Part Ii (Legal and Judicial Ethics - Remedial Law)

PART II (LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS – REMEDIAL LAW)
LEGAL ETHICS -- is the embodiment of all principles of morality and refinement that should govern
the conduct of every member of the bar.
(LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS (2009), AGPALO, PAGE 2 )
BAR -- the whole body of attorneys and body of judges.

(BASIC LEGAL ETHICS (2017), DIZON, PAGE 62 )
ATTORNEY – AT – -- class of persons who are by license officers of the courts, empowered to appear,
LAW prosecute and defend and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities
are developed by law as a consequence.
(BASIC LEGAL ETHICS (2017), DIZON, PAGE 62 )
ATTORNEY – AT – -- an agent whose authority is strictly limited by the instrument appointing him,
FACT though he may do things not mentioned in his appointment necessary to the
performance of the duties specifically required of him by the power of attorney
appointing him, such authority being necessarily implied.
(PINEDA, supra at PAGE 8 )
FOUR FOLD DUTIES OF A LAWYER

1) DUTIES TO SOCIETY;
2) DUTIES TO LEGAL PROFESSION;
3) DUTIES TO THE COURTS; AND
4) DUTIES TO THEIR CLIENTS (A.C. NO. 11350)
1) DUTIES TO SOCIETY;
To uphold the CONSTITUTION, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal
processes.
2) DUTIES TO LEGAL PROFESSION;

To uphold the dignity, and integrity of the legal profession.
3) DUTIES TO THE COURTS; AND

To be candid with and promote respect for the courts and judicial officers, and assist the courts in rendering
speedy and efficient justice.
4) DUTIES TO THEIR CLIENTS

To observe:
i. candor, fairness and loyalty to the client;
ii. hold client’s money and property in trust;
iii. serve the client with competence and diligence; and
iv. to preserve the confidence of the client. (A.C. NO. 11350)
REQUIREMENTS FOR ALL APPLICANTS FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR

Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be: (GRACE –F)
1) of Good moral character,
2) Resident of the Philippines;
3) At least 21 years of age, and
4) a Citizen of the Philippines, and
5) must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory Evidence of good moral character, and
6) that NO charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been Filed or are pending in any court in the
Philippines. (RULE 138, SECTION 2)
WHO MAY PRACTICE LAW

Any person:
1) duly admitted as a member of the bar, or
By: Caffeinated Wisdom

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2) admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the RULES OF COURT, and
3) who is in good and regular standing,
is entitled to practice law. (RULE 138, SECTION 1)
RATIONALE:
Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as: (FPOSR)
1) Furnishing satisfactory proof of educational, moral and other qualifications;
2) Passing the bar examinations;
3) taking the lawyer’s Oath and
4) Signing the roll of attorneys and
5) Receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of the license to practice. (B.M. No. 1678)
The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in good standing ― is a continuing requirement. This
means: (MPO)
1) continued Membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual membership dues in the IBP;
2) Payment of the annual professional tax; compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement;
3) faithful Observance of the rules and ethics of the legal profession and being continually subject to judicial
disciplinary control.
Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law in the Philippines? No.
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens
save in cases prescribed by law. Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof
terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law.
In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the
Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country
but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225.
This is because "all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed NOT to have
lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]."
Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his
Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to
have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, NO automatic right to resume law practice accrues.
(B.M. No. 1678)
PRACTICE OF -- means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
LAW procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
(G.R. No. 100113)
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law.
One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney
and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law.
Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto
constitutes a practice of law.
One who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that
extent, practicing law. (Bar Matter No. 553)
RIGHT TO PRACTICE LAW IS A PRIVILEGE

The right to practice law is NOT a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege.

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It is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The
exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even
public trust since a lawyer is an officer of the court.
A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations.
The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the
person seeking admission had practiced law without a license.
The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict.
In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad, a candidate passed the bar examinations but had NOT taken his oath and signed the
Roll of Attorneys.
He was held in contempt of court for practicing law even before his admission to the Bar.
Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized practice of
law is liable for indirect contempt of court. (B. M. No. 1036)
STUDY OF LAW
The definition of the practice of law, NO matter how broad, CANNOT be further enlarged as to cover the
study of law.
Section 5, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is not directed to law schools, but to those who would like to
take the bar examinations and enumerates the academic competencies required of them. The Court does not impose
upon law schools what courses to teach, or the degree to grant, but prescribes only the core academic courses which
it finds essential for an applicant to be admitted to the bar. Law schools enjoy the autonomy to teach or not to teach
these courses.
The State has a "high responsibility for [the] education of its citizens"190 and has an interest in prescribing
regulations to promote the education, and consequently, the general welfare of the people.191 The regulation or
administration of educational institutions, especially on the tertiary level, is invested with public interest.192 Thus,
the enactment of education laws, implementing rules and regulations and issuances of government agencies is an
exercise of the State's police power.
As a professional educational program, legal education properly falls within the supervisory and regulatory
competency of the State.
NMAT is a valid exercise of police power because the method employed, i.e., regulation of admissions to
medical education is reasonably related to the subject, i.e., the protection of the public by ensuring that only
those qualified are eventually allowed to practice medicine.
In general, R.A. No. 7662, as a law meant to uplift the quality of legal education, does not encroach upon the
Court's jurisdiction to promulgate rules under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution.
It is well-within the jurisdiction of the State, as an exercise of its inherent police power, to lay down laws
relative to legal education, the same being imbued with public interest. (G.R. No. 230642)
LAWYERS EMPLOYED IN THE GOVERNMENT

Work in government that requires the use of legal knowledge is considered practice of law.
This court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law.
When this court orders a lawyer suspended from the practice of law, the lawyer must desist from performing
all functions requiring the application of legal knowledge within the period of suspension.
This includes desisting from holding a position in government requiring the authority to practice law.
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The exercise of the powers and functions of a Commission on Human Rights Regional Director constitutes practice
of law. Thus, the Regional Director must be an attorney - a member of the bar in good standing and authorized to
practice law. When the Regional Director loses this authority, such as when he or she is disbarred or suspended from
the practice of law, the Regional Director loses a necessary qualification to the position he or she is holding. The
disbarred or suspended lawyer must desist from holding the position of Regional Director. (A.C. No. 5377)
NATURE OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW

1) It is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and morality, including
honesty, integrity, and fair dealing. (A.C. NO. 11350)
2) It CANNOT be assigned or inherited. (B.M. NO. 553)
3) It is a profession and NOT a business. (A.C. NO. 10164)
4) It is burdened with conditions. (G.R. NO. 79690 – 707)
1) It is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and morality, including
honesty, integrity, and fair dealing. (A.C. NO. 11350)
2) It CANNOT be assigned or inherited. (B.M. NO. 553)
3) It is a profession and NOT a business. (A.C. NO. 10164)

In this day and age, members of the bar often forget that the practice of law is a profession and NOT a business.
Lawyering is NOT primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is NOT a capital that
necessarily yields profits.
The gaining of a livelihood is not a professional but a secondary consideration.
Duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers,
who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves.
The practice of law is a noble calling in which emolument is a byproduct, and the highest eminence may be attained
without making much money. (AC No. 99 – 634)
4) It is burdened with conditions.

There should be faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession, maintenance of the highest degree
of morality, and adherence to the standards of mental fitness. (G.R. NO. 79690 – 707)
RATIONALE:
A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor NOT only protects the interest of his client, he also
serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal
profession. (A.C. No. 9976)
CRITERIA FOR THE PRACTICE OF LAW (CHAR)

1) COMPENSATION
2) HABITUALITY
3) APPLICATION OF LAW, LEGAL PRINCIPLE, PRACTICE OR PROCEDURE WHICH CALLS FOR
LEGAL KNOWLEDGE, TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE
4) ATTORNEY – CLIENT RELATIONSHIP (AGPALO, supra at 39)
1) COMPENSATION
It implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active practice and that his professional services
are available to the public for compensation, as a source of livelihood or in consideration of his said service.
(G.R. NO. L - 19450)
2) HABITUALITY
It implies customarily or habitually holding oneself out to the public as a lawyer.
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However, an isolated appearance may constitute practice of law when there is a rule prohibiting some persons
from engaging in the exercise of the legal profession. (G.R. NO. L - 19450)
3) APPLICATION OF LAW, LEGAL PRINCIPLE, PRACTICE OR PROCEDURE WHICH CALLS FOR

LEGAL KNOWLEDGE, TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE
4) ATTORNEY – CLIENT RELATIONSHIP

Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of a lawyer – client relationship. (AGPALO, supra at
39)
A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment complainant asked respondent for
legal advice regarding the former's business.
To constitute professional employment, it is NOT essential that the client employed the attorney professionally
on any previous occasion.
It is NOT necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged;

neither is it material that the attorney consulted did NOT afterward handle the case for which his service had
been sought.
If a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining
professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation,
then the professional employment is established.
Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal relationship between the
lawyer and the complainant or the nonpayment of the former's fees.
Hence, despite the fact that complainant was kumpadre of a law partner of respondent, and that respondent
dispensed legal advice to complainant as a personal favor to the kumpadre, the lawyer was duty-bound to file the
complaint he had agreed to prepare -- and had actually prepared -- at the soonest possible time, in order to protect
the client's interest. Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that lawyers should not neglect
legal matters entrusted to them. (AC No. 99 – 634)
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES

Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights
and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the
following conditions:
4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a
license or permit to engage in such practice; and (R.A. 9225, SECTION 5)
FORMER FILIPINO LAWYER REACQUIRES CITIZENSHIP

A Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship
under R.A. No. 9225, remains to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
However, as stated in Dacanay, the right to resume the practice of law is NOT automatic.
R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who intends to practice his profession in the Philippines must apply
with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice. (B.M. No. 2112)
Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for the practice of law, the OBC required the herein
petitioner to submit the original or certified true copies of the following documents in relation to his petition:
(POCO – C – PIC)
1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;
2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
3. Certificate of Good Standing issued by the IBP;
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4. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;

5. Certification from the IBP indicating updated payments of annual membership dues;
6. Proof of payment of professional tax;
7. Identification Certificate (IC) issued by the Bureau of Immigration; and
8. Certificate of compliance issued by the MCLE Office. (B.M. No. 2112)
REQUIREMENTS FOR A LICENSE OR PERMIT TO ENGAGE IN LAW PRACTICE

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino
citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in
such practice."
Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law
practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on: (UPCR)
a) the Updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;
b) the Payment of professional tax;
c) the Completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is specially significant to
refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and
d) the Retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will NOT only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer
and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
B.M. No. 1678
FAILURE TO SIGN ROLLS OF ATTORNEY

In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad, a candidate passed the bar examinations but had NOT taken his oath and signed the
Roll of Attorneys.
He was held in contempt of court for practicing law even before his admission to the Bar.
Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized practice of
law is liable for indirect contempt of court. (B. M. No. 1036)
As Medado is NOT yet a full-fledged lawyer, we CANNOT suspend him from the practice of law.
However, we see it fit to impose upon him a penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys 1 year after receipt of this Resolution. (B.M. No. 2540)
INDIRET CONTEMPT TO BE PUNISHED AFTER CHARGE AND HEARING FOR AUTHORIZED

PRACTICE OF LAW
A person guilty of Assuming to be an Attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority may
be punished for indirect contempt. (AA) (RULE 71, SECTION 1(e))
REQUIREMENTS FOR ALL APPLICANTS FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR

Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be: (GRACE –F)
1) of Good moral character,
2) Resident of the Philippines;
3) At least 21 years of age, and
4) a Citizen of the Philippines, and
5) must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory Evidence of good moral character, and
6) that NO charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been Filed or are pending in any court in the
Philippines. (RULE 138, SECTION 2)
ESSENCE OF GOOD MORAL CHARACTER

GOOD MORAL CHARACTER is NOT only a condition precedent relating to his admission into the practice
of law, but is also continuing imposition in order for him to maintain his membership in the bar. (A.C. NO.
10179)
ADMISSION AND OATH OF SUCCESSFUL APPLICANTS

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An applicant who has passed the required examination, or has been otherwise found to be entitled to admission
to the bar, shall take and subscribe before the Supreme Court the corresponding oath of office. (RULE 138,
SECTION 17)
LAWYER’S OATH
I, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
I will support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities
therein;
I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court;
I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent
to the same;
I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my
knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and
I impose upon myself these voluntary obligations without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So
help me God.
SIGNIFICANCE OF LAWYER’S OATH

The significance of the lawyer’s oath is that it NOT only impresses upon the attorney his responsibilities, but
it also stamps him as an officer of the court with rights, powers and oath of a lawyer is a condensed code of
legal ethics.
It is a source of his obligation, and its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment, or other disciplinary
action. (AGPALO, LEGAL ETHICS, 5TH EDITION, PAGE 59)
ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR OTHER APPLICANTS

A Filipino citizen who graduated from a foreign law school shall be admitted to the bar examination only upon
submission to the Supreme Court of certifications showing:
1) completion of all courses leading to the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent degree;
2) recognition or accreditation of the law school by the proper authority; and
3) completion of all the fourth year subjects in the Bachelor of Laws academic program in a law school duly
recognized by the Philippine Government. (As amended by B.M. No. 1153, March 09, 2010) (RULE 138,
SECTION 5)
USING THE APPELLATION ATTORNEY

court has already had occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the
Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts.
While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both
be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is
an "attorney."
The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who:

1) having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations,
2) have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing;
and
it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction. (A.C. No. 5170)
ATTORNEY’S ROLL
The clerk of the Supreme Court shall kept a roll of all attorneys admitted to practice, which roll shall be signed
by the person admitted when he receives his certificate. (RULE 138, SECTION 19)
DUTIES OF ATTORNEYS
It is the duty of an attorney: (A – DANCER – AI)
1) To maintain Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey the laws of
the Philippines.

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2) In the Defense of a person accused of crime, by all fair and honorable means, regardless of his personal opinion
as to the guilt of the accused, to present every defense that the law permits, to the end that no person may be
deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of law.
3) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as Appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he
believes to be honestly debatable under the law.
4) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed;
5) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means only as are Consistent with
truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or
law;
6) NOT to Encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or proceeding, or delay any man's
cause, from any corrupt motive or interest;
7) To observe and maintain the Respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers;
8) To Abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party
or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged;
9) To maintain Inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to
accept no compensation in connection with his client's business except from him or with his knowledge and
approval; (RULE 138, SECTION 20)
DIRECT CONTEMPT PUNISHED SUMMARILY

A person guilty of misbehavior in: (P – NO – DORS)
1) the Presence of or (P)
2) so Near a court (N)
3) as to Obstruct or Interrupt the proceedings before the court, (O)
4) including Disrespect toward the Court, (D)
5) Offensive Personalities toward others, (O) or
6) Refusal to be sworn or to answer as a Witness, (R) or
7) to Subscribe an affidavit or deposition when Lawfully required to do so, (S)
may be summarily adjudged in contempt by such court and punished by a fine NOT exceeding PHP.2,000.00
or imprisonment NOT exceeding 10 days, or both, if it be a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher
rank, or
by a fine NOT exceeding PHP.200.00 or imprisonment NOT exceeding 1 day, or both, if it be a lower court. (1a)
(SECTION 1)
PUNISHMENT FOR DIRECT CONTEPT

If the respondent is adjudged guilty of direct contempt committed against:
1) a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, he may be punished by a a fine NOT exceeding
PHP.2,000.00 or imprisonment NOT exceeding 10 days, or both
2) a Municipal Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, by a fine NOT exceeding PHP.200.00 or
imprisonment NOT exceeding 1 day, or both. (1a) (SECTION 1)
PRESUMPTION OF AUTHORITY OF ATTORNEY TO APPEAR

GENERAL RULE:
An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and NO
written power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for his client,
EXCEPTION:
but the presiding judge may, on motion of either party and on reasonable grounds therefor being shown,
require any attorney who assumes the right to appear in a case to produce or prove the authority under
which he appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of the person who employed
him, and may thereupon make such order as justice requires.
PROVIDED:
An attorneys wilfully appear in court for a person without being employed, unless by leave of the court, may
be punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transactions. (RULE 138,
SECTION 21)
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EFFECTS OF AN UNAUTHORIZED APPEARANCE;

1) Party is NOT bound by the attorney’s appearance in the case or by the judgment rendered therein.
2) Court does NOT acquire jurisdiction over the person if the party has not been served with summons.
3) The adverse party who has been forced to litigate as a defendant by the unauthorized action on the part of
the attorney for the plaintiff may, on that ground, move for the dismissal of the complaint. (G.R. NO. L –
12289)
4) A person guilty of Assuming to be an Attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority
may be punished for indirect contempt. (AA) (RULE 71, SECTION 3(e))
ATTORNEY WHO APPEARS IN LOWER COURT PRESUMED TO REPRESENT CLIENT ON APPEAL

An attorney who appears de parte in a case before a lower court shall be presumed to continue representing his
client on appeal, unless he files a formal petition withdrawing his appearance in the appellate court. (RULE
138, SECTION 22)
AUTHORITY OF ATTORNEYS TO BIND CLIENTS

Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by: (ATM)
1) any Agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and
2) in Taking appeals, and
3) in all Matters of ordinary judicial procedure. (RULE 138, SECTION 23)
EXCEPTIONS:
1) GROSS NEGLIGENCE
2) AUTHORITY TO APPEAL
3) AUTHORITY TO DISMISS A CASE
1) GROSS NEGLIGENCE
REQUISITES OF GROSS NEGLIGENCE: (JDN)
i. The counsel has been grossly negligent to Justify a new trial;
ii. The client has good and meritorious Defense;
iii. The client is Not himself guilty of gross negligence. (G.R. NO. 125272)
2) AUTHORITY TO APPEAL
A lawyer has NOT right to waive his right to appeal without the client’s knowledge and consent. (A.C. NO.
5718)
3) AUTHORITY TO DISMISS A CASE

A lawyer had NO authority to dismiss his client case with prejudice even if he does NOT believe that his client
is entitled to prevail in the action. (AGPALO, supra at 346)
LIMITATION OF AUTHORITY OF ATTORNEYS TO BIND CLIENTS

But they CANNOT, without special authority, compromise their client's litigation, or receive anything in
discharge of a client's claim but the full amount in cash. (RULE 138, SECTION 23)
FORM OF COMPROMISE
NO particular form of agreement is essential to the validity of a compromise. (G.R. NO. L – 34998)
AUTHORITY TO APPEAL
A lawyer has NO right to waive the appeal without the client’s knowledge and consent. (A.C. NO. 5718)
COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY IN LAW FIRM PRACTICIONERS

as name practitioner of the law office, Atty. Inocentes is tasked with the responsibility to make reasonable efforts
to ensure that all lawyers in the firm should act in conformity to the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Partners and practitioners who hold supervisory capacities are legally responsible to exert ordinary diligence
in apprising themselves of the comings and goings of the cases handled by the persons over which they are
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exercising supervisory authority and in exerting necessary efforts to foreclose the occurrence of violations of
the CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY by persons under their charge. (A.C. NO. 6504)
SIGNATURE AND ADDRESS

Every pleading and other written submissions to the court must be signed by the party or counsel representing
him or her. (RULE 7, SECTION 3)
OBLIGATORY FORCE OF CONTRACTS

Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be
complied with in good faith. (1091a) (NEW CIVIL CODE, ARTICLE 1159)
COMPENSATION OF ATTORNEYS / QUANTUM MERUIT (as much as he deserves)

An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client NO more than a reasonable compensation for his
services, with a view to: (PIE)
1) the Professional standing of the attorney.
2) the Importance of the subject matter of the controversy, and
3) the Extent of the services rendered,
RATIONALE:
NO court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may
disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge.
A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be
unconscionable or unreasonable. (RULE 138, SECTION 24)
COMPENSATION OF ATTORNEYS / QUANTUM MERUIT (as much as he deserves)

An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client NO more than a reasonable compensation for his
services, with a view to: (PIE)
1) the Professional standing of the attorney.
2) the Importance of the subject matter of the controversy, and
3) the Extent of the services rendered,
NON – LAWYERS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES

imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition to the recovery of attorney's fees.
Such a relationship CANNOT exist unless the client's representative in court be a lawyer.
Since respondent Muning is not one, he CANNOT establish an attorney-client relationship with Enrique
Entila and Victorino Tenezas or with PAFLU, and he cannot, therefore, recover attorney's fees.
Certainly public policy demands that legal work in representation of parties litigant should be entrusted only to those
possessing tested qualifications and who are sworn, to observe the rules and the ethics of the profession, as well as
being subject to judicial disciplinary control for the protection of courts, clients and the public.
NO one is entitled to recover compensation for services as an attorney at law unless he has been duly
admitted to practice ... and is an attorney in good standing at the time. (G.R. NO. L – 23959)
UNLAWFUL RETENTION OF CLIENT’S FUNDS

When an attorney unjustly retains in his hands money of his client after it has been demanded, he may be
punished for contempt as an officer of the Court who has misbehaved in his official transactions;
but proceedings under this section shall NOT be a bar to a criminal prosecution. (RULE 138, SECTION 25)
EXPRESS CONTRACT IN CONTINGENT FEE

"an attorney is NOT entitled to a percentage of the amount recovered by his client in the absence of an express
contract to that effect" (7 C.J.S. 1063 citing Thurston v. Travelers Ins. Co., 258 N.W. 66, 128 Neb. 141). (G.R. No.
L-40424)

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KINDS OF ATTORNEY’S LIEN

1) RETAINING LIEN
2) CHARGING LIEN
RETAINING LIEN -- is the right of the attorney to retain the funds, documents, and papers of his client
which have lawfully come into his possession until his lawful fees and disbursements
have been paid and to apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof.
(72 Phil. 133)
CHARGING LIEN -- is the right which the attorney has upon all judgments for the payment of money,
and executions issued in pursuance of said judgments, which he has secured in
litigation of his client.
(72 Phil. 133)
RETAINING LIEN CHARGING LIEN

AS TO NATURE
PASSIVE LIEN. ACTIVE LIEN.
It cannot be actively enforced. It is general lien. It can be enforced by execution. It is a special lien.
AS TO BASIS
Lawful possession of papers, documents, and property Securing of a favorable money judgment for the client.
belonging to the client.
AS TO COVERAGE
Covers paper, documents, and properties in the lawful Covers all judgments for the payment of money and
possession of the attorney by reason of his professional execution issued in pursuance of such judgments,
employment. proceeds of judgment in favour of the client, proceeds of
compromise settlement.
RETAINING LIEN CHARGING LIEN

AS TO EFFECTIVITY
As soon as the attorney gets possession of the papers, As soon as the claim for attorney’s fees had been entered
documents, or property. into the records of the case.
AS TO NOTICE
Client need NOT be notified to make it effective. Notice must be served upon client and adverse party.
AS TO APPLICABILITY
May be exercised before judgment or execution Generally, exercisable only when the attorney had
regardless thereof. already secured a favorable judgment for his client.
AS TO EXTINGUISHMENT
When possession lawfully ends as when the lawyer When the client losses the action as the lien may only be
voluntarily parts with the funds, documents, and paper enforced against a judgment awarded in favor of the
but NOT when documents have been improperly or client, the proceeds thereof or executions thereon.
illegally taken from lawyer’s custody.
(PINEDA, supra at 388 and AGPALO, supra at 450
– 459)
PROPERTY TO WHICH CHARGING LIEN ATTACHES

An attorney’s charging lien, once duly recorded, and attaches to the judgment for the payment of money and
the executions issued in pursuance of such judgment.
The charging lien does NOT attach property or land in litigation. (G.R. NO. 88866)

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KINDS OF ATTORNEY’S FEES:

1) ORDINARY ATTORNEY’S FEES
2) EXTRAORDINARY ATTORNEY’S FEES
ORDINARY -- the attorney’s fee is the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his
ATTORNEY’S FEES client for the legal services he has rendered to the latter.
EXTRAORDINARY -- the attorney’s fee is an indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be
ATTORNEY’S FEES paid by the losing party in a litigation to the prevailing party.
(G.R. NO. 120592)
ORDINARY ATTORNEY’S FEES EXTRAORDINARY ATTORNEY’S FEES

AS TO WHOM PAID
Paid to the lawyer. GENERAL RULE:
Paid to the client.
EXCEPTION:
Paid to the lawyer when there is an agreement that
the award shall pertain to the lawyer as an additional
compensation or as part thereof.
AS TO BASIS
The fact of employment by the client. Any of the cases authorized by law.
(A.C. NO. 5067)
LIABILITY FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND EXPENSES OF LITIGATION

GENERAL RULE:
In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be
recovered,
EXCEPTION:
except: (BUS – CALM – WILD)
1) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident Bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid, just
and demandable claim;
2) In case of a clearly Unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;
3) In a Separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;
4) In any other case where the Court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should
be recovered;
5) When exemplary damages are Awarded;
6) In actions for Legal support;
7) In criminal cases of Malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;
8) In actions for the recovery of Wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;
9) In actions for Indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws;
10) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to Litigate with third persons or to incur
expenses to protect his interest;
11) When at least Double judicial costs are awarded;
In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable. (NEW CIVIL CODE, ARTICLE
2208)
OBLIGATION CONSISTS IN THE PAYMENT OF A SUM OF MONEY

If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for
damages, there being NO stipulation to the contrary, shall be: (A – 6%)
1) the payment of the interest Agreed upon, and

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2) in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which is 6% per annum. (1108) (NEW CIVIL CODE,
ARTICLE 2209)
IMPOSITION OF LEGAL INTEREST

Article 2209 of the Civil Code does NOT even justify the imposition of legal interest on the payment of
attorney's fees as it is a provision of law governing ordinary obligations and contracts.
It deleted the 6% interest imposed by the appellate court on the payment of attorney's fees.
The imposition of legal interest on the amount payable to private respondent as attorney's fees is
unwarranted.
Even as we agree that parties can freely stipulate on the terms of payment, still the imposition of interest in the
payment of attorney's fees is NOT justified.
Contracts for attorney's services in this jurisdiction stands upon an entirely different footing from contracts
for the payment of compensation for any other services.
An attorney is NOT entitled in the absence of express contract to recover more than a reasonable compensation for
his services; and even when an express contract is made, the court can ignore it and limit the recovery to
reasonable compensation if the amount of the stipulated fee is found by the court to be unreasonable. (G.R.
No. 160334)
EFFECTIVITY OF ATTORNEY’S LIEN

Under this rule, this lien, whether retaining or charging, takes legal effect only from and after, but NOT
before, notice of said lien has been entered in the record and served on the adverse party. (66 Phil., 590)
UNLAWFUL RETENTION OF CLIENT’S FUNDS

When an attorney unjustly retains in his hands money of his client after it has been demanded, he may be
punished for contempt as an officer of the Court who has misbehaved in his official transactions.
But proceedings under this section shall NOT be a bar to a criminal prosecution. (RULE 138, SECTION 25)
CHANGE OF ATTORNEYS
An attorney may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding, by the written consent of his client
filed in court.
He may also retire at any time from an action or special proceeding,

without the consent of his client,
should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing,
determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. (RULE 138, SECTION 26)
In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in place
of the former one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the advance party.
A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his place,
but if the contract between client and attorney has been reduced to writing and the dismissal of the attorney was
without justifiable cause, he shall be entitled to recover from the client the full compensation stipulated in the
contract.
However, the attorney may, in the discretion of the court, intervene in the case to protect his rights. (RULE
138, SECTION 26)

Page 13
For the payment of his compensation the attorney shall have a lien upon all judgments for the payment of
money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgment, rendered in the case wherein his services had
been retained by the client.
In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in place
of the former one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the advance party. (RULE 138, SECTION 26)
RATIONALE:
The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relation at
any time with or without cause.
The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is, however,
considerably restricted.
Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action
impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. He is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause.
A lawyer's right to withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises only from the client's written
consent or from a good cause.
A lawyer may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding with the written consent of his client filed in
court and copy thereof served upon the adverse party. Should the client refuse to give his consent, the lawyer must
file an application with the court. The court, on notice to the client and adverse party, shall determine whether he
ought to be allowed to retire. The application for withdrawal must be based on a good cause.
The lawyer has NO right to presume that his petition for withdrawal will be granted by the court.
Until his withdrawal shall have been approved, the lawyer remains counsel of record who is expected by his
client as well as by the court to do what the interests of his client require.
He must still appear on the date of hearing for the attorney-client relation does not terminate formally until there is a
withdrawal of record. (A.C. No. 3773)
CHANGE OF ATTORNEYS
An attorney may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding,
by the written consent of his client filed in court.
He may also retire at any time from an action or special proceeding,

without the consent of his client,
should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing,
determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. (RULE 138, SECTION 26)
ILLUSTRATION:
A lawyer who desires to retire from an action without the written consent of his client
must file a petition for withdrawal in court.
He must serve a copy of his petition upon his client and the adverse party at least 3 days before the date set
for hearing, otherwise the court may treat the application as a "mere scrap of paper."
The circumstances of the case show that Atty. Cristobal made NO such move. (A.C. NO. 12146)
Page 14
CHANGE OF ATTORNEYS
XXXXX
A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his place,
but if the contract between client and attorney has been reduced to writing and the dismissal of the attorney was
without justifiable cause, he shall be entitled to recover from the client the full compensation stipulated in the
contract.
However, the attorney may, in the discretion of the court, intervene in the case to protect his rights. (RULE
138, SECTION 26)
CLIENT WHO EMPLOY’S A LAW FIRM

a client who employs a law firm engages the entire law firm;
hence, the resignation, retirement or separation from the law firm of the handling lawyer does NOT
terminate the relationship, because the law firm is bound to provide a replacement.
A compromise agreement is a contract, whereby the parties undertake reciprocal obligations to avoid litigation, or
put an end to one already commenced.
The client may enter into a compromise agreement with the adverse party to terminate the litigation before a
judgment is rendered therein.
If the compromise agreement is found to be in order and NOT contrary to law, morals, good customs and
public policy, its judicial approval is in order.
A compromise agreement, once approved by final order of the court, has the force of res judicata between the parties
and will not be disturbed except for vices of consent or forgery.
A client has an undoubted right to settle her litigation without the intervention of the attorney, for the former
is generally conceded to have exclusive control over the subject matter of the litigation and may at anytime, if
acting in good faith, settle and adjust the cause of action out of court before judgment, even without the
attorney’s intervention.
It is important for the client to show, however, that the compromise agreement does not adversely affect third
persons who are not parties to the agreement.
By the same token, a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relationship at any time
with or without cause.
But this right of the client is NOT unlimited because good faith is required in terminating the relationship.
The limitation is based on Article 19 of the Civil Code, which mandates that "every person must, in the exercise of
his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith." The right is also subject to the right of the attorney to be compensated. This is clear from Section 26, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
To be sure, the LAWYER’S OR Intervenor’s withdrawal from the case NEITHER cancelled NOR
terminated the written agreement on the contingent attorney’s fees.
Nor did the withdrawal constitute a waiver of the agreement. (G.R. No. 183952)
TWO OR MORE PERSONS / JOINT – TORT FEASORS

Page 15
The responsibility of 2 or more persons who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary. (n) (NEW CIVIL CODE,
ARTICLE 2194)
RATIONALE:
Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons, although acting
independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it is
impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible
for the whole injury. x x x
Joint tort-feasors are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as if they had
performed the wrongful act themselves.
It is likewise not an excuse for any of the joint tort-feasors that individual participation in the tort was insignificant
as compared to that of the other.
To stress, joint tort-feasors are NOT liable pro rata.

The damages CANNOT be apportioned among them, except by themselves.
They CANNOT insist upon an apportionment, for the purpose of each paying an aliquot part.
They are jointly and severally liable for the whole amount.
Thus, as joint tort-feasors, Malvar and the respondents should be held solidarily liable to the Intervenor. There is no
way of appreciating these circumstances except in this light.
Were the EMPLOYERS also liable?

The respondents would be liable if they were shown to have connived with Malvar in the execution of the
compromise agreement, with the intention of depriving the Intervenor of its attorney’s fees.
Thereby, they would be solidarily liable with her for the attorney’s fees as stipulated in the written agreement
under the theory that they unfairly and unjustly interfered with the Intervenor’s professional relationship with
Malvar. (G.R. No. 183952)
IMMORAL CONDUCT VS. GROSSLY IMMORAL CONDUCT
IMMORAL -- "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to
CONDUCT the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community"
(7 C.J.S. 959). (A.M. No. 1608)
GROSS IMMORAL -- Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or
MISCONDUCT so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under
such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of
decency.
(A.C. No. 5816)
RATIONALE:
The Court makes these distinctions, as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly
immoral, not simply immoral, conduct.
MORAL -- an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes
TORPITUDE his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals."
(A.C. No. 6792)
"It (moral turpitude) implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is punishable by law or
not.
It must not be merely mala prohibita, but the act itself must be inherently immoral.

Page 16
The doing of the act itself, and NOT its prohibition by statute fixes the moral turpitude.
Moral turpitude does NOT, however, include such acts as are NOT of themselves immoral but whose
illegality lies in their being positively prohibited." (G.R. No. 180363)
CRIMES INVOLVING MORAL TORPITUDE

Zari v. Flores is one case that has provided jurisprudence its own list of crimes involving moral turpitude, namely:
(FM – BABE – BRACE – M – COME – DBP – F – FEELS)
1) Forgery,
2) Making fraudulent proof of loss on insurance contract,
3) Barratry,
4) Adultery,
5) Bigamy,
6) Evasion of income tax,
7) Blackmail,
8) Rape,
9) Arson,
10) Concubinage,
11) Embezzlement,
12) Murder,
13) Criminal conspiracy to smuggle opium,
14) Offenses against pension laws,
15) Mutilation of public records,
16) Extortion,
17) Dueling,
18) Bribery,
19) Perjury,
20) Fabrication of evidence,
21) Falsification of public document,
22) Estafa,
23) Estafa thru falsification of public document,
24) Libel,
25) Seduction under the promise of marriage, (G.R. No. 180363)
CRIMES NOT INVOLVING MORAL TORPITUDE

The Court, on the other hand, has also had the occasion to categorically rule that certain crimes do not involve moral
turpitude, namely:
1. Minor transgressions of the law (i.e., conviction for speeding)
2. Illegal recruitment
3. Slight physical injuries and carrying of deadly weapon (Illegal possession of firearms)
4. Indirect Contempt (G.R. No. 180363)
Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime.
Moral turpitude is NOT involved in every criminal act and
is NOT shown by every known and intentional violation of statute,
but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude
may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. (A.C. No. 6792)
CRIMES INVOLVING MORAL TORPITUDE
GROSS MISCONDUCT -- any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of a person
concerned with the administration of justice;
i.e., conduct prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of the
cause.
(A.C. No. 7389)

Page 17
ATTORNEYS REMOVED OR SUSPENDED BY SUPREME COURT ON WHAT GROUNDS

A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for:
(GOOD – SCAM)
1) Grossly immoral conduct, or
2) for any violation of the Oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or
3) Other gross misconduct in such office,
4) any Deceit,
5) for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful Order of a Superior court, or
6) for corruptly or willful Appearing as an attorney for a party to a case Without authority so to do, or
7) Malpractice, or
8) by reason of his Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, (RULE 138, SECTION 27)
RATIONALE:
The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the preservative and NOT on the vindictive
principle, with great caution and only for the most weighty reasons and only on clear cases of misconduct
which seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the Bar.
Only those acts which cause loss of moral character should merit disbarment or suspension, while those acts
which neither affect nor erode the moral character of the lawyer should only justify a lesser sanction unless
they are of such nature and to such extent as to clearly show the lawyer's unfitness to continue in the practice
of law.
The dubious character of the act charged as well as the motivation which induced the lawyer to commit it must be
clearly demonstrated before suspension or disbarment is meted out. The mitigating or aggravating circumstances
that attended the commission of the offense should also be considered. (A.C. No. 12125)
EFFECT OF DEATH OF LAWYER DURING PENDENCY OF DISCIPLINARY ACTION

This Court's disciplinary powers must always be read alongside the guarantee of any respondent's fundamental
rights. Any attempt to exercise our disciplinary powers must always take into account the provisions of the
Constitution, from which these disciplinary powers are derived.
It is a settled doctrine that a disciplinary case against a court official or employee may continue, even if the
officer has ceased to hold office during the pendency of the case.
Cessation from office may either be voluntary or involuntary.

