Towards A New Theory of Justice: A Critical Analysis of John Rawls’

Philosophical Liberal Views

By Dr. Kabuye Uthman Sulaiman

Preamble

Justice is one of the most discussed subjects in religions and philosophy. The views of

thinkers on this important subject vary greatly and thus there are many conceptions and

theories of justice. Our aim in this paper is to analyse the liberal conception of justice

with specific reference to the views of John Rawls in his three major works; namely, A

Theory of Justice, Political Liberalism, and The Law of Peoples.

John Rawls is a contemporary American philosopher and a social democrat.1 He has had a

great impact on the minds of great many scholars in the West which can be seen in many

contemporary works in political philosophy. In 1999, President Bill Clinton awarded

Rawls the National Humanities Medal. Conferring the award, the president said of Rawls:

John Rawls is perhaps the greatest political philosopher of the twentieth

century. In 1971, when Hillary and I were in law school, we were among
the millions moved by a remarkable book he wrote, A Theory of Justice,
that placed our rights to liberty and justice upon a strong and brilliant new
foundation of reason. Almost single-handedly, John Rawls revived the
disciplines of political and ethnical philosophy…he has helped a whole
generation of learned Americans revive their faith in democracy itself.
(U.S. President, 1852)2

1
Social Democrats are people who advocate a welfare state, liberty and democracy. For details see
mark N. Hagopian, Ideals and Ideologies of Modern Politics, Longman Inc., New York, Nd.
2
Quoted in Robert B. Talisse, On Rawls: A Liberal Theory of Justice and Justification,
Wadsworth/Thomas Learning, Inc., USA, etc, 2001, p.5.
Rawls’ A Theory of Justice is believed to be the most prominent contemporary work in

the liberal theory of justice,3 and also the most widely discussed within the Western

analytical philosophical tradition.4 It has received remarkably broad international

acceptance as the statement of the ethical basis for redistributive social democracy.

As a matter of fact, we hardly find any work in the contemporary political, philosophical,

economic, and legal discussions which does not refer to Rawls’ A Theory of Justice.

Indeed the book has “sparked what may fairly be called a revolution in political

philosophy.”5

H. L. A. Hart, in his “Rawls on Liberty and its Priority”, writes, “No book of political

philosophy since I read the great classics of the subject has stirred my thoughts as deeply

as John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice.”6

Robert Nozick, a libertarian7 and a strong critic of Rawls’ a theory of justice, registered

the following assessment of the significance of Rawls’ book:

“A Theory of Justice is a powerful, deep, subtle, wide-ranging, systematic

work in political and moral philosophy which has not seen its like since the
writings of John Stuart Mill, if then. It is a fountain of illuminating ideas,

3
Ronald L. Cohen (ed.), Justice: views from the social sciences, New York and London, Plenum
Press, 1986, p.6.
4
See J. Angelo Corlett (ed.), Liberty and Equality: Analyzing Rawls and Nozick, Macmillan,
London, 1991, p.1.
5
Robert B. Talisse, On Rawls: A Liberal Theory of Justice and Justification, Wadsworth/Thomson
Learning Inc., USA, 2001, p. 4.
6
H. L. A. Hart, “Rawls on Liberty and its Priority” in Norman Daniels (ed.), Reading Rawls:
Critical Studies on Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1975, p.230.
7
Libertarians people who believe in liberty or freedom. According to them freedom is a birthright
that should never be violated. They advocate a limited government because it enables people to pursue
happiness. In other words, it leaves them with freedom to and responsibility they need to mold satisfying
lives both as individuals and as members of families and communities.
 integrated together into a lovely whole. Political philosophers now must
either work within Rawls’ theory or explain why not.”8

In short, no account of the subject of political and moral philosophy is considered

adequate without a serious consideration of Rawls’ A Theory of Justice. Rawls is believed

to have come up with some genuinely new approaches to justice and revivals to the old

ones, which had been forgotten for decades or centuries. Specifically, Rawls has revived

the “social contract” theory of the seventeenth and eighteenth century philosophers

notably Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant.

Rawls’ Conception of Justice

Rawls considers justice as the first virtue of social institutions just as truth is of the

systems of thought.9 That is, as a system of thought must be rejected if it is untrue, justice

is that characteristic of a social system without which the society would be unacceptable.

