of the second
kind. What is inexplicable, therefore, is basically what ultimately exists without
being a substantial reality or a substantially established reality. Since substantial
realities and substantially established realities exhaust the entities that possess sepa-
rate identities, it is clear that ultimately existent inexplicable phenomena are enti-
ties without separate identities .... So inexplicable persons are conventional reali-
Endnotes to Chapter Nine 2601
ties insofar as they are conceived in dependence upon collections of aggregates, but
ultimately exist insofar as they exist apart from being con9eived, as entities without
separate identities. We do exist by ourselves, in other words, bi.It insofar as we do,
we cannot be conceived. Because we are inexplicable phenomena we cannot be con-
ceived apart from the aggregates we are said to acquire.
5. Similarities and differences in the views of the Pudgalaviidins and the Nyiiya-Vaise#kas in
regard to the person as a whole in relation to the aggregates: Duerlinger considers (IBTP.33)
it likely that, from a conventional point of view, both the Pudgalavadins and Vasubandhu
thought the object of the conception of a person to be a whole of parts conceived in depen-
dence upon collections of aggregates, b~t that the Pudgalavadins, in contrast to Vasubandhu,
did not think.that this whole is the same/in existence as its parts. According to them, the person
as a whole includes an underlying support (iisraya) for the mental states and aggregates that
cannot be reduced in existence to the aggregates. Duerlinger thinks this to be an idea borrowed
from the Nyaya-Vaise~ikas, although the Pudgalavadins naturally do not consider the person
to be a separate substance as do the Nyiiya-Vaise~ikas, but an entity that lacks separate identi-
ty; also for the Pudgalavadins, the phenomena for which the person is an underlying support
are aggregates (skandha) and not attributes (gu~) as with the Nyaya-Vaise~ikas.
To clarify this view, Duerlinger writes (IBTP.135) that, under the condition that the necessary
changes having been made, "we are present when our aggregates are present similar to the
way in which the Nyaya-Vaise~ikas say that a substance (dravya) is present when its attributes
(gu~) are present, as their 'underlying support' (iisraya). [... ] The underlying support, in both
cases, is that which performs the functions (1) of providing a common subject in which all of
the supported phenomena inhere and (2) of persisting through the momentary coming to be
and passing away of the phenomena that inhere in it. The perception of ourselves, the Pudgala-
vadins believe, is the perception of an inexplicable underlying support for our aggregates.
Since we lack a character by ourselves that can be discriminatc.d when we are perceived, we
must be conceived in reliance upon aggregates for which we are the underl)'.ing support." Thus
for the Pudgalavadins, Vasubandhu's two/realities objection does not show that persons do not
ultimately exist since they consider persons to be ultimately existing inexplicable underlying
supports that are neither real entities nor provisional entities.
6. The classification of the different views ofVasubandhu, the Pudgalaviidins, Candrakfrti
and others in regard to the conception of a person:
In regard to the different Buddhist and non-Buddhist theories of person, Duerlinger states
(IBTP.35f.):
A classification of Indian theories of persons may be formed on the basis of the dif-
ferent theses assumed to be true by Indian philosophers concerning our modes of
existence and/or identity and how we are related to the collections of aggregates in
dependence upon which we are conceived. The two basic kinds of theories are
1-. the no ultimate existence theory, which is held by Candrakirti, and
2. the ultimate existence theory, which is held not only by Vasubandhu and
the Pudgalaviidins, but also by the Tirthikas:
Vasubandhu's theory we may call the substantially established reality
version of the ultimate existence theory of persons, since in it the
2602 Treatise of the Refutation of the Person (Pudgalaprati:jedhaprakaraFJ,a)
extinguishing of a lamp. [The views which] grasp extremes are the same, inasmuch
as they are [of the nature of] suffering and without an objective basis.
Conception (or designation) according to approach is designation on the basis of
past aggregates, elements and spheres, as "I was called King Kusa", and likewise of
future [aggregates and so on]. Conception (or designation) according to cessation is
explained as designation according to appropriations and so on which have ceased:
"The Fortunate One has attained Parinirvar,ia."
As it is conceived (or designated) according to approach, the living being is not cut
off. With conception (or designation) according to cessation, the permanence of the
living being is precluded. With conception (or designation) according to appropria-
tion, the existence and non-existence of the living being are precluded.
Priestley then assesses the two versions of the Tridharmakhar:ujaka and comments (PuB .60)
that the definition of the first conception of the longer version, namely, "by appropriating as a
living being the aggregates, elements and spheres which are present and appropriated as
internal", is very similar to the explanation which the Viitsiputriya is represented as giving in
our passage here in the AKB. Duerlinger adds (IBTP.139) that the difference between the two
versions of the Tridharmakha,:i<J.aka and the AKB is that the first is written from the point
of view of marking the differences between the three conceptions, whereas in the AKB the
Viitsiputr"iyas attempt to "explain why persons are neither substantial realities nor substantially
established realities" or Vasubandhu attempts to "show that persons, as conventionally real
phenomena, cannot be inexplicable". In the Siirµmitfyanikiiyasiistra, the pudgala is explained
(T 1649, 466a28; PuB.63) as follows:
How is the person explained as existing?
The Buddha said that there are three kinds of person.
What are the three kinds of person?
a. The person conceived (or designated) according to the basis (Ch.: yi);
b. the person conceived (or designated) according to transition (Ch.: du);
c. the person conceived (or designated) according to cessation (Ch.: mie).
a. What is the person conceived (or designated) according to the basis?
As the Buddha explained when he spoke to Papaya, "Whatever the formations [i.e.,
created dharmasJ on whose basis it is expressed, from those its name is established."
This is called conception (or designation) according to the basis, as in the example of
the fire. And the Buddha said to Sariputra, "A person is called Niiga who is fair, pure
and attractive; what is formed by the four material elements is called the self', and so
on. It is also as in the example of milk. Thus on the basis of what is said in the sutras,
this is called conception (or designation) according to the basis. [ ...... ]
b. What is the person conceived (or designated) according to transition?
At the time when it is passing over to another existence, it i~ described by the
Buddha as "a being in transition". [ ...... ]
c. What is the person conceived (or designated) according to cessation?
Apart from the person conceived (or designated) according to the basis and the per-
son conceived (or designated) according to transition, the Buddha spoke of the per-
Endnotes to Chapter Nine 2605
son conceived (or designated) according to cessation, as "when the former body is
broken up"; this is called conception (or designation) according to cessation. And as
the Buddha said, "The five aggregates of a monk in whom the influxes (iisrava) are
extinct will cease through their impermanence." This is called conception (or de-
signation) according to cessation. And as the Buddha said, "None of the wise can
fathom those who have attained the unshakeable happiness." This is called concep-
tion (or designation) according to cessation. [...... ]
Priestley assesses this presentation again and makes comparisons with the two versions of the
Tridharmakhar_lf/,aka, noticing many similarities and differences between the detailed presenta-
tions of the three texts (see PuB.66-77). As for the SiilJ'lmitfyanikiiyasiistra,' he comments
(PuB.70) that the three kinds of conception "sum up three fundamental facts with which
Buddhism is concerned: [i] our existence, [ii] our perennial journey through the suffering of
Sarµsiira, and [iii] our eventual release in Parinirval).a". He also comments briefly that in
the first conception of the Siif!lmitfyanikiiyasiistra the examples of fire and milk occur as in
the AKB (see Sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3), but that the presentatic:;m is different, i.e., Vasubandhu
uses the example of milk, whereas the Vatsiputriyas are represented as using only the example
of fire.
3. In the context of the AKB, it is interesting to note that Vasubandhu focuses here only on
refuting the first conception of the person, at least he does not discuss the three concep-
tions sequentially as in the other three texts. As already mentioned above, Duerlinger thinks
(IBTP.139 and 141) that this is so because in the AKB the intention of the Viitsiputriyas is to
"explain why persons are neither substantial realities nor _substantially established realities
while the account in the Tridharmaka Siistra is not" or because "Vasubandhu's concern is to
show that persons, as conventionally real phenomena, cannot be inexplicable".
On the other hand, the second conception of the person seems to be addressed in Section 3.3,
3.4 and 3.4.2. But Vasubandhu also addresses it, at least indirectly, in chapter 3, Section BB:
The nature of the manner of reincarnation: dependent origination (pratftyasamutpiida) & the
refutation of the doctrine of self(iitman) as substrate of reincarnation (cf. verses 18-19). See
also Vasubandhu' s discussion of the four modes of birth (yoni) at iii. Sc-17, in particular
iii. 10, where he discusses the nature of intermediate beings.
As for the third conception of the person, Vasubandhu discusses in Section 3.5.2 (ix, F 269)
whether or not the Tathiigata exists after death. See also Vasubandhu's insert on the fourteen
indeterminate points (avyiikrtavastu) at v, ,F 43-48. As for the nirviil)a without remainder
(nirupadhiseia), it is only briefly alluded to at vi, F 211 and 279. In this regard Thlch Thien
Chau comments (LPEB.180, 185f.):
It is certain that the scholars of the Pudgalavadin school were monks well versed in
the teaching of the Buddha, particularly the doctrine of the insubstantiality of the self
(aniitmaviida). All the same, they were troubled by questions concerning the Tathii-
gata after death or Parinirviil).a. Is there a person who attains Nirviil).a without a
remainder (nirupadhiseianirvii,:ia) after the total disappearance of the aggregates?
After death, does the Tathiigata accede to eternity without happiness or does he enjoy
the bliss of Parinirviil).a?
In admitting the pudgala-designated-byccessation, they tried to explain the continuity
2606 Treatise of the Refutation of the Person (Pudgalaprati~edhaprakara,:ia)
of the person, even after the Parinirvai:ia of an Arhat or the Tathii.gata. In other words,
the Pudgalavii.dins, by establishing the designation of cessation (nirodhaprajfiapti),
wished to denounce the wrong interpretation of the Buddha's teaching on the pro-
blem of what happens after the death of an Arhat or the Tathii.gata. [... ]
[T]he Pudgalavii.dins wished to demonstrate that the pudgala-designated-by-cessation
was the pre-eminent person who, having reached the end of his last existence, attains
Nirvai:ia without a remainder or Parinirvai:ia and abides there in bliss.
Obviously, what is admitted by the Pudgalavii.dins with regard to the problem of
existence after the death of an Arhat or Tathii.gata, despite the designation (pra-
jfiapti), constitutes a new and remarkable doctrinal notion with regard to the unex-
plained domain in the teaching of the Buddha.
See below (Section 2.2) our comments on the relationship between nirvar:ia and pudgala.
4. When considering the three conceptions together, certain tensions become visible, ten-
sions that do not seem to be addressed by Vasubandhu when presenting the Pudgalavadins
doctrine, for example: What is the relationship between the three conceptions of the pudgala?
What is the relationship between the "conception" of the pudgala and the pudgala itself? What
is the relationship between the three conceptions of the pudgala and the analogy of fire? What
is the relationship between the pudgala that exists in reliance upon aggregates and the pudgala
mPa.inirvai:ia that can no longer be identified on the basis of any existing aggregates? There
also was the difficulty (PuB.190) that "the person conceived according to the basis would be
quite simply non-existent in Parinirvai:ia, without the aggregates on the basis of which it was
conceived, whereas the Pudgalavii.dins held, in accordance with the sutras, that the person in
Parinirvai:ia cannot be said either to exist or not to exist".
5. In regard to LVP's endnote above: "For the Vii.tsiputriyas, as for Vasubandhu, the aggre-
gates of the past and the future do not exist", notice that LVP also states in a footnote to its
discussion in i. 20ab that the Vaibhii.~ikas believe that the aggregates (skandha), sense-spheres
(ayatana) and elements (dhatu) are real entities (dravya), that the Sautrii.ntikas hold that the
elements are real entities, but that the aggregates and sense-spheres are only provisional enti-
ties, and that Vasubandhu holds that the aggregates are provisional entities whereas the sense-
spheres and elements are real entities.
Notice also that Dhammajoti suspects (private communication) that L VP-and Priestley
(PuB.108, 131) agrees with LVP-must have misunderstood our passage in the AKB to make
him state that for the Vii.tsiputriyas past and future aggregates do not exist. Dhammajoti
(SA.IV.60; SD.202f., 207)-as also Duerlinger (IBTP.163)-points to the Vatsiputriyas' five-
fold categories that include past, present and future dharmas (see Section 2.2) and to the ;riew
of the compilers of the. MVS (T27, 8b) who state that the Vii.tsiputriyas are doctrinally mainly
the same as the Vaibhii.~ikas, differing only in a few points. He also refers to Sruµghabh.adra
(cf. Ny, 630c--63la) as stating that the Pudgalavii.dins accept the reality of the pudgala in addi-
tion to that of the dharmas in the three times and as stating (Ny, 599b): "But the Vii.tsiputriyas
believe that the past and the future exist...", and adds (private communication) thaf Vasumitra's
Samayabhedoparaca,:,a-cakra enumerates doctrinal points of the Vii.tsiputriyas, which differ
from the Vaibhii.1?ikas, but that sarviistitva is not one of them.
Specifically, in regard to our passage "vartamiiniin skandhan", Dhammajoti does not see any
Endnotes to Chapter Nine 2607
indication that the Viitsiputriyas regard only the vartamiina (present) skandhas alone as real. It
only underscores their doctrine that the pudgala neither exists nor does not exist "as a dravya",
but is a dynamic reality that can only be designated (prajiiapyate) on the basis of the presently
experienced skandhas. It is, in particular, not a dravya like the dhanna& of the three times or
the asa,µskrtas: It is not a dhanna that subsists throughout the three times. For this reason, it
constitutes a unique category distinct from the three-times dharmas and the asa,µskrtas.
24
LS: 1. Duerlinger comments (IBTP.41) that "central to Vasubandhu's philosophical
critique of the Pudgalaviidins' theory of persons is the .principle that the object of a concep-
tion must be the same in existence as its causal basis. According to this principle, which I
(Duerlinger) shall call the causal reference principle, the object of the conception of ourselves
must be the same in existence as the collections of aggregates in dependence upon which we
are conceived."
The Pudgalaviidins, on the other hand, implicitly deny the truth of the causal reference prin-
ciple through accepting the aggregate-reliant identity thesis (IBTP.135), "which is that we
conceive ourselves in reliance upon collections of aggregates", and which is marked off from
Vasubandhu's aggregate-dependence thesis. In the first thesis, the person does ultimately exist
without being the same in existence as a collection of aggregates, and in the second thesis, he
ultimately exists because he is the same in existence as a collection of aggregates.
2. In the next Section 2.1.3, the Pudgalaviidins try to support the truth of their aggregate-
reliant identity thesis through the fire and fuel reply and in this way they try to undermine
Vasubandhu's causal reference principle. From their point of view, persons as aggregate-
reliant identities are inexplicable conventional realities in the way fire is. Provisional entities
as aggregate-dependent identities, on the other hand, are conventional entities in the way
milk is. Duerlinger thus thinks that the Pudgalaviidins' claim that "persons are conceived 'in
reliance upon' (as opposed to 'in dependence upon') aggregates" is based on the denial that we
are conventional realities of the sort milk is, and he states: "This means, in the end, that our
being conceived in reliance upon collections of aggregates implies that, although we are con-
ceived in dependence upon them, we do not exist in dependence upon them."
25
LVP: skandhiin upiidiiya, Madhyamakavrtti, 436.
26
LS: Pradhan.461.22 has: skandhiinarri lak:jyate.
27
LS: l. Priestley points out that the analogy with fire plays an important part within the
doctrine of the Pudgalaviidins. It is discussed in detail in the Abhidharmakosabhiifya and in
Harivannan's Tattvasiddhi, but it is also found in less detail in Asailga's Mahiiylinasatra-
alankiira (18.95) and in the Sii,µmitfyanikiiyasiistra, Tridharmakha,;r;iaka and Sa,µskrtlisa,µ-
skrtaviniscaya.
As for fire itself, Priestley comments (PuB.168):
The charater of fire as something persistent, mobile and supremely fluid, showing
none of the discontinuity by which it might be analyzed into momentary elements,
publicly observable, though not as a separate, isolated dhanna, not reducible to its
fuel and yet impossible to identify without it, and associated moreover with warmth,
vitality and the light of consciousness, such a character might well seem to approxi-
mate the more intimate and mysterious character of the self.
But even 'though Priestley, as well as Duerlinger (IBTP.142), point out that the analogy of fire
2608 Treatise of the Refutation of the Person (Pudgalaprati~edhaprakara,:ia)
does not need to imply that the conception of the person in reliance upon the aggregates is in
all respects the same as the world's conception of fire in reliance upon fuel, Priestley "pushes"
the analogy as far as possible. In the context of the three conceptions of the pudgala (PuB .197)
he continues:
Fire, as traditionally conceived, is after all the best analogy to convey the unique
nature of the indeterminate self.
[1. basis:] As the individual fire is identified by its fuel, so the pudgala is identified
by its particular body, feelings, perception, mental forces and consciousness.
[2. transition:] As the fire continues, always changing and yet always the same fire,
passing from one kind of fuel to another, so the person continues a~ the same sentient
being through all the alterations of personal existence, life after life.
[3. cessation:] As the fire is eventually extinguished when the last of its fuel has been
consumed, so the person att\lins cessation with the final vanishing of the aggregates.
And as the fire is really the one fire, whether burning or extinct, so the person is the
same ultimate reality, whether wandering through Sarµsiira or finally passed away
into Parinirviil).a. The fire that is extinct and the person in Parinirviil}.a are alike
beyond all categories of discourse; they are "deep, immeasurable, unfathomable as
the great ocean".
On the details, and twists and turns, of Priestley's interpretation of pudgala and fire-mostly
based on the Buddhist, but also influenced by texts of the Brahmanical tradition-see
PuB.165-85 and 197-207.-
28 LVP: yathendhanam upiidiiyiignif:i prajiiapyata iti dravyasan pudgalal}. I niinyo niinanya iti
svam upiidiinam upiidiiya prajfiapyamanatviit I yo hi bhiivo niinyo niinanya iti svam upiidiinam
upiidiiya prajiiapyamiinal}. sa dravyasaqis tathiignir iti viitsiputriylibhipriiyal}. I [WOG.700.3ff.].
29
LS: Here I follow the wording of Duerlinger's translation which fits better with the fol-
lowing two arguments.
30
LVP: apradfptar,i kii~!hiidikam indhanam ... [WQG.700.9]. - The Vyiikhyii attributes this
paragraph to the author, not to the Viitsiputriyas.
LS: L VP ascribes this paragraph to the Viitsiputriyas, but Duerlinger writes (IBTP.114f.):
"Following Yasomitra and Fa-bau, rather than Pii-guang, who attributes what is expressed in
this and the next two sentences to the Pudgalaviidins, I attribute it to Vasubandhµ, who is
giving reasons why the Pudgalaviidins cannot identify fuel and fire with what he himself takes
to be the conventional realities commonly called.fuel and fire. Stcherbatsky and La Vallee
Poussin follow Pu-guang's interpretation. The Pudgalaviidins do not subscribe to the views
that are presented in these sentences, that fire and fuel are made up of the eight elements and
exist at different times."
31
VIP: For certain commentators idhyate and dahyate are equivalents.
32
LVP: a~{adravyaka (ii. 22): the four fundamental material element~ (mahiibhuta) and the
four derivative material elements (upiidiiyarapa), from visible fofill (rapa) to the tangible.
33 LS: Thus far, the Pudgalavadins were trying to support their fire and fuel reply that was
ge'ared toward undermining Vasubandhu's objection from the causal reference principle to
their aggregate-reliant identity thesis, by relying on the conventional definitions of fire and
1
Endnotes to Chapter Nine 2609
fuel. Now they put forward their own definition of fire and fuel.
34
LVP: tatraiva kii~fhiidau pradfpta iti tadubhayalak~ai:ie samudiiye [WOG.700.20f.]. -The
burning thing (pradfpta) is a complex; it is; at the same time, what bums it (i.e., fire) and what
is burned (indhana): indeed, that which is composed of four fundamental material elements
(note above); that [element] which is "heat", is here the fire.
35
LVP: Earth and water are different, for their characteristics (lak~ar,za) differ; the same will
hold for what burns and what is burned.
36
LVP: upiidiiyiirthas tu vaktavya iti I ananyatviid ity abhipriiyiil,l [WOG.700.24]. - One
needs to give the expression "in reliance upon" (upiidtiya) an explanation that justifies the
thesis that fire and fuel are not different.
37
LVP: na hi tat (indhana'!I) tasya (agneM kiirar,zam Iniipi tatprajfiapteJ:i [see WOG.700.24).
Fuel= three fundamental material elements (mahiibhata); fire, the characteristic of heat (u~ma-
la~ar,za) = the fourth fundamental material element. They arise at the same time like the two
horns [of an ox].
38
LVP: One should understand: "in reliance upon fuel" (indhana'!I upiidiiya) = "based on
fuel" (indhana'!I iisritya): fire is based on fuel. Or else, the meaning is that of co-existence
(sahabhiiva), or co~arising (sahotpiida).
39
LVP: Paramiirtha: If one says, "that which is hot in its nature, [the fire,] is called hot. The
object in question, [fuel], although different from fire, which is hot in its nature, becomes hot
through its association with that which is hot in its nature", we conclude that it is not incorrect
to say that fire and fuel differ.
40
LS:'Vasubandhu concludes Section 2.1 by claiming that the Viitsiputriyas' attempt to
back-up their inexplicability thesis and aggregate-reliant identity thesis by the fire and fuel
analogy has not been successful.
41
LVP: paficavidha'!ljfieyam [WOG.701.3]. - See below F 243 (note). - See Siil!lmitfya-
nikiiyasiistra.
LS: 1. The target of Vasubandhu's objection here is not the Pudgalaviidins' claim that persons
are a fifth category, but their thesis that persons are inexplicable phenomena (IBTP.164).
2. Thesis IV of the Tridharmaka Siistra (see its explanation: T 1505, 4c20-25; LPEB.91f.)
runs as follows:
There are five things subject to being known, the first three of which are com-
pounded things (sa'!lskrta); the follrth, the pudgala, which is neither identicaJ to nor
different from compounded things; and the fifth, Nirvai:ia, which is devoid of causes
and conditions (ahetupratyaya).
3. Duerlinger thinks (BTP.164f.) that there is "an ambiguity in the idea of a fifth kind of
object known to exist. If the criterion of difference in kind is otherness, the Pudgalaviidins can
say that we are not a fifth kind of object known to exist, since we are not other than the three
kinds of causally conditioned phenomena.... But if the criterion of difference in kind is
separate ultimate existence, they can say that we are a fifth kind of object known to exist, since
we are ultimately existent without being other than either causally conditioned phenomena or
being causally unconditioned phenomena."
2610 Treatise of the Refutation of the Person (Pudgalaprati~edhaprakararia)
Priestley, on the other hand-after recapitulating the progression of his research at the end of
his book (PuB.194-198)---comments as follows:
We are now in a position to form a reasonable picture of the Pudgalavii.din doctrine
of the self. The self of pudgala forms a unique category of being, situated between
the three categories of created dharmas (past, present and future) and the category
of the uncreated, which is Nirviit;ta. It is supported by tkc~eated, and therefore
impermanent, dharmas of the five aggregates, as fire is supported by its fuel. Since it
is supported by impermanent dharmas, it cannot be said to be permanent; when the
series of dharmas which supported it has come to an end with Parinirvii.i;ia, it is no
longer existent. On the other hand, it does not share in the impermanence of its
supporting dharmas, for it continues through life after life, and even in Parinirvii.i;ia
cannot be said to be non-existent. It is thus not the same as the five aggregates, since
it continues as they arise and pass away, nor is it separate from them, since its exis-
tence is not independent of tbem.
Its nature can be conveyed, if only approximately, through the analogy of fire, pro-
vided that fire is thought of as something which is manifested wherever a fire is
kindled, but which continues to exist even when all of its manifestations have passed
away. Similarly, the self or pudgala is the manifestation of something which appears
wherever there is a system of the five aggregates, and which continues to exist,
though unmanifest in this world, when the five aggregates have come to final extinc-
tion. What is manifested as the self or pudgala is evidently the uncreated dharma,
Nirvii.i;ia. [ ... ]
The Buddha~s teaching of non-self is to be understood as a rejection of any view of
the self which ascribes to it the determinacy of a dharma. To identify the self with
any of the aggregates is an error, and so also, to imagine it to be something distinct
and independent of the aggregates. The denial that there is any self at all is likewise
erroneous. To see the self rightly is to see it as indeterminate, as indescribable either
as the same as the aggregates or as different from them.[ ... ]
The pudgala can be thought of, then, as either conceptual or substantial. Since it can
be identified only through the aggregates on which it is based, it may be considered
conceptual; but since its content is the uncreated dharma, Nirvii.i;ia, it may be consid-
ered substantial. But it is not conceptual or substantial in any usual sense of either
term. Unlike any ordinary conceptual entity, it is publicly observable and indepen-
dent of any particular perception or ideation. Unlike the created dharmas, it is inde-
terminate, neither the same as the dharmas it is based on nor separate from them.
The Viitsiputriya in the Abhidharmakosabhii~ya is represe~ted accordingly [see
Section 2.1.1] as denying that is is either conceptual or substantial. Its nature is
evidently unique. [... ]
He self-reflects and qualifies (PuB.204):
The argument by which we arrived at our conclusion, that it is Nirviil;ta that appears
as the pudgala, depended on four points: first, that Nirvii.i;ia exists and is not merely
the absence of the dharmas which pass away when it is attained; secondly, that Nir-
viii;ia is not wholly different from the padgala; thirdly, that Nirvii.i;ia already exists
Endnotes to Chapter Nine 2611
before the pudgala attains it and is thus neither a newly created dharma nor a trans-
formation of the pudgala; and fourthly, that there is only one Nirvib}a, and not a
separate NirviiI_la for each pudgala that attains it.
Cf. our endnote to AKB i. 6ab,
4. As for the relation of the pudgala to the truths [satya; cf. AKB vi, F 120-42], the shorter
and longer versions of the Tridharmakha,µJaka explain the truths as follows (T 1506, 24c16;
T 1505, 10c8; PuB.105; see also Priestley's translation of the extended explanation in Sangha-
deva's version, PuB.105f., whjch Priestley describes as "unfortunately very obscure and pos-
sibly corrupt"):
What are the truths?
The truths are practical (Ch.: deng, sushu), characteristical (Ch.: xiang) and ulti-
mate (Ch. diyeyi). (sutra)
Practical truth, characteristical truth and ultimate truth are the three kinds of truth.
Priestley comments (PuB.107) that if pudgala is the "true and ultimate" (saccikafthapara-
matthena; as maintained in the Kathiivatthu, 1.1.1; Vijfliinakiiya, T 1539, 537b2; cf. also
Sa'!lmmitfyanikiiyasiistra, 1649, 464b6 and 464b2 [PuB.95f. and 98]), it ought to form part of
1
the ultimate truth. T-he1affef1soefiried in the shorter version of the Tridharmakha,µJaka as fol-
lows (T 1506, 25a2-5):
What is ultimate truth?
Ultimate truth is the final stopping of action, speech and thought. (sutra)
The final stopping of action, speech and thought i.s called ultimate truth. Action is
bodily activity; speech is verbal activity; thought is mental activity. If these three
have finally ceased, that is called ultimate truth, which means Nirvii1,1a.
As for the relationship between pudgala and the truths (satya), after considering various di-
verging passages, Priestley comes to the following conclusion (in the context of his initial
interpretation) (PuB.1 lOf.):
We can perhaps conclude, then, that the person as concept according to the basis and
concept according to transition is to be assigned to characteristical truth (comprising
the Truths of Suffering, its Origin and the Path), but that the person as concept
according to cessation partakes of ultimate truth (the.Truth of Cessation). The person
is thus part of the content of all four of the Noble Truths.
As for the practical or conventional truth-consisting of modes of behavior rather than actual
entities, i.e., local, ancestral and trained usage (cf. PuB .105~Priestley comments (PuB .111
and 196) that it obviously involves both phenomena and persons which are conceived on their
basis, even though "neither phenomena nor persons are the immediate content of practical
truth". Thus in brief, Priestley thinks that "whatever deals indirectly with dharmas and per-
sons, through convention, custom and the like, is identified as practical truth. The self or
pudgala is involved in all three of these truths, as in all four of the Noble Truths."
Duerlinger, on the other hand, states that his view is radically different from Priestley on this
point (IBTP.1 l and 61). He thinks that according to this threefold division of realities (satya)
in the Tridharmika Siistra, i.e., (i) conventional reality, which is equated with worldly conven-
tion, (ii) reality:that includes all of the causally conditioned phenomena that comprise suffer-
2612 Treatise of the Refutation of the Person (Pudgalaprati~edhaprakara"l}a)
ing, the origin of suffering and the path to nirvii,:ia, called reality of phenomena that possess
defining characteristics (lak~a,:iasatya), and (iii) ultimate reality, which is equated with the
causally unconditioned phenomenon called nirvii,:ia, "persons [who are conceived in three
ways (see endnote to Section 2.1.1)) will be conventional realities, which are unlike other con-
ventional realities insofar as they are inexplicable''. He comments that the second and third
kind of reality "include all of the substances (dravya-s) that are called ultimate realities by
those who belonged to the ... Vaibha~ika school". In his commentary to Section 3.3, he later
adds the following clarifying remarks regarding his view (IBTP.214):
In the Tridharmaka Siistra, conventional realities are in effect distinguished from the
four realities known to the .Aryas on the paths of insight and meditation. Some of
these conventional realities, they seem to concede, are the same in existence as col-
lections of causally conditioned phenomena, but not all. If some conventional reali-
ties, persons included, are inexplicable and still ultimately exist, inexplicable persons
would not be included among the four realities. In particular, the Pudgalaviidins can
say that it is not necessary for us to realize that we are inexplicable in order to com-
plete the path of insight, and continue on the path of meditation, only to realize that
we do not possess separate identities. And since the realization that we do not pos-
sess separate identities requires only that we do not find, among the phenomena in
dependence upon which we are conceived, a single phenomenon that possesses all of
the attributes by reference to which we are conceived as persons, we need not realize
that we are inexplicable phenomena in order to enter the path of insight and continue
on the path of meditation.
42
LS: This passage supports the view that the Pudgalaviidins accept the Vaibha~'ika view
that causally conditioned phenomena posses~, substantial reality in the three times. For other
sources supporting this view and differing from it, see our endnote to " ... exist in the present
fpratyutpanna; vartamiina]" at Section 2.1.1.
43
LS: There seems to be some disagreement regarding how many unconditioned factors
(asa,pskrta) are accepted by the Viitsiputnyas. Yasomitra states (WOG.15.2ff.) that they ac-
cept only one, i.e., nirvii,:ia, b:ut this view does not seem to be corroborated with the Chinese
sources, who do not mention this view and thus seem to assume that the Viitsiputriyas also
accept three asa,,,skrtas as the Vaibhii~ikas do. For example, the MYS states that Vij:tsiputnyas
are doctrinally mainly the same as the Vaibhii~ikas, differing only in accepting a pudgala and
in "five or six points", the asa,,,skrtas not being one of them. See our endnote to AKB i. Sc.
44 LS: Duerlinger adds (IBTP.76): "since the person cannot be said to be other than the ag-
gregates, which are the three kinds of conditioned phenomena".
45
LVP: Stcherbatsky, p. 832, differs.
LS: Duerlinger adds (IBTP.76): "since the person cannot be said to be the same as the aggre-
gates, and they do not believe that the person is an unconditioned phenomenon".
46
LVP: This would perhaps be better translated: "is noticed".
47
LVP: riipasyiipi prajfiaptir vaktavyii cak~uriidi~u satsu tasyopalambhiit tiini cak~uriidfny
upiidiiya rupa'!I prajiiapyata iti [WOG.701.6f.].
48
LS: According to the Pudgalaviidins, we are not other than the.aggregates.
Endnotes to Chapter Nine 2613
Pudgalaviidins' view that a person is perceived or known to exist by all six consciousnesses by
means of perception.
60
LVP: dvaya'!I pratftya ... [WOG.703.5]; not because of three.
61
LVP: Sa'!lyukta, 9, 6. -The Vyiikhyii cites the first words [WOG.703.7]: cak~ur bhik~o
hetur [cak~urvijiiiinotpiidiiya I rupa'!I bhi~o pratyaya?z ... ].
Vyiikhyii [WOG.703.7ff.]: hetur ii.sann~ pratyayaJ.i I viprakmas tu pratyaya eva I janako hetul,l
pratyayas tv ii.lambanamii.tram ity apare I paryiiyii.v etav ity apare. - See ii. 61c; vii. 13a (F 32,
34).
62
LVP: Saeki Kiokuga has a note (fol. 14a) on the Diir~!iintika theory of the six conscious-
nesses (vijiiiina).
63
LS: The fourth objection receives, in Section 2.5.3:1, a reply by the Pudgalaviidins, which
in tum is rejected by Vasubandhu in Section 2.5.3.2.
64
LVP: Thus, none of them "experience" the person (pudgala).
65
LVP: Madhyama, 58, 12: svakarµ gocaravi~ayarµ pratyanubhavanti I niinyad anyasya
gocaravi~aya'!I pratyanubhavati I manas cai~ii'!I pratisara,:iam.
Sa'!lyutta, v. 218: paiicimiini briihma,:ia indriyiini niiniivisayiini niiniigocariini niiiiiiamaiiiiassa
gocaravisaya'!I paccanubhonti I katamiini paiica ... I imesa'!I kho paiicanna'!I indriyiina'!I niinii-
visayiinarµ niiniigocariina'!I na aiiiiamaiiiiassa gocaravisaya'!I paccanubhontiinarµ mano pa{i-
sara,:ta'!I mano ca nesa'!I gocaravisaya'!I paccanubhoti.
On the phrase: manas cai~ii'!I pratisara,:iam, the Vyiikhyii says the following [WOG.703.15ff.]:
anusangenedam uktam I nedam udaharaI_lam I tathii.pi tu manas cai~iim indriyiil_lii.m prati-
saraI_lam iti tadapek~iiI_1Indriyii.1_1i vijiiii.notpattau kiiraI_laiµ bhavantity arthal,l.
MVS, 449a16: - The Diir~tiintikas say: "The object of the six groups of consciousness
(vijiiiinakiiya), visual consciousness (cak~urvijiiiina), etc., is distinct." They say: "The mental
6onsciousness (manovijiiiina) has a distinct object; it is not concerned with the object of the
five consciousnesses (vijiiiina), visual consciousness (cak~urvijiiiina), etc." They say: "The six
consciousnesses (vijiiiina) are concerned only with external objects; they are not concerned
with the internal (iidhyiitmika, see F 231) sense-faculties, or with the consciousness (vijiiiina)."
In order to refute this opinion, it is explained that the first five consciousnesses (vijiiiina) have
a distinct object, being concerned only with external objects, not being concerned with the
sep.se-faculties and the consciousness (vijiiiina); but that mental consciousness (manovijiiiina)
has an object common to the five consciousnesses (vijiiiina) and also a different object which
is concerned with the internal sense-faculties and also with the consciousness (vijiiana). - It
has been explained, Kosa, i. 48a, that among the eighteen elements (dhatu), thirteen are the
object of a single mental consciousness (manovijiiiina) with the exception of visible form,
sound, etc., which are also the object of visual consciousness (cak~urvijiiiina), etc.
66
LVP: The words in parentheses are according to Hsiian-tsang.
Bha~ya and Vyiikhya [WOG.703.18ff.]: na vii pudgalo vi~aya iti [yadi sutraiµ pramiiiµ1criyate] I
na ced vi~aya?z [yadi na kasya cid vijiiiinasya vi~ayal,l] na tarhi vijiieya?z [tatas ca paiicavidhaiµ
Jiieyam iti svasiddhiinto biidhyate]. (See above F 237, note).
Paramiirtha: Or else, the person is not an object. If it is not an object, it is not cognized by the
six consciousnesses.
Endnotes to Chapter Nine, 2615
67
L VP: In spite of the siitra, you affirm that the object of mental consciousness is general;
likewise, in spite of the siitra, we affirm that the person is perceived by visual consciousness.
68
LVP: Sal'flyukta, 43, 10, Ekottara, 32, 4, Sal'flyutta, iv. 198. - ~a4 imiinfndriyii,:ii niiniigo-
carii,:ii" . . . kukkurapak~isrgii.lasisumii.rasarpamarkafaJ.1 ~at pr~akii.li kena cid baddhii. madhye
granthiqi krtvotsmati I te svakal'fl svakal'fl gocaravi~ayam iikank~ante I grii.mii.kii.sasmasii.noda-
kavalmikava1'~kii.Qk~al).iid evam eva ~ac.I imii.nindriyii.l).i... [WOG.703.24ff.].
69
LVP: The desire (iikank~a,:ia) to see, to hear, etc., is certainly foreign to the sense-faculties
of the eye, ear, etc., which are material (riipasvabhiivatviit), and also to the visual conscious-
ness, auditory consciousness, etc., which are non-conceptual (nirvikalpakatviit). This refers,
under the name of the sense-faculty of the eye (cak~urindriya), to the mental consciousness
induced (adhyahrta) by the dominant (adhipatya) action of this sense-faculty.
70
LVP: Sa1riyutta, iv. 29: sabbarrz bhikkhave abhifiiiiipariiiiieyyam I kirrz ca bhikkhave
abhiiiiiiipariiiiieyyam I riipal'fl bhikkhave abhiiiiiiipariiiiieyyam Icakkhuviiiiiii,:iam.,.. .
71
LVP: prajiiiivijiiiinayo~ samiinavi~ayatviit [WOG.704.16]. - Compare Vasumitra, Sectes,
onjiieya,vijiieya,abhijiieya.
72
LVP: According to Hstian-tsang. - Paramii.rtha: The masters who believe in a self say:
"We see the person by (Ch.: yu: by means of) the eye"; since they see that there is a self in
(Ch.: yii) that which is not a self, they fall ....
The Bhii~a has the word aniitmanii which the Vyiikhyii glosses as ca~u~ii cak~urvijiiiinenety
artha~ [WOG.703.19]. - Therefore, one should understand the (Ch.) yu of Paramii.rtha in the
sense of the instrumental: "As they see, through that which is not a self-that is to say, through
the eye, through the visual consciousness ... ".
Stcherbatsky: "This idea of yours that there is an existing self who, by opening his eyes, con-
templates other selves, this idea is what is called Wrong Personalism."
From the phrase cak~u~ii riipii,:ii dr~(vii, one can draw the conclusion that the person sees by
means of the eye, Vyiikhyii, ad i. 42 [F 85) (edition of Petrograd). We have in Cullaniddesa,
234: cakkhunii puriso iilokati riipagatiini. - See below F 254 (note).
73
LVP: According to Paramii.rtha and Hsiian-tsang. - Stcherbatsky: "In the Ajita-sermon".
74
LVP: Version of Paramii.rtha. - This is a well-known text: cak~u~ prat'itya riipii,:ii cot-
padyate ca~urvijiiiinam I trayiiniil'fl sal'flnipiita~ sparsa~ I sahajiita vedanii sa,rijiiii cetanii ... .
- See iii. 32ab (Hsiian-tsang, x. 7b).
75 LS: See AKB i. 15ab (F 28f.) for possible reasons why intention here stands for forma-
tions (sal'flskara ).
76
LVP: Paramii.rtha transcribes; Hstian-tsang: nara = na ramate, miinava = (Ch.) ju-t'ung
= scholar-kumiira,jantu "who are born".
A Yogii.cii.ra commentary cited by Saeki Kiokuga: sattva, because all noble ones (iirya) truly
see that only. the factors (dharma) exist and not other things; or else, because there is affection
therein (sattva from sakta, as in Buddhaghosa ?); manoja (Ch.: i-sheng), because being consti-
tuted by the mental faculty (manas) ... ; pudgala, because taking up the planes of existence
many times without the power to become disgusted with them; jfva, because of living present-
ly by union with the life-force (Kosa, ii. 45); jantu (Ch.: sheng), because all factors (dharma)
that exist are endowed with arising.
2616 Treatise of the Refutation of the Person (Pudgalaprati~edhaprakara,:ia)
Other lists contain thirteen names. Among the latter is yak~a, see Suttanipiita, 875.
On sattva, see Ledi Sadaw, JPTS, 1914, p. 133; Mrs. Rhys Davids, Buddhist Psychology, 1914,
p. 83. - We have seen that sattva signifies "that which perishes", see v, F 16, and above
F 228-29.
punafi punar jiiyata iti jantufi, see Madhyamakavrtti, xvii, 28.
77
LVP: See below, F 256 (note).
78
LVP: The satra of the four "authorities", "refuges" or "reliances" (pratisara,:za) [i.e.,
1. teaching (dharma), 2. meaning (artha), 3. explicit meaning (nitiirtha), 4. cognition (iniina)]
is cited in Vyiikhyii, ad ii. 46 (F 226): catviirimiini bhik~avaI:i pratisara1,1iiJ:li I katamiini catviiri I
dharrnaI:i pratisara1,1ai:µ na pudgalaI:i I arthal:t pratisaral).atµ na vyafijanam I nitiirthai:µ sutrai:µ
pratisaral).atµ na neyiirtham Ijiiiinai:µ pratisaral).atµ na vijiiiinam [WOG.704.20ff.].
Mahiivyutpatti, 74, where the order differs: arthapratisara,:zena bhavitavyal?l na vyanjana-
pratisara,:zena, dharma ... , jniina .. . , nftiirthasatrapratisara,:zena ... [extract from Hsien-yang,
Nanjio, 177, Tokyo, xviii. 7, 10a].
Dharmasal?lgraha, 53; Satriilal?lkiira, xviii.·31-33; J. As., 1902, ii. 269; Madhyamakavrtti, 268,
598.
Pratisara,:za, pratisara,:za (Divya, 427, 22, 176, 26, where the editor translates "confidence") is
translated as rton pa (confidence) and rten pa (basis), f (basis), (Ch.) liang (authority).
1. Bodhisattvabhami, I, xvii.
katharri bodhisattva§ catur~u pratisara,:ze~u prayujyate.
iha bodhisattvafi arthiirthf parato dharmal?l sr,:zoti na vyanjaniibhisal?lskiiriirthf I arthiirthf
dharmarri sr,:zvan na vyanjaniirthf prakrtavyiipi viicii dharmarri desyamiinam arthapratisara,:zo
bodhisattvafi satkrtya sr,:zoti.
punar bodhisattvafi kiiliipadesarri mahiipadesarri ca (Dfgha, ii. 124, etc.) yathiibhatarri prajiiniiti
Iprajiinan yuktipratisara,:zo bhavati na sthavire,:ziibhijniinena vii pudgalena tathiigatena vii
sarrighena vii ime dharmii bhii#tii iti pudgalapratisara,:zo bhavati I sa eva,µ. yuktipratisara,:zo na
pudgalapratisara,:zas tattviirthiin na vicalati aparapratyayas ca bhavati dharme~u. [apara-
pratyaya = gzhan las shes ma yin, Madhyamakavrtti, xxiv. 8]. ·
punar bodhisattvas tathiigate nivi~fasraddho nivi~faprasiida aikiinriko vacasy abhiprasannas
tathiigatanftiirthasatral?l pratisarati na neyiirtham I nftiirtha,µ. satral?l pratisarann asal?lhiiryo
bhavaty asmiid dharmavinayiit I tatra hi neyiirthasya satrasya niiniimukhaprakrtarthavibhiigo
'niscitafi sal?ldehakaro bhavati I sacet punar bodhisattvo nftiirthe'pi satrr 'naikiintikafi syiid
evam asau sa,µ.hiiryafi syiid asmiid dharmavinayiit.
punar bodhisattvafi adhigamajniine siidarsf (?) bhavati na ca srutacintiidharmiirthavijniina-
miitrake I sa yad bhiivaniimayena jfiiinena jniitavyarri na tac chakyal?l srutavijniinamiitrakena
vijfiiitum iti viditvii paramagal?lhhfriin api tathiigatabhii~itiin dharmiin srutvii na pratik~ipati
niipavadati I
eval?l ... catur,:za,µ. priimii,:zyal?l prakiisitarri bhii~itasyiirthasya yuktefi sa'stur bhiivaniimayasya
ciidhigamajniinasya. ·
--l.- arthal:z pratisarar:zal?l ... . - Notion expressed in Mahiivagga, i. 23, 4, Majjhima, ii. 240;
developed in Lanka: arthapratisara,:zena bhavitavyam ... and also arthiinusiiri,:zii bhavitavyal?l
Endnotes to Chapter Nine· 2617
na desaniibhiliipiibhinivi:,fena. The "syllable or word" is like a finger that touches the object
which one should see; one has to remove the finger in order to see the object (Lanka cited in
Subhii:,itasaf!1graha, ed. Bendall, fol. 34).
,On the relationship between meaning (attha) and syllables or words (vyaiijana), see Dfgha,
iii. 121-29,]Vettiprakaral}a, 21.
3. dharmal;i pratisaTalJaf!I na pudgalal;i. - Variant: yuktipratisaral}o bhavati na pudgalaprati·
saral}al;i.
The refuge .is the truth in itself, not the authority, whatever it may be, even of the Buddha. This
is the doctrine of Majjhima, i. 265. Those who say: "These factors (dharma) are taught by
an elder (sthavira), a person possessing the superkno'Nledges (abhijiiii), the Tathiigata, the
Saipgha", are those who take recourse in the person (pudgalapratisaralJa).
Not to lose touch with the doctrine of the "great authorities" (mahiipadesii), see below F 252
(note).
See Saipghabhadra, 36, p, 558a,
4. The nftiirtha sutra is the sutra "of explicit meaning" (vibhaktiirtha); the neyiirtha sutra is
of undetermined meaning, of meaning to be determined (Vyiikhyii, ad iii. 28). - iv. 39 (F 96),
appealing to a sutra of explicit meaning. - Vasumitra, Sectes.
It seems that the only interesting canonical text here is Aliguttara, i. 60: to attribute to the
Tathiigata that which he has not said; to not recognize that which he has said as being said by
him; to consider a nftattha Suttanta as neyyattha and vice versa. [The theory of the satra which
is well proclaimed but badly understood, Dfgha, iii. 127-28, can lead to the distinction of
nftattha and neyyattha satras].
Nftattha and neyyattha in Nettippakaral}a [the meaning of which is in accordance with the
letter, (yathiirutavasena iiiitabbattham), the meaning of which ~hould ~termined through
reflection (niddhiiretvii gahetabbattham); and in Dfpavamsa (e~l;-O@enberg, p. 36) cited in
the Introduction to the Commentary of the Kathiivatthu (JPTS, 1889, p.' 3). "To confuse the
· pariyiiyabhiisita and the nippariyiiyabhiisita (compare Visuddhimagga, 473,499: that which
should not be taken literally and that which should be taken literally), the nftattha and the
neyyattha; to attribute another meaning [than the true meaning] to that which has been said
with a certain intent (sa,rulhiiya bhal}ita): thus, respecting the letter destroys the meaning;
making pseudo-sutras ... ."
Atthasiilinf, 91: After saying, "We will weigh the meaning of your Sutta", the teachers weigh it
thus ....
Saipghabhadra, iii. 25 (Tokyo xxiii. 4, 33b16). - According to the Sthavira, any noble instruc-
tion (iiryii desanii) promulgated by the Buddha himself (tathiigatabhii:,ita = ahaccavacana of
Nettippakara,:ia, 21) is a nftiirthasutra; the other sutras are anftiirtha. Saqighabhadra first
observes that this definition is not found in Scripture; then, that it is unreasonable: for there
are sutras-not promulgated by the Buddha-which are nftiirtha and vice versa. - Exam-
ples follow. It is said: "It is impossibl.e to say, except through an erroneous conception (abhi-
miina) (or "pr~sumption"): I will enter into signlessness (iinimitta) without relying on empti-
ness." [These words are riot from the Buddha himself, nevertheless the sutra is nftiirtha] ... .
The schools, as is seen in Wassiliev, 329, in Madhyamakiivatiira, vi. 94, do not agree on how
2618 Treatise of the Refutation of the Person (Pudgalaprati~edhaprakara"(la)
83
LVP: Lung phran tshegs. - Hsiian-tsang: "in the Tso-tigama"; Paramiirtha: "in the Hsiao-
tigama". [Nanjio, 546]
84
LVP: P'o-t'o-li = old-beam-pear (Hsiian-tsang) = (Ch.) puo-chih-li = waves-cover-profit
(Paramiirtha); Stcherbatsky reads: Biidarayal)a.
85
LVP: Paramiirtha: Biidari, listen, [you will attain] the power to free yourself from any
fetter; by that, thought is defiled, by that, too, it is purified. The self does not have the nature
of a self; by error, one imagines (Ch.:fen-pieh); there is not a self, not those who are born
(jantu); there are only factors (dharma), causes and effects ....
MYS, 731bl 1: By trouble and the pollution (sal'Jlklesa) of thought, beings (sattva) are troubled,
defiled; by purification (vyavadtina) of thought, beings are purified; the two male and female
sexual faculties exercise controlling power over two things, the (primary) distinction among
sentient beings (sattvabheda), the differences (of secondary characteristics) among sentient
beings (sattvavikalpabheda) (see Kosa, ii, F 104).
