1

2
 I. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

1. AAA died intestate and was survived by his son BBB, and CCC, his other son who predeceased him,
was survived by DDD. In July 17, 2003, DDD moved that she be included in the distribution and
partition of AAA’s estate as she alleged that she was CCC’s only child and that AAA’s or their clan’s
overt acts translated to her legal recognition as CCC’s child. CCC died before she was born on
October 9, 1978. BBB opposed the same, claiming that CCC never legally recognized DDD as his
natural child in his lifetime and DDD never presented sufficient evidence to prove her filiation in
accordance with Arts. 172 and 175 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, BBB claims that DDD was already
barred from claiming her nonmarital filiation to CCC, since she was born after his death. He claims
that even if the provisions under the Civil Code were applied, DDD’s claims will not prosper since she
did not file any action for recognition within 4 years from the time she attained the age of majority,
when she turned 18 years old in 1996. Can DDD still prove her filiation even if CCC died before she
was born?
Yes. DDD, who was not yet born when the Family Code took effect, has the right to prove that she was her
father's daughter under Article 285 of the Civil Code within four years from attaining the age of majority. Under
Article 402 of the Civil Code, the age of majority is 21 years old. DDD attained majority on October 9, 1999.
She had until October 9, 2003 to assert her right to prove her filiation with CCC. In this case, when she moved
to be included in the distribution and partition of AAA's estate on July 17, 2003, she was not yet barred from
claiming her filiation. Moreover, DNA testing is a valid means of determining paternity and filiation and the
Court has affirmed the use of DNA testing in an instance when the putative father was dead. Thus, issues on
her filiation may still be proved and may be done thru reception of DNA evidence upon consultation and
coordination with experts in the field. (Aquino vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 208912, December 07, 2021)

2. Kimric claimed that although the surname indicated in his birth certificate is Tan, he has never used it
and in fact has only learned the same in 2009. He has already been known by the name Kimric
Casayuran. The name of his father as indicated in his birth certificate is Carlos Tan. His father also
signed the same as informant. When he renewed his driver’s licence in 2010, he was informed by the
Land Transportation Office (LTO) that he should first secure documents to change his name. Thus,
the filing of the petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). However, RTC denied the petition on
the ground that a change of name might lead to a misunderstanding as to one’s paternity or status of
legitimacy. Will the change of Kimric’s name affect his status as a legitimate child?
No. In Kimric's birth certificate, Carlos Tan is not only named as the father, but he also signed the same as
informant. Thus, even if his name is changed, his father's identity still appears in his birth certificate, where it
will always be written, and which can be referred to in cases where paternity is relevant. A change of name
does not define or effect a change in one's existing family relations or in the rights and duties flowing
therefrom. It does not alter one's legal capacity, civil status, or citizenship: What is altered is only the name.
(Tan vs. Office of the Civil Registrar, G.R. No. 222857, November 10, 2021)

II. PROPERTY, OWNERSHIP, AND ITS MODIFICATIONS

3. In 2013, AAA filed an Application for Registration praying for the issuance of a Decree and Original
Certificate of Title over the subject lots, in its name. It averred that they acquired the lots through
purchase as evidenced by a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Absolute Sale. Furthermore, they
showed tax declarations, the oldest of which dates from 1948. They claimed that by itself or through
its predecessors-in-interest, it has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of both lots under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, and
that the lots are within alienable and disposable lots of the public domain. The Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) filed its Opposition as the application is barred by res judicata due to the decision of
the Court of Appeals (CA) reversing the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) Decision, thereby
resulting in the dismissal of AAA’s first application for registration due to its failure to prove
possession of the lots from June 12, 1945 or earlier and to prove that the property is part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Did AAA fail to prove their possession under a
bona fide claim of ownership, thus,
barring their application by res judicata?
No. Supposing AAA proves all the other requirements under R.A. No. 11573, including its possession of the
subject land from 1948 up to 2013 or the time it filed an application for registration, that would mean
petitioner's possession for approximately 65 years, or way beyond the 20-year possession requirement under
R.A. No. 11573. Ordinarily, under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, petitioner must prove possession under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. R.A. No. 11573 has lowered the required length
of possession to twenty (20) years immediately preceding the filing of the application. Under the new
provision, the applicant for original registration of title to land must establish the following: (1) that the subject
land, which does not exceed 12 hectares, forms part of disposable and alienable lands of the public domain;
(2) that the applicants, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation thereof; and (3) that the possession is under
a bona fide claim of ownership for at least twenty (20) years immediately preceding the filing of the application
for confirmation of title. (Superiora Locale vs. Republic, G.R. No. 242781, June 21, 2022)