Thus, the doctrinal safeguard against the dismissal of disciplinary cases prevents erring officers and
employees from escaping liability by voluntarily ceasing to hold office, either through resignation or optional
retirement.
Compulsory retirement is likewise covered by this doctrinal safeguard, even though this is an involuntary cessation
from office. After all, retirees know when they will retire. Prospective retirees could attempt to escape liability for
infractions by committing them near retirement.
However, death, unless self-inflicted, is an involuntary cessation from office.
It is NOT like resignation or optional retirement.

Unlike compulsory retirement, no one knows when they will die. In death, there is no certainty as to when one
ceases holding office.
Death forecloses any opportunity to be heard.

To continue with the proceedings is a violation of the right to due process. (A.M. No. RTJ – 15 – 2438)
in a verified complaint, CALIXTO YAP alias Yap Souy Huat accused BENJAMIN S. SOMERA, a member of the
Philippine Bar, of "irregular practice of his profession" in connection with the latter's intervention in Civil Case No.
Q-5850 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City entitled, Yap Souy Huat vs. Amado R. Santos.
Page 18
The Solicitor General states that the case has become moot and academic because of the death of the
respondent.
The record shows that Atty. Benjamin S. Somera died on November 24, 1981, as a result of myocardial infarction
Nonetheless, the Solicitor General recommends that the complaint against Atty. Somera be dismissed for lack of
merit and this We do by this resolution in order to clear publicly the name of a lawyer although he has crossed
the bar. (Adm. Case No. 2093)
IMMORAL CONDUCT VS. GROSSLY IMMORAL CONDUCT
(7 C.J.S. 959). (A.M. No. 1608)
GROSS IMMORAL -- Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or
MISCONDUCT so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under
such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of
decency.
(A.C. No. 5816)
RATIONALE:
The Court makes these distinctions, as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly
immoral, not simply immoral, conduct.

(GOOD – SCAM)
1) Grossly immoral conduct, or (RULE 138, SECTION 27)
GROSSLY IMMORAL ACTS

in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant
administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity.
Even if NOT all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside
marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of
marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.
And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:
The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not the respondent did contract a bigamous marriage . . . It
is enough that the records of this administrative case substantiate the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as
well as the IBP Board of Governors, i.e., that indeed respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with
a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct and indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental
ethics of his profession.
This detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges
which his license confers upon him. (A.C. NO. 7136)
The rape of his neighbor's wife constituted serious moral depravity even if his guilt was not proved beyond
reasonable doubt in the criminal prosecution for rape.
He is NOT worthy to remain a member of the bar.
The privilege to practice law is bestowed upon individuals who are competent intellectually, academically and,
equally important, morally. (A.C. NO. 1474)

Page 19
The Court agrees with the observation of the Investigating Commissioner that complainant had sufficiently
substantiated the charge of gross dishonesty against respondent, for having appropriated the insurance
proceeds of the complainant's deceased husband, and the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that
respondent should be disbarred.
When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an
accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for a particular purpose.
And if he does NOT use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to
his client. (A.C. NO. 6246)
Atty. Aguado committed the act complained of as it was established that he was in possession of a falsified ID
showing him as a legal consultant of the PASG and mission order identifying him as the Assistant Team Leader of
the anti-smuggling operation. Although Atty. Aguado claimed in his Conference Brief that he was indicted merely
on the basis of an ID found hanging in his carnapped Toyota Fortuner,18 his counsel, Atty. Letecia Amon (Atty.
Amon), during the mandatory conference held on February 25, 2011, acknowledged that the ID and mission
order were found in the Toyota Fortuner owned by Atty. Aguado, thus: xxxx
The well-settled rule is that "in the absence of satisfactory explanation, one found in possession of and who
used a forged document is the forger and therefore guilty of falsification."
Atty. Aguado failed to rebut the allegations. Other than the police blotter showing that he reported the carnapping of
his vehicle, Atty. Aguado presented no other convincing evidence to support his denial of the crime. He also failed
to show any ill motive on the part of Palmes in testifying against him whom he claimed to have met only in
February 2010.
In several cases, the Court, after finding the lawyer guilty of gross dishonesty, imposed the supreme penalty of
disbarment for engaging in unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful acts by falsifying documents.
In Brennisen v. Atty. Contawi, the Court disbarred the lawyer when he falsified a special power of attorney so
he could mortgage and sell his client's property.
In Embido v. Atty. Pe, Jr., the penalty of disbarment was meted out against the lawyer who authored the
falsification of an inexistent court decision. (A.C. NO. 10781)
When he issued the worthless checks, he discredited the legal profession and created the public impression that laws
were mere tools of convenience that could be used, bended and abused to satisfy personal whims and desires.
In Lao v. Medel, the Court wrote that the issuance of worthless checks constituted gross misconduct, and put the
erring lawyer's moral character in serious doubt, though it was NOT related to his professional duties as a
member of the Bar.
Covered by this dictum is Atty. Salvado's business relationship with complainant. His issuance of the subject checks
display his doubtful fitness as an officer of the court. (A.C. NO. 10952)
respondent may NOT be disciplined either by the IBP or by this Court for failing to pay her obligation to
complainant.
Complainant's remedy is to file a collection case before a regular court of justice against respondent.
The general rule is that a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and the court may not ordinarily assume
jurisdiction to discipline him, for misconduct in his non-professional or private capacity. (A.C. No. 5141)
It is clear from the records that after Luis, Jr. left the country, complainant and his wife took turns in trying to
recover the debt from respondent, only to be repeatedly turned away empty-handed. This prompted Luis, Jr. to write
Page 20
respondent a letter dated February 3, 1978 reminding the latter of the P1,000.00 loan extended to him and at the
same time demanding payment thereof. (Rollo, p. 19) This however, like the other demands, was left unheeded.
The foregoing factual antecedents compel Us to conclude that from the very beginning, respondent had no intention
to honor and/or pay his just debt.
We cannot simply close our eyes to the unwarranted obstinacy displayed by respondent in evading payment of
a debt validly incurred. Such a conduct, to say the least, is unbecoming and does not speak well of a member
of the Bar.
A lawyer's professional and personal conduct must at all times be kept beyond reproach and above suspicion. He
must perform his duties to the Bar, to the courts, to his clients, and to society with honor and dignity (Marcelo vs.
Javier, 214 SCRA 1 [1992] ).
In the case at bar, it is clear to the Court that the conduct of respondent Saludares in failing to honor his just
debt to complainant's son constituted dishonest and immoral conduct.
This dishonest conduct was compounded by respondent's act of interjecting paltry excuses for his
unwarranted refusal to pay a valid and just debt. (A.C. No. 2029)

(GOOD – SCAM)
NOT GROSSLY IMMORAL ACTS

To recapitulate, respondent bore an illegitimate child with his sweetheart, Patricia Figueroa, who also claims that he
did not fulfill his promise to marry her after he passes the bar examinations.
We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the permanent exclusion of respondent from
the legal profession.
His engaging in premarital sexual relations with complainant and promises to marry suggests a doubtful
moral character on his part but the same does NOT constitute grossly immoral conduct.
The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral, but
grossly immoral. "A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree." It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act which
shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community.
We find the ruling in Arciga v. Maniwang8 quite relevant because mere intimacy between a man and a woman,
both of whom possess NO impediment to marry,
voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit on the part of respondent,
is neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled
as to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against him,
even if as a result of such relationship a child was born out of wedlock.
Respondent and complainant were sweethearts whose sexual relations were evidently consensual.
We CANNOT castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for marriage is a sacred and
perpetual bond which should be entered into because of love, not for any other reason. (SBC Case No. 519
July 31, 1997)
perceived acts of kissing or beso-beso on the cheeks as mere gestures of friendship and camaraderie, forms of
greetings, casual and customary.

Page 21
The acts of respondent, though, in turning the head of complainant towards him and kissing her on the lips
are distasteful.
However, such act, even if considered offensive and undesirable, CANNOT be considered grossly immoral.
Complainant’s bare allegation that respondent made use and took advantage of his position as a lawyer to lure her to
agree to have sexual relations with him, deserves no credit. The burden of proof rests on the complainant, and she
must establish the case against the respondent by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof, disclosing a case that is
free from doubt as to compel the exercise by the Court of its disciplinary power. Thus, the adage that "he who
asserts not he who denies, must prove." As a basic rule in evidence, the burden of proof lies on the party who makes
the allegations—ei incumbit probation, qui decit, non qui negat; cum per rerum naturam factum negantis probation
nulla sit. In the case at bar, complainant miserably failed to comply with the burden of proof required of her. A mere
charge or allegation of wrongdoing does not suffice. Accusation is not synonymous with guilt.
Moreover, while respondent admitted having kissed complainant on the lips, the same was not motivated by
malice.
We come to this conclusion because right after the complainant expressed her annoyance at being kissed by
the respondent through a cellular phone text message, respondent immediately extended an apology to
complainant also via cellular phone text message.
The exchange of text messages between complainant and respondent bears this out.
Be it noted also that the incident happened in a place where there were several people in the vicinity considering that
Roosevelt Avenue is a major jeepney route for 24 hours. If respondent truly had malicious designs on complainant,
he could have brought her to a private place or a more remote place where he could freely accomplish the same.
All told, as shown by the above circumstances, respondent’s acts are not grossly immoral nor highly reprehensible to
warrant disbarment or suspension. (A.C. No. 7204)

(GOOD – SCAM)
4) any Deceit,
7) Malpractice, or
RELEVANCY OF THE COMMISSION OF THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF

Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure – such as the verification of pleadings and prejudicial
questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant – do not
apply in the determination of a lawyer’s qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar.
We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to depart from this ruling.
First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration of justice and is a matter of public
interest because it involves service to the public. The admission qualifications are also qualifications for the
continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law.
Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter
of public concern that the State may inquire into through this Court.
In this sense, the complainant in a disbarment case is NOT a direct party whose interest in the outcome of the
charge is wholly his or her own; effectively, his or her participation is that of a witness who brought the
matter to the attention of the Court.
Page 22
As applied to the present case, the time that elapsed between the immoral acts charged and the filing of the
complaint is not material in considering the qualification of Atty. Garrido when he applied for admission to the
practice of law, and his continuing qualification to be a member of the legal profession.
From this perspective, it is not important that the acts complained of were committed before Atty. Garrido was
admitted to the practice of law.
As we explained in Zaguirre v. Castillo, the possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent
and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to retain membership in the legal
profession.
Admission to the bar does NOT preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any
question concerning the mental or moral fitness of the respondent before he became a lawyer.
Admission to the practice only creates the rebuttable presumption that the applicant has all the qualifications to
become a lawyer; this may be refuted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary even after admission to the
Bar.
where the respondent secretly contracted a second marriage with the daughter of his client in Hongkong. We found
that the respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of members of the Bar. In
particular, he made a mockery of marriage – a sacred institution that demands respect and dignity. We also declared
his act of contracting a second marriage contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality. (A.C. No. 6593)

(GOOD – SCAM)
ILLICIT AFFAIR
The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not respondent did contract a bigamous marriage, a matter
which apparently is still pending with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. It is enough that the records of this
administrative case sufficiently substantiate the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP
Board of Governors, i.e., that indeed respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, a
grossly immoral conduct and only indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his
profession.
This detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges
which his license confers upon him.
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard of his duties, or an odious
deportment unbecoming of an attorney. (A.C. No. 5170)
The settled rule is that betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity or sexual relations outside marriage is considered
disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows
protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. (A.C. No. 6116)
EFFECT FOREIGN DISBARMENT DECISION

The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other disciplinatory agency
in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or
suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of
the ground for disbarment or suspension. (B.M. No. 793)
SEVERITY OF DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION PROCEEDINGS

Page 23
"The severity of disbarment or suspension proceedings as the penalty for an attorney’s misconduct has always
moved the Court to treat the complaint with utmost caution and deliberate circumspection."
While the Court has the plenary power to discipline erring lawyers through this kind of proceedings, it does
so in the most vigilant manner so as not to frustrate its preservative principle.
The Court, in the exercise of its sound judicial discretion, is inclined to impose a less severe punishment if
through it the end desired of reforming the errant lawyer is possible.
the deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for
which a lawyer may be sanctioned with one-year suspension from the practice of law.
The same sanction was imposed on the respondent-lawyer in Rangwani v. Dinohaving been found guilty of gross
misconduct for issuing bad checks in payment of a piece of property the title of which was only entrusted to him by
the complainant. But in Barrientos v. Libiran-Meteoro, we meted out only a six-month suspension to Atty. Elerizza
Libiran-Meteoro for having issued several checks to the complainants in payment of a pre-existing debt without
sufficient funds, justifying the imposition of a lighter penalty on the ground of the respondent’s payment of a portion
of her debt to the complainant, unlike in the aforementioned Lao and Rangwani cases where there was no showing
of any restitution on the part of the respondents. (A.C. No. 9976)

(GOOD – SCAM)
PROFESSIONAL AND PRIVATE CAPACITY

any gross misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or in his private capacity is a ground for the imposition of
the penalty of suspension or disbarment because good character is an essential qualification for the admission
to and continued practice of law.
Any wrongdoing, whether professional or non-professional, indicating unfitness for the profession justifies
disciplinary action. (A.C. No. 8776)
AMBULANCE CHASER
The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice. (RULE 138, SECTION 27)
NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS AGAINST LAWYERS;

1) SUI GENERIS
2) COMPLAINANT IS NOT INDISPENSABLE TO THE DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
3) DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS ARE CONFIDENTIAL
4) PARI DELICTO RULE
5) PRESCRIPTION
1) SUI GENERIS
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis.
Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do NOT involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather
investigations by the Court into the conduct of its officers.
Not being intended to inflict punishment, they are in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein.
They may be initiated by the Court motu proprio.
Public interest is their primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the
attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. (A.C. No. 5321)

Page 24
Respondent, being a member of the bar, should note that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of
their own.
They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of criminal cases.
A criminal prosecution will NOT constitute a prejudicial question even if the same facts and circumstances
are attendant in the administrative proceedings.
Besides, it is not sound judicial policy to await the final resolution of a criminal case before a complaint against a
lawyer may be acted upon; otherwise, this Court will be rendered helpless to apply the rules on admission to, and
continuing membership in, the legal profession during the whole period that the criminal case is pending final
disposition, when the objectives of the two proceedings are vastly disparate.
Disciplinary proceedings involve NO private interest and afford NO redress for private grievance.
They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare and for preserving courts of justice from
the official ministration of persons unfit to practice law.
The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. (A.C No. 8708)
2) COMPLAINANT IS NOT INDISPENSABLE TO THE DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

SUI GENERIS
GENERAL RULE
DISBARMENT AND DISCIPLINE OF ATTORNEYS
HOW INSTITUTED
Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be taken by:
i. the Supreme Court motu propio, or
ii. upon the filing of a verified complaint of any person before the Supreme Court or the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP). (RULE 139 – B, SECTION 5)
NO investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement, compromise,

restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same,
EXCEPTION:
unless the Supreme Court motu propio or upon recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors, determines
that there is NO compelling reason to continue with the disbarment or suspension proceedings against the
respondent. (Amendment pursuant to Supreme Court Resolution dated May 27, 1993 re Bar Matter No. 356)
(RULE 139 – B, SECTION 5)
RATIONALE
administrative proceedings against lawyers are NOT strictly governed by the Rules of Court.
a disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an investigation
by the court into the conduct of its officers.
Hence, an administrative proceeding continues despite the desistance of a complainant, or failure of the
complainant to prosecute the same. (A.C. NO. 10439)
RELAXATION OF THE HEARSAY RULE

The relaxation of the hearsay rule in disciplinary administrative proceedings against judges and justices
where bribery proceedings are involved is not a novel thought in this 'Court; it has been advocated in the
Separate Concurring Opinion of Justice Arturo D. Brion in the administrative case of Justice Ong "before this Court.
The Opinion essentially maintained that the Court could make a conclusion that bribery had taken place when the
circumstances - including those derived .from hearsay evidence-· sufficiently prove its occurrence.

Page 25
It was emphasized that to satisfy the substantial evidence requirement for administrative cases, hearsay
evidence should necessarily be supplemented and corroborated by other evidence that are NOT
hearsay. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) (A.C. No. 8962)
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION DOES NOT CONSTITUTE PREJUDICIAL QUESTON TO

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING FOR DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION OF A LAWYER
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own.
They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of x x x criminal cases.
The burden of proof for these types of cases different.

In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment or
suspension, "clearly preponderant evidence" is all that is required.
Thus, a criminal prosecution will NOT constitute a prejudicial question even if the same facts and circumstances
are attendant in the administrative proceedings. (A.C. No. 5499)
3) DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS ARE CONFIDENTIAL

Disciplinary proceedings against a lawyer are private and confidential until its final determination. (RULES OF
COURT)
4) PARI DELICTO RULE

i. When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the cause or object of the contract, and
ii. the act constitutes a criminal offense, both parties being in pari delicto,
they shall have NO action against each other, and both shall be prosecuted. (NEW CIVIL CODE,
ARTICLE 1411)
IN PARI DELICTO is NOT applicable. (A.C. No. 7022)
5) PRESCRIPTION
GENERAL RULE:
An administrative complaint against a member of the bar does NOT prescribe. (A.C. No. 6656)
EXCEPTIONS:
The unexplained and unreasonable delay in the institution of an administrative complaint, filed only on the
eve of respondent’s retirement from the bench, creates suspicion concerning the negatives of the complainant.
(A.M. No. 1628-CAR)
The compromise agreement, which was claimed to have superseded the court proceedings was presented in
evidence.
Up to 1962, or for a period of seven years thereafter, plaintiff did nothing about the case, knowing fully well
that his complaint could be dismissed by the court for failure to prosecute and to comply with the order to
furnish defendant with his motion to reconsider the dismissal which contained his repeated allegations of
deceit and denunciation of respondent who, according to the evidence, enjoyed a good reputation in the
community in which he practiced his profession.
Obviously, complainant had understood the contents of the document he was made to sign and knew that a
settlement had been arrived at. (A.C. No. 204)
EFFECT FOREIGN DISBARMENT DECISION

The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other disciplinatory agency
in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or
suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of
the ground for disbarment or suspension. (B.M. No. 793)
Page 26
REINSTATEMENT / JUDICIAL CLEMENCY

NEW CLEMENCY GUIDELINES FOR REINSTATEMENT TO THE BAR
In fine, for the guidance of the Bench, the Bar, and the public, the new clemency guidelines for reinstatement to the
Bar are as follows:
1. A lawyer who has been disbarred CANNOT file a PETITION FOR JUDICIAL CLEMENCY within a period
of 5 years from the effective date of his or her disbarment, unless for the most compelling reasons based on
extraordinary circumstances, a shorter period is warranted.
2. Upon the lapse of the said 5 – year period, or earlier if so permitted by the SUPREME COURT, a
disbarred lawyer becomes eligible to file a VERIFIED PETITION FOR JUDICIAL CLEMENCY.
The petition, together with its supporting evidence appended thereto, must show on its face that the following
criteria have been met:
i. The petitioner has fully complied with the terms and conditions of all prior disciplinary orders,
including orders for restitution, as well as the 5 – year period to file, unless he or she seeks an earlier
filing for the most compelling reasons based on extraordinary circumstances;
ii. The petitioner recognizes the wrongfulness and seriousness of · the misconduct for which he or she was
disbarred.
For petitions already filed at the time of this Resolution, it is required that the petitioner show that he or
she genuinely attempted in good faith to reconcile with the wronged private offended party in the
case for which he or she was disbarred (if any), or if such is NOT possible, the petitioner must
explain with sufficient reasons as to why such attempt at reconciliation could NOT be made; and
iii. Notwithstanding the conduct for which the disbarred lawyer was disciplined, the disbarred lawyer has
the requisite integrity and competence to practice law.
3. Upon the filing of the verified petition for clemency, together with its attachments, the SUPREME COURT shall
first conduct a preliminary evaluation and determine if the same has prima facie merit based on the criteria
above-stated.
4. If the petition has prima facie merit based on the abovecriteria, the SUPREME COURT shall refer the
petition to the OFFICE OF THE BAR CONFIDANT (or any other fact-finding body the Court so designates)
in order to verify the details and the authenticity of the statements made and the evidence attached to the
clemency petition.
If the petition fails to show any prima facie merit, it should be denied.
5. After its investigation, the OFFICE OF THE BAR CONFIDANT (or such other fact-finding body
designated by the SUPREME COURT) shall submit its fact-finding report to the SUPREME COURT, which
shall ultimately resolve the clemency petition based on the facts established in the said report.
The threshold of evidence to be applied is clear and convincing evidence since it is incumbent upon the
petitioner to hurdle the seriousness of his or her established past administrative liability/ies, the gravity of
which had warranted the supreme penalty of disbarment.
6. Unless otherwise resolved by the Court sitting En Banc, these guidelines and procedure shall apply to pending
petitions for judicial clemency, as well as to those filed after the promulgation of this Resolution. (A.C. No. 5054)
RATIONALE
The basic inquiry in a petition for reinstatement to the practice of law is whether the lawyer has sufficiently
rehabilitated himself or herself in conduct and character.
Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great extent on the sound
discretion of the Court. The lawyer has to demonstrate and prove by clear and convincing evidence that he or
she is again worthy of membership in the Bar. (A.C. No.7054)
EFFECTS OF EXECUTIVE PARDON

Page 27
1) IF GRANTED AFTER THE DISBARMENT CASE

2) IF GRANTED PRIOR TO THE DISBARMENT CASE
1) IF GRANTED AFTER THE DISBARMENT CASE

The lawyer disbarred due to conviction for a crime is NOT automatically reinstated to the practice of law upon
being pardoned by the PRESIDENT. To be reinstated, there is still a need for the filing an appropriate
petition with the SUPREME COURT.
2) IF GRANTED PRIOR TO THE DISBARMENT CASE

Absolute pardon operates to wipe out the conviction and is a bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of the
attorney. (PINEDA, supra at 446 – 448)
CONDITIONAL PARDON
CONDITIONAL PARDON or the remission of the unexpired portion of the sentence does NOT operate as a bar
to disbarment proceedings.
The disciplinary action will be judged upon the act of conviction without regard to the conditional pardon
extended to respondent. (AGPALO, supra at 581)
PROCEED INDEPENDENTLY
As for the gross immorality charge against Atty. Nava, a thorough review of the records would show that there is
merit to the said charge. In order to exculpate himself from any liability, he highlights the dismissal of the complaint
for adultery against him and Annalyn by the Office of the Prosecutor.
However, it must be noted that administrative cases are sui generis and are NOT affected by the result of any
civil or criminal case.
They do NOT involve a trial of an action or a suit, being neither purely civil nor purely criminal, but rather
involve investigations by the Court into the conduct of its officers.
Therefore, the instant case, being administrative in nature, may proceed independently and is not bound by
the outcome of any criminal and civil proceeding. (A.C. No. 9459)
BURDEN OF PROOF AND EVIDENCE REQUIRED IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASES

The purpose of disbarment is to protect the courts and the public from the misconduct of the officers of the court and
to ensure the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be
competent, honorable and trustworthy men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.
The burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary power only if she
establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. (A.C. No. 4191)
SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEY BY THE COURT OF APPEALS OR THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

The Court of Appeals or a REGIONAL TRIAL COURT may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the
causes named in the last preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney shall NOT practice his
profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises. (RULE 138, SECTION 28)
IMPEACHABLE OFFICIALS (PVS – CO)

1) The President,
2) the Vice-President,
3) the Members of the Supreme Court,
4) the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and
5) the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment (SECTION 2)
GROUNDS:
for, and conviction of: (CTB – GOB)
1) Culpable violation of the Constitution,
2) Treason,
Page 28
3) Bribery,
4) Graft and corruption,
5) Other high crimes, or
6) Betrayal of public trust.
All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
(1987 CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE XI, SECTION 2)
DISBARMENT
To grant a complaint for disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Member’s incumbency, would in
effect be to circumvent and hence to run afoul of the constitutional mandate that Members of the Court may
be removed from office only by impeachment for and conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI [2] of
the Constitution. Precisely the same situation exists in respect of the Ombudsman and his deputies (Article XI [8] in
relation to Article XI [2]), . . . all of whom are constitutionally required to be members of the Philippine Bar.
The rule that an impeachable officer cannot be criminally prosecuted for the same offenses which constitute grounds
for impeachment presupposes his continuance in office.
Hence, the moment he is NO longer in office because of his removal, resignation, or permanent disability,
there can be NO bar to his criminal prosecution in the courts. (G.R. No. 146486)
SUB JUDICE RULE IN RELATION TO INDIRECT CONTEMPT TO BE PUNISHED AFTER CHARGE

AND HEARING
After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such
period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of Any Improper
Conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice may be
punished for indirect contempt; (IC) (RULE 71, SECTION 3)
NEWSPAPER PUBLICATION
The rule is well established that newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or influence
the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding constitute criminal contempt which is
summarily punishable by the courts. (G.R. NO. 214986)
ATTORNEY TO BE HEARD BEFORE REMOVAL OR SUSPENSION

NO attorney shall be removed or suspended from the practice of his profession, until he has had full opportunity
upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be
heard by himself or counsel.
But if upon reasonable notice he fails to appear and answer the accusation, the court may proceed to determine
the matter ex parte. (RULE 138, SECTION 30)
ATTORNEYS FOR DESTITUTE LITIGANTS

A court may assign an attorney to render professional aid free of charge to any party in a case, if upon investigation
it appears that the party is destitute and unable to employ an attorney, and that the services of counsel are
necessary to secure the ends of justice and to protect the rights of the party.
It shall be the duty of the attorney so assigned to render the required service, unless he is excused therefrom by the
court for sufficient cause shown. (RULE 138, SECTION 31)
STANDING IN COURT OF PERSON AUTHORIZED APPEAR FOR GOVERNMENT

Any official or other person appointed or designated in accordance with law to appear for the Government of the
Philippines shall have all the rights of a duly authorized member of the bar to appear in any case in which
said government has an interest direct or indirect. (RULE 138, SECTION 33)
BY WHOM LITIGATION CONDUCTED

In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with:
Page 29
1) the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for the purpose, or

2) with the aid an attorney. (RULE 138, SECTION 34)
CASES IN MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT

A law student was allowed to represent the accused in a case pending before the then Municipal Court, the
City Court of Manila, who was charged for damages to property through reckless imprudence.
The permission of the fiscal is NOT necessary for one to enter his appearance as private prosecutor. (G.R. No. L-
51813-14)
APPEARANCE AND FEES

NON - LAWYERS
NON – LAWYERS may appear before the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION or any of the
LABOR ARBITERS only: (TOMA)
1) If they represent Themselves; or
2) If they represent their Organization or members thereof. (ARTICLE 228. [222])
3) he/she represents a Member or members of a legitimate labor organization that is existing within the employer’s
establishment, who are parties to the case; and
4) he/she is a duly-Accredited member of any legal aid office recognized by the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE or
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
PROVIDED:
he/she
i. presents proof of his/her accreditation; and
ii. represents a party to the case; (2011 NLRC RULES OF PROCEDURE, AS AMENDED, RULE
III,SECTION 6)
ATTORNEY’S FEES
NO attorney’s fees, negotiation fees or similar charges of any kind arising from any collective bargaining
agreement shall be imposed on any individual member of the contracting union.
EXCEPTION:
attorney’s fees may be charged against union funds in an amount to be agreed upon by the parties.
PROVIDED:
Any contract, agreement or arrangement of any sort to the contrary shall be null and void. (THE LABOR
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ARTICLE 228. [222])
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL DE OFICIO AND NON – LAWYERS

GENERAL RULE:
The court, considering the gravity of the offense and the difficulty of the questions that may arise, shall appoint
as counsel de oficio only such members of the bar in good standing who, by reason of their experience and ability,
can competently defend the accused.
EXCEPTION:
But in localities where such members of the bar are NOT available, the court may appoint: (PRG)
1) any Person,
2) Resident of the province and of
3) Good Repute for Probity and Ability,
to defend the accused. (7a) (RULE 116, SECTION 7)
LIMITATIONS ON APPEARANCE OF NON – LAWYERS BEFORE THE COURTS:

1) He must confine his work to non – adversary contentions;
2) His services should NOT be habitually rendered; and
3) He should NOT be charged or collect attorney’s fee. (G.R. NO. 23959)
CERTAIN ATTORNEYS PROHIBITED TO ENGAGE IN PRIVATE PRACTICE

Page 30
NO judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall
engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients. (RULE 138, SECTION
35)
PROCEEDING S WHERE APPEARANCE OF ATTORNEYS ARE NOT ALLOWED

NO attorney shall appear in behalf of or represent a party at the hearing, unless the attorney is the plaintiff
or defendant.
If the court determines that a party CANNOT properly present his/her claim or defense and needs assistance,
the court may, in its discretion, allow another individual who is NOT an attorney to assist that party upon the
latter's consent. (REVISED RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR SMALL CLAIMS CASES, SECTION 19)
In all katarungang pambarangay proceedings, the parties must appear in person without the assistance of
counsel or representative, except for minors and incompetents who may be assisted by their next-of-kin who
are NOT lawyers. (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE, SECTION 415)
PRACTICE OF PROFESSION
LOCAL CHIEF EXECUTIVES
All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any
occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives. (R.A. NO. 7160, SECTION 90)
LOCAL SANGGUNIAN
GENERAL RULE:
Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools
EXCEPTION:
except during session hours. (R.A. NO. 7160, SECTION 90)
PROVIDED:
That sanggunian members who are also members of the Bar shall NOT: (COFU)
i. Appear as counsel before any court in any Civil case wherein a local government unit or any office, agency, or
instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;
ii. Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an Officer or employee of the national or local government is
accused of an offense committed in relation to his office.
iii. Collect any Fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local government unit of which
he is an official; and
iv. Use property and personnel of the government except when the sanggunian member concerned is defending
the interest of the government. (R.A. NO. 7160, SECTION 90)
Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only on occasions of
emergency.
PROVIDED:
That the officials concerned do NOT derive monetary compensation therefrom. (R.A. NO. 7160, SECTION 90)
ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION ON JUSTICES

1) And when a Justice of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeals has attained the age of 57 years and
has rendered at least 20 YEARS’ service in the Government,
2) 10 or more of which have been continuously rendered as such Justice or as judge of a court of record,
he shall be likewise entitled to retire and receive during the residue of his natural life the salary which he was
then receiving.
PROVIDED:
It is a condition of the pension provided for herein that NO retiring Justice during the time that he is receiving
said pension shall:

Page 31
i. appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein the Government or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof is the adverse party, or
ii. in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense
committed in relation to his office, or
iii. collect any fee for his appearance in any administrative proceedings to maintain an interest
adverse to the Government, insular, provincial or municipal, or to any of its legally constituted officers.
(R.A. NO. 910, SECTION 1)
ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION ON MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS

NO Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any court of
justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. (1987
CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE VI, SECTION 14)
COVERAGE OF ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION ON MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS

The word appearance includes not only arguing a case before any such body but also filing a pleading on behalf
of a client. (G.R. NO. L - 2610)
RULE XVII OF THE OMNIBUS RULES IMPLEMENTING BOOK V OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 292
AND OTHER PERTINENT CIVIL SERVICE LAWS
RULE XVII GOVERNMENT OFFICE HOURS
It shall be the duty of each head of department or agency

to require all officers and employees under him to strictly observe the prescribed office hours.
When the head of office, in the exercise of his discretion

allows government officials and employees to leave the office
during the office hours and NOT for official business,
but to attend socials/events/functions and/or wakes/interments,
the same shall be reflected in their time cards and charged to their leave credits. (SECTION 1)
Officers and employees of all departments and agencies

except those covered by special laws
shall render NOT less than 8 hours of work a day for 5 days a week or
a total of 40 hours a week, exclusive of time for lunch.
As a general rule, such hours shall be from eight o'clock in the morning to twelve o'clock noon and
from one o'clock to five o'clock in the afternoon on all days except Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays.
(SECTION 5)
RULE XVII OF THE OMNIBUS RULES IMPLEMENTING BOOK V OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 292
AND OTHER PERTINENT CIVIL SERVICE LAWS
RULE XVII GOVERNMENT OFFICE HOURS
It shall be the duty of each head of department or agency

to require all officers and employees under him to strictly observe the prescribed office hours.
When the head of office, in the exercise of his discretion

allows government officials and employees to leave the office
during the office hours and NOT for official business,
but to attend socials/events/functions and/or wakes/interments,
the same shall be reflected in their time cards and charged to their leave credits. (SECTION 1)
Officers and employees of all departments and agencies

except those covered by special laws
shall render NOT less than 8 hours of work a day for 5 days a week or
a total of 40 hours a week, exclusive of time for lunch.
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As a general rule, such hours shall be from eight o'clock in the morning to twelve o'clock noon and
from one o'clock to five o'clock in the afternoon on all days except Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays. (RULE
XVII, SECTION 5)
REVISED OMNIBUS RULES ON APPOINTMENTS AND OTHER PERSONNEL ACTIONS

Unless otherwise provided by law,
NO officer or employee shall engage directly or indirectly
in any private business or profession
without a written permission from the head of agency.
PROVIDED:
1) that this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees
whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the government;
2) that if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities,

the time devoted outside of office hours
should be fixed by the head of the agency
so that it will NOT impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or employee
NOR pose a conflict or tend to conflict with the official functions.” (RULE XIII SECTION 18)
3) That no permission is necessary in the case of investments,

made by an officer or employee, which do not involve
any real or apparent conflict between his private interests and public duties, or
in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and
he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or
become an officer or member of the board of directors”, (RULE XIII SECTION 18)
RATIONALE:
The nature of work of court officials and employees requires them to serve with the highest degree of efficiency
and responsibility, and devote their entire time to government service in order to ensure efficient and speedy
disposition of justice.
Thus, in Benavidez v. Vega, the Court suspended Court Stenographer Estrella Vega for moonlighting during
office hours, while working as an insurance agent.
Similarly, in Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Atty. Morales, Clerk of Court, MTC, Manila, the Court
suspended Court Stenographer Isabel Siwa for engaging in the business of lending and rediscounting checks.
In both cases, the Court emphasized that officials and employees of the judiciary are prohibited from engaging
directly in any private business, vocation, or profession
even outside office hours to ensure that full-time officers of the court render full-time service
so that there may be NO undue delay in the administration of justice and in the disposition of cases.
However, in Ramos v. Rada the Court merely reprimanded respondent messenger Rada who, without prior
permission from the head of office, accepted the appointment and discharged the duties as administrator of
the real properties of a private corporation.
XXXXX
The duties of messenger Rada are generally ministerial which do NOT require that his entire day of 24 hours
be at the disposal of the Government.
XXXXX
His connection with Avesco Marketing Corporation need NOT be terminated, but he must secure a written
permission from the Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, who is hereby