Kiokuga comments: the first stanza exhorts the hearing of the truths.
Siddhi, 214: "The sentient being is made dirty by the dirt of thought, is purified by the purity
of thought."
86
LVP: nlistfha sattva titmti va [dharmtis tv ete sahetuktil_i I
dvtidasasu bhavange~u skandhayatanadhiitu~u
] pudgalo nopalabhyate I [cf. WOG.704.25ff.]
See Madhyamakavrtti, 355; Twenty Verses, commentary of verse 8, Levi, p. 5.
87
LVP: MYS, 37a12: -The afflicted view of self (satkayadr~ti) is counteracted by the ten
types of emptiness (siinyatii), emptiness of the internal (adhyiitmasiinyatii), etc. [See the more
complete lists of Mahavyutpatti, 37 = Madhyamaktivatiira, v. 180 = S~tasiihasrikii, 215; Abhi-
samaya, twenty emptinesses].
Kiokuga refers to the Sal'Jlyuktahrdaya (? Nanjio, 1287), 7, 7.
88
L VP: siinyam adhyiitmikal'JI pasyan pasya siinyal'JI bahirgatam I
na vidyate so 'pi kascid yo bhavayati siinyatiim II
This third stanza (with the reading pasya pasya) is attributed to the Fortunate One without any
further information in Madhayamakavrtti, p. 348. - The reading pasyan pasya is recommended
by the Chinese versions: (Ch.)jo kuan nei chih kung: "Since you see that the internal [pheno-
mena] are empty" (Paramiirtha); (Ch.) chi kuan ... (Hsiian-tsang). - The Gauq,akiirikii, very
much suspected of being a Buddhist imitati~n. has: tattvam iidhyiitmikam dmva tattvarri dr~tva
tu bahyatal_z (ii. 38).
Hsiian-tsang translates the last line: "A seer capable of meditating on emptiness is not to be
found." The Vyiikhyii glosses [WOG.704.31]: yogy api niisti yal_z siinyatiim abhyasyati.
89
LVP: This text (according to Stcherbatski, K~udriigama) is cited in Siitralaf!lkara,
xviii. 101 (p. 158) as an extract of the "Pentades" (paficake~u. Chinese: "In the siitra Ts'eng-
wu = Paficottara ?" S. Levi): Paficake~u pancadfnava iitmopalambha iti desital_z I iitmadr~tir
bhavati jfvadr~fil_z I nirvise~'! bhavati tfrthikail_z I unmargapratipanno bhavati I siinyatiiyii,m asya
cittal'JI na praskandati na prasfdati na sal'Jlfi~{hate niidhimucyate I iiryadharmii asya na vyava-
diiyante.
2620 Treatise of the Refutation of the Person (Pudgalaprati~edhaprakarm;ia)
The readings are confirmed by the Tibetan and the Vyiikhyii, except that the Tibetan corres-
ponds to an original: iitmadr~tir bhavati sattvadr~fir jfvadr~ti/:t; likewise WOG.704.32: iitma-
dr~{ir bhavati yiivaj jfvadr~fir iti prathama iidfnava/:t. - Hsiian-tsang and Paramiirtha replace
1Tvadr~ti by: "falling into the doctrines of afflicted views (dr~figata)". - The phraseology
praskandhati ... in Aliguttara, iii. 246; Dfgha, iii. 240, Sarµyutta, iii. 133: .. .me nibbiine cittarµ
na pakkhandati na ppasfdati na sarµti{{hati na vimuccati (var. niidhimuccati) I paritassanii upii-
diinam uppajjati paccudiivattati miinasam. [The editor of Sarµyutta punctuates after pari-
tassanii].
90
LVP: na tarhi te~iirµ buddha/:t siistii [WOG.705.3].
91
LVP: na kilaitad buddhavacanam iti. - Vyiikhyii [WOG.705.5f.]: keniipy adhyiiropitiiny
etini siitriilfi"ty abhipriiyal;i.
1. "The sutras promulgated by the Tathiigata (tathiigatabhiisita) that are profound, of pro-
found meaning, supramundane (lokuttara), teaching emptiness (suiiiiatiipafisarµyutta), they do
not listen to them with faith, they do _not lend an ear to them, they do not recognize them as
true (aiiiiiicittam na upa!fhapessanti) ... . But the sutras composed by poets (kavikata) that are
poetic (kiiveyya), of artistic words and phrases, external (biihiraka), promulgated by disciples
(siivakabhiisita), they believe in them .... It is in this way that the sutras of the first category
will disappear ... " (Sarµyutta, ii. 267).
Affasiihasrikii, 328: yad etat tvayediinfrµ srutarµ naitad buddhavacanarµ kavikrtarµ kiivyam etat
'I yat punar idam aharµ bhii~e etad buddhabhii#tam etad buddhavacanam.
2. See Sarµghabhadra, Tokyo, xxiii. 3, 6a, 25b (translated in Nirvii,:za, 1925, p. 23); disap-
~rance of primary assembly (mulasamgftibhrarµsa), Kosa, iii. 12d, 13a (dreams of Krkin);
an independent (muktaka) sutra, iii. 4c; apiifha eva, see below F 254 (note).
Discussion of certain words in the sutras, iii. 30b, and elsewhere.
92
LVP: sarvanikiiyiintare~v iti [WOG.705.6]. - Vyiikhyii [WOG.705.6]: Tiimrapiinjiyanikiiya-
iidi~u. [The school ofTaprobane is named in Vyiikhyii (WOG.39.25f.), ad AKBL 17a (F 32)].
93
LVP: na dharmatiirµ biidhata iti prafityasamutpiidadharmatiim [WOG.707.7f.].
See the texts on the four great authorities (mahiipadesa) (Dfgha, ii. 123, Dialogues, ii. 133,
note, Anguttara, ii. 167, Nettippakara,:ia, 21-22; Rhys Davids-Stede separates mahii-padesa,
against the commentator of Netti) and the rule: "That which is in the sutra ... , that which does
not contradict the philosophical truth (dhar~atii)" (that is to say, "dependent origination"
[paficcasamuppiida], Netti), Satriilarµkiira, i. 10, Bodhicaryiivatiira, ix. 42, p. 431, Abhi-
samayiilarµkiiriiloka. - kiiliipadesa, F 246 (note).
94 LVP: sarve dharmii anatmiina/:t (Sarµyukta, 10, 7). - Vyiikhyii [WOG.705.9f.]: na caita
iitmasvabhiiviil;i na caite~v iitmii vidyata ity aniitmiina~.
Sutriilarµkiira, xviii. 101 (p. 158): dharmoddiine~u sarve dharmii aniitmiina. iti desitam:
95
LVP: dvayarµpratftya [WOG.705.10]. -IT the mental consciousness is concerned with the
person, it would arise from the person (pudgala) as object; thus it would arise from three con-
ditions.
96
LVP: Aliguttara, ii. 52; Kosa, v. 9.
'Tl
L VP: The thesis: niitma skandhiiyatanadhiitava/:t, contradicts the thesis: no tu vaktavyarµ
Endnotes to Chapter Nine 2621
receive, for this reason, the name burden" (skandhiiniim iti vistar~ I tatra ye upaghiitiiya sa1J1-
vartante dul_lkhahetava};I skandhii.s te bhiira iti krtvoktiil_i I uttare ye pi<;Iyante te bharahara iti
lqtvoktal;i [WOG.706.23ff.]).
LS: Duerlinger translates (IBTP.87): "Since the aggregates cause harm to themselves, the
earlier ones are called a burden (to the later ones) and the later ones are called the bearer of the
burden, since 'burden' means 'harm'." He comments (IBTP.117): "La Vallee Poussin follows
the interpretative translation of Xuanzang, who makes the earlier set of aggregates the carrier
of the burden and the later set the burden, since they are contaminated by the earlier. The
Sanskrit text and Y asomitra' s commentary support the translation I have given."
114
LVP: On apparitional sentient beings and intermediate existence, see iii. 8c.
115
LVP: According to Siirrzmitryanikiiyasiistra, third chapter.
MVS, 988a14: "This world does not exist; the other world does not exist; there are no
apparitional sentient beings": this is a false view, a negation of causes (compare iv. 78, 79b
and v. 7 [F 18]). "There are no appadtional sentient beings": there are some non-Buddhist
(biihya) masters who say that all sentient beings arise because of semen and blood, etc.; thllt
there are no sentient beings who arise without conditions (pratyaya), suddenly, by them-
selves .... According to some, apparitional sentient beings are the sentient beings of inter-
mediate existence (antariibhava); to deny this world and the other world is -to deny existence-
as-birth (upapattibhava); to deny apparitional sentient beings is to deny intermediate existence.
The text of the Karmaprajiiiipti (chap. iv. Mdo, 62 fol. 218) differs from the vulgate: "There is
neither gift, nor sacrifice, nor oblation, nor wholesome action, nor unwholesome action, nor
retQ,bution of wholesome and unwholesome actions. This world ~oes not exist, nor does the
other world. There is neither father, nor mother, nor apparitional sentient being. There is not,
in this world, a well-gone, well-entered perfected being ( arhat) who, knowing and realizing
this world and the other by himself, thinks: 'There is no more birth for me, the religious life
has been well-practiced ... '."
116
LVP: Kosa, chap. v and vi, F xvi. - The person, as you understand it, is not part of the
truths: it is not unsatisfactoriness (= the appropriative aggregates), nor the origin, nor cessa-
tion, nor the path. Therefore, if the negation of the person is, as you say, a false view (mithyii-
dml), this false view cannot be expelled by insight into the truths. Indeed, an afflicted view
(dr~#) is expelled by insight into the truth with which it is in contradiction (yasmin satye
vipratipannii). - On the other hand, a defilement is abandoned by cultivation (bhiivanii)
when this defilement has a thing abandoned by cultivation-a thing that is necessarily part of
the truth of unsatisfactoriness or of that of the origin-for its object (bhavanaprahatavyo hi
kleso bhavanaprahatavyam eva vastu du};lkhaqi samudayaqi vfilambate [WOG.706.31f.1) ....
Moreover, no "view" is abandoned by cultivation.
117
LVP: Ekottara, 3, 16, 5, 12. - Paramartha: "A person is born in this world; born, he or she
exists for the use, profit and happiness of many"= Ariguttara, i. 22, ekapuggalo bhikkhave toke
uppajjarniino uppajjati bahujanahitaya ... .
This text is utilized in Siil'flmitfyanikiiyasiistra.
118
LVP: ekatilaikata,:i{lulavad ekariisyekavacanavat [WOG.707.5]. -The grain of sesame
(tila) is made up of eight substantial entities, a word is made up of syllables.
Endnotes to Chapter Nine 2625
119
LVP: skandhiintaropiidaniit [WOG.707.10]. -Thus we recognize that it arises; but it is
not, for that, "conditioned".
120
L VP: yathii hi yiijfiiko jiita iti vidyopiidiiniid ucyate -na ciisau bhii tiirthena jiitas tadvat
[WOG.707.11].
121
LVP: Paramlirthasiinyatiisiitra in the SaT{lyukta, 13, 21: "When the eye is born, 0 bhik~us
there is no place from whence it comes; when it perishes, there is no place to which it goes. In
this manner, the eye is not real and yet it is born (Ch.: pu shih erh sheng); having been born, it
perishes. There is retribution of the action, however, there is no agent: these aggregates being
destroyed, other aggregates continue (Ch.: hsiang hsu): outside of any dharmasaT{lketa. The
ear. ... By dharmasaT{lketa (Ch.: su shufa) we understand: if this exists, that exists .... Be-
cause of ignorance, the karma-formations .... "
Bringing together the diverse fragments cited in our sources, we have a section of the siitra:
caqur bhib;ava utpadyamiinaT{I na kutas cid iigacchati [ nirudhyamlinaT{I ca na kva cit saT{l-
nicayaT{I gacchati I iti hi bhik~avas cak~ur abhiitvii bhavati bhiitva ca prativigacchati (Kosa,
v. 27 [F 59]) [ asti karma asti vipiikalJ, I kiirakas tu nopalabhyate ya imiiT{IS ca skandhiin
nik~ipati anyiiT{ls ca skandhiin pratisaT{ldadhiiti anyatra dharmasarrzketiit (the text which we
have here, and also Kosa, iii. 18, SiitriilaT{lkiira, xviii. 101, Bodhicaryiivatiira, ix. 73, which
presents variants) I atriiyaT{I dharmasarrzketo yad utiismin satfdaT{I bhavati asyotpiidiid idam
utpadyate (Kosa, iii. 18, Bodhicaryiivatiira, ibidem) I avidyiipratyayiilJ, sarriskiiriilJ, ... .
122
LVP: asti karma I asti vipiikalJ, Ikiirakas tu nopalabhyate. See Kosa, iii, F 57; v. 27 (F 59):
Buddhaghosa, at Visuddhi, 602, cites the Ancient Ones (PoriiI_la): kammassa kiirako natthi
vipiikassa ca vedako. [We see, p. 513, that dukkha, kamma, nibbuti, magga exist, but not
dukkhin, kiiraka, nibbuta ... ].
Same doctrine, or same text, in the sources of the Great Vehicle (mahiiyiina), Madhyamaka-
avatiira, vi. 84, Sik~asamuccaya, 244,262, Siitriila,,ikiira, (which depends on Vasubandhu),
xviii. 101.
123
LVP: The meaning of the expression anyatra dharmasaT{lketat (chos su brdar brtags pa
ma gtogs pa) is not uncertain. The Vyiikhya explains [WOG.707.16]: dharmasarrzketii.d iti
pratityasamutpiidalak~ai:iat: "outside of the combination of the factors (dharma), that is to say,
outside of the successive causation of factors": and elsewhere (ad iii. 18): sarrzketa = hetu-
phalasaT{lbandhavyavasthii. - But 1Paramiirtha understands saT{lketa = "metaphorical designa-
tion", hence the translation: "We do not see the existence of an agent ... except when, in
accordance with mundane use, one says of t,he factors (dharma) that they are a person."
124
LVP: SaT{lyukta, 15, s; SaT{lyutta, ii. 14. - Paramiirtha: "I do not say that a sentient being,
outside of the stream of factors (dharma), takes up the aggregates." -The Sanskrit edition has:
upiidatta iti phiilguna na vadami I aharrz ced evaT{I vadeyam upadatta iti atra te kalpalJ, syiid
vacanaya ko nu bhadanta upiidatta iti.
We note that the Fortunate One speaks of a human "who has laid down this body and takes up
· another body", taT{I ca kayaT{I nikkhipati afifiaT{I ca kiiyam upadiyati (SaT{lyutta, iv. 60). [Just as
the flame which goes some distance without fuel has the wind for its support, likewise the sen-
tient being who has laid down this body and has not (yet) taken up another body has thirst or
craving for its support, ibid. 400]. We have seen above, F 228, 245 (note), the etymology of
pudgala: punalJ, punalJ, ....
2626 Treatise of the Refutation of the Person (Pudgalaprati~edhaprakara,:ia)
125
LS: Each of the examples to which they refer must either be (1) a person, (2) a thought
with its thought-concomitants, or (iii) a body (IBTP:88).
126
LVP: Kiokuga cites the Siimmitfyanikiiya Siistra, i. 7 (fol. 2b).
127
LVP: sa eva hi dharmi na saqwidyate yasyiivasthitasya dharmiintaravikalpal,i parikalpyeta I
tad eva cedarµ tathii ity apiirvai~ii viico yukti}_l [WOG.707.30ff.].
paririantum, this is to change, anyathiitvam iipattum.
On pari!U'if!Ul, see iii. 43a, 50a, lO0ab, v. 26 (F 54); the transformation of the stream (sarµtati-
pari!U'ima) of the Sautriintikas is very different, ii. 36c, iv. 4a.
128
LVP: bhutiini catviiri ruparµ caikam iti [WOG.707.33). As we see in the definition: riiparµ
katamat Icatviiri mahiibhiitiin'ityiidi [WOG.707.33f.].
On the relationship between the fundamental material elements (mahiibhiita) and the deriva-
tive material forms or elements (upiidiiyarupa, bhautika rupa), i. 35, ii. 22, 65.
119
LVP: pak#ka eva do~a iti ekasmin pak~e 'yarµ do~aviida ity arthaJ-.i I bhatamiitrikapak~a iti
sthavirabuddhadevapak~e niismatpalc~a ity artha}_l [WOG.708.2f.].
MVS, 661c14. - "Buddhadeva maintains that material form (rupa) is solely the fundamen-
tal material elements (mahiibhata), that the thought-concomitants (caitta) are solely thought
(citta); he says: the derivative material form (upiidiiyarupa) is solely a type (vise~a) of the fun-
damental material elements; the thought-concomitants are solely a type of thought .... The
fundamental material elements see [when they form the sense-faculty of the eye) .... There is
no derivative sound (upiidayasabda) outside of the fundamental material elements, [that is to
say: _sound (sabda) is not a thing on its own, existing in dependence upon the fundamental
material elements]. It is the fundamental material elements that are called derivative sound
(upiidiiyasabda ). "
MVS, 730b26: - Buddhadeva says: twenty-one names [generally permeating factors (mahii-
bhamika), etc.], but only one real entity, the mental faculty (mana-indriya) ... . The conditioned
factors (dharma) are of two natures, fundamental material elements (mahiibhata) and thought
(citta). Outside of the fundamental material elements, there is no derivative material form
(upiidiiyarupa): outside of thought (citta), there are no thought-concomitants (caitta).
Compare i, F 64 (note); ii, F 150.
Kiokuga: "Vasubandhu mentions the opinion of Buddhadeva, etc., that the fundamental mate-
rial elements and derivative material form do not differ; but, as this is not the 'right meaning'
(Ch.: ch' eng i) of the Sarviistiviidins, he says that it is a 'fault' (do~a ). "
130
LVP: yadi skandhe~u pudgalopaciira}_l kasmiic chariram eva J'iva iti noktam [WOG.708.8].
The Satra of Vatsagotra, Sarµyukta, 34, 16. - The Fortunate One says to the monk Vatsagotra:
If one is of this opinion (dmi): "The world is eternal; thls,i~ true; any other theory is wrong",
this is the mistaken view coqsisting of afflicted view (dr~fiviparyiisa; v. 9d);this is (Ch.) kuan-
ts'a chien (esteeming of such things as bad views [dr~tipariimarsa], v, F 18). "The world is'not
eternal ... the Tathiigata neither exists nor does not exist after death": this is the mistaken view
consisting of afflicted view (dr~fiviparyiisa).
LS: The sameness and otherness questions are the first two of the fourteen questions not
answered by the Buddha. See Section 3.5.2 for the remainder of the questions.
Endnotes to Chapter Nine 2627
131
LVP: On the "questions to be declined", Kosa, v. 22, Nirvii,:ia, 1925, F 108, where we see
thafMalebr_anche reasons more or less the same way as Vasubandhu.
132
LVP: We have Divya, 358, bahubollaka, siikyaputrfya.
133
, LVP: The present passage from the Kosa has been pointed out by S. Levi, AIBL, 1893,
p. 232. - Chavannes has translated a very close version in Cinq Cents 'Contes, iii. 120 (accord-
ing to Nanjio 1329, Ratnakara,:i<f.a Satra [?], Tokyo, xiv. 10, fol. 39), the same version in Taka-
kusu, Chinese translations of the Milindapanho, JRAS, 1896, p. 17. See Pelliot, Les noms
propres du Milinda, JAs, 1914, ii. 380-81. [It seems indeed that the "Milindra" of the Tibetan
text of the Avadiinakalpalatii is a bold correction by the editor]. Finally, Paul Demieville, in a
fine paper on the Chinese versions of Milinda, BEFEO, 1924, p. 64, completes our informa-
tion.
134
LVP: WOG.708.11: The text has: sa ca taddesaniiyii ak~amal:, = nairiitmyadesaniiyii
ayogyal),.
135
L VP: purvam eva saf!1mu<;lha iti satkiiyadr~tisahagatena mohena bhayasyii miitraya saf!l-
moham iipadyeteti ucchedadr~tisahagatarµ dr~tyantaram utpiidayed ity abhipriiyal), I ata eviiha I
abhan me iitmii same etarhi niistfti [WOG.708.12ff.].
Compare Sarµyutta, iv. 400. - Saf!lyukta, 34, 1s: Vatsagotra asked: "Gotama, is there a self
(iitman)?" The Fortunate One did not answer. He asked a second time and a third time; and the
Fortunate One did not answer the second and the third time .... And the mendicant Vatsa-
gotra-in his bad (piipikii), false view-says: "The mendicant (srama~) does not know how
to answer my question." -The Fortunate One said to Ananda: "If I had answered him that
there is a self (iitman), then I would have increased the false view that he exists; ifl had
answered him that there is no self, would that not have increased the confusion-doubt he had in
the first place? Terror-stricken, he would say: 'The self that existed is now non-existent.' The
opinion in which he adheres to the existence of the self is the opinion of permanence; thinking
that this self is annihilated, is the opinion of annihilation. The Tathiigat~, avoiding these two
extremes, holding himself in the middle between them, teaches: This being, tl:iat comes to
be ... , when there is ignorance, karma-formations come to be .... "
136
LVP: MVS, 38a19: - In the Brahmajiilasutra; it is said that the sixty-t""'.,o--doctrines of
afflicted views (dr~figata) have the afflicted view of self (satkiiyadr~ti) for their root; in the
Satra of the Lion's Roar, it is said all the diverse afflicted views o~,the Brahmins and
mendicants rest on two afflicted views, (1) the afflicted view of existenci;1(bhavadr~fi; Ch.: yu-
chien) and (2) the afflicted view of non-existence (vibhavadr~fi; Ch.: wu-yu-chien); what is the
difference between the declarations of these two satras? - From the ppint of view of the origin
(samutpiida), it is said that all the doctrines of the afflicted views (dr~figata) have the afflicted
view of self (satkiiyadr~fi) for their root; from the point of view of (Ch.) t'ui-ch 'iu (to thrust-
search-out), it is said that the diverse afflicted views rest on the afflicted views of existence
and non-existence. - Below F 270.
MYS, 1002b6: -The afflicted view of existence (bhavadr~ti) is the afflicted view of etemality
(siisvatadr~ti), and the afflicted view of non-existence (vibhavadr~ti) is the afflicted view of
annihilation (ucchedadmi). Although bad afflicted views (kudr~figata) are of numerous types,
there are none that are not part of these. two afflicted views.
137
LVP: iiha ciitra [WOG.708.14]. - Vyiikhyii: Bhadantakumiiraliibhal_t. On Kumiiraliibha,
2628 Treatise of the Refutation of the Person (Pudgalaprati~edhaprakarar:ia)
there is no self.
4. And sine~ he takes into account the mode of thinking of the questioner, if the self exists,
why has he not said that it exists? Likewise, in regard to the question of non-existence in Nir-
.vii!Ja, he has stated nothing because one might fall into difficulties.
144
LS: The first two of the fourteen questions not answered by the Buddha are discussed in
Section 3.5,
145
LVP: Sa1J1yukta, 34, 18. - Vatsa asks: "Because of the knowledge of what factor (dharma)
are you not of the opinion, do you not say, that the world is eternal ... , that the Tathligata
neither exists nor does not exist after death?" - "Because of the knowledge of material form
(riipa), of sensation (vedanii), etc."
146
LVP: WOG.709.19ff: nirgranthasriivakacarakavad iti I nirgranthasriivakel,la catakwµ
J'Ivantaxp grhltvli bhagavan pmal}. kim ayruµ catako J'Ivati na veti I tasyiiyam abhipriiyal}. j yadi
srama1,10 gautama iidisej jivatiti sa taxµ nipI9anena miirayitvii darsayet I yadi punar bhagavan
evam adisen mfl:a iti sa taxµ J'Ivantam eva darsayet I kathaxµ namayam ajiia iti loko janiyiid iti
tasyiibhinivesai;i I bhagavatii tv asyiisayal'Jt ji'iiitvii na vyiikrta1f1 I tvaccittapratibaddham evaitaj
J'Ivati vii na veti.... niibhihitaxµ I tadvad etan na vyfilqtam. - Perhaps according to Tokyo,
xxiv. 9, J. As., 1925, i. 38.
LS: Duerlinger adds to the translation (IBTP.92): "since the bird's life depended upon the
listener's decision to squeeze it to death if the Buddha answered that it is alive, and to spare its
life if the Buddha said that it is dead".
147
LVP: tulyiirtho hy e,a catu,ka iti [WOG.709.26]. -The catu,ka (group of four questions):
"Is the world infinite (anantaviin)? etc.", have the same meaning as the group of four ques-
tions: "Is the world eternal (siisvata)? ... "
If that is so, why are there fourteen separate points, namely, three groups of four ques-
tions (catu,ka) and one group of two questions (dvika) (Is the living being the same as the
body? ... )? To this question the Vyiikhyii answers [WOG.709.31f.]: paryayariipatvavyavasthane
'pi caturdarsatvaxµ bhavafity ado~al;l.
148
L VP: kun ru rgyu smra byed kyis. - Chinese transcription: U-ti-chia. - Stcherbatsky:
Vatsa. -The Tibetan version guarantees Uktika.
This is the Paribbajaka Uttiya of Anguttara, v. 193-95-(perhaps different from the Uttiya of
Sa1J1yutta, v. 22, 166] who asks the Fortunate One about the fourteen points (beginning with
the eternity of the world); the Fortunate One answers: "This is not explained by me ... "; Uttiya
asks: "What is it then that you explain?"; the Fortunate One answers: "I explain the Dhamma
... for Nirvii!Ja." - Thereupon Uttiya asks: "Will the entire world, half of the world, a third of
the world_arrive at Nirvii!Ja through this Dhamma?" - The Fortunate One keeps silent. Ananda
then intervenes and explains to Uttiya that he asks that which he has already asked. [Asking
whether the entire world will arrive at Nirvana, is asking whether the world is eternal]. The
Fortunate One teaches how one arrives at Nirvai:ia: all those who have [already] arrived there,
are arriving there or will arrive there do so by the (noble) path.
In Sarµ.yuktf!, 34, 23, the first question of Uktika concerns the infinity of the world.
See Siddhi, 722, note 1.
The redactor of the Brahmajiila understands the infinity of the world in the sense of "infinite in
2630 Treatise of the Refutation of the Person (Pudgalaprati$edhaprakara,:ia)
space" (Dfgha, i. 23: horizontally infinite, not toward the zenith or the nadir; on this point see
Kosa, iii. 3d, at the end); he varies his phrases: he examines whether the self and the world are
eternal, whether the world is infinite.
149
LVP: Uktika asks: kiqi tu sarvo loko 'nena margeQ.a niryiisyati I iihosvid ekadeso lokasya
[WOG.709.33f.].
In the Pali recension: sabbo ca tena [dhammena] loko niyyissati uparf4ho vii tibhiigo vii.
iso LVP: WOG.710.2f: jfvantaf!1 pudgalam astfti vyiikarotfti tattviinyatveniivaktavyam I
santam eva pudgalam vyiikarotity abhipriiya}:l.
is, LVP: On Maitreya, see Peri, BEFEO, xi. 455; Przyluski, Aroka, 169, 171,332. -
Madhyama, 13, ts (sixty-sixth sutra: will come at the time when the life-span is 80,000 years),
Dfrgha, sixth sutra, and Dfgha, iii. 76, Siilistambasutra ·(see Kosa, iii. 28ab). - One thinks of
Ajita and Tissametteya of Suttanipiita, 1032, 1040. - Milinda, 159: Aniigatavamsa in Warren,
482; Mrs. Rhys Davids, Hastings, i. 414. - Ajita Maitreya and Mithra Invictus ?? - Dfgha,
iii, 76 (Cakkavattisfhaniida); Suttanipiita, Ajita and Tissametteya; Ajita will become, in a
group of sources, the nickname of Maitreya. - Bulletin, Peri, 1911, p. 455, Demieville, 1920,
p. 158, Goloubew, 1927, p. 223 (Baliiha). - S. Levi, JA, 1925, i, 65, ii, 318-29, Lanman
Studies, 40. - J. Przyluski, Funerailles, 161, Croyance au Messie, RHR, July 1929. - Saqigha-
bhadra, 38, p. 559al9, honoring the Sarµgha by thinking of Maitreya. - Kosa, i, F 12
(Vyiikhyii, 22); iii, F 193; iv, F 228; vii, F 120.
isi LVP: Kiokuga cites Sal'flyukta, 34, 10: "Gautama, is the living being the same as the body?
- This is not explained. - Is the livil).g being something else, is the body something else? -
This is not explained. - It is strange that the mendicant Gautama explains, concerning a
deceased disciple, that 'Such and such is reborn in such and such a place ... ' and that the
mendicant Gautama does not explain that the living being is something else, and the body
is something else."
Sal'flyukta, 30, 4, sermon to Nanda: The disciples endowed with unwavering faith who desire
long life and beautiful bodies (rupa), obtain them. The disciples endowed with perfect con-
fidence (avetyaprasiida), at the end of their life, are born among the gods (deva) and obtain the
ten qualities (Sal'flyukta 30, 10, 1i;; Madhyama, 18, 21).
153
LS: The person here refers to the Buddha himself.
154
LVP: siirvajiiam iti bhiivapratyayo yauvanam iti yathii [WOG.710.5f.].
155
L VP: na vaktavyarri pasyati vii na veti pasyati na pasyatiti na vaktavyam ity artha}:11 sanai/:1
sanair avaktavyarri kriyatiim iti Isa sarvajfio vii bhagaviin na veti na vaktavyam iti sanai}:l sanair
grahaQ.aqi ... siikyaputnyaprakopaparihariirthaqi [WOG.710.6ff.].
156
LVP: satyatal:, sthitital:, [WOG.710.9]. - Hsiian-tsang: (Ch.) ti ku chu ku. - Gloss of the
Japanese editor: (Ch.) chu ku = (Ch.) neng chu ku: "capable of enduring". - Paramiirtha:
(Ch.) i-shih i-chu.
157
LVP: astfty api dr~{isthiinam uktam [WOG.710.11]. - Hsiian-tsang: (Ch.) o chien ch'u
= kudr~fisthiina.
This discussion according to Siil'Jlmitfyanikiiyasiistra.
158
LVP: MYS, 255c13: The Fortunate One says: "You say that there is a cause: I also say
this; you say that there is no effect: this is a foolish doctrine." There are two doctrines, both of
Endnotes to Chapter Nine · 2631
the two extremes: the Fortunate One avoids the extreme of annihilation and the extreme of
· etemality, and he teaches the path of the middle way. He also says: "I am not in contradiction
with the world; but the world is in contradiction with me."
MVS, 77, 11: " ... those who say that [the living being (jfva)] is different from the body, is not
the body, enter into the afflicted view of etemality. Those who do not enter into the afflicted
views of annihilation or of etemality are not of non-Buddhist doctrines (biihya miirga), are not
of bad afflicted views (kudr~figata). All the Tathiigatas, in order to oppose this, teach the path
between the two, namely: material form (rupa) and thought are not annihilated, are not eter-
nal." -Above F 265 (note).
159
LVP: Saf!lyukta, 6, 1s. - Only Paramiirtha cites the whole sutra; Hsilan-tsang and the
Tibetan have only the first phrase. - Compare Sarriyutta, ii. 78, iii. 149: anamataggiiyaf!I sarri-
siiro pubbakofi na paiifiiiyati avijjlinfvara1Jiinaf!1 sattiinarri tal}hiisaf!1yojaniinaf!1 saf!ldhiivataf!I
sarrisaratam.
Same argument in Siif!lmitfyanikiiyasiistra.
From the point of view of the Miidhyamikas, neither the permanent nor the impermanent can
transmigrate: nityasya saf!lsrtir niisti naiviinityasya sarrisrtil;i I svapnavat sarrisrtir proktii tvayii
tattvavidii'!I vara (Catustava, cited in Bodhicaryiivatiirapaiijikii, ix. 108).
160
LVP: MVS, 424c15: - Sunetro niima siisteti saptasiiryodayasiitre 'yam eva bhagaviin ~il,t
sunetro niima babhuveti [WOG.710.20f.]. -Anguttara, iv. 103. - A long Siitra on Sunetra in
Vibhti.~ii. 82, p. 414c.
The Saptasuryasutra of Anguttara, iv. 103, does not identify Sunetra with the Fortunate One:
bhutapubbaf!I bhikkhave Sunetto niima satthii ahosi titthakaro kiimesu vrtariigo ... . (Compare
Anguttara iii, 371, 373). Details about the fate of the disciples of Sunetra and the rebirths of
Sunetra follow, which are also found in the MVS, 424c15. -There is no mention of Sunetra
in the fragments of Saptasurya of Sik~iisamuccaya, p. 247, and Karmaprajiiapti, Mdo, 62,
fol. 66a. - In Saundarananda, xi. 57, one does not find any longer that Sunetra is the Fortunate
One.
161
LVP: ekasaf!ltiinatii'!I darsayatiti yasmiit sunetro buddhasarptiina eviisid atal,t sa eviiham
ity abhedopaciiral). I yathii ·sa eviignir yal;i purvarri dr~io dahann iigata iti saqitiinavfttyii sa evety
ucyate [WOG.710.22ff.]. ·
162
LVP: WOG.710.25ff: sai~ii'!I syiit satkiiyadr~fir iti I sai~iiqi tathiigatiiniim iitmiitmiyikiirii
satkiiyadf!jtil). syiit I drrfhatariitmiitmfyasnehaparigriihitabandhaniiniim iti I iitmadntiiv iitmiya-
dr~tau ca satyiim iitmasneha iitmiyasnehas ca bhavatity ato riigo bandhanam (v. 45d) iti kftvii
dglhikftabandhaniiniiqi.
163
LS: L VP puts this sentence at the end of Section 3.9, whereas Duerlinger places it at the
beginning of 3.10.
164
LVP: Vyiikhyii [WOG.710.31f.]: ya eke~ii'!I pudgalagriiha iti viitsiputriyii.I,l.iim I eke~ii,µ
sarvaniistigriiha iti madhyamakacittiiniim. - This is the only reference to the system of the
Madhyamaka that the work of Vasubandhu contains.
Our translation is according to Hstian-tsang. - Paramiirtha: "Therefore, without cause or
reason, one introduces the sickness of the afflicted view into the True Doctrine of the Tathii-
. gata: there are scholars who deny selflessness (nairiitmya) and produce the adhesion to the .
2632 Treatise of the Refutation of the Person (Pudgalaprati$edhaprakara,:ia)
existence of the self (iitman); there are, moreover, scholars who deny the existence and affirm
the non-existence of all [factors]; the heterodox believe in the self (iitman) conceived as a thing
on its own. In the True Doctrine, scholars produce the adhesion to the self (iitman) and the
adhesion to universal non-existence. All these scholars, equally, do not attain liberation,
because they do not disagree [with these adhesions].
165
LS: Here Duerlinger ends Section 3.10 and begins Section 4, which he considers to repre-
sent the Nyiiy a-Vaise~ikas' objections to Vasubandhu 's theory of persons.
LVP, on the other hand, continues his translation of what we are calling Section 3.10, by men-
tioning the non-Buddhists' claim that a self is another real entity, and thus takes the doctrines
which do not lead to liberation to include those of the Viitsiputriyas or Nagarjuna or the non-
Buddhists.
166
LS: 1. As just mentioned, Duerlinger thinks (IBTP.238) that the objections and arguments
taken up in Section 4 are written "in the form in which the Nyiiya-Vaise'?ikas would raise
them". LVP, on the other hand, thinks that the exchange with the Viitsiputriyas continues up to
and including Section 4.6 and that from Section 4.7 onwards, the exchange occurs at first with
the SiiJllkhyas but then mainly with the Vaise'?ikas.
Duerlinger justifies his decision to begin Section 4 in the following way (IBTP.117f.):
Unlike Stcherbatsky, La Vallee Poussin, and the Chinese commentators, who assume
that the debate with the Pudgalaviidins is continuing, I see here the end of Vasu-
bandhu's consideration of their objections to his theory of persons. The Pudgala-
viidins may have been convinced by some of the objections of the Nyaya-Vaise'?ikas
to reject the theory of persons held by the orthodox Vaibhii~ika schools, arid so may
have used some of these very objections. But since none of the views expressed or
implied by Vasubandhu's adversaries after this point presupposes a Buddhist frame-
work, I shall suppose that the objections and arguments of the Nyaya-Vaise'?ikas are
now to be taken up. A sign that this change has in fact taken place is that the term
"self' is hereafter used in place of "person" in statements of the opponent's theories
and objections, and the Pudgalavadins have to this point been represented primarily
as presenting and defending the view that a person exists, but a self does not.
Although he takes the Pudgalavadins' theory that persons are inexplicable pheno-
mena to imply that a self exists and criticizes their theory on that basis, Vasubandhu
usually avoids the use of the term, "self', in direct statements of their theory. It is
also significant that the set of objections to which Vasubandhu now turns concern
memory, which the Nyiiyii-Vaise'?ikas repeatedly claim cannot be explained without
reference to a self.
As for memory, consciousness, etc., that are discussed in the following sections, Thlch Thien
Chau-explaining the pudgala designated by the bases in his article The Literature of the
Pudgalaviidins--comments as follows (p. 9f.):
It is the p_udgala that constitutes the person who carries a certain name, lives a certain
time, suffers or enjoys the consequences of its acts. This, then, explains how a person
has no connection with the sensations and thoughts of others. The persistence of the
person provides the basis of memory and consciousness. If such a person did not
exist, then how could memory and cop.sciousness arise, or, for that matter, recollec-
Endnotes to Chapter Nine· 2633
tion? The frequent explanation is that memory derives from impressions (viisanii)
formed by the aggregate of mental formation (sarµskiiraskandha) and kept in the con-
sciousness (vijniina). This would be impossible if there were no personal continuity,
because the aggregates of mental formation and consciousness are instantaneous.
Memory could not thus arise unless there existed that which remembers.
According to the Pudgalaviidin, for there to be knowledge, there must be a constant
subject who experiences and accumulates experiences. For example, there must be a
Devadatta for Devadatta to accumulate wealth. If there were.no pudgala who was the
"recipient" or experiences, how could knowledge be formed? The pudgala is not
only the agent of memory-a part of the aggregates of mental formation and con-
sciousness aggregates-but also the agent of sensations (vedana) and perception
(sarµjnii).
We have therefore chosen in the following to identify the opponent up to Section 4.7 simply as
the generic "opponent", partly also because this is a translation based on La Vallee Poussin.
2. Eor a brief overview of the Nyiiya-Vaise~ikas see: Bhatt, S.R. (1997): "Nyiiya-Vaise!iika",
in Companion Encyclopaedia of Asian P~ilos0pny (Indira Mahalingam and Brian Carr), Rout-
ledge, London; Franco, Eli (1998): "pljiiya-Vaise:;ika", in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philoso-
phy, London. For a more detailed overview see: Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Indian
Metaphysics and Epistemology: The Traaition of Nyiiya-Vaise:;ika up to Gangesa, (ed.) Karl H.
Potter, and Frauwallner, Erich (1973): History qf Indian Philosophy, Motilal Banarsidass,
Delhi.
See also our endnotes regarding doctrines of the Nyiiya-Vaise~ikas: underlying support in
Section 2.1.1, parts 5 and 6; memory and recognition in Section 4.1, parts 2 and 3; theory of
the production of minds, summary of ontological categories, the substances "self' (iitman) and
"mental organ" (manas), the quality "conjunction" (sarµyoga) in Section 4:7.1.
167
LS: This paragraph is a translation and repetition of the segment which L VP puts at the
end of Section 3.10. It has been adjusted based on Duerlinger's translation.
168
LS: 1. The central issue in Section 4.1 is whether the self does or does not play a causal
role in the production of11 memory and recognition.of an object. Section 4.1 and 4.1.1 mainly
focus on memory, but the account of memory also applies to recognition, as V_asubandhu
points out at the end of 4.1.1, since recognition of an object arises only from a memory of JD
object.
2. As_ for the status of memory within the Nyiiya-Vaise~ikas, Potter states (EIP.Il.172):
Prasastapiida says memory is a form of true knowledge (vidyii), but nevertheless ·does
not classify memory as a pramii~a. Jayanta explains that memory is not to be counted
as true knowledge (pramii) because its content is not among its causal factors: when
we remember x it is the trace produced by x, and not x itself, which is the crucial
causal factor.[', .. ] (According-to Uddayana), memory never represents its object cor-
rectly, since it always leaves out some of the properties previously noted or adds
others not initially present.
As for recognition, Potter comments (EIP.ll.173) that "recognition (pratyabhijfiii) is different
from memory, since in it we judge with respect to a presented object that it is the object we
were previously acquainted with".
2634 Treatise of the Refutation of the Person (Pudgalaprati~edhaprakara1_1a)
from such causes as-(1) attention, (2) association, (3) retentiveness, (4) in-
dicative, (5) distinguishing feature, (6) likeness, (7) ownership, (8) supporter,
(9) supported, (10) relationship, (11) sequence, (12) separation, (13) co-pro-
fession, (14) enmity, (15) superiority, (16) acquisition, (17) cover, (18) pleasure
and pain, (19) desire and aversion, (20) fear, (21) need, (22) profession, (23) af-
fection, (24) merit and (25) demerit. (Siitra 41).
1. Attention-the fixing of the mind, with the desire to recollect something, and
the pondering of the peculiarities of the thing desired to be recalled-is a cause of
recollection.
2. Association-is either (i) the arranging of several things in a connected chain,
things so connected bringing about the recollection of one another, either in the order
in which they have been arranged, or in some oilier order; or (ii) the fixing of things
(in the plexuses of the body) to be remembered with those already known-such
connecting being done with the help of the science of concentration (yoga).
3. Retentiveness-the faculty produced by the repeated cognition of like things;
and this quality of faculty, belonging to the soul, is called retentiveness, this also like
others, is a cause of recollection.
4. Indicative-this is of four kinds-(i) conjunct, ( ii) inherent, ( iii) co-inherent in
one substratum, and (iv) contradictory; (i) e.g., smoke is the conjunct "indicative" of
fire; (ii) the horn is the inherent "indicative" of the bull; (iii) the hand is the co-
inherent "indicative" of the feet; and as also color of touch; and (iv) the non-material
substance is the contradictory "indicative" of the material substance.
5. Distinguishing feature-as found in a living being-reminds us of the race of
family to which that being belongs, in such forms as "this belongs to the race of the
Vidas", "this belongs to the family of the Gargas", and so forth.
6. Likeness-the likeness of Devadatta in the pictures reminds us of Devadatta.
7. Ownership-the master reminds us of the servant, and the servant of the master.
8. Supporter-one is reminded by the landlord of his tenants.
9. Supported-the servant reminds one of the landlord.
JO. Relationship-the pupil reminds one. of the teacher, and the priest of the person
at whose sacrificial performance he officiates.
11. Sequence-as in the case of a i;iumber of acts to be done one after the other (the
preceding reminds us of the succeeding).
12. Separation-when one is separated from a person and feels the separation, he
remembers him frequently.
13. Co-profession-one cutter reminds us of another cutter.
14. Enmity-of two rivals the sight of one reminds us of the other.
15. Superiority-reminds us of that which has produced the superiority.
16. Acquisition-when one has either acquired a thing, or wishes to acquire it, he is
frequently reminded of it.
17. Cover-when the sword is remembered by its scabbard.
2636 Treatise of the Refutation of the Person (Pudgalaprati:jedhaprakara,:ia)
1,8. Pleasure and pain-remind one of what is liked and what is disliked.
19. Desire and aversion-remind one of what is liked and what is disliked.
20. Fear-reminds one of the cause of fear.
21. Need-reminds one of what he needs, in the shape of food or clothing.
22. Profession-the chariot-maker is recalled by the chariot.
23. Affection--one frequently remembers the woman whom he loves.
24. Merit-reminds one of his previous births; and
25. Demerit-reminds one of the causes of pain suffered in the past.
These several causes of recollection are never cognized at the same time; hence no
simultaneous recollections are possible.
The Sutra is merely suggestive of what causes recollection; it is by no means exhaus-
tive.
4. As for Section 4.1 in relation to the AKB, Jaini comments (CPBS.284f.):
We already have referred to Vasubandhu's brief definition of smrti [AKB ii. 24] and
how it was understood as mindfulness by the Vaibhii~ikas. However, in his appendix
to the Abhidharmakosabhii:jya, called the Pudgalaviniscaya, Vasubandhu provides us
with detailed material on smrti, not as he defined it earlier as mindfulness, but as
memory of the past. ...
Vasubandhu's stipulation that smrti is a special type of mental event (citta-vise:ja), a
representative cognition of the past object, removes the necessity to postulate a sepa-
rate dharma called smrti. By being a type of mental event, smrti thus already is in-
cluded in the consciousness aggregate (vijnlina-skandha), and hence there is no need
to postulate a new dharma by that name.
169
LVP: Kiokuga cites a Vijfiaptimiitra commentary: "If the self is not real, who remembers,
who recognizes things, who recites and retains books, who repeats texts, who loves some and
hates others, who loves what is good and hates the rest?" ... The Viitsiputriyas have a reason-
ing: "[In the system of our adversaries], sentient beings (sattva) do not remember, because
they are not 'self', like space."
Explanations of the cause of memory, six different explanations, MYS, 55a18: There are
scholars who maintain that the self, in its nature, is real, [namely,] the Viitsiputriyas who say:
"We say that there is a self that remembers what has been done; for first one experiences
things oneself, then one remembers them oneself. If there were no self, how could one remem-
ber what has been done? ... " Again, there are scholars who say: "The previous thought goes
and says to the later thought: I have done this; as for you, retain it and remember it .... It is in
this way that one remembers what has been done."
MVS, 56a7, explains the "right" doctrine of the Sarviistiviidins.
For an explanation of memory in the Madhyamaka school, see notably Bodhicarylivatliia,
ix. 24 (against the Vijfianaviida), 73 (against the Pudgalaviida), 101.
On memory, see Kosa, i. 33; ii. 24, 26a; vi. 15b.
LS: 1. As for smrti and pratyabhijfilina, Griffiths comments in his On Being Buddha (p. 194f.):
Endnotes to Chapter Nine 2637
The standard Buddhist account of memory employs two technical terms: smrti and
pratyabhijiiiina. Here, for reasons that will become apparent, I shall translate the for-
mer as "re-presentation" (in the sense of presenting again what has been presented
before), and the latter as "recognition". ·
The former will denote the reappearance in a given mental continuum (cittasantiina)
of the complete experiential content, including the phenomenal properties or subjec~
tive character, of a preceding moment or moments of experience. Examples: I hear
again music I heard twenty years ago; I see again the buttons on a coat my mother
used to wear when I was a child; .... In all cases the re-presentation (smrti) is of the
complete experiential content of the original experience.
Recognition (pratyabhijniina) denotes a conscious acknowledgment or judgment on
/.the part of the subject that an experience she has just had was in fact an instance of
re-presentation. So, for- example, I acknowledge to myself that the music I just heard
with my mind's ear was a re-presentation of the version of Beethoven's Seventh
Symphony that I heard in the Royal Albert Hall when I was fifteen. And so forth.
Griffiths elaborates in his Memory in Classical Indian Yogiiciira (IMM.117):
Recognition [pratyabhijniina] follows from memory by way of a conceptuaHzed
(and perhaps even vocalized) judgment that (iti) the experience in question is an
instance of memory [smrti]. Paradigmatically, the judgment in question is of the.form
I saw this.
2. In the AKB smrti, smara,;za, etc., are discussed and translated variously according to dif-
ferent contexts (conceptualizing activity consisting of reco!lecting; mindfulness; applications
· of mindfulness; memory; etc.): see i. 33; ii. 24; v, F 6f; vi. 14ff; ix, F 273-79.
See in particular our endnote to the general permeating factor mindfulness (smrti; ii. 24).
As for the distinction with sensory cognitions, Griffiths comments in his On Being Mindless
(p. 100): "Memory-events, for Buddhist, are phenomenologically distinct from sensory cogni-
tions; the former are indistinct or unclear whereas the latter are distinct or clear."
170
LS: Vasubandhu responds to the opponents' objection with what Duerlinger (IBTP.240)
dubs the no self account of memory, i.e., "that a memory of an object arises from a mind that
(1) is causally connected to a prior discrimination of a character of the object, (2) is attracted
to the object, (3) possesses, among other things, ·a discrimination of a character of an object
associated with or similar to the object that was previously discriminated, and (4) is not inhib-
ited in its action of producing the memory of the object".
111
LVP: According to the Vyiikhyii, one can reconstruct the Bhii$ya: smrtivi$ayasaf!'l-
jniinvayiic cittavise$iit smara,;zaf!'I bhavati pratyabhijniinaTfl vii I kfdrsiic cittavise$iit I tad-
iibhogasadrsasal'flbandhisaTfljniidimatas cittavise$iid iisrayavise$asokavyiik$epiidyanupahata-
prabhiivat I tiidrso py atadanvaya~ [smara,;zaTfl] bhiivayitum [asamartha~] I [niipy] anyiidrso 'pi
[tadanvaya~].
