Radio Altimeter - 5G effects

Reference: 34.42.00048 Issue date: 02-FEB-2022 Last check date: 04-FEB-2022 Status: Open
A/C type/serie: A300, A300-600, A310, A318, A319, ... ATA: 34-42
Engine manufacturer: Supplier:
Purpose / Reason for revision: AMOC status, way forward and Q&A section updated
Engineering Support Status: Open

Updates are highlighted in bold blue characters.

1. REFERENCES

[Ref. 1] Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) Paper No. 274-20/PMC-2073 (dated 07 October 2020)
[Ref. 2] Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) AIR-21-18 (dated 02 November 2021)
[Ref. 3] Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) AD 2021-23-12 & AD 2021-23-13 (dated 09 December 2021)
[Ref. 4] EASA Safety Information Bulletin 2021-16 (dated 17 December 2021)
[Ref. 5] Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Safety Alert For Operators (SAFO) 21007 (dated 23 December 2021)
[Ref. 6] Airbus Technical Follow Up (TFU) 34.42.00.020 & 34.42.00.022 - Erroneous Radio Altimeter Height
[Ref. 7] Airbus Flight Operations Transmission (FOT) 999.0002/22 - Impacts of 5G telecommunications on aircraft operation
[Ref. 8] Airbus Flight Operations Transmission (FOT) 999.0004/22 - 5G interference – Status of the FAA approved AMOC
[Ref. 9] Airbus Operators Information Transmission (OIT) 999.0077/21 - Impacts of 5G telecommunications on aircraft operation

2. INTRODUCTION

This In Service Information (ISI) article intends to provide Operators with the latest information and Airbus position with regards to the
most recent publications related to the impact of 5G Interference on Radio Altimeter operations.
This article is applicable to the entire Airbus Fleet.
3. DESCRIPTION

Worldwide telecommunication has allocated 5G frequencies on mid-band spectrum (also known as C-band) close to the Radio Altimeter
operating range (4.2 to 4.4 GHz).
In the United States of America, based on the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) Paper No. 274-20/PMC-2073 [Ref. 1], the
5G mid-band emissions may interfere with the Radio Altimeters.
3.1 FAA AD 2021-23-12

The FAA published on the 7th of December an Airworthiness Directive AD 2021-23-12.

The AD mandates the application of NOTAMs on some US airports that prohibit precision approaches requiring Radio Altimeters
data when in the presence of 5G C-Band interference. The ADs and future NOTAMs address situations specific to operations in
U.S.A. airspace. In coordination with the FAA, EASA did not adopt the FAA ADs, EASA SIB 2021-16 [Ref. 4].

 Non-US-Registered Aircraft Operators

No need to include the limitations in the AFM (unless
explicitly required by their National Airworthiness
Authorities).

 US-Registered Aircraft Operators

Must introduce the limitations mentioned in the AD in
their Aircraft Flight Manual before the 4th of January
2022 (as first step).This date was later delayed to 19th
of January 2022.

 Operators shall assess the impact of NOTAMs for their

intended operation.
3.2. KEY MILESTONES

 Between DEC 27, 2021 and JAN 3, 2022: Airbus joined the AMOC task force regrouping the FAA, other OEMs and Radio Altimeter
Suppliers. The objective is to agree on a definition of the AMOC content.
 DEC 29, 2021: Airbus participated with other OEMs in IATA Flight Operations Group teleconference and presented the latest status for
Airbus fleet.
 DEC 30, 2021: Meetings with OEMs, US Telecommunication Operators (ATT & Verizon) and Radio Altimeter suppliers (Thales, Collins,
Honeywell).
 JAN 4, 2022: All US Telecommunication Operators operating in C-Band agreed to temporarily delay full 5G deployment around the
airfields.
 JAN 12/13, 2022: Issuance of new AMOCs request to the FAA (based on Radio Altimeter Part Numbers); Including A220 aircraft type.
 JAN 16/20/30: AMOC Approval receipt from FAA
 JAN 19, 2022: 5G Antenna activation / Exception on antenna in the vicinity of 87 airports
 FEB 28, 2022: End of Current AMOC validity
 JUL 5, 2022: New 5G C-Band service turned on consistent with telecom licenses.
 Airbus is committed to conduct a weekly Flight Ops and Engineering webinar to inform the Operators on the latest update/status of the
discussion with authorities.Webinar materials are available in the Airbus World portal (section Content Library > Flight Operations >
Flight Operations Events.

