TEDUTRAIN’22

#flymetedumun

NORTH
ATLANTIC
TREATY
ORGANIZATION

Nato's Indo-Pacific
Involvement
UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL
Melek Pektezel
ACADEMIC ASSISTANT
Pelin Onat

TED UNIVERSITY TRAINING

AND DEVELOPMENT
CONFERENCE 2022
Letter From the Secretary General

Most esteemed participants,

I am Yüksel Çağlar Baypınar, a sophomore student in TED University, Computer Engineering

department. It honors me to welcome you all to the second installment of the annual TEDUMUN

Training and Development Conference, TEDUTRAIN’22.

I’d like to believe that we have something of value that is truly worth passing down, and conferences

like this are our humble way of doing just that. Regrettably, as we look ahead of us, not every aspect

of life seems like rainbows and sunshine. Our country, the soil we call home, is in rapid decline of

practically every single aspect that once made it whole and just. As the youth that is meant to be the

future of this nation, it is nothing but our duty to help each other out, preparing ourselves for the

roads not yet travelled. Be that as it may, very difficult.

It was only a couple months back, when somehow someway, in a span of less than an hour, it was

decided that I would be passed down the torch of TEDUMUN Society. Because of the friends, and

the home I found for myself here, I have, and still am trying my absolute best and beyond to make

everyone proud to partake this journey with me.

I have no words to describe the kind of emotions I feel when I look back into the past and see myself

jumping on this MUN train. My dear friend Melek is one of the biggest reasons for this, as the joy

and pride of being able to bring my high school into such high academic levels is unmatched. She

is awe inspiring, with just how well she handles herself, and all the responsibilities that are placed

upon her. I’m glad to have met her, and the fact that she is here representing my high school is just

the cherry on the top. Much like Pelin, with whom I met quite recently but her passion alone was

enough for me to have her by my side. I could go on for pages here, but those pages are reserved

for a remarkable NATO experience, brought by two remarkable people

Sincerely.

Yüksel Çağlar Baypınar

Secretary-General of TEDUTRAIN’22
Letter From The Academic Team

Dearest Participants,

We are Melek Pektezel and Pelin Onat serving as the Academic Team of the North Atlantic

Treaty Organisation. We are pleased to welcome you all to the second edition of TED

University Model United Nations Training and Development Conference 2022.

In the coming decades, NATO could face systemic threats from authoritarian powers that

must be addressed with a full-scale approach on the Euro-Atlantic borders and beyond. The

challenges posed by China to Euro-Atlantic security will remain a matter of attention. The

Indo-Pacific landscape is likely to convert into a Chinese attempt to federate and increasing

militarization of the area is the main concern for the Alliance as it makes direct confrontations

with possible economic and geopolitical consequences. Thus, the Alliance needs to improve

its understanding of the entire region regarding China’s strategic influence therein.

After all, We would like to dedicate a part of this page to express our gratitude to certain

special people. First and foremost, we would like to thank Yüksel Çağlar Baypınar, The

Secretary General of this year's TEDUTRAIN, for giving us the opportunity to act as

Academic Team Members and for vesting his trust in us. His greatest support and interest

which felt us warm also motivated. We also would like to express our excitement about our

Director General Enis Şule Arısoy and the amazing Organisation Team for making

TEDUTRAIN come true. We are hoping that the committee will be able to please all who

take part in it. If you have any questions in mind please feel free to contact us via

melekpektezel@gmail.com / pelinonat88@gmail.com We look forward to meeting you all.

Take care until then!

Sincerely,

Academic Team responsible for NATO.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction To The Committee

a. The Basics Of NATO

b. Historical Background Of NATO

II. Working Structure Of NATO

a. Organisational Structure

b. Marritime Capabilities

III. Introduction to Agenda Item: Nato's Indo-Pacific Involvement With

Regard to the 2022 Strategic Concept

a. The Term Indo-Pacific

b. Past actions And Background Information Regarding Indo-Pacific

IV. Indo-Pacific from The Percpective Of NATO

a. Relation Between Indo-Pacific And NATO

b. Indo-Pacific Vison with Regard To The 2022 Strategic Concept

V. Situation Of Partners In Indo-Pacific And Fostering Closer Relations

VI. NATO And People’s Republic Of China

VII. Conclusion

VIII. Further Readings

IX. Questions To Be Addressed

X. References
 I. Introduction To The Committee

A. The Basics of NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO for short) is an intergovernmental political and

military alliance between 30 member states, 27 of which are in Europe, 2 in North America,

and 1 in Asia. NATO’s main purpose is to create a collective defence system, guarantee the

freedom and security of the North Atlantic Region, consultation and cooperation in which its

member states agree to mutual defence in response to an attack by any external party.1

Figure 1: Official Flag of NATO approved in 1953.2

B. Historical Background of NATO

After World War II in 1945, The Soviet Union’s unified military domination, especially in

Eastern Europe, increased the sense of vulnerability and spread communist regimes which led

to a joint decision to take the necessary steps. Western European nations began to see the

invasions of the Soviets as a security threat as their main importance is to preserve liberal and

democratic values. Those issues involved a discussion about how to erase the security threat

and manage the tension in the region. The United States’ political and military existence was

an ally to these nations and an antagonist to the Soviets.3 This unity made the United States also

a part of those discussions and forming a collective defence alliance for both political and
military purposes became a must to enhance security. The process continued with the North

Atlantic Treaty4 signed in Washington D.C. (also known as Washington Treaty) in 1949 by 12

members: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,

Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. This treaty was a

sign of commitment to the partnership to enhance political and military cooperation. With the

aim of succeeding in those missions, establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

and the North Atlantic Council was decided to create a joint military structure.