WOG.710.32ff: smrtivi$ayasaTfljniinvayiic cittivise$iid iti I smrtivi~ayo 'nubhuto 'rthal>-1 tatra
sarpjfia sanvayo hetur asyeti smrtivi1?ayasarpjfianvaya9- I cittavisel?al>- kirpcid eva cittarp na
sarvam ity artha1>, I tasmiit smaralJal'fl bhavati pratyabhijiilinal'fl vii I evam ubhayavise1?a1,1e krte
prcchati kfdrsiic cittavise$ad iti I iiha I tadiibhoga iti vistara1>, I yasmin smartavya abhogas
2638 Treatise of the Refutation of the Person (Pudgalaprati~edhaprakara,:ia)
by Sautriintika thinkers [as, for example, in AKB v. 2a]; in their view, seeds exist
in every mental continuum (cittasantana) with the capacity (sakti or samarthya) to
engender memory-events in that same continuum. These seeds can lie dormant for
long periods of time, being planted at the time when the original experience occurred
and growing to manifest maturity when the later memory of that original experience
occurs.
172
LS: LVP has " ... because these two thoughts belong to the same stream", which must be
a mistake.
173
LS: See also section 4.14 on the Sautriintika theories of seeds (bfja), stream (sal'[ltati),
transformation (pari,:zama) and "distinctive characteristic" or the culminating point of this
transformation(vise,l'a), as well as the epistemological discussion in the endnote to iii, F 104.
174
LVP: The Vyakhya provides the text of the Bha,l'ya when it explains (below F 278-79)
the discussion concerning the question [WOG.712.11]: "In the absence of the self, who cog-
nizes?" evarri ko vijanatiti vistarai;i. It suffices to replace vijanati with smarati, and vijiiiina
with smara,:za.
Bha,l'ya [WOG.712.11]: asaty iitmani ka e~a vijiiniiti I vijiiniifiti ko 'rthal;i I vijiiiinena vi~ayaiµ
gflu)iiti I kiiµ tad grahai:iam anyad vijiiiiniit I vijiianaiµ tarhi karoti I uktal;i sa yas tat karoti
vijfianahetur indriyarthamanaskarall I
• In the discussion of memory, read: smara,:zahetuf:, smrtivi,l'ayasal'[ljfianvayaf:, ... (as F 274,
note).
yat tarhi caitro vijiiniifity ucyate I tato hi caitriikhyiit saiµtaniidvijiiiinodbhavaiµ dmvocyate•
(?) I [WOG.712.lSf.).
• MS. -sal'[ltanad bhavadr,l'tyocyate. -The meaning, according to Paramiirtha, is clear: "One
says that Caitra discerns because one sees a discernment (vijfiana) to arise from the stream
called Caitra."
175
LVP: Paramiirtha, "Not different from memory, for memory grasps"; Hsiian-tsang: "Not
different from memory, only [grasping] comes from the agent."
176
LS: Whereas in Section 4.1, the central issue discussed was whether or not a self plays a
causal role in the production of a memO!Y or recognition of an object and, in Section 4.2,
whether or not a self as the agent of remembering is necessary, Section, 4.3 discusses whether
or not a self as an owner or possessor of the memory is necessary even if a self is'not needed
to produce the memory.
177
L VP: asaty iitmani kasyedaiµ vijiiiinaiµ I kimarthai~ii ~a~thI I sviimyarthii I yathii kal;i kasya
svamI I yathii gos caitral;i I katham asau tasyai;i sviimI I tadadhino hi tasyii viihadohiidi~u
vil ;.yogal;i I kva punar vijiiiinaiµ viniyoktavyaiµ yata etasya sviimI mrgyate I vijiiatavyiirthe I
0
178
LS: Duerlinger states (IBTP.248) that the Nyiiya-Vaise~ikas call "directing a memory to
the object to be remembered" what we might describe as the calling up of a memory-impres-
sion.
179
LVP: According to the commentators of Hsiian-tsang, these scholars are the Saiµkhyas;
according to the Vyiikhyii, this phrase refers to the Grammarians (Vaiyakiiraf).as); for Stcher-
batsky, Vasubandhu here continues the controversy with theVatsiputriyas: and indeed the
Vyakhya says that the intent of this argument is to_ establish the existence of the person
(pudgald). - See Kosa, iii. 28a, for a discussion of dependent origination (pratftyasamutpiida)
and a refutation of the "objection of the Grammarians" (vaiyiikara,:iacodya): "There is no
action (kriyii) without an agent (akartrkii)." The action of arising (bhiiti) is not different from
the one who arises (bhavitar).
LS: While LVP does not commit himself here as to who these scholars are, Duerlinger is in-
clined to think that they are the Nyiiya-Vaise~ikas.
As for Section 4.4 itself, Duerlinger thinks (IBTP.253) that it is primarily based on a gram-
matical consideration.
180
LVP: yo 'py iiha I bhiivasya bhavitrapek~atviid [litmlisti .. . ] [WOG.712.26].
181
LVP: vijfiiitrii bhavitavyam Ipudgalenety abhipriiyaJ:i [WOG.712.27].
182
LS: In this objection the opponents claim that Vasubandhu cannot explain how Devadatta
walks since a momentary entity cannot move and since for Vasubandhu Devadatta is the same
in existence as a collection of momentary aggregates.
183_ LS: Here Vasubandhu explains that conventionally it can be said that Devadatta walks
because the causal stream of the aggregates in dependence upon which the person is conceived
can change, although the momentary aggregates themselves are not capable of change.
184
LVP: gacchatigamanlibhidhiinavad iti I yathii jviilii gacchati sabdo gacchatiti gacchati-
sabdiibhidhiinam I yathii jviiliiyii.J:i sabdasya vii gamanam evaiµ devadatto gacchati devadattasya
gamanam Ianena dr~tantena vijlinliti devadatta iti sidhyati [WOG.712.28ff.].
It is an opinion of the Sarviistivadins that movement (gati) (or displacement [gamana]) is im-
possible, iv. 2b (F 4-5).
185
LS: Here Vasubandhu presents the Sautriintika theory of direct perception. Duerlinger
comments (IBTP.257) that "Vasubandhu's reply is to say that a consciousness apprehending
an object is an effect that conforms to its cause, which is its object, and that an effect that con-
forms to its cause receives a form like that of its cause and is not an agent that engages in an
activity. So since a consciousness apprehending an object just is its reception of a form like
that of its cause, which is its object, it is not an agent that engages in an activity."
186
LVP: akurvad api kirµcid iti. - Vyakhyii [WOG.712.31f.]: parispandam akurvad apity
arthaJ:i I
187
LVP: siidrsyenlitmaliibhiid iti. - WOG.712.31: kiiral_lasadrsyena kiiryiitmaliibhiit.
"Conforms to its seed", "to reproduce the seed", Hsiian tsang: (Ch.) ch'.ou (key 164) = to make
similar, conform.
The MVS, 480a14, explains that one cannot attribute the activity of conjunction (sarµyoga),
accompaniment (samanvligama) (Ch.: ch'eng chiu, Rosenberg, 204; below F 285, sarriyoga
Endnotes to Chapter Nine 2641
= Ch.: ho) either to a person (pudgala) or to factors (dharma): the first does not exist, the
second are lacking in any activity. No factor (dharma) is either the agent or the object of an
activity of conjunction (sarriyoga). But, just as there is cause-effect, defilement-purity, fetter-
liberations, process-stopping, so too the quality of being connected (sarriyukta) or unconnected
(asarriyukta) exists.
LS: Dhammajoti (SA.IV.264f.) translates and comments on this important, often quoted pas-
sage:
It is said in the siitra, "consciousness cognizes". Herein what does conscious-
ness do?
It does nothing .... Although doing nothing, consciousness is said to cognize
because of the obtaining of itself resembling [the object] (siidrseniitma-liibhad
akurvad api kilµcit)-[i.e., with the object as its supporting condition, it simply
arises as an effect resembling the object]. What is its resemblance [with the
object]? This consists in having the form or aspect of that. [object] (tadiikiiratii).
Given the proper context-especially Vasubandhu's usage6f the term iikiira (equated
with the resemblance of the object) here-this doctnrie, as so~e scholars like La
Vallee Poussin [Siddhi, F 445] assert, can be c~nsidered a Sautrii.ntika one. Never-
theless, even the Vaibhii.~ika would have no objection to the statement that conscious-
ness in this process does nothing in particufar. Sarp.ghabhadra too accepts that it is
only with regard to the specific nature of dharma that one speaks tn conventional
terms of an agent, so as to refute the view that apart from consciousness there exists
a real agent which is conscfous; consciousness act11ally does notpin~ in the percep-
tual process [Ny, 342a; SPrS, 783c]:
In what other situations does one see the reference of an agent as a conventional
expression (prajfiapti) to nothing more than the nature of a dharma? One sees in
the world that people speak of a shadow as that which moves. In this case there
is no moveme~t; but when it arises in a different place in the following moment
(anantaram),/it is said to move. The same is true for the case of consciousness;
when it ariS~s serially with regard to a different object, it is said to be that which
cognizel--i.e., it cognizes the object-even though there [really] is no action
[on its part].
188
LVP: tadiikiiratii = nilii.divi~ayii.kii.ratii. [WOG.712.33]. -The consciousness of blue has
a blue "aspect".
189
LVP: vijfiiinaktira7,1abhiiviit = vijfiii.narp. vijfiii.nii.ntarasya kii.raQ.am ... [WOG.712.33f.].
LS: Thus consciousness is not (IBTP.247) "an agent or producer because it is signified by a
noun to which the active verb, 'apprehends', is attached, but because it produces another con-
sciousness".
190
LVP: kiira7,1e kartrsabdanivesiid iti. - Vyiikhya [WOG.713.2]: kii.raQ.arp. karq·bhiitam iti
kp:va I tad yathii nii.dasya kii.raQ.arp. ghaQ.ta iti ghaQ.to rautity ucyate.
191
LS: Duerlinger comments (IBTP. 257) that a ring of a bell is "an agent or producer in the
sense that in a causal continuum of rings of a bell a ring at one moment produces a ring\in the
next moment".
2642 Treatise of the Refutation of the Person (Pudgalaprati~edhaprakarm:,,a)
192
LVP: WOG.713.4ff: arci:jiil'{l sal'{ltiine pradfpa iti upacaryate eka iveti kftvii Isa sal'{l-
tiinariipaJ:i pradipo desiinfare~utpadyamiinas ta'!l ta'!l deia'!l gacchatfty ucyate I eva'!l cittiinii'!l
sal'{ltiine vijfiiinam ity upacaryate ekam iveti krtvii I tat sal'{ltiinarupal'fl vijniinal'fl vi:jaya-
antare:jutpadyamiina'!l ta'!l ta'!l vi:jaya'!l vijiiniitfty ucyate I saxµtiinena vijfiiinotpattyii vijaniitity
abhipriiyal:J. [WOG.713.4ff.].
193
LVP: yathii ca bhavitu rupasya bhiiviij janitur jiitel:J. sthiituI:i sthiter anarthiintaratvam evaxµ
vijfiane 'pi syiid vijfiiitur vijfianasya vijniinad bhiiviid anarthantaratvaxµ [WOG.713.9f.].
Paramiirtha states: As the world says: "color exists, arises, lasts". Now the "agent of existing"
(bhavitr), etc., does not differ from existence (bhiiva) and yet nevertheless one employs two
words. Likewise, one employs two words for consciousness (vijniina).
194
LVP: The Siiqikhyas according to Kiokuga. - The Vaise~ikas, according to the Vyiikhyii:
vaise:jikamatiinusiiriid vii ... [see WOG.713.1 lf.].
LS: What is at issue in Section 4.7 is how the variations in the causal stream of thoughts, which
are undeniable, could be explained if there were no self as an agent who changes the order in
which thoughts arise.
195
LV,P: kasmiin na nityaxµ sadrsam evotpadyate na ca kramaniyamena [see WOG.713.23ff.].
Why dqes one, successively, have the notion of cow (gobuddhi), the notion of woman (strf-
buddhi), the notion of buffalo (mahi:jabuddhi)? Why does the notion of buffalo not follow the
notion of cow?
The Japanese editor understands: "Why is the latter thought not similar to the former thought,
wholesome, defiled, etc? ... "
196
· LVP: nikamadhyiinsamiihitiinii'!l sadrsakiiyacittotpattau [katha'!l] svaya'!l vyutthiinam. -
Vyiikhyii [WOG.713.21f.]: nikamena paryiiptena samaptep.a dhyanena samiihitaniim ....
197
LVP: kramo 'pi hi cittiinii'!l niyata eva [WOG.~13.25fl].
198
LVP: See, for example, Kosa, ii. 71b.
199
LVP: gotravise:jiid iti bhiivaniivise~at [WOG.713.26]. - Below, gotra is explained as
"seed" (bfja). - The gloss "particular perfuming" (bhiivaniivise:jiit) protects the translation,
"because of the particular manner in which they perfume the stream".
200
LVP: [WOG.713.26ff.:] strfcittiid iti vistaral:J. I strfcittiit (= stryiilambaniic cittiid) anantara'!l
tatkayavidu:far:iiicittam (= tasyiil;i striyiil;i kiiyasya vidu:ja'f)iiyai yadi parivriijakasya anyasya vii
siidhos cittam utpannal'{l bhavati) tatpatiputriidicittal'{l vii (= tasyiil:J. patiputriidayal:J. I iidi-
sabdena duhitriidayo grhyante I tadiilambanaxµ cittaxµ tatpatiputriidicittam). - Hsiian-tsartg:
" ... the thought of the impure body".
201
LVP: punas ca sal'{ltatiparir:iamena strfcittam utpadyate [WOG.713.31f.]. - See ii. 36
(F 1855.
202
LVP: tat pasciid utpannaxµ stri-citta'!l samartha'!l bhavati tatkiiyavidu,ra,:iiicittotpiidane tat-
patiputracittotpiidane vii I kasmiit I tatgotratviid iti I tadkiiyavidu,rar:iiicitta'!l tatpatiputriidicitta'!l
vii gotra'!l bfjam asyeti tadgotra'!l ... anyathety atadgotraxµ [see WOG.713.32ff.].
203
L VP: atha punal;i paryiiyer:ieti vistaral:J. I paryiiye1_1a ayugapat I stricittiit tatkayavidu~a1_1ii-
dttam I tatas tatpaticittam I tatas tatputracittam I tata eva ca tadduhitrcittam I tata eva ca tadupa-
kara1_1adicittam utpannal'{l bhavati I tatal;i stricittiid anantarotpannebhyas cittebhyo yad bahu-
Endnotes to Chapter Nine 2643
taraf(I pravahatal,l pa!utaraf(I saktita lisannataraf(I vlisyotplidyasya cittasya tad eva cittam ut-
padyate I tadbhiivanlibalapa!utvlit (MS. balaf(I yastvlit) tasya bahutarasya patutarasyasanna-
0
208
LS: 1. Duerlinger comments (IBTP.262) that in the long and complifated argument in
Section 4.7.1, Vasubandhu tries to show that the objection which was leveled against him in
Section 4.7 is actually a consequence which arises from the Nyii.ya-Vais~~ikas' own theory
that thoughts arise from a self.
For more details on how Vasubandhu might construct his two-part-root-objpction based on the
theses 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the TPM, see IBTP.263. This objection is, according to Duerlinger
(IBTP.263), based on the assumption that "if a self is a permanent phenomenon, an internal
organ is a permanent phenomenon, and a self is conjoined with an internal prgan, then a self is
always conjoined with an internal organ".
2. The Nyii.ya-Vaise~ikas, of course, think that they would not have to accept this assump-
tion, since they believe that the relational qualities (gu,;ia) "conjunction" (:saf!fyoga) and "dis-
junction" (vibhiiga) of permanent substances (dravya), like the self (iitm~n) and the internal
organ (manas), can change, since they are not the same in existence as the ,substances in which
they inhere. Thus, from their point of view, substances do not have to change when their quali-
ties do.
Hattori presents their main ontological categories and their relationship af the beginning of his
summary of the Vaise~ikasiitras (EIP.Il.212f.):
i. Entities are arranged under six categories (padiirtha), namely, (i) substance (dravya),
(2) quality (gu,;ia), (3) motion (karman), (4) genus (siimiinya), (5) species (vise~a) and
(6) inherence (samaviiya).
ii. The characteristic feature of (J) substance (dravya) consists: in its (a) possessing
motion [if material], (b) possessing qualities and (c) being an inherence cause of
motion and quality.
iii. The characteristic feature of (2) quality (gu,;ia) consists in its (a) residing in sub-
stance, (b) not possessing qualities and (c) being, when independent, not a cause of
contact or disjunction.
iv. The characteristic feature of (3) motion (karman) consists in its (a) possessing one
substance, (b) possessing no qualities and (c) being an independent cause of contact
and disjunction.
v. Excepting Being (bhiiva), (4) genera (siimiinya) such as substanceness, quality-hood
and motion-hood may be regarded as (5) species (vise~a) from another point of view.
The ultimate species (antya vise~a) is never regarded as a genus.
vi. Being (bhiiva) is the cause of the notion "exist" in respect to substances, qualities and
motions.
vii. (6) Inherence (samaviiya) is the cause of the notion that (A is) "here" (in B) with
respect to effect (kiirya) and cause (kiira,;ia).
viii. There are nine substances, viz., earth (prthivt), water (iipas), fire (tejas), air (viiyu),
iikiisa, time (kiila), place (dis'), self (iitman), ~nd internal organ (manas).
Thus, qualities (cf: endnote to ii, F 198) are ontologically distinct fiom the substances in which
they inhere, but depend on them as their substrata.
3. As for the self (iitm,m), Frauwallner comments (GIP.Il.97ff; translation is by LS):
Endnotes to Chapter Nine
The self possesses infinite size (paramaltattvam), that is to say, it is unlimited or, as
[Vaise~ikas] expressed themselves, formless (amurta?i). At the same time, it is all-
penetrating (vibhul:z) and omnipresent (sarvagatal:i). The self, therefore, also exists
there where other things are; it is, as was said, at the same place as all things con-
necJ~d with it, a,re (sarvasal'J'lyogi-samilnadesal:z). From this it follows further, that
the self cannot ~e impenetrable and cannot put up resistance to other things. The
Vaise~ikas thus_,spoke of the subtlety (sauk~myam) of the self. [... ] Furthermore, the
self does not consist of distinct parts. [... ] Further, from the absence of parts, it
seems that the partlessness of the self was inferred. [ ... ] Under such circumstances,
how could the activity of the soul be comprehended? [ ... ] The Vaise~ikas interpreted
the activity of the self as the will-impulse which brings about action by setting in
motion the body and the organs, and this will-impulse was called effort (prayatnal:i),
[ ... ] and declared it to be a state or quality of the self [along with the other specific
qualities: cognitions (buddhi), desires (icchli), hatred (dveia), and feelings of pleas-
ure (sukha) and pain du[lkha), and its common qualities: conjunction (sa7J1yoga) and
disjunction (vibhiiga)]. Since the self was considered to be omnipresent (sarvagatal:i),
the question had to be addressed whether the same also applies to the qualities. This
was denied and the qualities of the self were declared to occur as being limited in
terms of place (pradesavrttitvam). [ ... ] The qualities of the self were considered to
have only the duration of !l moment (k~anikatvam) since they are by nature imper-
manent. In this way' the qu~ities of the self were not only considered to be limited in
terms of place but also limited in terms of time to the shortest time-period. Thereby,
however, the qualities of the self had to appear next to the omnipresent permanent
self as something external, which does not belong to the self's nature. [ ... ]But this
means that they are not qualities which determine the nature of the self and bestow
on it a special character, [... ] rather, they have nothing to do with the actual nature of
the self.
209
LVP: The version of Hstian-tsang deviates from the original on many ·points:
If they say that the different kinds of consciousnesses (vijfllina) depend (apek~a) on
the different kinds of conjunction [of the self] with the internal organ (manas), we
answer: No;
1. because the conjunction of the self with another thing is not proved;
2. because the conjunction'of two things is limited (Ch.: fen-hsien) [that is to
say, two things can only join on one side]. They themselves define conjunc-
tion: "possession following upon non-possession": the conjunction of the
self and the internal organ (manas) should be limited;
3. because, if the internal organ changes (Ch.: i-ch'uan), the self should also
change;
4. or else, the self should perish with the internal organ.
If they say that conjunction is partial: No. For there are not diverse parts in one self.
·To suppose that there would be a conjunction, the self being permanent, the internal
organ not being modified (Ch.: pieh-i), how will conjunction be diverse?
If they answer that [this diversity] depends on the diversity of cognition (buddhi), the
2646 Treatise of the Refutation of the Person (Pudgalaprati$edhaprakara,:ia)
difficulty is the same [as wheni they explain that the different kinds of conscious-
nesses depend on the different kinds of conjunction of the self with the internal
organ]: we ask how cognition is diverse.
If they say that, in dependence on "subliminal impressions" (sa,µskara), the conjunc-
tion of the self and the mental organ is diverse (Ch.: jo tai hsing pifh wo i ho che), it
is necessary that a single thought, in dependence on a variety of subliminal impres-
sions, produces the variety of the consciousnesses (vijfiana). From that time on, what
will be the use of the self?
210
LS: Frauwallner (GIP.II.123ff; translation is by LS) explains that the Vaise~ikas "contrast
qualities which are bound to a specific substance and are characteristic for it (vaise~ikagu,:ial:t),
with qualities which are common to different substances (samanyagu,:ial:t)". - With the rise of
the doctrine of categories, conjunction (sa:µyogal:t) "w1,1s bound to become a quality (gu,:ial:t)
that inheres in the conjoined things and lets them appear as being conjoined, and since this
quality inheres in the different substances, it was naturally declared to be a common quality".
He continues to explain that this quality "conjunction" (sa'!lyoga) plays a rather important role
in the doctrine of categories of the classical Vaise~ika system. Among others, the cooperation
of the self (atman) and internal organ (manas) was explained through their conjunction.
As to the nature of the quality "conjunction", it wa~ defined as the joining of two
things, which so far were not joined together (apraptayol; praptil:t). Conjunction is
possible with limited (martal;) substances [i.e., earth (prthivi), water (apas), fire
(tejas), air (vayu), internal organ (,nanas), all of which are material,] as well as with
unlimited (amurtal;) substances (dravyam) [i.e., space (akasa), time (kala), spatial
direction (dis), self (atmari)]. The limited substances may well conjoin with each
other, as well as limited substances with unlimited substances, but the conjunction of
unlimited substances amongst themselves is impossible. These exist since eternity
next to one another without forming a conjunction, because this could occur, accord-
ing to the mechanistic way of thinking of the Vaise~ikas, only through motion, that is
to say, through a change of place, and a change of place is not possible among infi-
nitely great substances. [... ] Conjunction [... ] is a quality which inheres at the same
time in several substances (anekasrital:t), namely, the substanqes which it conjoins.
While other qualities, like color, taste, etc., attach themselves permanently to their substance,
"conjunction is/by contrast, an impermanent quality, which arises in its substrate and ceases
again. Its cause' is thereby, as a rule, a motion, namely, the motion which leads to the conjunc-
tion of the things
-,
concerned."
I
211 LVP: mana};sa'!lyogavise~apek~atvad iti cet I syan mataiµ tulye 'py atmaprabhavatve
cittotpatter atma"-kad_acit ka[da]cin manal_isaiµyogavise~am apek~ata ity ato na nityaiµ tadrsaiµ
cittam utpadyate na ca-lcramaniyamel}.a ailkurakiil}.c;lapattradivat [WOG.715.3ff.].
LS: Frauwallner comments (GIP.II.68) that in con,tra~t to the mind (manas) in the Saiµkhya
system, "no cognitive process~s occur in the mental o~gan (,nanas) of the Vaise~ikas. The cog-
nitive processes belong exclusively to the sphere o~ the self (atman). The mental organ is,
rather, a mere tool; namely, a mediating organ, just a~ the sense-organs, with which it is often
placed on the same level." This mediating organ limi'ts the activity of the self to a particular
iGea or sphere. GIP.Il.68ff. states (tral}slation is by LS)l, .1
Endnotes to Chapter Nine 2647
It was said that the self does not contact the sense-organs directly, but rather needs its
own organ for this. And since this organ is minutely small, the activity of the self can
extend only to a small area or sphere. Further, it was said that this organ lacks the
quality of tangibility and, therefore, it can move unhindered everywhere. The great
speed of its movement explains the quick change or succession pf the cognitive proc-
esses. [ ... ] Originally it was only the mediating organ that established the connection
with the self and the sense-organs. Later, the activity of the mental organ was ex-
tended to all mental processes and the respective arii;ing of particular mental ap-
pearances was explained based on its activity. [ ... ] B1.1Lsince the function of the
mental organ consists in directing and limiting the activity of the self to a particular
point, it follows from this that at all time only one mental process, in particular only
one cognition, is possible, even though this cognition might be of composite nature.
If occasionally we have the impression that several perceptions occur at the same
time, this is based on a deception and on the swiftness or speed with which these
perceptions succeed one another. Since two cognitive processes cannot coexist, each
new cognition replaces the previous one, just to make, in tum, room again for the
following cognition. Thus all mental occurrences break up into a rapid succession of
particular cognitive processes.
Thus, even though the self and the mental organ are permanent, for the Nyiiya-Vaise~ikas it
does not follow that the same kinds of minds always arise. The reason why different kinds of
thought arise and why they can arise in a non-fixed order is that the "self having different
conjunctions with the internal organ is the cause of the arising of different kinds of minds"
(IBTP.264).
212
LVP: WOG.715.6ff: na I anyasarriyogiisiddhe/:1 I naitad evam I kasmiit I tiibhyiim iitma-
manobhyiirn anyasya saqiyogasyiisiddhel:, I na hi saqiyogo niirna bhiiva):, kascid asmiikaqi
siddho 'sti. - A Buddhist does not accept the existence of an entity called conjunction C~arri-
yoga).
213
LVP: WOG.715.Sff: sarriyoginos ceti vistara):, I abhyupagate 'pi saqiyoge saqiyogi~ot,
lokaprasiddhayoh kii~thayor anyayor vii kayos cit paricchinnatviit paricchinnadesadr~tatvii<l ity
artha):, I
214
LVP: lalqa,:uivyiikhyiiniic ceti I vaise~ikatantre sarµyogalak~al).anirdesiit [WOG.715.1 lf.].
215
LVP: This is the definition of the Dasapadiirthf, H. Ui, see The Vaisefika Philosophy,
1917, p. 251. - Stcherbatsky cites Prasastapiida: apriiptayo/:1 priipti/:1 sarriyoga/:1, and observes
that Vaise#kasiitra, vii. 2, 9, differs.
216
LVP: tata/:1 kim I iitmanalJ paricchedaprasatigalJ. Vyiikhyii [WOG.715.12ff.]: paricchinna-
desatvaprasatiga/:1 I yatriitmii na tatra mana/:1 yatra mano na tatriitmeti. [There where the self
is, there is not the internal organ].
aneniinumiiniigamiipattito dharmavise~aviparyayo 'sya pak~asy~ sarµdarsito bhavati I manasii
saqiyoga iitmana iti I iitmii dharmI I tasya vise~a):, sarvagatvaqi I tadviparyayo 'sarvagatatvam
iti.
217
LVP: Addition of Paramiirtha.
218
LVP: tato-manalJsarriciiriid iitmana/:1 sa"f!lciiraprasatigo viniisasya vii.
2648 Treatise of the Refutation of the Person (Pudgalaprati~edhaprakara,:ia)
224
LVP: saty iitmani tayolJ sa,µbhava iti cet I syiin matarµ saty iitmani tayol;i sarµskiiracittayol;i
sarµbhava ity ato 'sty iitmeti I atra briimo viirimiitra,µ Iniitra kii cid yuktir astiti.
iisrayalJ sa iti cet I syiin matam iitmiisrayas tayor iti I yathii ka!J kasyiisraya iti I iisraya-
riipe1_1odiihara1_1arµ mrgyate I tam asyiisrayiirtham ayuktarµ darsayann iiha I na hi te iti vistaral;i I
te sarµskiiracitte citrabadariidivat I yathii ku<;lye citram iidhiiryarµ badararµ ca ku1_1<;1e I adi-
sabdena b~iijane bhojanam ity iidi I naiva -te sarµskiiracitte tatriitmany iidheye iidhiirye I niipi sa
kut;lyakw;u;iiidivad iidhiiro yuktalJ ... I ki,µ kiira1_1am ity aha Ipratighiititvayutatviidido~iid iti prati-
_ghiititvado!jiid yutatvado!}iic ca I sapratighatvaprasailgiit prthagdesatvaprasailgiic cety arthal;i
I yathii citrabadarayol;i ku<;lyaku1_1<;1ayos ciidhiiryiidhiirabhiive pratighiititvarµ yutatvarµ ca dme
evam ete!}iim api syiit ani!}!arµ caitad ato 'niitmiisrayal;i I [WOG.716.18ff.].
225
L VP: vyapadesas tu vise~m:iartham I te hy eva prthivyiikhyii yathii vijiiliyeran niinye I
kii~fhapratimiiyiilJ §arfravyapadesavat [see WOG.717.6ff.].
Paramiirtha: "If there is no [substance] 'earth' on its own, independent from [its qualities of]
odor, etc., why does one say, of the earth, that it has four qualities? - In order to distinguish: in
order that others may know that odor, taste, etc., receive the name of 'earth', etc., that there is
no separate earth, etc. Likewise one says: wooden statue."
yadi na gandhiidibhyo 'nyii prthivf katham aya,µ vyapadesalJ Prthivyii gandhiidaya iti I anyena
hy anyasya vyapadeso df!}!as caitrasya kambala iti I ata ucyate vyapadesas tv iti vistarai;i I
vise~a,:1iirtham ity apiidibhyo vise!}a1_1iirtham ity arthal;i katham iti pratipiidayati te hy eveti.
vistaral). I te hy evety evakiiras tadvyatiriktaprthividravyanivrttyarthal). I te eva gandhadayaJ;r.
prthivyiikhyii yathii vijiiiiyeran I tathii vise!}a1_1iirtharµ vyapadesa ity abhisarµbandhaJ.:i I niinya
iti niipiidyiikhyiil). prthivyiikhyebhyo 'nye vijiiiiyerann ity arthal). I k~fhapratimiiyiilJ §arfra;
vyapadesavad iti yathii kii!}!hapratimiiyiil). sariram iti vyapadisyate 'nyiibhyo mrnmayiidibhyo
vise~a1_1iirthaiµ Ina ca kii~!hapratimiiyiil;i sariram anyad evam ihiipi vyapadesal;i syiin na ca
gandhiidibhyo 'nyii pfthiviti [WOG.717.4ff.].
226
L VP: sa,µskiiravise~iipek~atva ity iitmamanal).sarµyogasya I yo hi b.ali~,:iur iti sarµskiira-
vise~as teniinye~ii,µ saiµskiiravise~ii1_1iiiµ pratibandhalJ I sa eva bali~fhalJ kasmiin nityaf!l na
phalati ity iiciiryavacanarµ I sa eva punar iiha I yo 'sya nyiiyo yal;i sarµskiirasya nyiiyo vinasa-
pratibandho vii so 'stu bhiivaniiyii bijiitmikiiyiiJ.:i I iitmii tu nirarthako ni~prayojanal). kalpyate
I sarµskiiriirthii hi tatkalpanii syiit tasya ca sarµskiirasya yat kiiryarµ tad bhiivanayaiva kriyata iti
[WOG.717.14ff.].
On "subliminal impressions" (saf!!skiira), "particular perfuming" (bhiivaniivi§e~a), see H. Ui,
162.
221
L VP: smrtyiidfniim iti vistarai;i I sy iin matarµ smrtisarµskiirecchiidve~iidiniirµ gu,:iapadiirthatvat
tasya ca gu,:iapadiirthasyiiva§ya,µ dravyiisritatviid dravyiisrayas ca gu1_1aviin ity eva lak~a1_1opa-
desiit I na cai~iim anya iisrayalJ pfthivyiidiko yujyate pratyak~iidibhil). kiira1_1air ato ya e~iim
iisrayal). sa iitmii I tasmiid asty iitmeti.
niisiddhelJ I naitad evarµ I kasmiit smrtyiidfniirri gu,:iapadiirthatviisiddhelJ I vidyamiinarri dravyam
iti yat svalak~a1,1ato vidyamiinaiµ tad dravyam I ~a<J. dravyii~ii sriima,:iyaphaliin iti riipa-
skandhiidini paiica saiµskrtani sriima1,1yaphaliiny asarµskrtaiµ ca ~a~!ham it i:;a<;l dravyai:ii
bhavanti I niipy e~iim-iti--smfJyiidiniirµ Iparik#to hy iisrayiirtha iti I yathii kal). kasyiisrayal). ...
[WOG.717.24ff.] (above F 288, note, line4).
On the categories (padiirtha), qualities (gu,:ia), substances (dravya), see H. Ui. p. 93f.
2650 Treatise of the Refutation of the Person (Pudgalaprati~edhaprakara,:za)
Discussion on the "quality possessor" (gu~in) and the quality (gu~a), s~e Kosa, lO0ab.
228
LS: Yasomitra glosses (WOG.717.31f.): ~at dravyii~i sriima~ya-phaliinili riipa-skandha-
iidini paqica skandhiini sriima1_1ya-phaliiny asarµskftaqi ca ~a~tham iti ~at dravyiil_li bhavanti.
229
LVP: Hsiian-tsang: "But the object of the idea of 'I' is not of this kind." -The text has na
tv ahalJ'lkiiraJ:z; Vyiikhyii: na tv aham ity evamiikiiral:i pratyaya ity arthal:i [WOG.718.lt].
230
LVP: idalJ'l punas tad eviiyiitam iti kimarthai~ii ~a~thi ... [WOG.718.3] (above F 277, 1. 15).
231
L VP: pu~pito vrk~a iti dr~tanto yatra siddhiinte vrk'?iivayavi ne~yate ... yatra tu vrk~a-
avayavy asti tatra dvitiyo dr~tiintaI:i phalitalJ'l vanam iti I na hi vanaqi namii kiqi cid asti I yathii
yasmin vane phalam utpannaqi tat phalitam ity l\cyate tathii yasminn iisraye ~a<.liiyatanalak~a1_1e
sukham utpannaqi duI:ikhaqi vii sa sukhito dul:ikito vii [WOG.718.1 lff.].
232
LVP: yathii tathoktam iti I yathii krtvasrayal:i ~a<.Iiiyatanaqi tathoktaqi I tadvikaravikaritviid
asrayas cak~uriidaya ity athal:i (i. 45a) Paii.caskandhakaqi bhaviin udiiharafity adhikftaqi [s!;!e
WOG.718.16].
[Vasubandhu refers to his work called Paficaskandhaka].
233
LVP: According to Hsiian-tsang and to the Tibetan (Stcherbatsky). - Paramartha: "One
calls agent (kartar) the one who brings it about that that which did not exist, exists; one calls
enjoyer (upabhoktar) the one who presently obtains the effect of a former action."
234
LVP: Stcherbatsky: the logicians; Hsiian-tsang and Paramiirtha: those who explain the
characteristics of the factors (dharmalak~a~a). - But Stcherbatsky notes that the definition of
these scholars is that of Pii~ini, i. 4, 54: svatantraJ:z kartii.
We see, Kosa, iii. 27 (F 41), that the Grammarians (Vaiyakara1_1as) protest against the thesis
of "action without an agent" (akartrkii kriyii). In the same passage, certain scholars (kecid
viidintil!) maintain that pratftyasamutpiida supposes a basis, namely, the self (iitman).
235
LS: Duerlinger comments (IBTP.287) that in the Nyiiya-Vaise~ikas' system the agent is a
causally independent cause of actions, whereas the other causes of actions, for example, the
cognitions (buddhi), desires (icchii), hatreds (dve~a) and intentions in dependence upon which
an agent of actions causes bodily motions, are themselves caused.
236
LVP: WOG.718.19f: sa eva kartii iti sa. eva paii.caskandhalak~a1_1aI:i kartii niitmeti siddho
'rthaI:i.
237
LVP: tasya tu sviitantryalJ'l niistfti darsayann aha trividhalJ'l cedarµ, karmeti vistaraI:i I
kiiyasya cittaparatantrii vrttiJ:z cittapravartitviit kiiyakarma1_1aI:i I cittasyiipi kiiye vrttil:z sva-
kiira~aparatantrii manodharmamanaskiiriidiparatantrii I tasyiipy evam I tasya cittasvakiira1_1asya
svakiira1_1aparatantrii vfttir iti niisti kasya cid api sviitantryalJ'l kiiyasya cittasy_a cittakiira1_1asya-
anyasya vii Ipratyayaparatantrii hi sarve bhiiviiI:i
caturbhis cittacaittii hi samiipattidvayaqi tribhil:i
dviibhyiim anye tu jiiyanta
iti vacaniit (ii. 65) I
iitmano 'pi ca nirapek'?asya buddhivise~iidyutpattiiv akiira1_1atviibhyupagamiin na sviitantryalJ'l
sidhyati I tasmiin naiValJ'l lak~a~a iti svatantral:i karteti [cf. WOG.718.2lff.].
238 L VP: evaqi tarhi kartety aha I yat tu yasya pradhiinakiira~am tat tasya kartety ucyate I
priidhiinyena tat prafityotpatteI:i I sa evam api karta" na yujyate pradhiinakiira1_1abhiiveniipi na
Endnotes to Chapter Nine 2651
xvii. 13: When action arises, there also arises, in the stream, a factor (dharma) dissociated
from thought, non-defined, destroyed through cultivation (bhiivanii), called non-disappearance
(avipral)iisa) and which produces the effect of the action.
From another point of view, the sprout (ankura) cannot arise from either the destroyed seed
(bfja), or from a non-destroyed seed, Catustava, cited in Madhyamakiivatiira, 97, Bodhicarya-
avatlirapaiijikii, ix. 108.
246
LVP: karmasal!ltiinaparil)iimavise~a, see ii. 36c (F 185).
247
LVP: tadiihitarµ hi tad iti tena bijeniihitaqi tat siimarthyam ity arthal_i I [WOG.719.19].
248
LS: Duerlinger comments (IBTP.295) that weighty action is determined according to
"(l) the nature of the action, (2) the force of the motivation of the action, (3) the amount of
suffering inflicted by the action, (4) the value of the object of the action, (5) the. frequency of
the action, and (6) the use of counter-measures".
249
LVP: Hsiian-tsang: "For example the thought 'associated with grasping' at the end of life.
Although there are traces (vlisanii) projected by any type of actions capable of producing a
new existence, nevertheless, that which appears [at death] is [the thought] produced by
weighty, near and habitual action; not another. There is a stanza .... "
250
Pradhan/Gokhale: yad guru yac c iisannal!l yac ca 'bhyastal!l krtal!l ca yat piirvam I
piirval!l piirval!l piirval!l vipacyate karma sal!lsiire II [9]
LVP: 1. yathoktam iti I sthavirariihule1,1a I yqd guru yac clisannam iti vistaraJ:i I ekasmin saqitiine
catvari karma1,1i gurv iisannam abhyastaqi piirvakrtaqi ca I e~iiqi catufl,liiqi guru karma piirvam
iti tribhyas tat piirvaqi vipacyate I iisannabhyastapiirvakrtaniim apy iisannaqi piirvam iti tat
piirvaqi dviibhyiiqi vipacyate I abhyastapiirvakrtayos ciibhyastaqi piirvam iti ekasmat piirvaqi
vipacyate I asatsv ete~u piirvajanmakrtaqi vipacyate aparaparyayavedaniyam [WOG.719.20ff.].
We can reconstruct an lirya [thirty-two syllabic verse], as on F 300, note.
yad guru yac ciisannal!l [yac clibhyastal!l yat piirvakrtal!l ca] I
piirval!l piirval!l piirval!l pasciit (caramal!l ?) tat karma vipacyate I
2. Compare the very similar theory in Shwe Zan Aung, introduction to Compendium of
philosophy, p. 72: garukakamma [very impressive kamma], iisannakamma [action proximate to
death], aci,:i,:iakamma [habitual conduct], ka(attakamma [action of the cumulative reserves of
the endless past]. - On the last thought, see "Death", in Hastings' Encyclopaedia, iv; Edgerton,
Annals of the Bhandarkar Institute, viii, part 3, p. 219.
LS: This is the ninth verse mentioned for the ninth chapter in V.V. Gokhale's MS.
251
LVP: Better: ... the capability to produce the ripened effect, a capability which a cause
places in the stream ... .
See Kosa, iii. 37c. - This problem has been indicated ad iv. 50 (F 114, note), where one will
find a part of the bibliography.
The Andhakas assert that the ripened (vipiika) [effect] is itself a cause of a ripened effect
(vipakadhamma): retribution involves a new retribution (Kathlivatthu, vii. 10).
The Riijagirikas and the Siddhatthikas, in view of Suttanipiita, 654, assert: sabbam idarµ
kammato; the Theraviidins have them say that the murderer commits the murder by the
retribution of the murder: Nirvii1,1a becomes impossible (Kathlivatthu xvii. 3).
Endnotes to Chapter Nine 2653
Madhyamakiivatiira, vi. 41, shows that there is no new ripening [cause] after the ripening
[effect).
In Karmaprajfiiipti (Mdo, 62, fol. 249b), Maudgalyiiyana refutes the Nirgranthas who maintain
that any sensation proceeds from past actions (comp. Majjhima, ii. 214): the torments of
penance which the Nirgranthas impose upon themselves are, say the Nirgranthas, "retribu-
tion":
"According to us [i.e., the Nirgranthas], one experiences a new retribution from the retribu-
tion."
"Do you accept purification, liberation, Nirviil).a?"
"Yes."
"Then do not say that a new retribution arises from retribution."
We have seen, iv. 58, that satisfaction (daurmanasya) and trouble-of-thought (cittak~epa) are
not retribution, but they can necessarily proceed from turmoil of the fundamental material
elements (mahabhata), which is retribution.
I
252
LVP: Here there are a few words which I[= LVP) do not tran~late. According to Hsiian-
tsang: (Ch.) ch 'ieh fei pi yii shih fa chieh teng = "The example is not a completely similar
factor (dharma)"; according to Paramiirtha: (Ch.) tz'u chung i-ch'ieh so-li-i yii pi-i pu-pi hsi
t'ung = "Here the meaning established by all should be completely similar to the meaning of
the example."
The Japanese editor puts this phrase into the mouth of Vasubandhu; likewise, Stcherbatsky,
who translates: ''The example may not fit in every detail. But even supposing it to be fitting,
does it prove your tenet? Is the new com produced from the old com directly?"
Further down, F 299, line 13, concluding his explanation of this example, Hsiian-tsang says:
(Ch.) ku yii t'ung fa: "Thus the example is similar (sadharma)"; Paramiirtha: (Ch.) tz'u pi yii Ii-
i t'ung: "Thus the example is analogous to the established meaning" = "Thus this example
confirms our thesis."
253
LVP: We follow the version of Hsiian-tsang. Compare the entire paragraph of the Bodhi-
caryiivatiira, 472-73. - Bhii~ya: na phaliid eva phaliintaram utpadyate kirµ tarhi viklitti-
vise~ajad vikiiravise~at I yo hi tatra bhutaprakiiro 'likurarri nirvartayati sa tasya bfjarri niinya~ I
bhiivinyii sarrijfiayii purvako 'pi sarritano bfjam iikhyayate siidrsyad va I
Vyiikhyii: viklittivise~ajad iti bhfunyudakasa;qibandhiit phalasya siik~mo vikiiro viklittii_i I tasyii
vise~al_i I sa eviitiprakr~tai_i I tasmiij jato vikiiravise~al_i I tasmiit phaliintaram utpadyate Ikidrsad
vikiiravise~iid iti darsayann aha I yo hi tatra bhutaprakiiro 'likurarri nivartayati sa tasya bfjam
iti tasyailkurasya bijarµ niinyo bhiitaprakiiro na purvabijavastho bhiitaprakiira ity arthal_i I
bhiivinya tu sarrijfiayeti I odanarµ pacati sakturµ pina~p:ti yathii bhavinyii sarµjfiayii vyapadesal_i
evarµ piirvako 'pi sarµtiino aviklinnabijiivastho bfjam ity akhyayate I bhavinyii 'nayii sarµjfiayeti
I siidrsyiid veti viklittivise~ajena bhii tavikiiravise~ei:ia sadrsai_i sa pii rvakal_i sarµtiina iti k ftvii
bijam ity akhyiiyate [WOG.719.27ff.).
254
L VP: evam ihiiplti vistaral_i I yadi saddharmasrava~ayonisomanaskiirapratyayavise~iij
jiita~ kusalasasravas cittavikiira utpadyate I asaddharmasrava~iiyonisomanaskiirapratyaya-
vise~iij jato 'kusalo vii cittavikara utpadyate I tasmiit tad vipiikiintaram utpadyate niinyathti iti
samiinam etat I tadyathii na phaliid eva phaliintaram utpadyate kirµ tarhi vikaravise~iid evarµ na
2654 Treatise of the Refutation of the Person (Pudgalaprati~edhaprakara-,ya)
vipiikiid eva vipiikiintaram utpadyate kirp tarhi cittavikiiravise~iid utpadyata iti tulyam etat
[WOG.720.3ff.].
255
LVP: On the effect of retribution (vipiikaja), see i. 37 (F 68); ii. 10; 53b (F 265); 54c
(F 271); 57a (F 290); 71b (F 320); iv. 11 (F 40).
256
LVP: Vyiikhyii [WOG.720.lOff.]: phale rakta/:1 kesara iti phaliibhyantare kesaraJ:i I yatra
bijapiirakarase amlo 'vati~thate 11 na ca sa tasmiit punar anya iti I na rasaraktaJ:i kesaras tasmiid
uktat kesariit punar upajiiyate I kirp tarhi priilqta eviiraktaJ:i kesara upajiiyata ity arthaJ:i II idam
atrodaharal}.am I yathii liik~iirasaraktamiitularigapu~paphaliid (MS. liik~iirasara,µ tat ma-)
raktakesariin na raktaqi kesariintararp punar bhavati evarµ karmajiid vipiikiin na punar
vipiikiintaram iti Iaha ciitra I
cittarp hy etad anantabijasahitarp sarptiinato vartate I
tat tad bijam upaiti pu~tim udite svapratyaye cetasi II '
tat pu~tarp drumalabdhavftti phaladarp kiilena sarppadyate I
rangasyeva hi miitulangakusume 'nyas tasya tatkesare II
punar aha I
karpasabije pu~pe ca miitulangasya rafijite I
liik~ayii jiiyate raktarp yathii karpiisakesaram II
tasminn astam ite range sarptiiniid bhiivitakramiit I
karmai:iy astam ite caiva bhiivaniitaJ:i phalodayaJ:i I
This stanza should be compared with that cited in Sarvadarsana (beginning of the chapter:
Jaina):
yasminn eva sarritana iihitii karmaviisanii I
phalarri tatraiva badhniiti kiirpiise raktatii yathii 11
kusume brjapiiriider yal lak~iidy upasicyate I
saktir iidhfyate tatra kii cit tarri kirri na pafyasi I
The first of these stanzas is known to us through the Bodhicaryiivatiira, ix. 73 (introduced by
tad uktam); compare Anandagiri, ad 2. 2. 27 (viisaniivaicitryiit), Atmatattvaviveka (Calcutta,
1873), p. 102 (liik~iirasavasekiid vii dhavalimiinam apahiiya raktatiim upiidiiyiinuvartamiinarri
kiirpiisabrjam .. .). -The first line of the second stanza is utilized by Kumiirila, Slokaviirttika,
p.267.
On these div~rse sources, "Bouddhisme d'apres les sources brahmaniques", Museon, 1902
(off-print, p. 63).
See AKB vii, F 35.
251
Gokhale: karma tadbhiivanii tasyii vrttiliibharri tata/:1 phalam I niyamena prajiiniiti buddhiid
anyo na sarvathii II [10]
LVP: karmeti sarvarp tadbhiivanarri karmabhiivaniirp tasmiid bhiivaniiyii vrttiliibharri tadvftti-
liibharp tatas tadvfttiliibhiit phalam ity etac catu~tayarp niyamena yadrcchayii I buddhiid anyq/:1
sriivakiidiJ:i sarvathii sarviikiirarp na prajiiniitity arthiid uktarp bhavati buddha eva tat sarvarp
sarvathii prajiiniititi [WOG.720.26ff.].
:We can reconstruct:
karma ca· tadbhiivanarri ca tasyiis ca vrttiliibharri tata/:1 phalam I
Endnotes to Chapter Nine 2655
The lis~ of the primary sources is based on the more detailed bibliography in Collett Cox's
Disputed Dhannas. Early Buddhist Theories on Existence; pp. 417-23.
For other bibliographies of secondary sources, particular Japanese ones, see Disputed Dharmas,
pp. 423--40 and Sarvtistivtida Buddhist Scholasticism (by Charles Willemen, Bart Dessein,
Collett Cox), pp. 294-311.
2660 Bibliography
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1977-1993.
