Child Development, January/February 2012, Volume 83, Number 1, Pages 159–172

Magic Memories: Young Children’s Verbal Recall After a 6-Year Delay

Fiona Jack Gabrielle Simcock
University of Otago University of Queensland

Harlene Hayne
University of Otago

This report describes the first prospective study specifically designed to assess children’s verbal memory for a
unique event 6 years after it occurred. Forty-six 27- to 51-month-old children took part in a unique event and
were interviewed about it twice, after 24-hr and 6-year delays. During the 6-year interview, 9 children
verbally recalled the event, including 2 who were under 3 years old when the event occurred. This may be
the most convincing evidence to date that such early experiences can be verbally recalled after long delays.
These data have important implications for current theories of memory development and childhood amnesia
and underscore some of the problems associated with evaluating the veracity of early memories under less
controlled conditions.

As humans, our personal memories are an integral
part of who we are. Recalling our past experiences
and sharing them with others contributes to our
sense of self and often helps us to form and foster
relationships with others (Nelson, 1993; Peterson,
2002). As adults, however, we experience a conspic-
uous gap in our subjective autobiographies. Studies
conducted with Western samples have shown time
and time again that on average, adults’ earliest
autobiographical memories date from approxi-
mately 3½ years of age (e.g., Dudycha & Dudycha,
1933a, 1933b; Jack & Hayne, 2007; Kihlstrom &
Harackiewicz, 1982; MacDonald, Uesiliana, &
Hayne, 2000; Mullen, 1994; Rabbitt & McInnis,
1988). The universal paucity of memories for our
early personal experiences is commonly referred to
as infantile or childhood amnesia.
Despite the pervasive nature of childhood
amnesia, researchers who study the phenomenon
This research was supported by Marsden Grants from the
Royal Society of New Zealand to Harlene Hayne. Preparation of
this manuscript was supported by a New Zealand Science &
Technology Postdoctoral Fellowship to Fiona Jack. We thank
Debbie McLachlan, Karen Tustin, Nicola Davis, Julien Gross,
and Celia Wright for their help with data collection and coding,
Elaine Reese for her insightful comments on an earlier draft of
this manuscript, and all of the children and parents who partici-
pated in this research.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to
Harlene Hayne, Department of Psychology, University of Otago,
PO Box 56, Dunedin, New Zealand. Electronic mail may be sent
to hayne@psy.otago.ac.nz.
consistently find that a small handful of individuals
report memories for events that occurred much
earlier than the norm. For example, in the first pub-
lished survey of adults’ earliest memories by Henri
and Henri (1898), adult participants reported 16
memories for events that occurred before the age of
2 (13% of all memories in their sample); 3 of these
memories dated back to the 1st year of life. Simi-
larly, when MacDonald et al. (2000) sampled
adults’ earliest memories, approximately 2% of the
memories reported were for events that occurred
before the participant’s first birthday, and another
12% were for events that occurred before the sec-
ond birthday. Tustin and Hayne (2010) found that
of the earliest memories reported by children and
adolescents, approximately 40% were for events
that occurred during the first 2 years of life.
While these very early memories are not uncom-
mon, their veracity is often debated. As researchers,
what do we know about memory development that
would allow us to establish an objective criterion
for accepting or rejecting these accounts as genuine
memories? Taken to the extreme, claims that some
people can recall their own birth are generally met
with great scepticism, but is there any scientific rea-
son to doubt the authenticity of these memories?
 2011 The Authors
Child Development  2011 Society for Research in Child Development, Inc.
All rights reserved. 0009-3920/2012/8301-0013
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8624.2011.01699.x
160 Jack, Simcock, and Hayne
What about other memories dating back to the 1st
year or 2 of life? From a theoretical perspective,
establishing the lower boundary for our ability to
recall our personal past would shed additional light
on the underlying cause of childhood amnesia.
From a practical perspective, establishing the lower
boundary for our ability to recall our personal past
would provide a benchmark against which we
could evaluate early memories for forensically rele-
vant events that sometimes make their way into the
courtroom.
One way that researchers have attempted to
evaluate the validity of retrospective accounts of
very early experiences has been to track children’s
recall of specific early experiences across develop-
ment. For example, some researchers have exam-
ined children’s recall for naturally occurring family
events after delays of several years (Cleveland &
Reese, 2008; Fivush & Schwarzmueller, 1998;
Huffman, Crossman, & Ceci, 1997; Van Abbema &
Bauer, 2005). In these studies, a parent or an experi-
menter typically discussed a number of events with
the child, first within a few months of the event’s
occurrence and then again during a follow-up visit
after a delay of several years. In some studies, chil-
dren were interviewed about recent events at a
number of time points across early childhood and
were asked to recall events from each of these time
points during a follow-up visit. In general, the pro-
portion of events that children recalled increased as
a function of their age at the time that events origi-
nally occurred (but see Huffman et al., 1997), but
even events that originally occurred at approxi-
mately 1½ years of age could sometimes be recalled
several years later. For example, Cleveland and
Reese (2008) found that at 5½ years of age, some
children recalled events that they had only experi-
enced prior to 19 months of age.
In similar studies, researchers have examined
children’s recall of naturally occurring traumatic
events. For example, Quas et al. (1999) examined
children’s recall of a painful medical procedure
after delays ranging from 8 months to over
5 years. Of the nine children in Quas et al.’s study
who were 2 years old at the time of the procedure,
only two could verbally recall the event, and their
memories were extremely vague; children were
much more likely to recall the procedure if they
had been aged 4 years or older when they experi-
enced it (see also Pillemer, Picariello, & Pruett,
1994). In another study of this kind, Peterson and
Whalen (2001) assessed 2- to 13-year-old children’s
recall for a personal injury that had required emer-
gency room treatment. They interviewed children
within a few days of the event and again 5 years
later. In contrast to Quas et al., Peterson and
Whalen found that even children who had been
only 2 years old at the time of the injury were able
to recall some aspects of the event after a 5-year
delay. Furthermore, although the amount children
reported about the emergency room visit
decreased slightly over time, the reports that they
gave of the injury after a 5-year delay were just as
complete as the reports they had given only a few
days after the injury occurred. In yet another
study, Fivush, Sales, Goldberg, Bahrick, and Parker
(2004) interviewed children who were 3–4 years of
age when Hurricane Andrew struck their town.
They interviewed children twice: once within a
few months of the event, and again 6 years later.
After a 6-year delay, not only were all of the
children still able to describe the event in consider-
able detail, but the amount of information that
children reported more than doubled between the
first and second interviews. On average, children
reported 116 propositions about the event after a
6-year delay.
In summary, research in which children have
been interviewed about naturalistic events has
yielded conflicting results. Some researchers have
found that children do not recall events that
happened before they were 4 years old while other
researchers have found that children who were
only 1, 2, or 3 years old at the time of the target
event exhibited recall over long delays. One poten-
tial source of this discrepancy is that children’s
long-term recall of some events might have been
inflated by information gleaned from external
sources during the retention interval. For example,
the events that children were interviewed about
were typically important to the child and his or her
family and, in the case of Hurricane Andrew, the
whole community. Thus, it is likely that children
would have overheard and participated in discus-
sions about the events during the retention interval;
they may have also seen photographs or videos
documenting the event. Furthermore, in some natu-
ralistic studies, repeated discussion of the target
event during the retention interval occurred as
part of the study (Cleveland & Reese, 2008; Fivush
& Schwarzmueller, 1998; Huffman et al., 1997;
Peterson & Whalen, 2001). In fact, naturalistic
studies that involved neither repeated interviews
nor family events that were likely to be the topic of
subsequent discussion have found little evidence
for recall of events that children experienced prior
to their fourth birthday (Pillemer et al., 1994; Quas
et al., 1999).