Figure 2: Singing of the North Atlantic Treaty.5

NATO undertook significant missions during the Cold War such as ensuring the sustainability

and guarantee of the USA’s political existence, pacifying the states concerned about the

prospect of Germany’s strengthening or helping develop the economic will of European

countries that collapsed during World War 2.6 These missions led NATO to specify its order of

businesses in three main subtitles:7

● Deterring Soviet expansionism,

● Encouraging European political integration

 ● Deterring the revival of nationalist militarism in Europe through a strong

North American presence on the continent,8

Even though the military integration of NATO, essentially the adaptation of "Massive

Retaliation” (which says if the Soviet Union attacked NATO would respond with nuclear

weapons) prevented any armed attack from the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War times, it

was not yet a military organization that was supported within a law framework. 9 The NATO

framework started to shape itself after their diplomatic companies with the Warsaw Pact

countries representing the Eastern block while NATO and member states represented the

Western bloc in the 1960s.10 This resulted in admitting four new member states bringing the

number of member states to 16: Greece, Türkiye, Germany and Spain.

Figure 3: Territorial distinctions of the time.11

By the mid-1980s, Soviet Communism had lost the intellectual battle with the West due to the

elimination of dissidents' support for the Communist regimes. This resulted in the dissolution

of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union in 1919.12 The next existential step for NATO was to
figure out if there is any further need for an Atlantic Alliance when there is no specific adversary

and the other purposes that the alliance could serve. Then, NATO began to plot its way for the

sake of the two unfinished goals that remained behind: To deter the rise of militant nationalism

and to encourage democratization and political integration in Europe. In 1991, NATO was a

milestone for a larger, joint European security architecture for maintaining security and political

stability. Current member states of the time established the North Atlantic Cooperation Council

which was renamed the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997. 13 Cooperation also

extended beyond Europe southward to deter nationalist militarism and fight terrorism which

caused security threats directed at NATO. The Mediterranean Dialogue with non-member

Mediterranean countries was founded by the Alliance.14 Mechanisms for partnership had to be

strengthened in a way that would call non-NATO countries for a cooperation with the Alliance

to reform democratic and military institutions. Being a part of these, Allies created the

Partnership for Peace programme which allowed non-NATO member Partners to share

information with NATO Allies and help modernize their military and political will in line with

democratic standards.15 Partners are encouraged to choose their own level of involvement with

the Alliance and the membership chance would remain open. The process resulted at the 1999

Washington Summit when three Partners (Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary) gained

their seats as member states. The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks (also known as 9/11

attacks) on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were a certain indicator of one thing only:

political disorder in even distant parts could have terrible consequences at home. Afterwards,

NATO continued accepting new members and building new partnerships. The NATO-Russia

Council was established in 2002 as a tool integrating member states and Russia aiming to work

equally to provide Middle Eastern nations with security cooperation. In 2004, the Istanbul

Cooperation Initiative was launched to offer security cooperation to countries of the Middle

East region. Finally, rounds of enlargement brought more member states: Romania, Bulgaria,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, Croatia, Albania, Montenegro, and North

Macedonia.16 With the words of the NATO Secretary General, "We continue our commitment

to NATO's open door policy. Today we have invited Finland and Sweden to become NATO

members," Finland and Sweden were formally invited to become members at the NATO

summit in 2022. 17

Figure 3: Enlargement of NATO over the years.18

NATO is determined to safeguard the freedom and security of allies. Its key purpose and

greatest responsibility are to ensure our collective defence, against all threats, from all

directions. The transatlantic bond between NATO nations is indispensable to ensure security.

They are bound together by common values: individual liberty, human rights, democracy, and

the rule of law. They remain firmly committed to the purposes and principles of the Charter of

the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty.

 II. Working Structure of NATO

A. Organizational Structure

NATO's organizational structure is based on formulation and execution. The military branch of

the centuries is generated by the system. It places a strong emphasis on worldwide equilibrium,

risk analysis, providing consistent focus and development of collaboration as the first order of

the businesses. As a result, NATO became a content version of a hierarchical system of organs

working on specific fields according to their interests. The smooth operation of this system has

achieved success thanks to these organs’ great interaction both internally and with each other.