Extract of letter from Verizon and AT&T:

“…until July 5, 2022, we will adopt the same C-Band radio exclusion zones that are already in use in France, with slight adaptation to
reflect the modest technical differences in how C-band is being deployed in the two countries”

“…The effect would be to further reduce C-band signal levels by at least 10 times on the runway or during the last mile of final
approach and the first mile after takeoff.”

“…These additional voluntary measures will give the FAA and the aviation industry ample opportunity to conduct any further studies
and remediate any altimeters that might not meet current standards,”
3.3 US AIRPORTS CARTOGRAPHY

To help the operators knowing which Airport/Runway can be operated without the AD limitation, the FAA set up the following
page on its website: www.faa.gov/5g.
This page offers a good visual for the released runways in the 87 airports equipped with the 5G.
It is worth to mention that the Airbus fleet is currently released for 100% of the runways in these 87 airports.
4. POSSIBLE SYMPTOMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 ARCHITECTURE

In the Airbus architecture, the RA system is connected to various systems to manage the Surveillance functions (TCAS, TAWS, Windshear),
trigger alerts, warnings and callout, provide information to the crew or engage AP modes and flight control laws (landing, flare laws logic, flight
modes, tail strike protection, thrust retard mode, etc.).
4.2. OBSERVED EFFECTS

Airbus and the RA suppliers have conducted a study based on the publication ref. 274-20/PMC-2073 released by the RTCA in October 2020.
The conditions of these tests were based on the worst case given by the RTCA publication with an added margin of 6dB to cover the variability
in 5G ground station performance.
 For all Airbus programs, within these RTCA boundaries, the tests demonstrated the absence of adverse effects on the aircraft.
 Beyond these limits
o On the RA systems embedded on A350 and A380, 5G interference on RAs are negligible. No cockpit effect was observed during
the simulations
o On the RA systems embedded on A300/310, A320 family and A330/340, erroneous low height values were observed: value may
oscillate rapidly between a low value and the real aircraft height, but never above the real aircraft height.
These values are emitted with a “valid” status by the RA system, meaning that they are not rejected by the connected systems.

4.2.1.Observed effects on the A320 family, A330-A340 with 5G emissions beyond the RTCA limits

Flight Instruments (PFD, HUD, Callouts)

 The RA height indication on the PFDs or HUDs may be unreliable alongside with untimely RA callouts (unusual or untimely sequence of
RA audio messages and/or indications)
 Untimely MINIMUM callout may occur (if RADIO Decision Height is selected in the FMS)
 Untimely RETARD auto callout
 The AUTOLAND warning light may flash
 The Ground Reference on the PFD altitude scale may be erroneous

Surveillance Systems:

 Untimely Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) / Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS) alerts may occur
 Aural TCAS alerts (“TRAFFIC” messages) may be inoperative
 Windshear detection systems (predictive and reactive) may be inoperative
Auto Flight System (Laws and Modes):

 With AP engaged, LAND / FLARE / THR IDLE modes may untimely/early engage
 During autoland, very small pitch oscillations may be observed in FLARE mode
 For A320Family NEO, during Take Off or Go-Around, the tail strike protection may be inoperative or operate prematurely. However, the
pilot retains full authority on the pitch control
 THS may freeze due to untimely activation of the Flare law: In the event of a Go-Around, the pilot may temporarily need additional
sidestick input as the auto-trim function is inhibited by flare law mode

Note: The A/THR RETARD mode is only available during automatic landing (i.e. AP engaged in LAND mode).
 When AP is OFF, the pilot retains full authority on thrust reduction (automatic engagement of RETARD mode is inhibited)

4.2.2. Observed effects on A300-A310 with 5G emissions beyond the RTCA limits

Flight Instruments (PFD, Callouts)

