The Turkish Party System: Institutionalization, Polarization, and Fragmentation

Author(s): Ergun Özbudun

Source: Middle Eastern Studies , Apr., 1981, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Apr., 1981), pp. 228-240
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4282829

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 The Turkish Party System: Institutionalization,
Polarization, and Fragmentation

Ergun Ozbudun

The study of the Turkish party system should be of interest to the comparative
political analyst, not only because Turkey is one of the very few 'developing'
countries which has been able to maintain a competitive (pluralist) party
system for a considerable length of time, but also because this system has been
undergoing significant changes in recent years. Such changes appear to be
associated, above all, with the process of rapid socio-economic modernization.
Thus, the study of the Turkish party system is likely to throw some light upon
the relationship between modernization and the party system. In this paper, I
shall first attempt to describe the format and the mechanics of the Turkish
party system, closely adhering to Sartori's typology. Then, I shall discuss some
more specific phenomena, such as polarization, institutionalization, and
fragmentation, which are obviously relevant to the Turkish case. In each cas
developmental implications and associations will also be spelled out. Finally, I
shall venture to provide some conjectural thoughts on the possible directions of
change in the Turkish party system.

I. THE FORMAT AND THE MECHANICS OF THE TURKISH PARTY SYSTEM

The format of the Turkish party system and its changes over time can be
discussed with reference to Table 1, which shows the percentage of votes and
the percentage of seats gained by each party in eight national elections since
1950. For the elections 1961-1977, only the National Assembly results are
given, omitting those of the Senate of the Republic, since the National
Assembly is clearly the more powerful branch of the bicameral Turkish
legislature under the Constitution of 1961.
In the years 1950 to 1960, the Turkish party system displayed a clear two-
party 'format', with the two major parties, the Democratic Party (DP) and the
Republican People's Party (RPP), together pulling about 90 per cent of the
total votes cast and gaining over 98 per cent of the parliamentary seats. The
other two parties represented in the Assembly, the National Party (NP, which
subsequently changed its name to Republican Nation Party and then to
Republican Peasant Nation Party) and the Freedom Party (FP), were entirely
insignificant parties both in terms of the percentage of votes and of the
percentage of seats. In other words, they were very far from satisfying Sartori's
criteria for relevance. At each of the three parliamentary elections during this
period (1950, 1954, and 1957) the DP received comfortable absolute majorities

* Prepared for delivery at the World Congress of the International Sociological Association,
Uppsala, August 1978.

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 TAlI

PERCENTAGE OF VOTES AND

IN PARLIAMENTAR'L' EL-ECTIONS

Electio
Year DP/JP RP1P NP FP NTP TLP NAP U

1950 33.() - _ _ _
(83.-) (P.2) (0.2)

1954 56.6 31.8 1.7 - - - -

(9'33.) (5s7) (0-9)

1957 4,7.7 40.8 7.2 3.8 - - _

(69.:5) (29.2) (0.,7) (0.7)

1961 34.8 '36-7 14.o - 13.7 -

(35.1) ('38.4i) (1;.0) (i4. 4)

1965 52.9 28.7 6.3 - 3.7 3.0 2.

(53.'3) (29.8) (6.9) (4.2) ('3.3) (2.4)

196)93 46.5 2'7.4 3.2 - 2.2 2.,7 3.0

(59.9) (31.8) (1.'3) (1.3) (o.4) (0.2) (1.8)

1973 29.8 33.3 1.0 - - - 3.4 1.1 5

(33.1) (41.1) No Sent. (0.'7) (0.2) (2

1977 36.9 il .4 - _ - 0.1 6.4 0.4

(142.0) (47.3) No Seat (3.6) No Seat

Notes
The first figure refers to the percentage of votes and thle? s(conld figufre in pare
theses to the percentage of seat-s. Abbreviations: DP - Democratic Party; RPP -
Republican People's Party; JP - Juistice Party; NP - Nation Party; FP - Freedom
Party; NTP - New Turlcey Party; TLP - Turlkish Labor Party; NAP - Nationalist Act
Party; UP - Unity Party; RRP - Republican Reliance Party; Dem.P. - Democratic
Party (foi-med ill 1970); NSP - National Salvation Party.