Page 33
authorized to grant or revoke such permission, under such terms and conditions as will safeguard the best
interests of the service, in general, and the court, in particular. (OCA I.P.I. NO. 15 – 4429 – P)
In this case, respondent Basada is

neither engaged in outside employment
nor in any private business or profession.
Respondent Basada is NOT receiving any salary from the services he renders as president of the
homeowners' association.
In performing his duties as president of the homeowners' association,
respondent Basada is merely exercising a civic duty as a member of the community. XXXXX
XXXXX
Accordingly, since respondent Basada is merely performing a civic duty and

is NOT actually engaged in outside employment or any private business or profession,
the requirement of obtaining authority from the head of office
to engage in outside employment obviously does NOT apply to him.
Finally, to require respondent Basada to relinquish his post as president of the homeowners' association would
effectively deprive him of his freedom of association XXXXX (OCA I.P.I. NO. 15 – 4429 – P)
CIVIL SERVICE OFFICERS OR EMPLOYEES NOT REQUIRED TO DEVOTE ENTIRE TIME AT THE
DISPOSAL OF THE GOVERNMENT
They need to secure written permit from the head of the department concerned. (A.M. NO. P – 220)
But if such official is authorized by the department head, he may, in an isolated case, represent a relative or a
close family friend. (A.M. NO. 226)
It is incumbent upon public official to secure the proper authority from the department head NOT only for the
first term, but also his second and third. (A.C. NO. 5582)
Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was NOT forbidden to practice his profession.
However, he should have procured prior permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as
required by civil service regulations.
A Lawyer In Government Service Who Is NOT Prohibited To Practice Law Must Secure Prior Authority
From The Head Of His Department
A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do NOT require his time to be fully at the disposal of
the government can engage in the private practice of law only with the written permission of the head of the
department concerned. (A.C. NO. 5738)
CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES
R.A. NO. 6713
PROHIBITED ACTS AND TRANSACTIONS

In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing
laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and
are hereby declared to be unlawful:
1) FINANCIAL AND MATERIAL INTEREST

Public officials and employees shall NOT, directly or indirectly, have any financial or material interest in any
transaction requiring the approval of their office. (R.A. NO. 6713, SECTION 7)
2) OUTSIDE EMPLOYMENT AND OTHER ACTIVITIES RELATED THERETO

Public officials and employees during their incumbency shall not: (CER)

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i. Control, Own, manage, accept or employment as officer, employee, consultant, counsel, broker, agent,
trustee or nominee in any private enterprise regulated, supervised or licensed by their office unless
expressly allowed by law;
ii. Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided,
that such practice will NOT conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; or
iii. Recommend any person to any position in a private enterprise which has a regular or pending official
transaction with their office.
PROVIDED:
These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of 1 year after resignation, retirement, or
separation from public office,
except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional concerned CANNOT practice his
profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with, in which case the 1 year
prohibition shall likewise apply. (R.A. NO. 6713, SECTION 7)
CIVIL SERVICE OFFICERS OR EMPLOYEES NOT REQUIRED TO DEVOTE ENTIRE TIME AT THE
DISPOSAL OF THE GOVERNMENT
They need to secure written permit from the head of the department concerned. (A.M. NO. P – 220)
But if such official is authorized by the department head, he may, in an isolated case, represent a relative or a
close family friend. (A.M. NO. 226)
It is incumbent upon public official to secure the proper authority from the department head not only for the
first term, but also his second and third. (A.C. NO. 5582)
Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his profession. However, he should
have procured prior permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil service
regulations.
A Lawyer In Government Service Who Is NOT Prohibited To Practice Law Must Secure Prior Authority
From The Head Of His Department
A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do NOT require his time to be fully at the disposal of
the government can engage in the private practice of law only with the written permission of the head of the
department concerned. (A.C. NO. 5738)
THEORIES ON THE PROHIBITION OR DISQUALIFICATION FOR GOVERNMENT ATTORNEYS

1) ADVERSE – INTEREST CONFLICT
2) CONGRUENT – INTEREST CONFLICT
1) ADVERSE – INTEREST CONFLICT

A former government lawyer is enjoined from representing a client in private practice if the matter is
substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with while employed by the government and if the
interests of the current and former clients are adverse. (G.R. NO. 151809 – 12)
2) CONGRUENT – INTEREST CONFLICT

The disqualification does not involve a conflict at all because it prohibits the lawyer from representing a
private practice client even if the interests of the former government client and the new client are entirely
parallel. (G.R. NO. 151809 – 12)
AMICUS CURIAE
Experienced and impartial attorneys may be invited by the Court to appear as amici curiae to help in the
disposition of issues submitted to it. (RULE 138, SECTION 36)
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ATTORNEYS’ LIEN
An attorney shall have:
1) a lien upon the funds, documents and papers of his client which have lawfully come into his possession and
2) may retain the same until his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid, and
3) may apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof.
He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in
pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall
have the caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering such
judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have the caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and
to the adverse paty; and
he shall have the same right and power over such judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his
lien and secure the payment of his just fees and disbursements. (RULE 138, SECTION 37)
RULE 138-A LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE

CONDITIONS FOR STUDENT PRACTICE
A law student who has:
1) successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and
2) is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme Court,
may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial court,
tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school. (RULE
138-A, SECTION 1)
APPEARANCE
The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and control of a
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school.
Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the
supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic. (RULE 138-A, SECTION 2)
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS
The Rules safeguarding privileged communications between attorney and client shall apply to similar
communications made to or received by the law student, acting for the legal clinic. (RULE 138-A, SECTION 3)
STANDARDS OF CONDUCT AND SUPERVISION

The law student shall comply with the standards of professional conduct governing members of the Bar.
Failure of an attorney to provide adequate supervision of student practice may be a ground for disciplinary action.
(Circular No. 19, dated December 19, 1986). (RULE 138-A, SECTION 4)
RULE 139-A INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
MEMBERSHIP DUES
Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual MEMBERSHIP DUES as the Board of Governors
shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court.
A fixed sum equivalent to 10% of the collection from each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled
members of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof. (RULE 139 – A, SECTION 9)
IBP DUES VS. SENIOR CITIZENS PRIVILEGE

While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, §4 grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income
taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does NOT exceed the poverty level as determined by the
National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption does NOT include
payment of membership or association dues.

Page 36
Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed merit the
most severe penalty. However, in view of respondent's advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and
plea for a more temperate application of the law, we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of
law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate. (Adm. Case No. 4749)
MANDATORY MEMBERSHIP IN THE INTEGRATED BAR IN THE PHILIPPINES IS NOT

VIOLATIVE OF FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is NOT violative of his constitutional freedom to
associate.
A lawyer became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations.
The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. (A.M. No. 1928)
IBP DUES VS. TAX

A membership fee in the INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES is an exaction for regulation, while
the purpose of tax is revenue. (A.C. NO. 526)
FILIPINO LAWYER STAYING ABROAD

payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no one is exempt.
This means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as one's membership in the IBP
remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged in.
There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of membership dues.
At most, as correctly observed by the IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his
intention to stay abroad before he left.
In such case, his membership in the IBP could have been terminated and his obligation to pay dues could
have been discontinued.
As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, one
of which is the payment of membership dues.
Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such drastic
move. (B.M. NO. 1370)
EFFECT OF NON – PAYMENT OF DUES

DEFAULT IN THE PAYMENT OF ANNUAL DUES FOR:
1) 6 months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and
2) 1 year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
(RULE 139 – A, SECTION 10)
PROVIDED:
NO action involving the suspension or disbarment of a member or the removal of his name from the Roll of
Attorneys shall be effective without the final approval of the Supreme Court. (RULE 139 – A, SECTION 12)
VOLUNTARY TERMINATION
1) A member may terminate his membership by filing a written notice to that effect with the Secretary of the
Integrated Bar, who shall immediately bring the matter to the attention of the Supreme Court.
2) NO action involving the suspension or disbarment of a member or the removal of his name from the Roll of
3) Forthwith he shall cease to be a member and his name shall be stricken by the Court from the Roll of
Attorneys. (RULE 139 – A, SECTION 11)

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REINSTATEMENT
Reinstatement may be made by the Court in accordance with rules and regulations prescribed by the Board of
Governors and approved by the Court. (RULE 139 – A, SECTION 11)
GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE
The Board of Governors shall provide in the By-Laws for grievance procedures for the enforcement and
maintenance of discipline among all the members of the Integrated Bar, (RULE 139 – A, SECTION 12)
SUSPENSION OR DISBARMENT OR REMOVAL FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS

NO action involving the suspension or disbarment of a member or the removal of his name from the Roll of
NON – POLITICAL BAR

The Intergrated Bar is strictly non-political, and every activity tending to impair this basic feature is strictly
prohibited and shall be penalized accordingly.
NO lawyer holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof shall be eligible for election or appointment to any position in
the Integrated Bar or any Chapter thereof. (IBP BY – LAWS, ARTICLE I, SECTION 4)
EFFECT OF NON – OBSERVANCE OF NON – POLITICAL BAR RULE

A Delegate, Governor, officer or employee of the Integrated Bar, or an officer or employee of any Chapter
thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his position as of the moment he:
1) files his certificate of candidacy for any elective public office or
2) accepts appointment
to any judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof. (IBP BY – LAWS, ARTICLE I, SECTION 4)
MEMBERS IN GOOD STANDING

Every member who has:
1) paid all membership dues and all authorized special assessments, plus surcharges owing thereon, and
2) who is NOT under suspension from the practice of law or from membership privileges,
is a member in good standing. (IBP BY – LAWS, ARTICLE II, SECTION 20)
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

CHAPTER I THE LAWYER AND SOCIETY
CANON 1 —
A lawyer shall:
1) uphold the constitution,
2) obey the laws of the land and
3) promote respect for law and for legal processes.
RATIONALE:
A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.
He shall NOT engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct; or counsel or abet activities aimed
at a defiance of the law or at a lessening of confidence in the legal system.
He should advise his client to uphold the law, NOT to violate or disobey it.
Conversely, he should not recommend to his client any recourse or remedy that is contrary to law, public
policy, public order, and public morals.
A lawyer who proposes to his client a recourse or remedy that is contrary to law, public policy, public order
and public morals, or that lessens the public confidence in the legal system is guilty of gross misconduct, and
should be suspended from the practice of law, or even disbarred. (A.C. NO. 6738)
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the Court, considered the failure to comply with the court's order, resolution, or directive as constitutive of
gross misconduct and insubordination. (A.C. No. 8854)
While respondent's duty as a notary public is principally to ascertain the identity of the affiant and the
voluntariness of the declaration, it is nevertheless incumbent upon him to guard against any illegal or
immoral arrangement or at least refrain from being a party to its consummation.
Rule IV, Section 4 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice in fact proscribes notaries public from performing any
notarial act for transactions similar to the herein document of sale, to wit: (A.C. No. 8854)
The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public.
They are required to certify that the party to every document acknowledged before them has presented the
proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence tax); and to enter its number, place of issue and
date as part of such certification.
They are also required to maintain and keep a notarial register; to enter therein all instruments notarized by them;
and to "give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before [them] a number corresponding to the
one in [their] register [and to state therein] the page or pages of [their] register, on which the same is recorded."
Failure to perform these duties would result in the revocation of their commission as notaries public.
These formalities are mandatory and CANNOT be simply neglected, considering the degree of importance
and evidentiary weight attached to notarized documents.
Notaries public entering into their commissions are presumed to be aware of these elementary requirements.
(A.C. No. 6252)
In Co v. Bernardino, [A.C. No. 3919, January 28, 1998, 285 SCRA 102] the Court considered
the issuance of worthless checks as violation of this Rule and an act constituting gross misconduct.
Moreover, in Cuizon v. Macalino, we also ruled that

the issuance of checks which were later dishonored
for having been drawn against a closed account
indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him,
shows such lack of personal honesty and good moral character
as to render him unworthy of public confidence, and
constitutes a ground for disciplinary action.
Similarly, Sanchez v. Somoso held that

the persistent refusal to settle due obligations
despite demand manifests a lawyer's low regard
to his commitment to the oath he has taken
when he joined his peers, seriously and irreparably
tarnishing the image of the profession he should, instead, hold in high esteem.
This conduct deserves nothing less than a severe disciplinary action. (A.C. NO. 10541)
CANON 1 —
A lawyer shall:
LIABILITY OF JUDGES AS LAWYERS

Page 39
a perusal of respondent’s Statements of Assets and Liabilities for the years 1998-2001 revealed that among his
personal properties were a Daewoo car acquired in 1996 and an L-200 double cab acquired in 1998.
Accordingly, we found respondent guilty of dishonesty for having falsely denied that he ever owned the
aforementioned vehicles.
For his infraction, respondent judge was fined in the amount of ₱40,000. He would have been dismissed from the
service were it not for the fact that he had already been dismissed therefrom because of an earlier case.
Significantly, pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, we deemed respondent Judge Suerte’s administrative case as
disciplinary proceedings for disbarment as well, and proceeded to strip him of his membership in the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
Under the same rule, a respondent "may forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and show cause why he
should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as member of the Bar."
The rule does not make it mandatory, before respondent may be held liable as a member of the bar, that respondent
be required to comment on and show cause why he should not be disciplinary sanctioned as a lawyer separately
from the order for him to comment on why he should not be held administratively liable as a member of the bench.
In other words, an order to comment on the complaint is an order to give an explanation on why he should
NOT be held administratively liable NOT only as a member of the bench but also as a member of the bar.
This is the fair and reasonable meaning of "automatic conversion" of administrative cases against justices and
judges to disciplinary proceedings against them as lawyers.
This will also serve the purpose of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC to avoid the duplication or unnecessary replication of
actions by treating an administrative complaint filed against a member of the bench 27 also as a disciplinary
proceeding against him as a lawyer by mere operation of the rule.
Thus, a disciplinary proceeding as a member of the bar is impliedly instituted with the filing of an
administrative case against a justice of the Sandiganbayan, Court of Appeals and Court of Tax Appeals or a
judge of a first- or second-level court.
It cannot be denied that respondent’s dishonesty did not only affect the image of the judiciary, it also put his moral
character in serious doubt and rendered him unfit to continue in the practice of law.
Possession of good moral character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a continuing
requirement to the practice of law. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic
ideals, those counted within its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also accord
continuing fidelity to them.
The requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned,
than the possession of legal learning.
A parting word.
The first step towards the successful implementation of the Court’s relentless drive to purge the judiciary of morally
unfit members, officials and personnel necessitates the imposition of a rigid set of rules of conduct on judges.
The Court is extraordinarily strict with judges because, being the visible representation of the law, they
should set a good example to the bench, bar and students of the law.
The standard of integrity imposed on them is – and should be – higher than that of the average person for it is
their integrity that gives them the right to judge. (A.M. No. RTJ-08-2138)
LIABILITY BOTH AS A LAWYER AND NOTARIAL COMMISSION

CANON 1 —
Page 40
A lawyer shall:
RULE 1.01
A lawyer shall NOT engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
RATIONALE:
For having violated the Notarial Rules, respondent also failed to adhere to Canon 1 of the CPR, which requires
every lawyer to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for the law and legal
processes.
She also violated Rule 1.01 of the CPR which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any unlawful, dishonest,
immoral, and deceitful conduct.
Based on recent jurisprudence, a lawyer commissioned as a notary public who fails to discharge his or her duties as
such is penalized with revocation of his or her notarial commission and disqualification from being commissioned as
a notary public for a period of two (2) years.
In addition, he or she may also be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months for
notarizing a document without the appearance of the parties.
Thus, the Court affirms the penalty imposed by the IBP Board. (A.C. NO. 11584)
RULE 1.01
A lawyer shall NOT engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
(7 C.J.S. 959). (A.M. No. 1608)
GROSS -- is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be

IMMORAL reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of decency.
-- is not confined to sexual matters.

(A.M. No. RTJ – 13 – 2361)
PLAGIARISM
The rule exonerating judges from charges of plagiarism applies also to lawyers.
Judges should not be exposed to charges of plagiarism in what they write so long as they do not depart, as officers of
the court, from the objective of assisting the COURT in the administration of justice. (A.M. NO. 10 – 7 – 17 – SC)
INCLUDES PRIVATE CAPACITY

Respondent cannot evade disciplinary sanctions by implying that there was no attorney-client relationship between
her and complainant.
In Nulada v. Paulma, this Court reiterated that by taking the Lawyer's Oath, lawyers become guardians of the
law and indispensable instruments for the orderly administration of justice.
As such, they can be disciplined for any misconduct, be it in their professional or in their private capacity, and
thereby be rendered unfit to continue to be officers of the court. (A.C. No. 11380)
RULE 1.02
A lawyer shall NOT counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the
legal system.

Page 41
RATIONALE:
The respondent did NOT deny the preparation of Exhibit A, put up the defense that he had the idea that
seven years separation of husband and wife would entitle either of them to contract a second marriage and for
that reason prepared Exhibit A, but immediately after the execution of said document he realized that he had made a
mistake and for that reason immediately sent for the contracting parties who, on June 30, 1939, came to his office
and signed the deed of cancellation Exhibit A.
There is no doubt that the contract Exhibit A executed by and between the spouses Ernesto Baniquit and Soledad
Colares upon the advice of the respondent and prepared by the latter as a lawyer and acknowledged by him as a
notary public is contrary to law, moral, and tends to subvert the vital foundation of the family.
The advice given by the respondent, the preparation and acknowledgment by him of the contract constitute
malpractice which justifies disbarment from the practice of law.
The admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is upon the implied condition that his continued enjoyment of
the privilege conferred is dependent upon his remaining a fit and safe person to society.
When it appears that he, by recklessness or sheer ignorance of the law, is unfit or unsafe to be entrusted with
the responsibilities and obligations of a lawyer, his right to continue in the enjoyment of this professional
privilege should be declared terminated. (A.C. No. 932)
RULE 1.03
A lawyer shall NOT, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man’s
cause.
BARRATRY -- the offense of frequently exciting and stirring up quarrels and suits, either at law or
otherwise.
(FUNA, supra at 45)
MAINTENANCE -- it is the wanton and inofficious intermeddling in the dispute of others in which the
OF SUIT intermeddler has no interest whatever, and where the assistance rendered is without
justification or excuse.
(G.R. NO. 173188)
RULE 1.04
A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement.
RATIONALE:
It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the
merit or lack of merit of his case.
If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and
submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible.
A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his clients propensity to litigate.
A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable.
(G.R. NO. L – 28546)
CANON 2 —
A lawyer shall make his legal services available in an efficient and convenient manner compatible with the
independence, integrity and effectiveness of the profession.
RULE 2.01

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A lawyer shall NOT reject, except for valid reasons, the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed.
RATIONALE:
Those enrolled in its ranks are called upon to aid in the performance of one of the basic purposes of the State, the
administration of justice.
To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a lawyer may be required to
act as counsel de oficio.
The fact that his services are rendered without remuneration should NOT occasion a diminution in his zeal.
Rather the contrary. This is not, of course, to ignore that other pressing matters do compete for his attention. After
all, he has his practice to attend to. That circumstance possesses a high degree of relevance since a lawyer has to
live; certainly he cannot afford either to neglect his paying cases.
Nonetheless, what is incumbent upon him as counsel de oficio must be fulfilled." (G.R. NO. L – 23815)
RULE 2.02
In such cases, even if the lawyer does NOT accept a case, he shall not refuse to render legal advice to the person
concerned if only to the extent necessary to safeguard the latter’s rights.
RULE 2.03
PROFESSIONAL TOUTING
A lawyer shall NOT do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.
RATIONALE
practice of law is NOT a business.
It is a profession in which duty to public service, NOT money, is the primary consideration.
Lawyering is NOT primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is NOT a capital that
necessarily yields profits.
The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration.
The duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who
must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves. (A.C. NO. 5299)
The publication or circulation of ordinary simple business cards, being a matter of personal taste or local custom,
and sometimes of convenience, is not per se improper.
But solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal communications or interviews NOT

warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional.
It is equally unprofessional to procure business by indirection through touters of any kind, whether allied real estate
firms or trust companies advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or wills or offering retainers in exchange for
executorships or trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer.
Indirect advertisement for business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments concerning the manner
of their conduct, the magnitude of the interests involved, the importance of the lawyer’s position, and all
other like self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the tone of our high calling, and are intolerable. (G.R.
NO. 32329)
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers.
Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment. (A.C. NO. 6672)
Page 43
PRIMARY CHARACTERISTICS WHICH DISTINGUISH THE LEGAL PROFESSION FROM BUSINESS

ARE:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a byproduct, and in which one may attain the highest
eminence without making much money.
2. A relation as an "officer of court" to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity, and
reliability.
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary.
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current
business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their
clients. (PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "SYCIP, July 30,
1979)
RULE 2.04
A lawyer shall NOT charge rates lower than those customarily prescribed unless the circumstances so warrant.
RATIONALE:
This rule prohibits the competition in the matter of charging professional fees for the purpose of attracting
clients in favour of the lawyer who offers lower rates.
the rule does NOT prohibit a lawyer from charging a reduced fee or none at all to indigent or to a person who
would have difficulty paying the fee usually charged for such services. (AGPALO, 2004)
CANON 3 —
A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective
information or statements of facts.
RULE 3.01
A lawyer shall NOT use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-
laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.
RATIONALE:
To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the profession in
the public’s estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high character of service to which
every member of the bar is called. (A.C. No. 6672)
the solicitation of legal business is NOT altogether proscribed.

However, for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession.
If it is made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar.
Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office and residence address and
fields of practice, as well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible.
Even the use of calling cards is now acceptable. (A.C. No. 5299)
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards
of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data. (B.M. No. 553)
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents.
A lawyer CANNOT, without violating the ethics of his profession advertise his talents or skill as in a manner
similar to a merchant advertising his goods.
The prescription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental
postulate that the that the practice of law is a profession. (Bar Matter No. 553)
Page 44
respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a representation that being associated with the firm
they could "render legal services of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and others engaged in
foreign trade and investment" (p. 3, respondents' memo).
This is unethical because Baker & McKenzie is NOT authorized to practise law here. (See Ruben E. Agpalo,
Legal Ethics, 1983 Ed., p. 115.) (A.C. NO. 2131)
RULE 3.02
In the choice of a firm name, NO false, misleading or assumed name shall be used.
The continued use of the name of a deceased partner is permissible provided that the firm indicates in all its
communications that said partner is deceased.
RULE 3.03
Where a partner accepts public office, he shall withdraw from the firm and his name shall be dropped from the
firm name unless the law allows him to practice law concurrently.
RULE 3.04
A lawyer shall NOT pay or give anything of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in
return for, publicity to attract legal business.
CANON 4 —
A lawyer shall participate in the development of the legal system by initiating or supporting efforts in law
reform and in the improvement of the administration of justice.
CANON 5 —
A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in continuing legal education programs,
support efforts to achieve high standards in law schools as well as in the practical training of law students and
assist in disseminating information regarding the law and jurisprudence.
THREE – FOLD OBLIGATION OF A LAWYER CONCERNING THE REQUIREMENT OF

CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION (HPP)
1) He owes it to Himself to continue improving his knowledge of law;
2) He owes it to his Profession to take an active interest in the maintenance of high standards of legal
education; and
3) He owes it to the Public to make the law a part of their social consciousness. (AGPALO, supra at 80)
CANON 6 —
These canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks.
RATIONALE:
The Code of Professional Responsibility does NOT cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he has joined
the government service.
In fact, by the express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the conduct of lawyers "shall apply to
lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks."
Thus, where a lawyer's misconduct as a government official is of such nature as to affect his qualification as a
lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds.
Although the general rule is that a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of
the bar for infractions he committed as a government official, he may, however, be disciplined as a lawyer if
his misconduct constitutes a violation of his oath a member of the legal profession. (A.C. NO. 4018)
RULE 6.01
Page 45
The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is NOT to convict but to see that justice is done.
The suppression of facts or the concealment of witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the accused
is highly reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary action.
RATIONALE:
A prosecuting attorney, by the nature of his office, is under NO compulsion to file a particular criminal
information where he is NOT convinced that he has evidence to prop up the averments thereof, or that the
evidence at hand points to a different conclusion.
So it is, that in People vs. Sope 75 Phil. 810, 815, this Court made the pronouncement that "it is very logical that
the prosecuting attorney, being the one charged with the prosecution of offenses, should determine the
information to be filed and cannot be controlled by the off ended party." (G.R. NO. L – 26222)
RULE 6.02
A lawyer in the government service shall NOT use his public position to promote or advance his private
interests nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
RATIONALE:
Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and integrity.
More specifically, lawyers in government service are expected to be more conscientious of their actuations as
they are subject to public scrutiny.
They are NOT only members of the bar but also public servants who owe utmost fidelity to public service.
Government employees are expected to devote themselves completely to public service.

For this reason, the private practice of profession is prohibited. (A.C. NO. 6788)
RULE 6.03
A lawyer shall NOT, after leaving a government service, accept engagement or employment in connection
with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
RELATED LAWS:
1) Accepting or having any member of his family accept employment in a private enterprise which has pending
official business with him during the pendency thereof or within 1 year after its termination shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public officer. (R.A. NO. 3019, SECTION 3(d))
2) Public officials and employees shall NOT within the period of 1 year after resignation, retirement, or
separation from public office practice his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used
to be with. (R.A. NO. 6713, SECTION 7(b))
CHAPTER II THE LAWYER AND THE LEGALPROFESSION

CANON 7 —
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of
the integrated bar.
OMISSION OF MARITAL STATUS

A married lawyer’s declaration in his application for ADMISSION TO THE BAR EXAMINATIONS that he was
single was a gross misrepresentation of a material fact made in utter bad faith, for which he should be made
answerable. (A.C. NO. 2505)
RULE 7.01
A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material fact, in
connection with his application for admission to the bar.

Page 46
RATIONALE:
Every applicant is duty bound to lay before the Court all his involvement in any criminal case, pending or
otherwise terminated, to enable the Court to fully ascertain or determine the applicant's moral character.
The petitioner should have realized the implication of any omission on his part, even if inadvertently made.
In this case, the fact that the criminal complaint for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 did NOT even reach the
arraignment stage is of no moment; it was the petitioner's duty to disclose the same as it was a material
fact which could affect his application for admission to the bar.
It has also been held that an applicant for the admission to the bar who made a false statement in his
application is NOT of good moral character.
If what the applicant concealed is a crime which does NOT involve moral turpitude, it is the fact of
concealment and not the commission of the crime itself that makes him morally unfit to become a lawyer.
It should be noted that the application was made under oath, which he lightly took when he made the concealment.
(B.M. NO. 1209)
He should bear in mind that as an officer of the court his high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the
law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusion.
The courts, on the other hand, are entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and
pleading before them.
While a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his client's rights and is expected to display the utmost zeal in
defense of his client's cause, his conduct must never be at the expense of truth. (A.C. NO. 5379)
PENALTIES
The concealment or withholding from the court of the fact that an applicant has been charged with or indicated for
an alleged crime is a ground for disqualification of the applicant to take the bar examination, or for revocation
of the license to practice, if he has already been admitted to the bar.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition of CAESAR Z. DISTRITO to be allowed to take the oath as member of the
Philippine Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys in accordance with Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court is
hereby DENIED. (B.M. NO. 1209)
RULE 7.02
A lawyer shall NOT support the application for admission to the bar of any person known by him to be
unqualified in respect to character, education, or other relevant attribute.
RULE 7.03
A lawyer shall NOT engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, NOR shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
RATIONALE
when the Code or the Rules speaks of "conduct" or "misconduct," the reference is NOT confined to one’s behavior
exhibited in connection with the performance of the lawyer’s professional duties, but also covers any
misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the actual practice of his profession, would show him to be unfit for the
office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law invest him with. (A.C. NO. 7280)
COVERAGE
The grounds for disciplinary actions enumerated under the RULES OF COURT are NOT exclusive and are so
broad as to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer in a his professional and private capacity. (A.M. NO.
104)

Page 47
RATIONALE:
While Atty. Valencia contends that Atty. Garrido’s marriage with Maelotisea was null and void, the fact remains
that he took a man away from a woman who bore him six (6) children. Ordinary decency would have required her to
ward off Atty. Garrido’s advances, as he was a married man, in fact a twice-married man with both marriages
subsisting at that time; she should have said no to Atty. Garrido from the very start.
lawyers, as officers of the court, must NOT only be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good
moral character and must lead lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. Atty.
Valencia failed to live up to these standards before she was admitted to the bar and after she became a
member of the legal profession. (A.C. No. 6593)
RULE 7.03
A lawyer shall NOT engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, NOR shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
FACEBOOK POSTS
Thus, restricting the privacy of one's Facebook posts to "Friends" does not guarantee absolute protection
from the prying eyes of another user who does not belong to one's circle of friends.
The user's own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of
whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or
when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged can
view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at "Friends.”
Under the circumstances, therefore, respondent's claim of violation of right to privacy is negated.
Time and again, it has been held that the freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not
absolute.
While the freedom of expression and the right of speech and of the press are among the most zealously
protected rights in the Constitution, every person exercising them, as the Civil Code stresses, is obliged to act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
As such, the constitutional right of freedom of expression may not be availed of to broadcast lies or half-truths,
insult others, destroy their name or reputation or bring them into disrepute. (A.C. No. 11394)
CANON 8 —
A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and
shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
RATIONALE:
Since they deal constantly with each other, they must treat one another with trust and respect.
Any undue ill feeling between clients should NOT influence counsels in their conduct and demeanor toward
each other.
Mutual bickering, unjustified recriminations and offensive behavior among lawyers NOT only detract from
the dignity of the legal profession, but also constitute highly unprofessional conduct subject to disciplinary
action. (A.C. NO. 5148)
CANON 8 —
A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and
shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
RULE 8.01
A lawyer shall NOT, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper.

Page 48
ILLUSTRATION:
To recall, Atty. Puti called Atty. Tan "bakla" in a condescending manner.
To be sure, the term "bakla" (gay) itself is not derogatory. It is used to describe a male person who is attracted to the
same sex. Thus, the term in itself is not a source of offense as it is merely descriptive.
However, when "bakla" is used in a pejorative and deprecating manner, then it becomes derogatory.
Such offensive language finds no place in the courtroom or in any other place for that matter.
Atty. Puti ought to be aware that using the term "bakla" in a derogatory way is no longer acceptable — as it should
have been in the first place.
Verily, in Sy v. Fineza, the Court ruled that the respondent judge's act of ruling that a witness should NOT be given
any credence because he is a "bakla" was most unbecoming of a judge.
XXXX
Thus, while Atty. Puti is guilty of using inappropriate language against the opposing counsels and the judge,
such transgression is NOT of a grievous character as to merit his suspension
since his misconduct is considered as simple rather than grave. (A.C. NO. 10949)
RULE 8.01
A lawyer shall NOT, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper.
RATIONALE:
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use strong language in
pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients.
However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not
justify the use of offensive and abusive language.
Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory,
illuminating but not offensive.
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to
advance no fact prejudicial to the honor and reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of
the cause with which he is charged.
In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer’s language even in his pleadings must be
dignified. (A.C. No. 7199)
LACK OF INTENTION IS IMMATERIAL

We are not unmindful of counsel's statement that the language used "was not in any way meant to slight or offend"
this Court.
Want of intention, we feel constrained to say, is no excuse for the language employed.
For, counsel cannot escape responsibility "by claiming that his words did not mean what any reader must
have understood them as meaning."
At best, it extenuates liability. (G.R. NO. L – 22979)
RULE 8.02
PROFESSIONAL ENCROACHMENT
A lawyer shall NOT, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another lawyer.
However, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those
seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.