Nyiiyiinusiirasiistra [A-p'i-ta-mo shun cheng-li lun]. T 29 (1562). Sailghabhadra, transl.
Hsiian-tsang.
Prajiiaptisiistra [Shih-she lun]. T 26 (1538). Attrib. Maudgalyayana (Skt.), Maha-
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Hstian-tsang.
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adhi,thanakarai;ia (supporting cause)
adhimok~a (resolve) of the arhat (per- opposed to aki,epakarai;ia (projecting
fected being), vi, 296-98, cause), iv, 27.
adhimok~aprabhavita (informed by aspi- adhisthana (blessing), magical or
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ii, 162; hatadhimok~a, vii, 85. adhimaiµ iik(li (training in higher moral-
adhimok~ika gamana (displacement of ity), vi, 225, 23~31.
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§raddha- (through faith), vi, 196. spada (contact), iii, 98.
adhimukti (resolution), read adhimok~a adhivasayati, iv, 163.
(resolve), ii, 153 and foll., ninth maha- adhobhilmikapak~ii.lavigama, viii, 149;
bhumika (generally permeating factor). comp. avarabhagiya.
adhimukti (resolution), adhimok~a adhoga (go below), iii, 134.
(resolve), ruci (preference), i, 40,
vii, 70, 85 (hata-); ii, 204. adhvan (course, time period), the saip-
skrtas (conditioned phenomena) are the
adhimukticaryabhiimi, carita, iv, 224. adhvan (course, times), i, 12, iv, 62. -
adhimuktimanasikara (mental applica- discussion of the existence of the
tion proceding from resolution), ii, 325, past..., i, 77, ii, 260, v, 51-65.
vi, 149 and foll., viii, 143,200, 202, adhvananatva (dilra ... ), v, 107; saip-
214; adhimuktisaipjii.ana (conceiving kara (confused)~ 55;- paryanta (limit),
of a resolution), 199. iii, 177. •
adhipati (ruler), indriya (faculty), ii, 103. ekadhvika (single time period),
adhipatipratyaya (condition of domi- traiyadhvika (three time periods),
nance), ii, 307-8; phala (effect of domi- ii, 274; dvyadhvaga (two time periods),
nance), adhipaja, adhipata (dominator), tryadhvaga (three time periods),
Sanskrit-English Index-Glossary 2697
kiualatyiga, iv, 100; deiani'i, ix, 195; Mii.modaka (cakes of hope), iii, 125.
dharma (= sukladharma) vi, 199-200. uarp.suila (morality of hope), iv, 248.
iiryamiirgapriyogika (noble path dani (rain of stones), iv, 187.
acquired thorugh the path of
application) (~magata [heat], etc.) a§anivat, buddha and sarp.gha commu-
vi, 163; samipanna (person who is nity), iv, 225.
traveling on the noble path), (the person datha (honest), v, 46.
who is established on the noble path Maya (intent), iv, 24; = dhii.tu, in nanii.-
(stha), iv, 55. dhiitujiiii.na (cognition of the different
iryaprajiii (noble understanding), vi, 258, acquired dispositions of sentient
bhil;ii (ii.cyan language), iii, 146, 165. beings), vii, 70; cala (movable), guc;tha
iiryapudgalas (noble one), vi, 230, 232; (hidden), drc;tha (fixed), iv, 174-75;
chap. vi; taik~a (those in training), papa (bad), iv, 174, 176, 182-83.
daik:fa (those beyond training); uayavipanna (lost the intent), iv, 176;
difference of gotra (family), etc. §uddhi (avetyaprasiida), vi, 205 .
.iiryavarp.§a (lineage of the noble one), a§caryadharmasarp.pad (perfection of
vi, 146; vihiira (abode), vi, 259, marvelous qualities), vividha (multiple)
viii, 187; vyavahira (vocal behavior), and nija (natural), vii, 83.
iv, 159; §Ile 'vetya prasiidal;t (morality a&e~aprahiii;ia (complete abandonment),
and perfect confidence), vi, 293; ii, 284.
sarp.vara (restraint), iv, 184; satya
(truth), vi, 122-23, 127, 186, 188; a&lokabhaya (fear of a bad reputation),
sabhii.gatii. (homogeneity), ii, 197. iv, 128, 248.
a§aik~a (those beyond training), arhat Mraddhya (non-faith), ii, 162.
(perfected being), vi, 230-31; complete, asraya (basis)= body, urita (the sup-
277; the thought of the a§aik~a (those ported) = thought, iii, 126.
beyond training), when it arises, 298; uraya in contrast to bhoga (objects of
slisrava (impure) and laukika enjoyment); iv, 1.
(mundane) body and thought, 300,
a&raya of the ~aik~as (those in training),
vii, 25.
etc. iv, 78-79.
how are the kii.madharmas (factors of
uraya miirgaviruddha, iv, 217.
the realm of desire) cognized, vii, 28.
uraya, adhi,thiina (basis), vastu (object),
a§aikfa (those beyond training), two
basis, iv, 232. - the dhyiinas (medita-
jil.ii.nas (cognitions), vi, 230, vii, 6; nine tions) are uraya (basis) of the gm;,.as
types, vi, 272; ten ab.gas (members),
(qualities), viii, 127. - the educated
. 295; eight balas (powers), 265.
monk is uraya (basis) of the schism. -
a§ai1q1a karman (actions of those beyond the sense-faculty, uraya (basis) of the
training) (mauneyya [silence]), iv, 133. consciousness, i, 95.
a§aik,adharma (factors of those beyond ii.graya (basis), sarp.tiina (stream),
training), iv, 130. sendriyaka kiiya (body endowed with
a§ait,amiirga (path of those beyond sense-faculties), iitmabhiiva (person or
training), vi, 149,253,258. individual), ,ac;tiiyatana (six sense-
a§aik,a&iinyatii.samii.dhi (concentration of spheres), object of the idea of self, i, 37,
emptiness of those beyond training), 63, ii, 110,284, iii, 126, 132, iv, 101,
217, v, 8, vi, 148, vji, 52.
viii, 188.
ii.sraya-avasthiivi~e~a (distinctive condi-
a§aiqi samyagdnti (right view of those
beyond training), i, 81, vi, 240, vii, 6. tion of the corporeal basis), ii, 214,
ix, 275.
a§ait,r vidyii. (clear knowledge of those
beyond training), vii, 108-12. Mrayaparivrtti (renewal of the basis),
paravrtti (transmutation of the cor-
a§akya (out of reach), iv, 90. poreal basis), vikopana (overturning),
atiikyaputriya, iv, 96. iv, 24, 44, 94, 121,123,213, vii, 81,
Sanskrit-English Index-Glossary 2707
biihulika nirdda, iv., 29, 112. bhakte 'samatii (drowsiness after a meal),
bahulI]qta (much practiced), iv, 186, v, 89, 99.
viii, 192. bhakti (devotion), bhaktiviida
bahuvikalpa (being multiple), bahu- (declaration of devotion), iv, 245,
bheda, ii, 236. ii, 312.
bahya (external) and iidhyiitmika bhiisvaratva (shining, brilliance), accha-
(internal), i, 73; biihyii bhliviil;t (being tva (transparaency) (indriyiii:iiim),
disrupted), iv, 187. ii, 130.
biihya (outside), biihyaka (the one bhqya (commentary), prajiiiiptibhqya
outside), biihiraka, non-Buddhist, (commentary of the Prajiiapti), ii, 260,
ii, 119, 128-29 (kamavrtariiga ni); 270.
they can possess samiidiindila bhii~yiik!llepa (imitation of a preceding
(undertaking of morality), iv, 49; phrase in the commentary, ii, 259,
iiniipiinasmrti (mindfulness of iv, 242, vii, 11.
breathing), vi, 154; insight into the bhautika (derived material elements), see
truths, v, 14, vi, 247; rddhi mahiibhuta (fundamental material ele-
(supernormal accomplishment), abhijiiii ments).
(superknowledge), vii, 97.
bhautika and mahiibhiitas, i, 22, 63-66,
biila (fool) (drutaviin pfthagjanal;t), ii, 146, 149, Vyii. ii, 49 (opinion of the
ii, 255, iii, 87, viii, 219. Yogiiciiracittas); 252,313, iii, 102,
bala (power), five indriyas (praxis- iv, 26; iittamahiibhautika, vii, 114,
oriented faculties) and five praxis- Add.
oriented balas (powers), vi, 283; five bhava (existence)= upiidiinaskandhas
of the ~aik~as (those in training), iv, 85; (appropriative aggregates), i, 14;
eight of the a§aik~as (those beyond bhavena bhavasya nil;tsaral}.a (become
training), vi, 265; ten of the buddha, delivered from existence through exis-
vii, 67-72; balasatppad (perfection in tence), viii, 141.
power), vii, 84.
a~tamabhava (eighth existence),
baliigra, forbidden spectacles, iv, 190. iv, 203.
biilaka (newly-born), iii, 119. bhava = punarbhava (existence ofre-
bandhana (bondage) (three), v, 2, 87. birth), karmabhava (existence of ac-
bhagavat (Fortunate One), i, 1, Vyii.; tion), v, 1.
pravacana (teaching), vii, 242. four (antariibhaviidi [intermediate
bhaligura (perish), iv, 8. existence, etc.), iii, 31, 117; seven
(niirakidi [hell beings, etc.]), 13, 36.
bhiigin, iv, 108.
bhava (existence), member of the
bhiigiya (conducive to), pul}.yabhiigiya pratityasamutpiida (dependent origina-
(conducive to merit), mok~abhiigiya tion), iii, 64, 87.
(conducive to liberation) or nirviil}.a-
bhiigiya (conducive to nirvai:ia), bhiiva (mode of existence) (dharmasya),
nirvedhabhiigiya (conducive to v, 53, 54.
penetration), iv, 252,253; vi§e~a- bhiiva (action) and bhavitar (agent),
bhiigiya (conducive to improvement), ix, 279.
sthitibhiigiya (conducive to duration), bhava-iisrava (flux of existence), v, 73-
viii, 172. 74; ogha (flood of existence), yoga
bhiijana (capable of), iv, 171, vi, 148. (yoke of existence), v, 75; cakraka
bhiijanaloka (receptacle world), iii, 138- (wheel of existence), iii, 59; tpgtii
217; satpnive§a ( arrangement of the (craving for existence), itibhavatn1=1a,
receptacle world), iii, 138; satpvartani v, 29, vi, 148 (may I be Indra!); dnti
(disappearance.of the receptacle world), (afflicted view of existence), ix, 265;
iii, 182. attachment to existence (riiga), v, 8.
bhak~ayati lokam, iii, 30. bhavadve~itva (hating existence), vi, 170.
Sanskrit-English Index-Gl9ssary 2713
buddham uddi§ya, adhikrtya, pravrajita, i, 80, iii, 13; vijiiina (visual conscious-
vii, 76. ness), i, 19, 46, iii, 99, vi, 263 (fourfold
buddhatva (quality of the Buddha), simagrI), viii, 151; saipspada (contact
daik~a dharmas (factors of those of the eye), iii, 98; saippriipta (attained
beyond training) and laukikadharmas by the eye sense-faculty), i, 85.
(mundane factors)(, iv, 79. cak~us (eye), jiiiina (cognition) ... , vi, 246,
buddhi, cognition, mind, sadasad- 248, Add.
iilambana (existent and non-existent ciimara (tail-fan), iii, 146.
things as cognitive object)? v, 63; caiica (box), caiicudurbhik~a (famine of
vi~ayavyasek:avisari1;1I (scatter natu- the box), iii, 208.
rally, distracted by the object-field),
vi, 289; synonym of prajiiii (under- candana (sandalwood) and gandha (odor),
standing), dhI, vi, 246, Add. ii, 236.
candanasvapna (dream of sandalwood),
buddhotpada, periods of appearance, two
at the same time, iii, 192, 198-201; iii, 44.
extent of his power, iii, 199. candrakiintii (moon-stone), iii, 157.
candramas (moon), iii, 156-57, 159,205.
cii1;1 iira, vii, 74.
C ciira (conduct), in bhiki,uciira (conduct of
a Bhik~u), pil}.4apiitiidiciira, vi, 265;
caitasika dharma (mental factor) ciiragata bhik11u (Bhik~u doing the
(jighatsa), i, 18. rounds), v, 101.
caitasikI vedana (mental sensation), caramabhavik:a (being in the last life-
iv, 111; etc. · time), ii, 220,240, iii, 176, v, 62.
caitraratha (various chariots), park, carita (conduct, behavior), in cittacarita
iii, 161. (conduct of thought), i, 47; riiga (attach-
caitta (thought-concomitant), saippra- ment), ii, 175, §amatha (devoted to
yukta (asscociated), ii, 149; defined, calm abiding), vipa§yanii (devoted to
ii, 177; difficult to discern, ii, 159,235. insight), vi, 214, lobhacarita (domi-
caitya, offering, iv, 234, 245; kama- nated by greed), i, 47, etc.
mithyicira (sexual misconduct) in a ciit~kotika prafaanirnaya, passim.
caitya, iv, 157. catul;lk~a1;1ika vastu, ii, 222, Add.
cakra (wheel) (krama1;1at), brahma, caturaiigabala (army with four members),
dharma, vi, 245. iv, 68, aiigaseniivat, viii, 148.
cakrabheda (breaking of the wheel), ciiturdi§a bhik,u saipgha (Bhik~u com-
iv, 210. munity in four directions), iv, 15;
cakraratna (jewel of a wheel), iii, 198, dvipak:a (continents), iii, 197; mahii-
vi, 245, 248. riijika (four great kings), iii, 1; mahii-
cakravi4a (circle; iron mountain), riijakiiyika (assemblage of the four
iii, 141, 143. great kings), iii, 159, 165.
cakravartin (wheel-turning king), ii, 181, caturdvipaka (four continents), iii, 141.
220,iii,30,56, 196-199,202,206 caturmahiiriija (four great kings), iii, 159.
(dynasty), iv, 166, v, 148, vi, 248, ciiturthakajvaravat (quartan fever), v, 79.
vii, 73, 122.
cauravat (thief), kle§a (defilement),
cakrilqta (encircle), iii, 141. vi, 190.
cak~ur-abhijiii (superknowledge of the cay1r(jncreasetapacaya (decrease),
[divine] eye), vii, 107, viii, 192; iv, 90.
ibhasagata (falling within the range of
the eye sense-faculty), i, 85; indriya cetal;lkhilamrak~avastu (cause of harden-
(eye sense-faculty), i, 65, 81, 85, ii, 104, ing thought and of concealment), iv, 20.
107; dhitu (sense-element of the eye), cetal;lparyiiya (thought of another),
Sanskrit-English Index-Glossary 2717
dharmatii (nature of factors or suchness), who obtain nirvai;1.a after having barely
never in the sense of Bodhisattva- arrived in the realm of fine-materiality),
bhumi, vi, 158. -ii, 237, iii, 77, v, 29, iii, 39.
ix, 252, pratityasamutpiidadharmatii viriigadhiitu (element of detachment),
(philosophical truth of dependent origi- prahiii;iadhiitu (element of abandon-
nation); vi, 178, pravacanadharmatii; ment), nirodhadhiitu (element of cessa-
vi, 204, daik,amiirgadharmatii (nature tion), vi, 301; nirviii;iadhiitu (element of
of factors of the path of those beyond nirvai;1.a).
training); v, 65, gambhirii dharmatii
(nature of factors is profound); dhiitupatita (fallen from a realm), apatita
viii, 218. - iv, 128, anityatii... (transcendent to the realm), iipta (be-
longing to a realm), asa:qiprayukta (not
Comp. ii, 235, suk,mii dharmapra- associated with a realm), ii, 187, iv, 27,
krtaya).i (nature of factors is subtle); vii, 28-29.
iii, 35, dharmiii;tii:tp §aktibhedo
'cintya];i (inconceivable is the power of dhiitus (sense-elements), the eighteen;
factors and the variety of this power); meaning of the word dhiitu, i, 37; enu-
iv, 20, aniidikiilikii §aktil;i. meration and characteristics, sani-
dar§ana (visible), sapratigha, etc., i, 51;
dharmatiibala (power of the nature of the 62 elements arranged in them, i, 49;
factors), vi, 204, viii, 218; abhijiiii dhiituku§ala, i, 48 (Vya)._
(knowing deeply the nature of factors),
iv, 128. five pure dhiitus, faith (sraddhii), etc.
dharmatii§ila (morality of the nature of four dhiitus, prthivi (earth), etc., i, 23;
factors), priitilambhika§ila (morality their vai,amya (disequilibrium),
iii, 136, iv, 127.
through obtaining the nature of factors),
iv, 49, 81, 139, Add.; priitilambhika- six dhiitus (elementary substance),
dhyiina (entering into the meditation pfthivi (earth), etc., i, 49.
through obtaining the nature of factors), dhiivak~putra, parricide, iv, 214.
iii, 183. dhi (intelligence), pratisa:qikhyii (delib-
dharmiiyatana (sense-sphere of factors), eration), ii, 291, prajiiii (dscrimination),
i, 30-31, 36, 41, 45-46, 65, iv, 16, vii, 3.
ix, 231.
dhrti (supporting) and pfthivi (earth),
dharmopaviciira (ponderings of factors), i, 22, ii, 146.
iii, 108.
dhruvadnti (afflicted view of eternity),
dhiitu (disposition), in the sense of Maya v, 15.
(disposition), vii, 70. dhuma (smoke), vari;ia (color), i, 16;
dhiitus (realms), three, kiima, etc.; mean- urdhvagamana (rising of the smoke),
ing of the word, definition of the three ii, 231.
dhiitus, iii, 6-7. - relationship of the dhvajiigra, iv, 190.
diverse dhiitus, mahiibhutas, iii, 184;
succession of thoughts, ii, 316. - anu- dhvaxp.saka hetu, ii, 277.
§ayas (proclivities) of the diverse dhyiina (meditation), chap., viii; defined,
dhiitus. (realms), v, 9; indriyas (facul- viii, 131, 192; stage of numerous gui;ias
ties) and the realms, ii, 129. - higher (qualities, vii, 101, 107, etc.; excellent
dhiitus (realms), ii, 219, vi, 250, etc. - pratipad (route), vi, 279.
dhiitu-atikrama (going beyond a aku§ala (unwholesome meditation),
realm), samatikrama (going entirely v, 43, viii, 132; aniisrava (pure medita-
beyond a realm), sa:qiciira (transmigra- tion), viii, 172-73; iikiri;iabhiivita,
tion), ii, 329, v, 115, vi, 207,220. - vi, 221; iiniiijya (unagitated medita-
dhiitupratyiigamana (retrogressing tion), viii, 161; iisvii.dana (enjoyment of
from the higher realms), ii, 328. - meditation), v, 42, viii, 132, 144.
dhiitusamvartani (dissolution of the
realm), iii, 182, 184. caturthadhyiina (fourth meditation),
ii, 199, iii, 2, 22-23, 167, vi, 177, 198,
[rupa]dhiitugatal;i parinirviiti (those 221-23, vii, 87, viii, 195.
2722 Sanskrit-English Index-Glossary
upapatti (birth) and samapatti (medita- mediate stage), iv, 105; dhyiiniintarikli
tive attainment), iv, ll0, viii, 127. (intermediate stage), belvedere, ii, 199,
tli,ta (defiled meditation), iv, 249, iii, 4.
viii, 131. dhyiiniinubhiitariipa.. ., i, 55.
k!}al}.ika (momentary meditation), dhyanapiiramita (perfection of giving),
prabandhika (prolonged meditation), iv, 231, vii, 78.
vi, 221. dhyanapratiriipa (resembling true medi-
tftiyadhyana (third meditation), tation), viii, 132.
ii, 114, iii, 167, viii, 209. dhyiinapraveta (entrance into medita,
prathama (first meditation), ii, 176, tion), viii, 207; phala (effect of the
viii, 147. meditations), vii, 115; bhiimikapu:Qya-
dharmatipratilambhika (entering into tyiiga (losing the merit of the stage of
the meditation through obtaining the meditation), iv, 100.
nature of factors), iii, 183 dhyiinavedanii (sensation of meditation),
prii.bandhika (prolonged meditation), iii, 19, 167.
vi, 221. dhyiinavimok,asamiidhisamiipattijiiana
priintakotika (maximum meditation), (cognition of the meditations, libera-
vii, 89, viii, 95. tions, concentrations and meditative
attainments), vii, 69.
mi§raka (mixed meditation), vi, 213-
.14, 222, vii, 55; vyatibhinna, dhyiinasaipvara (restraint co-existent with
vyavakirl}.a, ibid. meditation), i, 21, iv, 43, 50.
§uddhaka (pure meditation), vii, 117, dhyiinopapatti (birth of meditation),
. viii, 144. iii, 166, viii, 162~64 .
satnl}.a (endowed with craving), sadr~ti dhyiiyin (practitioner in meditation), i, 88,
(endowed with afflicted view), samiina iii, 9 (Vyii.), v, 43.
• (endowed with conceit), v, 42; digbhagabheda (spacial division), i, 92.
siipak!}iila (adverse characteristics of the dirghakiliibhyisa, vii, 81.
meditations), iv, 108; sefi.jita (agitated
meditation), iv, 107, viii, 161. dirghiiyu~as (living a long time), iii, 205.
divyacak!}US (divine eye), §rotra (divine
dhyina-iikirana (combining, mixing
meditation), etc., vi, 213, 215, 221; ear), abhijiiii (superknowledge), iii, 47,
iptaku§alatyiiga, iv, 99. vii, 99, 106-7, 123, viii, 194. - divya-
cak~uravabhiisa (illumination of the
dhyiina-aniisravasaipvara (pure restraint divine eye), v, 62.
and restraint co-existent with medita-
divyavihiira (divine abode), vi, 259.
tion), iv, 87; anu§aya (contaminent),
iii, 18. do~a (corruption), dve~a (hatred), iv, 128.
dhyiina-apak~iila ( defect of meditation), do(!a (humor or the body), bile, etc.,
iii, 215. iii, 136.
dhyinii:liga (member of meditation), do,a (vice), lde§a (defilement), iv, 199,
viii, 132-33, 147-61, especially 157 v, 67.
(pratipak!iii:liga [member of counter- do~a (fault), four, durgatido~a (fault of an
agent] ... ). unfortunate plane of existence), etc., of
dhyiinaka~taka (thorn of meditation), the v ... ,.,,u=... , bodhisattva, iv, 226.
iii, 215. do~agriihin (those who delight in uncov-
dhyiinaliibha (acquisition of the medita- ering the faults of others), viii, 202.
tions), viii, 164-71. dravya (ingredient), sugar-cane juice,
dhyiiniintara (intermediate meditation), iv, 86.
iii, 167, iv, 110, viii, 180-82; karman drnvy2 (real entity), i, 16, 18-19, ii, 147,
(intermediate action), iv, 110-11, 124. 260, iii, 142, v, 53, vi, 140, ix, 290.
dhyiiniintarika deva (gods of the inter- dravyadharma (real entity, substance),
Sanskrit-English Index-Glossary 2723
ii, ~86, iii, 211, 213, p1uamil}.u (real- sai:pjiliicittavibhrama (mistaken idea-
entity atom) (a~fadravyaka [eight real tion and thought), v, 25.
entities]), ii, 144, 146; sat (existing as a dnti-adhyavasiya (attachment to opin-
real enitity), iv, 13, ix, 232, Vyii. ii, 78, ions), i, 41; arbuda (abscess of bad
82; saqimoha (delusion), v, 81; sva- views), iv, 212; uttara-dhyiiyin (medi-
lak,ar,ia (particular inherent character- tator endowed with afflicted views),
istic), i, 19, ii, 303, vii, 27. v, 43; upiidiina (grasping of afflicted
dravyatas (existing in and of themselves) views), v, 76; ogha (flood of afflicted
svalak,a1;1atas, ii, 213. ' views), v, 75.
dr§ (viewing), dnti (view), dadana dn;tigata (doctrines), etad agraqi dn;fi-
(insight), vii, 3. gatiiniim... , v, 40.
drtim andhii}.I. pratilabhante, vii, 84. dr~fika~iiya (corruption of afflicted views),
drtya (visible form), vi, 152. ~11, 14, 193; carita (the intellectual),
1v, 174, 268; dntidai:p~tra (teeth of
dr,ta = pratyak~a (direct perception), afflicted views), ix, 265; nidhyiina-
1v, 5; and vijdiita (cognized) (cak~u}.1.- k~iinti, vi, 165.
saqipripta [that which is attained by the
eye sense-faculty], cak~uribhisagata dr~tipariimada (esteeming of such things
[that which falls within the range of the as bad views), v, 18, ix, 262;
eye sense-faculty]), i, 85; drsta§ruta- pari§uddhi (complete purification),
vijdiitamata (seen, heard, cognized, iv, 189, vi, 297, viii, 130; pripta (those
known), iv, 160. who have attained through views),
vi~ 196,252,274.
dHtabhiimini}.l.sangii§vaprasarana - vat,
vi, 122. · dntiyoga (yoke of afflicted views), v, 75;
vipatti (false view), iv, 167; vipanna
dr~tadharma-nirviil}.a (nirvana in the (false view), iv, 177; viparyiisa (mis-
present life), parinirviiyin ·(those who taken view consisting of afflicted view),
obtain nirviii:ia), ii, 204, 284, vi, 215; v, 23, ix, 262; saqiyojana (fetter of
vedaniya (sensed or experienced in the afflicted views), v, 82-83; sampanna
present life time, iv, 115, 121; sukha- (in possession of the view), vi". 202;
vihiira (happiness in this life), ii, 110, ~thiina (locus of false opinions), i, 14,
vi, 222,259, viii, 131, 193. IX, 270.
dr~tamiitraqi bhavi!lyati, iv, 161. du~dhavat (like the milk in the udder),
dHtiinta (example), diverse, vi, 121,264, 1, 11. .
etc. du}.l.kha (unsatisfactoriness); that the
dntantayoga, dntiintayukti, vi, 199. sukha (pleasure) exists ( thesis of the
dr~tasatyakalpa (similar to those who ekiintadu}.l.khati (that everything is
have envisioned the truths), iv, 209. exclusively ~uffering) refuted, vi, 129,
131, Add.; defined, iiryapratikiila (to
dr~ti (view), dr§ (viewing), dadana be adverse to the noble ones), vi, 127;
(insight). - are dnti (view), the eye, the du}.l.kha = phalabhutii}.I. skandhii}.I.. -
five dntis (afflicted views), the mun- svayai:p krtam, iv, 185.
dane samyagdnti (right view), the
§aik'i (view of those in training) and du}.l.kha pratikira (remedy for suffering),
the a§aik,i (view of those beyond train- vikalpa (modific_ation of suffering),
ing), i, 80, 82. - pure and impure prajdiis vi, 129; bodha (difficult to understand),
(understandings) that are dnti (views), iv, 23; vedaniya (unsatisfactory sensa-
viii, 3.- five dntis (afflicted views), tion), 109; satya (truth of unsatisfactori-
v, 15; sixty;two afflicted views, their ness), vi, 120-25, vii, 31; skandha
roots, ix, 265. (kevala) (entire mere mass of suffer-
ing), iii, 82, 88.
dnti or dar§ana (view or insight) and
jdiina (cognition), vii, 3, 11, viii, 192. du}.l.khiibhisamaya (direct realization of
unsatisfactoriness), vi, 187-88.
dr~ti (afflicted view) and avidyii (igno-
rance), iii, 89; tf!ll}.i (craving), v, 30; du}.l.khiikiira (aspect of "unsatisfactory")
mithyiijdiina (false cognition), v, 33; and anityatii.kiira (aspect of imperma-
2724 Sanskrit-English Index-Glossary
nent), vi, 128; duh.khendriya (faculty dve~a (hatred), un,-holesome root, iv, 35;
of displeasure), ii, 113, iii, 215, v, 87 ... ; and duh.khii vedanii (sensation of dis-
ktietra (field)(?), iv, 236. pleasure), v, 87 ! and paths of action,
duh.khana (cause to suffer), iv, 188. iv, 144.
duh.khasya anta:qi karoti (putting an end dvimukhapradadaniirtham (answer in
to unsatisfactoriness), vi, 205. two ways in order to express the same
meaning), ii, 258,
duh.khatii (unsatisfactoriness), threefolcl,
vii, 78; duh.khaduh.khatii (unsatisfac- dvipaktla (two categories) (monastics and
toriness of suffering), vi, 125. laity ... ), v, 84.
duh.khe dharmajiiiina (cognition of the dvipas (continents), iii, 145.
factors with regard to unsatisfactori- dvisiihasra madhyama lokadhiitu (di-
ness) and k~iinti (receptivity to the cog- chiliocosm, middle universe), iii, 170.
nition of the factors with regard to dvjvyaiijana, iv, 101.
unsatisfactoriness),'i, 71, vi, 179, 183;
jiiiina (cognition of unsatisfactoriness), ifvyaI)uka (combination of two atoms),
vii, 13. iv, 7.
duh.khilatas (as unsatisfactory), vi, 239. dyotayati (manifest), pratyiiyati (indi-
cate), ii, 240.
duh.§Ila bhik~u, iv, 96.
diiratii (distancing), diverse, i, 36, Add.,
ii, 316, iv, 31, v, 106; diire dharmiih. ... ,
v, 107; diirikaraI)a (setting aside), E
vi, 145, 200; diiribhiivapratipaksa ehi bhiktio (come, 0 bhik~u), v, 63; ehi-
(counter-agent of distancing), v, i04. bhiktiukii (come, bhik~u), iv, 61.
duravadhiina (difficult to disti,:rguish), ekiibhisamaya (single direct realization of
durlaktiya (discerned only/with difficul- the truths), vi, 187.
ty), duh.pariccheda (difficult to distin-
guish), durjiiiina (difficult to cognize), ekadetakiirin (lay practitioner of one
ii, 156, 159. rule), iv, 73.
durbalikaraI)a (weaken) (jarii [deteriora- ekadhyam, aikadhyam, i, 35.
tion]), ii, 223. ekadigmukha (one direction), lV, 9.
durbhiktia (famine), iv, 225; kalpa (aeon), ekiigracitta (one-pointed thought), eka-
iii, 207. agratii (one-pointedness), ekiilambanatii
durgati (unfortunate plane of existence), (having a single cognitive object),
apiiya, iii, 2, 21; dotia (fault of an unfor- iii, 132, viii, 128-29.
tunate plane of existence), 1v, 225; ekiikiira (same aspect), ii, 267.
bhaya (fear of unfortunate planes of ekiilambana (same cognitive object),
existence), iv, 128. ii, 267.
durjiiiinam (difficult to cognize)... ekaluliga, vi, 192.
jiiiiyate; idam atidurjiiiinam, ii, 159.
ekii:qi~ena vyiikaraI)am (answer in a cate-
durmanaskatii (dissatisfaction), ii, 131. gorical manner), v, 44.
diitiaI)am miituh. (violating one's mother), ekanavatyii:qi kalpetJu (in the course of
iv, 219. ninety-one cosmic aeons), iv, 225.
dl!Acaritatraya (three bad conducts), ekiintaduh.kha (being exclusively suffer-
iv, 135,217. ing), vi, 129, 149; sukha (pleasure),
dviida§iikiira miirgacakra (twelve aspects 129.
of the wheel of the noble path), vi, 247. ekarasa (same sentiment), ekamati,
dvandviililiganiidi (copulating, embrac- avyagra, iv, 211.
ing, etc.), iii, 164. · ekisana (one sitting), vi, 177.
dvayade§anii (teaching of the two things), ekasatya (one truth), vi, 139.
vi, 247.
ekatila (one grain of sesame seed), eka-
Sanskrit-English Index-Glossary 2725
ta1_1<Jula (one grain of rice), ix, 259. giithii (stanza), defined, ii, 242.
ekavicika (those who have one separa- gati (plane of existence), iii, 11-15; vrtti
tion), vi, 207-8. (function) and utpatti (birth), vi, 217.
e~yadharmahetu (cause of future factors), gati (movement), iv, 4.
iii, 74. gati-k~etra (field is excellent through its
evamiikiira (such an aspect), vii, 15. plane of existence)(?), iv, 236; de§a
(place of plane of existence), iii, 50;
niyatakarman, iii, 50; sarpvartanI (dis-
G appearance of the planes of existence),
iii, 182; sarpcara (reborn in another
gajapota (young elephant), iii, 44. plane of existence), ii, 197.
gajaprameha deva (Gajaprameha gods), gaurava (respect), sagauravatii,
iii, 140. saprati§atii, sabhayava§avartitva,
ii, 170.
gamana (displacement) and gantar,
ix, 279; three, adhimok~ika (displace- ghana (wide), iii, 143; embryonic stage,
ment of resolve), etc., vii, 113; gamana- iii, 62, 255.
sa:rppad (perfection of movement), ghiilii, niisiiputi (nostril), i, 93.
vii, 83 (avrta, iikiifa, etc.). ghatiimbuvat (like a pitcher, water),
gamika bhik~u, iv, 237. vi, 140.
gaminI, iv, 108, etc. gho~a (articulated sound), ii, 240; paratas,
ga1_1am anu§asayitum, vii, 76. ii, 245.
ga1_1anii (counting), iv, 254; in iiniipana- ghrtaghata (pot of butter), vi, 251 (ghrta-
smrti (mindfulness of breathing), pur1_1a or ghrtapek~a).
vi, 154. giri, parvata, iii, 143, 147; tatavinipiita-
ga1_1<.ta (ulcer), and pari1_1iimadul;tkhata vat, ii, 202.
(unsatisfactoriness which is transforma- gita (singing), iv, 165.
tion or change), ii, 122. gliina, gliinopasthiiyaka bhik~u, iv, 237
gandha (odor), i, 17, 57; upavicara (pon- godiiniya (bountiful cow), iii, 145.
dering), iii, 108; malyavilepana (per-
gorajas (cow particles), iii, 178.
fumes, garlands and unguents), iv, 47;
sarptiina (stream of odor), iii, 163; gosava (vedic rite) iv; 147.
hastin, vii, 73. gotra (family), of§riivaka (listeners),
gandhabhuj, iii, 47. pratyeka (self-enlightened ones),
buddha, iii, 194, vi, 175; six families
gandhamadana (mountain of intoxicating
and parihii1_1adharman (susceptible to
odors), iii, 147.
retrogressing), etc., of the prthagjanas
gandharI vidya (gandhiirt clear knowl- (ordinary worldlings), etc. vi, 252 and
edge), vii, 111. foll.; gotra of thoughts, ix, 282; of the
gandharva (odor-eater), ii, 105, iii, 32, k~iintis (receptivities), etc.; synonym of
36-53, 48 Add., 119, 122. bija (seed), hetu (cause), vi, 168,
garbhiivakranti (intermediate beings
vii,49.
entering into the womb), four, iii, 37, govrata (vow to act like a cow), fila
54-56. (morality), iii, 86, iv, 147, v, 20.
garbhiivasthii (stage of the embryo), five, go§abda (sound go), ii, 240.
ii, 255, iii, 51, 58, iv, 119, 154, vi, 157; griisavyavaccheda (separating the mor-
transfer ofkalala, iv, 213. sels), iii, 120.
garbhinigamana, iv, 157. gredhii§rita (attachment), iii, 115-16; cp.
gardha§rita (being supported by craving), vi, 289.
vi, 289; cp. iii, 115. ' grhapati (householder), grhastha (house-
garu<;ta, iii, 29, 31. holder), grhin (householder), avadiita-
2726 Sanskrit-English Index-Glossary
vasana, iii, 194, iv, 69-70,.80, 189, hiini (loss, retrogression) (= vihiini [loss
v, 76, 84, vi, 126,204. - grhipak~a or giving up], parihiiI].i [retrogression]),
(householder) and pravrajitapak~a iv, 99, vi, 173, Add.
(those who have entered the religious haral}.a (conversion), vii, 110.
life). .
har~iikiiravartin (having joy for their
grhapatiratna Gewel of the chief aspect), v, 95.
steward), iii, 203, vii, 122.
hasita-setughiita, iv, 17.
gr~avastu (taking possession of a house),
11,287. hatiidhimok~a, hataruci, vii, 85.
grhidnti, tithiGnti, iv, 189. hemiinta (cold season, advancing cold
season), iii, 180.
gulika (counting block), v, 54, Add.
hetu (cause), six, ii, 245, five, 277, five,
gulma (?), iii, 136. 314; four effects, 297; hetu and pratyaya
gul}.a (quality) and gul}.in (quality-posses- (condition), ii, 234,245 Add., 177,
sor), iii, 210. iv, 100, 176, ix, 241; samudayiikiira
gul}.a (qualities), understood as miirgas (aspect of the origin), vii, 31-34.
(paths), vi, 198. hetu-pratyaya (causal condition), ii, 299;
gul}.a-k~etra (field of qualities), iv, 121, phaliipaviidinI dnti (afflicted view of
213, 237; griihin (delight in the quali- negating cause and effect), iv, 171;
ties of others), viii, 202; parihiiI].i balena (power of the cause), iv, 100,
(retrogressing from the possession of a 176; vastu as cause, ii, 286; hetuvid
spiritual status), vi, 267; bhiivanii (cul- (logician) (on kiiraI].a [cause]), ii, 254;
tivation of the qualities), vii, 66; saip- samutthiina (origination), iv, 36; sam-
bhiivanii (confidence in qualities), pad (perfection of the causes), vii, 82; -
ii, 172, vi, 292. the effect taken and given forth, ii, 293.
gul}.as (qualities), enumerated, viii, 195. hetukrta, vi~ayakrta daurmanasya,
ii, 130, Vyii. ii, 25.
aniisravagul}.a (pure qualities), vii, '62,
viii, 195; iiriipya, viii, 215; jfiiinamaya hina (inferior), iii, 192 (madhya [medio-
(qualities or spiritual boons constituted cre], §re~tha [excellent]), iv, 255, v, 18;
by the cognitions), vii, 66, viii, 127; hinoccadnti (afflicted view that holds
traidhiituka (qualities of the three that which is low), v, 15.
realms) or impure qualities (siisrava), hitiiya, sukhii.ya, hitasukhiiya, vii, 76.
vii, 62, viii, 195; qualities of the bodhi- hrdayaprade§a (residing in the heart)
sattva, iv, 226; vaite~ikagul}.iibhinir- (ojas [vigor]), iv, 188.
hiira (taking possession of certain spiri-
hrdayavastu (heart), i, 32, Add.
tual qualities), viii, 195; samiidhimaya
(qualities constituted by concentration), hrI (modesty), and apatriipya (shame),
v, 27. ii, 172, iii, 45, iv, 25, 105.
guru (heavy), gurutva (heaviness), i, 18, huhuva (hu hu wailing), hell, iii, 154, 176.
67; karman (weighty action), ix, 297;
dharmiibhyupagama (accepting the
special obligations), iv, 61.
I
idaipdharman (Buddhists), vi, 154.
H idhyate (ignited), ix, 235.
ifijita (agitated), iv, 107 (sefijita dhyiina
hiicittaparidevaka (lamenting: A!
[agitated meditation]).
Thought), iv, 127.
ijyii (?), iv, 138.
hahava (ha ha moaning), hell, iii, 154,
176. Ik~al}.ikii vidyii (clear knowledge), &iistra,
vii, 112, 125.
hiinabhiigiya (conducive to retrogres-
sing), viii, 172. inataka, iii, 141.
Sanskrit-English Index-Glossary 2727
indhanam upiidiiya agnil}. (fire in reliance irfyii (jealousy or envy) and miitsarya
upon fuel), ix, 234. (avarice), v, 81; saip.yojana (fetters of
indra (desire for becoming Indra), v, 30; jealousy or envy and avarice), 82.
§akra, iii, 161. iryiipatha (deportment), ii, 320, iv, 164.
indriyii1_1i (controlling faculties). twenty- i§iidhara (maintaining a shaft)(?),
two, i, 100-102; ii, indriyanirde§a (ex- mountain, iii, 141.
position of the faculties); meaning of i§vara (God), ii, 311, iv, 212, v, 19, 58
the word, ii, 103; definition, ii, 110-13. (ceiJtita, kiira1_1atiiviidin).
faculties of the Siiip.khyas, ii, 110-12. ifiidhiira, deva (god), megha (cloud),
indriya, material (riipi1_1i), (seven, the iii, 10, 139---41.
five and the two vyaii.janas [physical i~tavifayaparivarjana (renunciation of
organs]), ii, 125, 128-29, 131. agreeable things), v, 76.
pail.ca (five sense-faculties), cakfur- i~u (arrow), vega (momentum; impetus),
iidini, bhiitas (primary matter) or ii, 200,217, iv, 102.
bhautikas (secondary matter)?, i, 65;
accha (transparent), atindriya (supra- itibhavavibhavahetoh tn1_1ii, vi, 147-48.
sensible, i, 15, ix, 231; formation of the itthatptva, iv, 186.
six sense-spheres (fa<;liiyatana), iii, 63.
- description, i, 87, 93-94 ...
indriya-adhi~thiina (visible support of the
sense-faculties) (vyaii.jana [physical
J
organ]), ii, 110, iii, 58; pariiparajii.iina- ja<;la (stupid), iv, 57.
bala (power of the cognition of the jala (water), eight qualities of the water of
praxis-oriented faculties of sentient the sitas (oceans), iii, 144, ma1_1<;lala
beings), vii, 70; prthagvrtti (sensory (circle of water), iii, 141.
organism), vinirbhiigin (sensory organ-
ism), vi, 157; bhiivanii (cultivation of jaliigniprapiitana (throwing oneself into
the sense-faculties), vii, 65; vivrddhi or water or into fire), v, 76.
saip.ciira (perfecting transformation of jalogi, iv, 83.
the faculties), iv, 100, v, 108, vi, 219, jalp (murmur, speech), jalpana, kle§a-
235, 253, 270, 278; saip.vara (restraint) jalpa (murmur of the defilements),
of the sense-faculties iv, 52. iv, 134, Add.
indriyii1_1i yathiibhiitaip. dntiini, vi, 133. jambudvipa (jambu tree continent), iii, 2,
indriyii1_1i vifayefu viciirayati, iv, 53. 145, 147, 148; jimbudvipaka (inhabi-
indriyapiiramitii (perfection of the praxis- tants of jiimbudvipa), iv, 174, 223.
oriented faculties), ii, 119. jambudvipapurU!Ja (male body in jambu-
pail.ca (five sense-faculties), dvipa), iii, 129, vii, 71, the bodhisattva.
§raddhiidini (faith, etc.), ii, 111, 116, jambumiila, viii, 195; vrk~a, iii, 148;
119, 156, vi, 219, 223 (akfa), 220 ,a1_1<;Iagata, iii, 128.
(paripakvatara), 281 (bodhipiikfika). jana (creatures) and manufya (humans),
difference between indriya (praxis-ori- iii, 202.
ented faculties) and bala (praxis-oriented janaka (that which generates) and janita
powers), vi, 286. (that which is generated), janya,
aniisravii1_1i (pure faculties), ii, 105, 109, iii, 101, 103; janakahetu (gener11tive
116, 118. cause), ii, 247,277, 314; janaka-
pratyaya (generative condition), v, 60.
avikalendriya (non-lacking faculties),
ahinendriya (non-deficient faculties), janana (generation) by the same, iii, 211.
iii, 27. janapadaniruktiip. niibhiniviteta, i, 86;
iranakarman (action of motion), ira1_1a- vitarka (initial inquiry), v, 89, 99.
iitmaka (essential property mobility),' jiiniiti (knowing) and pa§yati (seeing),
i, 23. V, 25.
2728 Sanskrit-English Index-Glossary
cultivation), etc., are absent, vi, 292; kiirai;ia (projecting cause), adhi~thiina-
manobhiimika sukha (pleasure of the kiirai;ia, iv, 27; kiirai;iaparikalpa, iv, 7.
stage of mental faculty) is absent kiirai;iahetu (efficient cause), ii, 245, 288,
iii, 109; thought included in the realm 293,299,307.
of desire (kiimadhiitupratisatp.yukta-
citta), vii, 28; manopaviciira (mental kiiral}.c;tava, iv, 98.
pondering in the realm of desire), kiiritra (activity), i, 75, ii, 225 (dharma-)
iii, 111; saipprayuktadharma (factors . v, 55, 107; and a§rayabhiiva (quality of
associated with the realm of desire), being a basis), ii, 305.
iii, 8. . karkandhu (well without water), iii, 47.
klimagui;ia (objects of sense enjoyments karka§a (rough), i, 18.
or of desire), i, 43, iii, 7, 86, 166, v, 3;
chanda (predilection for the objects of karma-ativighnakarai;ia (absolute imped-
desire), 84, and abhidhyii (covetous- ing of action), iv, 220; abhisatp.skiira
ness), iv, 166. (instigation of action), i, 29, vii, 34;
iivarai;ia (obstacle of action), iv, 201;
kiimii~, kiimapradhiinatviit kiimadhiit~ upacaya (accumulating of actions), v, 1;
kiimii~, ii, 131, Vyii. ii, 26. rddhi (supernormal accomplishment
kiimaja (kiimadhiitupatita ... ), iv, 133. which comes from action), iii, 46, 205;
kiimamithyiicara (sexual misconduct), jii rddhi (supernormal accomplishment
iv, 82, 146-47, 157, 188. produced through action),
purvaniviisiinusmrti (recollecting past
kiimariiga (attachment to pleasure), iii, 9, existences realized through action),
'V, 8, 77, viii, 197; sthiina (causes),
divyacak~us (divine eye), vii, 122, 126.
vi, 263; paryavasthiiniya (manifestion
of the attachment to pleasure), v, 72. karmabhava (existence as action), iii, 13,
36, v, 1-2, (abhinirharati [leading to
kiimasukha (laxity), kiimasukhallikii action]).
(laxity), iii, 194.
karmabhiivanii (impression caused by
kiimatf~J}.ii (craving for pleasure), v, 29, action), ix, 300.
nivarai}.a (hindrance of the inclination
for the objects of desire), v, 100. karmabheda (schism of formal ecclesi~
as:tical actions) (satp.ghabheda), iv, 211.
kiimavitarka (initial inquiry of the realm
of desire), iii, 7, v, 89; virakta (detach- karman (action), defined, iv, 1-3, 12, 38,
ment toward the realm of desire), vita- 136, 149; see cetanii (intention),
raga (detachment from kiimadhiitu), avijllapti (non-informative action);
ii, 136, vi, 195, 232; vairiigya (detach- karman (action) and karmapatha (path
ment from the realm of desire), iv, 170. of action), 137. - karman (action),
tni;ia (craving) and avidyi (ignorance),
kiimayoga (yoke of desire), v, tf,, 77. vi, 136. - upapattihetu (cause of vari-
kiiiicanamayI bhumi (ground of gold), ous births), vi, 137.
iii, 140, 145. sabbatp. kammato, ix, 297.
kiii;tc;lllll (sections) of the prafityasamut- kartar (action) and kriyii (action),
piida (dependent origination), iii, 60. iii, 79. .
kii.ntii vimukti (cherished liberation), karman (action) and karmaphala
vi, 260, 261. (effect of action), without kiiraka
kai;tthokti (explicit declaration), iii, 36, (agent), iitman (self), iii, 57, v, 29,
iv, 77. ix, 260, 290.
kapiiliirdha (half of the skull), vi, 151. ama karman (past action), iv, 185,
kapotaka (mudrii), iv, 65. v, 59, 63, ix, 295; atyudiri;iaparipuri;ia,
iii, 41; afalighaniya (insurmountable
kiira (pujiidika), apakiira, iv, 123, vii, 85. action), vii, 85; avipiika (action without
kiiraka hetu (efficacious cause), ii, 277, retribution), iv, 130; asatp.cintya (unin-
288. tentional action), bhriintyii (action com-
kiirav.a (cause), iii, 35, Vyii.; iik~epa- mitted by mistake), iv, 152-55, 214.
Sanskrit-English Index-Glossary 2731
mundane path), vi, 239, Add., 266, lok.apala (guardian of the world), iii, 1.
vii, 30; their objects, vi, 239; the fruit, lokasatp.jfii (common usage), i, 23, 86.
vi, 243.
lokasatp.vftisatp.gha (sarµgha in the
laukika~itta (mundane thought) (§aik~a mundane conventional sense), iv, 97;
[of those in training], a§aik~a [of those jfiana (mundane conventional
beyond training]), vi, 300; stha (pres- cognition), v, 14, vii, 4.
ently mundane thought), iv, 79.
lokayatapratisatp.yuk.ta, iv, 190.
laukikajfiana (mundane cognition),
vi, 142, vii, 4, 10 (lok.ottarajfiil.na- lokottari pripti, Vya. ii, 37.