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230 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

in the Grand National Assembly, and it governed alone continuously for ten
years until it was overthrown by the military coup of 27 May, 1960.
However, the question regarding the period 1950 to 1960 is not really one of
format, but one of 'mechanics'. Did the party system prevailing in that period
display the properties of a two-party or a predominant party system? Sartori
(1976: 197, 278; see also Sayari, 1978: 43-5) maintains that Turkey (between
1950 and 1973) has been 'a clear case of a predominant party system'. True, as
Table 1 reveals, the DP and its successor the Justice Party (JP) won five
consecutive absolute majorities of seats in the Assembly with one single
exception during the 1961-1965 legislature. And this exception can easily be
explained by the effects of the 1960 coup; after the dissolution of the DP
(incidentally, the DP was not outlawed by the military government, but was
dissolved by a court order on account of a technicality) a three-cornered
competition took place between the JP, the RPNP (formerly the Nation Party),
and the NTP (New Turkey Party, established after the coup) for the votes of
the former DP supporters. As a result of this, no party received an absolute
majority of seats in 1961. Still, the total number of votes and seats of the three
conservative parties all of whom claimed to be the true heir to the defunct DP
far exceeded those of the RPP. Thus, the predominance of the DP/JP in the
1950-73 period seems, in fact, to satisfy Sartori's (1976: 196, 199) basic
condition for a predominant party system, namely three or four consecutive
absolute majorities in the legislature.
Nevertheless, a word of caution appears to be in order here. First, the
percentages of seats are highly misleading for the 1950-60 period, because the
electoral system in operation then was a single-ballot simple-majority system
combined with very large constituencies. Under the winner-take-all
arrangement of this system, relatively modest popular majorities were
translated into landslide parliamentary majorities. A good case in point is the
1957 election when the RPP made a strong comeback, increasing its share of
votes from 34.8 to 40.8 per cent and that of parliamentary seats from 5.7 to
29.2 per cent. In the same election, the DP's popular vote fell below the 50 per
cent line. Furthermore, just prior to the elections, the DP-dominated Assembly
had amended the electoral law to forbid electoral alliances among political
parties. This was intended as a measure to prevent the three opposition parties
(RPP, RPNP, and FP) from presenting joint lists as they had agreed to do.
Without this electoral manipulation, the DP might well have lost the 1957
elections.
Thus, the 1950-60 period is not one of clear predominance. If the two-party
system is to be defined as leniently as Sartori (1976: 186) suggests, in other
words if 'alternation should be loosely understood as implying the expectation
rather than the actual occurrence of governmental turnover', then the period
can be said to have displayed two-party properties. The margin between the
popular votes of the DP and the RPP being less than 7 per cent in 1957, there
certainly was 'sufficient credibility to the expectation that the party in
opposition [had] a chance to oust the governing party.' The cases of 1965 and
1969 elections are different in that the JP not only obtained absolute majority
of parliamentary seats, but also showed a clear domination of the total vote, by

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 THE TURKISH PARTY SYSTEM 231

