Cultural Rules and Material Relations

Author(s): Douglas V. Porpora

Source: Sociological Theory, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Jul., 1993), pp. 212-229
Published by: American Sociological Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/202143
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 Cultural Rules and Material Relations*
DOUGLAS V. PORPORA
Drexel University

This paper attempts to synthesize the Winchianstress on constitutiverules with the

Marxian stress on material relationships by developing the concept of emergently
material social relations. Such relationships, it is argued, arise from the constitutive
rules that constitute a group's way of life. Although such relationships thus are
derivativefrom the conscious rule-followingbehaviorof actors, neverthelessthey have
an objective existence independentof actors' specific awareness.
It is argued that such material relations are an importantmechanismbeyond the
cultural rules throughwhich our behavior is constrained, enabled, and motivated. Yet
the Winchiantraditionin general and contemporarystructurationtheory in particular
have tended to peripheralize the notion of material relations, treating them largely as
epiphenomenal abstractions. This, it is argued, is a mistake and the source of an
importantlacuna in structurationtheory. In particular, because structurationtheory
decenters the actor, conflates the distinctionbetween regulativeand constitutiverules,
and peripheralizessocial relations, it lacks an adequate explanationof motivation, as
symptomizedby its inordinate appeal to the unconscious. The concept of emergently
material social relations overcomes this problem and offers a reintegration of the
Marxianand the Winchiantraditions.

In this paper I attempt to synthesize a Winchian stress on cultural rules with a traditional
Marxian stress on material relations. Whereas Winch (1958) argued that actors' collective
self-understanding of what they are doing must be the starting point of any social analysis,
certain traditional readings of Marx have always maintained that the proper starting point
of analysis must be the objective or material conditions in which actors are situated.
This paper offers a synthesis of these seemingly opposed views by emphasizing two
distinctions. The first distinction is between context and behavior. Both the Winchian and
the Marxian views tend to agree that social behavior must be explained in terms of its
context. They disagree, however, on the nature of that context. Whereas Winch stressed
the cultural context created by constitutive rules, the relevant Marxian tradition emphasizes
the material context created by objective social structural relations. I will argue here that
a more complete context for explaining behavior involves both constitutive rules and
material relations, and that this context analytically precedes actors' further self-under-
standing of and behavior in their situation. Actually I propose a dialectical process that
augments Giddens's "stratification model" of action such that the material and cultural
context is both the "condition" and the outcome of social behavior.
Second, I will establish the need to distinguish three different analytical moments: the
* I would like to thankthe'following people for their helpful comments on previous draftsof this paper:Orly
Benjamin, Ira Cohen, David Kutzik, Anthony Monteiro, Julie Mostov, EdwardReed, Victor Roudometof and
David Rubinstein.One anonymousreviewer providedunusuallyconstructivecomments, and his or her influence
is evident in the way the argumentis now cast. Finally, I owe a debt of gratitudeto Alan Sica for shepherding
what is admittedlya controversialpaper throughmultiple reviews and revisions.
1
By "dialectical"I do not mean anything particularlyobscure but only a process, much like a dialogue, in
which various elements affect each other in an ongoing way over time. This sort of process already is entailed
by Giddens's stratificationmodel of action. I argue here, however, that one importantelement has been left out
of the stratificationmodel, namely materialrelations.

Sociological Theory 11:2 July 1993

? AmericanSociological Association. 1722 N Street NW, Washington,DC 20036
CULTURALRULES AND MATERIALRELATIONS 213

culturally produced constitutive rules, the emergentlymaterial social relations to which

those rules give rise, and the situated behavior and self-understandingof actors operating
within those rules and relations. The relationshipsbetween these three moments are truly
dialectical. Although emergently material social relations are generatedby culturalcon-
stitutiverules, those relationsindependentlyaffect the ways in which situatedactors think
and act. In particular,the social relations generatedby the constitutiverules may differ-
entially benefit and empower certain actors, who thereby are motivated and enabled to
maintainor change the rules. Thus, if we ask why the rules are what they are, we must
examine the materialrelations generatedby the currentor past rules.2
Today the most prominent perspective within the Winchian tradition is Giddens's
structurationtheory;this theory now has become widely influentialamong social theorists,
if not among sociologists as a whole.3 Structurationtheory is at least neo-Winchianin its
heavy emphasis on rules and (as I will argue) in its almost complete peripheralizationof
the causal influence of social relations. In structurationtheory, social relationsare desig-
nated by the category "social system" and appear largely as epiphenomenaof ongoing
human behavior. Giddens (1979: 64) himself admits that "social structure"traditionally
has referredto patternsof objective, social relations, but "structure"in structurationtheory
now refers to rules and resources. This change has been disturbingto Marxiansociologists
(e.g., Callinicos 1985; Wright 1983), but no concerted effort has been made to reclaim
the originalmeaningof social structurewith a sustaineddefense of the emergentmateriality
of social relations.
Such a defense is the underlying purpose of this paper. A major question currently
confrontingsocial theoristsis "whatis living and what is dead in the classical sociological
tradition"(Turner 1992). Under the sway of the Winchian traditionin general and of
structurationtheory in particular,many social theoriststoday take for grantedthat one of
the dead items is the Marxiannotion of materialrelations, which collectively used to be
what was meant by "social structure."In this paper, however, I argue that there is a
coherent and defensible sense in which the social relations identified by Marx may be
consideredmaterial, that these materialrelations are socially consequential,and therefore
that they cannot be left out of account without major analyticalloss. This does not mean
that we should abandon the insights of the Winchian traditionand returnto a reductive
materialism. Instead I will show that the Marxian concept of material relations can be
recoveredthrougha synthesis with the Winchiantraditionratherthan througha rejection
of that tradition.Thus we may preserve Winch's insights as well as Marx's.
To achieve a synthesis of the Marxianand the Winchianviews, I will argue, a number
of fundamentalchanges must be made in structurationtheory.First, the distinctionbetween
constitutive and regulative rules, which structurationtheory now conflates, must be re-
stored. Second, social relations, which currently appear in structurationtheory as a
dependentvariable only, must be reintroducedinto the dialectic that structurationtheory
2
Clearly, others before me have stressed the importanceof situated self-understandingand of culture. After
all, this is largely the point of much of the vast literatureassociated with symbolic interactionismand even
functionalism. Here I am trying to examine how situated self-understandinginterrelateswith the notion of
materialrelations found in the Marxiantraditionand with constitutiverules, one specific aspect of culture that
is not addressed much by symbolic interactionismor functionalism or, for that matter, by social theory in
general. In fact, because structurationtheory, the one contemporaryapproachthat does address constitutive
rules, currentlyconflates them with regulativerules, one point of this paper is to recover the distinction.
Likewise I am not claiming any uniqueness in speaking of emergent propertiesper se. The original element
is this paper's demonstrationthat the materialrelations upheld by the Marxiantraditionactually emerge from
the constitutive rules upheld by the Winchian tradition.
3 Although Bourdieu coined the term "structuration" before Giddens and although Bourdieu himself may be
considered a structurationtheorist, the designation "structurationtheory" has come to be associated with
Giddens's work. Consequently, like Ira Cohen (1989), I have only Giddens's theory in mind when I refer to
structurationtheory.
214 SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY
identifiesbetween culturalrules and materialbehavior.Finally,the actormustbe recentered
along with the concepts of motivation and interest.
The argumentitself will proceed in a dialecticalfashion, moving from two flawed, one-
sided views to a fuller synthesis. First I will presentone traditionalbut flawed reading of
Marx, with an account of the materialityof social relations. That will be followed by the
Winchiancritiqueand a summarystatementof structurationtheory. Then I will show that
structurationtheory itself contains an importantlacuna that must be filled with a stronger
account of social relations. In the next section of the paper, I will attemptto fashion the
proposed synthesis with a more sophisticated renderingof the Marxian conception of
social relations as emergently material phenomena. Finally I will address the issue of
objective interests implicit in the account of materialrelations.

