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Özbudun fRAGMENTATİON
Özbudun fRAGMENTATİON
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Middle Eastern Studies
Ergun Ozbudun
The study of the Turkish party system should be of interest to the comparative
political analyst, not only because Turkey is one of the very few 'developing'
countries which has been able to maintain a competitive (pluralist) party
system for a considerable length of time, but also because this system has been
undergoing significant changes in recent years. Such changes appear to be
associated, above all, with the process of rapid socio-economic modernization.
Thus, the study of the Turkish party system is likely to throw some light upon
the relationship between modernization and the party system. In this paper, I
shall first attempt to describe the format and the mechanics of the Turkish
party system, closely adhering to Sartori's typology. Then, I shall discuss some
more specific phenomena, such as polarization, institutionalization, and
fragmentation, which are obviously relevant to the Turkish case. In each cas
developmental implications and associations will also be spelled out. Finally, I
shall venture to provide some conjectural thoughts on the possible directions of
change in the Turkish party system.
The format of the Turkish party system and its changes over time can be
discussed with reference to Table 1, which shows the percentage of votes and
the percentage of seats gained by each party in eight national elections since
1950. For the elections 1961-1977, only the National Assembly results are
given, omitting those of the Senate of the Republic, since the National
Assembly is clearly the more powerful branch of the bicameral Turkish
legislature under the Constitution of 1961.
In the years 1950 to 1960, the Turkish party system displayed a clear two-
party 'format', with the two major parties, the Democratic Party (DP) and the
Republican People's Party (RPP), together pulling about 90 per cent of the
total votes cast and gaining over 98 per cent of the parliamentary seats. The
other two parties represented in the Assembly, the National Party (NP, which
subsequently changed its name to Republican Nation Party and then to
Republican Peasant Nation Party) and the Freedom Party (FP), were entirely
insignificant parties both in terms of the percentage of votes and of the
percentage of seats. In other words, they were very far from satisfying Sartori's
criteria for relevance. At each of the three parliamentary elections during this
period (1950, 1954, and 1957) the DP received comfortable absolute majorities
* Prepared for delivery at the World Congress of the International Sociological Association,
Uppsala, August 1978.
IN PARLIAMENTAR'L' EL-ECTIONS
Electio
Year DP/JP RP1P NP FP NTP TLP NAP U
1950 33.() - _ _ _
(83.-) (P.2) (0.2)
Notes
The first figure refers to the percentage of votes and thle? s(conld figufre in pare
theses to the percentage of seat-s. Abbreviations: DP - Democratic Party; RPP -
Republican People's Party; JP - Juistice Party; NP - Nation Party; FP - Freedom
Party; NTP - New Turlcey Party; TLP - Turlkish Labor Party; NAP - Nationalist Act
Party; UP - Unity Party; RRP - Republican Reliance Party; Dem.P. - Democratic
Party (foi-med ill 1970); NSP - National Salvation Party.
in the Grand National Assembly, and it governed alone continuously for ten
years until it was overthrown by the military coup of 27 May, 1960.
However, the question regarding the period 1950 to 1960 is not really one of
format, but one of 'mechanics'. Did the party system prevailing in that period
display the properties of a two-party or a predominant party system? Sartori
(1976: 197, 278; see also Sayari, 1978: 43-5) maintains that Turkey (between
1950 and 1973) has been 'a clear case of a predominant party system'. True, as
Table 1 reveals, the DP and its successor the Justice Party (JP) won five
consecutive absolute majorities of seats in the Assembly with one single
exception during the 1961-1965 legislature. And this exception can easily be
explained by the effects of the 1960 coup; after the dissolution of the DP
(incidentally, the DP was not outlawed by the military government, but was
dissolved by a court order on account of a technicality) a three-cornered
competition took place between the JP, the RPNP (formerly the Nation Party),
and the NTP (New Turkey Party, established after the coup) for the votes of
the former DP supporters. As a result of this, no party received an absolute
majority of seats in 1961. Still, the total number of votes and seats of the three
conservative parties all of whom claimed to be the true heir to the defunct DP
far exceeded those of the RPP. Thus, the predominance of the DP/JP in the
1950-73 period seems, in fact, to satisfy Sartori's (1976: 196, 199) basic
condition for a predominant party system, namely three or four consecutive
absolute majorities in the legislature.
Nevertheless, a word of caution appears to be in order here. First, the
percentages of seats are highly misleading for the 1950-60 period, because the
electoral system in operation then was a single-ballot simple-majority system
combined with very large constituencies. Under the winner-take-all
arrangement of this system, relatively modest popular majorities were
translated into landslide parliamentary majorities. A good case in point is the
1957 election when the RPP made a strong comeback, increasing its share of
votes from 34.8 to 40.8 per cent and that of parliamentary seats from 5.7 to
29.2 per cent. In the same election, the DP's popular vote fell below the 50 per
cent line. Furthermore, just prior to the elections, the DP-dominated Assembly
had amended the electoral law to forbid electoral alliances among political
parties. This was intended as a measure to prevent the three opposition parties
(RPP, RPNP, and FP) from presenting joint lists as they had agreed to do.