As an alternative to these naturalistic studies,
some researchers have examined children’s mem-
ory for laboratory-based events over periods of sev-
eral years. These studies have two main advantages
over the naturalistic studies described so far. First,
laboratory-based events are less likely to become
part of family stories and there are typically no
photographs or videos available for viewing during
the retention interval. Second, because the experi-
menters know exactly what happened during the
target event, it is possible to assess the accuracy of
children’s reports objectively, identifying intrusions
and distortions in participants’ accounts.
In contrast to data obtained with naturalistic
studies, the results of the laboratory-based studies
conducted to date offer little or no evidence of ver-
bal recall of early experiences after delays of several
years (e.g., Goodman, Batterman-Faunce, Schaaf, &
Kenney, 2002; Myers, Perris, & Speaker, 1994). On
the surface, these data suggest that the superior
memory for naturalistic events may be due, at least
in part, to rehearsal opportunities and exposure to
photographs and videos. Before drawing this firm
conclusion, however, it is important to note that the
target events that have been used in these labora-
tory studies are typically mundane, which might
decrease the probability that children will recall
them over long delays. Selecting target events that
are not particularly distinctive may lead us to
underestimate young children’s ability to retain
memories for their early experiences over the
course of development.
The present experiment goes some way to over-
coming the limitations of prior research. In this
experiment, children participated in a highly dis-
tinctive Magic Shrinking Machine event when they
were 27–51 months of age. We initially interviewed
the children after a short delay (24 hr) and then
re-interviewed them 6 years later. The Magic
Shrinking Machine paradigm, developed by Sim-
cock and Hayne (2002, 2003), provided an ideal
target event for a number of reasons. First, like
other laboratory-based studies, we were able to
evaluate the accuracy of the children’s accounts.
Second, there were no photographs or videos of
the event available for children to view during the
retention interval. Third, children took part in an
initial interview 24 hr after the event, allowing us
to assess whether recall of early experiences after
short delays helps to predict long-term recall.
Fourth, the Magic Shrinking Machine was a highly
distinctive event, increasing the possibility that
children might recall it after a delay. Prior research
with the Magic Shrinking Machine has shown that
Verbal Recall After a 6-Year Delay 161
children in this age range remember the event
when they are tested 1 year later (Simcock & Hay-
ne, 2002), raising the possibility that they might
also remember it after an even longer delay.
Finally, given that parents were present during the
target event, we also had a unique opportunity to
assess developmental differences in the frequency
and quality of verbal recall, not only between chil-
dren of different ages, but also between children
and adults.
Method
Participants
Fifty-six 27- to 51-month-old children took part
in the target event. All of the children were
recruited from Dunedin public birth records. The
children were predominantly of European descent
and were from a wide range of socioeconomic
backgrounds. Three additional 27-month-olds
(females), one additional 33-month-old (male), and
one additional 45-month-old (male) were excluded
due to refusal to participate in the demonstration
session, and one additional 27-month-old (female)
was excluded due to paternal interference during
the 24-hr interview.
At the time of the 6-year interview, 7 partici-
pants could not be contacted or had moved out of
town and 2 who were contacted declined to take
part. The data from 1 participant who did partici-
pate in the 6-year interview were excluded due to
experimenter error. Of the 56 original participants,
46 (82%) were included in the final sample during
the 6-year interview. Only data for participants
who took part in both the 24-hr and the 6-year
interview are reported here. The children who
were and were not included in the final sample
did not differ in terms of their verbal or nonverbal
recall during the 24-hr interview (ps > .05).
In addition, at the 6-year interview we also inter-
viewed ten control participants, who had never
played with the Magic Shrinking Machine before.
These participants were recruited from the same
source as the experienced participants; the only dif-
ference was that they had never participated in the
Magic Shrinking Machine event. Five of the control
participants were 8 years old, and 5 were 10 years
old; these ages correspond to the youngest and old-
est ages of the experienced participants at the time
of the 6-year interview.
Table 1 shows the mean age and gender of the
final sample (N = 56). Informed written consent
was obtained from a parent of each participant
162 Jack, Simcock, and Hayne