 The RA height indication on the PFDs may be unreliable alongside with untimely RA callouts (unusual or untimely sequence of RA audio
messages and/or indications)
 Untimely MINIMUM callout may occur (if RADIO Decision Height is selected in the FMS)
 The AUTOLAND warning light may flash

Surveillance Systems:

 Untimely Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) / Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS) alerts may occur
 Aural TCAS alerts (“TRAFFIC” messages) may be inoperative
 Windshear detection systems (predictive and reactive) may be inoperative

Auto Flight System (Laws and Modes):

 With AP engaged, LAND / FLARE modes may untimely/early engage

 With A/THR engaged in SPD/MACH mode, RETARD mode may untimely/early engage and automatic throttles retard may occur whatever
the AP/FD mode.
4.3. MAINTENANCE RECOMMENDATIONS

The tests performed by the RA suppliers confirm possible NO (Normal Operation) erroneous values of the Radio Altimeter. This
behavior is not supposed to trigger any ECAM alert (NAV RA x FAULT or NAV RA DEGRADED) nor failure message in the PFR. Thus
only the operational effects described in this article allow to suspect a 5G interference event.

Should the above mentioned effects be observed during the approach on an airport where 5G possible interference is mentioned through a
NOTAM, it is recommended to do a RA system test in order to confirm that the events were not due to an equipment failure.

On A300-A310: AMM TASK 34-42-00

On A320 family: AMM TASK 34-42-00-740-002
On A330-A340: AMM TASK 34-42-00-740-801
On A380: AMM TASK 34-42-00-740-801
On A350: MP TASK A350-A-34-42-XX-00001-343A

If no equipment failure is confirmed, the observed effects are likely due to 5G interference and the RA system units should not be removed.

If the interference is observed on a US airport, the event shall be reported to the authorities through the FAA website:
https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/nas/RADALT_reports

The event shall also be reported to Airbus through Techrequest by submitting the following information:
 the aircraft registration / MSN
 the observed symptoms and the consequences on the operations (type of approach, cockpit effects, flight crew
actions, etc)
 the name of the Airport and the runway where the interferences were observed
 related NOTAM status
 the date and hour together with the QAR data
 Any other relevant information (5G Station location if available…).
5. ON-GOING ACTIONS

Airbus is actively participating in various forums (RTCA - Eurocae, French and European Task Forces, ICAO panels) on the impact of the
potential 5G interferences and has engaged since February 2020 a 5G risk management multi-function team with the objective to ensure
the continuous safe operations of airplanes by assessing potential interference between the 5G networks and aircraft systems.
To support the 5G risk management multi-function team objectives, Airbus is now engaged in the following actions:
 Co-chairing the new Radio Altimeter Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) ED-30/DO-155 to ensure future radio
altimeter performances considering current and future radio frequencies threats.

 To monitor data and report from the fleet and to identify the root causes of any radio altimeter misbehaviors.

 In order to improve the situation short term and alleviate restrictions, we are closely working with FAA, RA suppliers, other OEMs and
Telco Operators to enhance the "parametric model " currently in definition and take full benefit of RA system design & 5G Base Stations
actual behaviors. Expectation is to agree this new model within 1 to 3 weeks starting January 31st 2022.

 The status concerning mid/long term Plan is the following :

o For Honeywell ALA-52B no action required at this stage
o For LRA-700/900 no action launched at this stage
o For Collins LRA-2100, next standard for in-service fix (not linked to 5G interferences) is under certification (specific roadmap per
Program in re-definition)
o For Thales ERT-530/540/550, a new standard development has been launched, (P/N Change), with a solution to provide enhanced
(out-of-band) filtering performances to be more resilient to 5G interferences. Certification on Airbus A320Fam is expected end
2022.

 The situation is very volatile and can evolve according to the daily discussions within the AMOC Task Force and the Telco operators'
decision to maintain guaranteed power emissions levels up to July 5th, 2022.
5.1 AMOC status

 By January 13th, 2022, Airbus submitted 6 AMOCs to the FAA, one for each RA system model.
 1 for Thales ERT-530/ERT-540
 1 for Thales ERT-550
 1 for Collins LRA-700/LRA-900
 1 for Collins LRA-2100
 1 for Honeywell ALA-52B
 1 for Collins ALT-4000 (A220 only)

 By January 22nd /23rd, 2022, Telecommunication Companies delivered to FAA a new database including additional (up to 3500)
new base stations to the 5G system.