far outdistancing its closest rival, the RPP. Had this pattern continued beyond
two consecutive elections, then one could rightly describe the system as a
predominant party system. But the JP's dominance came to an end in 1973,
and this trend was also confirmed by the 1977 elections. Furthermore, unlike
the 1961-65 period, this time the fragmentation of the Right cannot be
attributed to the effects of the 1971 military intervention, since the two
conservative splinter parties, the Democratic Party (Dem.P.) and the National
Salvation Party (NSP), had defected from the JP previous to the military
action.
We may now turn to the format of the Turkish party system as it evolved
after the hiatus of 1960-61. The National Assembly elected in 1961 contained
four 'relevant' parties, no party having an absolute majority of seats and all
four displaying 'coalition potential'. This increase in the number of relevant
parties was due partly to the fragmentation of the former DP voters as
mentioned above, and partly to the introduction of proportional representation
to replace the old simple-majority single-ballot system.' The format of party
system that prevailed in the 1961-65 legislature conformed neatly to the
pattern of 'limited pluralism'.
The 1965 and 1969 elections produced a very different pattern. In both, the
JP, having established itself as the rightful heir to the DP, won comfortable
absolute majorities of seats (in 1965, the absolute majority of votes as well). At
the same time, the number of parties represented in the Assembly increased to
six in 1965 and to eight in 1969. Applying Sartori's 'counting rules', (1976:
121-4) however, we must conclude that almost all of these minor parties
were irrelevant. With the JP governing alone, they had no coalition potential at
all. With respect to 'blackmail potential', only the TLP (Turkish Labor Party)
may qualify in a sense. As the first Marxist party ever represented in the
Turkish legislature, the TLP did not act or seem like a truly 'anti-system' party.
Our characterization of it as having blackmail potential is rather based on
Sartori's definition of such potential. Thus, 'a party qualifes for relevance
whenever its existence, or appearance, affects the tactics of party competition
and particularly when it alters the direction of the competition-by
determining a switch from centripetal to centrifugal competition either
leftward, rightward, or in both directions-of the governing-oriented parties'
(Idem., 123). Indeed, the appearance of the TLP seems to have been a major
factor in the RPP's opening to the left for fear of losing support among the
party's traditional stronghold, the urban intellectuals. Thus, the TLP, despite
its negligible size, did effect a switch from centripetal to centrifugal
competition.
This new and important characteristic notwithstanding, the period 1965-73
can be described as a case of short-lived predominance, as explained above.
The incidence of so-called 'above-party' coalition governments in the last two
years of the period was dictated not by the parliamentary arithmetics, but by
the desire of the military strongly expressed in the memorandum of 12 March,
1971, which led to the resignation of the JP government headed by Mr
Demirel.
The elections of 1973 once again produced a different party system format.

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 232 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

Now seven parties were re

majority of seats, counting rules determining relevance once more became
important. Looking at the sheer size of the parties, only five of them appeared
relevant: RPP, JP, NSP, Dem.P, and RRP. The remaining two, the Nationalist
Action Party (NAP) and the Unity Party (UP) were exceedingly small, with
three seats and one seat respectively. Hence, the situation still looked like a
case of limited pluralism. Nevertheless, the workings of the 1973-77 legislature
provided exceptionally strong support for Sartori's argument that:

(1976: 121-2) the relevance of a party is a function not only of the

relative distribution of power ... but also, and especially, of its position
value ... [Al minor party must be counted, no matter how small it is, if it
finds itself in a position to determine over time, and at some point in time,
at least one of the possible governmental majorities.

Thus, the small NAP became a partner in the 'Nationalist Front' government
led by Demirel, and was given two ministerial seats in return for its three votes
in the Assembly, thereby establishing itself as the sixth relevant party.
The National Assembly that emerged from the 1977 elections presented a
similar picture. Now six parties were represented in the Assembly, of which
two were very small: the RRP (Republican Reliance Party) and the Dem.P.
(Democratic Party) with three seats and one seat respectively.2 But due to the
very close division between the RPP and its Nationalist Front opponents (JP,
NSP, and NAP), both of these minor parties found their way into the RPP-
dominated Ecevit government, each of their three deputies being given a
ministerial seat. The number of relevant parties, therefore, again climbed up to
six, and the Turkish party system seemed to be situated almost on the border
line between limited and extreme pluralism. A closer look suggests, however,
that the number of parties represented in the Assembly tends to decrease rather
than to increase. There are now six parties in the Assembly instead of eight in
the 1969-73 legislature and seven in the 1973-77 legislature. Furthermore, the
two minor parties (RRP and Dem.P) are clearly on the verge of disappearance.
Their inclusion in the government is the result of a very special parliamentary
arithmetic. At present, and seemingly for the near future, the Assembly
displays an essentially four-party format. In short, it would not be wrong to
characterize the system as still appertaining to the class of limited pluralism.
When we turn now to the 'mechanics' of the system, we are confronted with
still more serious difficulties. The 1961-65 legislature presents no problems.
Clearly, this is a case of 'moderate pluralism', with no anti-system parties, no
bilateral oppositions, no multipolarity, no centrifugal drive, and little
ideological polarization. Alternative coalitions were possible and were, in fact,
practiced: RPP-JP; RPP-NTP-RPNP; RPP minority government; JP-NTP-
RPNP. (It should be noted, however, that the RPP's presence as the senior
partner in the first two coalitions and its minority government were due less to
the normal exigencies of the parliamentary system than to a desire to placate
the military and to ward off the danger of another military takeover.)
After eight years of predominance by the JP, the 1973 legislature still
displayed most of the characteristics of moderate pluralism. The party system