Only the relevant organs will be described throughout this booklet. The North Atlantic

Council (NAC) is the only body that has the authority from the Washington Treaty itself as the

only NATO organ founded by the Treaty (Article 9) and the only body that has the authority to

set up subsidiary bodies in accordance with the purposes of NATO. It serves as a superior to all

other NATO committees and units. NAC is the main principal political decision-making

mechanism of NATO in order to discuss issues that have the potential of affecting all members

of the alliance.19 Decided matters in North Atlantic Council reflect the consensus (each one of

the 30 members must give consent) of member countries since decision-making is based on

common ground. Decisions taken at meetings of the Council cover all aspects of the Alliance

activities and express the collective will of all. Every member state of NATO has a national

delegation at the NAC represented by “Permanent Representatives” (or “Ambassadors”), at the

level of foreign and defence ministers, and at the level of heads of state and government. The

NAC regularly gathers at three different levels (permanent representatives, foreign or defence

ministers, heads of state and government) and decisions have the same status and validity at

whatever level it meets. These decisions are based on the advice originating from its

subordinate committees. The only body that has comparable authority to the NAC (not

subordinated by the NAC) is the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), but only for matters within
its specific area of competence.20 The NPG engages with nuclear matters in the alliance and

improvement of the nuclear strategy covering shared concerns like nuclear proliferation and

armament control. The civil servant in NATO who is in charge of directing consultation and

decision-making process is the Secretary-General. They serve as the spokesperson for NATO,

chair of all key decision-making bodies (including the NAC), direct the process of reaching an

agreement within NATO, and lead the International Staff, a civilian NATO organization tasked

with guiding the national delegations at NATO Headquarters. Jens Stoltenberg is the Secretary-

General of NATO since 2014.21 The Military Committee is at the top of the detailed military

structure of NATO and is subordinated to NAC.22 It is an essential link between the political

decision-making process and the military command structure, having a key role in the

development of NATO’s military policy and implementation of decisions regarding operations

and missions of NATO. It meets at the level of national Military Representatives or Chiefs of

defence having the main function of providing NAC and NPC consensus based advice on

military policy and strategy. To achieve this, the Military Committee holds the NATO

Command Structure (NCS). One of those commands is the Allied Command Operations

(ACO).23 ACO operates at three levels: strategic, tactical, and operational. It is responsible for

the planning and execution of all NATO military operations and is led by the Supreme Allied

Commander Europe (SACEUR) headquartered in Belgium. The other one of those

commands is the Allied Command Transformation (ACT).24 It is responsible for developing

concepts that describe new ways of dealing with emerging challenges and seeking to meet

today’s and tomorrow’s capability requirements by promoting interoperability. ACT is headed

by Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) headquartered in the United

States. ACT also directs various subordinate joint commands in its fields of interest. During

operations, member states contribute military forces on a voluntary basis under the authority of

the SACEUR, to be included in the structure known as the NATO Force Structure (NFS).25
This means that NATO does not have permanent forces on its own despite having a military

command structure.

Figure 4: Working structure of NATO26

B. Maritime Capabilities

Maritime security is seen as the key to peace and prosperity in NATO. Strengthening

situational awareness to deter and defend against all threats in the maritime domain, uphold

freedom of navigation, secure maritime trade routes and protect lines of communications are

going to be the first order of the business. There are three functions to the Alliance naval forces

assigned Alliance Maritime Posture of NATO:

● Strategic function for deterring adversaries and expressing the intent of NATO

to operate.

● Warfighting functions for providing defence and establishing sea control

 during wartime to contribute to operations.

● Security function: The maintenance of a safe and secure maritime

environment

NATO has been organizing maritime and joint exercises with the aim of improving maritime

capabilities which focus on various elements such as warfare and defence capacity, the

protection of sea lines communication and many more.27 Standing Naval Forces (SNF), which

are part of NATO Response Force, provide continuous naval presence and perform the

functions mentioned in three functions above. Two of those major SNF bodies are Standing

NATO Countermeasures Groups (SNMCMG), which are participating in search and

explosive ordnance disposal operations, and Standing NATO Maritime Groups perform in

different fields from exercises to operational tasks.28

III. Introduction to Agenda Item: Nato's Indo-Pacific Involvement With Regard to the

2022 Strategic Concept

A. The Term Indo-Pacific

The new geographical term "Indo-Pacific" has become a widely used regional phrase in recent

years. Since 2010, the concept of “Indo-Pacific” has gained increasing prevalence in the

geopolitical and strategic discourse, and is now being used worldwide by policy makers,

analysts, and academics. The term “Indo-Pacific” combines the Indian and the Pacific oceans

into a singular regional construct. However, the two regions are vastly dissimilar in the geo-

economics that shape such geopolitics, and even in terms of security environment.29 Through

the translation of the Indo-Pacific concept into Indo-Pacific strategies adopted by some notable

actors, a new theatre of global interaction is taking shape. As more stakeholders gather behind

the radical idea, variety is brewing, both in terms of geographic reach and the possible

groupings under the concept's banner. To establish their own defined region, these actors have
defined the "Indo-Pacific” region's geographical boundaries. The increasing economic and

political clout of developing players in the Indo-Pacific region suggests that the geostrategic

power shift toward the East and South will certainly continue.30 The Indo-Pacific is important

for the North Atlantic Alliance, given that developments in that region can directly affect Euro-

Atlantic security. Therefore, the evolution of the international security system will require the

Alliance to adopt a global outlook and approach. In this region, it would mean that NATO might

be challenged to define its own common view of the Indo-Pacific.