Pfllthalabdha [mundane cognition lokottarajfiii.na (supramundane cognition)
acquired consecutively to the supra- (paramirtha [absolute]), vi, 142.
mundane cognition]). lokottaramii.rga (supramundane path),
laukik.amiinasa (mundane thought), arhat satyii.dyii.karapravrtta (proceeding
(perfected being), prthagjana (ordinary through the aspects of the truths),
worldling), ii, 183, Vya. ii, 79. vi, 238, 267; perhaps practiced by the
lauk.ikamiirga (mundane path) and prthagjana (ordinary worldling) to
lokottaramii.rga (supramundane pat~) perfect indriyasatp.cii.ra (praxis-ori-
of the bodhisattva, iii, 77. ented faculties), vi, 266.
laukikavitariga (mundane detachment), lokottarask.andha (supramundane
iii, 196. groups), vi, 297.
laukikI dniti (mundane afflicted view), luji, lold, luhyate, i, 14.
samyagdniti (mundane right view),
i, 80, vii, 3, Vibha~a. 97, p. 502; pri.ipti
(possession), ii, 138, Vya. ii, 36.
laulya (frivolous speech), iv, 165.
M
mada (pride), ii, 176, iv, 67, v, 91, 94, 98;
lava (long minute), time, iii, 179. and pramii.dasthii.na (non-vigilance),
lingas (marks) of the gods, iii, 17. iv, 45.
lik,a (nit), iii, 178. madaniya (intoxicating), iv, 84.
lina (slack), liniibhibtp.kin, vii, 18, 23. madhya (medium), ii, 255; satp.moha
lipi (writing), iv, 254. (delusion relative to the present),
vii, 108; stha (indifferent), vii, 110.
lobha (greed), see akmalamiila (unwhole-
some roots); and paths of action, iv, 144; madhyami pratipad, ix, 271.
vi~amalobha, iii, 207. madhyasthya (impartiality), viii, 198.
loharajas (iron particle), iii, 178. madupajfiam opposed to siitre dnitam,
loka (world), bhii.jana (receptacle world) Vya. ii, 27.
world and sattva (sentient beings), iii; madya (intoxicating liquor), madyapina,
ananta (eternity of the world), §asvata iv, 83-84; Vibhii.~a. 123, p. 664a;
(world is eternal), ix, 267. Nanjio 1289, 8, p. 786a.
loka (world), i, 14. mii.gadha viha (mii.gadha cart-load),
loka-anuvrtti (viev.:s of the world), iii, 176.
vi, 132; ca~us (eye of the world), mangaladr!iti, iv, 189, Add.
viii, 224. , mahii.bhiimi (great stage), mahibhiimika
lokabhii.!iii (everyday language), ii, 238. (generally permeating factors), ii, 152,
lokadharmas (mundane factors), iv, 25. 251, iii, 104.
lokadhlitu (universe), number, disposi- 'mahii.bhiita-samatii. (equilibra,ting the
tion, iii, 10; forty-eight places, iv, 226; fundamental material elements, ii, 213;
small, medium, great; vivarta, iii, 210; parii;iamavi§e~a (difference due to the
sarp.varta (destruction of the world), transformation of the fundamental
viii, 217, etc. material eleJ,Tients), ii, 230.
mahibhiitas, see bhiitas.
Sanskrit-English Index-Glossary 2737
nitiral}.a (examination), vi, 144. satya (truth of the path), vii, 32-33, 39.
nitya (permanent); anitya (impermanent),
aspect of dul}.khasatya (truth of unsatis-
factoriness), vii, 31; nityadnti (afflic-
ted view of permanence), with regard to
0
Brahma, v, 33; viparyiisa (mistaken ogha (flood), v, 75, 80.
view of taking as permanent that which ojoniwana (destroying the vigor), iv, 188.
is impermanent), v, 23; saljljilii (idea-
tion of permanence), v, 17; samiihita o§adhikftii rddhi (supernormal accom-
(always concentrated), iv, 41. plishment created through herbs),
vii, 122.
nityii dharmii asawskrta1}. (unconditioned
factors are eternal), i, 100.
nityaka (ordinary)(?), iv, 65.
nivaral}.iini pailca (five hindrances),
p
ii, 158, iv, 167, 201, v, 81, 98-99, 101. padakiiya (collection of phrases), ii, 238.
nivrta (obscured), nivrtavyakrta padawparama (those listeners for whom
(obscured-non-defined), ii, 168, iv, 32- the words are the highest attainment),
33, 255, v, 40. i, 35 (Vya. 49).
nivrtti, vi, 124. piidiisthi (bones of the foot) (a~ubhii
niyama (assurance), niyiima, nyiima, ava- bhiivanii [meditation on the loath-
kriinti (assurance of the eventual attain- some]), vi, 150.
ment of enlightenment), ii, 201, vi, 180 padma (splitting like a lotus), hell,
and Add., 181. . iii, 154, 176.
niyama (restriction), fivefold of the viratis pai§unya (malicious speech), iv, 164.
(abstention), iv, 89; threefold, fourfold piika (cooking), piikaja (products), iv, 7.
of thought, ii, 207.
pakti (ripening) (tejodhiitu [elementary
niyamavatigamana (vow of chastity), substance fire]) i, 22, ii, 146.
iv, 157.
pakvabhik,anupradiina, iv, 225.
niyata (determined; destined), niyata-
vipiika (retribution which is certain), pakvaUira§aribhiivayogena, iii, 140.
niyatavedan'iya karman (action the pailca angiini (five members),
effect of which is to be experienced at a satkiiyadnti\1 (afflicted view of self)... ,
particular time), iv, 115-16, 120,122. Vyii. ii, 77.
dharmii§ catu~ke niyatiil}. (factors pailca iirdhvabhiigiyiini (five of the class
determined from a fourfold point of which lead to the higher realms), Vya.
view), ii, 260. ii, 77.
niyatii micchiiditthi (assuredly wrong pailca vijiliinadhiitava1}. (five sense-ele-
views), iv, 202. ments of consciousness) or vijiliina-
niyate katham (how to explain), ii, 260. kiyil}. (groups of consciousness)
(cak!Juriidi [visual, etc.]), i, 31, 72, 77,
niyatipatita bodhisattva (predestined 84, 96; in which dhiitu (realm), 55.
bodhisattva), iv, 221.
ku§ala (wholesome), avyiikrta (non-
nrga (those who go among humans), defined)? i, 54, iv, 180, v, 94, 107;
iii, 134. savitarka (associated with initial
nrtyag'itavii~ita (dancing, singing and inquiry)... ? i, 24, 60, iv, 39; their
music), iv, 47. iilambana (cognitive object), sva-
nyiimiivakriinti (assurance of the eventual lak~al}.a (particular inherent character-
attainment of enlightenment), see istic), iiyatanasvalak,al}.a (particular
niyama. inherent characteristic of the sense-
sphere), i, 19, iv, 39.
nyatkutii, iii, 151.
see cakr,urvijiliina (visual conscious-
nyiiya (correct method), aspect of miirga- ness), manovijiliina (mental conscious-
2746 Sanskrit-English Index-Glossary
parl}.aruho viita};I., iii, 132. tion]), v, 25; vijiiniiti (seeing and cog-
parohamiitra (mere germination), vi, 138. nizing), i, 84.
paropaghiita (doing bad to another), Piilllii~atp dadiimi... , iv, 243.
iv, p1. pii~i (?), vii, 35.
parpataka (earth-food), iii, 205. piita = parihiil}.i, vi, 164.
par~adbheda (dividing the assembly), piitakiilabheda (of a projectile), ii, 229.
iv, 212. pataniya (fall), iv, 95, 97.
par~acitta (harmful thought), iv, 150; patasvapna (dream of a cloth), iii, 44.
vacana (harsh speech), 164, 178.
piithaprasangena, iii, 105.
piir~ya (armory), heavenly park, iii, 161.
patinidhibhuta (substitute), ii, 229.
piir~ya (harmful talk), iv, 164.
patisatpbhidii (unhindered knowledge),
parvatas, iii, 141, Add., 147. vii, 89.
paryiidiinatp cetasas (thought causing patubuddhi (intelligence is sharp),
exhaustion), ii, 176; paryiidiiya, v, 85, iv, 205, 223.
vi, 259, 265.
piiyu (anus) and utsarga (excretion of
paryanta (the last one), by naming the matter), ii, 112.
paryanta of a list, one includes the iidi
(first), ii, 221. pe4ii (sack), vii, 62.
rupaparyanta, niima (smallest unit or pesin (third embryonic stage), ii, 255,
the minimum of matter, of a name) ... , iii, 62.
iii, 177. phala (effect), ii, 275 and foll. (vipiika
paryiipanna (included), sa1p.siira- (in [ripened effect], adhipati [effect of
cyclic existence), iv, 35. dominance], ni~yanda [effect ofuni-
form outflow], paur~a [effect of
parylipti, ala1p.tii, iv, 84. human action], visa1p.yoga [effect of
paryavasthiina (envelopJllent) and disconnection]), iv, 185; ii, 297, four
an~aya (proclivities); the svatantra effects different from the five, prati~thii
(independent envelopment); the aban- (effect of the base), prayoga (effect of
donment, iii, 118, v, 3-4, 28, 31, 81, the preparatory practice), siimagrI
83, 89-91; paryavasthita, satp- (effe_ct of a complex or complete assem-.
prayukta (associated with), iii, 91; four blage), bhil.vaniiphala (effect of cultiva-
svatantra (independent developments), tion); four fruits of the sriimal}.ya (way
iii, 118. of virtuous endeavor), vi, 242, ii, 134-
paryliyel}.a (in a way), ayugapat, ix, 283; 38.
opposed to ekiintena (absolutely), whether the asa1p.skrta (unconditioned
vi, 132; ni:t;,.paryiiyel}.a (absolutely), phenomenon) is phala (effect), ii, 286;
vi, 218; paryiiyadvaya (in two ways), miirgaphala (effect of the path), ii, 276,
iii, 81; asti paryaya:t;,., vi, 218. vi, 241.
ceta};l.paryiiyajil.iina (cognition of phalaparigraha (taking or projecting an
another's thoughts), vii, 99. effect), prayacchana (giving forth or
parye,aka manojalpa (mental conversa- producing an effect), ii, 293, 294; effect
tion of examination), ii, 175. of action, viprakr~ta (distant effect),
etc. iv, 116.
paryupiisitavya (practice), iv, 255.
phala-anupurviidhigama (obtaining the
paryutthiina (envelopment), v, 4. fruits in sequence), vi, 232.
pdciitpiidaka (second part of the ques- phaladharma (dh~rma as fruit)= nirviil}.a,
tion), i, 53. iv, 78, vii, 91.
pasughiita (killing of cattle), iv, 145. phalapiiramitii, ii, 118.
pa&yati (seeing) (iinantaryamiirga [unhin- phalapriipti (acquisition of the fruit),·
dered path]), jii.niiti (see and actually notably v, 108; bhra1p.sa (retrogressing
know) (vimuktimiirga [path of libera- from the fruit), vi, 255, 268; miirga
Sanskrit-English Index-Glossary 2749
(resolution for liberation), vi, 179. dhyiina (meditation), viii, 158. - manda
praI].idhiiya = cetasi lqtvii, ii, 120. (weak), tivra (intense), prasiidavega
(momentum of religious conviction),
praI].idhijiUna (cognition resulting from a · prasiidaghanarasa (extreme power of
resolve), liibhin, ii, 303, vi, 172, confidence), iv, 56, 101, 140. - avetya-
vii, 88-89. prasiida (perfect confidence), vi, 293. -
praI].idhipiirvaka, iibhogapiirvaka, cittaprasiida (confidence of thought),
vii, 89. silaprasiida (confidence of morality),
pral}.Ita (excellent), subha (good), amala vi, 295.
(stainless), iv, 255; iikara (aspect) of the prasanna (believing), vi, 295.
mundane path, vi, 239; of nirodhasatya prasaral}.a (procession), prabandha,
(truth of cessation), vii, 32-33, 38. vii, 33.
priil},ivadha (kill), iv, 178. prasarpal].a (deplacement), vyiihana
priintabhiimi, vii, 95, Add. (expansion), i, 22.
priintakotika (whose highest point has praskandati, ix, 250; praskandin, vii, 73.
been pursued up to the extreme), ii, 120, pratiipana (intense heating), hell, iii, 149.
122, vi, 211, 268, vii, 89, 95.
prathamiibhinirvrtta (gods arising at the
priipakahetu (leading cause), ii, 277. beginning of the aeon), iii, 17.
priiptiibhijiia, ii, 120. priithamakalpika (beginning of the
priiptaparihiil},i, vi, 267. cosmic period, beginner), ii, 210, iii, 28,
priipti (possession), ii, 179-95; passim, 119,172,204.
especially ii, 150, 294, v, 1-2, 79, pratibandha (obstacle) oHila (morality),
vi, 167, 190, 234 (visatp.yoga [posses- of dauI;tmya (immorality), iv, 93.
sion of disconnection]), vii, 105. - pratibhiinapratisaqi vid (unhindered
Vaise~ikas, ix, 285. kno~ledge of eloquence), vii, 90-91.
priiptijiia, ii, 162. pratibimba-iikiira (form of the reflection),
priipya (attaining), sense-faculty and . iii, 34-35 (bhriinta vijiiiina [illusory
object, i, 88-89. ideal).
prarohamiitra (mere germination), praticchiidanacitta (thought of hiding the
vi, 138. crime), iv, 99.
priirthanii (desire), v, 32, 39. pratidesanii karmanal;t, iv, 243.
prasiikhii (fifth embryonic stage), ii, 255, pratigha (resistance, encounter), iii, 47
iii, 62. (sapratigha ... ); diverse modes of
pra§antaviihitiivasthii, viii, 159. pratighiita (resistance, i, 51.
prasnavyakaral}.a (question and answer), pratighiinusaya (contaminanct of
v, 47; iiriidhana (satisfied by the answer hostility), v, 3; sai:p.joyana (fetter of
to the question), iv, 61. hostility), v, 81, and
anunayasaqiyojana (fetter of lust),
prasrabdhi (pliancy), ii, 157 (kusala- ii, 286.
mahabhiimika [wholesome permeating
factor]); i, 55 (and spra~tavya [tangi- pratighasatp.spada (contact through
ble], kayaprasrabdhi [bodily pliancy]); resistance), iii, 98.
iii, 215 (and priti [joy]); viii, 192 pratighiita (resistance), i, 25, 51.
(ki'iyika [bodily pliancy], caitasika pratigrahaI].a, ii, 293.
[mental pliancy]); member of dhyiina
(meditation), viii, 150, pliancy as bodhi priitihiirya (miracle), vii, 110.
(member of enlightenment), vi, 283, pratihatacitta (hating thought), madhya-
viii, 156; sukha (pleasure as pliancy), stha (indifferent), vii, 110.
viii, 150. pratijiiii (vow), iv, 94, vow; bhik~u (self-
prasiida (confidence, clarification, styled bhik~u), ivJ 96; miitra, iv, 5.
serenity), riipaprasada (pellucid/subtle pratikriinta (bhik~u), iv, 156.
material element). - member of the
2752 Sanskrit-English Index-Glossary
prUi (joy), ii, 115 (saipprahar,a [joyous truth), iv, 208; paripakvasaiptiina
exaltation]). (thought streams are ripened), vi, 206
in dhyina (meditation), ii, 114, iii, 215, (seven rebirths); sakalabandhana
viii, 147 and foll.; pravivekaji, pra- (bound by all bondages), ii, 180.
§rabhdijll., viii, 153. prthagvrtti, vinirbhigin, vi, 157.
as saipbodhyaliga (member of enlight- pfthakkarmakarai;ia, iv, 212.
erunent), ii, 158, vi, 283. pfthivi (earth) and prthividhiitu
prUibhak11a, iii, 205, viii, 140. (elementary substance earth), i, 21, 23,
priyavacanll(affectionate words), iv, 138. ii, 146, iii, 75.
pn;thabhuta (consecutive action) (of the pfthivI (earth) and gandha (odor),
karmapatha [paths of action]), iv, 137. ix, 288.
Pnithalabdha (jiita) jiiina (cognition prthivirasa (earth-nectar), iii, 205.
acquired consecutively [later]), vi, 142, pudgala (person), etym. ix, 245; and
vii, 4, 10, 28, 93. skandhas (aggregates), ix, 232; saipjiiii-
pfthagjana (ordinary worldling), defini- mitra, iv, 5; avaktavya (person being
tion, i, 79-80, Add., ii, 191; or bila. ineffable), prajiiaptisat (being as a
(ignorant person or fool), ii, 142, iii, 84, provisional designation), na dravyasat
iv, 118; but different from biila (fool), (does not exist as a real entity), ix, 232.
iii, 87: the prajfiii (understanding) not pratitaraI].a (recourse or authority),
arisen from satyibhisamaya (complete ix, 246.
understanding of the truths) is absent in pudgalagriha (clinging to the person),
them; biihiro puthujjanapakkhe... , ix, 274; prajfl.apti (designation person),
ji, 118; how they enter into the vehicle 233; vrne,a (distinguished person),
of the pratyekas (self-enlightend ones), vi, 268. - irivakapudgala...
iii, 195.
pudgalapiramitii, ii, 119.
do not attain nirodhasamiipatti (attain-
ment of cessation), ii, 204;-neither pudgalatas, iv, 203.
parijiii (complete knowledge), v, 114; piigaphala. .. , iv, 85.
not a true irama~a (mendicant), vi, 241 piljii (render homage), paryupiisana
(opposed to samaI_J.abriihmaI_J.a, Sutta- (venerate), anugraha (render service)
nipiita, 859). (buddha, stupa, parinirvrta), iv, 227,
loss of the nirvedhas (stages conducive 233, vii, 85.
to penetration) through death, vi, 171; punaJ;,.prabandha (continue), iv, 29.
like the loss of all wholesome dharma
(factors), iv, 100, vi, 231; and the loss punal;l.pratisaipdhiina (recover), vi, 157.
of visaipyoga (disconnection), vi, 235. punarbhava (new existence), ik~epa
prah~a (abandorunent) that they can (projecting a new existence), nirvrtti
obtain, v, 14, 114; abhijfiiis (super- (produced from), iii, 126; chanda (pre-
knowledges), etc., vii, 59; nirviil}.a, dilection for a new existence), vii, 34.
vi, 232; vair!igya (detachment), vi, 235. _ puI].ya (merit), defined, iii, 84.
six families, iv, 118, vi, 252, 266. pu~ya-upaga (approaching meritorious
abandonment of the state of prthagjima, consciousness), iii, 76; karman (merito-
vi, 17 5, 181; not in the realm of fine- rious action), iv, 106; kriyiivastu (meri-
materiality, vi, 250, · torious works), iv, 231; k~aya (exhaus-
tion of merit), ii, 217; k11etra (field of
prthagjanasabhiigatii (homogeneity of merit), iv, 213,237, vii, 85, 86; jii.iina-
an ordinary worldling), ii, 197. saipbhiira (provisions of merit and cog-
iibhyantaraka (ordinary worldling nition), iv, 77; prasan (produced by
inside), ii, 119. merit), gods, iii, 2; buddhyii pitr-
jambuqai;i~agata (sitting under the vadhal;I. (holding that patricide is meri-
jambu tree), iii, 129; dmasatyakalpa torious), iv, 121; bhiigiya ku&ala
(similar to those who have envisioned (wholesome conducive to merit),
iv, 252; vrddhi (increase of merit),
Sanskrit-English Index-Glossary 2755
iv, 15; liata (hundred merits), iv, 226; priitihirya (miracle of supernormal
siu:p.bhiira (provision of merit), iv, 77, accomplishments), i, 3, vii, 110; min
vii, 78. (priiptiibhijfia) (possession of super-
puru~a (male, soul, individual), strI normal accomplishments), ii, 121; vara-
(female), pwpstva (manhood), stritva pradinaprabhivena (supernormal
(womanhood), pur~endriya (male accomplishments or granting favors),
sexual faculty), puru~abhiva, i, 57, 94, i, 3; vifayajfiiinasiUttltkira (realization
101, ii, 104, 108, 111-12, 130, 140, of the cognition concerned with the
142, iv, 70. - losing, regaining, chang- object-field), vii, 98.
ing of gender, iv, 121, 213. rdhyati (realized), saip.padyate
pur~ahasta (human cubit), iii, 178. (successful), vii, 113.
pur~akiira (human action, operation), ni (seer), iii, 53, 129; p1u1Jad (assembly),
pur~akiiraphala (effect of human iv, 212; pravrajyii (becoming a seer),
action), paur~a (human), ii, 225, 289, vi, 204; manodo,a (mental fault of the
292, iv, 192, vi, 167, 242. seer), iv, 163,218.
pur~ilyusaip. viharati (living only for one rtu (season), three, six, iii, 180; iv, 187,
human lifetime); iii, 200. vi,amartuparil}.iimll (seasons are
disrupted).
purva-antakalpaka (individuals who
build up their system on the past), saip.- rtuja dul,lkha, iv, 185, Add.
moha (delusion relative to the past), rtwnatr (fertile), iii, 37.
v, 14, vii, 108; aparilntamadhye~u saxp-
moha (delusion relative to the past, the
future, and the interval between past
and furure), iii, 67; kiilabhava (prior to
death existence), iii, 43, 45, 118; nimitta raga (attachment), pripte 'rthe
(signs), of death, iii, 137; of the path, vasiinam, ii, 281; of Uma, rUpa and
vi, 163; niviisiinusmrti (recollecting of irupya, iii, 8; fourfold (varJ.J.ldau),
one's former abodes or existences), vi, 149; and chanda (predilection),
jiliinabala (power of the cognition of) ... , iii, 87; sahaja (innate attachment),
vii, 71, 99, 102-3, 108, 125; piidaka, v, 21; sukhi vedani (agreeable sen-
i, 37 (Vyii. 77); rupatva, vi, 163; sation), v, 87.
videha, iii, 146; svabhiiva, vi, 163.
rilga-adhika (those which abandoned
putikakiiya, iii, 95. attachment), vi, 149; upaklifta citta,
iii, 92; carita (behaving through attach-
ment), ii, 175, vi, 148; ja karman
R. (action arising from attachment),
iv, 189; jiita, vi, 254, paryavasthiina
fddhi (supernormal accomplishment), (active concupiscence), priipti (posses-
samiidhi (concentration), vii, 112; sion of concupiscence), v, 55; prnhiii;ia
rddhipiida (basis of supernormal (abandonment of attachment), v, 72;
accomplishments), samiidhi (concen- bahula, vi, 148 (rii.gavikalpabii.hJlya,
tration), vi, 285; rddhil,l sarvag'lll;la- vi, 149); samudicirn (active concupis-
saxppattilak~aJ.J.ii. cence), ii, 175, v, 55; aaxpprayukta
fivefold, vii, 122 (o~adhikrtii [super- (associated with attachment), saxpyukta
normal accomplishment created through (connected with attachment) and sariiga
herbs] ... ). citta (thought with attachment), vii, 24.
- Comp. tnu;iicarita (passionate per-
iiryii (supernormal accomplishment of son), iv, 174, 208.
the noble ones), vii, 111, viii, 210.
riijan (king), etymology, the first, iii, 206;
karmarddhi (supernormal accomplish- iisaxpvarika (the non-restrained), iv, 91;
ment of action), iii, 46, 205, vii, 122. and bhik~u~is, etc., 157.
rddhipiida (basis of supernormal acco~- rajas (dust) (v1ul}.a [color]), i, 16;
plishment), ii, 124, vi, 281, 283, 285; rajodhulivnti, iv, 187.
2756 Sanskrit-English Index-Glossary
rafi.janahetu (cause of coloring), iv, 128; (material form arisen from ripening),
rafi.janiyavastu (object to which one vi, 157; cittaja, viii, 142.
could be attached), iv, 182. in the iiriipya, viii, 135-43.
riik~asa (cannibal demon), iii, 146. rupa nivrta (material form is obscured),
rakta (attached), avirakta (unattracted), ii, 190, Vyii.. ii, 88 (first dhyiina
V, 73. [meditation]).
ra1_1a (conflict) (sara1_1a [endowed with riipa-avacara iiyatana (sense-sphere of
conflict] ... ), i, 13, vii, 86. the dominion of material form), i, 15,
rasa (taste), i, 17 (6 and 14 types); upa- 45, iii, 121, iv, 9; upagii vijfi.iinasthiti,
viciira (pondering with reference to iii~ 23; upaviciira (pondering of visible
taste), iii, 108; parityiiga, v, 76; riiga form), iii, 108.
(attachment to taste), iii, 206; riipa-nimitta (signs of material form),
viryavipiika, iii, '194. c_ittanimitta (signs of thought),
ratha and sattva, ix, 249. vii, 102; nil_lsara1_1a (escape from
material forms), viii, 141; prabhiivita
ratna (royal treasures), of the cakra- riipadhiitu, ii, 132, viii, 7; paryanta
vartin, ii, 203. (limit of physical matter), iii, 177;
rauk~ya, Vyii. ii, 25. pratisai:p.vedin (experiencing material
raurava (weeping) (naraka [hell]) iii, 2, form), iv, 113.
149. riipadadana (seeing of visible form),
riiti (heap), meaning of skandha (aggre- tabda§rava1_1a (hearing of sound)
gate), i, 35; the three, iii, 137, iv, 177, through the vijfiiina, i, 82, ii, 107.
202; dhiiriivat, ix, 254. riipadhiitu-antariibhava (intermediate
rirai:p.sii (sexual pleasure), iii, 50. existence of the realm of fine-material-
ity), iii, 45; upaga (those who go toward
roga (sickness), ga1_1i.fa (ulcer) and salya the realm of fine-materiality), fivefold,
(thorn), ii, 122, iii, 124. · vi, 215; deva (gods of the realm of fine-
rogakalpa (aeon ends with sickness), materiality ), iii, 2, 165-66, 171,173;
iii, 207. manopaviciira (mental pondering of
rogasya apagamal}., vi, 269. fine-materiality), iii, 110, sai:p.prayukta-
dharma (factors associated with the
ruci (preference), adhimok~a (resolve), realm of fine-materiality), iii, 8. .
i,A0, vii, 70; rucita = abhipretai:p.
yuktyanumiinatal}., iv, 162. that which makes a dharma (factor) is
riipadhiitupatita (integral to the realm
rudhirabindu (drop of blood), iii, 52. of fine-materiality), pratisai:p.yukta,
1
s
sabda (sound), §abdadhiitu (sense-element
according to the stick), iii, 208.
§alya (thorn) (sarp.skii.radul}.khata [unsat-
isfactoriness which is the fact of being
conditioned]) ii, 122.
of sound), i, 17, 47, 54 (kwala [whole- samatha (calm abiding), vipasyanii
some] ... ), 67 (apraviihavartin [not
2758 Sanskrit-English Index-Glossary
s•
~a4iiyatana (six sense-spheres) (miila-
sadvrtti (practice of the good), vi, 218.
saha (together), iii, 106; kiirin (auxilia-
ries), ii, 312; gata (together with),
ii, 326, iii, 106; ja (satkiiyadmi)
sattvadravya (essence of the person), (innate afflicted view of self), v, 41;
i, 66), iii, 63, 85; krama (order of the jiita (arise together among themselves),
six sense-spheres), i, 43; iik~epa (pro- iii, 105.
jecting a generic skeletal-effect), sahabhii (co-existing) and sahabhiihetu
iv, 200. (co-existent cause), ii, 248, 252, 289,
~a~thI (the use of the genitive), ii, 236. 313,iii, 102.
~at sparsakiiyiil;l (six groups of contact), siihacarya (associated with), iv, 10.
iii, 95. sahasii krta (done at random or in haste),
~o4a§a k11a1].iil;l (sixteen moments), iv, 242.
vi, 192-93. sahasirthika (companions in a caravan),
ii, 268 (comparison).
s
sa-uttara citta (thought which is with
siihasra cii4ika lokadhiitu (small
chiliocosm), iii, 170.
sahetuka vinHa (destruction depending
on a cause), iv, 5.
superior), anuttara (mind which is sainika (soldiers), iv, 152.
without superior), vii, 20, iv, 255.
sajiva riipa (living matter), i, 63.
sabhiiga (homogeneous)= sama... , ii, 196;
cak~us (active eye), i, 75; hetu (homo- sakalakiiral}.a or -sthiina kle§a (defile-
geneous cause), ii, 255,291,294,313, ments with complete causes), v, 72,
vi, 167. vi, 263; sakalabandhana (bound by all
bondages), ii, 180, vi, 194, 275.
sabhiigatii ([group] homogeneity), ii, 195,
198 (brahmaloka), 244, iv, 186. - siikiira (having an aspect or a mode of
Stcherbatsky, Logic, ii, 413. activity) (cittacaitta [thought and
thought-concomitants]), ii, 177; ix, 280;
siibhisaqiskiiraparinirviiyin (those who jfiiinasya vi11ayiikiiro nilapitidiriipo
obtain nirviil}.a with effort), vi, 210. 'rthena jfiiina iihital;l.
sabrahmaciiril}.ah, iv, 72. siikaraqi sodddam .. ., vii, 100.
sacetana riipa, i, 63. sakrd utpannaqi ti~thati (abiding, having
sadimatta (always intoxicated), iii, 159. arisen once), ii, 218.
saddharma (True Doctrine), confusion in sakrdiigiimin (once-returner), phala (fruit
regard to scriptures, iii, 40. of once-returner), phalapratipannaka
saddhltrma (True Doctrine), dvividha (candidate of the fruit of once-returner),
Sanskrit-English Index-Glossary 2761
the sarp.gha), vi, 293; upagamana nirvai:ia later when ideation is active),
(approaching the sarp.gha), iv, 98; iii, 39; cittavibhrama (mistaken idea-
upade~a (instruction of the sarp.gha), 98; tion a.nd thought), v, 25; bhik~u (bhik~u
dvaidha (two groups of the sarp.gha), in name only), iv, 96; mayakii.ya (body
212; bheda (schism of the sarp.gha), 78, made of ideations), ii, 209; mii.tra (only
206, 217, 250; ratna (jewel of the ideation), iv, 5; viparyii.sa (mistaken
sarp.gha), 78; bnmagamana (taking view consisting of ideation), i, 42, v, 23;
refuge), 76, 78. vibhramiid anyatra, iv, 156; vedita-
sarp.gha, iv, 77, pravrajitas (those who nirodha, see nirodhasamii.patti (attain-
have entered the religious life) of the ment of cessation); skandha (aggregate
four castes; 97, five types; ii.gantuka of ideation), i, 28, ii, 154, 177.
(guest), dharmabhii.I}.aka (preacher), sarp.kalana (to add up), v, 117.
237, 240. - buddha and sarp.gha, sarp.kalpa (thought), vitarka (initial
iv, 238, vi, 293. - §ravaka sarp.gha inquiry), vi, 283, Add., 291; sarp.kalpa-
(sarp.gha ofthe listeners), vi, 293. - rii.ga (attachment to thought), iii, 8;
giving to the sarp.gha, iv, 237, 238. samyak (right thinking) and mithyii.
sarp.gharp. pratisarp.dadhati, iv, 250. (wrong thought), ii, 158, iv, 36, vi, 283.
sarp.ghii.ta (crushing), hell, iii, 2, 149. sii.rp.ketika (conventional), i, 34.
sarp.ghata (composite), mii.tra (only a sarp.khyii. (calculation), iv, 25:l; great
composite), paramii.I}.u (composite numbers, iii, 189.
molecule), stharilpa (material form sarp.kleta (pollution) and vyavadiina
being in a composite), i, 25, 90, ii, 144, (purification), sarp.kletavastu, i, 29, 42,
iv, 12. ii, 105, 109, ix, 249.
sarp.ghibhavanti (becoming a sarp.gha), sii.rp.kle§ika dharma (factor of defile-
iv, 78. ment), ii, 105, iii, 115.
sarp.giti (assembly or conversation), in sarp.k~epa (reducing), sarp.k~iptacitta
dharmasarp.giti, iii, 39 (prakar~ayukta (contracted thought), sarp.k~ipta-
[enter entirely into the assembly]). pailcendriyapraciira (activity of the
sarp.graha (cohesion), function of water, five sense-faculties is contracted),
i, 22, ii, 146. iii, 131, vi, 151, vii, 18, 21-22.
sarp.graba, inclusion of the dharmas sarp.k~epaprathana (reducing-expanding),
(factors), i, 33. vii, 83.
sarp.grahavastu (element of popularity), sarp.moha (delusion), iii, 67, v, 71,
i, 34. vii, 144.
sarp.har~al}.Iya (intention to encourage) sarp.mukhii.t pratigrhitam, iii, 199.
(vaineya), vi, 219. sarp.mukhibhii.va (present operation), ,
samita (uninterrupted), iv, 15. lii.bha (acquisition), prii.pti (possession.),
sarp.jiva (reviving), hell, iii, 2. ii, 328, iv, 105, 181. ·
sarp.jila (ideation), paricchedyatii.rilparp. sarp.mukhibhiivavedaniyatii (experience
gfhl}.ii.ti (ideation insofar as it is sus- through the present operation), iv, 113.
ceptible of being defined), ii, 177; is not sarp.mukhikaroti (actualize), vi, 294;
pur~asya ii.tman (the self of the per- sarp.mukhikaral}.a, vii, 64.
son), v, 47; engendered by nii.man sarp.nikr~ta bodhisattva (bodhisattva
(name), ii, 238. - i, 28, ii, 154, 177; in close to enlightenment), iii, 129,
riaivasarp.jilii. (perception-sphere of iv, 220.
neither ideation) ... , viii, 143, 144; loka-
sarp.jilii. (ideations used in the world), sarp.nirodhasahagata (accompanied by
i, 86; and sarp.jilii.karal}.a (that which calm), vii, 21.
causes ideation to arise), ii, 238. sarp.nive§a, iii, 139.
sarp.jilii.-upagii. vijilii.nasthiti (station of sarp.ni&raya (support) and a§raya (basis),
l consciousness as ideation), iii, 24; iv, 27.
gatal;l parinirvati (those who obtain
2764 Sanskrit-English Index-Glossary
investigation), iii, 104; samiidhi (con- smrti (mindfulness), i, 60, ii, 154, 162,
centration with initial inquiry and inves- 185, iii, 114, vi, 160, 283, viii, 157,
tigation), viii, 183. ix, 294.
siUraya (having a basis), ii, 177. unmattiil;t smrti1p pratilabhante,
seiijita dhyiina (agitated meditation), vii, 84.
iv, 107, viii, 161. anuparigrhitatva (supervision through
seniivyuha, iv, 199. mindfulness), iv, 226,248; utpiida
(arising of mindfulness), vi, 264; upa-
sendriyakakiiya (body possessed with sthiina (application of mindfulness),
sense-faculties), ii, 212, iv, 254. vi, 153,158, 161,283,289,ofthe
setu (dike), setubhutii virati (abstention buddha, vii, 76, 105; chanda (predilec-
from transgressions is like a dike), tion), vitarka (initial inquiry)... ,
iv, 17, 25. ix, 294; pari§uddhi (complete purifica-
setusamudghiita (destruction of the dike), tion of mindfulness), viii, 147; lapse of
iv, 17. mindfulness (smrtimo~a), iv, 67; saxp-
prajanya (mindfulness and introspec-
sevya dharma (factors to be practiced), tion), iii, 114, iv, 53, vii, 76; sampra-
iv, 255. mo~a (lapse or loss of mindfulness),
siddhiinta (tenet), Vaibha~ika doctrine, ii, 154, 162,v,25,vi,258,259,261,
ii, 140. 264,269.
simii (boundary), simiibandha (parish); sniiniibhyanga (bathing and ointments),
mai;i4ilala, jiiiipti and prakrtisimii, iii, 120.
iv, 95,212. sniiniyaka~iiya (bathing suit), iv, 112.
shµhaniida (lion's roar), vii, 74. snapana (bathing), iv, 138.
srta (ocean), iii, 143, var. §Itii; see srtii.
sopadhi§e~a (with remainder), ii, 284,
skandha (aggregate), called vyavakiira by vi, 211, 279.
the ancient buddhas, ii; 207. spar§a (contact), defined, iii, 98, iii, 95-
meaning of the word, i, 35. 101; and vedanii (sensation), iii, 101-6;
the five, riipa (material form), etc., ii, 154; spar&iinga (member of contact),
i, 11, 13, 40, 41, 42; impermanent, iii, 64, 85, 95; spar§& (contact) as iihiira
iii, 57; causes of saxpkle§a (pollution) (sustenance), iii, 121.
and vyavadiina (purification), i, 42. spra~tavya (tangible), iiyatana (sense-
upiidiinaskandha (appropriative aggre- sphere of the tangible), dravya (real
gates), i, 13 (biihya skandha [external entity), dhatu (sense-element of the
aggregate]). tangible), i, 18-19, 55, 64, iv, 9, vii, 74,
viii, 155.
skandhas other than the five, i, 48.
sprha (desire to appropriate), iv, 167.
the five, ma (morality), etc., i, 12, 48,
ii, 159, v, 100. - aniisrava (pure aggre- spr~ta spr~tahetuka (substantial entity-in-
gates), lokottara (supramundane aggre- contact having for its cause a substantial
gates), jina (groups of the victorious entity-in-contact), i, 90.
ones), asamasama (unequalled groups), sprtyate adattiidiinavadyena... iv, 141.
dharmaskandha, vi, 297. srotaiipanna (stream-enterer), phala (fruit
skandhapraviiha (stream of aggregates), of stream-enterer), phalapratipannaka
ix, 254; bheda (dissolution of the aggre- (candidate of the fruit of stream-
gates), iii, 37; miitra (nothing other than enterer), i, 11, ii, 134, iv, 121, 123,
the aggregates), iii, 57; miira who is the v,23,29,85;vi, 194,200,256.
aggregates, ii, 124. srotas (motion), gati (movement), vi, 212.
smarai;ia (remembering), smarai;iajfiiina sthana (habitat) and sthiinin (inhabitant),
(cognition of memory), v, 6, ix, 273; ii, 166.
viniyoga, ix, 277.
asty etat sthiiniim asty etad vastu
smarasaxpkalpa (thoughts of desire), (there is this characteristic, there is this
vi, 264, 289.
Sanskrit-English Index-Glossary 2769
the three periods) ... , iii, 73. fact of not speaking), iv, 135.
triiyastrixp§a (the thirty three), iii, 1, 161, tyiiga (discarding)= virati (abstention),
vi, 207; iii, 161, Add. iv, 82.
triparivarta dharmacakra (three revolu- tyiigiinvaya pul}.ya (merit produced
tions of the wheel of dharma), vi, 246. through discarding), iv, 244.
tripita, vii, 188, Add. tyajati (rejecting), utsrjaty iiyu.l}.saxp-
trisiihasraka (trichiliocosm), iv, 227. skiiriin (rejecting the life energies),
ii, 121.
trisiihasramahiisiihasra (trichiliocosm),
ii, 170.
trividya (three clear knowledges),
vii, 108.
trivrtkar~a (trivrti root), vi, 200.
u
ubhayatobhiigavimukta (those who are
tri§aral}.agata (taking the threefold liberated through both parts), ii, 205,
refuge), gamal}.a, iv, 71. vi, 273, 276.
tr pti, iv, 84. ubhayavyaii.janaka (hermaphroditism),
iv, 94,175.
tnl}.ii (craving), three, v, 29; fourfold
utpiida (production of craving), vi, 147. ucca§ayana (high beds), iv, 47.
- prarthanii (desire) which is not tf~J}.ii ucchiistra (in contradiction to the Mstra),
(craving), v, 39. - avyikftii, v, 42. iv, 129.
in definition of the samudayasatya uccheda-anta (extreme view of annihila-
(truth of the origin), abhinirvrttihetu tion), ix, 265; tf~J}.ii (craving for annihi-
(cause ofre-existence), vi, 136, 137. lation), v, 30; dnti (afflicted view of
in pratityasamutpiida (dependent annihilation), v, 15, 40, ix, 270; bhiru-
origination), iii, 64, 85. tva (dread of annihilation), ii, 204.
in vijii.iinasthiti (station of conscious- udbhava (arising later) (uttarakiile
ness), iii, 23. bhava), ii, 290, but udbhava (birth),
iii, 131.
determines the bhiimi (stage), iii, 8,
viii, 176. udbhiivanii (expressed entity), vi, 140.
itibhavatf~J}.ii (various types of craving udbhiitavrtti (fully develop), i, 22,
to existence), bhava (craving for exis- ii, 175, viii, 218.
tence), vibhava (craving for non-exis- uddhata citta (restless thought), vii, 23-
tence), vi, 137; in the realm of desire, 24; uddhava = auddhatya (restless-
iv, 166; pur~endriya (male sexual ness), ii, 162.
faculty) ... , i, 57; sarvagii (pervasiveness uddi~ati, iv, 84; udde§apada,
of craving) ? , v, 32; craving for svarga nirde§apada, iv, 70, 166.
(heaven), v, 41.
udghatitajii.a (the listener who, during the
tnl}.a-abhi~yandita (moistened through course of a given explanation, comes to
craving), ii, 271; uttaradhyiiyin (medi- penetate the truth), i, 40.
tator endowed with craving), v, 43;
udaya (arising of craving), vi, 147; udgfhl}.iiti = pathati (reading), vi, 142;
carita (passionate person), iv, 174, 208; udgrahal}.a (seizing, apprehending),
piirvakakarman, i, 57; vicarita (modes pariccheda (determination, discern-
ofcraving), ii, 281, iii, 67-68, vii, 36. ment), i, 28.
truti (a little bit), iii, 178. udgiiral}.a, iv, 190.
tuliidal}.c;{aniimonniimavat, iii, 51. udrekatva (preponderant), adhikatva,
vi, 160.
tu~avat (like a grain), t~ital}.c;lulavat (like
a grain with its husk), iii, 116, 117. udvartana (unguents), iv, 138.
tu~ita Goyous ones), gods, iii, 1, 164. udyuthikii, iy, 190.
tii~J}.i.tpbhiivamiitra (solely through the ummiida, iv, 125.
Sanskrit-English Index-Glossary 2773
~xperienced after having been born), upaviisa (fast), saip.vara (restraint of the
lV, 115, V, 216. fast), saip.varastha (person who is
upapadyamiina (arising), upapanna established in the restraint of the fast),
(born), iii, 41. ailga (members of the fast), puqya
(merit of the fast), iv, 44, 47, 63-64,
upapadyo deval}. ?, iii, 38. Add., 68, 69, 101, 157, 253.
upapiita (birth), iii, 27. upaviciira (pondering) (manopaviciira
upapatti (birth, existence-as-birth) (prati- [mental pondering]) iii, 107-15;
saip.dhicitta [thought at conception]), upaviciirikii vedanii (sensation sus-
iii, 132; karmanivrttii janmiintare ceptible to pondering), saip.tirikii
skandhaprabhiitil}., iii, 5. - and abhi- (&.ensation susceptible to contempla-
nirvrtti (completion), iii, 123. ' tion), iii, 109.
kli~tii (existence-as-birth is always upavicarati (iilambate), upaviciirayati,
afflicted), iii, 118; acittakasya, 132. iii, 107, 109.
upapatti-citta (thought at birth), ii, 328; upayiisa, iii, 84.
ja (innate), vii, 121; dhyiina (medita- upek~ii (equanimity), three, ten, ii, 159.
tion) of birth, viii, 28, 146, 162, 171;
niyama, viii, 216; nirodha, i, 35. as apramiiqa (immeasurable), viii, 196;
upapattibhava (existence-as-birth), iii, 32, saip.bodhyailga (as member of enligh-.
45, 118, 131, ix, 258; va§itva (mastery tenment), vi, 283, cp, 153, dhyiiniiilga
over birth), iii, 30; saip.yojana (fetters (as member of meditation), viii, 148,
which cause birth), iii, 123; hetu (cause 197; vedanii (sensation): upek~endriya
of various births), vi, 137, viii, 216. (faculty of equanimity).
upapattik~aqa (moment of birth), iii, 13. k~aladharma (wholesome thought as
associated with equanimity) (citta-
upapattipratilambhika (acquired at birth samatii [balancing of thought]),, ii, 159.
or innate), liibhika, ii, 264,320, iv, 171,
vii, 121-22, viii, 219. pratisaip.khyiiya upek~ii (equanimity
preceded by deliberation), apratisaip.-
uparama (ceasing), ghatasya (ceasing of a khyiiya upek~ii (equanimity not pre-
jug), i, 42; and asaip.bandha, vii, 33. ceded by deliberation), iii, 114, viii, 148;
upa§abda, iii, 109. ekatvasaip.ni§ritii (equanimity resting
upa§amasukha, vi, 259, Add., viii, 150, on unity), niiniitvasaip.ni§ritii (equa-
Add. nimity resting on variety), iii, 115.
upiisaka, upiisikii (lay practitioner), iv, 29, saip.skiiropek~ii (equanimity of forma-
44, 46, 69, 70, Add., 74. tions), ii, 159, viii, 148 (aniibhoga-
lak~aqii pritil}. [joy that is free from
upasaip.khyiina (completing), ii, 249, tilting toward any object]).
vi, 242 (pravacanasya [completing the
teaching]). upek~ii-upaviciira (pondering of equanim-
ity), iii, 108.
upasaip.pad (ordination), iv, 60; upasam-
piidyamiina (receiving ordination), 37. upek,aka, vii, 76.
upasaip.padya, samiipadya, viii, 210. upek,apari~uddhi (complete purification
of equanimity), viii, 148.
upastambhahetu (maintaining cause),
ii, 314. upek~iivedaniya (susceptible to be sensed
as equanimity), ii, 125.
upastha (penis) and puru~endriya (male
sexual faculty), ii, 110, 112. upek~endriya (faculty of equanimity)
ii, 115,127, iii, 131, v, 88.
upasthitasmrti (applying mindfulness),
ii, 227, vi, 161. upottama (almost the best), iii, 197.
upati~thati karman, iv, 220. iirdhvabhiigiya saip.yojana (fetter
characterized as higher), v, 87.
upiitta (appropriated) and anupiitta (non-
appropriated), i, 17 (Vyii..), 62-63, iirdhvasrotas (those who go higher),
iv, 28, vi, 157. iirdhvasravaqadharman (nature of
goi~g toward what is high), bhaviigra-
Sanskrit-English Index-Glossary 2775
i, 22-23, ii, 146; i, 90, iii, 185, aggre- vedaniyatii (to be experienced (svabhiiva
gate of the atoms, the universe (priig- [in and of itself]), iv, 113.
viiyu [primordial wind]); viiyusam- vedanopagli vijiianasthiti (station of
vartanI (destruction by wind), iii, 210; consciousness consisting of sensation),
role in excretion, ii, 112; in action, iii, 24. i
ix, 294; in hell, iii, 149; movement of 1
the sun, iii, 156. veditam: yat kil]l cit... vi, 131.
viiyubhak~a (those who live on wind dntadharmavedaniya (to be experi-
alone), ii, 192. enced in the present life), etc., iv, 121-
22 ...
viiyukrtsniiyatana (source of totality of
wind), viii, 214. vega (impetus or momentum) of the
arrow, ii, 217.
viiyumal},4.ala (circle of wind), iii, 138,
185, vi, 155 .. vibandha (obstacle), vi, 300.
vedanii (sensation) and sal]ljiiiiskandha vibhiijyavyiikarai;ia, v, 44.
(aggregate of sensation), i, 40--41. vibhii~ii, viii, 222, Add.
vedanii (sensation)= anubhava (experi- vibhava (non-existence) or vinii§atr~I;lii
ence), i, 27, Vya. vastuno hliidapari- (craving for non-existence), v, 29-30,
tiipatadubhayavinirmuktasvarupa- vi, 148; dn!i (afflicted view ofnon-
sak~itkaral}asvabhiival;l.; kiiyacitta- existence), v, 40, ix, 265.
upacayiipacayatadubhayavinirmukta- vibhiivanli (inspection), vibhiivana-
avasthipravrtta§ caitasikavi§e~a- bhiivanii (cultivation of inspection),
spar&inubhaval;l.. vii, 65; vibhutarupasal]ljiia (ideation of
upalabhyatiirupal]l gfhI;liiti (perceiving material form), viii, 204.
the object in a general manner, insofar vibhrii.nta (squinting; squint-eyed)
as it is a perceivable entity), ii, 177. (kekara), vii, 123.
kiiyikI (bodily sensation), ii, 113, 115, vibodhya (having in one's mind), iii, 48.
iii, 109; miinasi (mental sensation),
caitasikI (mental sensation), ii, 114-15,
vicii.ra (investigation), pratyavek~aka
manojalpa (mental conversation of
126, 128, iii, 108. - agreeable sensation,
appreciation, of judgment); see vitarka
etc., see sukhendriya (faculty of sensa-
tion of pleasure), dul;l.khendriya (facul- (initial inquiry); i, 60, ii, 173, viii, 147
ty of sensation of displeasure) ... and 159.
vichinnabhavodbhava (?), iii, 34.
the adul;l.khiisukha (the neither pleasure
nor displeasure sensation) and the whole- vici (interruption, agreeable state, separa-
some action, ii, 115, 127. tion), iii, 10 (Vya.), 149. - vi, 209.
three, vi, 125, six, iii, 106. •vicikitsii. (doubt), anu§aya (proclivity of
and kle§as (defilement), v, 95; anu- doubt), nivaral}a (hindrance of doubt),
sal]lyojana (fetter of doubt), v, 3, 71,
§ayana (adhering or growing in sensa-
82, 98.
tion), v, 87.
videha (superior body), iii, 146.
aniisravii (pure sensation), iv, 212.
vidhii. (undertaking, type), mii.navidha
vedanii dvi§alyii, ii, 127, Vyii. ii, 22.