A TRADITIONALMARXIAN CONCEPTIONOF MATERIALRELATIONS

As noted previously, a majorpurpose of this paper is to recover the Marxianconception
of social structureas material relations. That project raises two immediate questions: Is
such a conception to be found in the varied accounts of Marxiantheory? If so, can one
defend the sense in which certain social relationsare consideredmaterial?In this section
I arguethat the conception of social structureas materialrelationsis an importantelement
in the Marxian traditionand that the sense of materialityassociated with such relations
is, indeed, defensible. This does not mean thatthe materialisttraditionin Marxianthought
is entirely immune to criticism. In fact, as will be seen, I will admit that the traditional
materialistposition presentedin this section is vulnerableto a criticism effectively raised
by the Winchian tradition. In subsequentsections I hope to show that this criticism can
be addressed, that the concept of material relations thereby can be recovered, and that
something importantis lost if we do not recover it.
In at least one importantMarxian tradition, "social structure"refers to the patternof
social relations and particularlyto the patternof relationsof production.For this tradition,
passages such as the following, taken from Marx's Preface to the Critique of Political
Economy, are programmatic:

In the social productionof theirlife, men enterinto definiterelationsthatare indispens-

able and independentof theirwill, relationsof productionwhichcorrespondto a definite
stageof developmentof theirmaterialproductiveforces. The sumtotalof these relations
of productionconstitutesthe economicstructure,the real basis, on which arises a legal
and politicalsuperstructure (1988, p. 389).

Although the relations of productionspecifically constitute the economic structureof

society, by extension "social structure"encompasses any patternof social relations gen-
eratedby actors' behavior.Thus we could speak of the structureof a religious organization,
even though it might not be an economic institution.As GerryCohen (1978) argues, this
conception of structureis consistent with its general usage.

Considersome othercases: the structureof an argumentand the structureof a bridge.

The structureof an argumentis given by the relationsbetweenits constituentstatements,
of a bridgeby the relationsbetweenits constituentgirders,spans, etc. (p. 36).

In all cases, "structure"refers to a patternof relationships.

Cohen goes on to argue that social structureis a form, whereas the partsrelatedby the
structure(people or physical means of production)are the content, and that the content
CULTURALRULES AND MATERIALRELATIONS 215
consists of natural things, whereas the structureor form is social. In this way Cohen
makes a distinctionbetween the naturaland the social. This distinctionis valid, but there
is also a Marxiantraditionthat regardsthe social form-the patternof relations-as also
material,if not natural.Because I wish to defend that tradition,let us examine what might
be meant by "materiality."
The materialmay refer to that which 1) has an existence independentof consciousness;
2) has causal effects independentof consciousness;and 3) obeys physical laws. According
to the Marxian tradition I have in mind, social structuralrelations are not material in
Sense 3, but only in Senses 1 and 2.
Sense 1 needs clarification. It refers to what has objective existence or existence
independentof our subjectiveawareness.Epistemologicallyit mightbe arguedthatnothing
is objective, that we apprehendthe world only throughour concepts. That is so, but the
point is ontological ratherthan epistemological. Althoughepistemologicallywe apprehend
the world only through concepts of our own making, ontologically we still make a
distinction between those things which, in our conception, exist independent of our
consciousness and those which do not. Presumablywe are all still sufficiently materialist
to believe that the material universe, however we conceptualize it, existed before we
arrivedon the scene. In this sense the universehas an objective existence even if we have
no objective conception of it.
Sense 2 also needs clarification.It implies that a materialthing will exert a causal effect
whetheror not actors are aware of it, but not that the causal effect necessarily will be the
same in both cases. Throughtheir awareness,actorsby theiractions may modify, mitigate,
or neutralizethe effect, but then that awareness and those actions themselves are effects
that were producedcausally by the thing in question. If I am unawareof a ditch, I may
trip and fall; this is one causal effect of the ditch. If I am aware of the ditch, however, I
will walk aroundit, in which case it has had another,but different, causal effect.
Lenin is one exponent of the Marxiantraditionthat regardssocial structuralrelations
as materialin Senses 1 and 2, but one hardlyneed be a Leninistto belong to that tradition.
Whateverone thinks of Lenin, his distinctionbetween material and ideological relations
is analytically important.According to Lenin (1970, p. 14), ideological social relations
are "such as, before taking shape, pass throughman's consciousness," whereas material
social relations are "those that take shape without passing throughman's consciousness:
when exchanging productsmen enter into productionrelationswithout even realizing that
there is a social relation of productionhere." As the quotes imply and as Lenin goes on
to make explicit, relationsof productionare materialrelationsin the sense that they exist
and are consequential, whetheror not actors are aware of those relations.
It is true that Lenin sometimes wrote as if he subscribedto a nomothetic account of
causality, which would suggest that he also believed that relations of production are
material in Sense 3. In such a case, Lenin's notion of materialitywould coincide with
that of the holist Durkheimiantraditionnow representedby (among others) Peter Blau,
Bruce Mayhew, and JonathanTurner.Even in that case, however, an importantdistinction
still separatesthe Durkheimianholist and the Marxiantraditions,and that concerns their
conceptions of social structure.
According to the holist Durkheimiantradition, social structurerefers to lawlike rela-
tionships among social facts, which operate over actors' heads independentof human
agency. In contrast, accordingto the Marxiantradition,social structurerefers to human-
not nomothetic-relations among categories of people, relations such as competition,
exploitation,domination, and cooperation.4Thus, in the Marxiantradition,social structure