Figure 5: Geography of the Indo-Pacific Region31

B. Past Actions And Background Information Regarding Indo-Pacific

The Indo-Pacific region, as defined by geography, is the vast territory that includes the Indian

Ocean, the western Pacific Ocean, and the portion of South-West Asia that connects them all.

Years of increasing interconnection in this region -especially in trade and finance, but also in
diplomacy and security- led to the emergence of the name "Indo-Pacific.”.32 The trigger for the

“Indo-Pacific” coinage was China’s increasing politico-military assertiveness and the ensuing

enunciation of China’s String of Pearls strategy in 2005 by a United States think-tank. China

used the "String of Pearls" strategy for building military network facilities across numerous

nations.33 China has used this tactic to safeguard its trade interests because a sizable portion of

its trade goes through the Indian Ocean and other choke points as a part of programs like the

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) -Pakistan here is being the traditional enemy of

India- and other elements of China's One Belt and One Road Initiative (BRI), which is a

mega strategic attempt project China designed to physically connect Asia, Europe, the Middle

East, and Africa through its logistics and transport networks, with roads, ports, railway tracks,

pipelines, airports, transnational electric grids, and even fiber-optic lines to be deeply utilized

This theory was a threat to both India's and the region countries' national security. 34 Such a

structure would encircle India, endangering its ability to project power, conduct trade, and

possibly even maintain its geographical integrity. These developments led to anxieties in many

regional countries, including India and Japan. The “Indo-Pacific” idea was an opportunity to

showcase the Indian Navy’s capability to moderate China’s behaviour, thereby dissuading its

future aggressiveness. Additionally, the Indo-Pacific area is home to half of the world's

population, with China and India making up close to a third of that total. Over the past twenty

years, the Indo-Pacific area has seen rapid urbanization and economic growth, making it the

world's newest centre of trade and commerce. The world's top three economies, respectively,

are the United States, China, and Japan, with India and South Korea rounding out the top ten

list of the greatest GDPs worldwide. The growth in Indonesia and elsewhere in the region could

see the emergence of more economic giants in the Indo-Pacific. Also, this region is naturally at

the crossroads of trade routes and some of its waterways are strategically important worldwide.

But today, a strategic change results from China's rise, increasing assertiveness, and
increasingly competitive relationship with the United States. These conflicts involve both

member and non-member actors, and they all constitute destabilizing factors in the region. The

geopolitical relationship between the Indian Ocean and the western Pacific had become more

obvious by the turn of the twenty-first century, both in regard to geoeconomics and security.

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), led by the United States and launched in 2004 to

combat the proliferation of Weapons Of Mass Destruction (WMD) carried by ships and

concentrating on the maritime swath extending from West Asia to Northeast Asia, is the best

illustration of the security dimension.35 China was publicly mentioned first in the declaration

of the London Summit in December 2019 and again at the Brussels summits in June 2021 and

March 2022. 36 Meantime, NATO has considerably expanded cooperation with Asia-Pacific

partners such as Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and New Zealand. Today, China is

widely feared and criticized for its increasingly authoritarian domestic policies. In 2008, China

was seen as working towards opening up and embracing the rules-based global order.

International condemnation of the minority Uighur Muslim group's mistreatment has been

expressed. Additionally, China is violating fundamental rights that were earlier protected by

Hong Kong legislation and has significantly hampered people's and businesses ability to

exercise their right to free enterprise. Another key centre of tension is the complex relationship

between China and the island of Taiwan. The risk of incidents and escalation has increased in

recent months and years, especially after the crackdown of China on Hong Kong's bid for

autonomy in 2019 and 2020. This tension has been manifested in escalatory statements by

senior military officials from China, and increasing incursions into Taiwan's air defence

identification zone. Tensions escalated to a dangerous level when China planned extensive live-

fire drills surrounding the island of Taiwan, including allegedly firing missiles over the island,

following the arrival of the Speaker of the US House of Representatives to Taipei in the summer

of 2022.37 While the primary sources of tension are Beijing's attitudes, China, the US, and the
Taipei authorities continue to calibrate their activities in the region in order to prevent a full-

scale conflict. China is surely keeping a close eye on the unified and determined response to

Russia's aggression against Ukraine. The dispute over the Senkaku Islands in the East China

Sea between China and Japan is linked to another regional flashpoint. In 10 years since Japan

acquired these islands from a private owner in 2012, Tokyo has registered 332 cases of Chinese

vessels entering waters around the islands. Economically, China has been pursuing its flagship

BRI since 2013, where it has already invested in over 100 countries including the United States

and other Allies. While the partners of China benefit from the BRI, it is increasingly seen as a

tool for China to advance its geopolitical objectives, gather intelligence, stifle criticism of the

nation in the relevant regions, and establish dependent ties through "debt-trap diplomacy."