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 THE TURKISH PARTY SYSTEM 233

was essentially bipolar, the

JP, the two major parties far outdistancing all others. The center space
remained largely unoccupied: the only party close to a centrist position (RRP)
received only 5.3 per cent of the vote and obtained a mere 13 seats out of a
total of 450. All parties represented in the Assembly were governing-oriented
parties, and five of them actually took part in one of the coalition governments.
Alternative coalitions were practiced, first between the RPP and the NSP, and
then among the JP, the NSP, the RRP, and the NAP. Interestingly, the
religious NSP appeared to have the greatest coalition potential, being a partner
in two different coalitions, a rather surprising occurrence in a country which
prides itself on its secularist reforms (for an analysis of the NSP ideology and
tactics, see Landau, 1976). In a sense, the NSP can be compared to the Israeli
National Religious Party which 'can freely float along the left-right dimension
precisely because its identifiers are interested only in the religious payoffs of
whatever alliance pays' (Sartori, 1976: 340). There were no openly anti-system
parties, with the possible exception of the NAP which, in any case, held only
three seats. Even if the NAP were regarded as an anti-system party, still the
system did not contain bilateral oppositions since there was no relevant
parliamentary party to the left of the left-of-center RPP. The centrifugal drive
which had started for the RPP in the mid- 1960s as a response to the
appearance of the TLP on its left seemed to have stabilized, and the party
settled on a distinctly moderate course.
And yet, there were certain trends quite contrary to the mechanics of
moderate pluralism. The ideological polarization, or distance, in the party
system increased considerably. Instead of the centripetal drive of moderate
pluralism, the basic drive of the system seemed to be in a centrifugal direction.
Growing polarization was accompanied by increasing political violence and
terrorism engaged in by small but well-organized groups on the extreme left
and the extreme right. Political cleavages tended to politicize and reinforce
dormant ethnic (Turkish versus Kurdish) and sectarian (Sunni versus Alevi)
cleavages. Standards of 'fair competition' fell significantly and there was a
corresponding increase in 'politics of outbidding' (Sartori, 1976: 139-40; for
a similar appraisal of the growing polarization in the Turkish party system, see
Sayari, 1978: 49-52).
These trends, although contradictory and paradoxical at first sight, can still
be explained within the framework of party system theory. The main
explanatory variable in this regard is the position of the NAP. It is beyond the
scope of this paper to present a detailed analysis of the NAP ideology and
tactics (for such an analysis, see Landau, 1974). Suffice it to say here that,
despite its public pronouncements upholding the constitutional system, the
NAP is widely believed to have neo-fascist leanings and its commitment to the
maintenance of democratic consensus seems at best dubious. The party has
been instrumental in waging a vehement campaign against all shades of leftism,
thereby contributing to growing ideological polarization. The NAP is known to
train and organize its cadres (appropriately called 'commandoes') in a highly
hierarchical, semi-military fashion, and many suspect that these commandoes
are connected with right-wing terrorist activities. Here, it is useful to refer to

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234 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

Sartori's distinction (1976: 143-4) between visible and invisible politics.