(types of conceit), v, 27, vi, 250.
vedaniiliga (member of sensation), iii, 64,
85, 107; and spar§a (contact), iii, 101. vidhiprabhra~;a (irregular action),
iv, 198.
vedaniisal]lbhiira (provisions or apparatus
of sensation), iv, 110. vidu~al}.ii.-pratipak~a (counteragent of
disgust), v, 104.
vedaniismrtyupasthiina (application of
vidyii. (clear knowledge), dadanamii.rga
mindfulness to sensation), vi, 158.
(path of insight), iv, 38; as prajiiii.
vedaniivigraha (mass of sensation), (understanding), anii.sravii prajiia (pure
iii, 17. . understanding), iii, 100, vi, 246; vidyii.
vedanendriyiil}i (faculty of sensation), cak~ur jiiii.nam... vi, 246, Add.; vidyii.-
ii, 105, 108. sal]lspada, iii, 100. - the three, vi, 276,
2778 Sanskrit-English Index-Glossary
iJ,, 2'27; arthaviniscaya, i, Vya. 12. abiding), vi, 158, 280, vii, 21, 27;
vinodana (rejecting, removal), vyupa- vipasyaniicarita (devoted to insight)
sama (appeasement), Vya. ii, 82. = prajfiii.priya (devoted to understand-
ing), the two /lrhats of the Compen-
vipii.dana (destruction)= vikopana, dium, 55, 75.
iv, 205,213.
viprakiri;ia (dispersion) (atoms), v, 61.
vipac;tumakasaxp.jiiii. (ideation of the ca-
daver eaten by worms), vi, 149. vipratipannatva (being in error) (hetau
[about the cause] ... ), v, 19-20.
vipii.ka (retribution, ripening); taste of the
digestion product of the fruits of the vipratisara (remorse), iv, 243.
earth, vii, 35; etymology, definition, viprayukta (dissociated), Vyii. ii, 74,
ii, 272, 289; that which is savipiika cittam iva cittena ca viprayuktii. iti.
(with retribution), avipiika (without viprayuktasaxp.skii.ra (formations dis-
retribution), ii, 128; karmavipiika sociated from the thought), ii, 178-244,
(retributi~n of action), vedanii.vipii.ka 237,319, iv, 206 (saxp.ghabheda
(retribution as sensation), iv, 114, 200; [schism]); v, 6 (anusaya [proclivities
suppressed, modified, iv, 121-22; dissociated from thought]); ii, 304
ii.ntarii.bhavika (retribution in the (anii.gataphalacihna [indication of the
intermediate existence), aupapatti- effects which will arise in the future]).
bhavika (retribution in the primary
existence), iv, 129; simultaneity of vipilyaka (rotting cadaver), vi, 149.
actions with agreeable sensations, etc., virii.ga (detachment), ii, 282.
iv, 112; dhyii.nii.ntara (retribution in the virii.gadhii.tu (element of detachment),
intermediate meditation), iv, 111; vi, 301-2, Add. (prahii.i;ia and nirveda).
mental and bodily sensation, iv, 124.
virati (abstention), iv, 17; see
vipii.ka-ii.varai;ia (obstacle consisting of pratimok~a. saxp.vara (restraint).
retribution), iv, 203; ii.rambha (retribu-
tion begins), iv, 116; vipii.kaja (arisen
viraticetanii. (intention to abstain),
iv, 227; samii.dii.na (undertaking th~
from retribution) (citta [thought], rilpa
abstention), iv, 46; purification of the
[material form]), i, 69, ii, 68,265,271,
virati (bodhisattva), iv, 226.
290, 320, iv, 40, vi, 157; phala (ripened
effect), ii, 191,287,290, iv, 110, 124, virodha, logical contradiction, ii, 159.
185. virya (vigor), indriya (praxis-oriented
vipii.kahetu (ripening cause), ii, 271. faculty of vigor), bala (power of vigor),
i, 101, ii, 111,160, vi, 283 (= samyak-
vipii.kasya vipiikal;l (ripened effect from a
ripened effect)?, iii, 117, iv, 114,
pradhii.na [right effort]); pii.ramitii
(perfection of vigor), iv, 229, vii, 78;
ix, 297.
see sraddhiidini.
vipii.kavedaniyatii. (to be experienced as
virya (vitality or potency), ojas (vitality)
retribution), iv, 113.
of the plants, iv, 187; virya (potency),
vipak~atvadilratii. (distancing through vipii.ka (taste of the digestion product),
opposition), v, 107. prabhii.va (specific property), vii, 35.
vipakti, ii, 271. visiita (uneven), i, 16.
viparii;iii.ma (transformed, deteriorating), vise~a (distinction), samii.dhisaxp.nisrita
i, 24. gui;ia (factors connected with concentra-
viparitadarsin (mistaken or erroneous tion), pure or impure, v, 27, vi, 272.
seeing, iv, 136; viparitii.lambanii. vise~a (special)= ii.scarya (surprising),
prajiiii. (understanding which errs), iii, 129.
v, 33.
vise~agamana (going in progression),
viparyii.sa (mistaken view), four, iii, 55 vi, 214; vise~agii.my iiyatyii.xp.
(???), v, 21, vi, 162, ix, 252; twelve svargopagal;l, iii, 95; vise~iidhigama
according to the Vibhajyavadins, (principle of progression), vi, 287:
Vibhii~ii, 104, beginning.
vise~amii.rga (path of advancement),
vipasyanii. (insight) and samatha (calm
Sanskrit-English Index-Glossary 2781
ner (priithamakalpika), ii, 210, iii, 28, iii, 5. - birth and completion (abhinir-
119, 172, 204. vrtti), iii, 123.
being active (samudiiciira) (factor existence-as-birth is always afflicted
[dharma], possession [priipti]), iii, 8, (kli~ia), iii, 118; acittakasya, 133.
iv,30, 175. birth of meditation (dhyiinopapatti),
being multiple (bahuvikalpa, bahubheda), iii, 166, viii, 162-<i4.
ii, 236. birth, blissful (sukhopapatti), ii, 221,
belief in an 'I' and in 'mine' iii, 166.
(iitmiitmiyagriiha), v, 15. birth, existence-as- (upapattibhava),
believing (prasanna), vi, 295. iii, 32, 45, 118, 131, ix, 258; mastery
belonging to a stream or prolonged over birth (vasitva), iii, 30; fetters
(priibhandika), prakar~aka, vi, 163, 192, which cause birth (sarp.yojana),
221. iii, 123; cause of various births (hetu),
vi, 137, viii, 216.
belvedere or fortress (pariga1_1a), iii, 4.
birth, thought at (upapatti-citta), ii, 328;
benefactors, field of (upakiirik~etra), innate (upapattija), vii, 121;
iv, 213. meditation of birth (dhyiina), viii, 128,
beneficial (anugriihaka), i, 18 (cold 146,162,171; niyama, viii, 216;
[sTta]), iii, 124, vi, 155. nirodha, i, 35.
benefit, perfection of the (upakiirasarp.- birth, mode of (yoni), iii, 12, 26.
pad), vii, 84. birth, moment of (upapattik~al_la), iii, 13.
best (adhimiitra, visiey(a), ii, 266; exces- black action (kr~,;iakarman), iv, 129,
sive-excessive (adhimiitra-a:dhimiitra), destroying black action (k~ayakrt),
vi, 199; strong-strong (adhimiitrapari- 131,
piir1_1a), iv, 170
black factor (km1adharma), weak,
between the two eyebrows (bhrii- vi, 199-200.
madhye), vi, 151.
black string (kalasiitra), hell, iii, 2, 149.
bhik~hus, confession ceremony of the
(bhik~u-po~adha), iv, 163; loss of the black-and-white action (kr~i:iasukla-
restraint of the Bhiksu, iv, 95; marks karman), iv, 1, 129; destroying black-
of a Bhik~u (lil_lga), vi, 204; renounc- and-white action (k~ayakrt), 131.
ing the restraint (sarp.vararp. praty- bliss (iinanda), ii, 113.
iicak~ii1_1al_i), iv, 46; community bliss (sukha); bliss of going forth (pra-
(sarp.gha), ciiturdisa, iv, 250. vrajyiisukha), vi, 259, pleasure of
bhik~u. four types, iv, 96, Add.; cut off pliancy (prasrabdhisukha), viii, 150,
the defilements (bhinnakle~atviit), bliss of awakening (bodhisukha),
iv, 97; enjoyer of kiimas vi, 259, pleasure and joy of liberation
(kiimopabhogin), iii, 8, aparisuddhasila. (vimuktipritisukha), pleasure of libera-
bhik~ul}.I in training (sik~ama1_1ii), iv, 43. tion (vimuktisukha), ii, 110,, 112,
happiness of detachment (viveka-
bhiksunI, iv, 43, 44; illicit intercourse sukha), vi, 259.
(aga~yii), 157; violating (dii~aka), 157,
219. bliss of concentration (adhicaitasika),
vi, 261'.
bile (pitta), iii, 136.
J?lissful birth (sukhopapatti), ii, 221,
binding (anubadhnanti), v, 79. iii, 166.
birth (janman, jiiti) or general character blisters bursting (nirarbuda), h~ll,
of one's existence (nikiiyasabhiiga), iii, 154, 176.
iv, 198.
blow (upakrama), vi, 140.
birth (upapiita), iii, 27.
bodhisattva and community (saipgha),
birth (upapatti) (thought at conception vi, 293.
[pratisarp.dhicitta]), iii, 132; karma-
nivrtta janmiintare skandhaprabhiitil_i, bodhisattva close to enlightenment
2792 English-Sanskrit Index-Glossary
(sa11mikrHa bodhisattva), iii, 129, (vijfiapti), i, 20, iv, 3; ix, 294; tactile
iv, 220. consciousness (vijiiana), i, 19; bodily
bodhisattva in the intermediate exis- witness (sak~in), vi, 223, 273; applica-
tence (bodhisattva-antarabhava), iii, 44; tion of mindfulness to the body
antyajanman, caramabhavika, ii, 220, (smrtyupa~thana), vi, 159, 293.
240, v, 62; niyata, predestined (niyati- body having cavities (su~irakaya),
patita), iv, 221; imminent or near vi, 157; body in which the conscious-
Bodhisattva (sarpnikr~ta), near to ness has arisen (savijiianaka), 224.
enlightenment (asanniibhisarpbodhi), dharma, riipa, putika, manomayakiiya,
iv, 220; turn away (avaivartika), etc,
iv, 222; jambusar_u;lagata, iii, 41.
body possessed with sense-faculties
bodhisattva, vii, 80. (sendriyakakaya), ii, 212; iv, 254.
unselfishness, iii, 191-92; acquisition body, thought bound to the (asrayaprati-
of enlightenment (bodhi), ii, 206, baddha citta), iii, 133; mrdukaral).a,
iii, 128, iv, 77,226,230, viii, 195. iii, 215; decaying of the body (vipari-
bodhisattva's entry into the womb 1).ii.ma), iii, 132; injuring of the body
(bodhisattva-garbhiivakriinti), iii, 56 (vipiidana), iv, 78; having acquired a
(born from a womb [jariiyuja], iii, 29; personality favorable to the path
young elephant [gajapota],.iii, 44); (vise~alabha), vi, 220; life-force is
family (gotra), vi, 176; conduct bound to the stream of the body
(carya), iv, 220-31; giving (dana), (sarptatipratibaddha ayus), ii, 218.
iv, 238, 240; going to unfortunate anya§rayodaya, iv, 62, 152; basis of
planes of existence (durgatigamana), the non-informative action (avijfiapty-
iii, 155, iv, 221, vi, 176; recollecting asraya), iv, 27; basis of the prepara-
past existences (purvaniviisiinusmrti), tory action of merit (pul).yaprayoga-
divine eye (divyacak~us), vii, 122; 126; iisraya), iv, 232; basis of consciousness
resolution or vow (pral).idhana), (vijfiiiniisraya), i, 95, iii, 135.
iii, 201; mother (miitar), ii, 220, iii, 44;
death (miiral).a), iv, 219; path (miirga), body (dehas), iii, 146.
vi, 293. bondage (bandhana) (three), v, 2, 87.
body (safira) of the Fortunate One bones (asthisarpghata) of Ka§yapa,
(bhagavat), vii, 84. vii, 120.
body (sarira), stupa, iv, 250. bones of the foot (padasthi) (meditation
body for its object or basis, action on the loathsome [asubha bhavana]),
having the (kaya-adhi~thana), action vi, 150.
having the body for its cognitive bones, chain of (asthispikhala) (sankala,
object (-alambana karman), iv, 12; Lueders), vi, 150, Add.
body sense-faculty (indriya), sense- born from moisture (sarpsvedaja),
sphei:;e of the body (ayatana), ii, 145, iii, 27-28.
iii, 135, viii, 155; bodily action
boundary (sima), parish (simabandha);
(karman), iv, 2, 12; rigidity of the
mal).<;lala, jiiapti and prakrtisima, iv, 95,
body (kiithinya), iii, 215; wind the
213.
existence of which depends on the
body and thought (cittasarpnisrita- bountiful cow (godii.niya), iii, 145.
priil).a), iv, 154; bad conduct of the box (cafica), famine of the box (caiicu-
body (duscarita), iv, 84-85; bad state durbhik~a), iii, 208.
of the body (dau~thulya), v; 89; box (samudgaka), iii, 208.
destruction of the body (nidhana),
disappearance of the body (nasa), bragging (lapana); iv, 165.
iii; 31; pliancy of the body (pra- brahma = buddha, vi, 245 (brahmabhuta).
srabdhi) ii, 15,7'.-58; cultivation of the brahmii, great brahma (mahabrahmii.),
body (bhavana), vii, 65; erasing the iii, 3-4, Add., 17, 174, Add., iv, 96,
stains 6f the b9dy (malapakar~ana), 203, v, 33, vi, 174,214, viii, 183.
iv, 135; bodily,informative action
English-Sanskrit Index-Glossary 2793
celestial palaces of the gods (vimiina), teristic (anulak~ai:ia), ii, 222, Add.
iii, 159, 164, 169. characteristics of the great person
celibacy (brahmacarya), i, 69 (Vyii. 73), (mahiipuru~a), wheel-turning king
ii, 123. (cakravartin), bodhisattva, ii, 230,
iv, 221, 223, vii, 85 (perfection of the
cemetery (ka~asi), iii, 53. characteristics [lak~ai:iasaqipad]).
cessation (nhodha), five;i, 35: 1. cessa- characteristics of things, exposition of
tion by the characteristic (laksana- the (liik~ai:iika nirdesa), iii, 67, vi, 137
nirodha), i, 35 or cessation due· to (abhidharma).
impermanence (anityatiinirodha),
ii, 222, viii, 189, or spontaneous cessa- characteristics, secondary (anulak~ai:ias)
tion (svarasanirodha), ii, 280; 2. cessa- of the conditioned phenomena (saqi-
tion of attainment (samiipattinirodha) skfta), ii, 224.
= attainment of cessation (nirodha- chariot (yiinaka), (self [iitman]), ix, 254.
samiipatti); 3. cessation by birth (upa- chattering (saqigai:iikii), iv, 166.
pattinirodha) = state of non-ideation
(iisaqijfiika); 4. cessation due to delib- chief steward, jewel of the (grhapati-
eration (pratisaqikhyiinirodha); 5. ces- ratna), iii, 203, vii, 123.
sation noi due to deliberation (aprati- chiliocosm, small (siihasra cii<;lika loka-
saqikhyiinirodha). dhiitu), iii, 170.
cessation due to deliberation (prati- circle of water (abmai:i<;lala), iii, 139;
saqikhyiinirodha), exhaustion (k~aya), water particle (rajas), 178
i, 10, ii, 180, 187, 275, 278, vi, 242 (89 circle of wind (viiyumai:i<;lala), iii, 138,
acquisitions); viii, 190. 185, vi, 155.
cessation not due to deliberation (aprati- circumstances, liberated limited by the
saqikhyiinirodha), i, 19, ii, 279, vi, 171, (samayavimukta), vi, 251, 254, 267,
174, viii, 189-90, 209 (asaqikhyayii 274.
k~ayal).).
circumstantial and cherished liberation
cessation, disposed to (nirodhaabhi- (siimayikI kiintii vimukti), vi, 260.
mukha), ii, 282; cognition of cessation
class of persons (pari~ad), assembly
(jfiiina), vii, 13; element of cessation
(par~ad), seven, iv, 65; eight, ii, 169,
(dhiitu), vi, 301; posssession of cessa-
Vyii. ii, 63; siiradyabhaya, iv, 128.
tion (priipti), ii, 180; taking delight in
cessation and in the path (miirga- clean meditative attainment (suddhaka-
iiriimatii), vi, 147; cessation as the samiipatti), clean meditation (dhyiina),
object-field of the contaminants viii, 144, 173.
(vi~ayiinusaya), v, 35. clear knowledge (Ik~ai:iikii vidyii), tiistra,
chain of bones (asthisfllkhalii) (sankalii, vii, 112, 125.
Lueders), vi, 150, Add. clear knowledge (vidyii), path of insight
change, modification (anyathiitva, (darsanamiirga), iv, 38; as understand-
bhiiva), ii, 223, iii, 143. ing (prajfiii), pure understanding
(aniisravii prajfiii), iii, 100, vi, 246;
characteristic (laksana) and character-
vidyii cak~ur jfiiinam ... vi, 246, Add.;
ized phenomenon ·(lak~ya), ii, 230;
vidyiisaqisparsa, iii, 100. - the three,
particular inherent characteristics
vi, 276, vii, 108. - supernormal,
(sva) and common characteristics vii, 111.
(siimiinya), ii, :½25, vi, 158.
clear knowledge of those beyond train-
characteristic, common (siimiinya- ing (asaik~I vidyii), vii, 108-13.
lak~ai:ia), v, 48, 158; mental applica-
tion l)earing on the common charac- clear knowledges, three (trividya),
teristics (manaskiira), ii, 325; aspect vii, 108.
(iikiira), vii, 15. clear light gods (iibhiisvara deva), iii, 2,
characteristics (lak~ai:ia) (primary Add., 18-20, 185.
[milla-]) of the conditioned phenom- clever (karmai:iyatii) (light or apt
ena (saqiskrta) and secondary charac-
2796 English-Sanskrit Index-Glossary
ka~aya, the five corruptions, iii, 14, craving for destruction (vinii.satr~i;iii.),
193,207. v, 29, vi, 148 (non-existence [vibhava]).
cotton threads (tantu) and cotton ball craving, moistened through (tr~Q.ii-
(pata), iii, 211. abhi~yandita), ii, 271; meditator
counter-agent (pratipak~a), four, v, 103; endowed with craving (uttaradhyiiyin),
shake (vi~kambhana), make distant v, 43; arising of craving (udaya),
(diirikaraQ.a), viii, 200; opposite vi, 147; passionate person (carita),
(vipak~a), counter-nourishment iv, 174,208; piirvakakarman, i, 57;
(anii.hii.ra), v, 99. - member of counter- modes of craving (vicarita), ii, 281,
agent (anga) in meditation (dhyana), iii, 67-68, vii, 36.
viii, 1.57. creation (vivarta) and destruction
counteragent of abandonment (sarµvarta), iii, 170.
(prahii.i;iapratipak~a), v, 103. creation or emanation (nirmita) (sound
counteragent of disgust (vidii~aQ.ii.prati- [sabda]), i, 17, iii, 9, 11, vii, 114, Add.,
pak~a), V, 104. 116, 118-19, 121 (nirmitasya
bhii.~aQ.aiil) .
. counteragent of support (ii.dhii.raprati-
pak~a), V, 103. creation, aeon of (vivartanakalpa), rain,
wind ..., iii, 139, 142, 153, 185.
counting (gai;ianii.), iv, 254; in mindful-
n~ss of breathing (iinapii.nasmrti), crime, deadly (abhithii.na), iv, 201.
Vl, 154. crookedness (kautilya), iv, 128.
counting block (gulikii.), v, 54, Add. crushed (parinunna = P.aripI<;lita), iv, 127.
counting block (vartikii., gulikii.), v, 54 crushing (sarµghiita), hell, iii, 2, 149.
Add. ' cubit, human (puru~ahasta), iii, 178.
courage, having (utsahate), iii, 196. cultivated (prabhii.vyante), vi, 289.
covetousness (abhidhyii.), iv, 135-36, 144, cultivation (bhii.van:l).
148, 166, 169, 178; ii.vi~ta, gata.
four, acquisition (pratilambha), prac-
cow particles (gorajas), iii, 178. tice (ni~evaQ.a), counter-~gent (prati-
crafty (sii.tha), iii, 146. pak~a), expulsion (vinirdhiivana); two
craving (tr~Q.ii), three, v, 29; fourfold others, restraint (sarµvara), inspection
production of craving (utpiida), (vibhii.vanii.), vii, 64; two, actualizing
vi, 147. - desire (priirthanii) which is (sarµmukhibhiivakarai;ia), taking for
not craving (tr~i:ia), v, 39. - avyii.krta, one's cognitive object (iilambanI-
v, 43. karai;ia), vii, 23; comp. ii, 15·7, iv, 255.
in definition of the truth of the cultivation, contemplation, vi, 142,
origin (samudayasatya), cause of re- 144; merit derived from cultivation
existence (abhinirvrttihetu), v, 136-37. (bhii.vanii.mayapm_1ya), etc.
in dependent origination (pramya- combined meditation (ii.kirnii.
samutpii.da), iii, 64, 85. bhiivanii.), vi, 221, 259, vii, 5·5, Vibhii.sii
175. . '
in station of consciousness (vijfiii.na-
sthiti), iii, 23. cultivation of the body (bhiivitakaya),
determines the stage (bhiimi), iii, 8, vii, 65, Add.
viii, 176. cultivation, fullness through (bhiivanii.-
various types of craving to existence paripiiri), vi, 290; abandonment by
(itibhavatr~i:ia), craving for existence cultivation (prahai;ia), v, 11; effect of
(bhava), craving for non-existence cultivation (phala), ii, 297, iv, 249;
(vibhava), vi, 137; in the realm of mental application derived from
desire, iv, 166; male sexual faculty cultivation (maya manasikara), ii, 328,
(puru~endriya)..., i, 57; pervasiveness cultivation as an object of a meritori-
of craving (sarvagii.) ?, v, 32; craving ous work (puQ.yakriyiivastu), iv, 232,
for heaven (svarga), v, 41. 248, stages conducive to penetration
(nirvedhabhagiya), vi, 170; under-
English-Sanskrit Index-Glossary 2803
vedin, i, 48 (Vyil. 56); discernment of saq1cilra), iv, 100, v, 108, vi, 219, 235,
the factors (pravicaya), i, 5, ii, 154, 253, 270, 278; restraint of the sense-
vi, 288; bhar.iaka, iv, 240; superknowl- faculties (saq1vara), iv, 53.
edge of the characteristics of the faculties, having complete
factors (lak~ar.ianabhijfia), vi, 219. (avikalendriya), iii, 204, iv, 223.
factors, time when reflecting on the faculties, incomplete (vikalendriya)
(dhannanidhyilnakilla), v, 101; recep- (fault [dosa]), iv, 200,226.
tivity (k~ilnti), vi, 163,165. faculty bringing about retribution
faculties, controlling (indriyai:i.i). (savipilka indriya), ii, 128.
twenty-two, i, 100-102; ii, exposition faculty of coming to know what is as
of the faculties (indriyanirdesa); yet unknown (aniljfiiltam ... indriya),
meaning of the word, ii, 103; defini- ii, 109,116,134.
tion, ii, 110-13. faculty of equanimity (upek~endriya)
faculties of the Siiipkhyas, ii, 110-13. ii, 115,127, iii, 131, v, 88.
faculties (indriya), material (riipir.ii), faculty of final and perfect knowledge
(seven, the five and the two physical (ajfiatavindriya), faculty of perfect
organs [vyafijanas]), ii, 125, 128-29, knowledge (ajfiendriya), ii, 109, 116,
131 135.
five sense-faculties (pafica), cak~ur- faculty of pleasure (sukhendriya), ii, 113,
iidini, primary matter (bhiitas) or v, 69, vi, 198, viii, 150.
secondary matter (bhautikas) ?, i, 65;
transparent (accha), suprasensible faculty of sensation (vedanendriyar.ii),
(atindriya), i, 15, ix, 231; formation of ii, 105, 108.
the six sense-spheres (~ac;lilyatana), faculty, mental (mana-indriya), ii, 105,
iii, 63. - description, i, 87, 93-94 ... 107, 127, iii, 99, ix, 243.
indriyiiI].i yathiibhiitaip dntiini, faith (sraddha), ii, 106, 156, Add., 171,
vi, 133. 246, vi, 196, 283, 294. - threefold
indriyiiI].i vi~aye~u viciirayati, iv, 53. confidence of the thought (citta-
prasada), v, 45, vi, 295.
perfection of the praxis-oriented
faculties (indriyapilramitil), ii, 119. faith, object of (sraddhaniya), not an
object of reasoning (anumeya), ii, 147.
five sense-faculties (pafica), faith, etc.,
(sraddhadini), ii, 111, 116, 119, 156, faith, praxis-oriented faculties of which
vi, 219, 223 (ak~a), 220 (paripakvatara), the first is faith (sraddhadini
281 (bodhipak~ika). indriyai:ii), ii, 105, 109, 118-19.
difference between praxis-oriented faith, those who are freed through
faculties (indriya)and praxis-oriented predominance of (sraddha-adhimukta),
powers (bala), vi, 286. vi, 196,251,274, vii, 7; pursuers
through faith (anusarin), vi, 193, 274,
pure faculties (anilsravar.ii), ii, 105, vii, 7; through this single thought of
109, 116, 118. faith (matraka), vii, 85.
non-lacking faculties (avikalendriya), fall (pataniya), iv, 95, 97.
non-deficient faculties (ahinendriya),
iii, 27. falling away (vyutkriimayati, pari-
hapayati), v, 3.
visible support of the sense-faculties
(indriya-adhi~ihana) (physical organ false conception of excellence (agra-
[vyafijana]), ii, 110, iii, 58; power of graha), afflicted view that this is
English-Sanskrit Index-Glossary 2815
vi, 207; human existence (bhava), ignorance (avidyii), very complex con-
iii, 13, 36; division of the human ception, defined iii, 88-m, v, 2, Add.;
(vigraha), iv, 154; outstanding man delusion (moha), iii, 90--91; however,
(vise~a), iii, 206; homogeneity of a [there is also delusion that] is not
human being (sabhiigatii.), ii, 197. delusion as an unwholesome root
humor of the body (do~a), bile, etc., [v, 41]; more precisely: confusion
iii, 136. (s~moha) with regard to the truths,
v, 71, which is ignorance defiled by
hunger (bubhuk~ii), i, 18. the defilements (kli~tasa111moha), i, 2;
hungry ghost (preta), existence as the with regard to the past, etc., vii, 108.
hungry ghosts (pretabhava), disap- does not contradict the defiled (klista)
pearance of the hungry ghosts (preta- or undefiled (akli~ta) actions, iii, 84;·
samvartanI), iii, 1, 11, 13, 29, 36, 156, iv, 38.
175, 182; pretI, 29.
however defiled non-cognition (kli~ta
ajiiiina) iii, 100, in contrast to the
defiled non-cognition (akli~ta ajfiiina)
I of the perfected beings (arhats), i, 3.
root of the karma-formations (sa111-
ideation (sarpjiiii), consciousness insofar skiiras), the fluxes (iisravas), of cyclic
as it is susceptible to being defined existence (sa111sara), iii, 84, v, 7 4. -
(paricchedyatii.riipa111 grhi:iati), ii, 177; is ignorance (avidyii), craving (tr~i:ia),
not the self of the person (puru~asya action (karman), vi, 136-37 (cause of
atman), v, 47; engendered by name various births [upapattihetu], [cause of
(niiman), ii, 238. - i, 28, ii, 154, 177; in re-existence [abhinirvrttihetu]). - cause
perception-sphere of neither idea- of satpriiga, v, 74.
tion ... (naivasa111jiiii ... ), viii, 143-44;
ideations used in the world (loka- distinct from understanding (prajiiii),
sa111jiiii), i, 86; and that which caµses from afflicted view (dr~ti); is non-
ideation to arise (sa111jiiiikarai:ia), grasping (agriihikii), has non-intellec-
ii, 238. tion for its intrinsic nature (asa111pra-
khyiinasvabhiivii), not seeing (adarsi-
ideation of a pleasure grove (iiriima- tva), ii, 170; iii, 89, v, 34, 77, and false
sa111jiiii)... iii, 55; svapna, 44. cognition (mithyajiiana), v, 33.
ideation of a unit (pii:i<;lagriiha), i, 40, is sut,sidiary defilement (upaklesa) of
v, 17. understanding (prajiiii), iii, 90.
ideation of the cadaver eaten by worms associated with attachment (raga),
(vipa<;lumakasa111jfiii), vi, 149. false view (mithyiidr~ti) ... , iii, 84,
ideation, sentient beings without (as~- v, 31, 34 .
. jiiisattva, deva), ii, 199-200, iii, 4, 22, is a proclivity (anusaya), a flux
132, iv, 201, vi, 174, viii, 136. (iisrava), a flood (ogha), a yoke (yoga),
ideation, station of consciousness as fetter (s~yojana), bondage
(sa111jnii-upagii vijiiiinasthiti), iii, 24; (bandhana) ... iii, 89, v, 2-3, 31, 74, 75,
those who obtain nirvana later when 81.
ideation is active (gata~ parinirviiti), in dependent origination pertaining
iii, 39; mistaken ideation and thought to states (prafityasamutpiida iivastika),
(cittavibhrama), v, 25; bhik~u in name iii, 62-63.
only (bhik~u), iv, 96; body made of
ideations (mayakiiya), ii, 209; only has incorrect mental application for
ideation (miitra), iv, 5; mistaken view its cause (ayonisomanaskarahetukii),
consisting of ideation (viparyiisa), member (nidiina), etc. iii, 70.
i, 42, v, 23; vibhramiid anyatra, iv, 156; ignorance is non-defined (avyakrta
vedayitanirodha, see attainment of avidyii), v, 43.
cessation (nirodhasamiipatti); aggre- independent (iivei:iikI) or isolated
gate of ideation (skandha), i, 28, (kevalii) ignorance, restricted
ii, 154, 177. defilement (parittaklesa), ii, 165,
English-Sanskrit Index-Glossary 2823
nition of the different acquired dis- intentionally (sa111cintya), iv, 136, 153,
positions of sentient beings (nana- 213-14.
dhatujiiana), vii, 70; movable (cala), intercourse with the wife of another
hidden (gU(Jha), fixed (dr<Jha), iv, 174- (paraparigrhita; sirI), iv, 157.
75; bad (papa), iv, 174, 176, 182-83.
intermediate aeon (antarakalpa), iii, 175,
intention (adhyasaya), iv, 90; corrupted 181, iv, 207.
(vipanna), 93.
intermediate beings entering into the
intention (cetana) (sixfold [~a(Jvidha]) womb, (garbhavakranti), four, iii, 37,
and aggregate of formations 54-56.
(sa111skaraskandha), i, 28.
intermediate existence (abhinirvrtti) and
the second generally permeating birth (upapatti), iii, 123, iv, 120 Add.,
factor (mahabhUmika), ii, 154. vi, 137; ripened in the intermediate
intention (cetanii) and understanding existence (vedaniya karman), vi, 216;
(prajfia), ii, 175. cause (hetu), vi, 137; fetter (sa111-
anabhyUhavastha, i, 61 (comp. Bodhi- yojana), iii, 123.
sattvabhUmi, 83); pure (aniisrava), intermediate existence (antariibhava),
iv, 131; associated with covetousness iii, 14, 31, 36--50, 118-19, 131, iv, 119,
(abhidhyiidisa111prayoginI), iv, 168; 176, vi, 201,216,220, vii, 103, ix, 25.8.
instigating a ripened effect (abhi- intermediate meditation (dhyiinantara),
samskarika), iii, 73; intense (fivra), iii, 167, iv, 110, viii, 180-82; inter-
iv, ·59; tritemporal intention (trikala), mediate action (karman), iv, 110-11,
iv, 22; prai:iatipatadisamutthana, 124.
iv, 168-69; intention in the summit of
cyclic existence (bhavagra), iv, 219; intermediate or small aeon (antaJ;ikalpa),
weak, etc. (mrdvI), iv, 59; intention iii, 181.
associated with adamantine concen- intermediate stage, gods of the
tration (vajropamasamadhisa111pra- (dhyiinantarika deva), iv, 105; inter-
yukta), iv, 219; etc. mediate stage (dhyiinantarikii), belved-
intention is mental action (cetana ere, ii, 199, iii, 4.
miinasam karma), iv, 1-2, 12; cetanii- internal (iidhyatmika), i, 15, 35, 73.
karman.(action is intention), kriya- intonation of Brahma (brahmasvaratii),
cetanakarman. i, 69.
and paths of action (karmapathas), intoxicating (madaniya), iv, 84.
iv, 168,177,227; covetousness, etc.
(abhidhyadayas), iv, 136, 168; intrinsic nature (svabhiiva) (particular
resolution (prai:iidhana), vi, 179. inherent characteristic [svalak~ai:ia])
and mode of existence (bhiiva), v, 57-
intention issues forth (cetanapravrtti), 58. - exposition characterized
iv, 136; vise~a, iv, 20. through intrinsic nature (prabhavita-
intention of another (parasa111cetana), nirdesa), iii, 92; vastu, ii, 286; concep-
ii, 219. tualizing activity in its intrinsic
intention to apply the acquired merit to nature (vikalpa), i, 60; modifying the
the acquisition of nirviii;ia intrinsic nature of the pre-existent
(parii:iamanacetana), iv, 227. effect (visesana), v, 64; to be experi-
enced in and of itself (vedaniyatii),
intention to do good to another iv, 113; application of mindfumess in
(paranugraha), iv, 137. its intrinsic nature (smftyupasthiina),
intention to make others undertake this vi, 159.
abstention (samadapanacetana), introspection (sa111prajanya, sa111pra-
iv,227. jfiiina), vi, 286, viii, 147.
intentional character (sa111cetana), investigation (viciira), mental conversa-
iv, 242; intention as sustenance, tion of appreciation, of judgment
iii, 121; one's own intention (atma➔, (pratyavek~aka manojalpa); see initial
intention of another (para-), ii, 219. inquiry (vitarka); i, 60, ii, 173, viii, 147
2826 English-Sanskrit Index-Gl9ssary
and 159.
invisible (anidarsana), i, 51. K
iron mountain or circle (cakrava<;Ia), kalpa, end of the (kalpaniryai:ia), iii, 20,
iii, 141, 143. 182, 207.
iron particle (loharajas), iii, 178. karma-formations (samskiira), member
iron-lover (ayas-kanta), Vya. ad iii, 35; (anga) of the dependent origination
wheel-turning king (cakravartin), 197; (prafityasamutpada), iii, 63, 84 and iv;
iron-beak (tui:i<;Ia), 151; prapatika, 38; upagii vijfianasthiti, iii, 24; formation
forest of iron §almali (salmalivana), of equanimity (upek~a), ii, 159,
151. viii, 148; unsatisfactoriness which is
the fact of being conditioned
irregular action (vidhiprabhra~ta), (du]:ikhata), vi, 125; preparatory stage
iv, 198.
(bhumi), iv, 224; aggregate of forma-
tions (skandha), i, 28, 40.
jivitasaip.skii.ra, ii.yu\lsaip.skii.ra, viik-
J saip.skii.ra, etc.
jealousy or envy (Ir~yii) and selfishness kill (prai:iivadha), iv, 178.
(miitsarya), v, 81; fetters of jeaousy or killing (nirakrti), killing (vipiidana),
envy and selfishness (sarp.yojana), 83. parityii.ga (eradicating), iv, 213.
jewel of a wheel (cakraratna), iii, 198, killing (prai:iatipata), iv, 141,144,151,
vi, 245, 248. 153, 163, 186, 188; abstention from
jewel of the chief steward killing (virati), 227.
(grhapatiratna), iii, 203, vii, 123. killing of cattle (pasughata), iv, 145.
jewel of the minister (parii:iayakaratna), killing, envelopment of (vadhaparyava-
iii, 203. sthiina), v, 28, 31.
jitatara, vi, 213. king (riijan), etymology, the first,
joining (sle~a), vi, 166. iii, 206; the non-restrained (iisarp.-
varika), iv, 91; and bhik~ui;i.Is, etc.,
joint (asthisarp.dhi), vii, 73. 157.
joint (saqidhi), bone joint (asthisarp.dhi), knowing Gana.ti) and seeing (pasyati),
vii, 73. v,25.
joy (-priti), ii, 115 Uoyous exaltation [sarp.- knowing (prajfiiina), grahai;i.a, i, 17.
prahar~a]).
knowledge (iiva = avagama), ii, 117;
in meditation (dhyana), ii, 114, · knowing (avitum).
iii, 215, viii, 147 and foll.; pravivekaja,
prasrabdhija, viii, 153. knowledge of the designated thing,
unhindered (arthapratisarp.vid),
joy as a member of enlightenment meaning of the word artha, vii, 90, 92;
(sarp.bodhyanga), ii, 158, vi, 283. pratisarp.vedin, i, 48 (gates of arrival
joy for their aspect (har~akaravartin), into liberation [vimuktyiiyatana]).
v, 95. knowledge, clear (vidyii), path of insight
joyful (iimodasahagata), v, 84. (darsanamiirga), iv, 38; as understand-
joyous excitement, distinctive (sarp.pra- ing (prajfiii), pure understanding
har~avise~a), ii, 176. (anasrava prajfiii), iii, 100, vi, 246;
vidyii. cak~ur jil.iinam... vi, 246, Add.;
joyous ones (tu~ita), gods, iii, 1, 164. vidyiisarµsparsa, iii, 100. - the three,
judgment after contemplation (tirai:ia), vi, 276, vii, 108~ - supernormal,
i, 81. vii, 111.
jurist (dharmapiithaka), iv, 145. knowledge, complete (parijfiii), v, 110-
18; complete knowledge qua cogni-
tion Qfianaparijfia), complete knowl-
edge qua abandonment (prahiii:iapari-
English-Sanskrit Index-Glossary 2827
lost (vihi:na) and abandoned (prahii:ia), 12, 130, 140, 142, iv, 70. - losing,
i, 80. regaining, changing of gender,
lost the intent (iisayavipanna), iv, 176; iv, 121,213.
suddhi (avetyaprasiida), vi, 205. male body in Jambudvipa (jambudvipa-
louse (yiika), iii, 178. puru~a), iii, 129, vii, 71, the bodhi-
sattva.
Lovely View (sudarsana), city (pura),
iii, 160. malice (vyiipiida), iv, 136, 167, v, 84, 90,
viii, 196; obstacle of malice (nivarana),
loving-kindness (maitrI), iv, 232, 245, ii, 158, v, 100; initial inquiry of ·
, 250-51, viii, 196; member of enligh- malice (vitarka), v, 89, contact of
tenment together with loving- malice (saqisparsa), iii, 100.
kindness (sahagata smrtisambodhy-
ailga), iii, 106; cultivation of loving- malicious thought (vyiipannacitta),
kindness (bhiivanii), meritorious work iv, 136, 178.
consisting of cultivation of loving- man (nara), person (pudgala), ix, 245.
kindness (bhiivaniipui:iya), iv, 232, 245; manifest (dyotayati), indicated
meditative attainment of loving- (pratyiiyati), ii, 240.
kindness (samiipatti), meditative
attainment of loving-kindness (sam- manifest vice (avadya), ii, 170.
iipanna), iv, 121,123,245, viii, 196- manifestation (abhivyakti}, achievement
203; possessor of loving-kindness (samiipti) of the ripened effect
(liibhin) and action, iv, 121. (vipiika), iii, 33.
low rank (aplesiikhya), iii, 48, v, 84. manifested (vyailgya, prakiisya), opposed
lower (avarabhiigiya), v, 85, 111-12, to produced (utpiidya, janya), ii, 240.
vi, 204,210 mantra, clear knowledge created
luminosity (prabhii) (of a gem [mai:ii-J), through mantras (vidyii), vii, 111,
iii, 120, food. Add.~ 122, 125 (supernormal accom-
plishments [rddhi], etc.).
lust (anunaya), v, 81, contact of lust
(saqisparsa), iii, 100, fetter of lust manu-born (manuja, manoja), ix, 245.
(saqiyojana), v, 82-83. mara who is a demon or son of a god
(devaputramiira), ii, 124; deviidhideva
(?), iii, 20.
ii, 154, 162, v, 25, vi, 258-59, 261, 264, through craving (tm1a-); ii, 271
269. moment or instant (k~a~a), ii, 145, 227,
mindfulness of breathing (iiniipiina- 232, iii, 177-78, iv, 4, Add. v, 65.
smrti), mindfulness of breathing moment, nature of the (k~a1:1adharmatii),
(smrta), vi, 148, 153-58 1 Add. 269. ii, 229; immediately perishing
mingled (sarµsr~!a), iii, 106-7; mingled (nirodha), 234; pure moment
with attachment (saragatii), vii, 17. (vyiikira1:1a), vi, 222; recollecting
minute and concomitant (a1_msahagata, successive moments (smaratii),
anusahagata), ii, 245, iv, 173. vii, 103.
miracle (priitiharya), vii, 110. momentary (k~a~ika), etym. iv, 4; the
explanation of Vasubandhu, 4 and
miracle of reading another's thoughts foll., is not that of the Vaibhiislkas,
(iidesaniipratiharya), vii, 110-11. says Sarp.ghabhadra. - Whether the
miracle of teaching (anusiisan,, doctrine of momentariness (k~a1:1ika-
priitiharya), iv, 41, vii, 111. viida) is reconcilable with the doc-
miraculous emanation (nairmita), trine of the four characteristics
thought associated with miraculous (lak~a1:}as), ii, 228.
emanations (nairmanika citta), ii, 320, three elements (dhiitus) called
vi, 158. · "momentary" (k~a~ika); i, 71;
mist (mahikii), visual form (riipa), i, 16. momentary dependent origination
(k~a1:1ika prafityasamutpiida), iii, 65;
mistaken or erroneous seeing momentary meditation (k~a~ika
(viparltadarsin), iv, 136; understanding dhyiina), vi, 221; confirming
which errs (viparlliilambana prajfia), momentariness of factors (ksanika-
v, 33. viidin), ii, 230, iii, 33. - Siirp.mitiyas,
mistaken view (viparyasa), four, iii, 55 ii, 222, doctrine of the four moments
(???), v, 21, vi, 162, ix, 252; twelve (catu!:ik~a1:1ikaviida). ·
according to the Vibhajyaviidins, moments, sixteen (~o<;Iasa k~a1:1al:i),
Vibh~ii, 104, beginning. vi, 192-93.
mistaken view of a self (iitmaviparyiisa), momentum of the period of duration
v, 22, 25. (sthitikiiliivedha), ii, 121.
mistaken view taken that which is month (miisa), investigation of months
impure to be pure (suciviparyasa), (miisaparik~ii), iii, 179-80.
v, 21.
moon (candramiis), iii, 156-57, 159, 205.
mixing (misrikara~a) (meditation
[dhyiina]), vi, 221. moon of unpleasant sound (kaurava),
iii, 146.
mixture (sarµbheda) (?), (misrata), iii, 12;
cp. 108. moon-stone (candrakiintii), iii, 157.
mode of existence (bhiiva) (dharmasya), morality (sila), iv, 47, 67, 247-48; iv, 226
v, 53-54. (bodhisattva); vi, 294. - and perfect
action (bhiiva) and agent (bhavitar), confidence (avetyaprasiida), vi, 293. -
ix, 279. undertaken morality (samiidiinasila),
morality without undertaking or
mode of experienced sensation (anu- vocal action (dharmatiipriitilambhika)
bhava, anubhiiti, upabhoga), i, 27; or morality of the nature of factors
cognition (jfiiina), v, 7. (dharmatiisila), iv, 81, 139.
mode of teaching (anusiisanavidhii), morality and certain types of spiritual
vii, 11,1. practices (silavrata), overesteeming of
modesty (hr!), and shame (apatriipya), morality and certain types of
ii, 172,iii,45,iv,25, 105. spiritual practices (silavrataparii-
modifying (vivartanii) (mindfulness of marsa), grasping to morality and
breathing [iiniipanasmrti]), vi, 156. certain types of spiritual practices
(silavratopiidiina), iii, 45, 86; iv, 135,
moistened (abhi~yandita), moistened
2834 English-Sanskrit Index-Glossary
with his very body into hell [svasarirena bodhi), iv, 221; time of death, iii, 118.
prapatitaI:i], intermediate being [antara: negation or non-existence, afflicted
bhava]) iii, 41 Add., 43, 53; being view of (niistidr~ti), iv, 170, v, 15.
reborn in hell (naraka upapadya-
manaI:i) and bringing about to die in neither knowledge nor non-knowledge
hell (narakacyutyabhimukhal:i), iv, 176. as wholesome but impure understand-
ing (naivavidyiinavidya kusalasasrava
characteristics, iii, 148, Add., 153, prajfiii), iii, 100.
Add., iv, 127,176, 181-82; cognition
of another's thoughts (paracittajfiana), neither pleasure nor displeasure
cognition of recollecting former (adul:ikhiisukha), ii, 115, v, 88; to be
abodes or existences (purvaniviisa) experienced neither satisfactorily nor
being innate in hell beings... , vii, 126, unsatifactorily (vedaniya), iv, 109 and
Add. foll.
natural marvelous qualities (nijascarya newly-born (biUaka), iii, 119.
dharma), vii, 83. nine ant mountains (kitiidrinavaka),
nature of factors (dharmatii), never in iii, 147. .
the sense of Bodhisattvabhiimi, nirviina, bringing about (nirviinam
vi, 158. - ii, 237, iii, 77, v, 29, ix, 252, kar~ti), vi, 205; nirviinii is obtained in
philosophical truth of dependent two non-defined thoughts (nirvaty
origination (pratityasamutpiida- avyakrtadvaye), iii, 133-34; without
dharmatii); vi, 178, pravacanadharmatii; relaxing their practice (aprati-
vi, 204, nature of factors of the path prasrabdhayogal:i), unconditioned
of those beyond training (asaik~a- (asaiµskaraI:i), obtaining nirvii.i;ia in the
miirgadharmata); v, 65, nature of intermediate existence (iintarii-
factors is profound (gambhirii bhavikal:i), obtaining nirviii;ia as soon
dharmata); viii, 218. - iv, 128, as they are born (utpannamatraI:i
anityatii ... parinirvati), vi, 211; through the
Comp. ii, 235, nature of factors is intention of oneself and of another
subtle (suk~mii dharmaprakrtayaI:i); (pariitma saiµcetana), ii, 219; whether
iii, 35, inconceivable is the power of everyone arrives there, ix, 67; stream-
factors and the variety of this power enterer (srotaiipanna) and nirviii;ia,
(dharmii~iirµ saktibhedo 'cintyal:i); vi, 204; see conducive to liberation
iv, 20, anii.dikii.liki §ak:til].. (mok~abhiigiya), etc. ·
nature of factors, morality of the jalapraviihanirodhabhutasetu-
(dharmatasTia), morality through sthiiniyal;I padiirthal:t, iv, 17.
obtaining the nature of factors wholesome (kusala), iv, 33, Add.
(pratilambhikasila), iv, 49, 81, 139. factor as fruit (phaladharma), iv, 78,
Add.; entering into the meditation Add.
through obtaini~g the nature of pure (aniisrava), i, 7, v, 34, 40; without
factors (priitilambhikadhyana), iii, 183. superior (anuttara), iv, 255; being
nature of factors, power of the simply non-production (anutpiida-
(dharmatabala), vi, 204, viii, 218; miitra), non-appearance (apriidur-
knowing deeply the nature of factors bhiiva), apradurbhuti (Sautrantika),
(abhijfiii), iv, 128. being mere non-existence (abhiiva-
nature, recollection of existences which matra) (?), ii, 280, 284, 285; nirvana is
· they possess by (prakrti-jatismaratii), called signlessness (animitta), viii; 185;
vii, 126; transgression by nature considered as near (antike), v, 107;
(siivadya), i'<, 67,122,247; simii, designated by object-referent (artha)
iv, 212; normal state (stha), iv, 96 in unhindered knowledge of the
(bhiksu); vi, 231 (nature of the noble designated thing (arthapratisarµvid),
one [~rya]), Vyii. ii, 77 (perfected being vii, 92; nirvana is not a factor of the
[arhat]). status of thos·e beyond training
(asaik~a), vi, 232; uttamadharmasya
near to enlightenment (iisanniibhisaiµ- priiptir arhattvaiµ nirva1:1asya vii priipti~
2836 English-Sanskrit Index-Glossary
(Vyii.); and the efficient cause of nirvii:t;1a (sukha), vii, 108; duration
(kiiral}.ahetu), ii, 247; being wholesome (sthiti) of the basis of nirviil}.a, ii, 111.