Implementation of justice results into what Rawls calls a well-ordered society;10that is, a

kind of society that is designed to advance the good of its members and is effectively

regulated by a public conception of justice.11 It is also defined as a society in which:

Firstly, “everyone accepts and knows that the others accept the same principles of

justice,” and; secondly, “the basic social institutions generally satisfy and are generally

known to satisfy these principles.”12

8
Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Oxford, UK, Blackwell, 1994, p. 183.
9
Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press, 1971, 3.
10
Rawls takes the term “well-ordered” from Jean Bodin, who at the beginning of his Six Books of
the Republic (1576) refers to the “République bien ordonnée.” [See John Rawls, The Law of Peoples with
“The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London,
England, Second edition, 2000, note sixth, p.4. Hereafter referred to as The laws of Peoples.
11
Rawls, The Laws of Peoples, pp. 4-5
12
Ibid.
People who live in a well-ordered society are the liberals and decent. The general terms

Rawls uses to refer to these people are: “well-ordered peoples”13and “liberal democratic

peoples.”14 They have three basic features:

First and foremost, they have a reasonably just constitutional democratic government that

governs their fundamental interests.15 Regarding this basic feature, two things need to be

pointed out. First, Rawls uses the phrase “reasonably just constitutional democratic

government” to show that it is not a necessary condition that a well-ordered society must

be governed by a fully just government.16 Probably he thinks that a fully just government

is unattainable.

Second, Rawls defines a “constitutional democratic government” as a government that is

under people’s “political and electrical control, and it answers to and protects their

fundamental interests as specified in a written or unwritten constitution and in its

interpretation.”17

Unlike a non constitutional government, namely, an authoritarian government or a

dictatorship; that is, a government that is governed by a small group of people pursuing

their own interests, and it is therefore entirely free from checks and balances, a

constitutional democratic government is governed by all people (by this we mean that

13
Ibid., p.4.
14
Ibid., p.23.
15
Ibid.
16
See Ibid., p.24.
17
Ibid.
people are given a chance to elect a government of their preference) and it is not free

from checks and balances.

The second basic feature of the people of a well-ordered society is that, they are united by

“common sympathies”18 that enable them to cooperate with one another in all matters

pertaining to their social, economic, cultural and political life. Having common

sympathies is generally due to identity of religion, language, race and descent. None of

these, however, is found among the people of a well-ordered society who instead, as we

shall shortly explain, are governed by principles of justice that are free from religious,

linguistic, cultural, ethnic and racial inclinations.

Regarding the present day societies, Rawls believes that they are seldom well-ordered.

This is because, he argues, there is no objectivity in the present day principles of justice

that govern human societies; people differ in their interpretation of what is just and

unjust, or the good and the bad.19

Like Immanuel Kant, Rawls remarks that objective and fair moral principles are those,

which are agreed upon under conditions that characterize men as free and equal rational

beings.20 They are ‘free’ because they choose plans of life without antecedent restrictions,

like those imposed by a concern for the interests of others.21 They are equal because,

among them, there are no differences that are due to their religious and ideological

beliefs, and also differences that are due to their social status, such as differences between
18
Ibid., p.23.
19
See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p.5.
20
Ibid., p.252.
21
Norman Daniels (ed.), Reading Rawls, p.xx.
the rich and the poor. Also there is no differences between the white and black, young and

old, able and disabled, man and woman, between one race or tribe and other races or

tribes, and between the generation to which they belong and the generations to come.

The third and last basic feature of the people of a well-ordered society is that they are

moral persons: “Moral persons”, writes Rawls, “are distinguished by two features: first

they are capable of having (and are assumed to have) a conception of their good (as

expressed by a rational plan of life); and second, they are capable of having (and are

assumed to acquire) a sense of justice, a normally effective desire to apply and to act

upon the principles of justice, at least to a certain minimum degree.”22

Moral persons are believed to co-operate with one another on fair terms and they must

abstain from things that are harmful to their fellow-beings. For example, says Rawls, they

(must) abstain from engaging themselves in a war to expand their territory or to gain

economic wealth or to acquire natural resources.23The only war that is justified is the one

they may engage in to defend and protect their territory and basic liberties. This third

basic feature of the people of a well-ordered society, says Rawls, “requires a firm

attachment to a political (moral) conception of right and justice.”24

Rawls’ Principles of Justice

22
Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p.505.
23
See Rawls, The Laws of Peoples, p.91.
24
Ibid., p.23.
Rawls offers two principles of justice for the well-ordered society. The first is called “the

principle of greatest equal liberty” and the second is composed of two parts; the first part

is called the “difference principle” and the second part is called “the principle of equality

of fair opportunity”. The arrangement of these two principles, argues Rawls must be “in a

serial order with the first principle prior to the second.”25 Rawls considers this ordering of

the two principles necessary because,

“a departure from the institutions of equal liberty required by the first

principle cannot be justified by, or compensated for, by greater social and
economic advantages. The distribution of wealth and income, and the
hierarchies of authority, must be consistent with both the liberties of equal
citizenship and equality of opportunity.26