Beijing continues to create a close, "no limits," partnership with the aggressor state Russia on

the political, economic, and military fronts.38 Notably, Putin ordered the invasion of Ukraine

weeks after releasing a joint statement with Xi Jinping. The Russian version of events has been

broadcast by Chinese media, and China also refused to condemn Moscow's actions. The

People's Liberation Army (PLA) also took part in the massive Vostok military drills held in

August 2022. 39 China and Russia are not formally or completely aligned, despite Beijing's

decision to abstain rather than exercise its veto during the UN voting on the resolution

condemning Russia. China's increasingly hardline domestic and foreign policies have damaged

the country's reputation worldwide and caused reactions from actors both inside and beyond the

region. Japan has traditionally been the closest ally of China's immediate neighbours in

advancing the idea of a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP),40 a cooperative and inclusive

vision based on complying with a maritime order governed by rules, and in which the

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 41 plays a key role. Japan has also

significantly increased its trilateral and bilateral ties with the US, Australia, as well as its

involvement in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad), which also includes India. In
order to strengthen the Quad and broaden its focus to include new challenges that can attract

further partners, Japan is eager to consolidate the Quad. The dispute over the Senkaku Islands,

the recent increase in Chinese aircraft interceptions close Japanese airspace, Tokyo's signals

that it is prepared to support the people of Taiwan. The Republic of Korea (ROK) has been

avoiding open confrontations with Beijing because of its vulnerable geopolitical position. With

a focus on uncontroversial issues and an increase in soft power, the "New South Policy" (NSP)

of former ROK Prime Minister Moon Jae-In aimed to reprioritise ties with ASEAN and India

in order to diversify its relationships abroad. 42 China’s assertiveness has become a major

concern for Australia and its foreign policy, most notably since the diplomatic spat and trade

war that Australian authorities were drawn into. Canberra and Beijing differ significantly in

their approaches to pacific partnerships with island countries, where Australia still seeks to be

the preferred partner despite China's rise in the region. Australian diplomacy actively pursues

a range of bilateral and multilateral cooperation 43 agreements with key partners, including

members of the "Five Eyes Alliance"44 (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom,

and the United States), Japan, Indonesia, India, and the ROK, while refraining from directly

challenging Beijing. New Zealand has been less active than Australia in forming coalitions to

balance China due to its size and less strategic location, but certain evolutions in the

government's strategy have also been noted. India serves as a natural counterweight on China

in the Indo-Pacific region. The two regional giants have traditionally avoided direct

confrontation, but recently their relationships have become tense. India is concerned about the

strategic partnership between China and Pakistan as well as the expanding connections between

China and its closest neighbors, Bangladesh, the Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. 45 Although

these governments have always seen India's position as dominating, some think they would

gain from working with Beijing because they want to have a greater say in the regional decision-

making processes. With the 2020 border incident in eastern Ladakh, which resulted in multiple
deaths, tensions between India and China reached their peak. Due to their geostrategic

significance, ASEAN member states in Southeast Asia hold a key position in the Indo-Pacific

concept. The FOIP concept essentially has to do with the secure operation of crowded marine

routes in Southeast Asia. By utilizing the region's crucial strategic relevance, the organization

has pushed to assume a larger role in the area. In this context, the "ASEAN Outlook on the

Indo-Pacific" (AOIP) proclamation in 2019 was a crucial beginning point.46 Indonesia and

Malaysia were relatively open in expressing their reticence, while Singapore, the Philippines

and to a lesser extent Vietnam, view this new partnership rather favourably. However, there are

still worries that the presence of Australian nuclear-powered submarines in the South China

Sea may spark an arms race. The Pacific islands have also grown a strategic significance. China,

which is now the second-largest donor after Australia, views these islands as a crucial part of

the BRI and has significantly increased its financial and political ties with numerous island

countries over the past 10 years. As seen by the signing of a defence deal with the Solomon

Islands in April 2022, China is already starting to convert its economic clout to have influence

in the area of security. The Solomon Islands are strategically situated close to New Zealand and

Australia. Additionally, Australia and the United States are also intensifying their economic

and diplomatic outreach to the Pacific islands. The US administration seeks to triple funding

for economic development in the region and is developing its first Pacific Island strategy.47 The

Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) continues to be a flashpoint in regional

geopolitics due to its nuclear and conventional threats since under extremely severe

international sanctions since the 1990s, DPRK's strategy of nuclear tests and missile launches

cannot be ignored by the Allies. North Korea's economy has been devastated by the COVID-

19 pandemic, but Kim Jong-Un is still using nuclear blackmail to obtain sanctions. In 2021–

2022, these tests became more frequent and reportedly involved the launch of longer-range and

submarine-launched ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and even hypersonic missiles. Various
other non-state tensions also contribute to destabilise the region. The Indo-Pacific region, home

to the world’s largest Muslim countries (Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Malaysia and Bangladesh),

has not been spared from Islamic fundamentalist or right-wing terrorism, even on its southern

(Australia, New Zealand) and western (Somalia and Mozambique) shores. 48 Coming to Euro-

Atlantic partners, at the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2018, French and British defence Ministers

declared their intention to sail warships through the South China Sea to challenge China‘s

military expansion. In addition, the United Kingdom conducted its first joint exercise with the

US in the South China Sea in 2019. 49 In 2020, the German government released policy

guidelines for the Indo-Pacific region, and Germany has thereupon expanded its engagement in

the region already. 50 In November 2020, the Netherlands released its first Indo-Pacific

strategy.51 It should also be noted that the European Union (EU) released its official Indo-

Pacific Strategy in September 2021.52 Last but not least, climate change also have an impact on

this area and has the potential to trigger major environmental crises with serious humanitarian

and security consequences.

