Professional Documents
Culture Documents
A Decade of Meituan-Dianping’s
Development:
What Makes a Brand Stands Out from The Crowd?1
1
This case was selected as an award-winning case study at the World Asian Business Case
Competition (WACC) 2019.
2
Guanxiu Lin is a student, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University (16096495d@connect.polyu.hk)
Shunshun Pang is a student, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University (16097531d@connect.polyu.hk)
Shuhan Wang is a student, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University (shuhan.wang@connect.polyu.hk)
Chen Te-feng is Assistant Professor, School of Accounting & Finance, The Hong Kong Polytechnic
University (tfchen@polyu.edu.hk)
Background of Meituan-Dianping
Meituan was originally two separate firms (i.e. “Meituan” and “Dianping”).
Meituan was founded in 2010 by Wang Xing in Beijing, and Dianping was
founded in 2003 by Zhang Tao in Shanghai. Both Meituan and Dianping provided
location-based services (LBS) initially, while Meituan focused on group buying
business, and Dianping mainly provided restaurant reviews services (DeGennaro,
2019). Regarding the popularity, Meituan was most well-known in second-tier and
third-tier cities in China, Dianping was more popular in first-tier cities (Perez,
2018).
After Meituan and Dianping strategically merged in 2015, Meituan-Dianping
(“Meituan”) was established as a rival to Groupon and Yelp as a one-stop e-
commerce service platform. The company’s primary business includes food
delivery, in-store hotel and travel, and new business such as hailing, shared-bicycle,
and fresh food (Meituan-Dianping, 2017). Apps such as Meituan (group
buying/coupons), Dazhong Dianping (restaurant reviewing), Meituan Waimai
(food delivery) and Maoyan (movie tickets) are offered to users for different
functions. After the merger, the company has undergone a revolutionary process of
reform, expansion, and soar.
Figure 1
Financial Performance of Meituan
90 ACADEMY OF ASIAN BUSINESS REVIEW, JUNE 2020
Figure 2
Revenue Components of Meituan
Figure 3
Active Merchant and Users Trend of Meituan
Meituan-Dianping 91
With the mission: “To help people eat better, live better”, Meituan strategically
focuses on the “Food plus Platform” to build a multi-level technology service
platform, covering the whole value chain in the foodservice industry in people’s
daily lives. The series of reforms are deemed attributable to Meituan’s current
prosperity: within a decade, Meituan evolved from a food service provider to a
multi-category e-commerce service platform and expanded from big cities to small
towns across China, creating a real “O2O” business pattern with nationwide
coverage. Until 2018, Meituan has occupied 59.1% market share in China’s e-
commerce market, with the figure being expected to see a continuous increase in
the following years (Meituan-Dianping, 2017).
Figure 4
Meituan’s Business Evolution, from 2003-2019
92 ACADEMY OF ASIAN BUSINESS REVIEW, JUNE 2020
Figure 5
Meituan’s Key Turning Points, from 2003-2019
between these companies, called “Thousand Regiments War” today, was gaining
momentum silently.
At the beginning of 2011, the group-buying market ushered in a blowout. In that
year, China’s group-buying websites once exceeded 5,000, not only the start-ups
but many IT giants such as Sina, Netease, Sohu, and Baidu that had previously
survived from the Internet bubble also attended the group-buying battlefield. To
cope with the violent competition, Meituan held the first city manager meeting. At
that meeting, Wang Xing defines Meituan as a “market”, while users and
merchants as “customers”. He also denoted that users are always the top priority of
Meituan, and customers' benefit is always higher than Meituan’s interests. This
meeting laid the “customers first” idea of Meituan, which proved to be one of the
important factors for its later strategy of “Automatic Refund Scheme”.
The Automatic Refund scheme was launch on March 4, 2011. Under this scheme,
all the Groupon coupon purchased in Meituan will be fully refunded when expired.