4. AAA was born with a physical disability known in the locality as "lumpo", which barred her from
attending school nor learning to read and write. When AAA's mother passed away, she was left in the
custody of her aunt, BBB. At the age of 64, AAA asked for Atty. CCC’s assistance in the disposition of

3
 her properties through preparation in her last will. In the presence of her 3 notarial witnesses, Atty.
CCC read the contents of the document to AAA and carefully explained to her its effects and
consequences. He then asked her if she fully understood its contents to which AAA confirmed. BBB
was left with all of AAA’s properties. When AAA died, years later BBB died. DDD, the adopted child of
BBB, filed a Petition for probate of AAA’s will and for her appointment as administrator of the estate,
to which, AAA’s half siblings opposed claiming that the last will was fatally defective for it was not
read twice: once by one of the witnesses, and by the notary public pursuant to Art. 808 of the Civil
Code. Did the last will and
testament of AAA comply with Art. 808 of the Civil Code?
Yes. Notably, Atty. CCC read and explained the contents of the last will and testament to AAA. Meanwhile, the
notarial witnesses listened and understood the explanation of Atty. CCC. It is also undisputed that AAA made
no denial or correction to what she had heard. Though a Supreme Court case seemingly extended the
application of Article 808 to cover not just the blind but also illiterates, the same case also recognized an
exception to the rule - substantial compliance. We find this exception applicable here. Substantial compliance
is acceptable where the purpose of the law has been satisfied, the reason being that the solemnities
surrounding the execution of wills are intended to protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and trickery but
are never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy the testamentary privilege. (Guia vs. Cosico, G.R. No.
246997, May 05, 2021)

5. Can AAA, the nonmarital child of BBB, who was a predeceased marital child of the decedent inherit
from her grandfather’s estate?
Yes. The Court adopted a construction of Article 992 that makes children, regardless of the circumstances of
their births, qualified to inherit from their direct ascendants — such as their grandparent — by their right of
representation. Both marital and nonmarital children, whether born from a marital or nonmarital child, are
blood relatives of their parents and other ascendants. However, this ruling will apply when the nonmarital child
has a right of representation to their parent's share in her grandparent's legitime. It is silent on collateral
relatives where the nonmarital child may inherit by themself. (Aquino vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 208912, December 07, 2021)

III. SPECIAL CONTRACTS

6. AAA mortgaged a Mitsubishi Pajero in favor of BBB corp. owned by CCC. When AAA was not able to
pay the loan, he executed a Deed of Sale leaving the name and details of the buyer in blank. The
Pajero was then bought from the BBB corp. by Spouses DDD. EEE, CCC’s employee, signed the
receipt on behalf of CCC. The Pajero was then sold to FFF. About a year later, the police apprehended
the subject Pajero while it was illegally parked and upon investigation, the Pajero turned out to be a
stolen vehicle from the Office of the President. FFF did not contest the confiscation and just filed a
complaint for sum of money against Spouses DDD, seeking reimbursement of the full price of what he
paid. When written demand failed, FFF filed a complaint for sum of money against Spouses DDD. In
turn, the Spouses DDD filed a third-party complaint against CCC and EEE for the unpaid
reimbursement.

Are CCC and EEE liable to Spouses DDD for the unpaid reimbursement, and, if so, what is the basis of
such liability?

Only CCC is liable. EEE transacted with Spouses DDD solely upon the direction and on behalf of CCC, her
employer. Accordingly, EEE must be absolved from liability in this case.
CCC's liability is anchored on the nullity of the Contract of Sale (COS) he executed with Spouses DDD. As a
general rule, the possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. This general
rule, however, does not apply in cases where the owner of said movable property has been unlawfully
deprived of the same, as in this case where the vehicle subject of the COS had been stolen. CCC had no
right to transfer the ownership of the subject Pajero at the time it was delivered to Spouses DDD, as the
object of the COS is clearly illicit. The second element of avalid contract of sale, determinate subject matter, is
consequently absent. The COS executed between CCC and Spouses DDD is therefore void ab initio. (Spouses
Gaspar v. Disini, G.R. No. 239644, February 03, 2021)

Did the sale of the subject Pajero from CCC to Spouses DDD give rise to an implied warranty of title
and a concomitant implied warranty against eviction?

No. The implied warranty against hidden defects pertains to defects which render the thing sold unfit for the
use for which it is intended, or should diminish its fitness for such use to such an extent that, had the vendee
been aware thereof, would not have acquired it or would have given a lower price. As its nomenclature
suggests, hidden defects pertain to imperfections or defects of the object sold. Such is not the case here,
where the subject Pajero, albeit stolen, was in working condition, and was in fact being used by FFF for its
intended purpose when it was confiscated by the authorities.