 As an outcome of the current FAA AMOC process, most of the 87 main airports/runways impacted by 5G NOTAMS were cleared.
Some differences between Radio Altimeters models can be observed, they are resulting from the RA filtering capability
translated in a different radius.

 30 January 2022, Airbus received all the AMOC approvals updated.

 These documents are available in the Airbus World portal in the Flight Ops section:
Content Library > Flight Operations > Miscellaneous > “FAA AMOC for 5G operations in the USA”

 These AMOC are approved until 28th of February: the situation being very dynamic, the FAA will regularly update the AMOC
approvals based on the known 5G antennas characteristics.

 AMOCs Annexes (Airport/Runway list) are delivered by FAA in excel sheets to ease change identification by
Operators.
 AIRCRAFT PART NUMBERS STATUS Approval reference
AMOC TYPE
9599-607-14901
9599-607-19501
A300-600/A310 9599-607-14921
9599-607-19502 APPROVED 720-22-1405A
Thales ERT-530/ERT-540 A320Family 9599-607-14932
9599-607-19503 UPDATED 720-22-1405A-RL Rev 0
A330/A340 9599-607-14942
9599-607-19504
9599-607-14943
9599-607-19994
APPROVED 720-22-1406
Thales ERT-550 A380 9599-607-19995
UPDATED 720-22-1406-RL Rev 1
9599-607-19998
A320Family
822-2365-02X APPROVED 720-22-1560A
Collins LRA-2100 A330ceo
822-2365-03X UPDATED 720-22-1560-RL Rev0
A350
A300-600/A310
622-4542-xxx APPROVED 720-22-1424A
Collins LRA-700/LRA-900 A320Family
822-0334-020 UPDATED 720-22-1424A-RL Rev 0
A330/A340
066-50007-0202
A320Family 066-50007-0232 APPROVED 720-22-1391B
Honeywell ALA-52B 066-50007-0212
A330/A340 066-50007-0432 UPDATED 720-22-1391B-RL Rev 0
066-50007-0222
APPROVED 720-22-1413
Collins ALT-4000 A220 822-0615-206
UPDATED 720-22-1413-RL Rev 2

Fleet situation: Airbus aircraft configurations (list of RA models)

6. CONCLUSION

 ILS CAT I approaches followed by manual landing, as well as conventional RNAV-GNSS approaches are not restricted by the FAA AD. As
a consequence, a vast majority of US operations remain unrestricted within 5G environment as soon as weather conditions exceed CAT I
minimum (i.e. ceiling 200ft - visibility/RVR 550m).

 In order to secure the full operational capabilities of Airbus products in the US, especially autoland, Airbus intends to obtain the approval
of Alternative Means Of Compliance (AMOC) from the FAA. Further to AMOC approval, the operator shall obtain from its authorities the
authorization to disregard 5G related NOTAMs published in the US.

 At this stage of the investigations, the Airbus system design alongside with existing flight crew procedures, provide a number of mitigations
in case of 5G perturbations. Airbus recommends that these procedures be reminded to flight crews.

 Furthermore, Airbus underlines that the 5G C-band is already deployed in some geographic areas and no adverse impact was reported in
service at this time.

 As the situation is still dynamic, Airbus remains committed to update operators as soon as any significant update is available through this
article and during the weekly webinars.

7. QUESTIONS & ANSWERS

Please refer to the “Annex Q&A.pdf” file in the attachment section of this article to get the Frequently Asked Questions received through the
TechRequest Tool or during the weekly webinars.