 Figure 6: The Indo-Pacific: International Engagement and Trade Axis53

IV. Indo-Pacific From The Perspective Of NATO

A. Relation Between Indo-Pacific and NATO

In the decades that follow, NATO could be subject to systemic dangers from authoritarian states

that require a comprehensive strategy to be addressed on the Euro-Atlantic borders and beyond.

Attention will continue to be paid to threats of China to the security of the Euro-Atlantic region.

The Indo-Pacific region is expected to become the scene of a Chinese effort to federate or

maybe restrain split countries through economic, political, cultural and military revers,

endangering the rule of law, international order, maritime and territorial integrity. The region

is dominated by the systemic competition between the United States and China which is

increasingly global in nature. 54 The alliance’s principal concern is the region’s growing

militarization as it engages in direct combat with potential geopolitical and economic

repercussions. The alliance must therefore increase its knowledge of the entire region, strategic

influence of China, and the numerous dynamics at work. That should also be noted that NATO

does not have certain regulations allow to officially operate in the Indo-Pacific, yet its political

and diplomatic interests in the region are broad.

B. Indo-Pacific Vision With Regard To the 2022 Strategic Concept

The political environment and security threats to NATO are constantly changing. Those require

flexibility always to remain a central concept for NATO since the Alliance needs to adapt itself

to those changes and formulate policies accordingly with the aim of fulfilling its mission

successfully in the long term. In order to achieve those, NATO expresses its vision by adopting
strategic concepts which are documents setting a guideline for the political and military stance

of the Alliance.55 The Strategic Concepts describe changes in the global security environment

and how NATO is going to respond. After the NATO Strategic Concept of “Active

Engagement, Modern defence” was adopted at the 2010 Lisbon Summit, three core tasks of

NATO were formulated: collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security. 56

Because of the emerging changes since then, In 2020, a group of experts gathered to make

recommendations about policies of NATO in the upcoming decade, leading to the creation of a

brand-new agenda introduced under the NATO 2030 Initiative, with the call of Jens

Stoltenberg.57 The agenda consists of various proposals aiming to preserve military strength,

improving political will within the Alliance and it was endorsed during the 2021 Brussels

Summit. There was a proposal among all for the development of a new strategic concept

formulated according to the updated vision of NATO. As a result, the 2022 Strategic Concept

was endorsed at the 2022 Madrid Summit.58

The present Indo-Pacific relations are dynamic and open to change, and the 2022 Strategic

Concept recognizes the complexity of these interrelated problems. Increased Alliance

awareness in the Indo-Pacific is necessary due to demographic trends, technological

developments, climate change transitions to a green sustainable economy, safety and security

concerns, and commercial interests. Therefore, NATO will be challenged to respond with a

global approach, as China grows increasingly assertive and the transatlantic landscape is

impacted and infected by the opportunities as well as by the challenges emanating from this

strategic region. At the same time, the Indo-Pacific region is much more than just China.

Political, human, technological, economic and environmental themes, as well as their military

implications, will continue to shape the present and the future of this vast area.
 V. Situation Of Partners In Indo-Pacific And Fostering Closer Relations

NATO’s increased interest in these partnerships was reflected in the 2010 Strategic Concept

and the revision of NATO partnership policy. NATO is the only transatlantic platform that can

be used for consultation. All matters regarding our individual and collective security should be

coordinated and addressed. The Alliance can be strengthened based on our everlasting security,

unity, and commitment to mutual defence as stated in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty

which states “Collective defence means that an attack against one Ally is considered as an attack

against all Allies.”.59 Ability of the Alliance is to resist and protect is the foundation of that

commitment. NATO will continue to fulfil three core tasks: deterrence and defence, crisis

prevention and management, and cooperative security. These are complementary to ensure the

collective defence and security of allies.

While the serious threats currently facing the Alliance’s immediate environment motivate

Allies to focus on their own backyard, NATO, reflecting the growing convergence of interests

with Asia Pacific countries, continues to work on a shared understanding of the Indo-Pacific

region and to upgrade engagement with like-minded partners there. The Russian invasion of

Ukraine in 2014 gave international cooperation a further boost by motivating nations like

Australia to actively cooperate with NATO. Contacts with like-minded "Partners across the

Globe" have been further upgraded since around 2018 when the issue of a rising China started

to gain traction in NATO circles. Partners from the Asia Pacific region have been meeting often

at the ambassadorial level using the "NAC+4" format of the North Atlantic Council (NAC).

Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the ROK have taken part in multiple NATO Ministerials

since December 2020, where the consequences of China's rise have been considered. The

security situation on the Korean Peninsula as well as marine security has been discussed in

recent NAC+4 meetings.60 In June 2022, Asia Pacific partners attended the Madrid Summit at

the level of heads of state and government. NATO and its Asia-Pacific partners can better
understand each other's situational awareness of security developments in the Euro-Atlantic and

Asia-Pacific regions through political interaction. 61 The Asia-Pacific allies provide unique

perspectives to NATO policy debates on issues like cyber defence, maritime capabilities and

climate change. NATO Allies the US, the UK and France have not always been able to

coordinate their Indo-Pacific policies. The vision of the United States about the region is based

on pursuing in concert their our allies and partners as well as with regional institutions with five

objectives in the Indo-Pacific: Advancing a free and open Indo-Pacific, building connections

within and beyond the region, driving regional property, bolstering Indo-Pacific security,

building regional resilience to transnational threats.62 France and Australia signed a partnership

agreement in January 2012, establishing close cooperation between the two nations in many

areas, particularly in security and defence. The unexpected announcement of the formation of

the Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) bloc in September 2021 revealed the carefully kept secret of

its three participants, even if they were France's allies and partners, and invalidated this Franco-

Australian strategic alliance. The announcement's timing, which took place with the release of

the EU's Indo-Pacific strategy, the lack of preliminary consultations, and the opinion of the

public all led to a diplomatic crisis between ally nations and a public outcry in Paris and

Brussels. Franco-American relations resumed following Washington's recognition that the

Allies concerned had not been adequately consulted and reaffirmation of the strategic

importance of French and European engagement in the Indo-Pacific region. Among Global

Partners, Australia has the most substantial record of cooperation with NATO. Australia and

NATO agreed to strengthen their cooperation by signing a political declaration in June 2012.

After two years, it became the only partner in the Indo-Pacific to be granted the status of

"Enhanced Opportunities Partner," which allows the nation to participate in the early stages of

operational planning for missions led by NATO.63 Australia has also been one of the most

significant non-Alliance contributors, and this status also makes it possible to engage in
additional privileged types of collaboration and greater political discussion. Japan also has an

ambitious cooperation agenda with NATO. The organisation’s contacts with Japan (joint

seminars and high-level consultations) predate the Partnership for Peace program. Japan’s main

objectives in this partnership were to provide informed perceptions on East Asia’s security

environment, which Tokyo felt was not adequately understood by Europeans, as well as raise

regional issues including Chinese military build-up and North Korean missile tests to the

international level. Following the signing of a joint political declaration, Japan and NATO

agreed to an Individual Partnership and Cooperation Program in 2014. The ROK's complex

geopolitical situation makes NATO's engagement with the country more sensitive. Yet, no joint

declaration has been approved. Nevertheless, the ROK, which has one of the most powerful

armies in the world, and NATO cooperate closely together in practice through the Individual

Partnership Cooperation Programme. Being the smallest of the Asia Pacific partner, New

Zealand has been historically pursuing a “hedging foreign policy” strategy, trying to avoid zero-

sum games and supporting multilateralism, while maintaining an alignment with the US

security apparatus. New Zealand has more restrained cooperation with NATO. The country has

not yet signed a joint political declaration with NATO. Aside from the aforementioned

countries, a notable NATO Global Partner in the region is Mongolia. It is situated in a

challenging area and is highly susceptible to the recent turbulence in international relations.

Mongolia pursues a “third neighbour” policy, which seeks to diplomatically balance its reliance

on Russia and China and increase relations with western countries, and, by extension, NATO.64

NATO’s partnership with Pakistan is largely centred on two themes: civil preparedness and

disaster response on the one hand; and the stabilisation of Afghanistan on the other.65 Pakistan

has been reconsidering its geopolitical strategy in recent years, but it established strong ties

with both Russia and China more recently. The list of NATO’s partnerships in the Indo-Pacific

region would be missing without relations with Afghanistan, which ended in August 2021 in
chaos. The Taliban regime created a challenge that Euro-Atlantic policymakers cannot afford

to ignore, even though subsequent global events have shifted attention from the developments

in Afghanistan. The impending humanitarian and economic meltdown of the country as well as

the presence of extremist groups on its territory present a threat. Focused on an inclusive and

broad-based approach, it recommits the EU’s political and maritime role to the region and

enhances its capacity in expanding security and defence dialogue to include more partners in

the region and the potential for enhanced NATO-EU cooperation.