Page 49
CANON 9 —
A lawyer shall NOT, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
UNAUTHORIZED -- it is committed when a person, not a lawyer, pretends to be one and perform acts
PRACTICE OF LAW which are exclusive to members of the bar.
(FUNA, supra at 116)
SHYSTER -- unscrupulous practitioner who disgraces his profession by doing mean work, and
resort to sharp practice to do it.
(FUNA, supra at 120)
RATIONALE:
The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of
those unlicensed to practice law and NOT subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. (A.C. No. 9604)
RULE 9.01
A lawyer shall NOT delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may only be
performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
RATIONALE:
The preparation and signing of any pleading, motion or other paper to be submitted in court in
connection with any pending matter constitute legal work within the context of the practice of law.
In fine, the responsibility of signing the so-called Motion for Prior Leave of Court to Admit the Herein
Attached Amended Complaint was personal to the respondent as the attorney of record.
That he delegated it to a non-lawyer was an abdication of the responsibility that subjected him to sanction.
(A.C. No. 12289)
The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving practice of law which is reserved
exclusively for the members of the legal profession.
Counsel may delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer but CANNOT do so in favor of one who is
not. (A.C. NO. 10525)
MAY BE DELEGATED TO NON – LAWYER: (FEED)

1) Finding and interviewing witnesses;
2) The Examination of case law;
3) Examining court records;
4) Delivering papers and similar matters. (AGAPALO (2004))
RULE 9.02
A lawyer shall NOT divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons NOT licensed to practice
law, except: (PIC)
1) Where there is a Pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate that, upon the latter’s death, money shall be
paid over a reasonable period of time to his estate or to persons specified in the agreement; or
2) Where a lawyer or law firm Includes non-lawyer employees in a retirement plan, even if the plan is based in
whole or in part, on a profit-sharing arrangement. or
3) Where a lawyer undertakes to Complete unfinished legal business of a deceased lawyer;
RATIONALE:
Only those duly licensed to practice law are allowed to charge attorney’s fees. A non – lawyer has no business to
act like a lawyer and charge fees on a client as it is tantamount to an unauthorized practice of law, which is
prohibited under the CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (ANITQUERA (2018), PAGE 48)

Page 50
The union president is NOT the attorney for the laborers. He may seek compensation only as such president. An
agreement whereby a union president is allowed to share in attorneys' fees is immoral. Such a contract we
emphatically reject. It CANNOT be justified. (G.R. NO. L – 24864)
Where in the agreement lawyer David NOT only agreed to give one-half of his professional fees to an
intermediary or commission agent but he also bound himself not to deal directly with the clients, the Court
held that the said agreement is void because it was tantamount to malpractice which is "the practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers" (A.C. NO. 1261)
The amount of P101,856.00 which Atty. Pineda donated to the Union and which actually corresponds to 5%
of the total 35% attorney's fees taken from the proceeds appears improper since it amounts to a rebate or
commission.
This amount was subsequently treated as union miscellaneous operating expenses without the consent of the general
membership. (G.R. NO. L – 24864)
an agreement between a lawyer and a layperson to share the fees collected from clients secured by the
layperson is null and void, and that the lawyer involved may be disciplined for unethical conduct.
Considering that complainant’s allegations in this case had not been proven, the IBP correctly dismissed the charge
against respondent on this matter. (A.C. No. 6622)
CHAPTER III THE LAWYER AND THE COURTS

CANON 10 —
A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
RATIONALE:
It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the
merit or lack of merit of his case.
If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and
submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible.
A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his client's propensity to litigate.
A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable.
(G.R. NO. L – 22320)
RULE 10.01
A lawyer shall NOT do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead or allow
the Court to be misled by any artifice.
RULE 10.02
A lawyer shall NOT knowingly:
1) misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper,
2) the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or
3) the text of a decision or authority, or
4) knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment or
5) assert as a fact that which has NOT been proved.
RATIONALE:
in citing this Court's decisions and rulings, it is the bounden duty of courts, judges and lawyers to reproduce or
copy the same word-for-word and punctuation mark-for-punctuation mark.
Thus, ever present is the danger that if NOT faithfully and exactly quoted, the decisions and rulings of this
Court may lose their proper and correct meaning, to the detriment of other courts, lawyers and the public
who may thereby be misled. (G.R. NO. L – 25291)
Page 51
Making the law office secretary, clerk or messenger the scapegoat or patsy for the delay in filing of pleading, motion
and other paper and for the lawyer's dereliction of duty is a common alibi of practicing lawyer.
Like the alibi of the accused in criminal cases, counsel's shifting of the blame to his office employee is usually a
concoction utilized to cover up his own negligence, incompetence, indolence and ineptitude.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to check, review and recheck the allegation in their pleadings, more
particularly the quoted portions, and ensure that the statements therein are accurate and the reproductions
faithful, down to the last word and even punctuation mark.
The legal profession demands that lawyers thoroughly go over pleadings, motions and other documents dictated or
prepared by them, type or transcribed by their secretaries or clerks, before filing them with the court. If a client is
bound by the acts of his counsel, with more reason should counsel be bound the acts of his secretary who merely
follow his orders. (G.R. NO. 100643)
RULE 10.03
A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall NOT misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
DUTIES OF ATTORNEYS
5) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means only as are Consistent with
truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or
law; (RULE 138, SECTION 20)
RATIONALE:
Lawyers have the duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
Filing multiple actions constitutes an abuse of the Court’s processes.
It constitutes improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade justice.
Those who file multiple or repetitive actions subject themselves to disciplinary action for incompetence or
willful violation of their duties as attorneys to act with all good fidelity to the courts, and to maintain only
such actions that appear to be just and consistent with truth and honor. (A.C. NO. 6323)
By grossly abusing his right of recourse to the courts for the purpose of arguing a cause that had been
repeatedly rebuffed, he was disdaining the obligation of the lawyer to maintain only such actions or
proceedings as appear to him to be just and such defense only as he believes to be honestly debatable under
the law.
By violating his oath NOT to delay any man for money or malice, he has besmirched the name of an honorable
profession and has proved himself unworthy of trust reposed in him by law as an officer of the Court. (A.C. NO.
3923)
CANON 11 —
A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the Courts and to judicial officers and should insist on
similar conduct by others.
RATIONALE:
It CANNOT be overemphasized that it is the sworn duty of a lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a
respectful attitude, "NOT for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the
maintenance of its supreme importance."
It is precisely for this reason that the Lawyer's Oath enjoins all members of the bar to conduct themselves with
good fidelity towards the courts in order NOT to erode the faith and trust of the public in the judiciary. (A.C.
NO. 7330)

Page 52
"Criticism or comment made in good faith on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness, of a
decision of the Court would be welcome for, if well-founded, such reaction can enlighten the court and
contribute to the correction of an error if committed. (G.R. No. 159486-88)
CANON 11 —
RESPECT TO THE COURTS VS. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE RIGHT OF SPEECH
While the freedom of expression and the right of speech and of the press are among the most zealously protected
rights in the Constitution, every person exercising them, as the Civil Code stresses, is obliged to act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
As such, the constitutional right of freedom of expression may NOT be availed of to broadcast lies or half-
truths, insult others, destroy their name or reputation or bring them into disrepute. (A.C. No. 11394)
Considering the defenses of freedom of speech and academic freedom invoked by the respondents, it is worth
discussing here that the legal reasoning used in the past by this Court to rule that freedom of expression is NOT a
defense in administrative cases against lawyers for using intemperate speech in open court or in court
submissions can similarly be applied to respondents’ invocation of academic freedom.
when lawyers speak their minds, they must ever be mindful of their sworn oath to observe ethical standards of
their profession, and in particular, avoid foul and abusive language to condemn the Supreme Court, or any
court for that matter, for a decision it has rendered, especially during the pendency of a motion for such
decision’s reconsideration.
while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of
offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but
respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.
All lawyers, whether they are judges, court employees, professors or private practitioners, are officers of the Court
and have voluntarily taken an oath, as an indispensable qualification for admission to the Bar, to conduct
themselves with good fidelity towards the courts.
There is no exemption from this sworn duty for law professors, regardless of their status in the academic community
or the law school to which they belong. (A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC)
CANON 11 —
ADDRESSING THE NLRC

Respondent's assertion that the NLRC not being a court, its commissioners, not being judges or justices and
therefore not part of the judiciary; and that consequently, the Code of Judicial Conduct does not apply to them, is
unavailing.
Respondent became unmindful of the fact that in addressing the NLRC, he nonetheless remained a member of the
Bar, an oath-bound servant of the law, whose first duty is NOT to his client but to the administration of
justice and whose conduct ought to be and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. (Adm. Case No.
7252)
RULE 11.01
A lawyer shall appear in court properly attired.
GENERAL RULE:
Contemporary business suit.
Page 53
MALE:
Either barong tagalog or suit with tie.
FEMALE:
Appropriate business attire. (DIZON, supra at 92)
RULE 11.02
A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings.
RATIONALE:
Lack of punctuality interferes in the speedy administration of justice.
It does NOT only prejudice the Court but the clients as well as who are totally dependent on the efficiency and
diligence of the lawyers in handling their cases. (ANTIQUERA (2018), PAGE 58)
RULE 11.03
A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
RATIONALE:
public scrutiny of our decisions and official acts as a healthy component of democracy.
However, such must NOT transcend the wall of tolerable criticism and its end must always be to uphold the
dignity and integrity of the justice system and NOT to destroy public confidence in them. (G.R. No. 186592)
Even granting that the bribery charges were true, such personal attacks against the person of complainant
Pantanosas should have been reserved for a different forum and certainly NOT included in a motion filed
before a court of law.
To be sure, a lawyer is obliged to abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language before the courts.
As a supposed officer of the court, such behavior exhibited by respondent Pamatong only serves to betray his utter
lack of reverence towards the courts, which promotes nothing but the degradation of the administration of justice.
(A.C. NO. 7330)
In closing, we find it befitting to reiterate that lawyers have the right, both as an officer of the court and as a
citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and
judges.
However, closely linked to such rule is the cardinal condition that criticisms, no matter how truthful, shall NOT
spill over the walls of decency and propriety.
To that end, the duty of a lawyer to his client's success is wholly subordinate to the administration of justice.
(A.C. NO. 7330)
RULE 11.03
A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
MERE DISCLAIMER
A mere disclaimer of any intentional disrespect is NO ground for exoneration. His intent must be determined be
fair interpretation of the languages employed by him. (G.R. NO. L – 24438)
RULE 11.04
A lawyer shall NOT attribute to a Judge motives NOT supported by the record or have NO materiality to the
case.
POST – LITIGATION UTTERANCES OR PUBLICATIONS

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Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial actuations,
whether amounting to a crime or not, which transcend the permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate
criticism and thereby tend to bring them into disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their integrity and
in the orderly administration of justice, constitute grave professional misconduct which may be visited with
disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the
prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian of the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity.
every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers.
This right is NOT diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority, or that it is
articulated by a lawyer.
Such right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded litigation, because then the court's
actuations are thrown open to public consumption. "Our decisions and all our official actions," said the Supreme
Court of Nebraska, "are public property, and the press and the people have the undoubted right to comment on them,
criticize and censure them as they see fit. Judicial officers, like other public servants, must answer for their official
actions before the chancery of public opinion."
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall NOT spill over the
walls of decency and propriety.
A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the One hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof,
on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts.
It is Such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. (G.R. NO. L – 27654)
RULE 11.05
A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper authorities only.
RATIONALE:
Meanwhile, in Re: Suspension of Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo, this Court imposed the penalty of suspension for 1
year for the respondent's act of resorting to the press instead of availing himself only of judicial remedies in
airing out his grievances:
Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and
upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.
Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations.

Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates a lawyer to "observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts and to judicial officers and he should insist on similar conduct by others." Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 states
that a lawyer "shall submit grievances against a judge to the proper authorities only." (A.C. NO. 7330)
RULE 140 DISCIPLINE OF JUDGES OF REGULAR AND SPECIAL COURTS AND JUSTICES OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN (A.M. NO. 01-8-10-SC)
HOW INSTITUTED
Proceedings for the discipline of judges of regular and special courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan may be instituted motu proprio by the Supreme Court or upon a verified complaint, supported
by affidavits of person who have personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents which may
substantiate said allegations, or upon an anonymous complaint, supported by public records of indubitable
integrity.
The complaint shall be in writing and shall state clearly and concisely the acts and omissions constituting
violations of standards of conduct prescribed for Judges by law, the Rules of Court, or the Code of Judicial
Conduct. (SECTION 1)
RULE 11.05
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A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper authorities only.
LAWYER’S FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

A lawyer is entitled to voice his criticism within the context of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
speech which must be exercised responsibly. After all, every right carries with it the corresponding obligation.
Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility.
The lawyer's fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and orderly administration of
justice. It must be done within the confines of reason and common sense. (A.C. No. 8954)
LAWYERS WHO ARE ALSO LAW PROFESSORS MAY NOT INVOKE ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN
DEFENSE OF INTEMPERATE STATEMENTS
The implicit ruling in jurisprudence is that the constitutional right to freedom of expression of members of the
bar may be circumscribed by their ethical duties as lawyers to give due respect to the courts and to uphold
the public’s faith in the legal profession and the justice system.
The reason that freedom of expression may be so delimited in the case of lawyers applies with greater force to
the academic freedom of law professors.
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use strong language in
pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients.
However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not
justify the use of offensive and abusive language.
Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory,
illuminating but not offensive. (SC A.M. NO. 10 – 10 – 4 – SC)
CANON 12 —
A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice.
RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION

All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies. (1987 CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE III, SECTION 16)
RULE 12.01
A lawyer shall NOT appear for trial unless he has adequately prepared himself on the law and the facts of his
case, the evidence he will adduce and the order of its profference.
He should also be ready with the original documents for comparison with the copies.
RULE 12.02
A lawyer shall NOT file multiple actions arising from the same cause.
RULE 12.03
A lawyer shall NOT, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period
lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.
RATIONALE:
The Court censures the practice of counsels who secure repeated extensions of time to file their pleadings and
thereafter simply let the period lapse without submitting the pleading or even an explanation or
manifestation of their failure to do so.
The Court herein reprimands petitioner's counsel for such misconduct with the warning that a repetition thereof will
be dealt with more severely. (G.R. NO. L – 35867)
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RULE 12.04
A lawyer shall NOT unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a Judgment or misuse Court processes.
RATIONALE:
Without a doubt, the present case is an instance where the due process routine vigorously pursued by petitioners is
but a clear-cut devise meant to perpetually forestall execution of an otherwise final and executory decision.
Aside from clogging court dockets, the strategy is deplorably a common course resorted to by losing litigants
in the hope of evading manifest obligations.
The Court condemns this outrageous abuse of the judicial process by the petitioners and their counsels.
It is an important fundamental principle in the judicial system that every litigation must come to an end. Access to
the courts is guaranteed. But there must be a limit thereto.
Once a litigant's rights have been adjudicated in a valid and final judgment of a competent court, he should
not be granted an unbridled license to come back for another try.
The prevailing party should NOT be harassed by subsequent suits.

For, if endless litigations were to be encouraged, then unscrupulous litigants will multiply to the detriment of
the administration of justice. (G.R. NO. 157911)
RULE 12.05
A lawyer shall refrain from talking to his witness during a break or recess in the trial, while the witness is still
under examination.
RULE 12.06
A lawyer shall NOT knowingly assist a witness to misrepresent himself or to impersonate another.
RULE 12.07
A lawyer shall NOT abuse, browbeat or harass a witness nor needlessly inconvenience him.
RULE 12.08
A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client, except:
a) on formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an instrument, and the like: or
b) on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential to the ends of justice, in which event he
must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to another counsel.
RATIONALE:
The reason behind such rule is the difficulty posed upon lawyers by the task of dissociating their relation to
their clients as witnesses from that as advocates.
Witnesses are expected to tell the facts as they recall them.

In contradistinction, advocates are partisans -- those who actively plead and defend the cause of others.
It is difficult to distinguish the fairness and impartiality of a disinterested witness from the zeal of an advocate. The
question is one of propriety rather than of competency of the lawyers who testify for their clients.
"Acting or appearing to act in the double capacity of lawyer and witness for the client will provoke unkind
criticism and leave many people to suspect the truthfulness of the lawyer because they cannot believe the
lawyer as disinterested.
The people will have a plausible reason for thinking, and if their sympathies are against the lawyer’s client, they will
have an opportunity, not likely to be neglected, for charging, that as a witness he fortified it with his own testimony.
The testimony of the lawyer becomes doubted and is looked upon as partial and untruthful." 33
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Thus, although the law does not forbid lawyers from being witnesses and at the same time counsels for a cause, the
preference is for them to refrain from testifying as witnesses, unless they absolutely have to; and should they do so,
to withdraw from active management of the case. (A.C. No. 6252)
CANON 13 —
A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or
gives the appearance of influencing the Court.
RATIONALE:
The judiciary, as the branch of government tasked to administer justice, to settle justiciable controversies or disputes
involving enforceable and demandable rights, and to afford redress of wrongs for the violation of said rights must
be allowed to decide cases independently, free of outside influence or pressure.
An independent judiciary is essential to the maintenance of democracy, as well as of peace and order in society.
Further, maintaining the dignity of courts and enforcing the duty of citizens to respect them are necessary
adjuncts to the administration of justice. (A.M. NO. 01 – 12 – 03 – SC)
RULE 13.01
A lawyer shall NOT extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for cultivating
familiarity with Judges.
RATIONALE
A lawyer that approaches a judge to try to gain influence and receive a favorable outcome for his or her client
violates Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
This act of influence peddling is highly immoral and has NO place in the legal profession.
The primary duty of lawyers is NOT to their clients but to the administration of justice.
To that end, their clients' success is wholly subordinate. (A.C. No. 9018)
improper for a litigant or counsel to see a judge in chambers and talk to him about a matter related to the
case pending in the court of said judge, in the case now before Us We do not consider it as an act of contempt of
court when petitioner asked his counsel to see respondent Judge in his chamber and request him to disqualify
himself upon a ground which respondent
Judge might consider just or valid.
It is one thing to act NOT in accordance with the rules, and another thing to act in a manner which would
amount to a disrespect or an affront to the dignity of the court or judge. (G.R. NO. L – 22536)
RULE 13.02
A lawyer shall NOT make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public
opinion for or against a party.
RATIONALE:
SUBJUDICE RULE
GENERAL RULE:
The SUBJUDICE RULE restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to judicial proceedings to avoid
prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice. (G.R. NO. 205956)
EXCEPTION:
It does NOT prohibit fair and accurate reporting of on – going proceedings by the media as long as it does
NOT usurp the court’s role by prejudicing the issue. (FUNA, supra at 214)

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The fact that respondent was not the judge nor the counsel but a litigant in the subject case does not strip her off of
her membership in the Bar, as well as her being a Member and the head of the highest court of the land at that time.
Her being a litigant does NOT mean that she was free to conduct herself in less honorable manner than that
expected of a lawyer or a judge. (A.M. No. 18 – 06 – 01 – SC)
SUB JUDICE RULE IN RELATION TO INDIRECT CONTEMPT TO BE PUNISHED AFTER CHARGE

AND HEARING
After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such
period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following
acts may be punished for indirect contempt; (CO – MADIC)
1) Any Improper Conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of
justice; (C)
6) Any abuse of or any unlawful Interference with the processes or proceedings of a court NOT constituting Direct
Contempt; (I) (RULE 71, SECTION 3)
CLEAR AND PRESENT -- means that the evil consequence of the comment must be "extremely serious
DANGER RULE and the degree of imminence extremely high" before an utterance can be
punished.
(A.M. No. 18-06-01-sc)
CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER RULE AGAINST SUBJUDICE RULE

The power of contempt is inherent in all courts in order to allow them to conduct their business unhampered
by publications and comments which tend to impair the impartiality of their decisions or otherwise obstruct
the administration of justice.
As important as the maintenance of freedom of speech, is the maintenance of the independence of the Judiciary.
The "clear and present danger" rule may serve as an aid in determining the proper constitutional boundary
between these two rights.
The "clear and present danger" rule means that the evil consequence of the comment must be "extremely serious and
the degree of imminence extremely high" before an utterance can be punished.
There must exist a clear and present danger that the utterance will harm the administration of justice.
Freedom of speech should NOT be impaired through the exercise of the power of contempt of court unless
there is no doubt that the utterances in question make a serious and imminent threat to the administration of
justice.
It must constitute an imminent, NOT merely a likely, threat. (Citations omitted)
From the foregoing, respondent may be correct in arguing that there must exist a "clear and present danger" to
the administration of justice for statements or utterances covered by the sub judice rule to be considered
punishable under the rules of contempt.
The case at bar, however, is NOT a contempt proceeding.

The Court, in this case is not geared towards protecting itself from such prejudicial comments outside of court by the
exercise of its inherent contempt power. (A.M. No. 18-06-01-sc)
PRINCIPLE OF OPEN JUSTICE

The PRINCIPLE OF OPEN JUSTICE refers to the public right to scrutinize and criticize court proceedings.

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The principle assists in preventing judicial arbitrariness or idiosyncrasy and maintaining public confidence in the
administration of justice. (A.M. NO. 07 – 09 – 13 – SC)
TRIAL BY PUBLICITY BECOMES PREJUDICIAL

To warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that judges have been unduly
influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. (G.R. NO. 111206 – 08)
POST – LITIGATON CRITICISMS

The guarantees of free speech and free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct.
The administration of law is a matter of vital public concern. (AGPALO, supra at 180)
RULE 13.03
A lawyer shall NOT brook nor invite interference by another branch or agency of the government in the
normal course of judicial proceedings.
CHAPER IV THE LAWYER AND THE CLIENT

NATURE OF ATTORNEY – CLIENT RELATIONSHIP: (PCF)
1) Strictly Personal;
2) Highly Confidential; and
3) Fiduciary. (G.R. NO. 105938)
RETAINER OR -- refers to the act of the client by which he engages the services of attorney to render
EMPLOYMENT legal service, or to defend or prosecute his cause of action.
(AGPALO, supra at 186)
AMICUS CURIAE -- friend of the court

-- experienced and impartial attorneys may be invited by the COURT to help in the
disposition of issues submitted to it.
(RULES OF COURT)
AMICUS CURIAE -- bar associations which in appear in court as friends to expound on some matters
PAR EXCELLENCE of law for the information of the court.
(RULES OF COURT)
COUNSEL DE -- a counsel appointed or assigned by the court, from among such members of the bar
OFFICIO in good standing who, by reason of their experience and ability, may adequately
defend the accused.
(PINEDA, supra at 8)
PAYMENT IS NOT ESSENTIAL

legal advice regarding the former's business.
To constitute professional employment, it is NOT essential that the client employed the attorney
professionally on any previous occasion.
It is NOT necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither is it material that the attorney consulted
did NOT afterward handle the case for which his service had been sought. (AC No. 99-634)
CANON 14 —
A lawyer shall NOT refuse his services to the needy.
RULE 14.01

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A lawyer shall NOT decline to represent a person solely on account of the latter’s race, sex, creed or status of
life, or because of his own opinion regarding the guilt of said person.
RULE 14.02
A lawyer shall NOT decline, except for serious and sufficient cause:
1) an appointment as counsel de oficio or
2) as amicus curiae or
3) a request from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any of its chapters for rendition of free legal aid.
COURT MAY APPOINT COUNSEL DE OFICIO IN CRIMINAL ACTIONS:
DUTY OF COURT TO INFORM ACCUSED OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL

Before arraignment, the court shall inform the accused of his right to counsel and ask him if he desires to have
one. (RULE 116, SECTION 6)
PRESENCE OF COUNSEL DE OFICIO

GENERAL RULE:
The court must assign a counsel de oficio to defend the accused.
EXCEPTION:
Unless the accused is: (HC)
1) allowed to defend Himself in person or
2) has employed a counsel of his Choice, (6a) (RULE 116, SECTION 6)
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL DE OFICIO FOR ACCUSED ON APPEAL

It shall be the duty of the clerk of the trial court, upon filing of a notice of appeal, to ascertain from the
appellant, if confined in prison, whether he desires the Regional Trial Court, Court of Appeals or the Supreme
Court to appoint a counsel de oficio to defend him and to transmit with the record on a form to be prepared by the
clerk of court of the appellate court, a certificate of compliance with this duty and of the response of the appellant to
his inquiry. (13a) (RULE 122, SECTION 13)
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL DE OFICIO FOR THE ACCUSED

If it appears from the record of the case as transmitted that: (CWH)
a) the accused is Confined in prison,
b) is Without counsel de parte on appeal, or
c) has signed the notice of appeal himself,
the clerk of court of the Court of Appeals shall designate a counsel de oficio.
An appellant who is NOT confined in prison may, upon request, be assigned a counsel de oficio within 10 days
from receipt of the notice to file brief and he establishes his right thereto. (2a) (RULE 124, SECTION 2)
RULE 14.03
A lawyer may NOT refuse to accept representation of an indigent client unless:
a) he is in NO position to carry out the work effectively or competently; or
b) he labors under a conflict of interest:
i. between him and the prospective client, or
ii. between a present client and the prospective client.
INDIGENT PARTY
A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or defense as an indigent if:
1) the court, upon an ex parte application and hearing,
2) is satisfied that the party is one who has no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and
basic necessities for himself and his family. (SECTION 21)
CONSIDERED INDIGENT PARTY:

1) his gross monthly income and that of his immediate family combine does NOT exceed amount double the
monthly minimum wage of an employee in the place where the party resides; and
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2) he does not own real property with a fair market value, as stated in the current tax declaration of more
than PHP.300,000. (IRR OF A.M. NO. 17 – 03 – 09 – SC, RULE I, SECTION 4(d))
RULE 14.04
A lawyer who accepts the cause of a person unable to pay his professional fees shall observe the same
standard of conduct governing his relations with paying clients.
CANON 15 —
A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client.
RATIONALE:
The purpose of the rule of confidentiality is actually to protect the client from possible breach of confidence
as a result of a consultation with a lawyer.
complainant went to respondent, a lawyer who incidentally was also then a friend, to bare what she considered
personal secrets and sensitive documents for the purpose of obtaining legal advice and assistance.
The moment complainant approached the then receptive respondent to seek legal advice, a veritable lawyer-
client relationship evolved between the two.
Such relationship imposes upon the lawyer certain restrictions circumscribed by the ethics of the profession. Among
the burdens of the relationship is that which enjoins the lawyer, respondent in this instance, to keep inviolate
confidential information acquired or revealed during legal consultations. The fact that one is, at the end of the day,
not inclined to handle the client's case is hardly of consequence. Of little moment, too, is the fact that no formal
professional engagement follows the consultation.
Nor will it make any difference that no contract whatsoever was executed by the parties to memorialize the
relationship.
As we said in Burbe v. Magulta,

legal advise regarding the former's business.
To constitute professional employment, it is not essential that the client employed the attorney professionally
on any previous occasion.
It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither is it material that the attorney consulted
did not afterward handle the case for which his service had been sought.
a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining
professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then the
professional employments is established. (A.C. NO. 6711)
DUTY OF COUNSEL AFTER DEATH OF PARTY

Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is NOT thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his
counsel: (30L)
1) to inform the court within 30 days after such Death of the fact thereof, (30) and
2) to Give the Name and Address of his Legal representative or representatives. (L) (RULE 3, SECTION 16)
RULE 15.01
A lawyer, in conferring with a prospective client, shall ascertain as soon as practicable whether the matter
would involve a conflict with another client or his own interest, and if so, shall forthwith inform the
prospective client.
RULE 15.02
CONFIDENTIALITY RULE
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A lawyer shall be bound by the rule on privilege communication in respect of matters disclosed to him by a
prospective client.
ATTORNEY – CLIENT PRIVILEGE

GENERAL RULE:
1) An attorney or person reasonably believed by the client to be licensed to engage in the practice of law
CANNOT, without the consent of the client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him
or her, or his or her advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional employment,
2) NOR can an attorney’s secretary, stenographer, or clerk, or other persons assisting the attorney be
examined without the consent of the client and his or her employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of
which has been acquired in such capacity,
EXCEPTIONS:
i. FURTHERANCE OF CRIME OR FRAUD
ii. CLAIMANTS THROUGH SAME DECEASED CLIENT
iii. BREACH OF DUTY BY LAWYER OR CLIENT
iv. DOCUMENT ATTESTED BY THE LAWYER
v. JOINT CLIENTS
i. FURTHERANCE OF CRIME OR FRAUD

If the services or advice of the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit
or plan to commit what the client knew or reasonably should have known to be a crime or fraud;
ii. CLAIMANTS THROUGH SAME DECEASED CLIENT

As to a communication relevant to an issue between parties who claim through the same
deceased client, regardless of whether the claims are by testate or intestate or by inter
vivos transaction;
iii. BREACH OF DUTY BY LAWYER OR CLIENT

As to a communication relevant to an issue of breach of duty by the lawyer to his or her client,
or by the client to his or her lawyer;
iv. DOCUMENT ATTESTED BY THE LAWYER

As to a communication relevant to an issue concerning an attested document to which the
lawyer is an attesting witness; or
v. JOINT CLIENTS
As to a communication relevant to a matter of common interest between two [(2)] or more clients if
the communication was made by any of them to a lawyer retained or consulted in common, when
offered in an action between any of the clients, unless they have expressly agreed otherwise.
(RULE 130, SECTION 24)
RATIONALE
The purpose of the privilege is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their
clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of
justice. (449 U.S. 383 (1981))
FACTORS ESSENTIAL TO ESTABLISH THE EXISTENCE OF THE ATTORNEY – CLIENT

PRIVILEGE
Now, we go to the rule on attorney-client privilege. Dean Wigmore cites the factors essential to establish the
existence of the privilege, viz:
1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought
2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such,
3) the communications relating to that purpose,
4) made in confidence
5) by the client,
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6) are at his instance permanently protected

7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be waived.
In fine, the factors are as follows: (ECP)

1) There Exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship, and it is by reason of
this relationship that the client made the communication.
2) The client made the communication in Confidence.
3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his Professional capacity.
1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship, and it is by reason

of this relationship that the client made the communication.
Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected by the rule on privileged communication even if
the prospective client does not thereafter retain the lawyer or the latter declines the employment. 23 The reason for
this is to make the prospective client free to discuss whatever he wishes with the lawyer without fear that what he
tells the lawyer will be divulged or used against him, and for the lawyer to be equally free to obtain information
from the prospective client.24
On the other hand, a communication from a (prospective) client to a lawyer for some purpose other than on account
of the (prospective) attorney-client relation is not privileged.
Instructive is the case of Pfleider v. Palanca, where the client and his wife leased to their attorney a 1,328-hectare
agricultural land for a period of ten years.
In their contract, the parties agreed, among others, that a specified portion of the lease rentals would be paid to the
client-lessors, and the remainder would be delivered by counsel-lessee to client's listed creditors.
The client alleged that the list of creditors which he had "confidentially" supplied counsel for the purpose of
carrying out the terms of payment contained in the lease contract was disclosed by counsel, in violation of their
lawyer-client relation, to parties whose interests are adverse to those of the client.
As the client himself, however, states, in the execution of the terms of the aforesaid lease contract between the
parties, he furnished counsel with the "confidential" list of his creditors.
We ruled that this indicates that client delivered the list of his creditors to counsel not because of the
professional relation then existing between them, but on account of the lease agreement.
We then held that a violation of the confidence that accompanied the delivery of that list would partake more
of a private and civil wrong than of a breach of the fidelity owing from a lawyer to his client.
2) The client made the communication in confidence.

The mere relation of attorney and client does NOT raise a presumption of confidentiality.
The client must intend the communication to be confidential.
A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary act of disclosure between attorney and
client in confidence and by means which, so far as the client is aware, discloses the information to NO third person
other than one reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose
for which it was given.
Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on quiescent ground.

Thus, a compromise agreement prepared by a lawyer pursuant to the instruction of his client and delivered to
the opposing party, an offer and counter-offer for settlement, or a document given by a client to his counsel
NOT in his professional capacity, are NOT privileged communications, the element of confidentiality NOT
being present.
3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity.

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The communication made by a client to his attorney must NOT be intended for mere information, but for the
purpose of seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his rights or obligations.
The communication must have been transmitted by a client to his attorney for the purpose of seeking legal
advice.
If the client seeks an accounting service, or business or personal assistance, and not legal advice, the privilege does
not attach to a communication disclosed for such purpose.
Applying all these rules to the case at bar, we hold that the evidence on record fails to substantiate complainant's
allegations. (A.C. No. 5108)
COVERAGE OF THE PRIVILEGE

It is NOT confined to verbal or written communications made by the client to his attorney, but extends as well
to information communicated by the client to the attorney by other means. (RIGUERA, supra at 419)
EFFECT OF THE TERMINATION OF THE ATTORNEY – CLIENT RELATIONSHIP

The termination of the attorney – client relationship does not justify a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to
in conflict with that of his client.
The reason behind this prohibition is that the client’s trust and confidence, once given, should not be
violated by the mere expiration of the lawyer – client relationship. (A.C. NO. 1346)
WHO MAY RAISE THE PRIVILEGE

Either the client or his lawyer may raise the privilege. (381 F. 2d 551 (CA2 1967))
CONTROL GROUP TEST

If the employee making the communication, of whatever rank he may be, is in position to control or even
to take a substantial part in a decision about any action which the corporation may take upon the advice
of the attorney, then, in effect, he is the personification of the corporation when he makes his disclosure to the
attorney and the privilege would apply. (236 U.S. 318 (1915))
CLIENT IS A CORPORATION
Where the client is a corporation, the attorney – client privilege extends to the employees of the company and
thus their communications to the attorney for the purpose of enabling him to give sound and informed
advice are considered privileged. (449 U.S. 383(1981))
WORK – PRODUCT DOCTRINE

The doctrine that the trial preparation materials of lawyer or his representative are protected from discovery
unless the other party shows that it has a substantial need for the materials to prepare its case, and cannot
without undue hardship, obtain their substantial equivalent by other means.
Trial preparation materials include written documents, such as records, notes, memorandums, and tangible things.
If discovery will be allowed, the court must protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions,
opinions and legal theories of the lawyer or his representative. (FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE, RULE 26(b)(3))
APPLICABILITY OF WORK – PRODUCT DOCTRINE

While in principle WORK – PRODUCT DOCTRINE is NOT applicable in the PHILIPPINES, it is submitted,
by implication, that it may be invoked on motion for protective orders (RULE 23, SECTION 16) or to motion
to terminate or limit examination (RULE 23, SECTION 18). (229 SCRA 355 (1994))
ATTORNEY – CLIENT PRIVILEGE WORK – PRODUCT DOCTRINE

AS TO NATURE

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A privilege. Not a privilege but a special protective rule against

discovery.
AS TO SCOPE
Based on confidential communication between client Extends to all trial preparation materials of the lawyer
and attorney. even if not based on attorney – client communication.
ATTORNEY – CLIENT PRIVILEGE WORK – PRODUCT DOCTRINE

AS TO LIMITATION
May not overcome by a showing of substantial need and May be overcome by a showing of substantial need and
undue hardship. undue hardship.
AS TO APPLICABILITY
Applies broadly at all stages of legal proceedings. Operates primarily as a limitation on pre – trial
discovery.
(BASIC EVIDENCE, BAUTISTA PAGE 71 (2004))
CLIENT’S IDENTITY SUBJECT TO THE ATTORNEY – CLIENT PRIVILEGE

GENERAL RULE:
A lawyer may NOT invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of this client.
EXCEPTIONS: (CRITO)
i. Where the government's lawyers have NO Case against an attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's name,
the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual
of a crime, the client's name is privileged;
ii. Where the client’s identity is Relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which the client sought legal
assistance.
iii. Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client's name would Implicate
that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice;
iv. Where the nature of the attorney – client relationship has been previously disclosed and it is the identity which is
intended to be confidential, the client’s identity is confidential since revelation would result in disclosure of the
entire Transaction.
v. Where disclosure would Open the client to civil liability; (G.R. No. 105938)
DURATION OF THE PRIVILEGE

GENERAL RULE:
THE ATTORNEY – CLIENT confidentiality privilege and lawyer’s loyalty to his client extend even after the
termination of the relationship. (G.R. NO. 105938)
EXCEPTIONS:
1) When required by law;
2) When the privilege is waived by the client; (A.C. NO. 927)
3) A lawyer shall NOT reveal the confidences or secrets of his client except: (RAN)
a) when Required by law;
b) when Authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of the disclosure;
c) when Necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or associates or by judicial action.
(RULE 21.01)
RULE 15.03

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A lawyer shall NOT represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.
RATIONALE:
"The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where the opposing
parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action."
The prohibition also applies even if the "lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the
lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential information
acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated."
To be held accountable under this rule, it is "enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose
the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyer’s respective retainers with each of them would
affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients."
To be sure, Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides an exception to the above
prohibition. However, we find no reason to apply the exception due to Atty. Sabitsana’s failure to comply with the
requirements set forth under the rule.
Atty. Sabitsana did not make a full disclosure of facts to the complainant and to Zenaida Cañete before he
accepted the new engagement with Zenaida Cañete.
The records likewise show that although Atty. Sabitsana wrote a letter to the complainant informing her of
Zenaida Cañete’s adverse claim to the property covered by the Deed of Sale and, urging her to settle the
adverse claim; Atty. Sabitsana however did not disclose to the complainant that he was also being engaged as
counsel by Zenaida Cañete. (A.C. No. 5098)
KINDS OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST

1) CONCURRENT REPRESENTATION (MULTIPLE)
2) SEQUENTIAL REPRESENTATION (SUCCESSIVE)
CONCURRENT -- occurs when a lawyer represents clients whose objectives are

REPRESENTATION (MULTIPLE) adverse to each other, no matter how slight or remote such adverse
interests may be.
SEQUENTIAL REPRESENTATION -- occurs when a law firm takes a present client who has an interest
(SUCCESSIVE) adverse to the interest of a former client of the same law firm.
(PINEDA, supra at 234)
TEST OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST

1) CONFLICTING DUTIES
2) INVITATION OF SUSPICION
3) USE OF PRIOR KNOWLEDGE (A.C. No. 5098)
1) CONFLICTING DUTIES
Whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to
oppose that claim for the other client.
2) INVITATION OF SUSPICION
Whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undivided
fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of
that duty.
3) USE OF PRIOR KNOWLEDGE (A.C. No. 5098)

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Whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former client any confidential
information acquired through their connection or previous employment.
TEST OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The test is whether or not in behalf of one client it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or claim, but is his
duty to oppose it for the other client.
TEST OF THE INCONSISTENCY OF INTERESTS

Whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the
performance thereof. (A.C. No. 10687)
COVERAGE OF CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

1) The rule prohibiting conflict of interest applies to situations where in a lawyer would be representing a client
whose interest is directly adverse to any of his present or former clients.
2) It also applies when the lawyer represents a client against a former client in a controversy that is related,
directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of the previous litigations in which he appeared for the former
client. (A.C. No. 10687)
RULE 15.04
A lawyer may, with the written consent of all concerned, act as mediator, conciliator or arbitrator in settling
disputes.
RULE 15.05
A lawyer, when advising his client, shall give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results
of the client’s case, neither overstating nor understating the prospects of the case.
RULE 15.06
INFLUENCE – PEDDLING
A lawyer shall NOT state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or legislative body.
RATIONALE:
By implying that he can negotiate a favorable ruling for the sum of ₱8,000.00, respondent trampled upon the
integrity of the judicial system and eroded confidence on the judiciary.
This gross disrespect of the judicial system shows that he is wanting in moral fiber and betrays the lack of integrity
in his character.
The practice of law is a privilege, and respondent has repeatedly shown that he is unfit to exercise it. (A.C. No.
11350)
RULE 15.07
A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness.
RATIONALE:
the ethics of the Legal Profession rightly enjoined every lawyer like him to act with the highest standards of
truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law.
As we have observed in one case:
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member
of the bar.
Thus, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a manner that would promote public confidence in
the integrity of the legal profession.