This announcement is very unexpected and was considered unwise by many
contenders at that time: As the group-buying market is saturated and gaining very
thin margin, expired coupon was the major income for many enterprises, and
Meituan’s move made it “threw” 10 million CNY at that moment. However, the
final outcome actually reversed the situation. Meituan reached over 250 million
monthly sales at the end of the year and ranked as the top enterprise in the market.
The “automatic refund scheme” was a hazardous but audacious move for
Meituan, because it posed great risks in the deposit capital and free cash flows of a
newly established company. However, this diametrically opposite approach worked
as the perfect substitution for mass advertising, achieved a long-term and solid
word-of-mouth reputation. On the contrary, advertising or massive business
expansion may be effective in the short run, but once the capital became
insufficient, the business will turn into a disaster. Therefore, surrendering profits to
a proper degree for customer relation helped Meituan survived during the initial
fierce competition stage, and rewarded it a long-term reputation for the carry-on
businesses in the transforming stage.
On December 23, 2013, Wang Xing interpreted the values of the Meituan. He re-
emphasized the importance of "customer-centric", put it at the top layer of
Meituan’s value pyramid. Followed is the second layer, “embrace change”. At that
time, Wang Xing commented,
“If we do not embrace change, we are hard to be customer-centric”.
This comment is of great time value. In 2013, not only the online group-buying
industry was changing, but the entire Internet is undergoing the mass reform: At
that year, mobile payment standard was introduced to China’s market, and the trial
of the three-network integration was finished. The 4G license was a starting point,
signaling the coming “mobile wave” that hit the surface. Numerous IT big names
turn into the mobile payment field: Alibaba strategically invested 294 million USD
to Gaode, Tencent injected 448 million USD into Sogou, Baidu former president Li
Mingyuan bet 1.9 billion USD to buy 91 Wireless, a wireless internet company,
pushing Baidu's mobile transformation.
Meituan quickly adjusts its strategic focuses at this time: In February 2013,
Meituan’s mobile phone orders accounted for only 35% of the transaction volume,
and Wang Xing set the target for this data at 50%. The focuses on mobile payment
brought striking effects: according to Meituan’s annual report of 2013, the daily
trading volume exceeded 100 million CNY, which brought sufficient cash flow to
this IT company at that time.
At the same time, Meituan started forming its T-type strategy (Figure.6). T-type
strategy refers to the business integration and expansion under the mobile era: The
“vertical group” is the complete set of food-service industrial chain, which includes
food-delivery, food supply chain, restaurant ERP system and catering service,
while “horizontal group” involves various life-service functions, such as hotel
booking, films, spot ticks and education. The development in mobile payments
attribute to the business expansion of Meituan, as more and more users are turning
to mobile phones, and an integrated application is urgently needed.
After two years of preparing, the T-type strategy was formally implemented in
early 2015, the time when the O2O business pattern started heated in China.
According to <2015 O2O Industry Report>, Meituan ranked the first in China’s
O2O application coverage, showing by a 17.1% market coverage. To further
expand the business coverage, in October 2015, Meituan and Dianping jointly
issued a statement, announcing the establishment of strategic cooperation and
merged into Meituan-Dianping.
Meituan-Dianping 95
Figure 6
Demonstration of T-type strategy
The mobilization and T-type strategy in this period offered Meituan a valuable
chance to stretch into a bigger market scope. After a period of T-type strategy,
Meituan expanded its business to more than 100 cities across the country, which
subsequently led to a larger and more comprehensive management team. To
maintain a healthy corporate culture, Meituan adopted flexible hierarchical
management structure, and Wang Xing tried to exchange opinions face-to-face
with the principal management staffs parodically, he also emphasized the
“customer-centric” concept once again in one employee meeting, stressing that this
corporate value will never be outdated in Meituan. This corporate value is of great
importance for Meituan’s current success, which significance will be further
discussed in Section.4.