(kusala), being peaceful-and-happy or nit (lik~ii), iii, 178.
secure (keyema) (absence of sickness
[iirogya]), iv, 34; generative condition noble understanding (iiryaprajfiii),
(janakapratyaya), v, 60; and concentra- vi, 258, iiryan language (bhii~ii),
tion of the element of fire (tejodhiitu- iii, 146, 165.
samiidhi), iv, 230; putting an end to noble eightfold path (a~tiinga miirga), a
unsatisfactoriness (dul_lkhasya antal_l), wheel, vi, 246.
vi, 205; nirviil}.a without remainder noble path acquired through the path of
(nirupadhiseeya), nirviil}.a with remain- application (iiryamiirgapriiyogika)
der (sopadhise~a), vi, 211; and attain- (heat [u~magata], etc.) vi, 163; person
ment of cessation (nirodhasamiipatti), who is traveling on the noble path
ii, 208, iv, 123, vi, 224; necessary (samiipanna), person who is estab-
escape (nil_lsiira) (sarvasya sarµskrtasya lished on the noble path (stha), iv, 55.
nirviil}.am), i, 12; (cessation due to
noble path is invoked (miirga iiviihyate),
deliberation) (pratisarµkhyiinirodha),
ii, 109; mental application (manasi-
ii, 277, vi, 296; nirViiI}.a as an effect of
kiira) which precedes it and follows it,
human action (purueyakiiraphala),
ii, 17,326.
ii, 292; as the effect of the path
(miirgaphala), ii, 275, 277; each discon- noble one (iirya), etym. iii, 137; defini- ·
nection taken separately (visarµyogal_l tion, v, 28, opposed to ordinary
prthak prthak), i, 8, 275; taking refuge worldling (prthagjana).
in nirviil}.a (saral}.a), iv, 78; nirviil}.a as bound by all bondages (sakala-
peaceful (siinta), vi, 127; nirviil}.a as bandhana), in the first moment of the
the cessation of the unsatisfactoriness path of insight (iidikeyal}.astha), ii, 180.
of oneself and of others (siintyeka- noble one (iirya) and attainment of
lak~al}.a), iv, 78; nirviil}.a not being a non-ideation (asarµ jfiisamiipatti),
factor of the status of those in · ii, 202; attachment to pleasure
training (saik~a), vi, 232; absolute (kiimariiga), v, 24; mental trouble
good (sarµyaktva), vi, 180-81; (cittak~epa), iv, 127; complete
decreases the restraint (sarµvara) ?, knowledge (parijfiii), v, 114;
iv, 90; dike (setu), iv, 17 prakrtisiivadya, iv, 85; craving for
nirviil}.a in the present life (dr~ta- existence (bhavatfeyl).ii), v, 30; mahii-
nirviil}.a), dr~tadharmanirviil).a, ii, 204. brahmii, vi, 214; types of conceit
(miinavidhii), etc. v, 31; mistaken view
nirviil}.ii, giving done in order to attain
of the belief in happiness (sukha-
(nirviiniirtham diinam), iv, 239, basis of
viparyiisa), ideation of a sentient
nirvii~a (nir~iil}.a-iisraya), ii, 111, .
being (sattvasarµjfiii), smrtisarµpra-
· nirviil}.a appearing for the first time
moeya, v, 25.
(iidibhiiva), ii, 112; faculties arising
with regard to nirviil}.a (utpatti), iirya and the quality of Indra, v, 30.
ii, 111; experience of nirviii;ia (upa- supernormal accomplishments of the
bhoga), ii, 112; means to nirviil}.a noble ones (iirya rddhi), vii, 111,
(upiiya), vi, 250; destined to attain viii, 210; kiintasTia, vi, 293; 1$:usalatyiiga,
nirviil}.a (dharman), vi, 173; conquest iv, 100; desanii, ix, 195; dharma
of nirviil}.a (paril).iimita), iv, 226, 228; (= sukladharma) vi, 199-200.
city of nirviil}.a (pura), vii, 33; acqui- noble one, eighth (a~tamaka), vi, 201.
sition of nirviil}.a (pratipiidana, prati- noble one, lineage of the (iiryavarµsa),
lambha), ii, 109; turned toward nir- vi, 146; abode (vihiira), vi, 259,
Viil}.a (priigbhiira),.vi, 265; possession viii, 187; vocal behavior (vyavahiira),
of nirviil}.a (priipti), ii, 180; desire for iv, 159; morality and perfect confi-
nirviil}.a (priirthanii), v, 39; excellent dence (sTie 'vetya prasiidal_l), vi, 293;
outcome (phalatva) of the buddha restraint (sarµvara), iv, 184; truth
field (buddhak~etra), vii, 85; condu- (satya), vi, 122, 123, 127, 186, 188;
cive to nirviil}.a (bhiigiya), vi, 173; bliss homogeneity of a noble one (sabhii-
English-Sanskrit Index-Glossary 2837
viii, 140; peaceful abode (vihara), the fruit, iv, 119, v, 117, vi, 251.
ii, 203. renewing of the basis (asrayapara-
pefecting or purification (uttapana), vrtti), iv, 123.
perfecting (uttapanagata), vi, 165, 253, det.1/rmined (niyata) actions, iv, 121-
263. 23.
penetrate (abhivyapana), iv, 29. antya citta, ii, 305, iii, 133, •ri, 263.
penetrating (prativedha), vi, 169. ayul,i sarµskarasthiipana, ii, 133.
penis (upastha) and male sexual faculty faculties (indriyas), ii, 137.
(puru~endriya), ii, 110, 113.
of{ering (diina) to the perfected
perceivable entity (upalabhyataliipa), beings (arhats), iii, 129.
ii, 177.
mundane thought (laukikacitta),
perceiving (sarµprakhyana), iii, 92, iii, 115, vi, 300.
vii, 91.
sensation (vedana), ii, 115.
perception-sphere of infinite conscious-
ness (vijiiananantyayatana), viii, 143. impure aggregates (skandhas sasrava),
i, 13.
perception-sphere of mastery
(abhibhvayatana), viii, 211-13. obtaining supremacy over their
thought (svacittadhirajyapriipta),
perception-sphere of neither-ideation- vii, 63.
nor-non-ideation (naivasarµjiia-
nasarµjiiayatana), gods (deva) in the absence of the law, vi, 204.
(bhavagra), i, 49, ii, 220, viii, 136, 144. status of the perfected being associ-
perception-sphere of nothingness ated with dull praxis-oriented facul-
(akiiicanyayatana), viii, 143, 175. ties (mrdvindriyasarµgrhita arhattva),
vi, 263.
perception-sphere of totality
(kpsnayatana), viii, 213-15. liberation constituting the status of
the perfected being (arhattvavimukti),
perception-sphere of wind (viiyu- vi, 261; candidate (pratipannaka),
krtsnayatana), viii, 214. vi, 227.
perception, direct (dr~ta = pratyak~a), arhantidu~al}.a, iv, 219.
iv, 5; and cognized (vijiiata) (that
which is attained by the eye sense- arhaccak~uriidayas (sasrava?), Vya. ad
faculty [cak~ul;isarµprapta], that which i. 607.
falls within the range of the eye sense- perfected being who is not shaken from
faculty [cak~urabhasagata]), i, 85; seen, abiding in the fruit (sthitiikampya
heard, cognized, known arhat), vi, 251.
(df~tasrutavijiiatamata), iv, 160. perfected beings who are susceptible of
perception, direct (pratyak~a), iii, 213, retrogressing (parihai;iadharman
iv, 5, ix, 231. arhat) ... , vi, 253; cause of retrogress-
perfect beings who are capable to ing (parihai:iahetu).
penetrate to the unshakable ones perfecting (uttaptikarai;ia, uttapana,
without effort (prativedhanadharman vardhana), vi, 165,253, 263.
arhat), vi, 254. perfection (piiramitii), iv, 111, 231,
perfect confidence (avetyaprasada), vii, 78, 83. - indriya, phala, pudgala-
iv, 75, vi, 292, ix, 269. paramita, ii, 119.
perfected being (arhat), defined, iv, 119, perfection (sampad), of the buddha,
vi, 230, ultimate fully ordained monk vii, 81.
(paramarthabhik~u), absolute silent perfection of abandonment (prahai:ia-
one (muni), iv, 97, 134. see those sarµpad), vii, 83.
beyond training (asaik~a).
perfection of giving (dhyanapiiramitii),
nine classes, vi, 272, six types 251. iv, 231, vii, 78.
Retrogessing from and regaining of
perfection of installing in the three
English-Sanskrit Index-Glossary 2843
vehicles and in the fortunate planes not existing as a real entity (na
of existence (yiinatrayasugatiprati- dravyasat), ix, 233.
sthiipanasarµpad), vii, 84. not recourse or authority
perfection of marvelous qualities (pratisara~a), ix, 246.
(iiscaryadharmasarµpad), multiple person who understands the meaning
(vividha) and natural (nija), vii, 83. (arthiibhijfiii), iv, 159.
perfection of patience (k~iintiparamita), person, clinging to the (pudgalagriiha),
iv, 229. ix, 274; designation person (prajfiapti),
perfection of power (prabhiivasarµpad) 233; distinguished person (vise~a),
of the buddha, vii, 83. vi, 268. - sriivakapudgala ...
perfection of the benefit (upakiira- person, complete (paripiirin), iii, 61.
sarµpad), vii, 84. person, great (mahiipuru~a), character-
perfumed (paribhavita). sraddhasTia ... istic of the great person (lak~a~a),
paribhiivita citta, iii, 95; klesakarma- i, 57, 69, ii, 230, iii, 203, iv, 108, 110.
paribhiivita skandhamiitra, iii, 57; seed person, personal existence (iitmabhiiva),
that is consciousness, that is devel- basis (iisraya), own person (sviitma-
oped or perfumed through action bhiiva), iv, 77,101,205, v, 8; desire for
(karmaparibhavita vijfianabija), iii, 124, (chanda), vii, 34; acquisition (prati-
126; family penetratred and per- lambha) (fourfold), ii, 219; part of the
fumed through receptivity (k~iinti- person (mukhena; svasarµtiina-
paribhavita gotra), vi, 176. mukhena) i, 57; beauty and protection
period of time (prakar~aka, priibandhika), of the person (sobhiiparik~a~a), ii, 104;
vi, 163. attachment to the self (sneha), vi, 139.
periods of appearance (buddhotpiida), personal (adhyiitmam), i, 73.
two at the same time, iii, 192, 198- personal defilement (sviisarµtiinika
201; extent of his power, iii, 199. klesa), v, 105-6.
perish (bhailgura), iv, 8. persons, noble (iiryapudgalas), vi, 230,
permanent (nitya); impermanent 232; chap. vi; those in training
(anitya), aspect of the truth of unsat- (saik~a), those beyond training
isfactoriness (dul}khasatya), vii, 31; (asaik~a); difference of family (gotra),
afflicted view of permanence (nitya- etc.
dr~ti), with regard to Brahma, v, 33; pervasive (sarvaga), mental events
mistaken view of taking as perma- (caittas) of this category, ii, 153; see
nent that which is impermanent pervasive (sarvatraga).
(viparyiisa), v, 23; ideation of perma-
nence (sarµjfiii), v, 17; always concen- pervasive (sarvatraga), pervasive pro-
trated (samiihita), iv, 41. clivities (anusaya), pervasive mental
events (caitta); pervasive cause
permeating factors, unwholesome (sarvatragahetu), ii, 153,268,291,294,
(akusalamahiibhiimika), ii, 152, iii, 105; iii, 104, v, 31, 102; sarvatragatii smrti,
miila, iv, 35, 144, 170, v, 41; riisi, v, 99, vii, 23.
initial inquiry (vitarka), vi, 145;
continuous stream (sarµtatipravrtti), pervasive cognition (sarvajfiiina), vii, 45.
iv, 85 pervasive cognition (sarvatra jfiiinam),
permeating factors, wholesome (kusala- vii, 83.
mahiibhiimika), ii, 153. phlegm (sle~man), iii, 136.
perpetual methods (satatavihiira), phoneme (ak~ara), ii, 239, 242, iii, 177.
iii, 114, iv, 52, vii, 76, viii, 148. phrases, collection of (padakiiya), ii, 238.
perso11 (pudgala), etym. ix, 245; and pitcher, water, like a (gha~iimbuvat),
aggregates (skandhas), ix, 232; vi, 140.
sarµjfiiimiitra, iv, 5; person being
ineffable (avaktavya), existing as a place, occupying a (desa-iivara~a), iv, 18;
provisional designation (prajfiaptisat), leaving one place and occupying
2844 English-Sanskrit Index-Glossary
promoting force, second (anuvartaka), viii, 195; qualities of iiriipya, viii, 215;
iv, 27, 37. qualities or spiritual boons consti-
property, specific (prabhiiva) (of the fruit tuted by the cognitions (jfiiinamaya),
of the earth), vii, 35. vii, 66, viii, 127; qualities of the three
realms (traidhiituka) or impure quali-
prosperity, temporal (iibhyudayika), ties (siisrava), vii, 62, viii, 195; quali-
iii, 193. ties of the bodhisattva, iv, 226; taking
protector of the fields (k~etrapa), possession of certain spiritual quali-
iii, 206. ties (vaise~ikagu1,1iibhinirhiira),
provision, accumulated (satpbhara), viii, 195; qualities constituted by con-
accumulated merit and cognition centration (samiidhimaya), v, 27.
(pm,1yajfianasa1p.bhara), vii, 80; qualities, field of (gu1,1a-k~etra), iv, 121,
provisions of sensation (vedanii- 213, 237; delight in the qualities of
satpbhiira), iv, 110. - :vii, 82, etc. others (griihin), viii, 202; retro'gressing
provisional entity or designation from the possession of a spiritual
(prajfiapti or prajfiiipti). status (pariha1,1i), vi, 267; cultivation
of the qualities (bhiivanii), vii, 66;
provisional factor (prajfiaptidharma), confidence in qualities (satpbhiivanii),
ii, 214; sat, i, 39 (Vyii. 48), iv, 9, ii, 172, vi, 293.
vi, 140, ix, 232,237,257; provisional
transgression (siivadya), iv, 83. quality (gu1,1a) and quality-possessor
(gu1,1in), iii, 210. ·
pure abode (suddhiiviisika), gods of the qualities (gu1,1a), understood as paths
pure abodes (suddhiivasakayika), iii, 2, (miirgas), vi, 198.
22,216, vi, 213-14, 223, Add., vii, 103,
Vibhii~ii, 175-76. quality of not withdrawing
(anivartanatagu1,1a), iv, 226.
pure morality (parisuddhasTia), iv; 248.
quartan fever (ciiturthakajvaravat), v, 79.
pure, mistaken view taken that which is
impure to be (suciviparyiisa), v, 21. question (vyiikara1,1a), four types, v, 44.
vyiikaral}.a, grammar, ii, 249.
purification (parisuddhi) of action,
iv, 226; of mindfulness of breathing question and answer (prasnavyiikara1,1a),
(iiniipanasmrti), vi, 156, of morality v, 47; satisfied by the answer to the
(sTia), etc., viii, 130; effort (pradhana), question (aradhana), iv, 61.
vi, 297. question which one should not answer
purification (vaiyavadiinika), ii, 105, (sthiipaniyaprasna), v, 44.
iii,115.
purification (vyantibhava [?], vanfi-
bhiiva), ii, 285. R
purification (sauceya), iv, 135. rabbit particle (sasarajas), iii, 178.
purification, afflicted view that this is a rainy season (var~iil).) (dry season
means of (suddhidr~ti), v, 32; people [sarad]), iii, I 80.
who believe that one attains purity
(suddhidarsin), iv, 135. rat poison (mu~ikavi~avat), v, 79.
purification, preparation of (vyavadiina- reading (udgrh1,1ati = pathati), vi, 142;
satpbhara1,1a), ii, 105, 109, 111, ix, 250; seizing, apprehending (udgraha1,1a),
cause of purification (vastu), i, 43; determination, discernment (pari-
purification (vaiyavadiinika), ii, 105, ccheda), i, 28.
iii, 115. real entity (dravya), i, 16, 18-19, ii, 147,
260, iii, 142, v, 53, vi, 140, ix, 290.
real entity (dravyadharma), ii, 186,
Q iii, 211, 213 (substance), real-entity
atom (paramii1,1u) (eight real entities
qualities (gui:ias), enumerated, viii, 195. [aeytadravyaka]), ii, 144, 146; existence
pure qualities (anasravagu1,1a), vii, 62, as a real entity (sat), iv, 13, ix, 232,
2848 English-Sanskrit Index-Glossary
Vyii. ii, 78, 82; delusion (sruµmoha), associated with a realm (asam-
v, 81; particular inherent character- prayukta), ii, 187, iv, 27, vii, 28-29.
istic (svalak~ai;ia), i, 19, ii, 303, vii, 27. realm of desire (kii.madhatu), ii, 131,
reality (tattviirtha), vi, 142; opposed to iii, 7, viii, 137 (kiimagui;iaprabhii.vita);
following the sutra (siitriirtha), v, 29. mixed action (karman), iv, 129;
reality, in accordance with (yathii- wholesome thought in the realm of
bhutam) (adhyaropa-apavadiibhiiviit) desire (kusalacitta), vii, 28; mental
vi, 133; exact complete knowledge events in the realm of desire (caittas),
(parijfiana), v, 26; exposition in ii, 166; difficult to leave the realm of
accordance with fact (upadesa), desire (dul_isamatikrama), vi, 220;
vii, 110. eighteen elements (dhiitus) of the
realm of desire, i, 55; gods of the
realization (saksiitkarana; saksiitkara· realm of desire (kiimadhii.tudeva),
siik~iitkriya; siik~iitkartavya · ' iii, 164-65; path of cultivation
[utpiidayitavya]), vi, 224, 262, vii, 100, (bhii.vaniimiirga), etc., are absent,
108 (name of the abhijfiiis and clear vi, 292; pleasure of the stage of
knowledges [vidyiis]), viii, 211. mental faculty (manobhiimika sukha)
realization (adhigama), direct realiza- is absent iii, 109; thought included in
tion of the truths (satyiibhisamaya), the realm of desire (kii.madhii.tuprati-
viii, 219; cognition (jfiiina), viii, 219, sarp.yuktacitta), vii, 28; mental ponder-
ix, 248; dharma, vii, 91. ing in the realm of desire (manopa-
realization, end of direct (iibhisamaya- vicii.ra), iii, 111; factors associated
antika), receptivity (k~iinti), vii, 2, with the realm of desire (sarp.pra-
cognition (jfiana), 50-52, Add. yuktadharma), iii, 8.
realized (rdhyati), successful (sarp.- realm of desire, initial inquiry of the
padyate), vii, 113. (kiimavitarka), iii, 7, v, 89; virakta,
detachment from the realm of desire
realm (dhiitus), three, kiima, etc.; (vitarii.ga), ii, 135, vi, 195, 232; detach-
meaning of the w9rd, definition of ment from the realm of desire
the three dhiitus, iii, 6-7. - relation- (vairagya), iv, 170.
ship of the diverse dhiitus, mahii-
bhutas, iii, 184; succession of realm of fine-materiality (riipadhii.tu),
thoughts, ii, 316. - anu§ayas of the characterized by sensation (vedanii.),
diverse dhiitus, v, 9; indriyas, ii, 129. - i, 43, viii, '162; births of pleasure
higher realms (dhiitus), ii, 219, vi, 250, (sukhopapattayas), iii, 166; character-
etc. - going beyond a realm (dhii.tu- ized by the rupas, ii, 132; associated
atikrama), going entirely beyond a with the realm of fine-materiality
realm (samatikrama), transmigration (riipasarp.prayukta), iii, 7.
(sarp.cara), ii, 329, v, 115, vi, 207, 220. realm of fine-materiality, intermediate
- retrogressing from the higher beings of (riipadhiitu-antarii.bhava),
realms (dhiitupratyiigamana), ii, 328. - iii, 45; those who go toward the realm
dhiitusai:pvartani (dissolution of the of fine-materiality (upaga), fivefold,
realm), iii, 182, 184. vi, 215; gods of the realm of fine-
those who obtain nirvana after materiality (deva), iii, 2, 165-66, 171,
having barely arrived i~ the realm of 173; mental pondering of the realm
fine-materiality ([riipa]dhiitugatal_i of fine-materiality (manopavicii.ra),
parinirv,ati), iii, 39. iii, 110, factors associated with the
realm of fine-materiality (sarp.pra-
element of detachment (viriigadhiitu), yuktadharnia), iii, 8.
element of abandonment (prahiii;ta-
dhiitu), element of cessation (nirodha- that which makes a factor (dhaVITia) is
dhiitu), vi, 301; element of nirvana integral to the realm of fine-~aterial-
(nirviii;iadhiitu). · ity (riipadhii.tupatita, pratisarp.,yukta,
ii.pta), iii, 8.
fallen from a realm (dhiitupatita),
transcendent to a realm (apatita), transfer of material form friipa) of
belonging to a realm (ii.pta), not the realm of fine-materil)iity into the
English-Sanskrit Index-Glossary 2849
desire realm, ii, 121, vii, 123. receptacle world (bhajanaloka), iii, 138-
flame of the realm of fine-materiali- 217; arrangement of the receptacle
ty, iii, 184; wind of the realm of fine- world (sa:tµnivesa), iii, 138; disappear-
materiality and creation, iii, 210. ance of the receptacle world
(sa:tµvartanI), iii, 183.
realm of fine-materiality, number,
distance, dimensions of the places, receptivity (k~anti) and cognition Ufiana),
iii, 3, 167, 169. as unhindered path (iinantaryamarga)
and path of liberation (vimuktimarga)
realm of immateriality and formless of detachment (viraga), disgust
mediti.tive attainment (ariipya), (nirveda), vi, 302, see180, 190.
distinguishing the meditative attain- which receptivities are cognition,
ments (samapattis} and t,,he births vii, 1-2; receptivity to the cognition
(upapattis) of iirupya, f6J.r, the first of the factors (dharmajfiiinak~anti) and
described in chap. viii, the second in cognition of the factors (dharma-
chap. iii and viii, 133-35. - The realm jfiana), see path of insight (darsana-
of immateriality is above the realm marga), and v, 13,113.
of fine-materiality, but it is not a
place, ii, 132, iii, 4-5, 15; the orthodox receptivity (k~iinti), dr~ti, ruci, etc.
opinion is that there is no material vi, 165.
form (riipa) among the sentient receptivity (k~anti), stages. conducive to
beings of formles~existence, i, 32, penetration (nirvedhabhagiya), vi, 165
viii, 135-43; the .realm of immateriali- and foll.; possessor of receptivity
ty is characteriied by ideation (k~antiliibhin), iv, 208, vi, 174.
(sarp.jfiaprabhavita) and characterized receptivities, struck by the (k~anti-
by intention (sarp.skaraprabhiivita), vadhya), struck by the cognitions
i, 43; hence the problem how the Ufianavadhya), v, 13, 112, vi, 190.
sentient beings can exist there, how
they take up again material form recognition (pratyabhijfiana), ix, 274,
(riipa) when they retrogress from it, 276.
iii, 5, viii, 142-43. recollection of births Uatismrti), remem-
distancing from the desire realm bering births (smara1,1.a), remembering
through the four kinds of distancing births (smara!).agu1,1.a), iv, 199, 225-26,
(diiratiis), ii, 316, iv, 31; peaceful lib- vii, 100; cp. vii, 124.
eration (siinta vimok~a), viii, 140; recover (punal).pratisaiµdhiina), vi, 157.
single taste is calm abiding (samatha- reducing (sa:tµk~epa), contracted
ekarasa), viii, 157; not very favorable thought (saiµk~iptacitta), activity of
to the path, the fourth is incapable of the five sense-faculties is contracted
the path; with svaparasa:tµtiinapari- (saiµk~iptapaficendriyapracara), iii, 131,
cchediibhiiva, vii, 125. vi, 151, vii, 18, 21, 23.
see particularly, iii, 15.(those obt-aining reducing the consciousness (vijfiiina-
nirva1,1.a in the interval [antaraparinir- paribheda), iii, 21.
viil,l.a] ?), ii, 129-30, 132-33 (faculties
[indriyas], death), 243 (name [niiman]), reducing-expanding (sal!).k~epaprathana),
vii, 83.
318 (thoughts of), iv, 31 (pure non-
informative [avijfiapti]), vii, 88 (cog- reflection, deliberative (vimarsa), inves-
nized by the cognition resulting from a tigation (vicara), v, 63.
resolve [pra1,1.idliijfiiina]); 102-4, 125 reflection, form of the (pratibimba-
(superknowledge [abhijfiii]), viii, 143 iikara), iii, 34-35 (illusory idea [bhranta
(basis of thought [cittasraya]). vijfiiina]).
reasoning, arisen from (tarkaja), vii, 125. reflexive awareness, knowing itself
reassured or secure (k~ema), peaceful (svasa:tµvitti, svasarp.vedana, svasa:tµ-
(siinta), ii, 114, iv, 107; supremely vedyatii), ii, 182, vii, 26, 45, ix, 231;
i reassured (parama), vii, 33; possession svatmani vfttinirodhiit, vii, 45.
of reassurance (k~emaprapta), vii, 74. refuge (sara1,1.a), iv, 79-80; going for
refuge (gamana), 76, 102,; repeating
2850 English-Sanskrit Index-Glossary
three times the formula of refuge reproach, harmful (nigraha), iv, 183.
(traya), 76. residing in the heart (hrdayapradesa)
regret (kaukrtya), ii, 166, v, 31, 89, 97, (vigor [ojas]), iv, 188.
99; iidayas, ii, 165. resistance (pratighiita), i, 25, 51.
resistance (pratighiita), i, 25, 51. resistance, encounter (pratigha), iii, 47
rejecting (tyajati), rejecting the life (sapratigha ... ); diverse modes of
energies (utsrjaty iiyu]:isarµskiiriin), pratighiita, i, 51.
ii, 121. resistant, being (sapratigha), i, 51.
rejecting, removal (vinodana), appease- resolution (adhimukti), read resolve
ment (vyupasama), Vyii. ii, 83. (adhimoki?a), ii, 153 and foll., ninth
relationship (abhisarµbandha), iii, 77. generally permeating factor (mahii-
relative or conventional entity, based bhumika).
on another (sarµvrti-antaravyapiisraya), resolution (adhimukti), resolve (adhi-
vi, 140; nayena, vi, 159; miitra, iv, 5; mok1?a), preference (ruci), i, 40, vii, 70,
conventional truth (satya), vi, 139; 85 (hata-); ii, 204.
conventional point of view (vasena), resolution (prai:iidhii.na), iv, 223; resolu-
existing conventionally (sat), given tion for liberation (mokl?a-), vi, 179.
entities that exist conventionally (sad
vastu), vi, 139, vii, 4. resolution, mental application proced-
ing from (adhimuktimanasikiira),
reliance (pratisarai:ia), four, ii, 227, 246- ii, 325, vi, 149 and foll., viii, 143, 200,
48. - mental faculty (manas), recourse 202, 214; conceiving of a resolution
(pratisarai:i) of the other sense-facul- (adhimuktisarµjfiiina), 199.
ties (indriyas ), ix, 243.
resolve (adhimokl?a), ninth generally
reliance cause (nisrayahetu), ii, 314. permeating factor (mahiibhi1mika),
reliance upon, in (upiidiiya), in reliance ii, 154 (and not aspiration or conviction
upon fuel (indhanam), in reliance [adhimukti]; equivalent terms, e.g.
upon the aggregates (skandhiin), in viii, 198, or adhimoki?a = adhimukti
dependence upon the fundamental manasikii.ra).
material elements (mahiibhi1tiini) ... resolve (adhimoki?a) of the perfected
iv, 26, ix, 233. being (arhat), vi, 296-98.
religious life (pravrajitapaki?a), errors resolve, displacement of (iidhimoki?ika
peculiar to, iii, 194, v, 76, 84. gamana), vii, 113; cognition (jfiii.na),
remainder, with (sopadhisei?a), ii, 284, ii, 325, vi, 150,247.
vi, 211,279. resources (nisraya), four of the religious
remembering (smarai:ia), cognition of life, iv, 149.
memory (smarai:iajfiiina), v, 6, ix, 273; respect (gaurava, sagauravatii, sapratisatii,
viniyoga, ix, 277. sabhayavasavartitva), ii, 170.
remorse (anutiipa), ii, 166, iv, 243. respect (lajjitva), iv, 205.
remorse (vipratisiira), v, 243. restlessness (auddhatya), ii, 162, 164,
renouncing the rule (niki?iptasiki?a), v, 89, 99, vii, 20; ly,ndrance of regret
iv, 99. (kaukrtyanivarana), v, 99; restless
behavior (car~ta'), ii, 164.
renunciation of agreeable things (ii?ta-
vi~ayaparivarjana), v, 76 restraint (sarµvara), threefold, iv, 43;
incomplete restraint (vikala), limited
repeated exercise of the accumulation restraint (prii.desika), 88; samiidiinika,
of all qualities and of all cognitions 81; restraint of body (kiiyena) ..., 53.
(sarvagui:iajfiiina-sarµbhiiriibhyiisa),
vii, 83. restraint and abandonment (prahai:ia-
sarµvara), iv, 51.
repeated exercise, uninterrupted (nir-
antarii.bhyii.sa), vii, 83. restraint co-existent with meditation
(dhyiinasarµvara), i, 21, iv, 43, 50.
repeating three times (traiviicika), iv, 61.
English-Sanskrit Index-Glossary 2851
indriya), ii, 114, iii, 115, viii, 151; seeing (pasyati) (unhindered path
pondering of satisfaction (upaviciira), [iinantaryamiirga]), see and actually
iii, 108; giving rise to satisfaction know (jiiniiti) (path of liberation
(stiiniya), iii, 110. [vimuktimiirga]), v, '25; seeing and
s1,hism of formal ecclesiastical actions cognizing (vijiiniiti), i, 84.
(karmabheda; sarpghabheda), iv, 211. seeing of visible form (riipadarsana),
season, advancing heat (vasanta) (great hearing of sound (sabdasravana)
heat season [grI~ma]), iii, 180. through the consciousness (vijiiiina),
i, 82, ii, 107.
season, cold (hemiinta), iii, 180.
seer (r~i). iii, 53, 129; assembly (par~ad),
season, rainy (var~ii~) (dry season iv, 212; becoming a seer (pravrajyii),
[sarad]), iii, 180. vi, 204; mental fault of the seer
seat of enlightenment (bodhimai:1<;la), (manodo~a), iv, 163,218.
iv, 231; miila, viii, 195; bliss of awak- seer (siik~iitkiirin, siik~iiddarsin), ii, 304.
ening (sukha), vi, 259.
self (iitman) = basis (iisraya) ? , ix, ·288,
second part of the question (pasciit- 295.
piidaka), i, 53.
self (iitman), heretic conceptions, iii, 56, ·
second promoting force (anuvartaka), 82, ix, 253, 254 (sviimivat.. .), 284, 288
iv, 27, 37. (avidyiisraya, cittasraya ... ). - Should
secondary characteristics (anulak~al).as) be understood as thought (citta), ~ 74).
of the conditioned phenomena (sarp- self-arisen one (svayarpbhii), i, I, iii, 56.
skrta), ii, 224.
self-enlightened one (pratyekabuddha),
secondary possession (anupriipti), i, 79. those that live in a group (vargaciirin),
sections (kiil).<;ias) of the dependent those who are like rhinoceroses
origination (prafityasamutpiida), iii, 60. (kha<;lgavi~iil).akalpa), i, 2, iii, 194-95,
secure or reassured (k~ema), peaceful Add.; vi, 176 (family [gotra]), 177
(siinta), ii, 114, iv, 107; supremely (acquisition of enlightenment [bodhi]),
reassured (parama), vii, 33; possession 267 (retrogressing [parihiil).i]); 273, 293
of reassurance (k~emapriipta), vii, 74. (and sarpgha); vii, 9 (cognition of
another's thoughts [paracitt.ajiiana]), 73
seed (bija), potentiality (sakti), capabil- (power of the body), 124 (eye).
ity (siimarthya), ii, 147, 185, Add.,
iii, 80, 142, v, 2, 6. - how the fruit self-ordination (sviima upasarppadii),
(phala) proceeds from the seed (bija), iv, 60.
iii, 51, v, 7, ix, 296. self, accumulation of perishing entities
seed of liberation (mok~abija), i, 2, (satkiiya), afflicted view of self
iv, 252, vii, 73. (satkiiyadr~!i), v, 15-17, vii, 70;
spontaneous belief in a self (akalpikii),
seed which is the consciousness innate afflicted view of self (sahajii),
(vijiianabija), iii, 26, 124, 126. afflicted view of self resulting from
seed-state (bijabhiiva) of the person reflection (vikalpitii), v, 21; ii, 251,
(iisraya), ii, 184; thought existing in a 259,269, iii, 67, iv, 41, 193, V, 9, 15-
seed-state (b"ijabhiivena avasthitarp 17, 39-42, 72, ix, 250,254,264,293.
cittam), iii, 132; becoming a seed self, constitung a (iitma-grahal).a), i, '40;
(bijabhiivopagamana), ii, 293; citta object of the idea of self (griihavastu),
anantabijasahita, ix, 299. vi, 148, ix, 230; craving for the I
seed, intact (siirabija), ii, 271. (tf~l).ii), v, 32; well-tamed self
seed; definition (bijam) = name-and-form (damana), i, 74; afflicted view of self
which has capability in the produc- (dr~!i), iii, 84, 90, v, 22, 32, vi, 258
tion of an effect (yan niimariiparp (product of reflection [sarptiraka]),
phalotpattau samartham), ii, 185. ix, 230, 250 (jivadr~!i).
seeds (b"ijas) of the new universe, semen and blood (matapitrasuci)... ,
iii, 210. iii, 53.
2854 English-Sanskrit Index-Glossary
semen and blood (sukrasonita), iii, 36, sense-faculties, body possessed with
coming together (sa:qmipiita), iii, 27. (sendriyakakiiya), ii, 212, iv, 254.
sensation (vedanii) = experience sense-sphere of sound (sa<;liiyatana)
(anubhava), i, 27, Vyii. vastuno (primary real entity of the sentient
hladaparitapatadubhayavinirmukta- being [miilasattvadravya], ii, 110),
svarupasak~atkara~asvabhaval_i; iii, 63, 95; krama, i, 43; iikeyepa, iv, 200.
kayacittopacayapacayatadubhaya- sense-sphere of the mental faculty
vinirniuktavasthapravrtta§ (mana-iiyatana), i, 31.
caitasikavi§e~aspadanubhaval_i.
sense-sphere (ayatana), meaning of the
perceiving the object in a general word, i, 37, Add., canonical defini-
manner, insofar as it is a perceivable tions, 65; the twelve, reasons for the
entity (upalabhyatiiriiparp grh~iiti), teachings of the twelve, order, etc.,
ii, 177. 40, 43; particular characteristics of
bodily sensation (kiiyiki), ii, 113, 115, the sense-spheres (iiyatanasvalak~a~a),
iii, 109; mental sensation (miinasi), i, 19, ii, 303; a thirteenth sense-
mental sensation (caitasiki), ii, I 14- sphere, v, 61; others than the twelve,
15, 126, 128, iii, 108. - agreeable i, 48.
sensation, etc., see faculty of sensa- sense-sphere of factors (dharmiiyatana),
tion of pleasure (sukhendriya), faculty i, 30-31, 36, 41, 45-46, 65, iv, 16,
of sensation of displeasure (dul:ikha- ix, 231.
indriya) ...
sentence, discourse, speaking (viikya),
the neither pleasure nor displeasure i, 12, ii, 239, iv, 158.
sensation (aduf.ikhiisukhii) and the
wholesome action, ii, 115, 127. sentient being (sattva), ix, 228, 245; like
the name chariot (rathavat), 249;
three, vi, 125, six, iii, 106. sentient being (sattva), man (nara) ...,
and defilements (klesas), v, 95; 245. - object of pratimok~a. v, 87. -
adhering or growing in sensation pollution of beings (sattvasarpklesa),
(anusayana), v, 87. ix,249.
pure sensation (aniisravii), iv, 213. sentient beings, corruption of (sattva-
sensation (vedanii) and aggregate of ka~iiya), iii, 193-94; kiiya ananta,
sensation (sarpjfiiiskandha), i, 40-41. iii, 10; thought in regard to sentient
beings (citta) (and noble ones [iirya]),
sensation of meditation (dhyiinavedanii), v, 24; servant of the world (diisa),
iii, 19, 167. iv, 222; dravya, see mula sattva-
sensation, application of mindfulness to dravya; opinion that Brahma is a
·(vedaniismftyupasthiina), vi, 158. being (dmi), v, 33; primary distinc-
sensation, disagreeable (asiitii vedanii), tion among sentient beings (bheda),
ii, 113. ii, 104; that which refers to sentient
beings (mayanii), iii, 93; miira, ii, 124;
sensation, faculty of (vedanendriyii~i), sentient beings of the world (loka).
ii, 105, 108. iii, 1-138; differences of secorrdaty
sensation, mass of (vedaniivigraha), characteristics among sentient beings
iii, 17. (vikalpabheda), ii, 104; disappearance
sensation, member of (vedaniii:tga), of sentient beings (sarpvartani),
iii, 64, 85, 107; and contact (sparsa), iii, 182; ideation in regard to a
iii, 101. sentient being (sarpjfiii) (and noble
ones [iirya]), v, 24; sarptiinaja sabda,
sensation, provisions or apparatus of i, 17; homogeneity of sentient beings
(vedaniisarpbhiira), iv, 110.
(sabhiigatii), ii, 196,
sensation, station of consciousness
sentient beings without ideation
consisting of (vedanopagii vijfiiina- (asarpjfiisattva), ii, 199-200, iii, 4, 22,
sthiti), iii, 24. 132, iv, 201, vi, 174, viii, 136.
sensations, three (vittitrayam), ii, 131.
sentiment, same (ekarasa, ekamati,
English-Sanskrit Index-Glossary 2855
ii, 255, iii, 51, 58, iv, 119, 154, vi, 157; vi, 148.
transfer of kalala, iv, 213. stream (prabandha, sarµtati), vii, 31; con-
stage, great (mahabhumi), generally stituting a stream (yoga) (constituting
permeating factors (mahabhumika), a procession [prasarai:iayoga]), vii, 33.
ii, 152, 251, iii, 104. stream (sarµtana = sarµtati), stream of
stages (bhumis), three triads, iii, 104; rice (vrihisarµtana), iii, 33; reincarna-
nine, ii, 256, passim; delimited by tion, iii, 57; gentle thought stream
craving (tni:iaparicchinna), viii, 176; (snigdha), iv, 182; white and black,
relationship of the gods of the iv, 130; sarptanarp sarµtanute, iv, 8.
diverse stages (bhumis), iii, 168; from stream (sarµtati), person (atmabhava),
the point of view of meditative i, 18; bhojanecchapraval}.li,
attainment, vi, 279; higher stage bhoktukamatavarjita; viii, 209,
(bhumi) and grow or adhere depressed (lina).
(anusayana), v, 33, 40. - losing the
stage (bhumityaga), passing over into stream is bent through craving (sarµtati-
another stage (sarµcara), ii, 193, namana) (tr~i:iaya), iii, 95, vi, 139;
vi, 171,235, detachment from the nyayasarµcarin, iii, 57, Vya.; trans-
stage (vairagya), vi, 171. formation of the stream (parii:iama),
distinctive characteristic in the
stage of a spiritual practice, etc., e.g. transformation of the life-stream
vi, 170. (parii:iamavise~a), ii, 185, iv, 20-22,
stages of the bodhisattvas, iv, 224. ix, 283; stream is necessarily matured
stages conducive to penetration (paripaka), vi, 203, 206; pramodana,
(nirvedhabhagiya), vi, 167-77, also, viii, 209; overturning mental disposi-
ii. 327, iii, 129 (possessor of the stages tions (vipadana), iv, 99; excellence of
conducive to penetration [labhin]), 194, the stream (vise~a), ii, 281, iv, 99.
iv, 253 (wholesome conducive to stream of defilements (anusaya-
penetration [kusala]), vi, 266 (ten sarµtati), v, 79; santatyavasthapana,
categories), 287. - meditation condu- V, 3.
cive to penetration (nirvedhabhagiya stream of intermediate existence
dhyana), viii, 173. (antarabhavasarµtati), iii, 57.
stages of arising (jata-avastha), five, upacayasarµtana and vipakasarµtana,
ii, 255, iv, 119. i, 69, Vya. 73.
stainless (amala), pure (anasrava), stream of rice (vrihisarµtana), iii, 33.
iv, 255.
stream-enterer (srotaapanna), fruit of
stanza (gatha), defined, ii, 243. stream-enterer (phala), candidate of
state of non-ideation (asarµjfiika), ii, 199, the fruit of stream-enterer (phala-
viii, 144; desire to enter among the pratipannaka), i, 11, ii, 134, iv, 121,
sentient beings without ideation 123,v,23,29,85;vi, 194,200,256.
(pravivik~a), iii, 23. stream, distinctive characteristic in the
state of non-separation (nirantaratva) transformation of the life- (sarµtana-
(ai:iuniim), i, 88. parii:iamaviseeya), ii, 185, 272, iv, 20-23;
station of consciousness (vijfianasthiti), dependent on the stream (vartin),
i, 43, iii, 5, 16-26, viii, 139. ii, 218; liberation from continued
existence (vimukti), ii, 109; special
station of consciousness consisting of state of the stream (vise~a), v, 63;
sensation (vedanopagii vijfianasthiti), introducing into one's mental stream
iii, 24. (adhyaropai:ia), iv, 255.
stealing (adattadana), iv, 141, 146, 155, ripened stream (paripakvasarµtana),
188. vi, 206.
stealing (apaharai:ia), iv, 178. strong, best (adhimatra, visi~ta), ii, 266;
stones, rain of (asani), iv, 187. excessive-excessive (adhimatra-
stopping, for a short while (tatkalasanti), adhimatra), vi, 199; strong-strong
2858 English-Sanskrit Index-Glossary
supernormal accomplishments (rddhi), last, iii, 31, prolongs life, vii, 83,
concentration (samiidhi), vii, 112; emanation (nirmai;ia), vii, 119 (comp .
rddhipada, concentration (samiidhi), . 110), viii, 210. - vasitiiprabhava,
vi, 285; rddhi}:l sarvagul}.asaqipatti- adhi~thita, etc.
lak~a)}.ii. supporting (dhp:i) and earth (pp:hivi),
fivefold, vii, 122 (supernormal i, 22, ii, 146.
accomplishment created through herbs supporting (saqmisrayatva, iidhiiratva),
[o~adhikrta] ... ). ii, 135.
supernormal accomplishments of the supramundane cognition (lokottarajfiiina)
noble one (iiryii), vii, 111, viii, 210. (absolute [paramiirtha]), vi, 143.
supernormal accomplishments of supramundane path (lokottaramiirga),
action (karmarddhi), iii, 46, 205, proceeding through the aspects of the
vii, 123. truths (satyadyakarapravrtta), vi, 238,
supernormal accomplishment created 267; perhaps practiced by the ordi-
through herbs (osadhikp:ii rddhi), nary worldling (prthagjana) to perfect
vii, 123. the praxis-oriented faculties (indriya-
supernormal accomplishment of bles- saqi.ciira), vi, 266.
sing (iidhi~thiinikI rddhi), iii, 31, supremacy over their thought (sva-
vii, 120. cittiidhiriijya), vii, 63. ·
supernormal accomplishment produced supramundane groups (lokottara-
by cultivation (bhiivaniijii rddhi), skandha), vi, 297.
vii, 123. supreme factor (agradharma), supreme
supernormal accomplishment, b,asis of mundane factor (laukikiigradharma),
(rddhipada), ii, 124, vi, 281,283,285; vi, 167.
miracle of supernormal accomplish- surpassing (atikriinta), iv, 74; those w~o
ment (priitihiirya), i, 3, vii, 110; have surpassing mental application
possession of supernormal accom- (manaskiira), vi, 151.
plishment (man; priiptiibhijfia), ii, 121;
supernormal accomplishments or sustenance (iihiira), iii, 119-28, v, 99,
granting favors (varapradiinapra- viii, 139 (sparsa, etc.).
bhiivena), i, 3; realization of the cog- sustenance of consciousness (vijfiana-
nition concerned with the object- iihiira), iii, 121.
field (vi~ayajfiiinasiik~iitkiira), vii, 98. sustenance of mental intention (manal:_J.-
supplementary hell (utsada) (very strong saqi.cetaniihiira), iii, 121, 124.
[abhyutsada]) iii, 43, 149, 151-52, 193. swallow (abhyavaharai:ia, gilana), i, 55,
support (saqinisraya) and basis (iisraya), iii, 120-21.
iv, 27. swamp of rotting corpses (kui;iapa),
support, no (anadhi~thiina), defilements iii, 151.
with no support (avastuka klesa), swerving from one's intention
vi, 257. (vyutthana-iisaya), ii, 206; emerging
support, visible (adhi~thana), the visible thought (citta); i, 33, ii, 211, 302, 306.
eye is visible support (adhi~thiina) of syllables (vyafijana) and phonemes
the sense-faculty, iii, 58; in the sense (ak~ara), ii, 239, iii, 177; the text
of basis, agai11 iii, 68 (actions and opposed to the meaning, ix, 246.
passions), iv, 88 (of the path of action
sympathetic joy (muditii), viii, 196.
[karmapatha]); called va3tu. - catur-
nisr~yiidhi~thiina, iv, 149.
supporting cause (adhi~thanakarai:ia)
opposed to projecting cause
(iik~epakarai:ia), iv, 27.
T
tail-fan (camara), iii, 146.
blessing (adhi~thiina), magical or
supernormal action; makes the body taking up (upiidiitar) and abandon
2860 English-Sanskrit Index-Glossary
those who are capable a-twill (cetana- those who obtain nirvana in the next
dharman), vi, 253, 255, cp. ii, 219. existence (upapadya-parinirvayin),
those who are capable of guarding iii, 39, vi, 210; action to be experi-
themselves· (anurak~al).adharman), enced after having been born
perfected being (arhat)vi, 251. (vedaniyakarman), iv, 115, v, 216.
those who are resolved (adhimukta), in those who obtain nirvana with effort
§raddha- (through faith), vi, 196. (sabhisarp.skaraparinirvayin), vi, 210.
those who are liberated (mukta) = non- those who obtain the fruit of non-
returner (anagamin), perfected being returner in this very existence (pari-
(arhat), iii, 121; those who are lib- vrttajanman anagiimin), vi, 218.
erated from the world (lokan muktal,i) those who practice (pratipattar), viii, 219.
(gone forth [nil).srta], separated [visarp.- those who practice thoroughly (krta-
yukta], delivered [vipramukta]), ii, 119. parijaya), vi, 150. · ·
those who are liberated through both those who, during the course of a given
parts (ubhayatobhagavimukta), ii, 205, explanation, come to penetrate the
vi, 273, 276, C
truth (udghatitajiia), i, 40.
those who are like rhinoceroses those who are detached for the most
(khadgavi~iil).akalpa), khadgin (?), part (bhiiyovitaraga), ii, 135, vi, 195,
iii, 194, vi, 177-78. 233.
those who are nourished (po~a), ix,)245. thought (sarp.kalpa), initial inquiry
those who die everywhere (sarvacyuta), (vitarka), vi, 283, Add., 291; attach-
vi, 213. ment to thought (sarp.kalpariiga), iii, 8;
those who go among humans (nrga), right thinking (samyak) and wrong
1
of thought (!Inatva), v, 89, 99; libera- (kiirin), ii, 312; together with (gata),
tion of thought (vimok~a), ii, 286. ii, 326, iii, 106; innate afflicted view
thought, initial (sa111dhicitta) (conception of self (sahaja [satkiiyadr~ti]), v, 41;
[pratisa111dhil), iii, 14. arise together among themselves
Gata), iii, 105.
thought, malicious (vyiipannacitta),
iv, 136, 178. tortoise, hairs of a (kiirmaroman),
ix, 263.
thought, mental (manascitta) = mental
consciousness (manovijuana), iv, 125. totality of wind, source of (viiyu-
kftsniiyatana), viii, 214.
thought, non-liberated (avimuktacitta),
vii, 20. trace (viisanii, Stcherbatsky), Logic,
ii, p. 293,367.
thought, not dispersed (avisara1_1a citta),
iv, 41. vii.sana and vii.sanii., iii, 91, iv, 64, 249,
Vyii. ii. 83 (impregnation of thought
thought, right (samyaksa111kalpa), ii, 159, .[cittaviisanam], tilii.viisanii), vii, 70, 72,
vi;283. 77, 83 (abandonment of the traces
thoughts of desire (smarasa111kalpa), [saviisanii.prahiil_la]), viii, 142, 218
vi, 264, 289. (piirvadhyanaviisanii), ix, 283 (compare
three cleu knowledges (trividya), bhiivanii).
vii, 108. trace; serial continuity; with its conse-
three revolutions of the wheel of quences; connection (anubandha), flux
dharma (triparivarta dharmacakra), (praviiha), i, 21, iv, 64, v, 5, vii, 83
vi, 246. (trace [viisanii]).
threefold refuge, taking the (trisaraI).a- traces of action (kannaviisanii), ix, 297.
gata, gama1_1a), iv,, 71. traces, abandonment of defilements
throwing oneself into water or into fire with their (saviisaniiprahiil_la), vii, 83.