4 By "nomothetic relations" I mean the natural lawlike relations that structuralsociologists in the holist
216 SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY
resides not over people's heads but in their midst. As a result, social structuralrelations
always are modifiedby humanagents. Consequentlya dialecticalinterplayexists between
structureand agency in the Marxiantradition,which is absentfrom the holist Durkheimian
tradition. This distinction often is missed by Winchian sociologists, who mistakenly
believe that what counts against objective social structurein the Durkheimiantradition
counts equally against objective social structurein the Marxiantradition.
In one area the two traditionsare equally vulnerable.Whereasthe holist Durkheimian
tradition is strongly committed to a positivist understandingof causality as involving
nomothetic regularities, traces of such positivism still sometimes can be found in the
Marxian tradition as well (e.g., see Gerry Cohen 1978). As mentioned above, Lenin
himself seemed to subscribeto the nomotheticview of causality.WhateverLenin believed,
however, this paper rejects the covering law model of explanationand takes the realist
position (see Bhaskar 1979; Harreand Madden 1975; Manicas and Secord 1983; Porpora
1989) that causality is not to be equated with lawlike event regularities.In particular,the
causal effects of social structureon human agents must be explored in a narrativerather
than a nomothetic fashion that takes due account of the nonlawlike relations between
actors' reasons and their actions.5 Thus Sense 3 of materiality,cited above, is not being
applied at all to social relations;this fact makes even sharperthe distinctionbetween the
holist Durkheimianposition and the Marxianaccount defended here.
We now need to explore more fully what Lenin means by the distinction between
material and ideological relations. By the ideological, Lenin means the cultural. In turn
the cultural is understoodnarrowly here as the intersubjective-that is, the domain of
sharedconsciousness as opposed to the purely subjective, which refers to the domain of
individual consciousness. Rules in this sense are cultural or intersubjectiveratherthan
material. Rules exist only insofar as they exist in the shared discursive or practical
consciousness of the actors who conform to them. If there are no longer any actors who
are collectively aware of a rule system at some level of their consciousness, that rule
system ceases to exist. In contrast, Lenin wants to say that social relationsof production
can exist even if there is nobody who is aware of them. In this sense these relations are
concept-independentor material.
Lenin also wants to say that some relationshipsare not materialbut concept-dependent,
and thus are bound up with culturalideas. As Bhaskar(1979, pp. 48-49) expressed this
point more recently, such relationships"do not exist independentlyof the agents' concep-
tions of what they are doing in their activity." A marriagerelationship, for example,
cannotreally be said to exist unless the actorsinvolved possess some concept of marriage,
some concept of a husband, and some concept of a wife.

Durkheimiantraditionconsider to be constitutiveof social structure-that is, lawlike "if-then"relations among

social facts. An example would be "If a group's size increases, then the group's differentiationwill increase."
These lawlike relations are supposed to exist over the heads of humanactors. In contrast,by "humanrelations"
I mean the relations that characterizeinteractionamong humanagents, which are distinctly not conceptualized
as laws. For example, competitionis a relationshipamong humanagents that does not have an "if-then,"lawlike
form. I have discussed this distinctionelsewhere at length (Porpora1987).
5 Despite Bhaskar's (1979) seminal work, the realist view of causality is little known among American
sociological theorists. In contrastto the positivist view, realistshold thatcausalityhas little to do with nomothetic
laws of the "if-then"form that specify invariantrelationsamong events. Instead"causality"refers to capacities,
tendencies, and forces, all of which can be counteracted.Gravity,for example, is a causal force, but its effects
can be counteractedin a variety of ways. Similarly, a reason can be a cause of behavior, but it too may be
counteractedor modified by other reasons so that no specific behaviorinvariablyderives from it.
In the real world outside the laboratory,multiple, counteractingcausal mechanismsoperate simultaneously,
and human agents specifically do not behave in lawlike ways. Thereforeit is unlikely that the nomothetic laws
sought by positivist researcherswill ever be found. Instead causal accounts in the real world more generally
must take the form of a historical narrativein which the unique effects of causal conjuncturesare described.
Again, I have discussed more fully elsewhere the relations among agency, structuralcausality, and narrative
explanation(Porpora1987, pp. 87-104).
CULTURALRULES AND MATERIALRELATIONS 217

Thus, whereas actors must possess certain concepts pertainingto marriageif the rela-
tionship of marriageis to exist, Lenin is suggesting that class relations(for example) can
exist even if the actorsinvolved do not possess any conceptspertainingto class. According
to Lenin, the formertype of relationshipis ideological; the latteris material.
This materialist understandingof the relations of productionis not confined to the
Leninist school. We have evidence that Marx and even contemporarythinkers such as
GerryCohen (1978), Wright (1985), and Callinicos (1985) subscribeto it as well. Marx,
for example, made a distinction between a class in itself and a class for itself, which
certainlyimplies an objective existence to class structureindependentof actors' awareness.
Cohen upholdsthis distinctionand even spends a numberof pages attackingE.P. Thomp-
son's overvoluntaristicconceptionof class, accordingto which, classes exist only insofar
as actors behave in class ways. Wright (1985) explicitly accepts a notion of objective
interests, which again may exist independentof actors' awareness.
In all cases, social structuralrelationsare understoodto be materialnot only in Sense
1-in terms of their objective existence-but in Sense 2 as well. That is, they are also
understoodto be socially consequential,not merely abstractforms ascribedby observers.
Materialrelationships,as Giddens says of rules, are both enablingand constraining.They
create a field of opportunities, predicaments, constraints, and resources. In addition,
however, they have a quality that Giddens does not ascribeto rules: they are motivating.
Positions within social structuralrelations are thought to contain built-in objective
interests, which become distinct motives for action insofar as actors are aware of them.
The relationshipof competitionamong capitalists, for example, motivates them to maxi-
mize profit. Similarly, the competitionamong workersmotivatesthem to pursuethe kind
of credentialismcited by Collins (1979). Social relations consequently shape both the
thoughtand the action of the actors enmeshed in them; therefore, accordingto historical
materialism,social relations, together with the physical environment,form the material
context in terms of which all analysis should begin. This is largely what historical
materialismmeans by the primacyof the materialover the cultural.
The Marxian primacy thesis has a weak point, not only in what is termed vulgar
Marxismbut also in the standardbase/superstructure model (e.g., see GerryCohen 1978,
pp. 232-36): it assumes that material social relations are conceptually independentof
culturalcategories. If it turnsout (as we will see it does) that materialsocial relations are
generated by cultural constitutive rules and thus are ontologically dependent on those
rules, then the material cannot be assigned primacy in an unqualified way. A more
dialecticalunderstandingis required.