At this time, Meituan reformulated its future direction by setting the business
coverage “starts from eating”. Wang Xing stated that:
“The strategically business decision is a matter of “What” and “How”. “What” refers to the mission
of the company, ‘Eat Better, Live Better’. We need to start from the consumers’ needs, and consider
participating in the issues related to eating and lives.”
business model that highlighted “dynamic” and “flexibility”. Meituan, along with a
crowd of other e-commerce platforms, first entered China’s O2O market and got
the reward of huge consumer flows, and gradually cultivated new purchasing
behaviors for the coming generation.
Nevertheless, “good timing” is not enough for Meituan’s current success. The
previous section already talked about the fierce competition resulted from the
favorable market climate in 2010, which to some extent breeds Meituan’s first
standing-out strategy of “automatic refund scheme” that mentioned in first key
turning point. The following sections will further discuss Meituan’s developing
strategies and missions to figure out its core competitive advantages that make it
stand out from the crowd.
Figure 7
Distribution of Meituan’s Users
(Source: Wikipedia)
Meituan-Dianping 99
consumer basis attracts more merchants under myriad industries, which in return
absorb more consumers due to the “versatile” of service functions. Meanwhile, a
huge consumer basis also contributes a lot of valuable resources in this big-data era,
by which Meituan could facilitate the decision-making process through related
technologies.
Figure 9
Comparison of Consumer Retention Rate and Stickiness
that implement the “automatic refund scheme”, which was regarded as the main
source of income for the group-on industry. Meanwhile, Meituan offered
allowances for relative higher-end merchants who rarely cooperate with group-on
business at the early phase, such as Starbucks and Haagen-Dazs, to attract and
retain consumers that have different purchasing levels. Secondly, Meituan has high
standard on its application design, which has both strict requirements on the user-
interactive-interface and user-generated-content (UGC). Lastly, Meituan adopts
advanced technologies to reduce response time. It adopts several techniques to
determine the consumer’s instantaneous needs and automatically generates
recommendations through AI. According to Sun Yuan, the vice president of
Meituan, average 76% of service requests are accepted online in 2018, and 80% of
them are solved by AI (Zhao, 2019).
In return, a good user experience results in higher user stickiness, and
consequently more frequent transactions. According to Ling and Tam (2018), the
longer a user stays in Meituan’s platform, the more transactions it makes per year
(Figure.10). The increase in transaction frequency partially attributes to the high-
quality service and broadening the array of functions that focus on mass-market. In
short, Meituan seizes the market shares in the first round by surrendering parts of
its profits in both merchant-cooperation and technology-development aspects,
which is considered as an advisable strategy to maintain long-term growth at the
expense of short-term profits.
Figure 10
Users Transaction Frequency of Meituan
This factor is of key importance for Meituan’s survive throughout second and
third key turning points, as an accurately positioning not only avoid foreseeable
severe competition by averting inefficient investments and retained the growing
sustainability, but also restructure a healthier cash flow for the next phrase’s
development. Therefore, this strategy is considered as one of the most crucial
factors that make Meituan survive during the most hotly competitive periods of e-
commerce.
still need to develop strategies to create competitive advantage and increase the
user’s retention rate and loyalty.
The customer demand for physical restaurants (substitution) remains huge and
irreplaceable. Although both the traditional catering and food delivery service deal
with the needs for food, they are fundamentally different regarding the match
between customer requirements and the costs serving the customers. When
choosing the food delivery service, a customer may focus more on the taste and
delivery speed, while he may emphasize more on other aspects when choosing the
traditional catering, such as the reliability of menu, staffs’ attitude, atmosphere and
privacy (Ladhari, Brun & Morales, 2008; Yeo, Goh & Rezaei, 2017). From this
aspect, two types of dining services have their own focuses and merits, and
consequently there is no clear dominance position between them. However, the
stress of food safety recently drags the balance towards the traditional catering
service: Some of the online restaurants are not eligible to obtain the qualification to
provide catering service, while they may successfully sell the products due to the
wittingly or unwittingly negligence of the e-commerce platform. While, for the
traditional catering, the food quality and tidiness of the store are inspected on a
regular basis, and the customers can easily find the certificates hanging on the
walls of the restaurants. In conclusion, dining in the restaurant is still the
mainstream of the catering industry at present. The customer demand for the
physical restaurants remains huge and it remains irreplaceable.