The principle of greatest equal liberty

The principle of greatest equal liberty states that, “each person is to have an equal right to

the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.” 27 The basic

liberties referred to in this Rawls’ first principle of justice are, “freedom of political

participation (the right to vote and to be eligible for public office) together with freedom

of speech and assembly, freedom of conscience, freedom from arbitrary arrest and

seizure, and the right to hold personal property.”28These basic liberties, as the phrase “the

principle of greatest equal liberty” indicates, are required to be equally possessed by all

individuals in a just (well-ordered) society; each must have the same basic liberties.

25
Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p.61.
26
Ibid., p.61.
27
Ibid., p.60.
28
Ibid., p.61.
Rawls argues that any restriction of individuals’ liberty must be for the sake of liberty

itself.29 This means that one is at liberty to enjoy the basic liberties only if such enjoyment

does not lead to violation of the same liberties or rights enjoyed by others.

The following is the illustration of this: each individual human being is at liberty to use

his or her property in the way he or she pleases, however, such usage should not lead to

the denial of the same liberty or other different liberties to others.

Unlike extreme socialists who forbid the institution of private property on the assumption

that, to own something privately is to have liberty to use it in ways denied to others,

Rawls is not against the institution of private property. To hold personal (private)

property is for him one of the basic liberties each individual has.30

There is no denying the fact that in non-democratic governments, there is a tendency for

those who hold political offices to restrict individuals’ liberty to air their views through

political parties, as this is the only peaceful and approved way for the individual citizens

to take part in politics. Members of different political parties in multi-party systems may

condemn certain government policies because they feel that such policies endanger the

society, or are in the interests of the governors and not the governed. The condemnation

may not necessarily be true but it is one of the effective means through which opposition

parties gain public support and consequently take over the political power.

29
Ibid., pp.203, 229, 242, 244, and 250.
30
Ibid., p.60.
Like anyone who believes in democracy, Rawls denounces any ban on political parties as

it runs contrary to the principle of fair equality of opportunity or participation which holds

that, “all citizens are to have an equal right to take part in, and to determine the outcome

of, the constitutional process that establishes the laws with which they are to comply.” 31

In the liberal democracy, people participate in the political process through ‘voting’.

According to Rawls, “all sane adults, with certain generally recognized exceptions, have

the right to take part in political affairs, and the precept one elector one vote is honored as

far as possible. Elections are fair and free, and regularly held.”32 Rawls also remarks that,

irrespective of their economic and social class, “all citizens are to have an equal access, at

least in the formal sense, to public office. Each is eligible to join political parties, to run

for elective positions, and to hold places of authority.”33 People who are elected to

government offices should, however, not use their positions to serve their personal

interests. Whatever decisions they make must serve the common good; that is, they must

be beneficial to everyone. No one should be disadvantaged by such decisions.34

All Rawls arguments about the principle of participation are based on Kant’s “Categorical

Imperative” and Rousseau’s principle of the “free will”. These two thinkers argued that

all individuals must participate in the enactment of the rules or laws to regulate their

behaviours, and must conform to the rules they have chosen. They also remarked that

liberty is to act in accordance with laws that individuals give to themselves.

31
Ibid., p.221.
32
Ibid., p.222.
33
Ibid., pp.223-224, and 225.
34
Ibid., p.233.
It is, however, true that in many societies, people’s submission to the laws is illegitimate.

It is illegitimate because they are denied a right to participate in the enactment of the

laws, directly or indirectly. People who are denied a right to participate in the enactment

of the laws governing them and therefore, their submission to such laws is involuntary,

cannot, based on Rawls’ conception of justice as fairness, be described as equal, free or

autonomous. He concedes:

“No society can, of course, be a scheme of cooperation which men enter

voluntarily in a literal sense; each person finds himself placed at birth in some
particular position in some particular society, and the nature of this position
materially affects his life prospects. Yet a society satisfying the principles of
justice as fairness comes as close as a society can to being a voluntary
scheme, for it meets the principles which free and equal persons would assent
to under circumstances that are fair. In this sense its members are autonomous
and the obligations they recognize self-imposed.”35

Here follows an important question: Are people politically and morally obliged to follow

the laws, the enactment of which they have been denied participation?