OF MATERIALRELATIONS
THE WINCHIANPERIPHERALIZATION
Followers of the Winchian tradition, I argue here, have made a convincing case that at
least at some level, actors' self-understandingof what they are doing is ontologically prior
to the material relations generated by their behavior. Thus, in contrast to the Marxian
primacythesis, culturemust conceptuallyprecede materialstructureat some level. At the
same time, I argue, the Winchiantraditionultimatelyhas tended to peripheralizematerial
relationsaltogether.
Winch (1958) demonstratedthat we cannot even identify an actor's action without
simultaneously identifying the actor's intentions. The reason is that one and the same
behavior may constitute two different actions, depending on the actor's intentions. For
example, by putting her arm out the window in an L shape, the driver of a car may be
either signaling a right turnto the driverbehind her or waving to a friendon the sidewalk.
Thus, even to identify the action, one must take into account the actor's intention.
218 SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY
Winch furtherarguedalong post-Wittgensteinianlines that the actor's intentionis based
on the meaning of the act for that actor, and that this in turn depends on the social rules
to which the actor is conforming. Here Winch was referringto constitutiveratherthan
regulativerules; this distinctionis important.Regulativerules merely regulateour actions,
telling us, for example, where we can or cannot smoke. In contrast, constitutive rules
actually create new actions. One cannot meaningfully signal a turn, greet a friend, or
checkmatea king without the existence of constitutiverules specifying that certainbehav-
iors count as specific actions in certain contexts. All communicationis based on consti-
tutive rules. Language itself is a body of constitutive rules that tell us to regard certain
sounds as meaningfulwords and sentences.
Context is as importantto the Winchian traditionas to the Marxiantradition,although
for the Winchiantradition,the context is specified by the constitutiverules. Many actions
can take place only in the appropriatecontext. No matterwhat one does with one's arm,
for example, one cannot signal a right turn while sitting in one's living room. Thus even
the Winchian traditionpresumes that before situatedbehaviorcan be explained, we must
analyticallyappreciatethe context in which it occurs.
On the otherhand, counterto the Marxianprimacythesis, Winch statesthatour behavior
counts as meaningfulaction only insofaras it is governedby culturallysharedconstitutive
rules. Indeed, the meaning of the behavioris identifiedwith the constitutiverule to which
the behavior conforms (signaling, greeting, checkmating, marrying).Because we cannot
even identify the actors' actions without reference to the constitutive rules they are
following, our first necessary analytic step is to identify those rules. Rules are cultural
rather than material; therefore the cultural must take conceptual precedence over the
material.
This point has been made even more forcefully by subsequentscholarsin the Winchian
tradition.They point out thatwhetheror not propertyrelationscan be consideredmaterial,
they would not exist without prior constitutive rules of propertyownership. Rubinstein
puts this point most succinctly:

For one, it is difficultto see how some of Marx's basic economic categoriescan be
establishedindependentlyof the beliefs of social members.For example, Marxclaims
that law is an elementof the superstructure, i.e., it is somehowprecipitatedout of and
merely reflectsthe more basic 'relationsof production' . . . But if capitalismis priorto
and controllingof formallaw it cannotbe priorto all elementsof cultureor 'conscious-
ness.' Unless we would believe that ownershipand otherbasic categoriesof a specific
economic system are in some sense naturalfacts, it must be recognizedthat capitalist
institutionsinvolveculturalconventions,i.e., ideasin society.It is impossibleto describe
capitalismapartfrom such categoriesas ownership,sale, rights,andcontracts,andthus
it is not possible to speak of capitalistrelationsof productionapartfrom eitherformal
or informallegal systems(Rubinstein1981, p. 56).

Rubinstein'spoint is not only well taken;one almost might say it is decisive. It is not,
as Gerry Cohen (1978, pp. 232-34) suggests, that relations of productionexist on their
own, relying on culturalcategories only for ex post facto supportor legitimation.Whether
or not relations of production can exist without actors' awareness, certainly they are
generated by culturally developed constitutive rules and thus derive from those rules,
which create the very possibility of distinctive kinds of economic transactions.Thus, at
least ontologically, culture must precede materialrelations. Actually, Marxists also must
recognize this at some level because their goal is to change the rules of propertyownership
in order to eliminate the adverse propertyrelationsto which those rules give rise.
CULTURALRULES AND MATERIALRELATIONS 219

Unfortunatelythe Winchiantraditionhas moved from the insight that materialrelations

are generated by constitutive rules to the complete denial of materialrelations. Instead
patternsof social relationshipsare considered to be abstractforms generatedby actors'
behavior, with no social consequences of their own. That is the case, for example, in
Giddens's structurationtheory, now probablythe most influentialtheory within the Win-
chian tradition.
In structurationtheory, structureno longer even refers to patternsof relations but to
rules and resources. Patterns of relations instead are subsumed under the category of
systems. This move is more than a name change: throughoutGiddens's work, systems
figure only as dependent variables, never even as interveningvariables with their own
causal effects. The system in structurationtheory is largely an epiphenomenon.
Space prevents an exegetical defense of the above assertions. They can be defended,
however, in a more expeditious way. Ira Cohen's (1989) StructurationTheoryrepresents
a sympathetic systematizationof Giddens's work, undertakenin a series that Giddens
himself edits. In its own right, Cohen's work representsan importantstatementof struc-
turationtheory; if I confine myself to the summaryremarkscontained there, perhaps I
cannot be accused of misrepresentingthe theory.
Ira Cohen (1989, p. 93) argues that "structurationtheory postulatesno emergentprop-
erties for patterns of interaction,"by which he means powers to constrain, enable, or
otherwise influence action. He devotes an entire chapterto the critique of what he calls
the "latter-daymorphologists,"who, he maintains, "elevate formal patternsof positions
and relationshipsto a pre-eminentposition in their views on the constitutionof social life"
(p. 58). In the course of thatcritique, Cohen makes very clear thatfor structurationtheory,
patternsof relationships-and presumablyrelationshipsthemselves-are merely abstrac-
tions with no causal efficacy.

To be very clear aboutthis, morphologicalstructuremost certainlyis representedin an

abstractmanner.. . . But to endow morphologicalstructurewith the powerto constrain
or channelsocial actionor relationshipsis to suggestthatit maintainsa statusapartfrom
the activitiesthatare subjectto its influence..... It is invalidto speakof an orderliness
abstractedfrombehavioras guidingbehavior,exercisingpressure,or resistingthe impact
of change because abstractmodels of orderhave no concreteefficacy to producereal
consequencesin social life (I. Cohen 1989, pp. 71-72).

Here Cohen is thinking principallyof the positivist morphologistsin the Durkheimian