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Falsifying or simulating the court papers amounted to deceit, malpractice or misconduct in office, any of
which was already a ground sufficient for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.
The moral standards of the Legal Profession expected the respondent to act with the highest degree of
professionalism, decency, and nobility in the course of their practice of law.
That he turned his back on such standards exhibited his baseness, lack of moral character, dishonesty, lack of probity
and general unworthiness to continue as an officer of the Court. (A.C. No. 11256)
DUTIES OF ATTORNEYS
3) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as Appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he
believes to be honestly debatable under the law. (RULE 138, SECTION 20)
RULE 15.08
A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently with the practice of law shall make
clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.
RATIONALE:
A lawyer is NOT prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation.
Impropriety arises, though, when the business is of such a nature or is conducted in such a manner as to be
inconsistent with the lawyer’s duties as a member of the bar.
This inconsistency arises when the business is one that can readily lend itself to the procurement of professional
employment for the lawyer; or that can be used as a cloak for indirect solicitation on the lawyer’s behalf; or is of a
nature that, if handled by a lawyer, would be regarded as the practice of law.
It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by complainant that Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., which
purports to be a financial and legal consultant, was indeed a vehicle used by respondent as a means to
procure professional employment; specifically for corporate rehabilitation cases.
Annex "C"of the Complaint is a letterhead of Jesi & Jane
Management, Inc., which proposed an agreement for the engagement of legal services. The letter clearly states that,
should the prospective client agree to the proposed fees, respondent would render legal services related to the
former’s loan obligation with a bank. This circumvention is considered objectionable and violates the Code, because
the letter is signed by respondent as President of Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., and not as partner or associate of a
law firm.
Rule 15.08 of the Code mandates that the lawyer is mandated to inform the client whether the former is acting as a
lawyer or in another capacity.
This duty is a must in those occupations related to the practice of law.

The reason is that certain ethical considerations governing the attorney – client relationship may be operative
in one and NOT in the other.
In this case, it is confusing for the client if it is NOT clear whether respondent is offering consultancy or legal
services. (A.C. No. 6622)
CANON 16 —
A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession.
RATIONALE:
when a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an
accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for the intended purpose.
Consequently, if NOT used accordingly, the money must be returned immediately to the client.

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As such, a lawyer’s failure to return the money to his client despite numerous demands is a violation of the
trust reposed on him and is indicative of his lack of integrity, as in this case.
Clearly, respondent failed to exercise such skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal profession commonly
possess and exercise in such matters of professional employment and, hence, must be disciplined accordingly. (A.C.
No. 8826)
RULE 16.01
A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
RATIONALE:
Further, as this Court ruled in Parinas v. Paguinto, it is of NO moment that there is only partial payment of the
acceptance fee, to wit:
Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility ("the Code") provides that a lawyer shall account for all
money or property collected for or from the client.
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and
gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client's cause.
Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for filing fee, but NOT used for failure to file the
case must immediately be returned to the client on demand.
Paguinto returned the money only after Parinas filed this administrative case for disbarment. (A.C. NO. 10541)
In failing to apply to the filing fee the amount given by complainant -- as evidenced by the receipt issued by
the law office of respondent -- the latter also violated the rule that lawyers must be scrupulously careful in
handling money entrusted to them in their professional capacity.
Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that lawyers shall hold in trust all moneys of their
clients and properties that may come into their possession.
Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional ethics and are guilty
of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession.
It may be true that they have a lien upon the client's funds, documents and other papers that have lawfully
come into their possession; that they may retain them until their lawful fees and disbursements have been
paid; and that they may apply such funds to the satisfaction of such fees and disbursements.
However, these considerations do NOT relieve them of their duty to promptly account for the moneys they
received.
Their failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. In any event, they must still exert all effort to protect their
client's interest within the bounds of law.
If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it correlative
duties NOT only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public.
Respondent fell short of this standard when he converted into his legal fees the filing fee entrusted to him by
his client and thus failed to file the complaint promptly.
The fact that the former returned the amount does NOT exculpate him from his breach of duty. (AC No. 99 –
634)
a lawyer is NOT entitled to unilaterally appropriate his client's money for himself by the mere fact that the
client owes him attorney’s fees.

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The failure of an attorney to return the client's money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that he has
misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice and violation of the general morality, as well as of professional
ethics; it also impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.
In short, a lawyer's unjustified withholding of money belonging to his client, as in this case, warrants the
imposition of disciplinary action. (A.C. No. 11494)
Where a client gives money to his lawyer for a specific purpose, such as to file
an action,
appeal an adverse judgment,
consummate a settlement, or
pay the purchase price of a parcel of land,
the lawyer should, upon failure to take such step and spend the money for it, immediately return the money
to his client. (A.C. NO. 12044)
In Small v. Banares, the Court suspended Atty. Banares from the practice of law for two (2) years for failing to file a
case for which the amount of P80,000.00 was given to him by his client.
He also failed to update his client on the status of the case and to return the said amount upon demand of his
client. (A.C. NO. 12044)
RULE 16.02
A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him.
RATIONALE:
a lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money of his client that may come to his possession.
As trustee of such funds, he is bound to keep them separate and apart from his own.
Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose such as for the filing and processing of a case if NOT
utilized, must be returned immediately upon demand.
Failure to return gives rise to a presumption that he has misappropriated it in violation of the trust reposed
on him.
And the conversion of funds entrusted to him constitutes gross violation of professional ethics and betrayal of public
confidence in the legal profession. (A.C. No. 12768)
It is NOT only important to serve their clients with utmost zeal and competence.
It is also an equally important responsibility for them to properly separate and account for any money given
to them by their clients, and to resist the temptation to borrow money from their clients, in order to preserve
the trust and confidence reposed upon lawyers by every person requiring their legal advice and services. (A.C.
No. 10541)
A lawyer, once he takes up the cause of his client, has the duty to serve such client with competence, and to attend to
his client's cause with diligence, care and devotion, whether he accepts the engagement for free or for a fee.
Moreover, lawyers should refrain from obtaining loans from their clients, in order to avoid the perils of
abusing the trust and confidence reposed upon him by such client.
it is unethical for a lawyer to obtain loans from Complainant during the existence of a lawyer-client
relationship
issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account indicates a
lawyer's unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him, shows such lack of personal honesty and good
moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary
action.
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Similarly, Sanchez v. Somoso held that the persistent refusal to settle due obligations despite demand manifests
a lawyer's low regard to his commitment to the oath he has taken when he joined his peers, seriously and
irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession he should, instead, hold in high esteem.
This conduct deserves nothing less than a severe disciplinary action. (A.C. No. 10541)
CONTRACTUAL RELATION BETWEEN LAWYER AND CLIENT

The legal profession dictates that it is NOT a mere duty, but an obligation, of a lawyer to accord the highest
degree of fidelity, zeal and fervor in the protection of the client's interest.
The most thorough groundwork and study must be undertaken in order to safeguard the interest of the client. (A.C.
No. 3989)
RULE 16.03
A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand.
However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his
lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client.
He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as
provided for in the Rules of Court.
RATIONALE
the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and prescribes on a lawyer a great fidelity
and good faith. (A.C. NO. 8000)
A lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds or property held by him on behalf of his client
gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use
to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, his client.
Xxxxx
Those who are guilty of such infraction may be disbarred or suspended indefinitely from the practice of law.
xxxx
In the instant case, the act of Atty. de Vera in holding on to his client's money without the latter's acquiescence is
conduct indicative of lack of integrity and propriety.
It is clear that Atty. de Vera, by depositing the check in his own account and
using the same for his own benefit is guilty of
deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and unethical behavior.
xxxxx
Further, in Barcenas v. Alvero, the Court held that the failure of a lawyer to render an account of any money
received from a client and deliver the same to such client when due or upon demand, is a breach of the said
rule; and,
that a lawyer is liable for gross misconduct for his failure to return or repay money due to another person
upon demand, even in the absence of an attorney-client relationship between them. (A.C. NO. 10541)
RULE 16.03
A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand.
However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his
lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client.
He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as
provided for in the Rules of Court.
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Under this provision we are of the opinion that the attorney may cause a statement of his lien to be registered
even before the rendition of any judgment, the purpose being merely to establish his right to the lien.
The recording is distinct from the enforcement of the lien, which may take place only after judgment is
secured in favor of the client.
We believe also that the provision permits the registration of an attorney's lien, although the lawyer concerned
does not finish the case successfully in favor of his client, because an attorney who quits or is dismissed before
the conclusion of his assigned task is as much entitled to the protection of the rule. Otherwise, a client may
easily frustrate its purpose. (G.R. Nos. L – 6334 and L – 6346)
RULE 16.04
A lawyer shall NOT borrow money from his client
unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice.
Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client

except, when in the interest of justice,
he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
RATIONALE
In the instant case, there is no dispute that Respondent obtained several loans from Complainant beginning in 2008
or two (2) years after they established a lawyer-client relationship in 2006, and before they terminated the same in
2009, in violation of Rule 16.04 of the CPR.
XXXX
The rule against borrowing of money by a lawyer from his client is intended to prevent the lawyer from
taking advantage of his influence over his client.
The rule presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer's ability to use all the legal maneuverings to
renege on his obligation.
Suffice it to say, the borrowing of money or property from a client outside the limits laid down in the CPR is
an unethical act that warrants sanction. (A.C. NO. 10541)
A lawyer’s act of asking a client for a loan, as what respondent did, is very unethical.
It comes within those acts considered as abuse of client’s confidence.
The canon presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use all the legal maneuverings
to renege on her obligation. (A.C. No. 10681)
PROHIBITION ON PROPERTY WHICH IS SUBJECT OF THE LITIGATION

The following persons CANNOT --
1) acquire by purchase, including the act of acquiring by assignment, even at a public or judicial auction, the
property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or
territory they exercise their respective functions;
2) sales in legal redemption,
3) compromises and renunciations,
4) lessees of the things: (JJPOL)

i. Justices,
ii. Judges,
iii. Prosecuting attorneys,
iv. Other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice; and
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vi. Lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they
may take part by virtue of their profession;
(1459a) (ARTICLES 1491, 1492, AND 1646)
SEPARATE ACTION FOR COLLECTION SUM OF MONEY

It is settled that in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court
is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar.
In such cases, the Court's only concern is the determination of respondent's administrative liability; it should not
involve his civil liability for money received from his client in a transaction separate, distinct, and not intrinsically
linked to his professional engagement.
Hence, the IBP's recommended return of the aforementioned sum lies beyond the ambit of this administrative
case, and thus cannot be sustained. (A.C. No. 10681)
CANON 17 —
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him.
CANON 18 —
A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
RATIONALE:
Canon 18 clearly mandates that a lawyer is duty-bound to competently and diligently serve his client once the
former takes up the latter's cause.
The lawyer owes fidelity to his client’s cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
upon him.
Hence, his neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him amounts to inexcusable negligence for which he must be
administratively liable, as in this case.
The Court finds NO credence to Atty. Cristobal's defense that her failure to prepare and file the required
position paper was justified because of Lopez' refusal to pay her attorney's fees. (A.C. NO. 12146)
CANON 18 —
A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
DEGREE OF DILIGENCE
All that is required is ordinary diligence or that degree of vigilance expected of a bonus pater familias. (A.C.
NO. 5687)
DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTIONS / PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY

The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other
evidence:
1) That a person takes ordinary care of his or her concerns;
2) That official duty has been regularly performed; (RULE 131, SECTION 3 (d) (m))
RULE 18.01
A lawyer shall NOT undertake a legal service which he knows or should know that he is NOT qualified to
render.
However, he may render such service if, with the consent of his client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel a
lawyer who is competent on the matter.
RULE 18.02
A lawyer shall NOT handle any legal matter without adequate preparation.
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COMFORTABLE WORKLOAD
A lawyer should give adequate attention, care and time to his cases.
This is the reason why a practicing lawyer should accept only so many cases he can afford to handle. (G.R.
No. 94457)
RULE 18.03
A lawyer shall NOT neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.
RATIONALE:
this Court held that the failure of a lawyer to file a complaint with the court in behalf of his client, despite
receiving the necessary fees from the latter, is a violation of the said canon and rule:
The act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services in handling complainant's case and
subsequently failing to render such services is a clear violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional (A.C.
NO. 10541)
A member of the legal profession owes his client entire devotion to his genuine interest, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights.
An attorney is expected to exert his best efforts and ability to preserve his client's cause,
for the unwavering loyalty displayed to his client likewise serves the ends of justice.
Verily, the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the corresponding duties,
NOT only to the client, but also to the court, to the bar and to the public. (A.C. NO. 10541)
once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-bound to serve the latter with competence, and to
attend to such client’s cause with diligence, care, and devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.
He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him.
Therefore, a lawyer’s neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence
for which he must be held administratively liable. (A.C. NO. 8000)
DOCTRINE OF IMPUTED KNOWLEDGE

GENERAL RULE:
Any fact a lawyer acquired during the existence of the attorney – client relation and while acting within the
scope of his authority is imputed to the client. (A.C. NO. 6876)
EXCEPTION:
1) If strict application might foster dangerous Collusion to the detriment of justice. (AGAPLO, supra at 354)
2) The notice of pre-trial shall be served on counsel, or on the party if he or she has no counsel. (RULE 18,
SECTION 3)
3) If a party has appeared by counsel, service upon such party shall be made upon his or her counsel, unless
service upon the party and the party’s counsel is ordered by the court. (RULE 13, SECTION 2)
DUTY OF A PARTY –LITIGANT AS REGARDS HIS CASE OR CASES

It is a client’s duty to in touch with his counsel so as to be constantly posted about the case. (G.R. NO. 141484)
RULE 18.04
A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to
the client’s request for information.
CANON 19 —
A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law.

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RULE 19.01
A lawyer
1) shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and
2) shall NOT present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain
an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.
RATIONALE:
The filing of baseless criminal complaints, even merely threatening to do so, also violates Canon 19 and Rule
19.01 of the CPR, as explained in Pena v. Aparicio, thus:
XXXXXX
Under this Rule, a lawyer should NOT file or threaten to file

any unfounded or baseless criminal case or cases
against the adversaries of his client designed to secure a leverage
to compel the adversaries to yield or withdraw their own cases against the lawyer's client. (A.C. NO. 10541)
RULE 19.02
A lawyer who has received information that his client has, in the course of the representation perpetuated a fraud
upon a person or tribunal shall:
1) promptly call upon the client to rectify the same, and
2) failing which he shall terminate the relationship with such client in accordance with the Rules of Court.
RULE 19.03
A lawyer shall NOT allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling the case.
AS TO SUBSTANTIAL ASPECT
A LAWYER CAN BIND HIS CLIENT ONLY WITH THE CLIENT’S EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
CONSENT:
1) The cause of action;
2) The claim or demand sued upon; and
3) The subject matter of the litigation. (G.R. NO. L - 39059)
EXCEPTION:
A new trial may be granted where the incompetency of counsel is so great that the defendant is prejudiced and
prevented from fairly presenting his defense. (43 Phil. 167 [1922])
CANON 20 —
A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.
ACCEPTANCE FEES
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of
fidelity to the client’s cause.
The canons of the legal profession require that once an attorney agrees to handle a case, he should undertake
the task with zeal, care and utmost devotion.
Indeed, respondent neglected a legal matter entrusted to him by failing to file the Complaint-in-Intervention he
undertook to handle, thus making him liable under Rule 18.03 of Canon 18.
The failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family makes such
lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed in him by his client and makes him answerable not just to his client but
also to the legal profession, the courts and society. (A.C. NO. 5162)
REQUISITES FOR THE RIGHT TO ATTORNEY’S FEES:

1) Existence of attorney – client relationship; and
2) Rendition by the lawyer of services to the client. (G.R. NO. L - 43053)
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RULE 20.01
A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his fees: (CAPTINCS – CP)
a) The Customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which he belongs;
b) The Amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the service;
c) The Probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case;
d) The Time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;
e) The Importance of the subject matter;
f) The Novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
g) The Contingency or certainty of compensation;
h) The Skill demanded;
i) The Character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
j) The Professional standing of the lawyer.
QUANTUM MERUIT -- is used as basis for determining an attorney's professional fees in the absence of
(as much as he deserves) an express agreement.
(G.R. No. 217004)
RATIONALE:
Memo Cum Alterius Deter -- NO person should unjust enrich himself at the expense of another.
Detremento Protes
(G.R. No. 143958)
the payment of attorney's fees to respondent David may also be justified by virtue of the innominate contract
of facio ut des (I do and you give which is based on the principle that "no one shall unjustly enrich himself at
the expense of another."
innominate contracts have been elevated to a codal provision in the New Civil Code by providing under Article
1307 that such contracts shall be regulated by the stipulations of the parties, by the general provisions or principles
of obligations and contracts, by the rules governing the most analogous nominate contracts, and by the customs of
the people. (G.R. No. L – 40424)
The recovery of attorney's fees on the basis of quantum meruit is a device that prevents an unscrupulous client
from running away with the fruits of the legal services of counsel without paying for it and also avoids unjust
enrichment on the part of the attorney himself.
An attorney must show that he is entitled to reasonable compensation for the effort in pursuing the client's
cause, taking into account certain factors in fixing the amount of legal fees. (G.R. No. 217004)
The duty of the court is NOT alone to see that a lawyer acts in a proper and lawful manner; it is also its duty
to see that a lawyer is paid his just fees.
With his capital consisting of his brains and with his skill acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in
expenditure of time and energy, he is entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the
part of his client to escape payment of his just compensation. (G.R. No. 191470)
KINDS OF PAYMENT THAT MAY BE STIPULATED:

1) FIXED OR ABSOLUTE FEE
2) CONTINGENT FEE
1) FIXED OR ABSOLUTE FEE

PAYABLE REGARDLESS OF THE RESULT OF THE CASE:
RULE 20.01
A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his fees: (CAPTINCS – CP)

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a) The Customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which he
belongs;
b) The Amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the service;
c) The Probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case;
d) The Time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;
e) The Importance of the subject matter;
f) The Novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
g) The Contingency or certainty of compensation;
h) The Skill demanded;
i) The Character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
j) The Professional standing of the lawyer.
2) CONTINGENT FEE
CONTINGENT FEE -- "an agreement in writing where the fee, often a fixed percentage of what may be
CONTRACT recovered in the action, is made to depend upon the success of the litigation."
(G.R. No. 194814)
RATIONALE
Contracts of this nature are permitted because they redound to the benefit of the poor client and the lawyer
"especially in cases where the client has meritorious cause of action, but NO means with which to pay for
legal services unless he can, with the sanction of law, make a contract for a contingent fee to be paid out of the
proceeds of the litigation. (G.R. No. 169079)
CONTINGENT FEE arrangement is valid and is generally recognized as valid and binding but must be laid
down in an express contract. (A.C. NO. 9119)
CHAMPERTY
A bargain a stranger with a party to a suit, by which 3rd person undertakes on the litigation at his own cost and
risk, in consideration of receiving, if successful, a part of the proceeds or subject sought to be recovered. (525
S.W.2d 819)
CHAMPERTOUS -- a contract between a stranger and a party to a lawsuit, whereby the stranger pursues the
CONTRACT party’s claim in consideration of receiving part or any of the proceeds recovered under
the judgment
-- Agreement whereby the attorney agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to enforce the
client’s rights is champertous.
(G.R. NO. 182984) [166 F. Supp. 324 (1958)].
RATIONALE
The intention of the law in prohibiting this kind of contract is to prevent a lawyer from acquiring an interest in
the subject of the litigation and to avoid a conflict of interest between him and his client. (225 F. 242 (1918))
(G.R. NO. 182984)
CONTINGENT FEE CONTRACT CHAMPERTOUS CONTRACT

AS TO PAYMENT
Contingent fee is payable in cash. Payable in kind ONLY.
AS TO EXPENSES OF LITIGATION
Lawyers do not undertake to pay all expenses of Lawyers undertake to pay all expenses of litigation.
litigation.
AS TO VALIDITY
Valid. Void.

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(PINEDA, supra at 339 – 340)
PROHIBITION TO ACQUIRE BY PURCHASE

Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and employees
connected with the administration of justice cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction,
either in person or through the mediation of another, the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an
execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions.
This prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the
property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their
profession. (NEW CIVIL CODE, ARTICLE 1491(5))
RULE 20.02
A lawyer shall, in cases of referral, with the consent of the client, be entitled to a division of fees in proportion
to the work performed and responsibility assumed.
RATIONALE:
The referral of a client by a lawyer to another does NOT entitle the former to a commission or to a portion of the
attorney’s fees.
It is only when, in addition to the referral, he performs legal service or assumes responsibility in the case that
he will be entitled to a fee. (AGPALO (2004))
RULE 20.03
A lawyer shall NOT, without the full knowledge and consent of the client, accept any fee, reward, costs,
commission, interest, rebate or forwarding allowance or other compensation whatsoever related to his
professional employment from anyone other than the client.
RATIONALE:
The rule is designed to secure the lawyer’s fidelity to the client’s cause and to prevent the situation in which
receipt by him of a rebate or commission from another in connection with the client’s cause may interfere
with the full discharge of his duty to his client. (AGPALO (2004))
RULE 20.04
A lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his compensation and shall resort to judicial action
only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud.
INSTANCES WHEN AN INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION TO RECOVER ATTORNEY’S FEES IS

NECESSARY (JF – PARC)
1) Court has decided that it has NO Jurisdiction over the action or has already lost it;
2) The court rendered judgment without requiring payment for attorney’s fees and the judgment has become Final.
3) Person liable for attorney’s fees is NOT a party to the main action;
4) Main Action is dismissed or nothing is awarded;
5) Court Reserved to the lawyer the right to file a separate civil action for recovery of attorney’s fees; and
6) Services for which the lawyer seeks payment are NOT Connected with subject litigation; (G.R. No. 138882)
RESTRICTIONS ON SOME LAWYERS TO CHARGE FEES

1) A lawyer who is disqualified from engaging in the private practice of law by reason of his government
position may neither practice law nor charge attorney’s fee for such services. (A.C. NO. 880)
2) An executor or administrator is prohibited from charging the estate under his administration of his
professional fees or service rendered by him as a lawyer. (RULE 85, SECTION 7)
CANON 21 —
A lawyer shall preserve the confidences or secrets of his client even after the attorney-client relation is
terminated.

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FACTORS ESSENTIAL TO ESTABLISH THE EXISTENCE OF THE ATTORNEY – CLIENT

PRIVILEGE
Now, we go to the rule on attorney-client privilege. Dean Wigmore cites the factors essential to establish the
existence of the privilege, viz:
1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought
2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such,
3) the communications relating to that purpose,
4) made in confidence
5) by the client,
6) are at his instance permanently protected
7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be waived.
In fine, the factors are as follows: (ECC)

1) There Exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship, and it is by reason of
this relationship that the client made the communication.
2) The client made the communication in Confidence.
3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his Professional capacity.
1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship, and it is by reason

of this relationship that the client made the communication.
Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected by the rule on privileged communication even if
the prospective client does not thereafter retain the lawyer or the latter declines the employment. 23 The reason for
this is to make the prospective client free to discuss whatever he wishes with the lawyer without fear that what he
tells the lawyer will be divulged or used against him, and for the lawyer to be equally free to obtain information
from the prospective client.24
On the other hand, a communication from a (prospective) client to a lawyer for some purpose other than on account
of the (prospective) attorney-client relation is not privileged.
Instructive is the case of Pfleider v. Palanca, where the client and his wife leased to their attorney a 1,328-hectare
agricultural land for a period of ten years.
In their contract, the parties agreed, among others, that a specified portion of the lease rentals would be paid to the
client-lessors, and the remainder would be delivered by counsel-lessee to client's listed creditors.
The client alleged that the list of creditors which he had "confidentially" supplied counsel for the purpose of
carrying out the terms of payment contained in the lease contract was disclosed by counsel, in violation of their
lawyer-client relation, to parties whose interests are adverse to those of the client.
As the client himself, however, states, in the execution of the terms of the aforesaid lease contract between the
parties, he furnished counsel with the "confidential" list of his creditors.
We ruled that this indicates that client delivered the list of his creditors to counsel not because of the
professional relation then existing between them, but on account of the lease agreement.
We then held that a violation of the confidence that accompanied the delivery of that list would partake more
of a private and civil wrong than of a breach of the fidelity owing from a lawyer to his client.
2) The client made the communication in confidence.

The mere relation of attorney and client does NOT raise a presumption of confidentiality.
The client must intend the communication to be confidential.
A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary act of disclosure between attorney and
client in confidence and by means which, so far as the client is aware, discloses the information to no third person
other than one reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose
for which it was given.
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Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on quiescent ground.

Thus, a compromise agreement prepared by a lawyer pursuant to the instruction of his client and delivered to
the opposing party, an offer and counter-offer for settlement, or a document given by a client to his counsel
NOT in his professional capacity, are NOT privileged communications, the element of confidentiality NOT
being present.
3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity.
The communication made by a client to his attorney must NOT be intended for mere information, but for the
purpose of seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his rights or obligations.
The communication must have been transmitted by a client to his attorney for the purpose of seeking legal
advice.
If the client seeks an accounting service, or business or personal assistance, and not legal advice, the privilege does
not attach to a communication disclosed for such purpose.
Applying all these rules to the case at bar, we hold that the evidence on record fails to substantiate complainant's
allegations. We note that complainant did not even specify the alleged communication in confidence disclosed by
respondent. All her claims were couched in general terms and lacked specificity. She contends that respondent
violated the rule on privileged communication when he instituted a criminal action against her for falsification of
public documents because the criminal complaint disclosed facts relating to the civil case for annulment then
handled by respondent. She did not, however, spell out these facts which will determine the merit of her complaint.
The Court cannot be involved in a guessing game as to the existence of facts which the complainant must prove.
Indeed, complainant failed to attend the hearings at the IBP. Without any testimony from the complainant as to the
specific confidential information allegedly divulged by respondent without her consent, it is difficult, if not
impossible to determine if there was any violation of the rule on privileged communication. Such confidential
information is a crucial link in establishing a breach of the rule on privileged communication between attorney and
client. It is not enough to merely assert the attorney-client privilege. The burden of proving that the privilege applies
is placed upon the party asserting the privilege. (A.C. No. 5108)
RULE 21.01
A lawyer shall NOT reveal the confidences or secrets of his client except: (RAN)
a) when Required by law;
b) when Authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of the disclosure;
c) when Necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or associates or by judicial action.
RULE 21.02
A lawyer shall NOT:
1) to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the course of employment,
2) NOR shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third person,
unless the client with full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.
RULE 21.03
A lawyer shall NOT, without the written consent of his client, give information from his files to an outside
agency seeking such information for auditing, statistical, bookkeeping, accounting, data processing, or any similar
purpose.
RULE 21.04
A lawyer may disclose the affairs of a client of the firm to partners or associates thereof unless prohibited by
the client.

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RULE 21.05
A lawyer shall adopt such measures as may be required to prevent those whose services are utilized by him,
from disclosing or using confidences or secrets of the client.
RULE 21.06
A lawyer shall avoid indiscreet conversation about a client’s affairs even with members of his family.
RULE 21.07
A lawyer shall NOT reveal that he has been consulted about a particular case except to avoid possible conflict
of interest.
CANON 22 —
A lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice appropriate in the circumstances.
RATIONALE:
Rule 22.01, Canon 22 of the CPR, on the other hand, provides that an attorney may only retire from a case either by
written consent of his client or by permission of the court after due notice and hearing, in which event the attorney
should see to it that the name of the new lawyer is recorded in the case.
A lawyer who desires to retire from an action without the written consent of his client
must file a petition for withdrawal in court.
He must serve a copy of his petition upon his client and the adverse party at least 3 days before the date set
for hearing, otherwise the court may treat the application as a "mere scrap of paper."
The circumstances of the case show that Atty. Cristobal made no such move. (A.C. NO. 12146)
The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relation at
any time with or without cause.
The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is, however,
considerably restricted.
Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action
impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. He is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause.
A lawyer's right to withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises only from the client's written
consent or from a good cause.
A lawyer may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding with the written consent of his client filed in
court and copy thereof served upon the adverse party. Should the client refuse to give his consent, the lawyer must
file an application with the court. The court, on notice to the client and adverse party, shall determine whether he
ought to be allowed to retire. The application for withdrawal must be based on a good cause.
RULE 22.01
A lawyer may withdraw his services in any of the following cases: (POEM – VIC)
a) When the client deliberately fails to Pay the fees for the services or fails to comply with the retainer agreement;
b) Other similar cases.
c) When the lawyer is Elected or appointed to public office;
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d) When the Mental or physical condition of the lawyer renders it difficult for him to carry out the employment
effectively;
e) When the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct Violative of these canons and rules;
f) When the client pursues an Illegal or immoral course of conduct in connection with the matter he is handling; and
g) When his inability to work with Co-counsel will NOT promote the best interest of the client;
RULE 22.01
ACCEPTANCE OF INCOMPATIBLE OFFICE
A lawyer may withdraw his services in any of the following cases:
f) When the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office; and
PETITON FOR WITHDRAWAL MUST BE EXPRESSLY GRANTED

withdrawal of record. (A.C. NO. 3773)
RULE 22.02
A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a retainer lien:
1) immediately turn over all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and
2) shall cooperate with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter, including all information necessary
for the proper handling of the matter.
NUMBER AND DATE OF MCLE CERTIFICATE OF COMPLETION/EXEMPTION REQUIRED IN ALL

PLEADINGS/MOTIONS.
SUPREME COURT REQUIRES practicing members of the bar to INDICATE in all pleadings filed before the
courts or quasi-judicial bodies, the number and date of issue of their MCLE Certificate of Compliance or
Certificate of Exemption, as may be applicable, for the immediately preceding compliance period.
Failure to disclose the required information would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the
pleadings from the records. (ABANDONED)(B.M. No. 1922)
Bar Matter No. 1922 was amended in the Court’s Resolution of 14 January 2014, repealing the harsh penalty of
dismissal of the case and expunction of the pleadings for counsel’s failure to disclose the required MCLE
information.
Instead, the non-compliant counsel will merely be subject to fine, the amount of which depends on the
frequency of the offense, and disciplinary action. (A.M. No. MTJ-14-1839)
B.M. No. 850 MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION (MCLE)
PURPOSE OF THE MCLE

Continuing legal education is required of members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) to ensure that
throughout their career:
1) they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence,
2) maintain the ethics of the profession and
3) enhance the standards of the practice of law. (RULE 1, SECTION 1)
REQUIREMENTS COMPLETION OF MCLE

Members of the IBP NOT exempt under Rule 7 shall complete, every 3 years, at least 36 hours of continuing
legal education activities approved by the MCLE Committee. (RULE 2, SECTION 2)
COMPUTATION OF CREDIT HOURS

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Credit hours are computed based on actual time spent in an activity (actual instruction or speaking time), in hours
to the nearest one-quarter hour. (RULE 6, SECTION 1)
PARTIES EXEMPTED FROM THE MCLE

The following members of the Bar are exempt from the MCLE requirement:
1) The President and the Vice President of the Philippines, and the Secretaries and Undersecretaries of
Executives Departments;
2) Senators and Members of the House of Representatives;
3) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, incumbent and retired members of the
judiciary, incumbent members of the Judicial and Bar Council and incumbent court lawyers covered by the
Philippine Judicial Academy program of continuing judicial education;
4) The Chief State Counsel, Chief State Prosecutor and Assistant Secretaries of the Department of Justice;
5) The Solicitor General and the Assistant Solicitor General;
6) The Government Corporate Counsel, Deputy and Assistant Government Corporate Counsel;
7) The Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional Commissions;
8) The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman, the Deputy Ombudsmen and the Special Prosecutor of
the Office of the Ombudsman;
9) Heads of government agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions;
10) Incumbent deans, bar reviews and professors of law who have teaching experience for at least 10 years
accredited law schools;
11) The Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and members of the Corps of Professors and Professorial Lectures of the
Philippine Judicial Academy; and
12) Governors and Mayors. (RULE 7, SECTION 1)
OTHER PARTIES EXEMPTED FROM THE MCLE

The following Members of the Bar are likewise exempt:
1) Those who are NOT in law practice, private or public.
2) Those who have retired from law practice with the approval of the IBP Board of Governors. (RULE 7,
SECTION 2)
WHAT CONSTITUTES NON-COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES

The following shall constitute non-compliance (EA – EA – 60)
1) FAILURE to complete the Education requirement within the compliance period;
2) FAILURE to provide Attestation of compliance or exemption;
3) FAILURE to provide satisfactory Evidence of compliance including evidence of exempt status within the
prescribed period;
4) Any other act or omission Analogous to any of the foregoing or intended to circumvent or evade compliance with
the MCLE requirements.
5) FAILURE to satisfy the education requirement and furnish evidence of such compliance within 60 days from
receipt of a non-compliance notice; (RULE 12, SECTION 1)
NON – COMPLIANCE NOTICE AND 60 – DAY PERIOD TO ATTAIN COMPLIANCE

A member failing to comply will receive
a Non-Compliance Notice stating the specific deficiency and
will be given 60 days from the date of notification
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to explain the deficiency or otherwise show compliance with the requirements. XXXXX
The Member may use this period to attain the adequate number of credit hours for compliance.
Credit hours earned during this period may only be counted toward compliance with the prior compliance period
requirement unless hours in excess of the requirement are earned, in which case, the excess hours may be counted
toward meeting the current compliance period requirement. (RULE 12, SECTION 2)
NON – COMPLIANCE FEE

A member who, for whatever reason, is in non-compliance at the end of the compliance period shall pay a non-
compliance fee. (RULE 13, SECTION 1)
LISTING AS DELINQUENT MEMBER

A member who fails to comply with the requirements after the 60 day period for compliance has expired,
shall be listed as a delinquent member of the IBP
upon the recommendation of the MCLE Committee,
in which case, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court shall apply. (RULE 13, SECTION 2)
RATIONALE:
The investigation of a member for non-compliance shall be conducted by the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline
as a fact-finding arm of the MCLE Committee. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
This 60-day period shall commence from the time such member received a notice of non-compliance.
Without the notice of compliance, a member who believes that the units he or she had taken already amounts to
full compliance
may be declared delinquent without being made aware of such lack of units and with NO chance to rectify the
same.
In the instant case, there is no showing that respondent had ever been issued a Notice of Non-Compliance.
XXXX
Thus, there is NO reason for respondent to be held liable and declared delinquent under B.M. 850. (A.C. NO.
11584)

(GOOD – SCAM)
4) any Deceit,
7) Malpractice, or
DISBARMENT AND DISCIPLINE OF ATTORNEYS

Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys
Now therefore, Sections 1, 5, 12, 13, and 15 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court are amended to read as follows:
RULE 139-B Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys
HOW INSTITUTED
1) Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be taken by:
i. the Supreme Court motu propio, or
ii. upon the filing of a verified complaint of any person before the Supreme Court or the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP).