Table 1 trial. At the end of the second session, each child

Mean Age at Event, Mean Age at 6-Year Interview, Number, and Gen- was awarded a brightly colored cardboard medal
der of Participants as a Function of Group for his or her participation in the task. This medal
Mean age
was used as a retrieval cue during both the 24-hr
Mean age at 6-year interview and the 6-year interview.
at event interview
(and SE, (and SE, in
24-Hr Interview
Group in months) years) Gender
Twenty-four hours after the second demonstra-
27-month-olds 26.97 (0.10) 8.23 (0.01) 5 female, 5 male tion session, the same two experimenters returned
33-month-olds 32.99 (0.08) 8.75 (0.02) 5 female, 3 male
to the child’s home to measure his or her memory
39-month-olds 38.98 (0.10) 9.24 (0.01) 5 female, 5 male
for the event. First, one of the experimenters
45-month-olds 45.05 (0.14) 9.74 (0.01) 4 female, 4 male
51-month-olds 51.06 (0.10) 10.26 (0.02) 4 female, 6 male
asked the child to report everything that he or
8-year-old controls — 8.20 (0.06) 3 female, 2 male she could remember about the game they had
10-year-old controls — 10.25 (0.00) 2 female, 3 male played during the previous visit. Second, the
experimenter produced a photograph album and
asked the child to identify photographs of the
prior to the target event and again prior to the items that had been used during the event,
6-year interview. including the Magic Shrinking Machine itself, the
seven items that had been shrunk, and a case and
a bag that had been used to carry the items. Each
Target Event
target photograph was presented among three
Each child participated in two demonstration photographs of similar items that had not been
sessions separated by 24 hr. For each demonstra- present during the event (e.g., the original teddy
tion session, two experimenters arrived at the bear appeared with three other teddy bears).
child’s home with the Magic Shrinking Machine Third, the experimenters brought the Magic
(see Simcock & Hayne, 2002, 2003). The Magic Shrinking Machine inside and asked the child to
Shrinking Machine was a large black box show them how to make it work. The Magic
(43 cm · 60 cm · 80 cm) designed specifically for Shrinking Machine was fully functional during
our laboratory research and was not commercially the reenactment. This test procedure is identical
available. Following a brief warm-up, the experi- to that used in prior studies with this particular
menters invited the child to play a game. One event (Simcock & Hayne, 2002, 2003).
experimenter sat behind the machine in order to
operate it, while the other experimenter showed the
6-Year Interview
child how to make it work. In order to make it
work, the child had to turn the box on by pulling a Approximately 6 years after the first interview,
yellow lever, select a toy from an open suitcase, put we contacted parents and asked them whether they
it in a hole in the top of the magic box, and turn a would like their child to participate in a follow-up
green handle on the side. When a bell rang, the memory interview about the Magic Shrinking
child opened a red door in the front of the box to Machine event. We asked parents not to mention
retrieve a smaller but otherwise identical version of the Magic Shrinking Machine to their child before
the toy. the visit.
This sequence was repeated for seven trials; a The 6-year interviews were conducted by differ-
different object was placed in the machine on each ent experimenters than those who had conducted
trial. The objects were a purple and gold cloak, a the memory event and 24-hr interview 6 years ear-
packet of raisins, a bottle of bubble mix, a ball, a lier. With one exception, the 6-year memory inter-
bell, a flashlight, and a teddy bear. The child was views were all conducted in the Early Learning
asked to name each object as it was placed in the Project Laboratory at the University of Otago. One
Magic Shrinking Machine. After all the items had girl, who was in the 33-month age group, was inter-
been put in the machine, the experimenter turned viewed in her home. As in the 24-hr interview, we
the Magic Shrinking Machine off by pushing the measured both verbal and nonverbal memory,
yellow lever down. The child was encouraged although in this report we focus on verbal recall
to participate in all phases of the event and was only (the experienced children did not differ from
usually operating the machine alone by the last the control group or the parents on any nonverbal