The views of political and moral thinkers regarding this question vary and it is beyond the

scope of this study to discuss such controversial views in detail. Nevertheless, in brief, the

view that is held by almost all liberals is that there is no political and moral obligation

where people are denied a right to participate in the law-making.

Equal liberties versus inequalities of wealth and income

35
Ibid., p.13.
Although Rawls and other contemporary and modern liberal theorists like Thomas

Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant and others have argued that

all individuals who live in a civil society have equal rights or liberties such as; liberty to

send their children to smart schools, colleges or universities, liberty to ascend to political

posts, liberty to be treated in expensive hospitals, liberty to fair trial, liberty to stay in nice

houses and in nice places, liberty to travel anywhere they like, liberty to express their

opinions in the appropriate circumstances, and so on and so forth, it is impossible for the

people to enjoy these liberties and many others equally; that is, on the same footing. The

fact that also Rawls has admitted is that the enjoyment of these liberties is dependent

upon one’s financial capacity and authority. “Freedom as equal liberty”, says Rawls, “is

the same for all…but the worth of liberty is not the same for everyone. Some have greater

authority and wealth, and therefore greater means to achieve their aims.”36 The term

“worth of liberty” refers to one’s ability to exercise any kind of liberty.

To illustrate, people who are financially and materially well-off (the rich) have more

ability than those who are poor to travel to places of their interest easily and comfortably;

to send their children to the best schools, colleges or universities; to win elections and

therefore to ascend to political posts; and to be treated in expensive hospitals and clinics.

More so, the rich have more access to and control over the media and in this way, they

have more freedom to have their opinions advanced than the poor. They have more access

to better legal counsel than the poor. In general, they “have more opportunity to influence

36
Ibid., p.204.
the administration of justice both in specific cases and in determining what crimes will be

prosecuted, and have greater ability to secure laws that favor their interests.”37

Inequalities in wealth that result into inequalities in liberties are, in Rawls’ view,

unacceptable unless they do benefit the “less fortunate members of society”; these are the

people with lesser wealth and authority to enjoy the basic liberties defined by Rawls’ first

principle of justice.38 Included among the less fortunate members of society are the blind,

the retarded and physically disabled people who cannot work and have no one to feed

them, clothe them, or provide them with shelter.

The Difference Principle and the Principle of Equality of Fair

Opportunity

Rawls’ second principle of justice concerns goods other than liberty, specifically the so-

called “primary goods.” These are things “that one must enjoy in order effectively to

satisfy whatever desires one may have and in order to pursue whatever ends and purposes

one may adopt.”39

Rawls divides primary goods into two kinds: social and natural. Social primary goods are

“rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth.”40 Natural primary

37
Norman Daniels, “Equal Liberty and Unequal Worth of Liberty” in Norman Daniels (ed.),
Reading Rawls, p.256.
38
Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p.61
39
James Meadowcroft (ed.), The Liberal Political Tradition: Contemporary Peappraisals,
Cheltenham, UK, Brookfield, US, Edward Elgar, 1996, p. 44.Ibid., p.62.
40
Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p.62.
goods are for example, “health and vigor, intelligence and imagination.”41 Concerning

these goods (social and natural primary goods), Rawls’ second principle of justice states:

“Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a)
reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to
positions and offices open to all.”42

Rawls’ second principle of justice is composed of two parts. The first part is about the

distribution of income and wealth and it is called “the difference principle.” The second

part relates to positions of authority and to offices of command, which in Rawls’ view

must be accessible to all individual members of society under conditions of fair equality

of opportunity. It (the second part) is called “the principle of equality of fair opportunity.”

What follows is the analysis of Rawls’ second principle of justice.

The Difference Principle

It is true that in most cases natural talents such as intelligence and skill play a major role

in determining people’s fortune and success. Those with greater intelligence some times

end up becoming richer than those who have lesser intelligence. Skill generally requires

education. People who are educated and have the skills have a greater opportunity to

excel in life than those who are uneducated and without skills. The same is true with

physical strength and ability.

In Rawls’ opinion, natural talents should be viewed as a “collective asset” or a “pool”.