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2) The complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits
of persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may
substantiate said facts.
3) The IBP shall forward to the Supreme Court for appropriate disposition all complaints for disbarment,
suspension and discipline filed against incumbent Justices of the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of
Tax Appeals and judges of lower courts, or against lawyers in the government service, whether or not they are
charged singly or jointly with other respondents, and whether or not such complaint deals with acts unrelated to the
discharge of their official functions.
4) If the complaint is filed before the IBP, 6 copies of the verified complaint shall be filed with the Secretary of the
IBP or the Secretary of any of its chapter who shall forthwith transmit the same to the IBP Board of Governors for
assignment to an investigator. (RULE 139 – B, SECTION 1)
SERVICE
If the complaint appears to be meritorious, the Investigator shall direct that a copy thereof be served upon
the respondent, requiring him to answer the same within 15 days from the date of service. (RULE 139 – B,
SECTION 5)
DISMISSAL
If the complaint does NOT merit action, or if the answer shows to the satisfaction of the Investigator that the
complaint is NOT meritorious, the Investigator will recommend to the Board of Governors the dismissal of
the complaint.
Thereafter, the procedure in Section 12 of this Rule shall apply. (RULE 139 – B, SECTION 5)
SUI GENERIS
GENERAL RULE
NO investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the: (DSC – RWF)
1) Desistance,
2) Settlement,
3) Compromise,
4) Restitution,
5) Withdrawal of the charges, or
6) Failure
of the complainant to prosecute the same,
EXCEPTION:
unless the Supreme Court motu propio or upon recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors, determines
that there is NO compelling reason to continue with the disbarment or suspension proceedings against the
respondent. (Amendment pursuant to Supreme Court Resolution dated May 27, 1993 re Bar Matter No. 356)
(RULE 139 – B, SECTION 5)
RATIONALE
disciplinary and disbarment proceedings against lawyers are considered sui generis in nature with the main
aim of preserving the integrity of the legal profession.
The proceedings, which the Court may even motu proprio initiate, have neither plaintiffs nor prosecutors.
The Court will look into the conduct and behavior of lawyers in order to determine if they are fit to exercise the
privileges of the legal profession. If found guilty, the erring lawyers shall be dealt with accordingly and will be held
accountable for any misconduct or misbehavior, committed in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
(A.C. No. 10249)
PURELY ADMINISTRATIVE IN NATURE

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Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are only confined to the issue of whether or not the respondent-
lawyer is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar.
Matters which have no intrinsic link to the lawyer's professional engagement, such as the liabilities of the
parties which are purely civil in nature, should be threshed out in a proper proceeding of such nature, not
during administrative-disciplinary proceedings. (A.C. No. 7389)
INVESTIGATION
only the Court has the power to impose disciplinary action on members of the bar.
Factual findings and recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline and the Board of Governors of
the IBP are recommendatory, subject to review by the Court. (A.C. No. 10758)
Upon joinder of issues or upon failure of the respondent to answer, the Investigator shall, with deliberate speed,
proceed with the investigation of the case.
He shall have the power to issue subpoenas and administer oaths.
The respondent shall be given full opportunity to defend himself, to present witnesses on his behalf, and be
heard by himself and counsel.
However, if upon reasonable notice, the respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall proceed ex parte.
The Investigator shall terminate the investigation within 3 months from the date of its commencement, unless
extended for good cause by the Board of Governors upon prior application.
Willful failure or refusal to obey a subpoena or any other lawful order issued by the Investigator shall be
dealt with as for indirect contempt of court.
The corresponding charge shall be filed by the Investigator before the IBP Board of Governors which shall require
the alleged contemnor to show cause within ten (10) days from notice. The IBP Board of Governors may thereafter
conduct hearings, if necessary, in accordance with the procedure set forth in this Rule for hearings before the
Investigator. Such hearing shall as far as practicable be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its commencement.
Thereafter, the IBP Board of Governors shall within a like period of fifteen (15) days issue a resolution setting forth
its findings and recommendations, which shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action and if
warranted, the imposition of penalty. (RULE 139 – B, SECTION 8)
DEFECTS
GENERAL RULE:
NO defect in a complaint, notice, answer, or in the proceeding or the Investigator's Report shall be
considered as substantial
EXCEPTION:
unless the Board of Governors, upon considering the whole record, finds that such defect has resulted or may
result in a miscarriage of justice, in which event the Board shall take such remedial action as the circumstances
may warrant, including invalidation of the entire proceedings. (RULE 139 – B, SECTION 11)
SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEY BY SUPREME COURT

After receipt of respondent's answer or lapse of the period therefor, the Supreme Court, motu propio, or
upon the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors, may suspend an attorney from the practice of his
profession for any of the causes specified in Rule 138, section 27, during the pendency of the investigation until
such suspension is lifted by the Supreme Court. (RULE 139 – B, SECTION 15)
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE
We note that, in several cases, the Court, in determining or tempering the penalty to be imposed, has considered
mitigating factors, such as:
the respondent's advanced age,
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health,
humanitarian and
equitable considerations,
as well as whether the act complained of was respondent's first infraction.
In the present case, in view of the respondent's advanced age and

the fact that this is his first offense, respondent is hereby suspended from the practice of law for 6 months and
warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Respondent should also return the legal fees paid to him by the complainant in the amount of Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00), and the documents in respondent's possession which pertain to the case of the
complainant. (A.C. NO. 11326)
SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEY BY THE COURT OF APPEALS OR A REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

The Court of Appeals or Regional Trial Court may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes
named until further action of the Supreme Court in the case. (RULE 139 – B, SECTION 16)
CONFIDENTIALITY
Proceedings against attorneys shall be private and confidential.
However, the final order of the Supreme Court shall be published like its decisions in other cases. (RULE 139
– B, SECTION 16)
RATIONALE:
The confidentiality rule requires only that "proceedings against attorneys" be kept private and confidential.
It is the proceedings against attorneys that must be kept private and confidential.
This would necessarily prohibit the distribution of actual disbarment complaints to the press.
However, the rule does NOT extend so far that it covers the mere existence or pendency of disciplinary
actions.
The confidentiality rule is intended, in part, to prevent the use of disbarment proceedings as a tool to damage
a lawyer's reputation in the public sphere.
Thus, the general rule is that publicly disclosing disbarment proceedings may be punished with contempt.
As a general rule, disciplinary proceedings are confidential in nature until their final resolution and the final
decision of this Court.
However, in this case, the disciplinary proceeding against petitioner became a matter of public concern
considering that it arose from his representation of his client on the issue of video voyeurism on the internet.
A person, even if he was NOT a public official or at least a public figure, could validly be the subject of a
public comment as long as he was involved in a public issue.
The interest of the public is not in himself but primarily in his involvement and participation as counsel of Halili in
the scandal. Indeed, the disciplinary proceeding against petitioner related to his supposed conduct and statements
made before the media in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility involving the controversy. (G.R. NO.
214986)
PROCEDURE FOR FORMER FILIPINO LAWYER’S RESUMPTION OF PRACTICE OF LAW

before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first
secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on: (UPCR)
1) the Updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;
2) the Payment of professional tax;
3) the Completion of at least 36 credit hours of MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION; and
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4) the Retaking of the lawyer’s oath. (B.M. No. 1678)
PURPOSE OF RETAKING OF LAWYER’S OATH

It will NOT only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but
also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. (B.M. No. 1678)
2004 RULES ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE
RULE I: IMPLEMENTATION
PURPOSES
These Rules shall be applied and construed to advance the following purposes: (PSF)
(a) to Promote, serve, and protect public interest;
(b) to Simplify, clarify, and modernize the rules governing notaries public; and
(c) to Foster ethical conduct among notaries public. (RULE I, SECTION 2)
INTERPRETATION
Unless the context of these Rules otherwise indicates,
words in the singular include the plural, and
words in the plural include the singular. (RULE I, SECTION 3)
RULE II: DEFINITIONS:
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT -- refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion: (APR)

1) Appears in person before the notary public and presents an integrally
complete instrument or document;
2) is attested to be Personally known to the notary public or identified by the

notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules;
and
3) Represents to the notary public

that the signature on the instrument or document
was voluntarily affixed by him
for the purposes stated in the instrument or document,
declares that he has executed the instrument or document
as his free and voluntary act and deed, and,
if he acts in a particular representative capacity,
that he has the authority to sign in that capacity.
(RULE II, SECTION 1)
RATIONALE:
a notary public should NOT notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same
persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated
therein.
The purpose of this requirement is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the
acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party's free act and deed. (A.C. No. 9364)
AFFIRMATION OR -- refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion: (APA)

OATH 1) Appears in person before the notary public;
2) is Personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public

through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and
3) Avows under penalty of law to the whole truth of the contents of the

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instrument or document.
COMMISSION -- refers to the grant of authority

to perform notarial acts and
to the written evidence of the authority.
COPY CERTIFICATION -- refers to a notarial act in which a notary public: (PCCD)

(a) is Presented with an instrument or document that is neither
a vital record,
a public record,
nor publicly recordable;
(b) Copies or supervises the copying of the instrument or document;
(c) Compares the instrument or document with the copy; and
(d) Determines that the copy is accurate and complete.
NOTARIAL REGISTER -- refers to a permanently bound book with numbered pages

containing a chronological record of notarial acts
performed by a notary public.
JURAT -- refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion: (APST)

1) Appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument or
document;
2) is Personally known to the notary public or

identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules;
3) Signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and
4) Takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to such instrument or

document.
NOTARIAL ACT AND -- refer to any act that a notary public is empowered to perform under these Rules.
NOTARIZATION
NOTARIAL -- refers to the part of, or

CERTIFICATE attachment to,
a notarized instrument or document (CBS)
that is Completed by the notary public,
Bears the notary's signature and seal,
and States the facts attested to by the notary public
in a particular notarization as provided for by these Rules.
NOTARY PUBLIC AND -- refer to any person commissioned to perform official acts under these Rules.
NOTARY

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PRINCIPAL -- refers to a person appearing before the notary public

whose act is the subject of notarization.
REGULAR PLACE OF -- refers to a stationary office in the city or province

WORK OR BUSINESS wherein the notary public
renders legal and notarial services.
COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF IDENTITY

COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF IDENTITY refers to the identification of an individual based on:
1) at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the photograph and
signature of the individual, such as but not limited to:
i. passport, driver’s license,
ii. Professional Regulations Commission ID,
iii. National Bureau of Investigation clearance,
iv. police clearance,
v. postal ID,
vi. voter’s ID,
vii. Barangay certification,
viii. Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) e-card,
ix. Social Security System (SSS) card,
x. Philhealth card, senior citizen card,
xi. Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) ID,
xii. OFW ID,
xiii. seaman’s book,
xiv. alien certificate of registration/immigrant certificate of registration,
xv. government office ID,
xvi. certification from the National Council for the Welfare of Disable Persons (NCWDP), xvii.
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) certification; or (RULE II, SECTION 12
(a))
2) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument, document or transaction who is
personally known to the notary public and who personally knows the individual, or
of 2 credible witnesses neither of whom is privy to the instrument, document or transaction who each
personally knows the individual and shows to the notary public documentary identification. (RULE II,
SECTION 12 (b))
OFFICIAL SEAL OR -- refers to a device for affixing a (IMI) Impression, Mark, or Image
SEAL on all papers officially signed
by the notary public
conforming the requisites prescribed by these Rules.
SIGNATURE -- refers to a notarial act in which an individual on a single occasion: (APS)

WITNESSING a) Appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument or
document;
b) is Personally known to the notary public or

identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and
c) Signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary.


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COURT -- refers to the Supreme Court of the Philippines.

PETITIONER -- refers to a person who applies for a notarial commission.

OFFICE OF THE -- refers to the Office of the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court.
COURT
ADMINISTRATOR
EXECUTIVE JUDGE -- refers to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of a city or province
who issues a notarial commission.
VENDOR -- under these Rules refers to a seller of a notarial seal and

shall include a wholesaler or retailer.
MANUFACTURER -- under these Rules refers to one who produces a notarial seal and
shall include an engraver and seal maker.
RULE III: COMMISSIONING OF NOTARY PUBLIC

QUALIFICATIONS
A notarial commission may be issued by an Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court to any qualified
person who submits a petition in accordance with these Rules.
To be eligible for commissioning as notary public, the petitioner: (CORC – C)

1) must be a Citizen of the Philippines;
2) must be Over 21 years of age;
3) must be a Resident in the Philippines for at least 1 year and maintains a regular place of work or business in the
city or province where the commission is to be issued;
4) must be a member of the Philippine Bar in good standing with Clearances from the Office of the Bar Confidant of
the Supreme Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and
5) must NOT have been Convicted in the first instance of any crime involving moral turpitude. (RULE III,
SECTION 1)
FORM OF THE PETITION AND SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

Every petition for a notarial commission shall be in writing, verified, and shall include the following: (SCP3)
(a) a Statement containing the petitioner's (QDRTPRI)
personal Qualifications,
including the petitioner's Date of birth,
Residence,
Telephone number,
Professional tax receipt,
Roll of attorney's number and
IBP membership number; ,
(b) Certification of good moral character of the petitioner by at least two (2) executive officers of the local

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chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines where he is applying for commission;
(c) Proof of payment for the filing of the petition as required by these Rules; and
(d) three (3) passport-size color photographs with light background taken within thirty (30) days of the application.
The photograph should not be retouched.

The petitioner shall sign his name at the bottom part of the photographs. (RULE III, SECTION 2)
APPLICATION FEE
Every petitioner for a notarial commission shall pay the application fee
as prescribed in the Rules of Court.(RULE III, SECTION 3)
SUMMARY HEARING ON THE PETITION

The Executive Judge shall conduct a summary hearing on the petition and shall grant the same if: (SPE)
(a) the petition is Sufficient in form and substance;
(b) the petitioner Proves the allegations contained in the petition; and
(c) the petitioner Establishes to the satisfaction of the Executive Judge that
he has read and fully understood these Rules.
The Executive Judge shall forthwith issue a commission and a Certificate of Authorization to Purchase a Notarial
Seal in favor of the petitioner.(RULE III, SECTION 4)
NOTICE OF SUMMARY HEARING

(a) The notice of summary hearing
shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation
in the city or province where the hearing shall be conducted and
posted in a conspicuous place in the offices
of the Executive Judge and
of the Clerk of Court.
The cost of the publication shall be borne by the petitioner.

The notice may include more than one petitioner. (RULE III, SECTION 1 (a))
NOTICE OF HEARING
(b) The notice shall be substantially in the following form;
NOTICE OF HEARING
Notice is hereby given that a summary hearing on the petition for notarial commission of (name of petitioner) shall
be held on (date) at (place) at (time).
Any person who has any cause or reason

to object to the grant of the petition
may file a verified written opposition thereto,
received by the undersigned before the date of the summary hearing.
______________
Executive Judge (RULE III, SECTION 1 (b))
OPPOSITION TO PETITION
Any person who has any cause or reason to object to the grant of the petition
may file a verified written opposition thereto.
The opposition must be received

by the Executive Judge

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before the date of the summary hearing. (RULE III, SECTION 6)
FORM OF NOTARIAL COMMISSION

The commissioning of a notary public shall be in a formal order signed by the Executive Judge substantially in the
following form:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ______________
This is to certify that (name of notary public) of (regular place of work or business) in (city or province) was on this
(date) day of (month) two thousand and (year) commissioned by the undersigned as a notary public, within and for
the said jurisdiction, for a term ending the thirty-first day of December (year)
_______________
Executive Judge (RULE III, SECTION 7)
PERIOD OF VALIDITY OF CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORIZATION TO PURCHASE A NOTARIAL

SEAL
The Certificate of Authorization to Purchase a Notarial Seal
shall be valid for a period of three (3) months
from date of issue,
unless extended by the Executive Judge.
A (IMI) Impression, Mark, or Image of the seal

that may be purchased by the notary public
pursuant to the Certificate
shall be presented to the Executive Judge
for approval prior to use. (RULE III, SECTION 8)
FORM OF CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORIZATION TO PURCHASE A NOTARIAL SEAL

The Certificate of Authorization to Purchase a Notarial Seal shall substantially be in the following form:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF_____________
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORIZATION TO PURCHASE A NOTARIAL SEAL
This is to authorize (name of notary public) of (city or province) who was commissioned by the undersigned as a
notary public, within and for the said jurisdiction, for a term ending, the thirty-first of December (year) to purchase a
notarial seal.
Issued this (day) of (month) (year).
_______________
Executive Judge (RULE III, SECTION 9)
OFFICIAL SEAL OF NOTARY PUBLIC

Every person commissioned as notary public
shall have only one official seal of office
in accordance with these Rules. (RULE III, SECTION 10)
JURISDICTION AND TERM

A person commissioned as notary public
may perform notarial acts in any place
within the territorial jurisdiction
of the commissioning court
for a period of two (2) years
commencing the first day of January of the year
in which the commissioning is made,
unless

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earlier revoked or
the notary public has resigned
under these Rules and the Rules of Court. (RULE III, SECTION 11)
EFFECT OF NOTARIZE DOCUMENT

Notarization converts a private document into a public document; thus, making that document admissible in
evidence without further proof of its authenticity.
A notarial document is by law

entitled to full faith and
credit upon its face. (A.C. No. 7241)
REGISTER OF NOTARIES PUBLIC

The Executive Judge shall keep and maintain a Register of Notaries Public in his jurisdiction which shall contain,
among others, (DIRS - RD)
the Dates of
Issuance or
Revocation or
Suspension
of notarial commissions, and
the Resignation or
Death of notaries public.
The Executive Judge shall furnish the Office of the Court Administrator information and data recorded in the
register of notaries public. The Office of the Court Administrator shall keep a permanent, complete and updated
database of such records. (RULE III, SECTION 12)
RENEWAL OF COMMISSION
A notary public may file a written application with the Executive Judge
for the renewal of his commission
within forty-five (45) days before the expiration thereof.
A (IMI) Impression, Mark, or Image of the seal of the notary public

shall be attached to the application.
Failure to file said application

will result in the deletion of the name of the notary public
in the register of notaries public.
The notary public

thus removed from the Register of Notaries Public
may only be reinstated therein
after he is issued a new commission
in accordance with these Rules. (RULE III, SECTION 13)
ACTION ON APPLICATION FOR RENEWAL OF COMMISSION

The Executive Judge
shall, upon payment of the application fee mentioned in Section 3 above of this Rule,
act on an application for the renewal of a commission
within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof.
If the application is denied, the Executive Judge shall state the reasons therefor.(RULE III, SECTION 14)
RULE IV: POWERS AND LIMITATIONBS OF NOTARIES PUBLIC

POWERS

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A notary public is empowered to perform the following notarial acts: (JOCASA)

1) Jurats;
2) Oaths and affirmations;
3) Copy certifications;
4) Acknowledgments;
5) Signature witnessings; and
6) Any other act authorized by these Rules. (RULE IV, SECTION 1(a))
NOTARY PUBLIC IS AUTHORIZED TO CERTIFY THE AFFIXING OF A SIGNATURE

A notary public is authorized to certify the affixing of a signature by thumb or other mark on an instrument or
document presented for notarization if: (POB - JAS)
1) the thumb or other mark is affixed in the Presence of the notary public and of 2 disinterested and unaffected
witnesses to the instrument or document;
2) both witnesses sign their Own names in addition to the thumb or other mark;
3) the notary public writes Below the thumb or other mark: "Thumb or Other Mark affixed by (name of
signatory by mark) in the presence of (names and addresses of witnesses) and undersigned notary public"; and
4) the notary public notarizes the signature by thumb or other mark through an Jurat, Acknowledgment, or
Signature witnessing. (RULE IV, SECTION 1(b))
NOTARY PUBLIC IS AUTHORIZED TO CERTIFY THE AFFIXING OF A SIGNATURE

NOTARY PUBLIC IS AUTHORIZED TO SIGN ON BEHALF OF PERSON
A notary public is authorized to sign on behalf of a person who is physically unable to sign or make a mark
on an instrument or document if: (DAB - BJA)
1) the notary public is Directed by the person unable to sign or make a mark to sign on his behalf;
2) the signature of the notary public is Affixed in the presence of two disinterested and unaffected witnesses to
the instrument or document;
3) Both witnesses sign their own names;
4) the notary public writes Below his signature: "Signature affixed by notary in presence of (names and addresses
of person and 2 witnesses"; and
5) the notary public notarizes his signature by Jurat or Acknowledgment . (RULE IV, SECTION 1(c))
PLACE TO PERFORM NOTARIAL ACT

GENERAL RULE:
A notary public shall NOT perform a notarial act outside his regular place of work or business.
EXCEPTIONS:
That on certain exceptional occasions or situations, a notarial act may be performed at the request of the parties
in the following sites located within his territorial jurisdiction: (POC – D)
1) Public function areas in hotels and similar places for the signing of instruments or documents requiring
notarization;
2) (PCS) Public offices, Convention halls, and Similar places where Oaths of office may be administered;
3) (HO) Hospitals and Other medical institutions where a party to an instrument or document is Confined for
treatment; and
4) any place where a party to an instrument or document requiring notarization is under Detention. (RULE IV,
SECTION 2 (a))
PERSON CANNOT PERFORM NOTARIAL ACT

A person shall NOT perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document -

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1) is NOT in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
2) is NOT personally known to the notary public or
otherwise identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules. (RULE IV, SECTION 2 (b))
RATIONALE:
Thus, a notary public should NOT notarize a document
unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed it and personally appeared
before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. (A.C. NO. 11826)
The presence of the parties to the deed is necessary to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of
the signature. (A.C. NO. 11584)
DISQUALIFICATIONS OF A NOTARY PUBLIC

A notary public is disqualified from performing a notarial act if he:
1) is a Party to the instrument or document that is to be notarized;
2) will Receive, as a direct or indirect result, any: (CAFTRIC - PO)
Commission,
Advantage,
Fee,
Title,
Right,
Interest,
Cash,
Property, or
Other consideration,
except as provided by these Rules and by law; or
3) is a (SCAD - R)
Spouse,
Common-law partner,
Ancestor,
Descendant, or
Relative by affinity or consanguinity of the principal within the 4TH civil degree. (RULE IV, SECTION 3)
REFUSAL TO NOTARIZE
A notary public shall NOT perform any notarial act described in these Rules for any person requesting such
an act even if he tenders the appropriate fee specified by these Rules if: (KAD)
1) the notary Knows or has good reason to believe that the notarial act or transaction is unlawful or immoral;
2) in the notary's judgment, the signatory is NOT Acting of his or her own free will; and
3) the signatory shows a Demeanor which engenders

in the mind of the notary public reasonable doubt
as to the former's knowledge of the consequences
of the transaction requiring a notarial act. (RULE IV, SECTION 4)
RATIONALE:
Gross negligence on the part of a notary public encompasses the failure to observe any of the requirements of
a notarial act under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice which would result in putting the rights of a person to his
liberty or property in jeopardy.
This includes, among others,

failing to require the presence of the signatories to a notarial instrument and ascertaining their identities
through competent evidence thereof, and
allowing, knowingly or unknowingly, people, other than the notary public himself,

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to sign notarial documents, affix the notarial seal therein, and make entries in the notarial register.
In Spouses Santuyo v. Hidalgo, the Court ruled that

Atty. Hidalgo was grossly negligent NOT only in the supposed notarization of a deed of sale of a parcel of land
purchased by the Spouses Santuyo,
but also in allowing his office secretaries to make the necessary entries
in his notarial registry which was supposed to be done and kept by him alone.
XXXXX
Like the duty to defend a client's cause within the bounds of law,
a notary public has the additional duty to preserve public trust and confidence in his office
by observing extra care and diligence in ensuring the integrity of every document
that comes under his notarial seal, and
seeing to it that only documents that he personally inspected and
whose signatories he personally identified are recorded in his notarial books.
In addition, notaries public should properly secure the equipment they use in performing notarial acts,
in order for them NOT to fall into the wrong hands, and
be used in acts that would undermine the public's trust and confidence in the office of the notary public. (A.C. NO.
11165)
In Salita v. Salve, a case with a similar factual milieu,

the Court revoked therein respondent Atty. Salve's notarial commission and disqualified him from being
commissioned as a notary for a period of 2 years,
for his gross neglect in the performance of his duty as a notary
when he notarized the pre-formed Deed of Absolute Sale without therein complainant Salita's presence
before him.
The Court found that it was unfathomable for Salita to appear before Atty. Salve to have the Deed of Absolute Sale
notarized, as it would be detrimental to his own interests. (A.C. NO. 8450)
FALSE OR INCOMPLETE CERTIFICATE

A notary public shall NOT: (FI)
1) execute a certificate containing information known or believed by the notary to be False.
2) affix an official signature or seal on a notarial certificate that is Incomplete. (RULE IV, SECTION 5)
IMPROPER INSTRUMENTS OR DOCUMENTS

A notary public shall NOT notarize: (BIA)
1) a Blank or Incomplete instrument or document; or
2) an instrument or document without Appropriate notarial certification. (RULE IV, SECTION 6)
RULE V : FEES OF NOTARY PUBLIC

IMPOSITION AND WAIVER OF FEES
For performing a notarial act,
a notary public may charge the maximum fee
as prescribed by the Supreme Court
unless he waives the fee
in whole or in part. (RULE V, SECTION 1)
TRAVEL FEES AND EXPENSES

A notary public may charge travel fees and expenses
separate and apart from the notarial fees
prescribed in the preceding section
when traveling to perform a notarial act
if the notary public and the person
requesting the notarial act

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agree prior to the travel. (RULE V, SECTION 2)
PROHIBITED FEES
No fee or compensation of any kind,
except those expressly prescribed and allowed herein,
shall be collected or received
for any notarial service.(RULE V, SECTION 3)
PAYMENT OR REFUND OF FEES

A notary public shall not require payment
of any fees specified herein
prior to the performance of a notarial act
unless otherwise agreed upon.
Any travel fees and expenses

paid to a notary public
prior to the performance of a notarial act
are not subject to refund
if the notary public
had already traveled but failed to complete
in whole or in part the notarial act
for reasons beyond his control and
without negligence on his part.(RULE V, SECTION 4)
NOTICE OF FEES
A notary public who charges a fee for notarial services
shall issue a receipt registered with the Bureau of Internal Revenue and
keep a journal of notarial fees.
He shall enter in the journal all fees charged for services rendered.
A notary public shall post
in a conspicuous place in his office
a complete schedule of chargeable notarial fees.(RULE V, SECTION 5)
RULE VI : NOTARIAL REGISTER
FORM OF NOTARIAL REGISTER

(a) A notary public shall (KMPP)
Keep,
Maintain,
Protect and
Provide
for lawful inspection
as provided in these Rules,
a chronological official notarial register of notarial acts
consisting of a permanently bound book with numbered pages.
(b) The register shall be

kept in books
to be furnished by the Solicitor General
to any notary public
upon request and upon payment of the cost thereof.
The register shall be

duly paged, and
on the first page,

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the Solicitor General

shall certify the number of pages of which the book consists.
(c) For purposes of this provision,

a Memorandum of Agreement or Understanding
may be entered into by
the Office of the Solicitor General and
the Office of the Court Administrator. (RULE VI, SECTION 1 (a))
(b) A notary/ public shall

keep only one active notarial register
at any given time. (RULE VI, SECTION 1 (b))
ENTRIES IN THE NOTARIAL REGISTER

(a) For every notarial act,
the notary shall record in the notarial register at the time of notarization the following: (TEDTEN - WAFO)
(1) the Type of notarial act;
(2) the Entry number and page number;
(3) the Date and time of day of the notarial act;
(4) the Title or description of the instrument, document or proceeding;
(5) the competent Evidence of identity as defined by these Rules if the signatory is not personally known to the
notary;
(6) the Name and address of each principal;
(7) the name and address of each credible Witness swearing to or affirming the person's identity;
(8) the Address where the notarization was performed if not in the notary's regular place of work or business;
(9) the Fee charged for the notarial act; and
(10) any Other circumstance the notary public may deem of significance or relevance. (RULE VI, SECTION 2 (a))
(b) A notary public shall record

in the notarial register
the reasons and circumstances
for not completing a notarial act. (RULE VI, SECTION 2 (b))
(c) A notary public shall record

in the notarial register
the circumstances of any request to (IC)
Inspect or
Copy
an entry in the notarial register,
including the requester's (NASTO)
Name,
Address,
Signature,
Thumbmark or
Other recognized identifier, and evidence of identity.
The reasons for refusal to allow (IC)

Inspection or
Copying
of a journal entry
shall also be recorded. (RULE VI, SECTION 2 (c))
(d) When the instrument or document

is a contract,
the notary public shall keep an original copy thereof

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as part of his records and

enter in said records
a brief description of the substance thereof and
shall give to each entry
a consecutive number,
beginning with number one
in each calendar year.
He shall also retain a duplicate original copy

for the Clerk of Court. (RULE VI, SECTION 2 (d))
(e) The notary public

shall give to each instrument or document (ESA)
Executed,
Sworn to, or
Acknowledged
before him
a number corresponding to the one in his register, and
shall also state on the instrument or document
the page/s of his register on which the same is recorded.
No blank line shall be left between entries. (RULE VI, SECTION 2 (e))
(f) In case of a protest of any (DBP)

Draft,
Bill of exchange or
Promissory note,
the notary public shall make
a full and true record of all proceedings
in relation thereto and
shall note therein
whether the demand for the sum of money
was made, by
whom,
when, and
where;
whether he presented such (DBN)
Draft,
Bill or
Note;
whether notices
were given,
to whom and
in what manner;
where the same
was made,
when and
to whom and
where directed; and
of every other fact touching the same. (RULE VI, SECTION 2 (f))
(g) At the end of each week,

the notary public shall certify
in his notarial register
the number of instruments or documents (ESAP)

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Executed,
Sworn to,
Acknowledged, or
Protested before him; or
if none, this certificate shall show this fact. (RULE VI, SECTION 2 (g))
(h) A certified copy of each month's entries and

a duplicate original copy of any instrument
acknowledged before the notary public
shall, within the first ten (10) days of the month following,
be forwarded to the Clerk of Court and
shall be under the responsibility of such officer.
If there is no entry to certify for the month,

the notary shall forward a statement to this effect
in lieu of certified copies herein required. (RULE VI, SECTION 2 (h))
SIGNATURES AND THUMBMARKS

At the time of notarization, the notary's notarial register shall be (STO)
Signed or
a Thumb or
Other mark affixed by each: (PCW)
(a) Principal;
(b) Credible witness swearing or affirming to the identity of a principal; and
(c) Witness to a signature by thumb or other mark, or to a signing by the notary public on behalf of a person
physically unable to sign. (RULE VI, SECTION 3)
INSPECTION, COPYING AND DISPOSAL

(a) In the notary's presence,
any person may inspect an entry in the notarial register,
during regular business hours, provided; (ISSO)
(1) the person's Identity is personally known to the notary public or proven through competent evidence of
identity as defined in these Rules;
(2) the person affixes a Signature and thumb or other mark or other recognized identifier, in the
notarial register in a separate, dated entry;
(3) the person Specifies the month, year, type of instrument or document, and name of the principal in the
notarial act or acts sought; and
(4) the person is shown Only the entry or entries specified by him. (RULE VI, SECTION 4 (a))
(b) The notarial register

may be examined by a law enforcement officer
in the course of an official investigation or
by virtue of a court order. (RULE VI, SECTION 4 (b))
(c) If the notary public

has a reasonable ground to believe
that a person has a criminal intent or
wrongful motive in requesting information
from the notarial register,
the notary shall deny access
to any entry or entries therein. (RULE VI, SECTION 4 (c))
LOSS, DESTRUCTION OR DAMAGE OF NOTARIAL REGISTER

(a) In case the notarial register is (SLDDO)
Stolen,

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Lost,
Destroyed,
Damaged, or
Otherwise rendered unusable or illegible as a record of notarial acts,
the notary public
shall, within ten (10) days after informing
the appropriate law enforcement agency
in the case of theft or vandalism,
notify the Executive Judge
by any means
providing a proper receipt or acknowledgment,
including registered mail and
also provide a copy or number of any pertinent police report. (RULE VI, SECTION 5 (a))
(b) Upon (RED)

Revocation or
Expiration of a notarial commission, or
Death of the notary public,
the notarial register and notarial records
shall immediately be delivered to the office of the Executive Judge. (RULE VI, SECTION 5 (b))
ISSUANCE OF CERTIFIED TRUE COPIES

The notary public shall supply
a certified true copy of the notarial record, or any part thereof,
to any person applying for such copy
upon payment of the legal fees. (RULE VI, SECTION 6)
RULE VII : SIGNATURE AND SEAL OF NOTARY PUBLIC

OFFICIAL SIGNATURE
In notarizing a paper instrument or document, a notary public shall: (HAT)
(a) sign by Hand on the notarial certificate only the name indicated and as appearing on the notary's commission;
(b) not sign Asing a facsimile stamp or printing device; and
(c) affix his official signature only at the Time the notarial act is performed.(RULE VI, SECTION 1)
OFFICIAL SEAL
(a) Every person commissioned as notary public
shall have a seal of office,
to be procured at his own expense,
which shall not be possessed or owned by any other person.
It shall be of (MCTN - POA)

Metal,
Circular in shape,
Two inches in diameter, and
shall have the Name of the city or province and
the word "Philippines" and
his Own name on the margin and
the roll of Attorney's number on the face thereof,
with the words "Notary public" across the center.
A (IMI) Impression, Mark, or Image of such seal

shall be made directly on the paper or parchment
on which the writing appears. (RULE VII, SECTION 2 (a))
(b) The official seal

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shall be affixed only

at the time the notarial act is performed and
shall be clearly impressed by the notary public
on every page of the instrument or document notarized. (RULE VII, SECTION 2 (b))
(b) When not in use, the official seal

shall be kept safe and secure and
shall be accessible only
to the notary public or
the person duly authorized by him. (RULE VII, SECTION 2 (c))
(c) Within five (5) days after the official seal of a notary public is (SLDO)
Stolen,
Lost,
Damaged or
Other otherwise rendered unserviceable
in affixing a legible image,
the notary public,
after informing the appropriate law enforcement agency,
shall notify the Executive Judge in writing,
providing proper receipt or acknowledgment,
including registered mail, and
in the event of a crime committed,
provide a copy or entry number of the appropriate police record.
Upon receipt of such notice,

if found in order by the Executive Judge,
the latter shall order the notary public to cause notice of such loss or damage
to be published, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks,
in a newspaper of general circulation in the city or province where the notary public is commissioned.
Thereafter, the Executive Judge
shall issue to the notary public a
new Certificate of Authorization
to Purchase a Notarial Seal. (RULE VII, SECTION 2 (d))
(e) Within five (5) days after the (DRRE)

Death or
Resignation of the notary public, or
the Revocation or
Expiration of a notarial commission,
the official seal shall be surrendered to the Executive Judge and
shall be destroyed or defaced in public
during office hours.
In the event that the
Missing,
Lost or
Damaged seal
is later found or surrendered,
it shall be delivered by the notary public
to the Executive Judge to be disposed of
in accordance with this section.
Failure to effect such surrender
shall constitute contempt of court.
In the event of death of the notary public,
the person in possession of the official seal

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shall have the duty

to surrender it to the Executive Judge. (RULE VII, SECTION 2 (e))
SEAL IMAGE
The notary public shall affix a (SCLPP - IMI)
Single,
Clear,
Legible,
Permanent, and
Photographically reproducible
Impression,
Mark, or
Image
of the official seal
beside his signature
on the notarial certificate of a paper instrument or document. (RULE VII, SECTION 3)
OBTAINING AND PROVIDING SEAL

(a) A vendor or manufacturer of notarial seals
may not sell said product
without a written authorization
from the Executive Judge. (RULE VII, SECTION 4 (a))
(b) Upon written application and

after payment of the application fee,
the Executive Judge
may issue an authorization
to sell to a vendor or manufacturer of notarial seals
after verification and investigation of the latter's qualifications.
The Executive Judge shall charge an authorization fee

in the amount of Php 4,000 for the vendor and
Php 8,000 for the manufacturer.
If a manufacturer is also a vendor,

he shall only pay the manufacturer's authorization fee. (RULE VII, SECTION 4 (b))
(c) The authorization shall be in effect

for a period of four (4) years
from the date of its issuance and
may be renewed by the Executive Judge
for a similar period
upon payment of the authorization fee
in the amount of Php 4,000 for the vendor and
Php 8,000 for the manufacturer. (RULE VII, SECTION 4 (c))
(d) A vendor or manufacturer

shall not sell a seal to a buyer
except upon submission of
a certified copy of the commission and
the Certificate of Authorization
to Purchase a Notarial Seal
issued by the Executive Judge.
A notary public obtaining a new seal
as a result of change of name