Figure 7: Geography of the Indo-Pacific Region66

VI. NATO And The People's Republic OF China

China did not directly pose a danger to Allied security interests before the late 2010s, and this

was owing in part to the lack of agreement among the Allies over China's rise. The 2010

Strategic Concept made no mention of China at all. However, in recent years, NATO made

great progress in thinking about China and coming to an understanding of the specific challenge

that the country poses to the Alliance. 67 As expressed by NATO Secretary General Jens

Stoltenberg, this happened not because NATO developed an appetite for presence in the Indo-

Pacific, but because China came closer to NATO both in the physical (military and economic)

domain and in cyberspace.68 NATO is concerned about China's non-transparent investments in

European infrastructure, the advancement of its long-range nuclear capacity, its misinformation

operations, and its efforts to impose unfavourable international standards. China was described

as a "destabilizing factor" that poses "systemic threats to the rules-based international order and

to areas vital to Alliance security" in the communiqué from the NATO Summit of 2021. 69

NATO is currently more concerned with what to do about China than with China. Jens

Stoltenberg explicitly stated that the opportunity to engage in missions in the Indo-Pacific

region under the NATO banner was not on the agenda. The possibility of participating in

missions in the Indo-Pacific under the NATO banner was not on the menu, according to Jens

Stoltenberg. The Alliance is establishing resilience criteria for the strategic infrastructures of

its members, including ports and cyber facilities. In order to counter Chinese actions, it is also

modifying or plans to adjust its policy in areas including space and cyberspace, hybrid tactics,

and artificial intelligence. NATO encourages its members to take precautions to make sure that

Chinese investments do not prevent the Alliance's ability to use any other crucial infrastructure

in the case of a crisis.

VII. Conclusion

With the assertiveness of China growing day by day and having caused an obvious full-scale

invasion, NATO allies need to adjust their existing policies regarding the agenda item: Nato's

Indo-Pacific Involvement With Regard to the 2022 Strategic Concept. While addressing that

extensive agenda and formulating relevant policies, delegates need to primarily focus on the

overall benefits for the Alliance itself Although, they also need to consider the recent

developments coming from partner countries. While conducting their studies, that should also

be noted that NATO does not have specific policies shaping the action plan of member countries

regarding the Info-Pacific region. Besides, Alliance’s mind is clear about their vision which is

clearly stated in both the 2022 Strategic Concept and Meeting of NATO Ministers of Foreign

Affairs. Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg also expressed the fundamental idea of the

upcoming steps in words of him stating “We do not see China as an adversary. We will continue

to engage with China when it is in our interests. Not least to convey our united position on

Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine.”.70 The Indo-Pacific’s future depends on the choices we make

now. The decisive decade before us will determine if the region can confront and address

climate change, reveal how the world rebuilds from a once-in-a-century pandemic, and decide

whether we can sustain the principles of openness, transparency, and inclusivity that have

fueled the region’s success. If we, together with our partners, can reinforce the region for 21st

century challenges and seize its opportunities, the Indo-Pacific will thrive, bolstering NATO

and the world. In line with these common points, representatives should prepare the legal basis

for the military operations of NATO in the Indo-Pacific region by producing creative long-term

policies in the light of rationality, and realism, not hesitating to try the untested. Also, that

should be certainly noted that this guide is only meant to provide a general overview of NATO’s

past and present attitude regarding the Indo-Pacific region, as it is not possible to cover

everything related to such complicated agendas in a document of this length. That is why the
 representatives are strongly encouraged to refer to the “questions to be addressed” part to further

brainstorm about their path and conduct their own research in order to have a clear sight of their

country's stances.

VIII. Further Readings

• North Atlantic Treaty:

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm

• 10 things you need to know about NATO:

https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160627_1607-

10things-eng.pdf

• Understanding NATO: https://www.nato.int/docu/presskit/010219/004gb.pdf

• NATO 2030 Initative:

https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2021/6/pdf/2106-factsheet-

nato2030-en.pdf

• NATO’s Warfighting Capstone Concept:

https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/07/09/natos-warfighting-capstone-

concept-anticipating-the-changing-character-of-war/index.html

• Strategic Foresight Regional Perspectives Report on the Indo-Pacific:

https://www.act.nato.int/application/files/1616/6118/3976/regional-perspectives-2022-

07-v2.pdf

• Partnership Tools: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_80925.htm

• Fee And Open Indo-Pacific Vision:

https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Free-and-Open-Indo-Pacific-

4Nov2019.pdf
IX. Questions to be Addressed

● How can NATO base its Indo-Pacific vision in the 2022 Strategic Concept on legal

policies, with the aim of being able to fully operate in the region?

● How should NATO respond to discussions about preserving the independence of the

Indo-Pacific region or being controlled under one administration?

● In which areas does NATO possess adequate or inadequate policies regarding

investments in the Indo-Pacific region?

● What steps can be taken to finalize friendly/hostile relations of NATO with China?

● What kind of problems can NATO face in the actions it will take to ensure peace in the

Indo-Pacific region, and can there be future new partners it will need?

● To what extent is it possible to deter and defend from NATO adversaries by supporting

NATO partners in Indo-Pacific?

● Will there be any military support needed from NATO to respond aggression of China

in the Indo-Pacific region?

● How can multinational maritime defence planning be sustained in maintaining peace in

the region?

● Since the Indo-Pacific will face environmental and resource challenges, the growing

population, concentrating in urban areas and on the coastline will be increasingly

vulnerable to natural or human catastrophes. What kind of precautions can be taken to

ensure the safety of Indo-Pacific natives while discussions, and military operations, are

ongoing in the region?

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TEDUTRAIN’22

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