recall measures). The opportunity for verbal recall
always preceded the nonverbal test procedures. To
ensure that the children’s descriptions of the event
were based on their memory for it, the Magic
Shrinking Machine was left in another room during
the verbal recall phase of the interview. Interviews
were video- and audiotaped. To establish rapport,
each interview began with a brief chat about what
the child had been doing recently at school or dur-
ing school holidays.
The experimenter began the interview by asking
the child, ‘‘Do you know why we asked you to
come here today?’’ This question was included in
order to determine whether, contrary to our expli-
cit instructions, parents had mentioned the Magic
Shrinking Machine to their child. All but one of
the children either replied that they did not know
the purpose of the visit or gave some answer not
related to the Magic Shrinking Machine such as
‘‘you’re going to ask me some questions’’ or ‘‘to
see how much I know about spelling.’’ One child
who had been 39 months old at the time of the
original event replied that the purpose of the
visit was to see if he remembered the ‘‘shrink
box.’’ According to both his and his mother’s
independent reports, this child had spontaneously
recalled the Magic Shrinking Machine when his
mother first mentioned that they would be visiting
the university.
At the beginning of the interview, the experi-
menter gave each child a brief explanation of what
the visit would involve:
Today I’m going to ask you questions about
something that happened a long time ago and
later on we’re also going to do an activity to find
out what sort of words you know. When I’m ask-
ing you these questions, it might be really hard
to answer them because it is hard to remember
things from a long time ago. It’s important that
you don’t guess the answers if you can’t remem-
ber something and it’s okay to tell me that you
can’t remember. Because it is hard to remember
these things, when I ask you questions, some-
times I might pause and give you a chance to
think about it for a little while.
The experimenter began the free-recall portion of
the interview by asking the child to identify the
cardboard medal that had been given to him or her
at the end of the second visit and had been used as
a retrieval cue at the first interview 6 years ago. A
photograph of the target medal was presented
along with three other photographs, of two differ-
Verbal Recall After a 6-Year Delay 163
ent medals and a trophy. The experimenter asked
the child, ‘‘Have you seen any of these before?’’ If
the child identified the target medal, the experi-
menter produced the cardboard medal and said,
‘‘That’s great because I have one like that here.
What can you tell me about this medal?’’ If the
child failed to identify the target medal, the experi-
menter produced the medal and said, ‘‘I was told
that a long time ago someone gave you a medal like
this one. Can you remember anything about that?’’
This question was also asked if the child had identi-
fied the target medal but did not report having
received a medal like it.
If, at any stage, the child mentioned the Magic
Shrinking Machine event, the experimenter said,
‘‘It’s great that you can remember that because
that’s the really important thing I wanted to talk to
you about today. What can you remember about
when you did that?’’ The experimenter then used
open-ended questions such as, ‘‘Is there anything
else you can remember about that?’’ until the child
could report no additional information. Whether or
not the child did recall the Magic Shrinking
Machine event, the experimenter provided encour-
aging feedback throughout the interview (e.g.,
‘‘You’re doing really well. It’s very hard to remem-
ber something that happened such a long time
ago’’).
The next portions of the interview involved
prompted and cued recall of the Magic Shrinking
Machine event. The experimenter explained:
Now I’m going to ask you some more specific
questions. As we go through the questions,
you might have already told me some of the
answers, but please tell me again to make sure I
get all your answers. Please try hard to
answer the questions, but it’s okay if you can’t
remember.
At this point, children who had not yet men-
tioned the Magic Shrinking Machine event were
prompted with, ‘‘I was told you got a medal like
this for playing a special game. Can you tell me
anything about the game?’’ If the child still did not
mention the Magic Shrinking Machine, they were
given a second, more specific prompt: ‘‘I was told
that you played with the Magic Box, but I wasn’t
there, and today I want to find out everything you
can remember about that. Can you remember when
you played with the Magic Box?’’ (During the ear-
lier sessions, the experimenters had called the
Magic Shrinking Machine the ‘‘Magic Box.’’) If the
child indicated memory for the Magic Shrinking
164 Jack, Simcock, and Hayne
Machine at any stage, the experimenter asked
open-ended questions until the child had reported
all he or she could remember about the event.
Prompted recall was followed by cued recall. All
children were asked a series of 13 questions about
the Magic Shrinking Machine (e.g., ‘‘What did it
look like?’’), the people who came with the Magic
Shrinking Machine (e.g., ‘‘How many people came
with the Magic Box?’’), and the other objects those
people brought with them (e.g., ‘‘What did you do
with the toys?’’).
Next, the experimenter asked the child to iden-
tify photographs of items that had been used dur-
ing the event. During this task, participants were
given two additional opportunities for verbal recall.
First, following three warm-up trials, the experi-
menter showed the child a photograph of the Magic
Shrinking Machine and three photographs of
distracter items and asked, ‘‘Can you see the Magic
Box?’’ When the child had responded, the experi-
menter asked the child to look at the photograph of
the Magic Shrinking Machine and to report any
additional information he or she could remember
about the event. Second, after conducting the
remaining photograph recognition trials, the experi-
menter asked, ‘‘Since we’ve looked at those photos,
is there anything else you can remember about
when you played with the Magic Box that you
haven’t already told me?’’
To check for recent rehearsal of the Magic
Shrinking Machine event, the experimenter then
asked the child whether he or she had thought
about or talked about the Magic Shrinking Machine
since the event. If the child said that he or she had
thought or talked about the Magic Shrinking
Machine, the experimenter asked further questions
such as: ‘‘How often have you thought ⁄ talked
about it?’’ ‘‘When was the last time you thought ⁄
talked about it?’’ ‘‘What did you remember ⁄ say
about it?’’ and ‘‘Who did you talk about it with?’’
Four children reported having thought about or
talked about the Magic Shrinking Machine just
prior to the 6-year interview. In each of these cases,
the child reported that they had remembered some-
thing about the event when his or her parent had
said that they were coming to the university, but
none of the children indicated that their parent had
mentioned the Magic Shrinking Machine. There-
fore, while some parents said things to their chil-
dren that reminded them of the Magic Shrinking
Machine event, it does not appear that parents
deliberately coached their children, providing
specific information about the event prior to the
interview.
Finally, the experimenters brought the Magic
Shrinking Machine into the interview room and
asked the child to show them how to make it work.
At the conclusion of this task, the first experimenter
gave children in the control group a debriefing as
follows:
I have something to tell you. I was never actually
told that you played with the Magic Box when
you were little. The reason I said you had is that
I want to find out what kids of your age might
be able to guess about a magic box if we tell
them that they have played with one before. Is
there anything you would like to ask me about
that?
Parent Interviews
When they visited the laboratory for the mem-
ory interview, 42 of the 46 children who had
played with the Magic Shrinking Machine 6 years
earlier were accompanied by a parent who had
also been present during that event. This gave us
the unique opportunity to compare children’s
recall of the event with adults’ recall of the same
event, after the same delay. Thus, while the first
experimenter interviewed the child, the second
experimenter interviewed the parent in a separate
room about his or her memories of the Magic
Shrinking Machine.
The parent interview followed the same basic
format as the child interview, with three excep-
tions. First, when the experimenter contacted the
parents to schedule an interview, she had
reminded them that 6 years ago two people had
brought the Magic Box to their house for their
child to play with. Because the parent already
knew the purpose of the visit, the medal recogni-
tion (free recall) part of the interview was omit-
ted, and one prompt was given: ‘‘A long time ago
[child’s name] played with the Magic Box. Can
you tell me everything you remember about
that?’’ When the parent had reported all that he
or she could recall about the event in response to
this prompt, the interviewer moved on to the 13
specific questions about the event. Second, in
addition to the rehearsal questions described
above, the interviewer asked the parent whether
his or her child had talked about the Magic
Shrinking Machine since the experimenters
brought it to their house. Finally, the behavioral
reenactment phase was omitted from the parent
interviews.