Without this electoral manipulation, the DP might well have lost the 1957
elections.
Thus, the 1950-60 period is not one of clear predominance. If the two-party
system is to be defined as leniently as Sartori (1976: 186) suggests, in other
words if 'alternation should be loosely understood as implying the expectation
rather than the actual occurrence of governmental turnover', then the period
can be said to have displayed two-party properties. The margin between the
popular votes of the DP and the RPP being less than 7 per cent in 1957, there
certainly was 'sufficient credibility to the expectation that the party in
opposition [had] a chance to oust the governing party.' The cases of 1965 and
1969 elections are different in that the JP not only obtained absolute majority
of parliamentary seats, but also showed a clear domination of the total vote, by
far outdistancing its closest rival, the RPP. Had this pattern continued beyond
two consecutive elections, then one could rightly describe the system as a
predominant party system. But the JP's dominance came to an end in 1973,
and this trend was also confirmed by the 1977 elections. Furthermore, unlike
the 1961-65 period, this time the fragmentation of the Right cannot be
attributed to the effects of the 1971 military intervention, since the two
conservative splinter parties, the Democratic Party (Dem.P.) and the National
Salvation Party (NSP), had defected from the JP previous to the military
action.
We may now turn to the format of the Turkish party system as it evolved
after the hiatus of 1960-61. The National Assembly elected in 1961 contained
four 'relevant' parties, no party having an absolute majority of seats and all
four displaying 'coalition potential'. This increase in the number of relevant
parties was due partly to the fragmentation of the former DP voters as
mentioned above, and partly to the introduction of proportional representation
to replace the old simple-majority single-ballot system.' The format of party
system that prevailed in the 1961-65 legislature conformed neatly to the
pattern of 'limited pluralism'.
The 1965 and 1969 elections produced a very different pattern. In both, the
JP, having established itself as the rightful heir to the DP, won comfortable
absolute majorities of seats (in 1965, the absolute majority of votes as well). At
the same time, the number of parties represented in the Assembly increased to
six in 1965 and to eight in 1969. Applying Sartori's 'counting rules', (1976:
121-4) however, we must conclude that almost all of these minor parties
were irrelevant. With the JP governing alone, they had no coalition potential at
all. With respect to 'blackmail potential', only the TLP (Turkish Labor Party)
may qualify in a sense. As the first Marxist party ever represented in the
Turkish legislature, the TLP did not act or seem like a truly 'anti-system' party.
Our characterization of it as having blackmail potential is rather based on
Sartori's definition of such potential. Thus, 'a party qualifes for relevance
whenever its existence, or appearance, affects the tactics of party competition
and particularly when it alters the direction of the competition-by
determining a switch from centripetal to centrifugal competition either
leftward, rightward, or in both directions-of the governing-oriented parties'
(Idem., 123). Indeed, the appearance of the TLP seems to have been a major
factor in the RPP's opening to the left for fear of losing support among the
party's traditional stronghold, the urban intellectuals. Thus, the TLP, despite
its negligible size, did effect a switch from centripetal to centrifugal
competition.
This new and important characteristic notwithstanding, the period 1965-73
can be described as a case of short-lived predominance, as explained above.
The incidence of so-called 'above-party' coalition governments in the last two
years of the period was dictated not by the parliamentary arithmetics, but by
the desire of the military strongly expressed in the memorandum of 12 March,
1971, which led to the resignation of the JP government headed by Mr
Demirel.
The elections of 1973 once again produced a different party system format.
Thus, the small NAP became a partner in the 'Nationalist Front' government
led by Demirel, and was given two ministerial seats in return for its three votes
in the Assembly, thereby establishing itself as the sixth relevant party.
The National Assembly that emerged from the 1977 elections presented a
similar picture. Now six parties were represented in the Assembly, of which
two were very small: the RRP (Republican Reliance Party) and the Dem.P.
(Democratic Party) with three seats and one seat respectively.2 But due to the
very close division between the RPP and its Nationalist Front opponents (JP,
NSP, and NAP), both of these minor parties found their way into the RPP-
dominated Ecevit government, each of their three deputies being given a
ministerial seat. The number of relevant parties, therefore, again climbed up to
six, and the Turkish party system seemed to be situated almost on the border
line between limited and extreme pluralism. A closer look suggests, however,
that the number of parties represented in the Assembly tends to decrease rather
than to increase. There are now six parties in the Assembly instead of eight in
the 1969-73 legislature and seven in the 1973-77 legislature. Furthermore, the
two minor parties (RRP and Dem.P) are clearly on the verge of disappearance.