tradition.He is warningexplicitly against the Durkheimianholist view that morphological
social facts take on an emergentlife of their own independentof actors' behavior.This is
one of those cases, however, in which something that counts against the Durkheimian
traditiondoes not count against the Marxiantradition.It is a non sequiturto say, as Cohen
does, that to attributeemergent properties of constraintto social relations necessarily
implies a status apartfrom the activities that give rise to them. The Marxiantraditionis
perfectly able to admit that although relations affect actors' behavior, in turn they are
affected and reproducedby that behaviorin a dialectical fashion.
In one place Ira Cohen starts to talk about relationshipsin just the mannerthat struc-
turationtheory is supposedto oppose. Thatplace is not time-spacedistantiation.Although
structurationtheory has a great deal to say aboutthe reproductionof social systems across
time and space, the system itself and the relationshipsit encompasses exert no causal
effects. The system is still merely a reproducedepiphenomenon.6
6
Partisansof structurationtheory who are less careful with the theory than I am trying to be here may protest
220 SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY
The one place where relationshipsenter structurationtheory as anythingmore than an
abstractionis the place where power and resources are concerned. Resources enter struc-
turationtheory through rules of allocation and authorization.The proximally important
element, however, is not these rules but the relationshipsof controlover people and things
that these rules create. What we want to know about rules of allocation and authorization
is how much control they give to those empowered by them. That control varies with
differentrules of allocation and authorization.Thus, however much control is a function
of rules, control is nevertheless something analyticallydistinct and somethingconsequen-
tial. That something is a relationship, a relationshipthat is fundamentalto why rules of
allocation and authorizationmatter.
The independentefficacy of relationshipsalso becomes apparentin the case of coercion.
Rules of allocation may make workers dependenton capitalists for jobs, but that depen-
dency itself is neither a behaviornor a rule. There are no rules saying that workersare to
depend on capitalists for their livelihood. Such dependency is a relationship. This rela-
tionship, to be sure, is a consequence of rules of allocation, but it is a consequence that
itself has consequences. It enables the capitalist to coerce the worker into submittingto
(among other things) the rules of authorizationthat obtain at the job site.
Insofaras all of this is admittedby structurationtheory, a problemarises: structuration
theory cannot have it both ways. It cannot maintainthat relationshipsare simply abstrac-
tions with no causal efficacy while simultaneouslyalludingto the causal effects of relations
of control and dependence. Materialrelationsneed to be reintroduced.7

FURTHERPROBLEMSWITH STRUCTURATIONTHEORY
Furtherproblems with structurationtheory likewise indicate the need for a fuller account
of materialrelations. Again, as much as possible, I addressmyself to structurationtheory
as presentedsystematicallyby Ira Cohen.
As Cohen (1989, p. 237) notes in passing, Giddens (1979, pp. 66-67) explicitly
conflates the distinction between constitutive and regulative rules, arguing that all rules
have both constitutive and regulative aspects. Giddens has a point, but it is overstated.
His point is that regulativerules create actions of conformityand deviance, whereas there
may be implied regulationsrequiringconformityto constitutiverules. As true as this may
be, regulativerules do not create entire fields of novel actions, as do the constitutiverules
of (say) chess, language, and the market. Constitutiverules, on the other hand, can be

at this point. Does not Giddens refer to "unacknowledgedconditionsof action,"to constraint,to a "stratification
model of action"?How, then, can I claim that materialsocial relationsare peripheralizedby structurationtheory?
The problem is that people often do not read Giddens carefully;they tend to see in structurationtheory what is
not actually there but what they have broughtto the theorythemselves. Of course Giddens speaks of unacknow-
ledged conditions of action; it is part of his stratificationmodel. The unacknowledgedconditions of action to
which Giddensrefers, however, are specificallyrules and resources-and specificallynot social relations,contrary
to what many people think.
Giddens's stratificationmodel relates humanaction to rules and resourcesthroughunacknowledgedconditions
of action and unintendedconsequences. The stratificationmodel, however, does not refer at all to social relations,
which fall underGiddens's category of the social system and which are not partof the stratificationmodel. That
is my point. Social relations themselves need to be reintegrated.So far, if Giddens speaks of constraintand
enablementby structure,this constraintand this enablementare provided by structureconceptualizedas rules
and resources, not as social relations. Thus my complaintis not that Giddens does not speak of enablementand
constraint,but that he does not speak of them as an effect of social relations as well as of rules and resources.
7 Again, to avoid possible misunderstanding,let me be especially clear here. I acknowledge that Giddens
speaks of the unequal distribution of allocative and authoritativeresources. I am saying that the unequal
distributionof these resources gives rise to relationshipsof control and dependency;if it is admittedthat such
relationshipshave importantconsequences of their own, then it cannot be (as structurationtheory maintains)
that relationshipsare without their own causal effects. Thus, even in its own terms, when structurationtheory
begins to speak of inequality, it begins to contradictits own central principles. Such theoreticalinconsistency,
I argue, already constitutes grounds for questioningthose principles.
CULTURALRULES AND MATERIALRELATIONS 221
violated without sanctions. An improperlydrawnwill does not necessarilybringany social
sanctions, but only social consequences, namely that the document does not count as a
will.
Giddens's conflation of constitutive and regulative rules leads to a highly misleading
treatmentof routines. In structurationtheory, "routine"often implies that rule following
involves only repetitiveconformityto a prescribedbehavior.For thatreason, structuration
theory can maintain "that many social practices in day-to-day behavior are performed
without being directly motivated"(I. Cohen 1989, p. 51). According to Giddens (1984,
p. 6; I. Cohen 1989, p. 52), "Motives tend to have a direct purchaseon action only in
relatively unusual circumstances,situationswhich in some way breakwith routines ....
Much of our day-to-day conduct is not directly motivated."In one passage Cohen elab-
orates on this point at length:

Accordingto Giddens,it is often the case thatlarge areasof social life are not directly
motivated (Central Problems in Social Theory, pp. 59, 218). Agents, of course, tacitly
know what they are doing, they also tacitly recognizeat least some of the outcomes
engenderedby their conduct, and they can give reasonsfor theirconductupon request
(TheConstitutionof Society,p. 6). Nevertheless,in routinesituations(whichspecifically
excludesstarkand dramaticcircumstancessuch as thosein which suicidemay appearto
the agent as an availableoption) agents may maintainnothingmore than generalized
motivationto the integrationof their conventionalpracticesduringthe course of their
day-to-dayroutines.This motive is groundedin an unconsciousneed to maintain"onto-
logical security"(1989, p. 226).