On the other hand, a breach of the warranty against eviction presupposes the concurrence of the following
requisites: (i) the purchaser has been deprived of the whole or part of the thing sold; (ii) this eviction is by a
final judgment; (iii) the basis thereof is by virtue of a right prior to the sale made by the vendor; and (iv) the
vendor has been summoned and made co-defendant in the suit for eviction at the instance of the vendee
Here, FFF was not deprived of possession on the basis of a final judgment. In fact, based on the records, it
would appear that FFF did not contest the confiscation of the subject Pajero when he was informed that it had

4
 been stolen from the Office of the President. Hence, none of the foregoing warranties apply. (Spouses Gaspar v.
Disini, G.R. No. 239644, February 03, 2021)

7. AAA is the registered owner of a lot, which, upon her death and during the settlement of her estate,
was discovered to have been donated to one of her children, BBB. BBB was able to obtain a Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) over the property. BBB then mortgaged the property to CCCs in
consideration of a Php 7,000,000.00 loan. The mortgage was registered in 2001. CCCs conducted an
ocular inspection, whereby they confirmed that BBB was in possession and occupation of the
property. However, the mortgage was contested by DDD, BBB’s sister, by an Affidavit of Adverse
Claim which was annotated in 2002. When BBB’s siblings were informed that the lot was scheduled
for auction they filed a complaint with prayer for injunction for the annulment of the Deed of Donation
favouring BBB and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage. With the denial of the injunction by the
Regional Trial Court, the extrajudicial sale pushed through and CCCs emerged as highest bidders.
Subsequently, the RTC found that AAA’s signature in the Deed of Donation was forged. Thus, the
Deed of Donation was declared void.

Do CCCs have a right over the disputed property as mortgagees in good faith?
Yes, CCCs were mortgagees in good faith. The doctrine of mortgagees in good faith applies when the
following requisites concur, namely: (a) the mortgagor is not the rightful owner of, or does not have valid title
to, the property; (b) the mortgagor succeeded in obtaining a Torrens title over the property; (c) the mortgagor
succeeded in mortgaging the property to another person; (d) the mortgagee relied on what appears on the
title and there exists no facts and circumstances that would compel a reasonably cautious man to inquire into
the status of the property; and (e) the mortgage contract was registered. All these requisites were satisfied in
this case, viz.: (a) BBB was found to have no valid title to the property as his title was derived from a forged
Deed of Donation; (b) he was able to obtain a TCT; (c) he succeeded in mortgaging the property to CCCs; (d)
CCCs found nothing on the TCT that would have notified them of BBB's invalid title. In fact, CCCs even went
beyond the title and conducted an ocular inspection, whereby they confirmed that BBB was in possession and
occupation of the property; and (e) the mortgage contract was registered. Thus, CCCs were mortgagees in
good faith. CCCs were mortgagees in good faith. (Jimenez v. Jimenez, G.R. No. 228011, February 10, 2021)

Can DDD’s adverse claim affect the rights of CCCs, the purchasers in the foreclosure sale?
No. A subsequent lien or encumbrance annotated at the back of a certificate of title of a foreclosed property
will not affect the rights of a purchaser in a foreclosure sale because such sale retroacts to the date of the
registration of the mortgage, making the sale prior in time to the lien or encumbrance. The foreclosure sale
retroacts to the date of registration of the mortgage because it is incidental to the fulfilment of the mortgagor's
obligation in the mortgage contract upon his default. In turn, the purchaser in a foreclosure sale essentially
derives his right from the previously registered mortgage. Once the mortgagor defaulted in the fulfilment of his
obligation, the mortgagee in good faith can still cause the foreclosure of the mortgage. In such case, the
purchaser in the foreclosure sale acquires the right of the mortgagee in good faith, making the sale prior in
time as against any subsequent lien or encumbrance. The protection granted to a mortgagee in good faith
extends to the purchaser at a public auction even if he or she had notice of the adverse claim. Otherwise, the
value of the mortgage could be easily destroyed by a subsequent record of an adverse claim, for no one
would purchase at a foreclosure sale if bound by the posterior claim. Accordingly, DDD's adverse claim, which
was annotated after the registered mortgage in favor of CCCs, cannot prevail over CCCs's rights as
mortgagees in good faith and purchasers in the foreclosure sale. Being mortgagees in good faith, they have a
superior lien over that of DDD, and their right to foreclose is reserved. Therefore, CCCs's purchase of the
property in the foreclosure sale in 2002 retroacted to the date of the registration of the mortgage in 2001,
making the sale superior to the adverse claim in 2002. Their knowledge of the adverse claim is of no moment
because their right as mortgagees in good faith extends up to the time of the foreclosure sale and in their
capacity as purchasers. (Jimenez v. Jimenez, G.R. No. 228011, February 10, 2021)