Their inclusion in the government is the result of a very special parliamentary
arithmetic. At present, and seemingly for the near future, the Assembly
displays an essentially four-party format. In short, it would not be wrong to
characterize the system as still appertaining to the class of limited pluralism.
When we turn now to the 'mechanics' of the system, we are confronted with
still more serious difficulties. The 1961-65 legislature presents no problems.
Clearly, this is a case of 'moderate pluralism', with no anti-system parties, no
bilateral oppositions, no multipolarity, no centrifugal drive, and little
ideological polarization. Alternative coalitions were possible and were, in fact,
practiced: RPP-JP; RPP-NTP-RPNP; RPP minority government; JP-NTP-
RPNP. (It should be noted, however, that the RPP's presence as the senior
partner in the first two coalitions and its minority government were due less to
the normal exigencies of the parliamentary system than to a desire to placate
the military and to ward off the danger of another military takeover.)
After eight years of predominance by the JP, the 1973 legislature still
displayed most of the characteristics of moderate pluralism. The party system
K
D(t)=1/2 q/V (t-1)- V(0/
i = I
After having computed the factor scores of all provinces for each factor, we
ran a multiple regression analysis utilizing factor scores as independent
variables. Again, the combined RPP-JP vote was positively correlated with
Factor 1 (cultural and organizational development) and Factor 2 (urbanization
and industrialization): B weights for Factor 1 were (.659) for 1969 and (.502)
for 1973; B weights for Factor 2 were (.266) for 1969 and (.225) for 1973.
Conversely, the percentage of votes for independent candidates (an indicator of
a low level of political institutionalization) was negatively correlated with
development variables: B weights for Factor 1 were (-.591) for 1969 and (-
.543) for 1973; for Factor 2, they were (-.166) and (-.142), respectively
(Ozbudun, 1980: 129-35; 1977: 291-304). It seems clear that the two-party
tendency is distinctly stronger in the more highly developed regions of the
country. To put it differently, socio-economic modernization in Turkey
appears to be positively related to party-system institutionalization.
h 2
Fe=l-(2T,)
Fe = I 1j
TABLE 2
party format with no party even approaching absolute majority; the 1969
legislature presented a case of predominance; in 1977, the two major parties
together obtained almost 90 per cent of the seats (the highest such percentage
since 1957) and they were relatively evenly divided, the RPP being only a few
seats short of absolute majority. In short, the index of fractionalization does
not really distinguish between different party system formats, let alone party
system 'mechanics' which cannot be understood without resorting to the
ideological variable.
Fractionalization scores for each province were correlated with the
developmental factor variables mentioned above. Party system
fractionalization was found to be negatively associated with the level of
provincial socio-economic modernization: B weight for Factor 1 was (-.508) fo
1969 and (-.298) for 1973; they were (-.180) and(-.1 13) respectively for Factor
2. That the negative correlations for 1973 were weaker than the correlations
for 1969 may be due to the split of the Dem.P. from the JP in 1970, which
increased fragmentation in the provinces where the JP was strongest (i.e.,
generally more developed provinces). It is clear, however, that in Turkey, party
system fragmentation is associated with a low level of socio-economic
development. As development proceeds, there is a stronger tendency toward a
two-party format (Ozbudun, 1980: 129-35).
likely to increase polarization. At the moment, no parties to the left of the RPP
are represented in the Assembly, mainly because their potential voters were
afraid of fragmenting the leftist vote in the face of what they perceived as a
growing threat from the Right. In the future and under different circumstances,
such parties can possibly gain some representation in the Assembly. On the
Right, the crucial variable is the relationship between the JP and the NAP. The
NAP can be expected to increase its votes at the expense of the JP. But if the
JP leadership decides against the game of outbidding and revert to moderate
positions, the NAP's effects on the system can still be contained. If the present
collaboration between the two parties continues, on the other hand, a split
within the JP will be quite possible; the moderate elements will leave it to form
a new center party. In this case, although new coalition possibilities will appear,
the center space of the political spectrum will be occupied and the system will
display the properties of polarized pluralism, with anti-system bilateral
oppositions both on the Right and the Left exerting a centrifugal impact upon
the center. Finally, and most ominously, if none of these things happen and the
JP continues on its rightward course with the bulk of its membership, then the
democratic consensus and the maintenance of the constitutional system will be
greatly endangered.
NOTES
1. All National Assembly elections since and including 1961 were held under the 'd'Hondt'
version of proportional representation, with the single exception of 1965 elections held under
a national remainder system.
2. Shortly after the elections, one RRP member resigned to join the JP.
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