While at the level of visible politics the NAP seems to be committed to the
constitutional system, it is doubtful indeed if such commitment is also
expressed at the level of invisible politics. Limiting ourselves to known facts
can be said with a reasonable amount of confidence that the NAP is an anti-
system party at least on account of its 'delegitimizing impact' (Idem., 132-3).
Just as the appearance of the TLP in the 1960s started a centrifugal drive to
the left for the RPP, the NAP was also instrumental in producing a rightward
drive for the JP. One observer of the Turkish party system expresses the
opinion of most analysts of the Turkish scene by saying that 'during the four
years following the 1973 election ... the JP's ideological stand was discernibly
closer to the Extreme Right than to the Centre' (Sayari, 1978: 50). But,
compared to the earlier leftward drive, this new centrifugal drive to the right
posed a much greater challenge to the Turkish party system. For one thing, the
leftist TLP had never become a partner in any coalition government. In
contrast, the NAP entered the Nationalist Front coalition of Demirel in 1975,
and again in 1977 after the elections held on 5 June, 1977 failed to produce a
one-party majority. The party made very efficient use of its governmental
position not only to colonize the ministries it directly controlled but also to
infiltrate important ministries and other government2' agencies controlled by
sympathetic JP members (e.g., the Ministry of Education, the State Radio and
Television Corporation, the police force, etc.). For another, while the TLP vote
never exceeded the three per cent threshold, the NAP displayed a much greater
capacity to grow. Its percentage of votes was almost doubled from 3.4 in 1973
to 6.4 in 1977, and its number of seats increased more than five times from
three to 16. The NAP seems to siphon off votes mainly from the JP, and it
attracts large numbers of new voters. Thus, a typical centrifugal drive to the
right is in operation. The JP has now become party to the game of 'outbidding'
to the extent of condoning the violent activities of the NAP-affiliated groups,
lest it lose more votes to the NAP. The NAP, in its turn, has become bolder as
a result of the legitimization it is accorded by the JP.
In short, the Turkish party system at present displays some (but not all) of
the properties of polarized pluralism within an essentially limited pluralism
format. It, therefore, appears as a borderline case between moderate and
polarized pluralism. The possible directions of change in the system will be
discussed below in greater detail. But now we shall turn to two additional
aspects of the Turkish party system to complete our description, namely
institutionalization and fragmentation.

II. PARTY SYSTEM INSTITUTIONALIZATION

Political institutionalization can be defined, following Huntington (1968:

12-24) as increasing adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence of
political organizations and procedures. As Huntington (1968: 13) argues, older
organizations and procedures tend to be more adaptable and, consequently,
more institutionalized than the newer ones: 'the longer an organization or
procedure has been in existence, the higher the level of institutionalization.' In

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 THE TURKISH PARTY SYSTEM 235

the Turkish context, the olde

to 1923, and the DP which was founded in 1945 (the JP is, for all practical
purposes, a continuation of the DP). These two parties have shown their
adaptability not only by their sheer 'chronological age', but also by the fact
that they both have surmounted the problem of peaceful succession in
leadership, and both have survived major functional changes: they both have
shifted several times between government and opposition; the RPP has shifted
from the status of an unchallenged single-party to that of a competitive one; it
has undergone a major ideological reorientation in the late 1960s by its
opening to the left; the DP, in its turn, has survived (under the new name of the
JP) the effects of the 1960 coup. Conversely, all minor parties have had a much
shorter average life. Thus, the combined vote for the RPP and the JP can be
taken as a measure of party system institutionalization in Turkey.
If political institutionalization is conceived in terms of 'autonomy', again the
RPP and the JP seem to be the most highly institutionalized Turkish parties. In
fact, they are not only the oldest Turkish parties, but also the only major
parties far outranking all their competitors. As Huntington (1968: 20) points
out:

political institutionalization, in the sense of autonomy, means the

development of political organizations and procedures that are not
simply expressions of the interests of particular social groups ... A
political party, for instance, that expresses the interests of only one group
in society-whether labor, business, or farmers-is less autonomous
than one that articulates and aggregates the interests of several social
groups.