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shall present to the vendor or manufacturer

a certified copy of the Confirmation of the Change of Name
issued by the Executive Judge. (RULE VII, SECTION 4 (d))
(e) Only one seal may be sold

by a vendor or manufacturer
for each Certificate of Authorization
to Purchase a Notarial Seal, (RULE VII, SECTION 4 (e))
(f) After the sale,

the vendor or manufacturer shall affix a
Impression,
Mark, or
Image
of the seal
to the Certificate of Authorization to Purchase a Notarial Seal and
submit the completed Certificate to the Executive Judge.
Copies of
the Certificate of Authorization to Purchase a Notarial Seal and
the buyer's commission
shall be kept in the files of the vendor or manufacturer
for four (4) years after the sale. (RULE VII, SECTION 4 (f))
(g) A notary public obtaining a new seal

as a result of change of name
shall present to the vendor
a certified copy of the order
confirming the change of name
issued by the Executive Judge. (RULE VII, SECTION 4 (g))
RULE VIII : NOTARIAL CERTIFICATES

FORM OF NOTARIAL CERTIFICATE
The notarial form used for any notarial instrument or document
shall conform to all the requisites
prescribed herein,
the Rules of Court and
all other provisions of issuances by the Supreme Court and
in applicable laws. (RULE VIII, SECTION 1)
CONTENTS OF THE CONCLUDING PART OF THE NOTARIAL CERTIFICATE

The notarial certificate shall include the following: (NS - WWEA - RP PD I)
(a) the Name of the notary public as exactly indicated in the commission;
(b) the Serial number of the commission of the notary public;
(c) the (WWEA) Words "Notary Public" and the province or city Where the notary public is commissioned, the
Expiration date of the commission, the office Address of the notary public; and
(d) the (RP - PD - I) Roll of attorney's number, the Professional tax receipt number and the Place and Date of
issuance thereof, and the IBP membership number. (RULE VIII, SECTION 2)
RULE IX : CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORITY OF NOTARIES PUBLIC
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORITY FOR A NOTARIAL ACT

Certificate of Authority for a Notarial Act. -

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A certificate of authority evidencing the authenticity of the official seal and signature of a notary public shall be
issued by the Executive Judge upon request in substantially the following form:
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORITY FOR A NOTARIAL ACT

I, (name, title, jurisdiction of the Executive Judge), certify that (name of notary public), the person named in the seal
and signature on the attached document, is a Notary Public in and for the (City/Municipality/Province) of the
Republic of the Philippines and authorized to act as such at the time of the document's notarization.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have affixed below my signature and seal of this office this (date) day of (month)
(year).
_________________
(official signature)
(seal of Executive Judge) (RULE IX, SECTION 1)
RULE X : CHANGES OF STATUS OF NOTARY PUBLIC
CHANGE OF NAME AND ADDRESS

Within ten (10) days
after the change of name of the notary public (CMA)
by Court order or
by Marriage, or
After ceasing to maintain the regular place of work or business,
the notary public shall submit a signed and
dated notice of such fact
to the Executive Judge. (RULE X, SECTION 1)
The notary public shall not notarize until:

(a) he receives from the Executive Judge
a confirmation of the new name of the notary public and/or
change of regular place of work or business; and
(b) a new seal bearing the new name has been obtained.
The foregoing notwithstanding,

until the aforementioned steps have been completed,
the notary public may continue to use
the former name or
regular place of work or business
in performing notarial acts for three (3) months from the date of the change,
which may be extended once
for valid and just cause
by the Executive Judge
for another period not exceeding three (3) months. (RULE X, SECTION 1)
RESIGNATION
A notary public may resign his commission
by personally submitting a (WDS)
Written,
Dated and
Signed
formal notice to the Executive Judge together with his (NNR)
Notarial seal,
Notarial register and
Records.
Effective from the date indicated in the notice,

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he shall immediately cease

to perform notarial acts.
In the event of
his incapacity to personally appear,
the submission of the notice may be performed
by his duly authorized representative. (RULE X, SECTION 2)
PUBLICATION OF RESIGNATION
The Executive Judge
shall immediately order the Clerk of Court
to post in a conspicuous place
in the offices
of the Clerk of Court
the names of notaries public
who have resigned their notarial commissions
and the effective dates of their resignation. (RULE X, SECTION 3)
RULE XI: REVOCATION OF COMMISSION AND DISCIPLINARY SANCTIONS

REVOCATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONS
(a) The Executive Judge
shall revoke a notarial commission
for any ground on which an application for a commission
may be denied. (RULE XI, SECTION 1 (a))
(b) In addition, the Executive Judge may revoke the commission of, or impose appropriate administrative sanctions
upon, any notary public who: (KAMS - MIRS - EKO)
1) fails to Keep a notarial register;
2) fails to Affix to acknowledgments the date of expiration of his commission;
3) fails to Make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register concerning his notarial acts;
4) fails to Send the copy of the entries to the Executive Judge within the first 10 days of the month following;
5) fails to Make his report, within a reasonable time, to the Executive Judge concerning the performance of his
duties, as may be required by the judge;
6) fails to Identify a principal on the basis of personal knowledge or competent evidence;
7) fails to Require the presence of a principal at the time of the notarial act;
8) fails to Submit his notarial register, when filled, to the Executive Judge;
9) Executes a false or incomplete certificate under Section 5, Rule IV;
10) Knowingly performs or fails to perform any other act prohibited or mandated by these Rules; and
11) commits any Other dereliction or act which in the judgment of the Executive Judge constitutes good cause for
revocation of commission or imposition of administrative sanction. (RULE XI, SECTION 1 (b))
(c) Upon verified complaint by an (IAA)

Interested,
Affected or
Aggrieved person,
the notary public shall be required to file a verified answer to the complaint.
If the answer of the notary public is not satisfactory,

the Executive Judge shall conduct a summary hearing.
If the allegations of the complaint are not proven,

the complaint shall be dismissed.
If the charges are duly established,

Page 108
the Executive Judge shall impose

the appropriate administrative sanctions.
In either case,
the aggrieved party
may appeal the decision
to the Supreme Court for review.
Pending the appeal,

an order imposing disciplinary sanctions
shall be immediately executory,
unless otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court. (RULE XI, SECTION 1 (c))
(d)The Executive Judge may motu proprio

initiate administrative proceedings
against a notary public,
subject to the procedures prescribed in paragraph (c) above and
(c) Upon verified complaint by an (IAA)

Interested,
Affected or
Aggrieved person,
the notary public shall be required to file a verified answer to the complaint.
If the answer of the notary public is not satisfactory,

the Executive Judge shall conduct a summary hearing.
If the allegations of the complaint are not proven,

the complaint shall be dismissed.
If the charges are duly established,

the Executive Judge shall impose
the appropriate administrative sanctions.
In either case,
the aggrieved party
may appeal the decision
to the Supreme Court for review.
Pending the appeal,

an order imposing disciplinary sanctions
shall be immediately executory,
unless otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court. (RULE XI, SECTION 1 (c))
impose the appropriate administrative sanctions

on the grounds mentioned
in the preceding paragraphs (a) and (b). (RULE XI, SECTION 1 (c))
REVOCATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONS

(a) The Executive Judge
shall revoke a notarial commission
for any ground on which an application for a commission
may be denied. (RULE XI, SECTION 1 (a))
(b) In addition, the Executive Judge may revoke the commission of, or impose appropriate

Page 109
administrative sanctions upon, any notary public who:

1) fails to keep a notarial register;
2) fails to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register concerning his notarial acts;
3) fails to send the copy of the entries to the Executive Judge within the first 10 days of the
month following;
4) fails to affix to acknowledgments the date of expiration of his commission;
5) fails to submit his notarial register, when filled, to the Executive Judge;
6) fails to make his report, within a reasonable time, to the Executive Judge concerning the
performance of his duties, as may be required by the judge;
7) fails to require the presence of a principal at the time of the notarial act;
8) fails to identify a principal on the basis of personal knowledge or competent evidence;
9) executes a false or incomplete certificate under Section 5, Rule IV;
10) knowingly performs or fails to perform any other act prohibited or mandated by these
Rules; and
11) commits any other dereliction or act which in the judgment of the Executive Judge
constitutes good cause for revocation of commission or imposition of administrative sanction.
(RULE XI, SECTION 1 (b))
SUPERVISION AND MONITORING OF NOTARIES PUBLIC

The Executive Judge shall at all times
exercise supervision over notaries public and
shall closely monitor their activities. (RULE XI, SECTION 2)
PUBLICATION OF REVOCATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONS

The Executive Judge shall immediately order the Clerk of Court
to post in a conspicuous place in the offices
of the Clerk of Court
the names of notaries public
who have been administratively sanctioned or
whose notarial commissions
have been revoked. (RULE XI, SECTION 3)
DEATH OF NOTARY PUBLIC

If a notary public dies before fulfilling the obligations in Section 5(b), Rule VI and Section 2(e), Rule VII,
(b) Upon (RED)
Revocation or
Expiration of a notarial commission, or
Death of the notary public,
the notarial register and notarial records
shall immediately be delivered to the office of the Executive Judge. (RULE VI, SECTION 5 (b))
(e) Within five (5) days after the (DRRE)

Death or
Resignation of the notary public, or
the Revocation or
Expiration of a notarial commission,
the official seal shall be surrendered to the Executive Judge and
shall be destroyed or defaced in public
during office hours.
In the event that the
Missing,
Lost or
Damaged seal
is later found or surrendered,

Page 110
it shall be delivered by the notary public

to the Executive Judge to be disposed of
in accordance with this section.
Failure to effect such surrender
shall constitute contempt of court.
In the event of death of the notary public,
the person in possession of the official seal
shall have the duty
to surrender it to the Executive Judge. (RULE VII, SECTION 2 (e))
the Executive Judge,

upon being notified of such death,
shall forthwith cause compliance with the provisions of these sections. (RULE XI, SECTION 4)
RULE XII : SPECIAL PROVISIONS

PUNISHABLE ACTS
The Executive Judge shall cause the prosecution of any person who: (KKK)
(a) Knowingly acts or otherwise impersonates a notary public;
(b) Knowingly (D - COD)

Destroys
Conceals,
Obtains, or
Defaces,
The (SON)
Seal,
Official records of a notary public, or
Notarial register; and
(c) Knowingly (SCI)

Solicits,
Coerces, or
in any way Influences
a notary public to commit official misconduct. (RULE XII, SECTION 1)
REPORTS TO THE SUPREME COURT

The Executive Judge concerned
shall submit semestral reports to the Supreme Court
on discipline and prosecution of notaries public. (RULE XI, SECTION 2)
DE JURE JUDGE -- is one who is exercising the office of a judge as a matter of right.
He is an officer of a court which has been duly and legally elected or appointed.
(G.R. NO. L - 12647)
DE FACTO -- is an officer who is not fully invested with all of the powers and duties conceded to
JUDGE judges, but is exercising the office of judge under some color of right.
(G.R. NO. L - 12647)
QUALIFICATIONS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COURT OR ANY LOWER COLLEGIATE

COURT / COURT OF APPEALS / COURT OF TAX APPEALS
NO person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court unless he is:
1) a natural-born citizen of the Philippines;
2) must be at least 40 years of age; and
3) must have been for 15 years or more, a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the
Philippines. (1987 CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 7 (1))

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NO person shall be appointed Member of any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines. (1987 CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 7 (1))
QUALIFICATIONS OF THE JUSTICES OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN

NO person shall be appointed Presiding Justice or Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan unless:
1) he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines;
2) at least 40 years of age; and
3) for at least 10 years has been:
i. a judge of a court of record or
ii. been engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines or
iii. has held office requiring admission to the bar as a pre-requisite for a like period.
(PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1486 as amended, SECTION 1)
QUALIFICATIONS OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND HIS DEPUTIES:

1) shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines; and
2) at the time of their appointment, at least 40 years old, of recognized probity and independence; and
3) members of the Philippine Bar; and
4) must NOT have been candidates for any elective office in the immediately preceding election.
5) THE OMBUDSMAN must have, for 10 years or more, been a judge or engaged in the practice of law in the
PHILIPPINES. (1987 CONSTITUTION, ARTICL XI, SECTION 8)
QUALIFICATION OF JUDGES OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

NO person shall be appointed Judge of the Regional Trial Court unless:
1) he is at least 35 years of age;
2) for at least 10 years, has:
i. been engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines or
ii. has held a public office in the Philippines requiring admission to the practice of law as an
indispensable requisite;
3) he is a citizen of the Philippines; and
4) a member of the Philippine Bar. (B.P. 129, SECTION 15) (1987 CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE VIII,
SECTION 7 (2))
QUALIFICATIONS OF JUDGES OF COURTS OF THE FIRST LEVEL

NO person shall be appointed judge of courts of the first level (Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court) unless:
1) he is at least 30 years of age; and,
2) for at least 5 years, has:
i. been engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines, or
ii. has held a public office in the Philippines requiring admission to the practice of law as an
indispensable requisite;
3) he is a citizen of the Philippines; and
4) a member of the Philippine Bar. (B.P. 129, SECTION 15) (1987 CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE VIII,
SECTION 7 (2))
NEW CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR THE PHILIPPINE JUDICIARY
CANON 1 INDPENDENCE
Judicial independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and a fundamental guarantee of a fair trial.
A judge shall therefore uphold and exemplify judicial independence in both its individual and institutional aspects.
SECTION 1
Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of their assessment of the facts and in
accordance with a conscientious understanding of the law, free of any: (PITE)
1) Pressure,
Page 112
2) Inducement,
3) Threat or interference,
4) Extraneous influence,
direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.
SECTION 2
In performing judicial duties, Judges shall be independent from judicial colleagues in respect of decisions which
the judge is obliged to make independently.
SECTION 3
Judges shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before
another court or administrative agency.
SECTION 4
Judges shall NOT allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment.
The prestige of judicial office shall NOT be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey
or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.
SECTION 5
Judges shall NOT only be free from inappropriate connections with, and influence by, the executive and
legislative branches of government, but must also appear to be free therefrom to a reasonable observer.
SECTION 6
Judges shall be independent in relation to society in general and in relation to the particular parties to a
dispute which he or she has to adjudicate.
SECTION 7
Judges shall encourage and uphold safeguards for the discharge of judicial duties in order to maintain and
enhance the institutional and operational independence of the judiciary.
SECTION 8
Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct in order to reinforce public confidence in
the judiciary which is fundamental to the maintenance of judicial independence.
CANON 2 INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential NOT only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor
of judges.
AN APPLICANT FOR THE JUDICIARY MUST DISCLOSE ALL HIS PREVIOUS DISCIPLINARY
CASES
A judge may be dismissed for concealing from the appointing authority regarding the criminal charges for
homicide and attempted homicide against him. (A.M. NO. RTJ – 87 – 104)
SECTION 1
Judges shall ensure that NOT only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view
of a reasonable observer.
SECTION 2
The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the judiciary.
Justice must NOT merely be done but must also be seen to be done.

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DECIDING JUDGE NEED NOT BE THE ONE WHO HEARD THE EVIDENCE
It is a well settled rule however that a judge who did NOT hear a case may write the decision therein based on
the available records.
Thus, when the respondent judge assumed office in RTC, Branch 28, Iloilo City, he was obligated to decide
Criminal Cases Nos. 48880 and 44965 despite the fact that the cases were submitted for decision to the previous
judge. (A.M. No. RTJ-03-1763)
AUHORITY OF THE SUPREME COURT

Judges do NOT have the power and authority to preventively suspend a clerk of court as such power is vested
with the SUPREME COURT. (A.M. NO. 93 – 10 – 1296)
SECTION 3
Judges should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against lawyers or court personnel for
unprofessional conduct of which the judge may have become aware.
CANON 3 IMPARTIALITY
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office.
It applies NOT only to the decision itself but also to the process by which the decision to made.
TWO CONCEPTS OF IMPARTIALITY

1) Impartiality with respect to "the decision itself; and
2) Impartiality with regard to the process by which the decision is made. (A.M. NO. RTJ – 06 – 1974)
SECTION 1
Judges shall perform their judicial duties without favor, bias or prejudice.
NOTATU DIGNUM
Refers to the presumption of regularity in the performance of a judge’s functions. (A.M. NO. RTJ – 01 – 1640)
ALLEGATIONS MUST BE PROVED

Bias and prejudice, to be valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of judges, must be proved with clear and
convincing evidence. (G.R. NO. 130991)
Mere suspicion that a judge is partial is NOT enough.
There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and partiality.
Extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose, in addition to the
palpable error that may be inferred from the decision or order itself." (A. M. No. RTJ-99-1453)
EXAMINATION OF WITNESS BY TRIAL JUDGE

Judges must not only be impartial, but must also appear to be impartial. However, this is not to say that judges must
remain passive or silent during the proceedings.
A judge should properly intervene in the presentation of evidence to expedite and prevent unnecessary waste of time
but the judge should limit himself to asking clarificatory questions or those questions designed to clarify
points and to elicit additional relevant evidence. (A.M. NO. RTJ – 07 – 2043)
This Court has acknowledged the right of a trial judge to question witnesses with a view to satisfying his mind upon
any material point which presents itself during the trial of a case over which he presides.
But NOT only should his examination be limited to asking "clarificatory" questions, the right should be
sparingly and judiciously used; for the rule is that the court should stay out of it as much as possible, neither
interfering nor intervening in the conduct of the trial.
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Here, these limitations were not observed. Hardly in fact can one avoid the impression that the Sandiganbayan had
allied itself with, or to be more precise, had taken the cudgels for the prosecution in proving the case against
Tabuena and Peralta when the Justices cross-examined the witnesses, their cross- examinations supplementing those
made by Prosecutor Viernes and far exceeding the latter's questions in length.
The "cold neutrality of an impartial judge" requirement of due process was certainly denied Tabuena and
Peralta when the court, with its overzealousness, assumed the dual role of magistrate and advocate. (G.R.
Nos. 103501 – 03)
EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES
The examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or
affirmation.
PROVIDED:
UNLESS the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of
the witness shall be given orally. (1) (RULE 132, SECTION 1)
SECTION 2
Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of
the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.
SECTION 3
Judges shall, so far as is reasonable, so conduct themselves as to minimize the occasions on which it will be
necessary for them to be disqualified from hearing or deciding cases.
RULE OF NECESSITY
a judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, inhibit himself voluntarily from sitting in a case, but it
should be based on good, sound or ethical grounds, or for just and valid reasons.
It is NOT enough that a party throws some tenuous allegations of partiality at the judge. (G.R. NO. 112684)
SECTION 4
Judges shall NOT knowingly, while a proceeding is before, or could come before them, make any comment
that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the
process.
Nor shall judges make any comment in public or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any person or issue.
RATIONALE:
The subjudice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings in order to avoid
prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice.
a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and
law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in
court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies.
Notably, when Judge Paredes discussed the marriage scams involving Judge Tormis in 2010, the investigation
relative to the said case had not yet been concluded. In fact, the decision on the case was promulgated by the Court
only on April 2, 2013.
In 2010, he still could not make comments on the administrative case to prevent any undue influence in its
resolution.

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Commenting on the marriage scams, where Judge Tormis was one of the judges involved, was in
contravention of the subjudicerule. Justice Diy was, therefore, correct in finding that Judge Paredes violated
Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
SECTION 5
Judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in any proceedings in which they are unable to decide the
matter impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable observer that they are unable to decide the
matter impartially.
Such proceedings include, but are NOT limited to, instances where (FAR – PEER)
i. The judge knows that his or her spouse or child has a Financial interest, as heir, legatee, creditor, fiduciary, or
otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be
substantially affected by the outcome of the proceedings;
ii. The judge has Actual bias or prejudice concerning a party or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts
concerning the proceedings;
iii. The judge's Ruling in a lower court is the subject of review;
iv. The judge Previously served as a lawyer or was a material witness in the matter in controversy;
v. The judge served as Executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer in the case or matter in controversy, or a
former associate of the judge served as counsel during their association, or the judge or lawyer was a material
witness therein;
vi. The judge, or a member of his or her family, has an Economic interest in the outcome of the matter in
controversy; or
vii. The judge is Related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the 6TH civil degree or to counsel
within the 4TH civil degree;
SECTION 5
matter impartially.
ACTUAL BIAS OR PREJUDICE

affirmed that a judge may voluntarily disqualify himself on grounds other than those mentioned in
paragraph 1 of Section 1 of Rule 137, as amended, such as bias or prejudice engendered by the judge having
"lost respect in the manner the prosecutor was handling the case ..."; or when the lawyer for a litigant is his
former associate.
Herein respondent Judge, because of his personal knowledge of the case, at least had conducted a careful self-
examination after hearing some incidents on the criminal case wherein petitioner is the complainant, because
such personal knowledge on his part might generate in his mind some bias or prejudice against the
complaining witness or any of the accused or in an manner unconsciously color his judgment one way or the other
without the parties having the opportunity to cross-examine him as a witness.
It is possible that the respondent Judge might be influenced by his personal knowledge of the case when he
tries and decides the same on the merits, which would certainly constitute a denial of due process to the party
adversely affected by his judgment or decision.

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It is best that, after some reflection, the respondent Judge on his own initiative disqualified himself from hearing the
robbery case filed by herein petitioner and thereby rendered himself available as witness to any of the parties and
therefore maybe subject to cross-examination. (G.R. No. L-33508)
SECTION 5
matter impartially.
vi. The judge, or a member of his or her family, has an Economic interest in the outcome of the matter in
controversy; or
ECONOMIC INTEREST
Respondent Judge does not deny sending several letters bearing his sala's letterhead on matters involving an
apparent dispute in the administration of the estates of two relatives.
His excuse for doing so is that he wanted to protect the interest of his maternal co-heirs in the Paler building
and other disputed properties.
Here, although he is the complainant in the three criminal complaints, respondent Judge did not disqualify
himself from the cases.
Worse, he even issued a warrant of arrest in Criminal Case No. 5485, resulting in the arrest and detention of
complainant. By doing so, respondent Judge violated Rule 3.12 and, by implication Section 1 of Rule 137, which
covers the preliminary stages of criminal prosecution. To be sure, the situation in this case does not fall under any of
the instances enumerated in Rule 3.12. Nevertheless, as the provision itself states, such enumeration is not exclusive.
More importantly, paragraph (d) prohibits a judge from sitting in a case where he is related to a party or to counsel
within the sixth and fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity, respectively. Thus, there is more reason to prohibit a
judge from doing so in cases where he is a party.
Indeed, the idea that a judge can preside over his own case is anathema to the notion of impartiality that such
was no longer included in the enumeration in Rule 3.12 nor covered by Section 1 of Rule 137. (A.M. No. MTJ -02-
1444)
SECTION 5
matter impartially.
REVIEWING ON CASES
From the foregoing legal principles, we find no basis for Justice Victor to inhibit himself from deciding the case. To
be sure, as trial court judge, he presided partly over the case below, heard part of plaintiff's evidence and ruled on
motions. The decision itself, however, was penned by another judge, the Honorable Lucas Bersamin, who took over
as presiding judge when then Judge Luis Victor was promoted. Upon elevation to the Court of Appeals, the case was
assigned to Justice Victor as ponente.
The principle that approximates the situation obtaining herein is the disqualification of a judge from deciding a case
where his "ruling in a lower court is the subject of review" or "in which he has presided in any inferior court when
his ruling or decision is the subject of review."

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Granted that Justice Victor presided partly over the case in the court a quo, his was NOT the pen that finally
rendered the decision therein.
Hence, he CANNOT be said to have been placed in as position where he had to review his own decision as
judge in the trial court.
Accordingly, he was NOT legally bound to inhibit himself from the case.
Nevertheless, Justice Victor should have been more prudent and circumspect and declined to take on the
case, owing to his earlier involvement in the case.
The Court has held that a judge should NOT handle a case in which he might be perceived, rightly or wrongly,
to be susceptible to bias and partiality, which axiom is intended to preserve and promote public confidence in
the integrity and respect for the judiciary.
While he is NOT legally required to decline from taking part in the case, it is our considered view that his
active participation in the case below constitutes a "just or valid reason," under Section 1 of Rule 137 for him
to voluntarily inhibit himself from the case. (G.R. No. 106657)
SECTION 5
matter impartially.
MEMBERSHIP IN A COLLEGE FRATERNITY OR CLASSMATE

Membership in a college fraternity, by itself, does NOT constitute a ground to disqualify an investigator,
prosecutor or judge from acting on the case of a respondent who happens to be a member of the same
fraternity.
A trial Judge, appellate Justice, or member of this Court who is or was a member of a college fraternity, a university
alumni association, a socio-civic association like Jaycees or Rotary, a religion-oriented organization like Knights of
Columbus or Methodist Men, and various other fraternal organizations is NOT expected to automatically inhibit
himself or herself from acting whenever a case involving a member of his or her group happens to come
before him or her for action.
A member in good standing of any reputable organization is expected all the more to maintain the highest standards
of probity, integrity, and honor and to faithfully comply with the ethics of the legal profession. (underscoring
supplied)
The added fact that the law school’s alumni association published statements in support of Ong’s application cannot
lend credence to the imputation of bias on the part of pubic respondent.
NO clear and convincing evidence was shown to indicate that public respondent actively sponsored and
participated in the adoption and publication of the alumni association’s stand.
It is inconceivable to suppose that the alumni association’s statement obliged all its members to earnestly embrace
the manifesto as a matter of creed. (G.R. No. 180543)
SECTION 6
A judge disqualified as stated above may, instead of withdrawing from the proceeding, disclose on the records
the basis of disqualification.

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If, based on such disclosure, the parties and lawyers independently of the judge's participation, all agree in writing
that the reason for the inhibition is immaterial or unsubstantial, the judge may then participate in the
proceeding.
The agreement, signed by all parties and lawyers, shall be incorporated in the record of the proceedings.
RULE 137 DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDICIAL OFFICERS

DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES
NO judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which:
1) he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or
2) in which he is related to either party within the 6TH of consanguinity or affinity, or
3) to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or
4) in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or
5) in which he has been presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review,
without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid
reasons other than those mentioned above. (SECTION 1)
OBJECTION THAT JUDGE IS DISQUALIFIED

If it be claimed that an official is disqualified from sitting as above provided, the party objecting to his competency
may, in writing, file with the official his objection, stating the grounds therefor, and the official shall
thereupon proceed with the trial, or withdraw therefrom, in accordance with his determination of the
question of his disqualification.
His decision shall be forthwith made in writing and filed with the other papers in the case, but no appeal or stay shall
be allowed from, or by reason of, his decision in favor of his own competency, until after final judgment in the case.
(SECTION 2)
INSTANCES WHEN JUDGE NEED NOT INHIBIT

1) Close personal friendship with a party, as long as it does not influence the judge’s official conduct as a judge.
(A.M. NO. RTJ – 04 – 1823)
2) The fact that the judge is a next – door neighbour of the complainant or party – litigant. (A.M. NO. RTJ – 95
– 1063)
CANON 4 PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge.
SECTION 1
Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
RATIONALE:
By the very nature of the bench, judges, more than the average man, are required to observe an exacting standard of
morality and decency.
The character of a judge is perceived by the people NOT only through his official acts but also through his
private morals as reflected in his external behavior.
It is therefore paramount that a judge’s personal behavior both in the performance of his duties and his daily
life, be free from the appearance of impropriety as to be beyond reproach.

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A judge’s conduct must be above reproach. Like Caesar’s wife, a judge must NOT only be pure but above
suspicion.
A judge’s private as well as official conduct must at all times be free from all appearances of impropriety, and
be beyond reproach. (A.M. No. 12-8-160-RTC)
Although concern for family members is deeply ingrained in the Filipino culture, respondent, being a judge, should
bear in mind that he is also called upon to serve the higher interest of preserving the integrity of the entire judiciary.
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to avoid not only impropriety but also the mere
appearance of impropriety in all activities.
Even if respondent did not intend to use his position as a judge to influence the outcome of his brother’s
election protest, it CANNOT be denied that his presence in the courtroom during the hearing of his brother’s
case would immediately give cause for the community to suspect that his being a colleague in the judiciary
would influence the judge trying the case to favor his brother.
The fact that neither complainant nor his counsel objected to the presence of respondent during the hearing is
immaterial.
Respondent himself should have refrained from publicly showing his seemingly active interest and
participation in the case, for he does not deny that he whispered and passed notes to his brother’s lawyer
during the course of the hearing.
Judges are required not only to be impartial but also to appear to be so, for appearance is an essential
manifestation of reality. (A.M. NO. MTJ – 05 – 1591)
The factual setting in Abundo v. Mania, Jr. is not similar to the present case because Napoles was not a colleague or
lawyer-friend but an accused in a former case before the Sandiganbayan's Fourth Division chaired by respondent
and which acquitted her from malversation charge. What respondent perhaps want to underscore is the caveat for
judges, in pending or prospective litigation before them, to avoid such action as may raise suspicion on their
partiality in resolving or deciding the case. Thus, he emphasized in his Memorandum that he "never knew Napoles
on a personal level while she was still on trial as an accused in Kevlar helmet case." Respondent even quoted Sula's
testimony expressing her opinion that she finds nothing wrong with respondent going to Napoles' office because at
that time, the Kevlar case had already been terminated.
We do NOT share the view that the rule on propriety was intended to cover only pending and prospective
litigations.
Judges must, at all times, be beyond reproach and should avoid even the mere suggestion of partiality and
impropriety.
Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that "[p ]ropriety and the appearance of propriety are essential
to the performance of all the activities of a judge." Section 2 further provides:
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct
themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
As we held in Sibayan-Joaquin v. Javellana25

... Judges, indeed, should be extra prudent in associating with litigants and counsel appearing before them so
as to avoid even a mere perception of possible bias or partiality.
It is NOT expected, of course, that judges should live in retirement or seclusion from any social intercourse.

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Indeed, it may be desirable, for instance, that they continue, time and work commitments permitting, to relate to
members of the bar in worthwhile endeavors and in such fields of interest, in general, as are in keeping with the
noble aims and objectives of the legal profession.
In pending or prospective litigations before them, however, judges should be scrupulously careful to avoid
anything that may tend to awaken the suspicion that their personal, social or sundry relations could influence
their objectivity,
for NOT only must judges possess proficiency in law but that also they must act and behave in such manner
that would assure, with great comfort, litigants and their counsel of the judges' competence, integrity and
independence.
In this light, it does NOT matter that the case is NO longer pending when improper acts were committed by
the judge.
Because magistrates are under constant public scrutiny, the termination of a case will NOT deter public
criticisms for acts which may cast suspicion on its disposition or resolution.
As what transpired in this case, respondent's association with Napoles has unfortunately dragged the Judiciary into
the "Pork Barrel" controversy which initially involved only legislative and executive officials. Worse, Napoles'
much-flaunted "contact" in the judiciary is no less than a Justice of the Sandiganbayan, our special court tasked with
hearing graft cases. We cannot, by any stretch of indulgence and compassion, consider respondent's transgression as
a simple misconduct. (A.M. NO. SB – 14 – 21 – J)
CANON 4 PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge.
SECTION 1
Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
DECORUM IN SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES

We are not unaware of the increasing prevalence of social networking sites in the Internet – a new medium through
which more and more Filipinos communicate with each other.
While judges are NOT prohibited from becoming members of and from taking part in social networking
activities, we remind them that they do not thereby shed off their status as judges.
They carry with them in cyberspace the same ethical responsibilities and duties that every judge is expected
to follow in his/her everyday activities.
It is in this light that we judge the respondent in the charge of impropriety when she posted her pictures in a
manner viewable by the public.
Lest this rule be misunderstood, the New Code of Judicial Conduct does not prohibit a judge from joining or
maintaining an account in a social networking site such as Friendster. Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct recognizes that judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression. This right
"includes the freedom to hold opinions without interference and impart information and ideas through any media
regardless of frontiers."
Joining a social networking site is an exercise of one’s freedom of expression.

The respondent judge’s act of joining Friendster is, therefore, per se NOT violative of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct.
Based on this provision, we hold that the respondent disregarded the propriety and appearance of propriety
required of her when she posted Friendster photos of herself wearing an "off-shouldered" suggestive dress
and made this available for public viewing.