That is, an asset to which everyone has some entitlement or claim.43 He argues that any
41
Ibid.
42
Ibid., p. 60.
43
Ibid., p.179.
distribution of natural talents, which enables some to secure high returns for their skills,

is purely arbitrary from a moral point of view. According to him the effects of this so-

called ‘natural lottery’ have to be mitigated by the “difference principle,” meaning that

those with natural talents are entitled to high earnings only if such earnings are benefiting

the least advantaged; the worst off members of the society:

“Those who have been favored by nature, whoever they are, may gain from
their good fortune only on terms that improve the situation of those who have
lost out. The naturally advantaged are not to gain merely because they are
more gifted, but only to cover the costs of training and education and for
using their endowments in ways that help the less fortunate as well. No one
deserves his greater natural capacity nor merits a more favorable starting
place in society.”44

Rawls does not believe that income and wealth should or must be distributed equally

among people.45 He writes, “inequalities are not always unjust…when they are, it is

because of their unjust effects on the basic structure of the Society, and on relations

among peoples and among their members.”46 It does not matter how great the gap

between the rich and the poor is. What matters are the consequences of inequalities of

income and wealth. Those inequalities that worsen the condition of the poor, in Rawls’

perception, are arbitrary from a moral point of view. If there happens to be inequalities in

income and wealth they should benefit everybody and in particular, the least advantaged

members of society.

44
Ibid., pp.101-102.
45
See Ibid., p.61.
46
Rawls, The Law of Peoples, p.113.
Rawls has three reasons for not allowing excessive inequalities of income and wealth that

do not result into the betterment of the poor. First, he argues that, they lead to the

hardships and suffering of the poor people.47 Second, he says that such inequalities often

result into the poor being stigmatized and treated as inferiors, which is unjust.48 Third, he

claims that such inequalities lead to the absence of fairness in the political processes of

the basic structure of the Society of Peoples.49 During elections for example, as already

said, those who possess wealth always stand a better chance to win political offices than

those who possess a little or no wealth at all.

The Principle of Equality of Fair Opportunity

Fair equality of opportunity is “the condition that there is no legal bar to access to

education, to all positions and jobs, and that hiring is meritocratic.”50 This means that

hiring people to do a particular job, or electing them to any position whether it is political,

economic, social, or religious, should be based on their talent and intellectualism, not on

gender, race, ethnic origin, religion, or whatever. By granting equality of opportunity to

every member of society; i.e., removing all obstacles that stand in the way of each

individual’s development and self-realization, Rawls and all liberals (modern and

contemporary) believe that the problem of inequality in the distribution of wealth and

income may be overcome.

Since education is a pre-requisite for any professional job, modern liberals argue that the

educational system should offer an opportunity to all individual citizens to realize their

47
See Ibid., p.114.
48
Ibid.
49
Ibid.
50
See John E. Roemer, Theories of Distributive Justice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
London and Massachusetts, 1996, p.163.
talents. Equal opportunity as understood by the modern liberals does not necessary mean

that individuals, who are given the same opportunity, should end up getting the same

outcome. This is called “equality of outcome.” Some may turn out to be richer or more

talented than others.

What is important in the liberals’ view is that all individuals, regardless of their colour,

race, sex, religion, or ethnic origin, must be given “equal start.” In other words, they

should be given equal opportunity to seek education and to choose the jobs of their

preference. In pursuing their jobs, it does not matter whether they end up with equal or

unequal outcome (wealth). To sum-up this point, it is equal opportunity and not equal

results that is required.

All barriers to education and jobs are now removed. However, the situation remains not

fully changed. There are people with good education yet they are not employed in some

business firms due to gender, racial, colour, or religious discrimination.

Selection of Rawls’ two principles of justice

The two principles of justice explained above are arrived at through the process of

bargaining. The parties in the original position, who are placed behind the veil of

ignorance, engage in a game. This game is neither a zero-sum game; that is, a game in

which one party wins and the other loses, nor is it a non-zero-sum game; that is, a game in

which “everyone can win” or in which “everyone can lose.”51 During the game, each

51
For the explanation of a non-zero-sum game see Robert Paul Wolff, Understanding Rawls: A
Reconstruction and Critique of A Theory of Justice, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1977, p.55.
party is given a chance to submit a list of the proposed principles of justice (to the

referee). There is no time limit to the game therefore, the parties go on submitting the

principles they see fit until finally they unanimously agree upon two principles, which

have been analysed in the above foregone paragraphs.