Survey for the Engineering Support section

Flight Operations and Training Status: Open Modification on Operational Impact: NO

OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

PERFORMANCE

Landing performance of Airbus aircraft is NOT impacted by 5G interferences on Radio Altimeters. This is the result of Airbus aircraft design that is using
multiple redundant logics to allow ground spoilers and reversers’ actuation.
Ground Spoilers
Amongst other triggering logics, ground spoilers will deploy when:
 Ground Spoiler lever is armed
 Main Landing Gear is compressed
 Both engines are at idle (Thrust lever angles TLA<3°)

Thrust Reversers (Example for A320Family logics)

 Throttle control lever is selected in reverse
 One FADEC channel is operative with its associated throttle reverse signal
 Main Landing Gear is compressed
 SEC and static relay command SOV opening

Note: At this stage of the Airbus investigations, no occurrence of erroneously RA high value has been observed; As per Airbus design, ground spoilers and
thrust reversers are not affected by 5G interferences, provided weight on wheels sensors and wheel tachometers are operative. As a consequence, landing
performance of Airbus aircraft is not impacted by 5G interferences.
 EFFECT ON THE AIRCRAFT DISPATCH

As a result of the Airbus aircraft design (that is using multiple redundant logics to allow ground spoilers and reversers actuation), it was demonstrated that the
landing performance of Airbus aircraft is not impacted by 5G interferences on Radio Altimeters.

Ground spoilers and Thrust reversers can be actuated using inputs coming from the “weight on wheels” sensors and wheel tachometers as an alternative to the
Radio Altimeters.

In order to maintain the resilience of Ground Spoilers and Thrust Reversers deployment logics, Airbus recommends not to use the following MEL items for
dispatch of flights from/to a US runway that has not been cleared through the AMOC process.

The objective is to avoid a difficult landing distance computation in flight by the flight crew, should a failure occur in flight. The situation assessment in case of
a combination of some MEL dispatch + failure in flight + RA perturbation would create an important workload.

Note: Statistics show that these MEL items affect less than 0,02% of the flights.

SYSTEM / FUNCTION MMEL ITEMS AIRCRAFT TYPE

32-31-01A A320 Family
LGCIU 2
32-31-02A A330/A340
32-32-02A/B
LGCIU 2 RH/LH L/G Shock Absorber Proximity Detector A320 Family
32-32-03A/B
32-91-01A A380
Oleo Pressure Monitoring
32-11-01A/B A330/A340
32-42-06 A320 Family
32-42-05 A330/A340
Tachometer
32-42-0xA/B/C(*) A350
32-42-09A A380
32-42-03 A330/A340
Brake and Steering Control Unit (BSCU)
32-42-04 A320 Family
CPIOM G2-G4 42-11-04A A380
32-42-13A
Remote Braking Control Units (RBCU) A350
32-42-14A
(*): On A350, the tachometer fault is covered by the items DM BRAKES BRK 0x RELEASED. Refer to the Fault Isolation Procedures A350-A-32-42-XX-YY001-
421A-A - Dispatch Message shown related to Normal Brake 0X (Released) to confirm if the DM is due to a failure of the tachometers.
 FOCUS ON DM BRAKES BR 0x RELEASED (A350)

The DM BRAKES BR 0x RELEASED (items 32-42-0x) indicate a brake in the released configuration due to:
› An Normal Servo Valve (NSV) or
› A tachometer or
› The brake shuttle valve (stuck in alternate mode) or
› A fuse (safety valve) or
› A quick disconnect coupling damaged (results in a wheel brake being permanently in the released configuration in normal braking mode).

Indicated to the flight crew by:

The BRAKES RELEASED alert (with a subtitle BRK XX RELEASED).

The message BRAKES BRK XX RELEASED is displayed on the DISPATCH page.

Indication in the cockpit on the WHEEL SD page

The tachometer wheel speed reading is monitored on ground when the aircraft is accelerating.

If not detected during previous flights and triggered during push back: Not related to the tachometers.
 FOCUS ON TAILSTRIKE PROTECTION

The tailstrike protection is a feature of the normal law introduced in the following aircraft:
A320neo family, A330neo, A330 MRTT, A340-500/600, A350 and A380

The tailstrike protection does not constitute a threat when 5G interferences are announced by NOTAMs.

This feature was not required for aircraft certification and was introduce as a safety enhancement.
Though integration may differ from one A/C type to another, the general objective of this feature remains similar.

It is designed to introduce a limited nose down order based on residual tail clearance margin during rotation.
The residual tailstrike clearance is computed from Radio Altimeters. It can always be overridden by the flight crew.