This statementpresents two problems. In the first place, as we have seen, we do not
even know what action an actor is performingunless we know the actor's intention. If an
actor has an intention, then that actor also has a motive (Lyons 1976). Thus, unlike a
knee jerk or a sneeze, even the most habitualor routine action is motivated (Davidson
1971).
Second, Giddens's formulationmakes sense only if rule following is understoodpri-
marily in terms of regulative rules, whereby actors need make no decision but to repeti-
tively follow some prescribedbehavior.It makes less sense if we think primarilyin terms
of constitutiverules, whereby a whole field of alternativeactions is opened up and among
which motivateddecisions routinely must be made. .
Think of a chess game. It could be said that any proper move in a game of chess is
routine in the sense that it conforms to the constitutiverules. Then, however, in the very
midst of routine action, every move presumablyis motivated. Are we to say ratherthat
the routine moves in a game of chess are all motivated unconsciously by the need to
maintainontological security?Clearly not. Yet the same considerationsapply to everyday
life. We routinely make motivated decisions within the frameworksestablished by our
constitutiverules: What and where do we buy? Do we take the train or the bus? Do we
talk back to the boss or keep our silence? For whom do we vote? Only by forgetting
Goffman almost entirely or by reading him very tendentiouslycan we imagine that our
routines are not filled with strategic, managed, and hence motivatedbehavior.
The problem becomes apparentwhen we restore the distinction between constitutive
and regulative rules. Constitutiverules do not prescribebehaviors that can be followed
mindlessly: they endow an arrayof alternativebehaviors with meanings and social con-
sequences, among which we are variously motivated to choose. Consequently it also
becomes apparentthat the subjectcannot be "decentered,"as in structurationtheory. That
just leaves unexplainedtoo much of what goes on in everyday routines, as if it all were
222 SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY
in a black box. It is not enough to ask how actors reproducetheir routine behavior;we
still need to ask why they choose one routine over another.That considerationrequires
us to recenter actors and their motives.
The problem, as Ira Cohen notes, "is that to date Giddens has proposedno account of
the natureor developmentof motives above and beyond the need for ontological security"
(1989, p. 227). Ontological security, however, does too much work in the theory, even
where our behavior is purely repetitive. Cohen, for example, suggests that "a factory
worker may not be directly motivated to go to work on a day-to-day basis, but rather
merely follow her daily routine"(p. 227). Giddens (1984, p. 64) similarly suggests that
all of the strategic behavior examined by Goffman has less to do with actors' protecting
their own and each other's egos than with maintainingontological security.
This argumentis a reductionismwith regardto motives that in fact cannot be sustained.
Although work certainly provides an importantdegree of ontological security, can we say
that this, ratherthan an interest in survival, primarilymotivates the factory worker to go
to her job every day? Why, then, has she adopted that routine and not another?Such
heavy reliance on ontological security also threatens to become what Giddens (1976)
himself calls the "derogationof the lay actor."If you ask most actors why they do what
they do, certainly they will not cite ontological security. For this reason, as Ira Cohen
(1989, p. 52) observes, the theory begins to appeal to unconscious motivation.
At this point, where it is claimed that actors typically do not know the true motives of
their actions, structurationtheory is in serious dangerof duplicatingthe derogationof the
lay actor for which it so strongly and rightly criticizes functionalism.A systematic way
of accounting for actors' motives is needed, and materialrelationscan fill that need.

SOCIAL RELATIONSAS EMERGENTLYMATERIALPHENOMENA

At this point we may observe a need to distinguishbetween three analyticalmoments:the
culturally developed constitutive rules that are embodied and reproducedby actors' on-
going behavior; the emergentlymaterial relations to which those rules give rise; and the
situated human behavior and self-understandingof actors placed in the contexts of those
culturalrules and materialrelations. The relationsdiscussed above are emergentlymaterial
in that they have an ontologically objective and socially consequentialexistence, whether
or not any actors are aware of them. At the same time, those relationsare only emergently
materialbecause they arise only from the conscious, rule-following behavior of human
agents in action. Thus, although emergently material relations may exist objectively
without actors' being aware of them, they exist only if actors are doing something of
which they are aware.
As we have seen, Ira Cohen (1989) displays a strong distrustof emergentphenomena.
If he has in mind emergent phenomenaof the Durkheimianholist variety, which take on
a life of their own independentof humanactors, he is rightto be distrustful.But certainly,
unless we are to embracesome form of physicalistreductionism,the existence of emergent
phenomenamust be acknowledged. Languageitself is an emergentphenomenon(Margolis
1978). Cohen (1989, p. 76) states that "how action 'is responsible' for the emergence of
relationalpatternsremains mysterious and obscure." One task of this section will be to
make that emergence less obscure.
Again, consider a game of chess. Chess, including the propertiesof the chessboard, is
the creationof a body of constitutiverules. As Giddens notes, those rules are reproduced
whenever two players sit down to play. From the start, however, the rules give rise to
CULTURALRULES AND MATERIALRELATIONS 223
certain objective relationships. White begins with the initiative while Black is on the
defensive, a condition that persists throughoutthe opening. Meanwhile the center of the
board assumes profound strategic importance. These conditions-having the initiative,
being on the defensive, the importanceof the center-are not rules but objective relational
propertiesthat emerge from the rules. In this sense they are emergently material. The
players need not be aware of them; indeed, lesser players realize neither the importance
of the center nor the advantage of White's moving first. Such lack of awareness has
consequences, whether or not the players realize them. If White is unaware of these
relationalproperties, White's initial advantagemay dissipate quickly; if Black is a better
player,White will pay dearly. If both playersare novices, the game may go on inordinately.
As the play continues-that is, as the actors act-further relationshipsemerge: Black's
position may become crampedand may suffer from a threatto its king; White may have
control of the center, a strong pawn structure,and a more open position. Again, these
phenomena-control of the center, a crampedor an open position, a strong pawn struc-
ture-are not rules and not behaviors, however much they may be the result of past
behaviors. They are relationships-relationships which emerge only in the context of the
rules but which exist, nevertheless, whether or not the players are aware of them. They
are emergently objective or material.
These relationshipsalso are consequential. They are enabling, constraining, or moti-
vating. A weak pawn structure,a threatto one's king, a crampedposition, all constrain
the pursuitof the ultimategoal one is supposedto adoptas a chess player-the checkmate
of the other's king. Conversely, a strong pawn structure,control of the center, and an
open position all facilitate or enable the pursuitof that ultimategoal.
Chess ultimately is the attemptto create a positive patternof relationshipsfor oneself
and a negative patternfor one's opponent. That those relationshipschange and unfold in
the course of play illustrateshow humanagency can modify some relationshipseven under
the same set of constitutive rules.
Because there are positive relationshipsthat enable the pursuitof one's ultimate goal
as player of chess and because there are negative relationshipsthat constrainthat goal, as
the relationshipsunfold, a field of objective interestsunfolds. Whateverinstrumentalgoals
serve White's ultimategoal are objectively in White's interests, whetheror not the player
playing White recognizes them or chooses to act on them. Thus it is in White's objective
intereststo protectagainstthreatsto its pieces, to gain controlof the center, and to develop
an open position.
Such objective interests generally motivate the players' moves. Even not very good
players like myself recognize the more obvious of these objective interests and act on
them. To understandwhy I behave as I do-why I make the moves I make-an observer
first must understandthe context in which I am operating.That context involves the rules
of chess, the initial objective relations they generate, and the furtherrelations that the
other player and I have created in the course of our play.
Insofar as the observer understandsthis context, he or she will be able to explain and
perhapseven predict my behavior. Such predictionis neitherlawlike nor deterministic;it
is only a practical predictability-the kind of predictabilitywe encounter in everyday
social life. Usually all that can be predicted is some kind of response to my objective
interests.It might be predictedthatI will do somethingto uncrampmy position, something
to bolster my weak pawn structure, something to protect my endangered piece. Yet
althoughit may be predictedthat I will respondsomehow to my interests, my exact action
is often unpredictable.OccasionallyI may even do somethingtruly creative, such as offer
224 SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY
a queen sacrifice, that in principle could not have been predicted. On other occasions I
may not recognize my true interests or may believe mistakenlythat I have them covered
when I do not. Even so, a general coherence exists between interestsand behavior,which
makes the identificationof objective interests an explanatoryand often even a practically
predictive analytical tool.
Giddens (1979, p. 66) rightly warns that chess often is not a good generalizablemodel
of human behavior because its rules remain fixed. This point, however, does not affect
the relationship posited between constitutive rules and emergently material relations.
Certainly chess would be a more realistic example of social life if the rules could be
changed in the course of play. In that case, emergently materialrelations still would be
generated,but they might change drasticallyin an instant.
Yet do real-life analogues exist for the emergently material relations we observe in
chess? I would argue that they exist and that they are important.Consider just three:
inequality, competition, and the relationshipbetween jobs and job seekers. Although all
three may putatively arise from the culturallyshared constitutiverules of capitalism, for
example, and althoughall three may be reproducedby the behaviorof actors, nevertheless
they are emergently objective or materialrelationsin the sense that they exist-and exist
consequentially-whether or not any of the members of a capitalist society are aware of
them.
Although capitalism certainly is not alone in this regard, its constitutiverules tend to
generate inequality. This inequality is a relationalpropertythat itself has consequences.
For example, althoughfew Americansrealize how narrowlyconcentratedwealth is in the
United States-the wealthiest 1 percent hold more wealth than the least wealthy 90
percent-one result is economic stagnation due to insufficient aggregate demand. In
CentralAmerican countries, where 2 percent of the populationtypically own 60 percent
of the arable land, the direct consequences are widespreadmalnutrition,low life expec-
tancy, and high infant mortality.Certainly,inequalityis a relationalpatternwith important
consequences of its own. These consequences ensue whether or not anyone notices the
inequality,althoughif it is noticed, it frequentlyleads to even more dramaticconsequences
such as revolution.
Competition is another material relationshipgenerated from the constitutive rules of
capitalism. Competition may be considered both an activity and a relationship. As a
relationship, competition is established by rules that create either limited goods, a zero-
sum arrangement,or mutualthreat. Marketsharesfor which capitalistscompete are zero-
sum;jobs are a limited good for which workerscompete.
Because profits can be reinvested in ways that can attractconsumersfrom other capi-
talists, the profits made by any one capitalist are a potentialthreatto all others. Because
of this relationshipof mutual threat, it is in the objective interestof each capitalist who
wants to remain a capitalist to maximize profit. Consequently,over the long run, those
who remaincapitaliststend to recognize this interestand to act on it. It is largely because
this basic interest remains the same over time, and not because it is simply their routine,
thatcapitalistsdo many of the problematicthings they do: neglect workers'safety, replace
workers with machines, move operationsoverseas, externalizecosts to the environment,
and so on. Many of these actions are not even routine, but are capitalists' novel and
creativeresponses to their interests. The relationshipof mutualthreatgoverningcapitalists
is both constrainingand motivating: however humanisticindividual capitalists may be,
they are constrainedto act on certain motives if they want to remaincapitalists.
When capitalistsdo what they do, they createa certaindistributionof jobs; thatrelational
distributionis both objective and itself consequential.Whetheror not anyone is aware of
the situation,unemploymentand povertywill exist if thereare fewerjobs thanjob seekers.
CULTURALRULES AND MATERIALRELATIONS 225
It also mattershow many good jobs there are, where they are, and how they are linked.
Lesser jobs may not be so bad if at least they are linked to betterjobs so as to provide
eventual career advancement.All of these are relationalproperties.They are emergently
materialin the sense thatto whateverextentthey were producedby rule-governedbehavior,
they exist whether or not anyone recognizes them and they have importantsocial conse-
quences of their own. Thus real life contains importantanalogues to the emergently
materialrelationshipswe found in chess.