Regarding the rivalry, the current food delivery market is mainly dominated by
Meituan and Ele.me. According to Trustdata (2019), by 2019Q1 Meituan-Dianping
obtains the market share of 63.4% and Ele.me occupies 27.5% of the market. Also,
Star.ele.me obtains 6.3% of the market share (Star.ele.me is the former Baidu Food
Delivery which merged with Ele.me in Aug 2017 and formally changed its name to
Star.ele.me in Oct 2018). Thus, together with Star.ele.me, Ele.me holds 33.8% of
the market share. Though there are very limited competitors in this market, the
market is still growing and the competition between the big names remains intense.
As a result, the food delivery platforms used to invest heavily in their services to
compete for users. customers were offered great discounts and even free meals by
the platforms in an effort to carve out market share in the fiercely contested food
delivery industry. However, this type of competition is only suitable for giant
companies and poses threats to small businesses. Although the giants have solid
capital foundation, it is still less possible to carry out this kind of cash-burning
strategy in the long-run. The problem behinds is obvious: It is difficult for the
platforms to “win the most” and “get the most from the customers” simultaneously.
After years of development, the food delivery industry has entered a mature and
106 ACADEMY OF ASIAN BUSINESS REVIEW, JUNE 2020
stable stage, Burning money is not effective to compete with each other: The
competition gradually switches from the price war to the competition of the quality
and variety of services and user experience.
After many rounds of user competition, the food delivery service user group
become rather stable. Many users have established the habit of using at least one of
the food delivery platforms, and the industrial structure has thus stabilized. In the
future, the competition may be further upgraded. Zhu Xiaohu, an investor of
Ele.me call the future food delivery market “the war of three kingdoms” which is
referring to the market share competition among Meituan-Dianping, Ele.me, and
the entering DiDi Chuxing. While in the short-term, it will still be the competition
between the two giants. In addition, the competition in food delivery service is just
a starting point, Alibaba's acquisition of Ele.me in 2018 also reveals its
involvement in the competition between Alibaba and Tencent. The future
integration of the platforms and businesses under the two groups may push the
competition between Meituan and Ele.me to a higher level, rather than
concentrating on the food delivery service. The competition may eventually grow
to the competition of the whole “life service platform (ecosystem)”. The situation
of duopoly is predicted to continue during the next several years since the entry
barrier of the food delivery market is rising higher and higher. Other than the two
main companies, the other food delivery businesses only hold 2.8% of the market.
And the numbers show that the market share of the food delivery businesses other
than Meituan-Dianping, Ele.me, and Star.ele.me is shrinking throughout the years.
In conclusion, attributed to the mature management and operation structure,
professional service, high-quality staff, and the support of technology giants,
Meituan and Ele.me create a duopoly food delivery market, leaving only a small
share of the market to the other food delivery companies. In addition, though there
is still huge expansion capacity for the food delivery service, the existing market
appears high entrance barriers, such as user traffic, merchants and delivery staffs,
so it is hard for the new participants to enter the market. This implies that the
companies that do not have the previous foundation need to invest significant
capital to build a competitive food delivery platform. However, some companies
like DiDi Chuxing (a company provides ride-hailing service) that have existing
network platform with considerable user traffic and offline transportation networks
are still able to enter the food delivery market. While they will still face the
challenge of having to compete with the current two food delivery giants.