Detected loss of radio altimeters inhibits the tailstrike protection

Undetected High erroneous and consistent RA would lead to non-activation of tailstrike protection
Undetected Low erroneous and consistent RA would lead to sudden pitch rate decrease, always overridable by the flight crew when:
› Back stick input exceed predefined threshold (75% on A320 for example)
› Pitch rate objective commanded by the side stick input exceed predefined threshold (3.5°/s on A350 for example)
PROCEDURES

When a 5G related NOTAM exists at destination airport:

 Flight crew should be aware that interferences could affect the RA indication during approach, generally as aircraft reaches low heights.
 As per SOP, pilots are required to monitor and cross-check barometric and radio altitudes. Any abnormal deviation may indicate Radio Altimeter
interference.
 ILS CAT 1 and RNAV-GNSS approaches can be flown using the normal Airbus SOPs down to DH/MDH, followed by manual landing.

Note: ILS raw data (i.e. LOC and GLIDE signals) and GPS signals are not affected by potential 5G interferences.

As per SOP, In case of autoflight misbehavior while flying ILS CAT 1 approaches using AP/FDs, flight crews must:
 Be ready to discontinue the approach, and attempt a second approach without AP/FD, or
 Disconnect AP and FD (and A/THR for A300/A310) and continue the ILS manually, or
 Disconnect AP and FD (and A/THR for A300/A310) and continue the approach using external visual references

TECHNIQUES & MANEUVERS

As per FCTM Golden Rules: “Take action if things do not go as expected”

If the aircraft does not follow the desired vertical or lateral flight path, or the selected targets, and if the flight crew does not have sufficient time to analyze and
solve the situation, the flight crew must immediately take appropriate or required actions.

The PF should change the level of automation:

 From managed guidance to selected guidance, or
 From selected guidance to manual flying.

The PM should perform the following actions in sequence:

 Communicate with the PF
 Challenge the actions of the PF, when necessary
 Take over, when necessary.
ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS
We would like to take opportunity to emphasis on the following Flight Ops recommendations (underlined by the authorities) and that
remain applicable at all time:
 Pax should be reminded that the PED must not be in the baggage hold, but must be kept with them in the cabin, unless they are
secured off.
 5G compatible devices in the cabin should be set to “airplane mode” or turned off.
 For emergency communications (health emergency for instance), the crew shall only use the 3G or 4G networks.
 In accordance with the regulation (UE) 376/2014, any interference with the avionics system shall be reported by the crew to the
Traffic Control. It is therefore important that the Traffic Control have knowledge of the potential 5G impact on the RA in order to
take appropriate operational measures and inform the airport authorities if the 5G interference is suspected.

Survey for the Flight Operations and Training section

 Annex

General Information
Potential impact: Safety - Flight Operations
Key information:
Solution benefit:
First issue date: 09-FEB-2021 Issue date: 02-FEB-2022 Last check date: 04-FEB-2022

Technical parameters
ATA: 34-42
A/C type/serie: A300, A300-600, A310, A318, A319, A320, A321, A330, A340, A350, A380
Engine:
Engine manufacturer:
Fault code/ECAM
warning:
FIN:
Part Number:
Supplier:

Attachments
General:
- EASA_AD_US-2021-23-12_1.pdf
- FRC_Document_AD-2021-01169-T-D.pdf
- FAASAIBAIR-21-185.pdf
- DGACBulletin-info_securite_2021_01_IS_Brouillage_5G(1).pdf
- RTCASC-239-5G-Interference-Assessment-Report_274-20-PMC-2073_accepted_changes.pdf
- ANNEXQ&A20220203.pdf
Links
Other articles (ISI/TFU):
- 34.42.00.020, 34.42.00.022

© Airbus SAS, 2022. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.The technical information provided in this article is for convenience and information purposes only. It
shall in no case replace the official Airbus technical or Flight Operations data which shall remain the sole basis for aircraft maintenance and operation. These recommendations and
information do not constitute a contractual commitment, warranty or guarantee whatsoever. They shall not supersede the Airbus technical nor operational documentation; should
any deviation appear between this article and the Airbus or airline's official manuals, the operator must ensure to cover it with the appropriate document such as TA, FCD, RDAS.
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