OBJECTIVEINTERESTS
The concept of objective or material interests plays a prominentrole in the foregoing
analysis. Because that concept currentlyis consideredproblematic(Balbus 1971; Benton
1981; Connolly 1972; Wall 1975), some indication should be provided that a tenable
concept of material interests can be developed. This task actually requires a full-length
paper of its own; currentlyI am collaboratingon such a paper. All that is possible here
is a sketch of a fuller treatment,a promissorynote for later work.
Although I have been critical of Giddensin this paper,it is Giddenswho offers the key
to a viable concept of materialinterests. He writes, "Wants(or 'wanting') are the 'basis'
of interests:to say that A has an interest in a given course of action, occurrenceor state
of affairs, is to say that the course of action, etc. facilitatesthe possibility of A achieving
his or her wants. To be aware of one's interests, therefore,is more than to be aware of a
want or wants; it is to know how one can set abouttryingto realize them"(1979, p. 189).
Giddens's conception draws on Weber's distinctionbetween instrumentaland ultimate
goals: instrumentalgoals are pursued for some further,more ultimate end, and ultimate
goals are pursued as ends in themselves. In terms of this distinction, it is always in an
agent's interests to realize the instrumentalgoals or conditions that serve his or her
collective ultimate goals. Thus interests already possess a certain objectivity: if some
instrumentalgoal or conditionwould objectively serve an agent's collective ultimategoals,
then the realization of that instrumentalgoal or condition is in that agent's objective
interests, whetheror not the agent knows this.
Admittedly this formulationpresents a potentialproblem. Suppose an agent's ultimate
goal does not really contributeto that agent's well-being. Suppose the agent were a drug
addict, one of whose ultimate goals is to get high. Acquiringthe drug then would be an
instrumentalgoal, but should we really say that acquiring the drug is in that agent's
interests? Here we might distinguish between true and false interests, both of which,
however, are real in a causal sense. Acquiringthe drug is a false interestbecause it serves
an ultimate goal that is not really conducive to the agent's well-being. Yet althoughit is
false, obtaining the drug nevertheless is a real interest in the sense that it motivates the
actor by serving one of his or her ultimategoals.8
The identification of true interests is a moral issue that requires a wert-rational
evaluation of our ultimate goals as humans. Such an evaluation is value-ladenand ideo-
logical. On such grounds, arguesBenton (1981), thereis no way to establishtrueinterests.
This notion is mistaken: just as theories generate values, values rest on theories and
ontologies. However problematicthe process may be, we manage to adjudicateamong
8 It is
relatively easy to provide other examples of false interests. Consider those African Americans who
supportedClarence Thomas's appointmentto the SupremeCourt simply because he is African American. If it
is conceded that Thomas will do more harm than good for African Americansin this capacity, then although
the political behavior of some African Americans might have been motivatedby an interestin having Thomas
appointedsolely because of his race, there are strong grounds for regardingthis as a false interest. Generally,
false interestsare involved whenever the concept of false consciousness is applicable.
226 SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY
rival theories and ontologies. In doing so, we are simultaneouslyadjudicatingamong the
rival values they sustain. Thus we can potentiallybe persuadedaway from certain values
if we are shown that the theories which sustainthem are untenable.For example, we may
value maintainingthe status quo because of our belief in functionalism;if this belief were
undermined,the value we place on the status quo also might be undermined.In short,
there are ways of adjudicatingamong rival values, including rival conceptions of human
well-being.
The moral distinctionbetween true and false interestsis crucialin questions concerning
false consciousness, but it and the problems it raises are of secondary importancehere;
we are concerned with the explanatoryrole of interests-both true and false-in motiva-
tion. Social relationsmay structureor otherwise affect the objective intereststhat motivate
us in three basic ways: they may enable or constrain us in the pursuit of our ultimate
goals and even may affect our very capacity to act as agents; they may create interests
thatotherwisewould not exist; and they may generatesocial positionswith built-inultimate
goals.
Being poor constrainsour ability to pursue a large arrayof culturallygeneral ultimate
goals, whereas being rich facilitates that pursuit. For that reason, people generally are
motivated by an objective interest in being rich ratherthan poor. This objective interest
also generally motivates capitalists to do what they must do to remain capitalists. If we
are poor enough-malnourished, for example-our very capacity to act as agents in the
purposive pursuit of any ultimate goal is endangered. Because we are material beings
whose capacity to act is materially based, we are generally motivated by an objective
interestin securing the materialconditions requiredfor any action at all.
Certain interests, such as capitalists' interest in maximizing profit, are a creation of
specific social relations such as competition. Where the relationshipdoes not exist, the
relation-specificinterest disappearsas well. The relationshipsgenerate these interests by
creatingconditions such as mutualthreat, which otherwise would not exist.9
Many social positions or roles have ultimate goals built in by definition, which the
incumbentsof those positions or roles are supposed to adopt. It is the ultimate goal of a
manageras manager to manage, and the ultimate goal of a teacher as teacher to teach.
Whateverfacilitates the incumbentsin the pursuitof their role-designatedfunctions is in
theirobjective interestsas role incumbents,whetheror not they realize this. Thus, whether
or not the particularincumbentsrealize it, it is in the objective interestsof a teacher or a
manager to maintain some level of respect, discipline, and morale among those they
supervise.
One's interests may conflict with one another because one's ultimate goals conflict.
Thus a worker's short-term,situated interest in continuedemploymentmay conflict with
a long-terminterest in a better society. How one resolves such conflicts is often a matter
of personal choice, which depends (among other things) on the relative weight assigned
to the competing ultimate goals served by the respective interests. To say that actors act
in their interestsis not to say on which of their intereststhey will act, althoughthe more
immediate and obvious the interests are, the more likely it is that actors will respond to
them.
Positing objective interestshardlyentails either psychological egoism or rationalchoice
theory. Human purposiveness cannot be reduced to calculation; outside highly specific