Language and General Memory Assessment
At the time of the target event, children’s lan-
guage skill was assessed in three ways. During
the first demonstration session, the experimenter
assessed the child’s receptive vocabulary
using the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT;
3rd ed., Form A; Dunn & Dunn, 1997). During
the second demonstration session, the experi-
menter assessed the child’s expressive vocabulary
using the Expressive Vocabulary Test (EVT;
Williams, 1997). To assess the production of
words specifically associated with the task, care-
givers were also asked to complete a checklist of
words specifically associated with the target
event. For example, target items such as ball, and
target actions such as open were listed on this
checklist. Parents were given the checklist at the
end of the first session and returned it to the
experimenter at the beginning of the session
the next day. Previous work with the Magic
Shrinking Machine has shown that parents are
highly accurate when completing the checklist
(Simcock & Hayne, 2003). Furthermore, given that
the experimenters used only ‘‘empty’’ language
during the demonstration sessions, the children
were unlikely to have acquired any additional
task-relevant vocabulary during the course of the
event per se.
At the 6-year interview, the experimenter
assessed the child’s receptive vocabulary using the
PPVT–III (Form B) and assessed the child’s expres-
sive vocabulary using the EVT. To check that the
8- to 10-year-old children in our sample said and
understood all of the words on the task-relevant
vocabulary checklist, the parent who brought the
child to the laboratory for the 6-year interview was
asked to complete the checklist of words specifi-
cally associated with the target event. On a separate
occasion, the second experimenter visited the child
at home and measured his or her general memory
skill using the Children’s Memory Scale (CMS;
Cohen, 1997).
Coding
24-hr verbal recall.. The 24-hr interview was
video-recorded and was coded by two independent
observers, one of whom was unaware of the child’s
age. During the verbal recall phase of the interview,
children were given a single point for each correct
item that they reported about the memory event
(e.g., ‘‘I turned the magic box on’’). Interrater
reliability for 90% of the interviews was 94%.
Verbal Recall After a 6-Year Delay 165
All disagreements were easily resolved through
discussion.
24-hr and 6-year nonverbal recall.. During the pho-
tograph recognition task, children were given a sin-
gle point for each photograph that they identified
correctly. There were 10 target photographs at the
24-hr interview and 11 at the 6-year interview. Dur-
ing the behavioral reenactment task, children were
awarded 1 point for the first instance of each of the
following target actions: (a) turn on the Magic
Shrinking Machine, (b) take a toy from the suitcase,
(c) put the toy in the top of the machine, (d) turn
the handle on the side, and (e) retrieve the toy from
the door. Interrater reliability was 98% for 70% of
the 24-hr interview videos and 99% for 50% of the
6-year videos. Disagreements were easily resolved
through discussion.
6-year verbal recall.. The 6-year memory interview
was transcribed verbatim from audio tape. Two
coders, who were both highly familiar with the
Magic Shrinking Machine paradigm but were blind
to each child’s age and condition (experienced vs.
control), read through each transcript and made a
global judgment on whether the child or parent did
or did not verbally recall the Magic Shrinking
Machine event. Specifically, any participant who
described a toy that changed the size of objects was
considered to remember the event. Participants
who did not mention a change in size but accu-
rately described a number of other features of the
target event were also assigned to the remember
category. A participant was only assigned to the
remember category if the coder had no doubt
that he or she recalled the target event. Interrater
reliability (agreements over agreements plus
disagreements) was .91 (Kappa = .80). One coder’s
decisions were used in analyses.
One coder then parsed the verbal reports of the
children and parents in the remember category into
clauses. A clause corresponded roughly to a simple
sentence and was defined by the presence of an
explicit or implicit verb, such that there was one
verb per clause. The same coder also removed repe-
titions and off-topic remarks (e.g., ‘‘I keep remem-
bering the rabbit but I think that’s a different one’’).
She then read through all of the transcripts and
coded each clause as correct (e.g., ‘‘I put a packet of
raisins in’’), incorrect (e.g., ‘‘It came out big’’), or
unverifiable, (e.g., ‘‘He thought the suitcase was
cool’’). A second coder, unaware of each child’s
age, coded half of the transcripts. Interrater reliabil-
ity (agreements over agreements plus disagree-
ments) was 91%. Disagreements were resolved
through discussion.
166 Jack, Simcock, and Hayne

Results was to assign children and parents to one of two

categories on the basis of whether they verbally
An alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical
recalled the event after the 6-year delay. No control
tests. Thus, all results reported as significant had a
child was assigned to the remember category, but 9
p value of < .05.
(20%) of the experienced children and 26 (62%) of
the parents did exhibit verbal recall. Across all age
Verbal and Nonverbal Recall after a 24-Hr Delay groups, a larger proportion of parents than children
verbally recalled the event (see Figure 1). A chi-
As shown in Table 2, children of all ages
square analysis confirmed that significantly more
recalled the event after a 24-hr delay, exhibiting
parents than children recalled the event,
both verbal and nonverbal recall of the Magic
v2(1) = 16.43. Although the data shown in Figure 1
Shrinking Machine. Furthermore, a series of one-
suggest that parents’ recall decreased as a function
way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) confirmed
of child age, Fisher’s exact test showed that this
that children’s photograph recognition, F(4, 39) =
trend was not significant (for all comparisons,
4.33; behavioral reenactment, F(4, 40) = 3.44; and
p > .10).
verbal recall, F(4, 39) = 11.66 increased signifi-
Although more parents than children recalled
cantly as a function of age. These data are highly
the event, we were also interested in potential age-
consistent with those previously reported by Sim-
related differences in the quality of their reports. In
cock and Hayne (2003) with a different sample of
order to address this issue, we took a closer look at
children who were the same age as the children
the reports provided by the parents and children
in this experiment.
who recalled the event. The total number of clauses
reported about the event, the number of clauses
Children’s and Parents’ Verbal Recall After a 6-Year that were correct, the number of clauses that
Delay were incorrect, and the number of clauses that
were unverifiable were subjected to independent
To confirm that children in the control group did
samples t tests across age group (parents, children).
not differ from the children in the experienced
There were no significant differences. As shown in
group in terms of their general language and mem-
Figure 2, parents and children who verbally
ory skills at the time of the 6-year interview, all
recalled the event reported a similar number of
children’s standard scores on the PPVT and EVT,
clauses about it (children, M = 21.7, SE = 5.80; par-
general memory scores on the CMS, and vocabu-
ents, M = 24.2, SE = 1.69). Overall, across both par-
lary checklist scores were subjected to separate one-
ents and children, approximately 60% of the
way ANOVAs, with group as a between-subjects
information that they reported was correct, 27%
variable with six levels (five age groups and the
was incorrect, and 13% was unverifiable (see
control group). There were no significant effects.
Figure 2).
Given that the children who participated in the
Magic Shrinking Machine event encoded the event
and recalled it after a 24-hr delay, the key question
was whether they would also recall it 6 years later. 1.0
The first step toward answering that question
Proportion Exhibiting Verbal Recall

0.8 Children
Parents

Table 2 0.6
Mean Scores (and Standard Errors) on Memory Tasks at the 24-Hr
Interview as a Function of Age 0.4