-Hence, by definition, major parties tend to be more autonomous and more

highly institutionalized than minor ones.
Finally, if political institutionalization is measured by the criterion of
'coherence', once more the RPP and the JP outrank their competitors. Our
study of party cohesion in the National Assembly in the 1960s has shown that
both parties attained a higher level of cohesion than the minor parties, among
which only the TLP had a degree of cohesion comparable to that of the major
parties (Ozbudun, 1968: 185-97).
If the combined major party vote is taken as an indicator of party system
institutionalization in Turkey, then a vote for minor parties and independents is
associated with low levels of political institutionalization. In other words, the
more fractionalized the vote is, the lower the level of institutionalization. Party
system fragmentation will be discussed more specifically below. It should be
stressed here that I am not claiming universal validity for my associating two-
party system with high institutionalization and fragmentation with low
institutionalization. These associations, however, hold true for the Turkish
case.
Another negative indicator of party system institutionalization is the level of
support for independent candidates. Independents, by definition, lack an
institutionalized base of support, and independent deputies within legislative
assemblies, again by definition, do not constitute an institutionalized political

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 236 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

organization. Furthermore, a high proportion of votes garnered by

independents demonstrates the incapacity of the party system to articulate
and/or aggregate interests.
Ideally, one more measure of political institutionalization, or rather
deinstitutionalization could have been constructed from voting data. It can be
argued that where party system institutionalization is low, voting behavior is
characterized by sudden and erratic fluctuations in party votes, or 'electoral
volatility' as Pedersen (1978) calls it. In other words, party loyalties tend to be
weak, and voters tend to shift their allegiances frequently from one party to
another. The magnitude of such shifts can be measured as one-half of the sum
of the absolute differences between the shares (vi) of all parties (K) at time (t -
1) and time t, or by the following formula (Przeworski, 1975: 33);

K
D(t)=1/2 q/V (t-1)- V(0/
i = I

0 ' D (t) < 1.00

While this is a useful measure of deinstitutionalization of the par

does not differentiate among various types of shifts ;- party vote
volatility, for example, may be the result of voter mobilization by
patrons or notables, in which case a party switch by the patron leads to the
wholesale transfer of the political loyalties of his personal following. This type
of electoral behaviour is indeed characteristic of some of the least developed
regions of Turkey, particularly the Eastern region. Or, electoral volatility may
reflect the sudden appearance and disappearance of many short-lived,
ephemeral parties. These two types of volatility are, no doubt, conceptually
associated with deinstitutionalization. But a high degree of electoral volatility,
in the short and medium run, may also be the expression of the secular changes
in the cleavage structure of a society and in its voter alignments. In that sense,
it may represent a movement toward higher levels of political
institutionalization in the long run. At the moment, Turkey seems to be
witnessing two types of electoral volatility simultaneously in different parts of
the country. In the more modernized regions and especially in the big cities, we
observe a major voter realignment which results in substantial shifts in party
votes. In the least modernized regions, on the other hand, party shifts are
usually associated with local, personal, and temporary factors. Thus, one single
measure of 'deinsitutionalization' would have failed to give an accurate account
of the current situation in Turkey (Ozbudun, 1980).
Having defined, for our purposes, party-system institutionalization as the
combined votes for the two major parties, we may now look at the
developmental relationships. When we correlated the combined provincial
percentage of the RPP-JP vote with a number of provincial developmental
indicators, such as urbanization, literacy, percentage of population in
manufacturing industry, percentage of population under social security,
number of people per radio receivers, number of people per association, etc., all
the correlations were found to be significantly positive. We then ran a factor
analysis to identify the principal components of such developmental variables.

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 THE TURKISH PARTY SYSTEM 237

After having computed the factor scores of all provinces for each factor, we
ran a multiple regression analysis utilizing factor scores as independent
variables. Again, the combined RPP-JP vote was positively correlated with
Factor 1 (cultural and organizational development) and Factor 2 (urbanization
and industrialization): B weights for Factor 1 were (.659) for 1969 and (.502)
for 1973; B weights for Factor 2 were (.266) for 1969 and (.225) for 1973.
Conversely, the percentage of votes for independent candidates (an indicator of
a low level of political institutionalization) was negatively correlated with
development variables: B weights for Factor 1 were (-.591) for 1969 and (-
.543) for 1973; for Factor 2, they were (-.166) and (-.142), respectively
(Ozbudun, 1980: 129-35; 1977: 291-304). It seems clear that the two-party
tendency is distinctly stronger in the more highly developed regions of the
country. To put it differently, socio-economic modernization in Turkey
appears to be positively related to party-system institutionalization.