Figure 12
China’s Consumption Type Between Physical & Service
Figure 13, 14
Asia E-commerce Users Amount, Average Revenue and Age, 2019
Meituan-Dianping 109
Figure 15
Urbanization Population & Percentage in China, Meituan-Dianping, 2017
Technology advancement also reveals some good news: The network coverage
greatly prompts the utilization and service range of Meituan. In June 2015, mobile
coverage expanded to “ubiquitous level” by assessing 90% of the population of at
least 2G signal in Asia; by 2025, ASEAN is expected to experience 5.5 times
growth in online service economy and become the center of global online platform
economy that occupies over 40% of the market shares (Hatt, Okeleke & Meloan,
2015; Chen, 2017). This digital transformation process interacts with the expansion
of e-commerce enterprises, as demonstrated by Figure.16. Under this trend,
Meituan is guaranteed an extensive market space for business development:
According to the historical income statement, Meituan appeared a rapid growth
trend, realizing 7 times of increase in operating income from 2015 to 2017,
realizing an annual growth of 223.2% and 161.2% in 2016 and 2017 respectively
(Meituan-Dianping, 2018). Additionally, digitalization helps Meituan to penetrate
traditional industries by exploring to booming diversified demands from the
constant flow of new users. It is currently stepping into areas including
transportation, vacation planning, wedding service, household management service,
etc. This integrates the merchants which were originally highly dispersed in the
traditional markets and consolidates the consumer basis for Meituan by seizing the
first-mover advantage.
110 ACADEMY OF ASIAN BUSINESS REVIEW, JUNE 2020
Figure 16
Asia E-commerce Revenue & Digitalization
Figure 17
Summary External Environment of E-commerce Platform
Figure 18
Demonstration of “Super App”
Meituan-Dianping 113
complex operation model is prone to the data breach, as not only the cyber attack
but also the offline third parties (e.g. merchants, delivery staffs) could obtain users’
privacy. In April 2018, it is revealed that over a million of its users’ personal
information has been sold online, and it is occasionally reported by individuals that
they are receiving harassing phone calls after using Meituan. Therefore, the
development of digitalization also suggests Meituan improve the encryption
methods, as well as input higher supervision and monitoring costs to lessen the
frequency of data leakage.
Considering the fact that Meituan has experienced an information leak crisis that
weakened users' confidence in 2018, it is recommended that Meituan should strive
for more comprehensive methods to maintain and protect its database. One of the
intentions of this approach is to help Meituan better serve the users and built better
trust between the platform and the consumers. The rewards of this approach is
more than just building up a good image and reputation. It will also reduce the
potential costs of compensation to the users for information leak and the potential
revenue loss due to customer churn.
active participation in the foreign markets would help Meituan to gain a better
knowledge of foreign purchasing habits and help it develop its business in hotel &
travel to pave the way for its development of full business chain and become a
multifunctional “life service platform”. However, Meituan should be meticulous
when going global, as powerful international competitors such as UK-based
“Deliveroo” and Germany-based “FoodPanda” have already set branches in many
developed regions. Thus, it is recommended to select unexplored East Asia regions
for first-step global expansion and enter other developed markets after accumulated
relevant experience or, at least reach enough capital strength and technology
highlights to attract consumers from giant competitors. While on the other hand,
Meituan’s global competitors have been competing for the global market share
both in developing countries and developed countries fiercely. The rapid expanding
of Deliveroo and Foodpanda has made a deep impression on the whole industry.
Late entry into the global markets would at the same time mean that there would be
little space for Meituan and the competition would also be tougher for Meituan. It
is also recommended for Meituan to learn from the expanding strategies of its
competitors. Merges and acquisitions of the small food delivery companies that
have already existed in the target markets may be an easier way for Meituan to
enter the global markets. M&A may also help Meituan to adapt to foreign customer
behaviors and preferences. In the journey of expanding to the global markets,
Meituan still has a long and tough way to go. Meituan needs to take its steps
carefully and wisely.
Figure 19
China’s Food Delivery Market Revenue & Growth Rate
Conclusion
(Received June 26, 2019; Revised December 25, 2019; Accepted May 27, 2020)
Meituan-Dianping 117
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