Photograph Behavioral
0.2
Age group recognition reenactment
(months) (max = 10) (max = 5) Verbal recall
0.0
27 8.00 (0.56) 3.60 (0.43) 2.20 (1.18) 27 33 39 45 51

33 9.38 (0.50) 4.63 (0.18) 7.00 (1.34) Age of Child at Encoding (Months)
39 8.00 (0.45) 4.50 (0.40) 8.40 (1.38)
45 9.57 (0.20) 5.00 (0.00) 12.29 (0.71) Figure 1. The proportion of children and parents who verbally
51 9.78 (0.15) 4.89 (0.11) 12.33 (1.29) recalled the Magic Shrinking Machine event after a 6-year delay
as a function of the child’s age at the time of the event.
 Verbal Recall After a 6-Year Delay 167

18 of information. The amount of information reported

16 Children by the 8 other children who verbally recalled the
Parents
event ranged from 7 to 27 clauses. The 2 youngest
Mean Number of Clauses

14

12
10
8
6 27 clauses of information respectively. A child who
4 was in the oldest age group—51 months at the time
2 of the event—reported the smallest amount of
0
Correct Incorrect Unverifiable
Accuracy
Figure 2. Mean number (± SE) of correct, incorrect, and
unverifiable clauses reported by children and parents about the
Magic Shrinking Machine event.
Age-Related Differences in Children’s Verbal Recall
After a 6-Year Delay
The data presented in Figure 1 clearly show that
there was no systematic relation between a child’s
age at the time of the event and whether or not he
or she verbally recalled it 6 years later. Given the
small number of children who did verbally recall
the event, it was not possible to test for age-related
differences in either the amount or accuracy of
information they reported using standard statistical
techniques. From a more qualitative perspective,
however, there were no obvious age-related differ-
ences in these variables (see Table 3, top panel). For
example, a child who was 39 months old at the
time of the event reported the largest amount of
information about the event; he reported 65 clauses
Table 3
Amount, Accuracy, and Type of Information Reported About the Magic Shrinking Machine Event by Children in the Remember Category
children who recalled the event, who were only 27
and 33 months old when they played with the
Magic Shrinking Machine, by no means reported
the least information about it; they reported 12 and
information.
Although only one child who had been in the 27-
month-old group verbally recalled the event, his
account of the Magic Shrinking Machine event was
100% correct. On the other hand, only one third of
the information reported by the one 33-month-old
who was assigned to the remember category was
correct. The accuracy of the remaining seven chil-
dren who verbally recalled the event was interme-
diate between these 2 children, ranging from 50%
to 93% (see Table 3, top panel).
The specific content of the reports provided by
the children in the Remember category is summa-
rized in Table 3 (bottom panel). As shown in
Table 3, children’s reports varied in content, but all
children exhibited clear evidence that they recalled
at least something about the central aspects of the
event.
Predicting Children’s Verbal Recall After a 6-Year Delay
As discussed earlier, the child’s age at the time
of the event was not a particularly reliable predictor
of whether or not he or she verbally recalled it. To
assess whether it was possible to predict which

Child

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Age at event (months) 27 33 39 39 39 39 51 51 51

Number of clauses 12 27 65 23 16 10 7 17 18
Accuracya (%) 100 32 57 70 93 80 50 88 82
Details reported

Change in size 4 4 4 4 — 4 4 4 —
Any item placed in the box 4 4 4 4 — — 4 4 —
Any other accompanying item (e.g., bags, book) — — — — 4 — 4 — —
Any target action 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Location (at home) 4 — 4 4 4 4 4 — 4
Own reaction to event — 4 4 4 4 — — — —
Other 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4

a
The number of correct clauses reported as a percentage of the total number of correct and incorrect clauses reported.
168 Jack, Simcock, and Hayne

children recalled the event, we subjected a range of (e.g., once or twice), and 2 was assigned if the par-
dependent variables, including verbal and nonver- ent indicated that the child had talked about the
bal recall scores during the 24-hr interview, nonver- event often (in general, parents indicated that
bal recall scores during the 6-year interview, rehearsal was limited to the days and weeks imme-
language scores, and general memory scores, to diately following the target event). We then sub-
independent samples t tests across verbal recall sta- jected these data to an independent samples t test
tus (remembered, did not remember). None of across verbal recall status (remembered, did not
these variables, including 24-hr verbal and nonver- remember). On average, the children who did ver-
bal recall scores and 6-year nonverbal recall scores, bally recall the event at the 6-year interview
differed as a function of whether children recalled (M = 1.06, SE = 0.18) had talked about the event
the event after a 6-year delay (see Table 4). Note significantly more than the children who did not
that the nonverbal recall tasks tapped only certain recall it (M = 0.57, SE = 0.09), t(41) = 2.35. Parents’
aspects of the event, which may or may not have reports about how much they had talked about the
formed part of children’s verbal recall. event did not significantly differ as a function of
Recall that during the 6-year interviews, we whether they or their child recalled the target event
asked parents whether they or their children had at the 6-year interview (ps > .10).
talked about the target event since it occurred. On
the basis of parents’ answers to the rehearsal ques-
Verbal Expression of Preverbal Memories
tions, we assigned each child a number from 0 to 2.
Zero was assigned if the parent indicated that his In an earlier study with the Magic Shrinking
or her child had never talked about the event, 1 Machine, Simcock and Hayne (2002) found that
was assigned if the child had talked about it a bit when children were interviewed after a 1-year
delay, no child used a word to describe the event
that had not been part of his or her productive
Table 4 vocabulary at the time of the event. In order to
Children’s Mean Scores (and Standard Errors) on Tests of Language
establish whether the children in this study ver-
Skill, General Memory Skill, and Memory for the Magic Shrinking
bally described any preverbal aspect of their memo-
Machine Event, as a Function of Verbal Recall
ries, we compared children’s verbal reports with
Verbally recalled the Magic the task-specific vocabulary checklists that were
Shrinking Machine event? completed by a parent at the time of the event. On
the basis of the verbal checklists, two children used
Variable Yes No t
a word to describe the event that was not part of
Measured at target event or 24-hr interview their productive vocabulary at the time the event
Vocabulary checklist 20.75 (0.77) 19.63 (0.61) 1.43 took place. One girl who had been aged 39 months
PPVT raw 46.88 (6.98) 45.54 (3.43) 0.19 at the original event described the Magic Shrinking
PPVT standard 99.75 (3.18) 100.54 (2.11) 0.19 Machine as a ‘‘big black container.’’ According to
EVT raw 43.25 (4.00) 36.46 (2.23) 1.45 her mother, the word container had not been part of
EVT standard 110.75 (4.37) 107.09 (2.28) 0.79 her vocabulary at the time of the event. One boy
Free recall 3.00 (1.13) 1.60 (0.44) 1.35 who had been aged 51 months when he first played
Prompted recall 5.33 (1.28) 5.29 (0.64) 0.03 with the Magic Shrinking Machine told the experi-
Cued recall 0.44 (0.24) 1.11 (0.21) 1.53
menter, ‘‘there was a box . . . it was a shrinking
Total verbal recall 8.78 (2.04) 8.00 (0.86) 0.35
box.’’ According to his mother, the word shrink had
Photograph recognition 9.00 (0.33) 8.83 (0.26) 0.31
Reenactment 4.22 (0.46) 4.56 (0.15) 0.88
not been part of his vocabulary at the time of the
Measured at 6-year interview event. In both instances, the statement was made
Vocabulary checklist 33.00 (0.00) 32.95 (0.04) 0.90 during free or prompted recall, before the experi-
PPVT raw 136.33 (6.51) 125.81 (2.52) 1.75 menter had mentioned the Magic Shrinking
PPVT standard 112.89 (6.07) 102.89 (1.78) 1.58 Machine.
EVT raw 94.11 (7.19) 83.38 (2.24) 1.88
EVT standard 100.67 (5.24) 93.78 (2.03) 1.42
CMS general memory 78.11 (5.01) 84.38 (2.13) 1.26
Photograph recognition 5.67 (0.67) 4.65 (0.35) 1.31 Discussion
Reenactment 3.67 (0.33) 3.03 (0.18) 1.57
We interviewed a large group of children about a
Note. PPVT = Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test; EVT = distinctive event that they had experienced during
Expressive Vocabulary Test; CMS = Children’s Memory Scale. early childhood. We found that 20% of these