9 I am told that in corporate governance, legal scholars refer to what I am calling objective interests as
"positionalinterests":shareholdersand managershave different interestsbecause of their different positions in
the firm. Why call these interestsobjective? As I tried to make clear in the first section of this paper, the reason
is that such positional interests exist independentof the subjective awarenessor preferencesof the incumbents
of the positions. Insteadthey are objective propertiesof the relatedpositions themselves.
CULTURALRULES AND MATERIALRELATIONS 227
contexts such as capitalist competition, it rarely makes sense to speak of actors' "maxi-
mizing" their interests as opposed to simply acting on them. Altruism, furthermore,is
neither logically impossible nor particularlyrare (Porpora1987, pp. 76-77, 138-43).10
Actors do not always act in their interests, but there are costs for not doing so. A
capitalistwho continually fails to act in his or her interestsas a capitalistwill not remain
a capitalistfor long. Moreover,a general congruenceexists between interestsand actions,
which we may miss if we ignore all the mundaneacts that constituteour day and focus
only on the few dramaticepisodes. Because interests are construedhere as instrumental
goals, to deny that actorsgenerally act in their own interestsis to deny that they generally
act to realize their instrumentalgoals in pursuitof their ultimategoals. That is the same,
however, as denying that humanbehavioris purposive,which it manifestlyis (behaviorists
notwithstanding).Thus the general congruencebetween interestsand actions follows from
the intrinsicpurposivenessof human agency.
Nevertheless, the relationshipbetween interests and action is complex and indetermi-
nate. That indeterminacy,however, is not a problem in the concept of interests but an
ineluctable feature of human purposive action. Thus we should not respond to this
indeterminacyby rejecting the concept of interests. No replacementwill make this inde-
terminacydisappear,and the identificationof actors' interestsis still our best purchase-
practically and theoretically-on understanding,explaining, and even predicting each
other's motivated behavior.

CONCLUSION
Undera varietyof influences such as postmodernismand the Winchiantradition(the latter
representedmost forcefully today by structurationtheory), social theory has moved in a
decidedly idealist direction. Today, in fact, even to accuse social theory of idealism
immediately subjects one to a defensive counterchargeof materialistreductionism,as if
that were the only alternative.
To say that a dominant tendency in social theory today is idealist is to say that this
tendency has utterly abandonedthe recognitionof what used to be called social structure,
namely the network of materialsocial relationsin which humanbeings are situated. It is
true that in the past, material social relations tended to be affirmed in a reductionistic
way, a way that reduced all humanbehaviorto materialsocial relationsand made culture
an epiphenomenon.Today, however, a dominanttendency is to overcorrectthat errorby
denying the very existence or consequentialityof materialrelations. Such overcorrection
itself is an errorthat this paper has sought to correct.
In this paper I have sought to recover the Marxianlegacy of materialsocial relations
without succumbing to materialistreductionism. I argued that there is a defensible and
nonreductivesense in which the social relations identified by Marx can be considered
material. I argued furtherthat these materialsocial relations are consequentialto human
behavior and that accordinglythey cannot be ignored without cost to our analysis of that
behavior.
I have attempted, however, to do more than that. I have attemptedto show that the
Marxianstress on material social relations actually can be reconciled with the Winchian
stress on cultural rules. Insofar as this synthesis is successful, a fuller, more complete
analysis of humanbehavior becomes possible. Such an analysis fully recognizes both the

10 This view of
objective interests differs markedlyfrom the view associated with rationalchoice theory. The
lattersimply equates interests with subjective preferences,largely without argument.
228 SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
culturaland the materialwithout negating either. Throughsynthesis ratherthan rejection,
the valuable elements in both the Marxianand the Winchianperspectivesare preserved.
It is hardly reductionisticto simply speak of the materialagain, to attemptto recover
a place for it. It would be reductionisticto claim that all humanbehaviorcan be explained
deterministicallyin terms of material social relations. In this paper I did not argue that.
In fact, I explicitly rejected a deterministic,nomothetic account of causality. Likewise it
would be reductionistic to maintain that culture is a mere reflection of material social
relations. Again, I did not argue that. In fact, I argued that material social relations
themselves emerge from culturalconstitutiverules. Finally, it would be reductionisticto
claim that human actors have no effect on material relations, but I did not argue that
either. Instead I maintainedthat just as material social relations affect human behavior,
humanbehavior in turn affects materialsocial structure.
In short, it is difficult to understandhow the argumentof this paper can be construed
as reductionistic,but in the currentidealist climate, many readersundoubtedlywill see it
as such. After all, it calls for a move back toward materialism.Yet, just as it would be
materialisticallyreductionisticto attributeall causality to materialsocial relations, it is,
likewise, idealistically reductionistic to forget entirely about material social relations.
What I defend here is a nonreductivematerialismthat accords both culture and material
relations their properplace.

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