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To restate the rule: in communicating and socializing through social networks, judges must bear in mind that
what they communicate – regardless of whether it is a personal matter or part of his or her judicial duties –
creates and contributes to the people’s opinion NOT just of the judge but of the entire Judiciary of which he
or she is a part.
This is especially true when the posts the judge makes are viewable not only by his or her family and close friends,
but by acquaintances and the general public.
Thus, it may be acceptable for the respondent to show a picture of herself in the attire she wore to her family and
close friends, but when she made this picture available for public consumption, she placed herself in a situation
where she, and the status she holds as a judge, may be the object of the public’s criticism and ridicule. The nature of
cyber communications, particularly its speedy and wide-scale character, renders this rule necessary.
We are not also unaware that the respondent’s act of posting her photos would seem harmless and inoffensive
had this act been done by an ordinary member of the public.
As the visible personification of law and justice, however, judges are held to higher standards of conduct and
thus must accordingly comport themselves.
This exacting standard applies both to acts involving the judicial office and personal matters. (A.M. No. RTJ – 09 –
2200)
SECTION 2
As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly.
In particular, judges conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
SECTION 3
Judges shall, in their personal relations with individual members of the legal profession who practice regularly
in their court, avoid situations which might reasonably give rise to the suspicion or appearance of favoritism
or partiality.
SECTION 4
Judges shall NOT participate in the determination of a case in which any member of their family represents a
litigant or is associated in any manner with the case.
SECTION 5
Judges shall NOT allow the use of their residence by a member of the legal profession to receive clients of the
latter or of other members of the legal profession.
SECTION 6
Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly, but in
exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the
judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.
RATIONALE:
the right to criticize the courts and judicial officers must be balanced against the equally primordial concern that the
independence of the Judiciary be protected from due influence or interference.
In cases where the critics are NOT only citizens but members of the Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly
affirmed the authority of this Court to discipline lawyers whose statements regarding the courts and fellow
lawyers, whether judicial or extrajudicial, have exceeded the limits of fair comment and common decency.
As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, as any attorney, is in duty bound
to uphold its dignity and authority and to defend its integrity, not only because it has conferred upon him the high
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privilege, not a right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and 160), of being what he now is: a priest of justice (In re
Thatcher, 80 Ohio St. Rep., 492, 669), but also because in so doing, he neither creates nor promotes distrust in the
administration of justice, and prevents anybody from harboring and encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is
the source of disorder, thus undermining the foundation upon which rests that bulwark called judicial power to
which those who are aggrieved turn for protection and relief. (A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC)
SECTION 7
Judges shall inform themselves about their personal fiduciary financial interests and shall make reasonable
efforts to be informed about the financial interests of members of their family.
SECTION 8
Judges shall NOT use or lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance their private interests, or those of a
member of their family or of anyone else,
nor shall they convey or permit others to convey the impression that anyone is in a special position
improperly to influence them in the performance of judicial duties.
ATTACHMENT OF LIABILITY
Judge Zosimo Escano has behaved in a manner unbecoming of his judicial robe, betrayed the peoples high
expectations, and diminished the esteem in which they hold the judiciary in general.
It is of NO import that respondent Judges act of using the courts facilities be motivated by a good cause, no
matter how honorable.
The moment such act deviates from purposes NOT directly related to the functioning and operation for
which the courts of justice has been established, it must be immediately rectified. (A.M. No. RTJ 98-1400)
SECTION 9 as last updated by OCA Cir. 103-06 (2006)

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION acquired by judges in their judicial capacity shall NOT be used or disclosed
for any other purpose NOT related to their judicial duties.
SECTION 10
Subject to the proper performance of judicial duties, judges may: (EWA)
i. Engage in other activities if such activities do not detract from the dignity of the judicial office or otherwise
interfere with the performance of judicial duties.
ii. Write, lecture, teach and participate in activities concerning the law, the legal system, the administration of justice
or related matters;
iii. Appear at a public hearing before an official body concerned with matters relating to the law, the legal system,
the administration of justice or related matters;
DISQUALIFICATION
The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency
performing quasi-judicial or administrative function. (1987 CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE VIII, SECTION
12)
SECTION 11
Judges shall NOT practice law whilst the holder of judicial office.
SECTION 12
Judges may form or join associations of judges or participate in other organizations representing the interests
of judges.
SECTION 13

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Judges and members of their families shall neither ask for, nor accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in
relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done by him or her in connection with the
performance of judicial duties.
SECTION 14
Judges shall NOT knowingly permit court staff or others subject to their influence, direction or authority, to
ask for, or accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be
done in connection with their duties or functions.
SECTION 15
Subject to law and to any legal requirements of public disclosure, judges may receive a token gift, award or
benefit as appropriate to the occasion on which it is made provided that such gift, award or benefit might not
reasonably be perceived as intended to influence the judge in the performance of judicial duties or otherwise
give rise to an appearance of partiality.
VOID DONATIONS
DONATIONS made to a public officer or his wife, descendants and ascendants, by reason of his office shall be
void. (NEW CIVIL CODE, ARTICLE 739)
LOAN PROHIBITED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION

NO loan, guaranty, or other form of financial accommodation for any business purpose may be granted, directly or
indirectly, by any government-owned or controlled bank or financial institution to the members of the
Supreme Court. (1987 CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE XI, SECTION 16)
CANON 5 EQUALITY
Ensuring equality of treatment to all before the courts is essential to the due performance of the judicial office.
SECTION 1
Judges shall be aware of, and understand, diversity in society and differences arising from various sources,
including but NOT limited to:
1) race,
2) color,
3) sex,
4) religion,
5) national origin,
6) caste,
7) disability,
8) age,
9) marital status,
10) sexual orientation,
11) social and economic status and
12) other like causes.
SECTION 2

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Judges shall NOT, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct, manifest bias or prejudice
towards any person or group on irrelevant grounds.
SECTION 3
Judges shall carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration for all persons, such as the parties,
witnesses, lawyers, court staff and judicial colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant ground,
immaterial to the proper performance of such duties.
SECTION 4
Judges shall NOT knowingly permit court staff or others subject to his or her influence, direction or control to
differentiate between persons concerned, in a matter before the judge on any irrelevant ground.
SECTION 5
Judges shall require lawyers in proceedings before the court to refrain from manifesting, by words or conduct,
bias or prejudice based on irrelevant grounds, except such as are legally relevant to an issue in proceedings
and may be the subject of legitimate advocacy.
INHERENT POWERS OF COURT

To control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any
manner connected with a case before it, in every manner appertaining thereto. (RULE 135, SECTION 5)
CANON 6 COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE

Competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office.
SECTION 1
The judicial duties of a judge take precedence over all other activities.
SECTION 2
Judges shall devote their professional activity to judicial duties, which include not only the performance of
judicial functions and responsibilities in court and the making of decisions, but also other tasks relevant to
the judicial office or the court's operations.
DUTIES OF JUDGES
1) JUDICIAL DUTIES
2) ADMINISTRATIVE DUTIES
JUDICIAL DUTIES -- refer to the actual administration of justice such as, but not limited to
hearing and deciding cases on the merits.
ADMINISTRATIVE DUTIES -- refer to the administration of court employees assigned to the sala of the
judge including supervision of their daily tasks, efficiency, and effectiveness.
(ANTIQUIERA, supra at 146)
SECTION 3
Judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance their knowledge, skills and personal qualities
necessary for the proper performance of judicial duties, taking advantage for this purpose of the training and
other facilities which should be made available, under judicial control, to judges.
RATIONALE
When a judge displays an utter unfamiliarity with the law and the rules, he erodes the confidence of the public
in the courts.
A judge owes the public and the court the duty to be proficient in the law and is expected to keep abreast of laws and
prevailing jurisprudence. (A.M. MTJ – 96 – 1106)

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GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW

When a law or a rule is basic, judges owe it to their office to simply apply the law. “Anything less is gross
ignorance of the law.”
There is gross ignorance of the law when an error committed by the judge was “gross or patent, deliberate or
malicious.”
It may also be committed when a judge ignores, contradicts or fails to apply settled law and jurisprudence because
of bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. Gross ignorance of the law or incompetence cannot be excused by a
claim of good faith. (MTJ – 15 – 1851)
SECTION 4
Judges shall keep themselves informed about relevant developments of international law, including
international conventions and other instruments establishing human rights norms.
SECTION 5
Judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with
reasonable promptness.
SECTION 6
Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and
courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official
capacity.
Judges shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence,
direction or control.
RATIONALE:
A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity, independence and respect for
himself/herself, the Court and the Judiciary as a whole.
He must exhibit the hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint.
He should choose his words and exercise more caution and control in expressing himself.
In other words, a judge should possess the virtue of gravitas.
As held in De la Cruz (Concerned Citizen of Legazpi City) v. Judge Carretas, a judge should be considerate,
courteous and civil to all persons who come to his court; he should always keep his passion guarded.
He can never allow it to run loose and overcome his reason. Furthermore, a magistrate should not descend to the
level of a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant by uttering harsh words, snide remarks and sarcastic comments.
Similarly in Attys. Guanzon and Montesino v. Judge Rufon,43 the Court declared that "although respondent judge
may attribute his intemperate language to human frailty, his noble position in the bench nevertheless demands
from him courteous speech in and out of court.
Judges are required to always be temperate, patient and courteous, both in conduct and in language."
Accordingly, the respondent’s unnecessary bickering with SCP’s legal counsel, her expressions of exasperation over
trivial procedural and negligible lapses, her snide remarks, as well as her condescending attitude, are conduct that
the Court cannot allow. They are displays of arrogance and air of superiority that the Code abhors. (A.M. No. RTJ –
09 – 2200)
SECTION 6

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Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and
courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official
capacity.
Judges shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence,
direction or control.
ILLUSTRATION:
The Court is convinced that respondent Judge is guilty of Oppression as shown in several incidents of
misbehavior by respondent Judge, some of which are stated below:
1) Respondent Judge displayed antagonistic behavior towards Atty. Macapado who appeared as defense
counsel in three (3) criminal cases and who might have increased the tone of his voice in their verbal tussle.
XXXX
2) Respondent Judge engaged in an argument in open court with a certain Atty. Gerardo Padilla who
appeared as defendants' counsel in Civil Case No. 06-7010. XXXXX
3) Assistant City Prosecutor Diaz was humiliated by respondent Judge who admonished her also in open
court because respondent Judge felt displeased with ACP Diaz's reaction and alleged disrespectful behavior
which led ACP Diaz to cry and made her unable to continue with the presentation of her witness.
4) Respondent Judge exhibited conduct unbecoming of a judge when she shouted at a court staff in her
chambers while correcting the court staffs draft orders which she dictated in open court and called the court
staff, "bogo ba nimo" (you are dumb or stupid). XXXXXX
5) Another court staff also experienced being berated and humiliated by respondent Judge. In correcting the court
staffs eleven (11) draft orders, respondent Judge humiliated her by repeatedly pointing at her mistakes in an
elevated voice in the presence of a friend of respondent Judge, who happened to be a party in a civil case
pending before their court. XXXXX
The Court has previously ruled that "a display of petulance and impatience in the conduct of trial is a norm of
behavior incompatible with the needful attitude and sobriety of a good judge.'' (A.M. NO. RTJ – 16 – 2470)
SECTION 7
Judges shall NOT engage in conduct incompatible with the diligent discharge of judicial duties.
ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION OF THE SUPREME COURT

The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. (1987
CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE VI, SECTION 6)
CERTAIN ATTORNEYS PROHIBITED TO ENGAGE IN PRIVATE PRACTICE

NO judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall
engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients. (RULE 138, SECTION
35)
RULE 137 DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDICIAL OFFICERS

1) MANDATORY OR COMPULSORY DISQUALIFICATION
NO judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which:
1) he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or
2) in which he is related to either party within the 6TH degree of consanguinity or affinity, or
3) to counsel within the 4TH degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or À
4) in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or

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5) in which he has been presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of
review,
without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
(RULE 137, SECTION 1)
2) VOLUNTARY INHIBITION
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid
reasons other than those mentioned above. (RULE 137, SECTION 1)
RATIONALE
The issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the
judge.
It is a subjective test, the result of which the reviewing tribunal will not disturb in the absence of any manifest
finding of arbitrariness and whimsicality.
The discretion given to trial judges is an acknowledgment of the fact that they are in a better position to determine
the issue of inhibition, as they are the ones who directly deal with the parties-litigants in their courtrooms. (G.R. No.
180543)
DECISION TO INHIBIT
A decision to disqualify himself is not conclusive and his competency may be determined on application for
mandamus to compel him to act. (A.M. NO. 87 – 9 – 3918)
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE JUDGE

respondent Judge, because of his personal knowledge of the case, at least had conducted a careful self-examination
after hearing some incidents on the criminal case wherein petitioner is the complainant, because such personal
knowledge on his part might generate in his mind some bias or prejudice against the complaining witness or
any of the accused or in an manner unconsciously color his judgment one way or the other without the parties
having the opportunity to cross-examine him as a witness.
Herein respondent Judge therefore harkened to the injunction announced by this Court in Pimentel versus
Salanga that when a Judge "might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant
arising out of circumstance reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-
examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the courts of justice is not impaired.
A salutary norm is that he reflect on the probability that a losing party might nurture at the back of his mind the
thought that the judge had unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against him."
It is possible that the respondent Judge might be influenced by his personal knowledge of the case when he
tries and decides the same on the merits, which would certainly constitute a denial of due process to the party
adversely affected by his judgment or decision.
It is best that, after some reflection, the respondent Judge on his own initiative disqualified himself from hearing the
robbery case filed by herein petitioner and thereby rendered himself available as witness to any of the parties and
therefore maybe subject to cross-examination. (G.R. No. L-33508)
DISQUALIFICATION INHIBITION
AS TO CONCEPT
It is conclusively presumed that judges cannot It gives the judges the exclusive prerogative to rescue
actively and impartially sit in the instances mentioned themselves from hearing cases for reasons other than
by the RULES OF COURT. those mentioned by the RULES OF COURT.
AS TO GROUNDS
RULES OF COURT enumerate the specific and RULES OF COURT do not expressly enumerate the

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exclusive grounds under which any judge or judicial specific ground for inhibition but merely giver a broad
officer is disqualified from such. basis thereof.
AS TO JUDGE’S DISCRETION
RULES OF COURT give the judicial officer NO RULES OF COURT leave the matter on inhibition to
DISCRETION to try or sit in a case. the SOUND DISCRETION of the judge.
COVERED ACTS OR OMISSIONS OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS SUBJECT OF QUO WARRANTO

An act or omission committed prior to or at the time of appointment or election relating to an official’s
qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment or election invalid is properly the subject of a quo
warranto petition, provided that the requisites for the commencement thereof are present.
On the contrary, acts or omission, even if it relates to the qualification of integrity, being a continuing
requirement but committed during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected official,
CANNOT be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding. It may be subject to impeachment proceeding or
disciplinary, administrative or criminal action. (G.R. No. 237428)
A.M. NO. 01-8-10-SC September 11, 2001

RE: PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO RULE 140 OF THE RULES OF COURT RE: DISCIPLINE OF
JUSTICES AND JUDGES
The Court resolved to APPROVE the amendment of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court regarding the discipline of
Justices and Judges, so as to read as follows:
RULE 140 DISCIPLINE OF JUDGES OF REGULAR AND SPECIAL COURTS AND JUSTICES OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN (A.M. NO. 01-8-10-SC)
HOW INSTITUTED
Proceedings for the discipline of judges of regular and special courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan may be instituted motu proprio by the Supreme Court or upon a verified complaint, supported
by affidavits of person who have personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents which may
substantiate said allegations, or upon an anonymous complaint, supported by public records of indubitable
integrity.
The complaint shall be in writing and shall state clearly and concisely the acts and omissions constituting
violations of standards of conduct prescribed for Judges by law, the Rules of Court, or the Code of Judicial
Conduct. (SECTION 1) CHECK FOR AMENDMENTS
RATIONALE:
The rationale for the requirement that complaints against judges and justices of the judiciary must be accompanied
by supporting evidence is to protect magistrates from the filing of t1imsy and virtually unsubstantiated
charges against them.
This is consistent with the rule that in administrative proceedings, the complainants bear the burden of
proving the allegations in their complaints by substantial evidence.
If they fail to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which their claims are based, the respondents are
NOT obliged to prove their exception or defense.
In this case, the anonymous complaint accused Justice Pizarro of selling favorable decisions, having a mistress, and
habitually playing in casinos; and essentially charging him of dishonesty and violations of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Law, immorality, and unbecoming conduct.
These accusations, however, with the only exception of gambling in casinos, are not supported by any
evidence or by any public record of indubitable integrity.

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Thus, the bare allegations of corruption and immorality do NOT deserve any consideration.
For this reason, the charges of corruption and immorality against Justice Pizarro must be dismissed for lack
of merit. (A.M. NO. 17 – 11 – 06 – CA)
With respect to Circular No. 4 and Administrative Matter No. 1544-0, it is with regret that the Court finds them
inapplicable to the present case. It is clear from the words of these issuances that the prohibition from entering and
gambling in casinos is applicable only to judges of inferior courts and court personnel. Stated differently, the
aforesaid issuances do not cover justices of collegial courts for the simple reason that they are neither judges of the
inferior courts nor can they be described as personnel of the court. Although the term "judge" has been held to
comprehend all kinds of judges, the same is true only if the said term is not modified by any word or phrase. In the
case of Circular No. 4 and Administrative Matter No. 1544- 0, the term "judge" has been qualified by the phrase
"inferior courts." Thus, absurd as it may seem, Justice Pizarro cannot be held administratively liable under Circular
No. 4 and Administrative Matter No. ] 544-0.
The Court has repeatedly reminded judges to conduct themselves irreproachably, NOT only while in the
discharge of official duties but also in their personal behavior every day.
NO position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from its occupant than does the judicial
office.
Judges in particular must be individuals of competence, honesty and probity, charged as they are with safeguarding
the integrity of the court and its proceedings. Judges should behave at all times so as to promote public confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, and avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all their
activities.
A judge's personal behaviour outside the court, and NOT only while in the performance of his official duties,
must be beyond reproach, for he is perceived to be the personification of law and justice. Thus, any
demeaning act of a judge degrades the institution he represents. (A.M. NO. 17 – 11 – 06 – CA)
EVIDENCE REQUIRED
In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required to establish a respondent’s malfeasance is not proof
beyond reasonable doubt but substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required. Faced with conflicting versions of complainant and
respondent, the Court gives more weight to the allegations and testimony of the complainant and her witnesses who
testified clearly and consistently before the Investigating Judge.127 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
After scrutinizing the testimony of complainant and the evidence she presented to support her allegations, we find
her account of the event to be genuine and believable.
Complainant’s narration of the dinner meeting held on March 3, 2010 and her account of events leading up to the
dinner meeting were detailed and comprehensive. The conversation alleged by complainant that took place with
respondents during the meeting was replete with details.
The strongest corroborative evidence to support complainant’s allegations was the exchange of text messages
between complainant and respondent Pecaña regarding the dinner meeting. These text messages were admitted by
respondent Pecaña.128 However, Justice Gaerlan failed to give any weight to the exchange of text messages. This fact
was not included in his investigation report. (A.M. NO. RTJ – 14 – 2388)
NOT BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION

Delay in filing an administrative complaint should NOT be construed as basis to question its veracity or
credibility.
There are considerations that a litigant must think about before filing an administrative case against judges and court
personnel. This is more so for lawyers where the possibility of appearing before the judge where an administrative
complaint has been filed is high.
Here, respondent Judge Rubia presided over three cases that involved complainant and her late husband’s estate. He
wielded an unmistakable amount of control over the proceedings.
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Filing an administrative case against respondents is a time-consuming ordeal, and it would require additional time
and resources that litigants would rather not expend in the interest of preserving their rights in the suit. Complainant
might have decided to tread with caution so as not to incur the ire of respondent Judge Rubia for fear of the reprisal
that could take place after the filing of an administrative complaint.
Judges and court personnel wield extraordinary control over court proceedings of cases filed. Thus, litigants are
always cautious in filing administrative cases against judges and court personnel.
In any case, administrative offenses, including those committed by members of the bench and bar, are NOT
subject to a fixed period within which they must be reported. In Heck v. Judge Santos, this court held that:
Pursuant to the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that an administrative complaint against an
erring lawyer who was thereafter appointed as a judge, albeit filed only after twenty-four years after the
offending act was committed, is not barred by prescription.
If the rule were otherwise, members of the bar would be emboldened to disregard the very oath they took as lawyers,
prescinding from the fact that as long as no private complainant would immediately come forward, they stand a
chance of being completely exonerated from whatever administrative liability they ought to answer for. It is the duty
of this Court to protect the integrity of the practice of law as well as the administration of justice.
NO matter how much time has elapsed from the time of the commission of the act complained of and the time
of the institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench and bar CANNOT escape the disciplining
arm of the Court.
This categorical pronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous members of the bench and bar, to deter them from
committing acts which violate the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Code of Judicial Conduct, or the
Lawyer’s Oath. (Emphasis supplied) (A.M. NO. RTJ – 14 – 2388)
MERE ERROR OR MISTAKE

not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his official duties renders him liable.
"As a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity
are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous."
"Unless the acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill-will, bad faith, or deliberate
intent to do an injustice, the respondent judge may NOT be held administratively liable for gross misconduct,
ignorance of the law or incompetence of official acts in the exercise of judicial functions and duties,
particularly in the adjudication of cases."
Even granting that the respondent indeed erred in the exercise of her judicial functions, these are, at best, legal errors
correctible not by a disciplinary action, but by judicial remedies that are readily available to the complainant. "An
administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a
judge where a judicial remedy is available, such as a motion for reconsideration or an appeal."
Errors committed by him/her in the exercise of adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through
administrative proceedings but should be assailed instead through judicial remedies. (A.M. No. RTJ – 09 –
2200)
GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW

To the eyes of this Court, Judge Paderanga is not guilty of gross ignorance of the law and procedure.
To be held liable for gross ignorance of the law, the judge must be shown to have committed an error that
was "gross or patent, deliberate or malicious."

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Also administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law is a judge who – shown to have been motivated by
bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption – ignored, contradicted or failed to apply settled law and
jurisprudence.
Such is not the case presently before this Court.
A heavy workload does NOT excuse Judge Paderanga from ascertaining all pertinent facts that would have
enabled him to justly resolve or decide a case.
A judge must NOT sacrifice the orderly administration of justice in favor of a speedy but reckless disposition
of a case.
A prudent judge should have ascertained the facts before reaching conclusions and issuing orders. It is routinary in
every case that the judge carefully evaluates facts before issuing an order in court. Otherwise, the judge may be held
liable for culpable negligence.18 (A.M. NO. RTJ – 06 – 2025)
To constitute gross ignorance of the law or procedure, the subject decision, order or actuation of the judge in
the performance of official duties should be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence.
Most importantly, the judge must be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption.
Judge Reyes’ bad faith is clearly apparent from the above-related facts and circumstances in the consolidated cases.
This Court cannot shrug off her failure to exercise that degree of care and temperance required of a judge in the
correct and prompt administration of justice, more so in these cases where her exercise of the power of contempt
resulted in the detention and deprivation of liberty of Migriño, Andree, Sebastian and Alicia, and endangered the
freedom of the other complainants. Tiongco v. Salao is instructive:
Thus, the carelessness and lack of circumspection on respondent Judge’s part, to say the least, in
peremptorily ordering the arrest and detention of complainant, warrant the imposition of a penalty on
respondent Judge as a corrective measure, so that she and others may be properly warned about carelessness
in the application of the proper law and undue severity in ordering the detention of complainant immediately
and depriving him of the opportunity to seek recourse from higher courts against the summary penalty of
imprisonment imposed by respondent Judge.
It is also well-settled that the power to declare a person in contempt is inherent in all courts so as to preserve
order in judicial proceedings and to uphold the administration of justice.
Judges, however, are enjoined to exercise such power judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and
with the end view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, and NOT
for retaliation or vindication.
The salutary rule is that the power to punish for contempt for purposes that are impersonal, because that power is
intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise.Only occasionally
should the court invoke the inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of justice
must falter or fail. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) (A.M. NO. MTJ – 06 – 1623)
When the law or procedure is so elementary, such as the provisions of the Rules of Court, NOT to know, or to
act as if one does not know the same, constitutes gross ignorance of the law, even without the complainant
having to prove malice or bad faith. (A.M. NO. RTJ – 09 – 2196)
Ignorance of the law is the mainspring of injustice. Judges are called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. Basic rules should be at the palm of their hands.
Their inexcusable failure to observe basic laws and rules will render them administratively liable. Where the
law involved is simple and elementary, lack of conversance with it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

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"Verily, for transgressing the elementary jurisdictional limits of his court, respondent should be administratively
liable for gross ignorance of the law."
"When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the
discharge of his functions, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds
or he is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of
judicial authority." (A.M. No. RTJ – 07 – 2063)
SEC. 3. By whom complaint investigated. - Upon the filing of the respondent's comment, or upon the expiration of
the time for filing the same and unless other pleadings or documents are required, the Court shall refer the matter to
the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report, and recommendation or assign the case for
investigation, report, and recommendation to a retired member of the Supreme Court, if the respondent is a Justice
of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, or to a Justice of the Court of Appeals, if the respondent is a Judge
of a Regional Trial Court or of a special court of equivalent rank, or to a Judge of the Regional Trial Court if the
respondent is a Judge of an inferior court. (SECTION 3)
CONFIDENTIALITY OF PROCEEDINGS
Proceedings against Judges of regular and special courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan shall be private and confidential, but a copy of the decision or resolution of the court shall be
attached to the record of the respondent in the Office of the Court Administrator. (SECTION 12)
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES / AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

Section 48, Rule X of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS) provides that in
the determination of the penalties to be imposed, mitigating and/or aggravating circumstances attendant to the
commission of the offense shall be considered. The following are to be considered: (UI – MUST – HOLE –
FIGOE)
1) Taking Undue advantage of official position;
2) Physical Illness;
3) Malice;
4) Use of government property in the commission of the offense;
5) Taking advantage of Subordinate;
6) Time and place of offense;
7) Habituality;
8) Offense is committed during Office hours and within the premises of the office or building;
9) Length of service;
10) Employment of fraudulent means to commit or conceal the offense;
11) First offense;
12) Undue disclosure of confidential Information;
13) Good faith;
14) Other analogous circumstances; or
15) Education;
(SECTION 48, RULE 10 OF THE REVISED RULES OF ADMINISTRATIVE CASES IN CIVIL SERVICE)
INSUBORDINATION BY JUDGES
A judge embodies the law; she CANNOT be above it.
She should NOT use it to advance her personal convenience, or to oppress others.
She should be obedient to the rules and directives enunciated by the Supreme Court for the effective
administration of justice; otherwise, she becomes an arrogant tyrant.
Being a magistrate of the law, she must comport herself in a manner consistent with the dignity of her judicial
office, and must NOT commit any act that erodes public confidence in the judiciary.
The respondent's correspondences were outside the scope of the constitutional proscription against self-
incrimination. She had not been subjected to testimonial compulsion in which she could validly raise her right
against self-incrimination. Worthy to recall is that she had herself voluntarily waived her right to be present and to
confront the complainant and her witnesses and evidence during the administrative investigation conducted by CA
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Associate Justice Hakim Abdulwahid. She was emphatically granted the opportunity to confront the complainant
and her witnesses but the voluntary and knowing waiver of her presence divested her of the right to insist on the
right to confrontation, if any.
The respondent contends that she was not given the opportunity to raise her objection to the certification issued by
the SC-MISO. This contention is dismissed also because of the same voluntary waiver of her presence from the
proceedings held before Justice Abdulwahid.
We also reject the respondent's appeal for relief based on her supposed lack of experience as a neophyte judge, and
her previously received awards and outstanding court performance. Lack of experience had no relevance in
determining her administrative liabilities for acts and actuations fundamentally irregular or contrary to judicial
ethical standards.
We even believe that her being a novice in the Judiciary, instead of mitigating her liability, could have
aggravated her offense, for her being a neophyte judge should have impelled her instead to practice greater
prudence and caution in her daily actuations and performance.
But instead of pausing and hesitating, she acted rashly and imprudently by condescendingly asserting herself over
her peers, by flagrantly disobeying her superiors, including this Court, and by ignoring obvious boundaries that
should have kept her in check or reined her in.
On the other hand, the awards for outstanding performances as a professional and as a judge, far from accenting her
good qualities as a person, rather highlighted her unworthiness to remain on the Bench by showing that her
misconduct and general bad attitude as a member thereof has put the awards and recognitions in serious question.
Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and
special courts; and court officials who are lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the
disciplinary action of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches of conduct that have been
traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers.
In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a disciplinary action against
the respondent Justice, judge or court official concerned as a member of the Bar.
The respondent may forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and show cause why he should not
also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinarily sanctioned as a member of the Bar.
Judgment in both respects may be incorporated in one decision or resolution.
The Court does not take lightly the ramifications of Judge Yu's misbehavior and misconduct as a judicial officer. By
penalizing her with the supreme penalty of dismissal from the service, she should not anymore be allowed to remain
a member of the Law Profession.
However, this rule of fusing the dismissal of a Judge with disbarment does NOT in any way dispense with or
set aside the respondent's right to due process. As such, her disbarment as an offshoot of A.M. No. 02-9-02-
SC without requiring her to comment on the disbarment would be violative of her right to due process.
To accord due process to her, therefore, she should first be afforded the opportunity to defend her
professional standing as a lawyer before the Court would determine whether or not to disbar her.
gross misconduct, violation of the Lawyer's Oath, and willful disobedience of any lawful order by the Court
constitute grounds to disbar an attorney.
In the respondent's case, she was herein found to have committed all of these grounds for disbarment, warranting her
immediate disbarment as a consequence. (A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813)
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OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE

PROHIBITED ACTS – The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
INTERVENTION OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES
Any officer or employee in the civil service, except those holding political offices; who:
1) directly or indirectly,
2) intervenes in any election campaign or engages in any partisan political activity,
except to vote or to preserve public order, if he is a peace officer. (SECTION 261(i))
EFFECT ON RETIREMENT OF JUDGE

The fact that a judge has retired or has otherwise been separated from the service does not necessarily divest
the Court of its jurisdiction to determine the veracity of the allegations of the complaint, pursuant to its
disciplinary authority over members of the bench. (A.M. No. RTJ-01-1657)
JUDICIAL CLEMENCY -- is an act of mercy removing any disqualification from the erring judge.
(A.M. No. RTJ-09-2183)
NEW CLEMENCY GUIDELINES FOR REINSTATEMENT TO THE BAR

In fine, for the guidance of the Bench, the Bar, and the public, the new clemency guidelines for reinstatement to the
Bar are as follows:
1. A lawyer who has been disbarred CANNOT file a PETITION FOR JUDICIAL CLEMENCY within a period
of 5 years from the effective date of his or her disbarment, unless for the most compelling reasons based on
extraordinary circumstances, a shorter period is warranted.
2. Upon the lapse of the said 5 – year period, or earlier if so permitted by the SUPREME COURT, a
disbarred lawyer becomes eligible to file a VERIFIED PETITION FOR JUDICIAL CLEMENCY.
The petition, together with its supporting evidence appended thereto, must show on its face that the following
criteria have been met:
i. The petitioner has fully complied with the terms and conditions of all prior disciplinary orders,
including orders for restitution, as well as the 5 – year period to file, unless he or she seeks an earlier
filing for the most compelling reasons based on extraordinary circumstances;
ii. The petitioner recognizes the wrongfulness and seriousness of · the misconduct for which he or she was
disbarred.
For petitions already filed at the time of this Resolution, it is required that the petitioner show that he or
she genuinely attempted in good faith to reconcile with the wronged private offended party in the
case for which he or she was disbarred (if any), or if such is NOT possible, the petitioner must
explain with sufficient reasons as to why such attempt at reconciliation could NOT be made; and
iii. Notwithstanding the conduct for which the disbarred lawyer was disciplined, the disbarred lawyer has
the requisite integrity and competence to practice law.
3. Upon the filing of the verified petition for clemency, together with its attachments, the SUPREME COURT shall
first conduct a preliminary evaluation and determine if the same has prima facie merit based on the criteria
above-stated.
4. If the petition has prima facie merit based on the abovecriteria, the SUPREME COURT shall refer the
petition to the OFFICE OF THE BAR CONFIDANT (or any other fact-finding body the Court so designates)
in order to verify the details and the authenticity of the statements made and the evidence attached to the
clemency petition.
If the petition fails to show any prima facie merit, it should be denied.
5. After its investigation, the OFFICE OF THE BAR CONFIDANT (or such other fact-finding body
designated by the SUPREME COURT) shall submit its fact-finding report to the SUPREME COURT, which
shall ultimately resolve the clemency petition based on the facts established in the said report.

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The threshold of evidence to be applied is clear and convincing evidence since it is incumbent upon the
petitioner to hurdle the seriousness of his or her established past administrative liability/ies, the gravity of
which had warranted the supreme penalty of disbarment.
6. Unless otherwise resolved by the Court sitting En Banc, these guidelines and procedure shall apply to pending
petitions for judicial clemency, as well as to those filed after the promulgation of this Resolution. (A.C. No. 5054)
respondent judge’s act of sending several letters bearing his sala’s letterhead, in connection with an apparent
dispute in the administration of the estates of his relatives, clearly showed the judge’s intent to use the
prestige of his judicial office, and hence, violative of Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. (A.M. No. RTJ-
08-2139)
"Unless the acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill-will, bad faith, or deliberate
intent to do an injustice, the respondent judge may not be held administratively liable for gross misconduct,
ignorance of the law or incompetence of official acts in the exercise of judicial functions and duties,
particularly in the adjudication of cases."
Even granting that the respondent indeed erred in the exercise of her judicial functions, these are, at best, legal errors
correctible not by a disciplinary action, but by judicial remedies that are readily available to the complainant. "An
administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a
judge where a judicial remedy is available, such as a motion for reconsideration or an appeal." Errors committed by
him/her in the exercise of adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings but should
be assailed instead through judicial remedies. (A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200)
"It is an ironclad principle that a judge must NOT only be impartial; he or she must also appear to be
impartial.
Hence, the judge ‘must, at all times, maintain the appearance of fairness and impartiality. His language, both written
and spoken, must be guarded and measured, lest the best of intentions be misconstrued.’" (A.M. No. RTJ-00-1573)
The rationale advanced for the prohibition in Article 1491(5) is that public policy disallows the transactions in view
of the fiduciary relationship involved, i.e., the relation of trust and confidence and the peculiar control exercised by
these persons. It is founded on public policy because, by virtue of his office, an attorney may easily take advantage
of the credulity and ignorance of his client and unduly enrich himself at the expense of his client. x x x
Undeniably, Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code prohibits the purchase by lawyers of any interest in the subject matter
of the litigation in which they participated by reason of their profession.
Here, however, respondent lawyer was not the purchaser or buyer of the property or rights in litigation. For,
in point of fact, it was his son Julius, and not respondent lawyer, who purchased the subject property.
Were we to include within the purview of the law the members of the immediate family or relatives of the
lawyer laboring under disqualification, we would in effect be amending the law. (A.C. No. 8502)
Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial action, either in person
or through the mediation of another:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and employees
connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before
the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the
act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the
object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession [emphasis supplied].
The prohibition in the aforesaid Article applies only to the sale or assignment of the property which is the subject of
litigation to the persons disqualified therein. WE have already ruled that "... for the prohibition to operate, the
sale or assignment of the property must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the
property" (A.M. No. 133-J)
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Part Ii (Legal and Judicial Ethics - Remedial Law)

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Part Ii (Legal and Judicial Ethics - Remedial Law)

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PART II (LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS – REMEDIAL LAW)

BAR -- the whole body of attorneys and body of judges.

FOUR FOLD DUTIES OF A LAWYER

2) DUTIES TO LEGAL PROFESSION;

3) DUTIES TO THE COURTS; AND

4) DUTIES TO THEIR CLIENTS

REQUIREMENTS FOR ALL APPLICANTS FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR

WHO MAY PRACTICE LAW

By: Caffeinated Wisdom

RIGHT TO PRACTICE LAW IS A PRIVILEGE

By: Caffeinated Wisdom

The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict.

LAWYERS EMPLOYED IN THE GOVERNMENT

NATURE OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW

2) It CANNOT be assigned or inherited. (B.M. NO. 553)

3) It is a profession and NOT a business. (A.C. NO. 10164)

The gaining of a livelihood is not a professional but a secondary consideration.

4) It is burdened with conditions.

CRITERIA FOR THE PRACTICE OF LAW (CHAR)

3) APPLICATION OF LAW, LEGAL PRINCIPLE, PRACTICE OR PROCEDURE WHICH CALLS FOR

4) ATTORNEY – CLIENT RELATIONSHIP

It is NOT necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged;

CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES

FORMER FILIPINO LAWYER REACQUIRES CITIZENSHIP

4. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;

REQUIREMENTS FOR A LICENSE OR PERMIT TO ENGAGE IN LAW PRACTICE

FAILURE TO SIGN ROLLS OF ATTORNEY

INDIRET CONTEMPT TO BE PUNISHED AFTER CHARGE AND HEARING FOR AUTHORIZED

REQUIREMENTS FOR ALL APPLICANTS FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR

ESSENCE OF GOOD MORAL CHARACTER

ADMISSION AND OATH OF SUCCESSFUL APPLICANTS

By: Caffeinated Wisdom

SIGNIFICANCE OF LAWYER’S OATH

ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR OTHER APPLICANTS

USING THE APPELLATION ATTORNEY

The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who:

By: Caffeinated Wisdom

DIRECT CONTEMPT PUNISHED SUMMARILY

PUNISHMENT FOR DIRECT CONTEPT

PRESUMPTION OF AUTHORITY OF ATTORNEY TO APPEAR

EFFECTS OF AN UNAUTHORIZED APPEARANCE;

ATTORNEY WHO APPEARS IN LOWER COURT PRESUMED TO REPRESENT CLIENT ON APPEAL

AUTHORITY OF ATTORNEYS TO BIND CLIENTS

3) AUTHORITY TO DISMISS A CASE

LIMITATION OF AUTHORITY OF ATTORNEYS TO BIND CLIENTS

COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY IN LAW FIRM PRACTICIONERS

SIGNATURE AND ADDRESS

OBLIGATORY FORCE OF CONTRACTS

COMPENSATION OF ATTORNEYS / QUANTUM MERUIT (as much as he deserves)

COMPENSATION OF ATTORNEYS / QUANTUM MERUIT (as much as he deserves)

NON – LAWYERS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES

UNLAWFUL RETENTION OF CLIENT’S FUNDS

EXPRESS CONTRACT IN CONTINGENT FEE

By: Caffeinated Wisdom

KINDS OF ATTORNEY’S LIEN

RETAINING LIEN CHARGING LIEN

RETAINING LIEN CHARGING LIEN

PROPERTY TO WHICH CHARGING LIEN ATTACHES

By: Caffeinated Wisdom

KINDS OF ATTORNEY’S FEES:

ORDINARY ATTORNEY’S FEES EXTRAORDINARY ATTORNEY’S FEES

LIABILITY FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND EXPENSES OF LITIGATION

OBLIGATION CONSISTS IN THE PAYMENT OF A SUM OF MONEY