children were able to verbally recall the event that
they had experienced 6 years earlier. We also had
the rare opportunity to compare the memories of
children and adults for the same event under the
same highly structured interview conditions.
Although more parents than children recalled the
event, for those parents and children who remem-
bered, there was no age-related difference in the
amount or accuracy of the information they
reported. Furthermore, of the 9 children who
remembered the event, most recalled it with very
little prompting. Four of the children described the
event during the free-recall phase of the interview,
before the interviewer had referred to the Magic
Shrinking Machine. Another 4 children recalled the
event the first time the interviewer mentioned it: ‘‘I
heard that you played with the Magic Box. . . . Can
you remember when you played with the Magic
Box?’’ The remaining child (51 months at event)
recalled the event when he saw the photograph of
the Magic Shrinking Machine during the recogni-
tion task. Two of the children who recalled the
event were only 27–33 months old when it hap-
pened. Taken together, these data provide compel-
ling evidence that early experiences can be verbally
recalled after long delays.
Although children’s 24-hr recall of the Magic
Shrinking Machine was related to their age at the
time of the event, the probability that they would
recall the event 6 years later was not—some
children who were only 2 at the time of the event
remembered it, while some children who were as
old as 4 did not. Nor were individual differences in
6-year verbal recall due to the failure of some
children to encode the event. As shown in Table 2,
children of all ages exhibited very high levels of
nonverbal recall and at least some verbal recall just
24 hr after the event. Despite this high level of
initial encoding, many of these children failed to
recall the event 6 years later. Furthermore, the
children who did recall the event at the 6-year
interview had performed no better on any measure
at the 24-hr test (or on the nonverbal measures at
the 6-year test) than the children who did not recall
it. Nor were children’s general or task-specific
vocabulary skills, measured at encoding and at test,
or their general memory skills measured at test
related to verbal recall during the 6-year interview.
Although this suggests that it might be difficult to
predict who will and will not recall an early experi-
ence after a long delay, it is possible that variables
that we did not measure, such as general intelli-
gence, might be related to long-term verbal recall.
For example, Willcock (2003) found that 5- to
Verbal Recall After a 6-Year Delay 169
6-year-old children’s intelligence scores predicted
their recall of a visit to the fire station after a
1-month delay, and Rabbitt and McInnis (1988)
found that age of earliest memory differed as a
function of intelligence in a large sample of older
adults.
It is also possible that children’s verbal rehearsal
plays an important role in long-term retention.
Although parents’ answers to our rehearsal ques-
tions were often quite tentative, and their retrospec-
tive reports of rehearsal over a 6-year delay may be
vulnerable to error, their answers allowed us to
explore whether individual differences in verbal
recall might be related to differences in rehearsal
during the retention interval. Our results suggest
that children who actively participated in conversa-
tions about the event were more likely to recall that
event years later than those who did not (see also
Tessler & Nelson, 1996). Furthermore, as a large
body of literature attests, it is likely that the narra-
tive quality of the memory conversations that chil-
dren take part in might also play a role (for a
review, see Reese, 2009).
In the past, some researchers (including us) have
argued that one reason why adults fail to recall the
events of their early childhood is that they are
unable to gain verbal access to memories that were
encoded prior to language acquisition (e.g., Morri-
son & Conway, 2010; Simcock & Hayne, 2002). For
example, in our prior research with the Magic
Shrinking Machine, we found that when inter-
viewed after a 1-year delay, children did not use
words to describe the event that had not been part
of their productive vocabulary at the time the event
took place (Simcock & Hayne, 2002). Subsequently,
Morris and Baker-Ward (2007) found that although
rare, at least some children could translate a prever-
bal aspect of a memory into words following lan-
guage training for a specific word that was
required to describe the task. The results of the
present research take the Morris and Baker-Ward
findings one step further. Although still rare, we
found that two children did describe aspects of the
target event that, according to their parents’
reports, had not been part of their productive
vocabulary at the time that the event took place.
Furthermore, this ‘‘translation’’ occurred on the
basis of vocabulary acquired in the course of nor-
mal language development without explicit instruc-
tion for particular event-related words. Taken
together, the Morris and Baker-Ward data and the
data reported here clearly challenge the strong form
of the language acquisition hypothesis of childhood
amnesia. At the same time, however, they also
170 Jack, Simcock, and Hayne
underscore the fact that under most circumstances,
lack of language skill at the time of original encod-
ing may place severe constraints on the probability
that a memory will be recalled after a long delay.
Although some participants recalled the event
after a 6-year delay, they often made errors in their
accounts. For example, both children and parents
were more likely to incorrectly recall that our
machine made objects bigger than to correctly recall
that it made objects smaller. At least 4 parents also
demonstrated memory distortions consistent with
typical expectations of magical events. For example,
1 parent reported, ‘‘She got to wear a wizard’s
jacket and a hat, she had a wand . . . she had to
wave the wand,’’ and another said, ‘‘I think she
may have said ‘abracadabra.’’’ Although it is well