III. PARTY SYSTEM FRAGMENTATION

Fragmentation indicates the degree to which political power is concentrated or

dispersed in the party system (Sartori, 1976: 127-8). Among many possible
measures of party system fragmentation, the one chosen here is Douglas Rae's
(1967: 56) 'index of fractionalization' which is written as follows:

h 2
Fe=l-(2T,)
Fe = I 1j

In this formula, derived from probability statistics, T is equal to any party's

decimal share of the vote. Thus, in a perfect one-party system Fe equals zero;
the more the vote is dispersed among competing parties, the more Fe approaches,
but never reaches, one. Under a perfect two-party system (i.e., a 50-S50 split), Fe
equals 0.5. The model is sensitive to both the number and the relative equality of
the party shares. Consequently, 'two non-identical systems may, both
conceptually and operationally, have the same level of fractionalization. One
might have more parties competing on rather unequal terms, while another
equally fractionalized system might have fewer parties competing on more
nearly equal terms' (Rae, 1967: 54, n.7; for a cogent criticism of Rae's index, see
Sartori, 1976: 304-15).
Table 2 gives the index values for all National Assembly elections from 1950
through 1977. It appears that after a period of low fragmentation in the 1950s,
the index value went up sharply in 1961, and remained at moderate levels in
1965 and 1969 due to the predominant position of the JP. Fragmentation was
greatest in the 1973 elections, and it fell again considerably in 1977, when both
the RPP and the JP increased their votes at the expense of most of the smaller
parties.
Certain limitations of the index of fractionalization become apparent from
an even superficial reading of the Table. For example, the index values for the
years 1961, 1969 and 1977 are very close, despite the fact that these three
elections produced markedly different party systems: in 1961, we had a four-

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238 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

TABLE 2

FRAGMENTATION IN THE TURKISH P'ARTY SYSTEM

1950-1977 (NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS)

Percentage o-f' Votes Percentage of Seats

lionl by the Two Won by the Two Fragmentation
Elections Strongest Parties Strongest Par ties of Votes

1950 93.2 98.0 0.554

1954 91.41 98.7 0.556

1-957 88.5 98.7 0O.605

1961 '71.5 73.5 0.706

193( 81.6 83.1 O.630(

1969 73 .9 88.7 0.e-,97

1973 63.1 741.,2 0.767

1 (977 78.3 89 . .3 o.68o

party format with no party even approaching absolute majority; the 1969
legislature presented a case of predominance; in 1977, the two major parties
together obtained almost 90 per cent of the seats (the highest such percentage
since 1957) and they were relatively evenly divided, the RPP being only a few
seats short of absolute majority. In short, the index of fractionalization does
not really distinguish between different party system formats, let alone party
system 'mechanics' which cannot be understood without resorting to the
ideological variable.
Fractionalization scores for each province were correlated with the
developmental factor variables mentioned above. Party system
fractionalization was found to be negatively associated with the level of
provincial socio-economic modernization: B weight for Factor 1 was (-.508) fo
1969 and (-.298) for 1973; they were (-.180) and(-.1 13) respectively for Factor
2. That the negative correlations for 1973 were weaker than the correlations
for 1969 may be due to the split of the Dem.P. from the JP in 1970, which
increased fragmentation in the provinces where the JP was strongest (i.e.,
generally more developed provinces). It is clear, however, that in Turkey, party
system fragmentation is associated with a low level of socio-economic
development. As development proceeds, there is a stronger tendency toward a
two-party format (Ozbudun, 1980: 129-35).