Galagniprapiitana), v, 76. tradition, sect (nikiiya, sarva), all the
thus (tathii), v, 3. canons, ix, 253.
tigress carrying her young (vyiighrI- training in higher understanding
potiipahiiravat), ix, 265. (adhiprajfi'iµ sik~ii), vi, 225, 231.
tilting, orienting, alerting (iibhoga), of training in higher morality (adhisTia111
thought (cetasas), ii, 154, vi, 154; sik~a), vi, 225, 230-31.
simple (miitra) bending of thought, training in higher things (adhisik~ii),
vii, 90. vi, 225, 230-31, viii, 130.
time (kiila), a formation dissociated training in the higher thought (adhi-
from thought (viprayukta) ?, iii, 188. - citta111 sik~ii), vi, 225, 230, viii, 130.
i, 12, iv, 62 (= conditioning forces trainings, three (sik~iitraya), vi, 225, 230,
[sa111skiira], five aggregates viii, 128.
[paficaskandha]), v, 53.
transformation (pariI).iima), ii, 230,
time or course (adhvan), the conditioned iii, 142, iv, 20, ix, 260,296; unsatis-
phenomena (sa111sk;tas) are the course factoriness which is transformation
or times (adhvan), i, 12, iv, 63. - dis- or change (du):ikhatii), vi, 125; pro-
cussion of the existence of the past ... fessing transformation (viida), v, 54;
i, 77, ii, 260, v, 51-65. mastery of transformation (vasitva),
adhvanii.nii.tva (diira ... ), v, 107; con- vii, 83. - parinantum, anyathii.tvam
fused (sa111kara), 55; limit (paryanta), ii.pattum.
iii, 177. transformation of the stream of a seed
.single time period (ekiidhvika), three (bijasa111tatipariI).iima), ii, 185.
time periods (traiyadhvika, ii, 274); transformed or deteriorating (vipari-
two time periods (dvyadhvaga), three 1_1iima), i, 24.
time periods (tryadhvaga), ii, 275.
transgression (siivadya) (transgression of
together (saha), iii, 106; auxiliaries disobedience [pratik~epaI).a] ... ), iv, 83,
2864 English-Sanskrit Index-Glossary
view (dreyti), viewing (drs), insight vital breath (prii.Q.a), iv, 154.
(darsana). - are view (dreyti), the eye, vital part (marman), iv, 126; splitting
the five afflicted views (dmis), the the vital parts (cheda), iii, 135.
mundane right view (samyagdreyti), the
view of those in training (saikeyi) and vital principle (J1va) and body (sarira),
the view of those beyond training ix, 262; vital principle (J1va), those
(asaikeyI), i, 80, 83. - pure and impure wh? are born (jantu) ..., ix, 245.
understandings (prajiiii.) that are views vitality faculty (jivitendriya), ii, 105,
(dmi), viii, 3.- five afflicted views 108, 120, 123, 127, 215, iv, 154; action
(dreytis), v, 15; sixty-two afflicted having for its ripened effect the
views, their roots, ix, 265. vitality faculty (vipii.kakarman), ii, 273
afflicted view (dreyti) and ignorance vitality or potency (virya), vitality
(avidyii.), iii, 89; craving (tm1a), v, 30; (ojas) of the plants, iv, 187; potency
false cognition (mithyajiiana), v 33; (virya), taste of the digestion product
mistaken ideation and thought (vipii.ka), specific property (rabhii.va),
(sarpjiiacittavibhrama), v, 25. vii, 35.
view or insight (dreyti or darsana) and vocal action (vii.k-karman), iv, 2;
cognition Giiana), vii, 3, 11, viii, 193. constituents for speech (vii.ksarpskii.ra),
view of those beyond training, right ii, 174; speech (vii.gbhii.eyii.), iii, 17; vii.g-
(asaikeyi samyagdr~ti), i, 81, vi, 240, vastu, viii, 136; vocal informative
vii, 6. action (viigvijiiapti), i, 17, iv, 3, 14.
view-of-transgression or false view vocal fction consisting of giving an
(pii.pikii. dr~ti), ii, 246; having no real or,Sler (ii.jiiiipana-vijiiapti), iv, 16, 138.
support (avastukii.), vi, 257. vocal behavior (vyavahii.ra), vii.g-,
view, right (samyagdf~ti), mundane and sixteen, iv, 159; miitra, iv, 5.
not mundane, i, 81, Add., ii, 159,245, voice (viic). - viig vacanam... i, 46;
iv, 137,175, 180,245,vi,290,298, initial inquiry (vitarka) and investi-
vii, 1 (Visuddhimagga, 509). gation (vicara), ii, 174,240; object of
viewing (drs), view (dr~ti), insight unhindered knowledge (pratisarpvid),
(darsana), vii, 3. vii, 90, 93; and name or V\'.Ord (nii.man),
· i, 12 (Vyii.. 21), iii, 99; voice and
views, esteeming of such things as bad speech (vacana), ii, 113.
(dreytiparii.marsa), v, 18, ix, 263.
vow (pratijiiii), iv, 94; self-styled bhik~u.
vigor (virya), praxis-oriented faculty of _iv, 96; mitra, iv, 5.
vigor (indriya), power of vigor (ba:la),
i, 101, ii, 111, 160, yi, 283 (= right vow of chastity (niyamavafigamana),
effort [samyakpradhana]); perfection iv, 157.
ofvigor (pii.ramitii.), iv, 229, vii, 78; see vow to act like a cow (govrata), morality
sraddhii.dIµi. (sTia), iii, 86, iv, 147, v, 20.
vigor, destroying the (ojonii.sana),
iv, 188.
violating one's mother (dii~ai:i,am mii.tul_J.),
iv, 219.
w
warrior-ruler (keyatriya), iii, 206.
visible (nidarsana), i, 51.
water (abdhii.tu), i, 22-23, ii, 146;
visible (sanidarsana), i, 51. destruction by water (apsarpvartani),
visible form (drsya), vi, 153. iii, 184,210; and death iii, 136.
vision (darsaha) through the eye, the water (ii.pya), celestial palace of the
two eyes, without attaining the · moon (candrakii.ntii.tmaka), iii, 157.
object, i, 81, 83-87. - forbidden water (jala), eight qualities of the water
spectacles, iv, 190. of the oceans (sitas), iii, 144, circle of
visualization Gitamanaskara), vi, 151; water (mal).C,ala), iii, 141.
compare vi, 150, 220. way of virtuous endeavor (srii.mal).ya),
2868 English-Sanskrit Index-Glossary
fruit of the way of virtuous endeavor some through intrinsic nature (sva-
(sriimai:iyaphala) (six), iv, 97, vi, 241- bhiivatas), wholesome through asso-
42, ix, 290. ciation (sarp.prayogatas), wholesome
way, in a (paryiiyei:ia), ayugapat, ix, 283; through the originating cause
opposed to absolutely (ekiintena), (samutthiinatas), iv, 33;. the nirvai:ia,
vi, 132; absolutely (nil_lparyiiyei:ia), the w.holesome roots, the wholesome
vi, 218; in two ways (paryiiyadvaya), mental events (caittas), etc., are also
iii, 81; asti paryiiyal_l, vi, 218. wholesome (kusala).
cognition of another's thoughts wholesome (kusala), etym. i,-54, Vyii.:
(cetal_lparyiiyajfiiina), vii, 99. kutsitiic chalitii durgater apakriintii
iti.
weak stage (mandikii avasthii), iii, r18.
wholesome (kusala) or good (subha)
weak-weak (mrdumrdu)..., vi, 199; weak action is secure (k~ema), will have
(mrdu), medium (madhya), strong agreeable or desirable retribution
(adhimiitra), stronger (adhimiitratara), (i~tavipiikatviit) (impure wholesome
strongest (adhimiitratama), vi, 223; action [kusalasiisrava]) or bring about
weak praxis-oriented faculties nirvai:ia (nirvai:iapriipakatviit) (pure
(mrdvindriya), vi, 193. good action [aniisrava]), iv, 106.
weaken (durbal"ikarai:ia) (deterioration defined, iv, 137, through the inten-
Uarii]), ii, 223. tion to do good to another (pariinu-
wearing rags (ciriidiina), v, 76. grahiibhisarp.dhi) opposed to the
weeping (raurava) (hell [naraka]) iii, 2, intention to do bad to another
149. (paropaghiitiibhisarp.dhi); how are the
correct and the false view wholesome
welcoming the opponent (pratyudyiina), (kusala), unwholesome (akusala)?
iii, 203. Comp. v. 41.
well achieved (subhadriivasiina), ii, 124. wholesome action, abandonment of
western bountiful cow (avaragodaniya), (kusalaprahai:ia), never absolute,
iii, 2, 145. iv, 131-33.
wheel (cakra) (kramai:iat), of briihma, of wholesome action, impure (kusala-
dharma, vi, 245. siisrava), iv, 106, 128.
wheel of Brahma (brahmacakra), vi, 244, wholesome moral quality (kusalatva) of
vii, 74. the superknowledges (abhijfiiis),
wheel-turning king (cakravartin), ii, 181, vii, 107; of the immeasurables
220,iii,30,56, 196-99,202,206 (apramai:ias), viii, 196; of the five
(dynasty), iv, 166, v, 148, vi, 248, sensory consciousnesses (vijfiiinas),
vii, 73, 123. iv, 180.
wheel-turning king with the copper wholesome permeating factors
wheel (tiimracakra cakravartin), (kusalamahiibhumika), ii, 153.
iii, 197. wholesome root (kusalamula), ii, 160,
wheel-turning king with the golden iv, 34, vi, 286, vii, 77, viii, 197, 199;
wheel (suvari:ia:cakravartin), iii, 197. cutting off the wholesome roots
(cheda, samuccheda), recovering the
wheel-turning kin•g with the silver wholesome roots (sarp.dhiina), recon-
wheel (riipyacakravartin), iii, 197. necting with the wholesome roots
white action (suklakarman), iv, 129; (pratisarp.dhiina), priirambha, ii, 294,
destroying white action iii, 131, iv, 94, 170--75.
(suklakarmak~ayakrt), 130, 132; white wholesome, damag\ng what is
factor (sukladharma), vi, 200--201, (kusalapak~avipatti), iii, 194.
iv, 130 (= wholesome [kusala] and non-
defined [avyakrta]). wholesome, outflow of the (kusala-
abhi~yanda), iv, 21; exclusively
wholesome (kusala), absolutely good wholesome (ekatiina), 41; wholesome
(paramatas or paramiirthatas), whole- thought citta), diverse types, ii, 320,
English-Sanskrit Index-Glossary 2869
iv, 179, vii, 18, 23. and the supreme mundane factors
wide (ghana), iii, 143; stage of the (laukikagradharmas), vi, 171; feminity
embryo, iii, 62, 255. (stritva), ii, 104, 108; notion of a
woman (stricitta) and notions that
wife, bad (akalatra), bad son (aputra), succeed her, ix, 283; fault of female
iii, 89. gender (stnohavado~a), iv, 226.
wife, taking a (vivaha), iv, 166. wood·(daru), piece of wood (daru-
wind (vata) (one of the three humors of skandha) (mahabhiitas), ii, 146--47.
the body [do~as]), iii, 136. wood, wedge contributes to the splitting
wind (vata), viitiiniirp. samiihal}., i, 23. of (darupatakilasarp.dhara1_1avat),
wind (vayu) and mindfulness of vi, 160.
breathing (anapanasmrti), vi, 154. word of an authoritative person (apta-
wind (vayu), elementary substance wind vacana), vi, 143.
(vayudhatu), fundamental material words, affectionate (priyavacana),
element wind (vayumahabhiita), i, 22- iv, 138.
23, ii, 146; i, 90, iii, 185, aggregate of world (loka), i, 14.
the atoms, the universe (primordial
wind [pragvayu]); destruction by wind world (loka), receptacle world (bhajana)
(vayusamvartanI), iii, 210; role in and world of sentient beings (sattva),
excretion, ii, 112; in action, ix, 294; in iii; eternity of the world (ananta),
hell, iii, 149; movement of the sun, world is eternal (siisvata), ix, 267.
iii, 156. world is infinite (anantavan lokal;l),
wind, circle of (vayumal_lgala), iii, 138, ix, 267.
185, vi, 155. world, views of the (loka-anuvrtti),
wind, primordial (pragvayu), iii, 185. vi, 132; eye of the world (cak~us),
viii, 224.
wise person (ajiia), ii, 117.
worldling, ordinary, see ordinary
wishlessness, concentration of worldling (prthagjana).
(apral).ihita samadhi), viii, 185;
wishlessness of wishlessness writing (lipi), iv, 254.
(apraI_1ihitapraI_1ihita), 189.
withdrawal, two (vyapakar~advaya),
withdrawn (vyapakr~ta), vi, 144, 259. y
without conflict (aral_la), with conflict yawning (vijrrp.bhika), v, 89. 99.
(saral_la), i, 13-14.
year (sarp.vatsara) (ecclesiastical year
without heat [of passion] (atapa), god, [candra], etc.), iii, 179, 180.
iii, 3.
yoke (yoga) (defilement [klesa]), v, 75,
without interruption (avyutthanena), 80.
ii, 206, iv, 173.
yoke bearing (yugandhara), iii, 141.
without making an effort (anabhisarp.-
skarel_la), iii, 199, vi, 154. yoke of desire (kamayoga), v, 75, 77.
without thought (acittaka, acitta), i, 20, yoke, harnessed to the (yuganaddha-
ii, 200, iii, 133. vahin), viii, 131.
without remainder (niriipadhise~a), young lion (kisora).
ii, 109, vi, 211, 279.
without superior (anuttara), thought
(citta), vii, 20; liberation (mok~a),
nirviii;ia, iv, 255, v, 63.
witness (sak~ijana), viii, 224.
women (strI), cutting off of the roots,
iv, 174; is she <;akra, Mara... ?, ii, 130;
GiUhii,s and Karikas
maral)arµ katamat? yii te~iirµ sattviil)iirµ tasmiic cyutis cyavanam ... , iii, 65.
miirµ siistiiram uddisadbhil:i kusiigre1Ja ... , iv, 84.
miinarµ nisritya miina eva prahiitavyal:i, iii, 115.
mrtasya khalu kiilagatasya ... , iii, 95.
p. 4, line 1.
A The Pfirvabhidharmlicliryas and the
Abhidhammas and Abhidharmas, Kasmira-mar_1<;1allicaryas say ... Parsva
Introduction, F viii. says.,. Others say ... Vibha~li, 123,
p. 644bc; 645a (restraint of the upiisaka).
Abhidharma, see ligama, sfitra.
''.The early Abhidharmlicliryas and the
Abhidharma, explanation of the word by Sastrlicliryas of Kasmir" agree on the
Abhidharma-slistrlicliryas, Vasumitra, problem of intoxicating liquor (Kosa,
Bhadanta, Parsva, Ghosaka, iv, 83), Vibhli~li, 123, p. 645a.
Dharmagupta15as, Mahisasakas,
Darstlintikas, Sabdikas, Buddharaksita Definition of the laukikiigras (highest
Buddhadeva, Lao-tcheou (or Tsouo·- ' mundane factors), 2, p. 7, 3 (against the
Vibhajyavadins).
tcheou), Vibhli~li, i, p. 4. 2.
Abhidharmako~a, explanation of the name
Abhidharma,
of this work, i, 1, foll. - Introduction:
dharmalak1a1:iopadesasvariipa, i, 6, Vyli.
bibliography and various notes.
i, 12.
Abhidharmasiira (rather than Abhidharma-
Abhidharma, several nftis: sautriintikanfti,
kasmfravaibhii#kanfti, siistranfti,
hrdaya), work of DharmasrI, v, 5, Add.
v. 37, and Introduction, F lxii. -Pelliot,
vibhii~iinfti, viii, 222.
JA, 1930, 2, p. 267. - See Dharmatrlita.
Abhidharma, work of the Buddha, i, 5-6,
Abhidharma~iistra or pitaka·, i, 4.
vii, 22, viii, 223.
Abhidharmdiistras designated as scripture
Abhidharma and Sutra: sarvo 'bhidharmah
(iigama), ii, 237.
siitriirthaf:i siitranika~af:i siitravyiikhyiinam,
ii, 245; see i, 21, 23, iii, 60, 67, 102. - Abhidhiirmika, or
"The Siitra is the root of this treatise ~atpiidiibhidharmiitrapiithin v, 45; or
(Jfianaprasthlina); what the Siitra does not abhidharmakiira, ii, 163. -And vinaya-
say, this treatise should say it", Vibha~li, dhara, iv, 83. - i, 39, 46, 86, 101, ii, 163,
112 beginning, and frequent [other 245, 30.2, iii, 118, v, 13, 33, 45, vi, 145.
references to Sfitra and Abhidharma]. Abhidhiirmikas, i, 101, designates the
Abhidharma and Sutra, Vibha~li, 46 at the readers of the Prakarar_1a.
beginning. - Plirsva says: "The entire Abhidharmo Jiiiinaprasthiiniidir ... , i, 5,
Abhidharma has the explanation of the Vyli.
Siitra for its purpose; because of such and miila abhidharma, ii, 161.
such a Siitra, we have such and such a
~listra. One needs to reject these [two] miilasiistra = Prakarar_1a, i, 4, vii, 10.
Sastras [on the three bonds (bandhana) siistriibhidharma, viii, 22, the Abhidharma
and the 98 contaminants (anusaya)] which which consists in the Sastras, Jfianapra-
are not spoken of in the Sfitra". Others sthlina, etc.,
say: "One dors not need to reject them, siistravirodha (contradicting the Sastra),
since these points are spoken of iil the rather than siitravirodha (contradicting the
Siitras ... which have been lost". Sfitra, vii, 22.
Abhidharma of the Sautriintikas: artha- §iistre~u avyiikr{am, undecided point,
viniscayiidayaf:i siitravife:tii ye1u dharma- vi, 214.
lak1m:ia1J1 van:zyate, i, 6, Vyli. 12.
siistraviikya, iv, 143.
Abhidharma = Sastra.
ucchiistra, iv, 111.
Abhidharmiiciirya = iibhidhiirmika, iii, 52,
iv, 26, v, 122, vi, 177, and elsewhere. Abhijiiiisutra (differentiation of actions),
Vibhli~li, 20, p. 99, 2.
Abhidharma-iicaryas, those who understand
without error the meaning of the Abhi~ Abhisamayiilarp.kiiriiloka, cited iv, 71, note,
dharmapitaka, not those who understand ed. Suali, p. 229.
the text, Vibhli~li, 23, p. 116, 2. - Invisible Aca1;u;la (?), iv, 253.
atoms, against Gho~aka, 132, p, 684. - Aciiryas = purviiciiryas, iii, 82
Explanation of the word Abhidharma, i,
2880 Name Index: Siitras, Books, Scholars, Schools, etc.
135, p. 697-8, s. Levi, JA, 1927, 2, p. 119. Nirgranthas, ii, 219, iii, 30, 86, iv, 2, 17,
Maskarin, iii, 30, iv, 177. 155, 157, 246, ix, 267, 297. - Nirgrantha-
siistra, iii, 30, ix, 297. - Vibhiisii, 120
Matrceta, stotrakiira, ii, 205, Add., S. Levi, beginning, p. 623, 2; 142, p. 729, 1
JA, 1910,2,p.450. (indriya). - Tucci, Pre-Dinniiga Texts,
Maudgalyiiyana, i, 2, iii, 29, v, 59, vi, 268, p. xxix.
vii, 113, ix, 297. - Hears during equipoise,
Vibhii~ii, 185, p. 929, 2 (Siddhi, 294);
false predictions, 180, p. 905, 3; enters
into the path through the difficult route,
p
95, p. 485, 3. Pailuka, iii, 214.
Maudgalyiiyana, author of Prajfiaptisiistra, Paiicaka, their ordination, iii, 60, 164.
i, 6 (Vyii. i, 12).
Paiicake~u. ix, 250.
Maudgalyiiyanskandhaka, Introduction,
F xxxiv. Paiiciilariija, iii, 28.
Miiyiidevi, dream, iii, 44; ii, 220, iii, 177, Paiicanivarai;iasutra, iv, 166-7 (v, 100).
vii, 80; Vibhii~ii, 70, p. 361, 3; Rockhill, Paiicaprabhabuddha, viii, 222.
15. Paiicaskandhaka of Vasubandhu, ii, 153
Milinda, on time, 49-50, Demieville, (Vyii. ii, 51), 157,160,171,175,186,200,
Bulletin, 1924, p. 129 (Kosa, v, 52). 217, iii, 105.
Mithiliimravana, iv, 126. Paiicavastuka of Vasumitra, i, 86
Mrgiiramiitar, iii, 28. [V asubandhu reproduces the argument of
Paficavastuka, comm. of Dharmatriita,
Mlecchas, iv, 145. -See Maga and Ta-syu. p. 991, 3; the argument of clarity is from
Miildiistra = Jiiiinaprasthiina, ii, 207; Jfiiinaprasthiina]; ii, 211-13; comm. from
elsewhere Vijfiiinakiiya, vii, 28, or Dharmatriita, Paficavastukavibha~ii,
Prakarai:ia, vii, 10. Taisho, 1555.
Munigiithiis, in Sruµyuktiigama, 49, Peri, Pai;iC,arabhik~u (Pai:i<Jarailgaparibhiijaka),
Hiiriti,34. iii, 86.
Piii;iini, vi, 242.
Piiriiyai;ia, in Ailguttara, iii, 399, in
N Sai:p.yuktiigama, 49, ~eri, Harm, p. 34; the
stanza Suttanipiita 1113, in Vibhii~ii,
Niigiirjuna, i, .30. 4, p. 17, and 137, p. 706; two other
Nagaropamiidisutra, iii, 60. stanzas, 5, p. 26 and. 27. - Levi,
Niigasena, ii, 228, iii, 145, ix, 263. Recitation, 24.
Naiyiiyikas, i, 57, Vyii. i, 65. Paramiirthdiinyatiisiitra, iii, 60, v, 59,
ix, 259.
Nanda, ii, 227, ix, 269; in Saundarananda,
see iii, 115, iv, 189, vi, 124, 126. Paramlivasthiiviidin, ii, 258.
Nanda, bad reading for Ananda, type of Piirii§ari, firthika, Vibhii~ii, 142, p. 729, 1.
miirgajfvin, v, 98. Piiriisika, iv, 121, 145, 147. ,
Nandikasiitra, iv, 85. Pariprcch~iistra of Vasumitra, ii, 212;
Niiriiyai;ia, vii, 73. same citation Karmasiddhiprakarai:ia,
Taisho 1609, p, 784, 2; Siddhi, 207
Narasiitra (?), ix, 245, 257. (Comp. Dat~tiintika and Vibhajyaviidin).
Navasattviiyiisasiitra, iii, 22. Parivrajakas, iii, 86, v, 59.
Netripada§iistra, ii, 205. Piidva, vi, 301, viii, 207; Introduction,
Nikiiyiintariya, i, 46 (Vyii. 54), jii, 10 F xliii, S. Levi, Dr~tiintapailkti, JA, 1927,
(Dharmagupta), 33 (Mahiisiiqlghikapra- 2, pp. 114-116.
bhftaya~), 77 (Mahisiisaka), 169 (Mahiisiii:p.- Piidva, frequently cited in Vibhiisii:
ghika ... ), 200 (Mahiisiii:p.ghika ... ), v, 26 .. explanation of the word Abhidharma, 1,
2890 Name Index: Siitras, Books, Scholars, Schools, etc.
Pretivadiina, iii, 156. ix, 284, 297, 300, three iiryiis; a fourth in
Pubbaseliyas, ii, 214. Prafityasamutpiidavyiikhyii, G. Tucci,
IRAS, 1930, p. 613.
Pudgalaprati~edhaprakara1a1a, iv, 154,
ix, 227. Riijagirikas, ii, 150,218, iv, 207, ix, 297.
Pudgalaskandhaka, Introduction, F xxxiv. Riijar~i, cakravartin, ii, 220.
Pudgalavidin, ix, 227-28. - lndroduction, Riijasena, iv, 215.
p. xxxiv. Rama (bhada,ntariima sthaviraii~ya, i.e.: the
Pura1a1iidil;l tiistii, Piira1a1a Ka§yapa, i, 3, student of SrTiata ?), iii, 81, v, 45, vi, 250.
iv, 177, Vyii. i, 8, Rockhill, 100,255, Riimaya1a1a, with his 12,000 verses, only
Jaworski, Heretic Masters (Rocznik). - talks about two things; this is not the
Vibhii~ii, 97, p. 504: niisti dattam ... Siitra, which is without measure in regards
Pur1a1a (abhijfiiis), vii, 97. to the words and the meaning, Vibhii~ii,
46, p. 236, 3.
Pur1a1a, author of Dhiitukiiya, i, 6, Vyii, i, 12.
Ratnagiri, gufia, iv. 229.
Pur1a1a, protagonist of Nanjio, 1297.
RatnarMisi1tra, iv, 21.
Piirl}.a Ko4ika, iii, 86, Vibhii~ii, 114, p. 590
(govratika). Ratna§ikhin, iv, 227.
Piirl}.Ma, iii, 74; Vibhii~ii, 23, p. 118, 2 Rauruka nagara, iv, 215.
(pratftya-samutpanna); 94, p. 487, 1 Rohitasiitra, i, 14.
(srotaiipattyangas). S. Levi, JA, 1927, 2, Rurujiitaka, iv, 237 (Lalou, J:A, 1925, 2,
p. 115. p. 333).
Pur~aviida, ii, 313.
Piirviibhidharmiiciiryas and Ka&mira-
ma1a14aliiciryas, on upaviisa, Vibhii~ii,
123, p. 644, 2 and 3, 645, 1.
S,
Piirviibhidhiirmikas, on pra,:iidhijfiiina, Sabda§iistra, i, 2. Vyii.
Vibhii~ii, 179, p. 896, 1. Sabdikas, Vibhii~ii, 42, p. 216, 2:
Piirvabahirde§akas, Vibhii~ii, 71, p. 368, 2. explanation of the word Abhidharma,
Purviiciiryas, ii, 103-105, 175, 212, iii, 53, 1, p. 4, 2.
Add., iv, 18, 20,162,225, v, 41, 100, Saila and Upa§aila, iii, 45.
vi, 141, viii, 157, ix, 248. -In particular Sakrapariprcchiisiitra, vi, 219, Vibliii~ii,
iii, 53, Add., iv, 162, 225, viii, 157. 53,p.277;comp. 70,p.365,3.
Piirva-kii§miras (ancient masters of this Siikyamuni, retribution of old offenses,
country), Vibhii~ii, 71, p. 368, 2. iv, 212 Add.; Vibhii~ii, 116, p. 603
Piirvakathii, iii, 195. (schism); the nine kalpas, iv, 225, 230
Pu~pottara, five iinantaryas, under Kiisyap!J, Add.; in the ninth antarakalpa of our age,
Vibhii~ii, 119, p. 620. iii, 192;jambumiile, bodhimiile, iii, 128,
vii, 80, viii, 195; the ancient Siikyamuni,
P~yabuddha, iv, 225,229. iv, 228.
Pu~yamitra, Vibhii~ii, 125, p. 655, 2. Samadatta (?), iii, 49, Vibhii~ii, 21, p. 113
(anusayana of past anuiayas);
29, p. 149, 2 (viriigadhiitu, etc.); 70,
R• p. 361, 2 (antariibhava); 23, p. 118, 3
(iivasthika pratftyasamutpiida);
ij.ddyabhijiiiisiitra (?), vii, 98. 186, p. 934, 1 (retrogressing from the
ij.k~ajiitaka (?), ii, 237, Add. fruits).
Sa1a1aviisa, iii, 45; Przyluski, JA, 1914, 2,
p. 547, Concile, 282, Aroka, 327, etc.
R Siiriputra, i, 2, ii, 209,220, iii, 7, 13, vi, 152,
268, vii, 72, 83. - Vibhii~ii, 29, p. 151, 2
Riihula, iii, 30, iv, 82. -The sthavira, (praises the-Bhagavat); 30, p. 153, 2 and
2892 Name Index: Siitras, Books, Scholars, Schools, etc.
s•
p. 64, 2 (eight causes of non-vision); 142,
p. 729 (indriyas) .
Sii:qiitiyanikiiya~iistra, ix, 229, 261, 270,
~ai;!dharmatiistra (eternity of paramii,:ius), 271.
Vibhii~ii, 8, p. 37, 2; Taisho 1546, p. 27, 2,
~atkagrantha (cho-ka). Sii:qimitiyas, ii, 123, 214, 222 Add., 224,
234, iii, 32, 153, iv, 4, 8, v, 24, ix, 232.
Sii:qitiinasiib~iigika[trama~a], ii, 302, a
s
Saddharmasmrtyupasthiinasutra, iv, 186.
school of Abhidhiirmikas; Siddhi, 246,
Vibhii~ii, 10, p. 50, 3: citta is the
immediate cause of citta; vedanii of
vedanii, and so on ... ; 17, p. 85, 3: same
Sadntantiini sutrii~i, vi, 188. theory of the homogeneous stream applied
Sagiithasiitra (?), iii, 11. to the kusalamiilas; 38, p. 198, 1, 3: the
Sahetusapratyayasanidiinasutra (elsewhere lak$a,:ias (origination,. etc.) of riipa are not
PratityasamutpadasUtra), iii, 70, vi, 138. separate from riipa; see Kosa, ii, J22.
Samiidhiskandha, or skandhaka, seventh Sa:qiyuktakiigama (Liiguc;Iasikhi);aka), v, 59,
book of the Jfiiinaprasthiina, viii, 201. vi, 188.
Sa:tp.bhuti (?), iii, 74. Saptabhavasutra, iii, 13, 36; Vibhii~ii,
60, p. 309, 2.
Sa:tp.cetaniyasutra, iv, 136.
Saptasuryavyiikara~a, itr, 20;
Name Index: Siltras, Books, Scholars, Schools, etc. 2893
Udraka Riimaputra, Vibha~a, 32, p. 165; VaiigUa, iii, 135, v, 25; Vibha~a, praises the
17 6, p. 885, 3; he does not plant the good Bhagavat, 173, p. 872, 1, and 86, p. 392, 2
leading to liberation (mok~abhiigfya). (where translated Ch. luen-li); tfrthika, 44,
Uktika, Uttiya, ix, 268. p. 229, 2 (Ch. luen-lz); a stanza on the
power of the Bhagavat of making himself
Upagupta, sthavira, author of understood to animals, 99, end.
Netripadasiistra, ii, 205.
Viirfiagai;iya, v, 64 Add. - Saqighabhadra,
Upagupta and Mara, Vibhii~a, 52,p.634, l;Woods, Yoga,p.xx.
135, p. 697, 3.
Viisifithi, iv, 126 Add.; Vibhii~a,
Upiilisutra, iv, 83, 163. 126, p. 658, 1.
Updiinta, author of an Abhidharmasara, Vasubandhu, author of the Kosa, disciple of
ii, 144, Introduction, F lxv. Manoratha (Hiuan-tsang), of Buddhamitra
Uragavarga, Introduction, F xl. (Paramartha); date of Vasubandhu,
Uttara, object of a prediction of the Introduction, F xxiv.
Bhagavat, ii, 220. Vasubandhu, iii, 78, 80, three slokas.
Uttara, tirthika, disciple of Piirasari, Gathiisaqigraha, iv, 137, Add. Viqisikii,
Vibhii~ii, 142, p. 29, 1. i, 89; Triqisikii, comp. the definition of
Uttarapathaka, ii, 151, iii, 40, iv, 214,216, caittas Kosa, ii, 153 and Sthiramati, Levi,
234, v, 5. 25-33.
Pratityasamutpadavyiikhya, Tucci, JRAS,
1930, pp. 611-23. .
V Vadavidhi and viisubandhava pratyak~a-
laka~a,:ia, Introduction, F xxiv.
Vaibhiifiika, vibhii~ayii dfvyanti ciiranti vii ... Karmasiddhiprakarai;ia, to compare with
vibhii~iilfl vii vidanti, viii, 222, Vya. i, 12 Kosa, iv: discussion of the theses of the
(Comp. Namasatµgiti, vi, 10: avivartakaJ:t I Vaibhii~ikas and of the Suryodayaviida (?)
tena dfvyatf(Y aviavartikaJ:t]. on bodily action, movement, etc.; also
admits the opinions expressed in the first nirodhasamiipatti.
line in the Vibhii~a ?, iii, 49. Vasubandbu is sautriintika-piik~ika (Vya. ad
gk~a,:iikaviidin, ii, 230; see iv,4, and i; 17). - Conflict with Vaibhii~ikas and
Saqighabhadra, 33, p. 533. Sautriintikas, i, 20, 38, 55, 60, 91, ii, 186,
"This is an object of faith not of 214,295, iv, 142,172,224, v, 78, 108 ...
reasoning", ii. 147. Vasubandhu-the-Older; vrddhiiciirya
Vaibhiifiika, of Kasmir or of the west, sthaviravasubandhu, master of Manoratha,
viii, 222, ii, 199; see Bahirdesaka, Introduction, F xxvii.- Kosa, Vyii. ad
Apariintaka, Giindhiira. i, 26; iii, 70, 152, iv, 7.
Vaibhiifiikadesiya, i, 56; siddhiinta, ii, 140, sthavirav(lsubandhuprabhrtibhir ayalfl
283. hetur ukta/:t ... , iv. 7.
Vainayikas of the Vaibhiifiika school, Viisudeva, fsvara, ii, 311.
iv, 60, Add. (see Vinayavibha~a); without Vasula, arhat of Kasmir-, refutes by silence
doubt the scholars of iv. 83, 90; the the tfrthika Saficalya (?), Vibhii~ii,
Vaibhiisikas who are not the Abhi- 15,p. 76,3. -
dhiirmikas, viii, 222. Vasumi tra, author o'f--a,_ salflgrahMloka,
Vai§esika, i, 7, ii, 195,198,217,236, ii, 165.
iii, :ho, ix, 284'; 289-95. Vasumitra, Introduction, F xliii, author of
Vaise~ikas, indriyas, Vjbhii~a, 142, p. 729, Prakarai;iapada, the gre!lt scholar of the
3. Vibhii~a, i, 6 (Vyii. 12), 79, ii, 16\~13,
Vaiyiikarai;ias, iii, 78 Add., ix, 279,292, 215,264,273, 301, iii, 49, 74, iv, 7tu7
(Vibhii~ii, 116 beginning), v, 38, 53, 81,
Vakfiu; iii, 147. 100, 102, vi, 171, vii, 64, viii, 143, 158. -
Vajrii bhik~ui;ii, ix, 249. His opinion i~ refuted by the Vaibhii~ika~,
2896 Name Index: Sutras, Books, Scholars, Schools, etc.
dieu iranien dans l'Inde, Rocznik, vii), close to that attributed to the Diirstiintikas,
Vibhajya-nikiiya opposed to Abhidharma- Kosa, iv, 136); 135, p. 700, 1 (negation of
Sarvastiviidy-iidi-nikiiyas, Vasubandhu, the antariibhava, time differs from the
Treatise on the nature of the Buddha, sarriskiiras; comp. Diir~tiintikas);
Taisho 1610, p. 787c. 152, p. 774, 1 (subtle thought in nirodha-
samiipatti, also Diir~tiintikas); 173, p. 871, 3
Vibhajyaviidin, Introduction, F xxxiv, lv. - (the body of birth of the Buddha is pure:
Various references, v, 23-24, 52 (the note opinion of the Vibhajyaviidin and. Maha-
on p. 24 should be corrected according to saqighikas; in the two identical passages,
Introduction, F lv). 44, p. 229, 1, 76, p. 391, 3, the Mahii-
Vibhajyaviidin, ordinarily (Ch.) fen-pie- siiqighikas are only named); 185, p. 929, 2
luen-tche; sometimes (Ch.) fen-pie-chouo- (the iirya of the bhaviigra become arhat
pou, Vibhii~ii, 113, p. 587, 1. . without the help of the path).
Vibhajyaviidin has Tsan-fo-song, Praises of Vibhajyaviidin opposed to Yuktaviidin. -
the Buddha, which depart from the truth Vibhii~ii, 9, p. 43, 1: "[In the Jiiiiriapra-
(Lokottara tendency), Vibhii~ii, sthiina] who asks and poses the objections,
79, p. 410, 2; he has the dr~(iintas like the who answers and explains? According to.
Diir~tiintika. some, the Vibhajyaviidin asks and objects,
Vibhajyaviidin in Ko§a, see F lvii-lviii. - the Yuktaviidin (Ch. ing-li-luen) answers
Add: life and heat, Kosa, ii, 215 (Vibhii.~ii, and explains; according to others, the
151, p. 771, 1); pure thought, vi, 299 master and the disciple; according to a
(27, p. 140);jfiiina and kusalatva, ix, 248 third group, the author answers to
and iv, 33 (144, p. 741, 1). -As for the himself... ".~ Vibhii~ii, 83, p. 431:_The
Vibhajyaviidin of the Vibhii.~ii, Vibhajyaviidin (or unorthodox) affirms the
112, p. 587, Hiuan-tsang substitutes the existence of rupa in iirupya; the Yukta-
Diir~tiintika, Kosa, iv, 136. viidin (orthodox) refutes (Kosa, viii, 135,
it is said wrongly that the Vibhii~ii names
Vibhajyaviidin in Vasubandhu, nature of the Mahiisiirp.ghikas). - See Yuktaviidin.
the Buddha, beginning: "The pr(hagjanas
and the iiryas have their root in emptiness, Vibh~ii., cited in Vyiikhyii ad i, 34, 39;
exit from emptiness; emptiness is the Bhii~ya, i, 85; Vyii. ad iii, 74; Bhii~ya,
nature of the Buddha; the nature of the iv, 142 (controversy); viii, 165, 188 (The
Buddha is the great Nirvii1_1a". text in the note is Vibhii~ii., 163, p. 824c
and 105, p. 543c).
Vibhajyaviidin in Vibh~ii, 2, p. 7, 3 (the
five indriyas are pure); 19, p. 90, 3 (five Contested opinion, vi, 198.
sarvatragas, with a sloka -stating this Etymology, viii, 222 Add.
doctrine); 27, p. 138, 2 (expulsion of Vibh~ii, on the scriptures, 82, p. 422, 3,
abhavatm1ii); 30, p. 154, 2 (buddhakiiya- S. Levi, Bulletin, iv, 558; on languages,
bala); 31, p. 161, 1 (the three nirodhas are 79, p. 719, 1, S. Levi, Bulletin, v, 286; on
unconditioned); 33, p. 169 (nirvii~a saik~a ? Harm, etc., N. Peri, Bulletin, x~ii, 3, 32-
discussion with Yuktaviidin); 38, p. 198, 1 34.
(the lak~a~as are unconditioned);
50, p. 280, 2 (sflavrata and vicikitsii); Vibhii.1,1ii and Prajiiii.pii.t:amitii.§ii.stra, Peri,
59, p. 306, 2 (theory of sal'flgraha, con- Hiirft~ (or Niigiirjuna is "ahead" of the
demned in Kosa, i, 33); 60, p. 312, 2 Vibhii~ii,'but uses the same data).
(retrogressing from the fruits ?); Vibhii.~yii.vyii.khyii.na (Anantavarman),
65, p. 336, 3 (the fruits are only uncondi- ii, 321.
tioned); 68, p. 355, 1, and 69, p. 356, 3 Vidiira (not Vidura), disciple of
(denies antariibhava); 77, p. 397, 2 (the Krakucchanda, iii, 41.
four truths); 79, p. 410 (Buddha always in
Vijfiii.nakii.ya, of Devasarman, Introduction,
equipoise); 93, p. 479, 3 (the path is
F xxxiii. - i, 6 (Vyii. 12), ii, 299, vii, 28,
unconditioned; comparison with the
ix, 229.
venerated image of a niiga); 104,
beginning (twelve viparyiisas); 113, p. 587 Vijiiii.naviida, Introduction, F xliii.
(abhidhyii, etc., are karman: doctrine Vijiiiinaviidin, i, 82, iv, 19.
contradicted by Dharmatriita, doctrine
2898 Name Index: Sutras, Books, Scholars, Schools, etc.
Vijil.aptimiitratavrtti, ix, 283. iv, 18, 43, 162; v, 21, 85; vi, 141; ix, 294.
Vi~uktyiiyatanasiitra, i, 27 (Vyii.), ii, 106, Yogiiciiracitta, Vyii. ii, 49 (ad ii, 149): asti
Vl, 149. samudaya ekabhautikas tadyatha su,l"ko
Vinaya, iii, 44, ~v, 96. - Vinayadhara in mrtpi~<J.afi I asti dvibhautikafi sa evardrafi I
conflict with Abhidharmika, iv, 83; . .. asti yavat sarvabhautikafi; ii, ,54, n. 5
compare iv, 60, vainayika. (Vyii. ii, 51).
Vinaya, five types of pa,:uJ.akas, ii, 105; Vyii. Yogiiciiras of the north, of the west, of all
ii, 3; sermon in three languages on the countries (practice of the first vimok,l"a),
four great kings, Vibhii~ii, 79, p. 410, 1. Vibhii~ii, 136, p. 704.
Vina:yacintiid_aras, viii, 222 (does not seem Y oga-iiciiryas, in agreement with the
to be a qualtfter of Sautriintikas). Diir~tiintikas on the "mixing" of the
dhyana, and on the comparisons, Vibhiisii,
Vinayamiitfkiisiitra, iv, 44. 175,p.879,3. .
Vinayavibhiillii, i, 1; authority of Kosa, Sautrantikamatena yogacaramatena va,
iv, 60 (enumeration of ten ordinations), ii, 177.
as in Dharmatriita, Abhidharmasiira,
3, p. 890, 3. Yogasena (Bhadanta), Tattvasaqigraha, 153,
denies the activity of lcyanika.
Vindhyaviisin iii, 32.
Yuktaviidin (Ch. ing-li-luen, transcribed yu-
Vinnaka (?) tfrthaka, iv, 145, 148. ta-vadin, Taisho 1546, p. 264), Vibhii~ii,
Viparitasutra, v, 22, viii, 160. 9,p.43, 1;27,p. 138,3;33,p. 169;
Vipa§yin, iv, 228. 69, p. 356; 110, p. 571, 3; see Vibhajya~
viidin.
ViruC,haka, iv, 217.
Vi§iikha, husband of Dharmadinnii, i, 6
(Vyii.); Vibhii~ii, 93, p. 479, 3.
Vi§iikhii and upavasa, Vibhii~ii, 124, p. 648
(Aiiguttara, i, 213); bhik,l"u~fDharmasenii,
150, p. 780, 3.
Vif~U, i, 3.
Vihakarman, ii, 189.
VyiiC,ayakt1a, Avadanasataka, ii, 104, Divya,
275.
Vyiidhisutra, vi, 121.
Vyiighrabodhiiyanas, vi, 298.
Vyiighrijiitaka, iv, 225.
Vyiikhyiiyukti, i, 3, Vyii. i, 7; Introduction.
Vyaiijaniisakta§rama~as (?), Vibhii~ii, 50,
p. 359, 2: "The Buddha speaks.of?
anusayas. Who knows them longer than
him? How to speak of 98 anusayas?"
y
Yamunii, iii, 147.
Ya§as, ii, 220.
Yogiiciira ·(yogacarya, yogacaracitta,
darsana, mata, mati), Introduction, F lviii.
- Kosa, i, 32, ii, 149 (Vyii. ii, 49), 154
(Vya. ii, 51), 177, 211; iii, 3-4, 53 (Vyii.);
ABOUT THE AUTHOR/TRA'NSLATORS
Vasubandhu (ca. 350-430 A.D.) was born in Puru~apura in Gandhara and is, next
to Asanga (ca. 330-405 A.D.), his half-brother, the most famous personage of the
Yogacara school.
He originally belonged to the Sravakayana school of the Sarvastivadins and had
already made a name for himself through the composition of· numerous treatises
when he was won over to the Mahayana by Asaiiga, sometime in his forties. He then
with great enthusiasm put his talents to work in the service of the Mahayana, for
which he wrote so many works that he received the name "master of a thousand
doctrinal treatises". Vasubandhu counts as the great systematizer of Buddhism
and is one of the six great ornaments-six great commentators of the Buddha's
teaching.
Even. though in the Kosa, Vasubandhu seems .to be generally partisan to the
"Hinayana--S-autraiilikas, lie too was evidently open-minded, of which fact the
Kosa is a testimony, and accordingly he did not seem to have become exclusively
.l partisan to. the tenets of any group as such-be it those of Hinayana- or Yogacara-
Sautrantika .or Sarvastivada.
Vasubandhu's personage, life and dates have been a matter of great debate in modem
Buddhist scholarship.
Hstian-tsang or Xuanzang (600-'664 A.D.), renowned for his sixteen-year pilgrimage
to India and his career as a translator of Buddhist scriptures, is one of the most
illustrious figures in the history of scholastic Chinese Buddhism.
Upon his return to China in 645, Hstian-tsang brought back with him a great number
of Sanskrit texts. In addition to his translations of the Abhidharmakosabhii~ya
(651-654), the* Nyayiinusiira (653-654), as well as the* Mahiivibhii~ii (656-659),
liiiinaprasthiina (657-660), * Abhidharmiivattira (658), Prakara,:iapiida (660) and
other important Abhidharma texts, he also translated many Mahayana scriptures,
e.g., the Yogiiciirabhiimisiistra (646-648) and Mahiiprajiiiipiiramitiisiitra (660-663),
and authored the Records of the Western Regions (646). It is through Hstian-tsang
and his chief disciple K'uei-chi that the Fa-hsiang or Yogacara School was initiated
in China; the most important book of the school being Hstian-tsang's Ch' eng wei-shi
lun (Vijiiaptimiitratiisiddhi; in 659).
Louis de La Vallee Poussin (1869-1938), born in Liege (Belgium), was an indologist
and specialist in Buddhist philosophy. Educated in Liege, Louvain, Paris (S. Levy)
and Leiden (H. Kern), he was a master in many languages, including Sanskrit, Pali,
Chinese, Tibetan, Greek, Latin, etc., and became professor at the University of Ghent
(Belgium) in 1893, a position he held until his retirement in 1929.
Hubert Durt (in Encyclopedia of Relgion) elaborates:
La Vallee Poussin dedicated all the strength of his philological genius to
his field and contributed to a reorientation of Buddhist studies toward the
languages of northern Buddhism (Sanskrit and Tibetan) and toward Buddhist
philosophy considered in its historical perspective. He produced two main types
of studies: (1) scholarly editions [of Tantric texts; Madhyamika texts; etc.] and
(2) translations with exegeses. These correspond roughly to the two periods of
his activity, that before and that after World War I.
After World War l, La Vallee Poussin, who had in the meantime mastered
the languages of the Chinese Buddhist translations, undertook the enormous
enterprise of translating and critically annotating two summae of Buddhist
scholastics: Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakosa, the masterwork of the northern
Hinayana Abhidharma school, and Hstian-tsang's Vijfiaptimatratiisiddhi, the best
compendium of the ten!;!ts of the Xogacara, or Idealist, current of the Mahayana.
For his Abhidharmakosa (1923-1931), La Vallee Poussin had to master the
huge Kashmirian Mahavibha~a, .... With his Vijfiaptimatratasiddhi: La Siddhi
de Hiuan-tsang (1928-1929), he took the lead in the study ofldealist Buddhism,
a field in which Sylvain Levi had laid the foundation and which Paul Demieville
and La Vallee Poussin's pupil Etienne Lamotte were to continue.
Besides these two main types of studies, La Vallee Poussin produced many other
writings, see our Bibliography. Sylvain Levi wrote: "His work is of unrivalled
magnitude." More modestly, La Vallee Poussin himself said: "Je suis l'homme du
Kosa."
Gelong Lodro Sangpo (Ji.irgen Balzer) - the translator - is a student of the late
Ven. Trungpa Rinpoche. Born 1952 in Germany, he received his first ordination in
•the Karma Kagyi.i Sangha in 1984, France, and then moved to Gampo Abbey,
Canada. From 1985-2002 he served as Secretary of International Kagyii Sangha
Association of Buddhist Monks and Nuns and published its magazine The Profound
Path of Peace.
He completed the traditional three year retreat in 1996 and a four year study retreat
in 2003. He also served for a few years as Acting Director of Gampo Abbey. He was
one of the co-founders of Nitartha Institute and is a senior teacher at the Vidyadhara
Institute, the monastic college of Gampo Abbey, since its inception.
His focus of study is •in the systematic traditions of Buddhist Abhidharma. In
recent years, he has translated and published - under the supervision of Prof. Ernst
Steinkellner - Erich Frauwallner's The Philosqphy of Buddhism (Motilal). At
present he is finalizing a translation of various books and articles by La Vallee
Poussin and is also engaged in the project of translating the collected writings of
Prof. Lambert Schmithausen from German into English.