established that memory distortions often occur
when individuals are exposed to misleading sug-
gestions (Huffman et al., 1997; Loftus, 2005; Suther-
land & Hayne, 2001), the results of the present
experiment suggest that, at least for playful events,
memory distortions might emerge over long delays
even in the absence of misleading information or
inappropriate interviewing. Furthermore, the obser-
vation that parents but not children made schema-
consistent intrusion errors is consistent with a
growing body of literature showing that expec-
tancy-based distortions sometimes increase with
age (Baker-Ward, Ornstein, & Principe, 1997; Brain-
erd, Reyna, & Ceci, 2008; Ornstein et al., 1998).
With the aim of eliciting only authentic memo-
ries of our target event, we reassured participants
that it was very hard to remember over such a long
delay; we repeatedly told them that it was okay to
say, ‘‘I don’t know,’’ and we asked them not to
guess any of the answers. Despite these precau-
tions, even children and parents who were sub-
sequently judged not to have remembered the
event often provided answers to at least some of
our questions. On average, among the participants
who were not assigned to the remember category,
parents provided answers to 8 of our 13 specific
questions about the event, and children provided
answers to 4. Sometimes these answers were cor-
rect, and sometimes participants were mistakenly
describing a different event, but it was often clear
that participants were guessing. Research has
shown that children often try to answer adults’
questions, even if they do not know the correct
answer or remember the event at all (Gross & Hayne,
1996; Hughes & Grieve, 1983); in this study, we
observed the same phenomenon with both children
and adults. Perhaps participants were reluctant to
say, ‘‘I don’t know’’ because they felt that they
were expected to remember, or because of a desire
to ‘‘help’’ the interviewer.
The results of the present experiment demon-
strate that, although rare, some participants could
recall an event that happened when they were only
2 years old. This age is substantially younger than
the modal age of most adults’ earliest memories,
which is typically about 3½ years (but see Jack &
Hayne, 2010; Usher & Neisser, 1993). How does the
fact that some children could remember such an
early event sit with prior research on the develop-
ment of autobiographical memory? Most theorists
currently agree that autobiographical memory is a
subtype of episodic memory, which in turn is a
subtype of declarative memory. Many researchers
have argued that declarative memory begins to
emerge late in the 1st year of human development,
supported by cortical structures in the medial tem-
poral lobes, including the hippocampus (Richmond
& Nelson, 2007; Schacter & Moscovitch, 1984) and
that episodic memory, which also requires the hip-
pocampus, as well as the prefrontal cortex, appears
to emerge somewhat later in development. For
example, Newcombe, Lloyd, and Ratliff (2007)
argued that episodic memory first becomes possible
at around 2 years of age, when a marked transition
in hippocampal functioning occurs.
In addition to the maturation of the requisite
neurological structures, autobiographical memory
is also dependent on a wide range of cognitive
skills. For example, autobiographical memories are
characterized by autonoetic consciousness (Tulving,
1985, 2002) or the feeling that the target event hap-
pened to ‘‘me’’ in the past. This subjective experi-
ence depends on the existence of a cognitive self, a
construct which prospective studies have shown
emerges late in the 2nd year of life (Howe & Cour-
age, 1993, 1997). According to a number of theo-
rists, autobiographical memory also depends on
language (Morrison & Conway, 2010; Nelson, 1993;
Pillemer & White, 1989; Simcock & Hayne, 2002),
the acquisition of which begins in earnest at around
18–24 months of age (Fenson et al., 1993).
Taken together, data on the neurological basis of
autobiographical memory, the emergence of a cog-
nitive sense of self, and the acquisition of language
all suggest that the basic ingredients of autobio-
graphical memory are in place by 2 years of age.
Furthermore, prospective studies with children
have repeatedly shown that, with some support,
2-year-olds can describe events from their own per-
sonal past (for a review, see Reese, 2009). Thus, our
observation that a child as young as 27 months at
the time of the event recalled the event 6 years later

is consistent with both theory and data on autobio-
graphical memory development. Of course, in this
study, the child was an active participant in the tar-
get event; it remains to be seen whether the present
findings will generalize to events in which the child
was a passive observer.
Children’s 24-hr recall in this study also confirms
that although the basic capacity for autobiographi-
cal memory appears to be in place by 2 years of
age, children’s mnemonic abilities continue to
increase dramatically with age. These improve-
ments depend on a number of factors, including
but not limited to parent–child conversations about
the past, additional language development, and
decreased encoding specificity (for review, see
Hayne & Jack, 2011; Reese, 2009). Individual differ-
ences in these factors may have contributed to indi-
vidual differences in our participants’ ability to
recall the Magic Shrinking Machine after a 6-year
delay.
In the final analysis, the present findings add
to a growing body of research showing that
young children can recall unique episodes in their
lives over long retention intervals. The factors that
determine whether they will recall any particular
event, however, remain elusive. The rarity of ver-
bal recall for the target event in this study paral-
lels the sparseness of adults’ memories for the
same period of life (Jack & Hayne, 2010). Further-
more, many of adults’ very early memories
involve extremely mundane experiences; the
reason that these particular experiences and not
others are selectively retained is unclear and
warrants further research.
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