IV. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

On the basis of the foregoing discussion, several possible paths of cha

to be open to the Turkish party system in the near future, the degree of

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 THE TURKISH PARTY SYSTEM 239

fragmentation and polarization being the decisive factors in determining the

direction of change.
One possibility is for the RPP to become a predominant party. The party's
percentage of votes increased by 14 per cent of the total valid votes cast
between 1969 and 1977. Furthermore, the RPP's rise is clearly associated with
the processes of urbanization and industrialization. Since 1969, the RPP vote
became positively correlated with the levels of urbanization and
industrialization (Ozbudun, 1976 and 1980). Given the extremely high rate of
urbanization and the more modest, but still respectably high, rate of
industrialization, this trend, all other things being equal, may provide the RPP
with enough additional votes to give it a predominant position. The party's
growth in rural areas, on the other hand, has been much more limited
compared to its performance in the cities. A truly predominant position would,
therefore, be dependent upon the party's success in making further inroads into
the conservative strongholds in rural areas.
The RPP's predominance, if it materializes, may be combined either with a
fragmented situation on the Right (JP, NSP, NAP) or the growth of the JP at
the expense of its minor competitors, eventually transforming the system into
an essentially two-party format. In the first case, the RPP's rise to
predominance will be greatly aided, since such fragmentation will lead to the
over-representation of the RPP in the Assembly even under the present
proportional representation system. It should be remembered that the existing
version of the proportional representation (d'Hondt) favors larger parties. As a
matter of fact, this mechanism operated perceptibly in the 1973 and 1977
elections. In each case, the RPP's percentage of seats was 6-8 per cent higher
than its percentage of votes (Table 1).
The second possible trend (i.e., the recovery of the JP) was observed, to
some extent, in the 1973-77 period: the JP increased its percentage of votes
from 29.8 to 36.9 and its percentage of seats from 33.1 to 42.0. Such recovery
was accomplished, mainly at the expense of the Dem.P., a conservative off-
shoot of the JP, which split from the main body in 1970. In 1977, the JP seems
to have attracted most of the Dem.P. voters back to its fold; the percentage of
votes for the latter fell from 11.9 in 1973 to 1.9 in 1977. Nevertheless, the JP's
recovery is likely to have reached its maximum limit, since the other two
parties on the Right (the NSP and the NAP) will offer much greater resistance
to the JP's efforts to coalesce the entire Right under its own banner. The
Dem.P. had neither a social base nor an ideology sufficiently different from
those of the JP; its emergence was chiefly due to a leadership competition
within the JP. The NSP and the NAP, by contrast, can be much more clearly
distinguished from the JP, the former because of its strong pro-Islamic
orientation, the latter because of its extreme nationalistic, neo-fascist leanings.
They both have their hard-core supporters who would be, in all likelihood,
impervious to the JP's pleas for unity. Thus, the JP's rise to an equal footing
with the RPP, let alone to its former predominance, seems rather unlikely (see,
however, Sayari, 1978: 55-6).
A third possibility is further fragmentation of the party system. This may
happen either on the Left or on the Right, or both. Such fragmentation is also

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 240 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

likely to increase polarization. At the moment, no parties to the left of the RPP
are represented in the Assembly, mainly because their potential voters were
afraid of fragmenting the leftist vote in the face of what they perceived as a
growing threat from the Right. In the future and under different circumstances,
such parties can possibly gain some representation in the Assembly. On the
Right, the crucial variable is the relationship between the JP and the NAP. The
NAP can be expected to increase its votes at the expense of the JP. But if the
JP leadership decides against the game of outbidding and revert to moderate
positions, the NAP's effects on the system can still be contained. If the present
collaboration between the two parties continues, on the other hand, a split
within the JP will be quite possible; the moderate elements will leave it to form
a new center party. In this case, although new coalition possibilities will appear,
the center space of the political spectrum will be occupied and the system will
display the properties of polarized pluralism, with anti-system bilateral
oppositions both on the Right and the Left exerting a centrifugal impact upon
the center. Finally, and most ominously, if none of these things happen and the
JP continues on its rightward course with the bulk of its membership, then the
democratic consensus and the maintenance of the constitutional system will be
greatly endangered.

NOTES

1. All National Assembly elections since and including 1961 were held under the 'd'Hondt'
version of proportional representation, with the single exception of 1965 elections held under
a national remainder system.
2. Shortly after the elections, one RRP member resigned to join the JP.

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