Since the parties that participate in the game are, because of the veil of ignorance, made

ignorant of their own abilities, of their psychological propensities and conception of the

good, and of their status and position in society and the level of development of the

society of which they are to be members, “no one is able to design principles to favor his

particular condition.” Due to this, says Rawls “the principles of justice are the result of a

fair agreement or bargain.”52 Hence, they apply to all persons. They have to accept them

and live upon them. By obeying these principles, individuals express themselves as free,

equal, and moral autonomous beings.

Rawls contends that the two principles of justice, which he believes to be the final

outcome of the game, are final and irrevocable; no party who involves in the selection of

the two principles of justice is allowed to change his mind and go back on the decision

reached by all parties.53 Since the selection cannot be made over again, the following two

things are to be put into consideration during the process of “give and take:”

Firstly, everyone (each party) must select only those principles, which he is sure that he

will always honour no matter how their consistent application might affect him.54

52
Ibid., p.12.
53
See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 176.
54
Ibid.
Secondly, no one (party) must be allowed by others to advance a justice conception that

either benefits himself exclusively, or fails to answer somehow the needs of all of them.55

Any analysis of Rawls’ theory of justice in general and his principles of justice for a well

ordered society in particular is considered incomplete without providing an analysis of the

concepts of the “Original Position” and the “Veil of Ignorance”. In the following we

attempt to provide an analysis of these two concepts.

The Original Position

The “original position” is described by Rawls as the initial situation that “corresponds to

the state of nature in the traditional theory of the social contract.”56 He writes:

“My aim is to present a conception of justice which generalizes and carries to

a higher level of abstraction the familiar theory of the social contract as found,
say, in Locke, Rousseau, and Kant.”57

Before we proceed to analyse the concept of the “original position” and the “veil of

ignorance,” it is important that we provide a brief discussion and analysis of the theory of

the “state of nature” and the “social contract.”

The “state of nature” is defined as the “natural condition of mankind.”58 According to

John Locke (1632-1704), an English political philosopher, every individual human being

55
Ibid.
56
Ibid., p.12.
57
Ibid., p.11.
58
C.B. MacPherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, New York, 12th edition, 1989, p. 19.
is considered to be originally or naturally in a state of perfect freedom (liberty) to order

their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the

bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other

man.59

The state of nature or the natural state of mankind is also known as the “state of equality”

because, as Locke argues, all the power and jurisdiction in that kind of state is reciprocal,

no one has more than another.60 On the basis of this argument it is not wrong to say that in

the state of nature, there is no ruler and the ruled, and master and slave relation; every

individual human being is (naturally) free from any form of human authority. Thus any

form of authority man imposes upon other fellow humans is conventional.

Since every individual human being is naturally free from any form of human authority,

liberal thinkers argue that, any rule that is to be imposed upon humans by their fellow

humans must be agreed upon by all of them. In other words, it must be based on mutual

consent. The following are some of the quotations pertaining to this argument:

John Locke:

“The only way thereby anyone divests himself of his Natural Liberty, and
puts on the bonds of Civil Society is by agreeing with other Men to joyn and
unite into a Community, for their comfortable, safe and peaceable living one
amongst the other, in a secure Enjoyment of their properties, and a greater
Security against any that are not of it. This any number of men may do,
because it injures not the Freedom of the rest; they are left as they were in the
Liberty of the State of Nature.”61

Nicholas of Cusa:

59
See John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, ed. C.B. MacPherson, Hackett Publishing
Company, Inc., Indianapolis, Cambridge, 1980, par.4.
60
Ibid., par. 4.
61
John Locke, Two treatises of Government, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1991, 5.96.
 “Accordingly since by nature all men are free, any authority by which
subjects are prevented from doing evil and their freedom is restrained to doing
good through fear of penalties, comes solely from harmony and from the
consent of the subjects, whether the authority reside in written law or in the
living law which is in the ruler. For if by nature men are equally strong and
equally free, the true and settled power of one over the others, the ruler having
equal natural power, could be set up only by the choice and the consent of the
others, just as a law also is set up by consent.”62

John Milton:

“The power of kings and magistrates is nothing else, but what is only
derivative, transferred and committed to them in trust from the people, to the
common good of them all, in whom the power yet remains fundamentally,
and cannot be taken from them, without a violation of their natural
birthright.”63

A government that imposes its rule upon people without their consent is considered (by

liberal thinkers) to have violated people’s natural right to freedom. There are two types of

consent: consent by all which is found in the direct democracy64 and consent by a few as

representatives of the rest of the people which is found in the indirect democracy.

Consent, according to liberal thinkers, gives rise to political obligation. At the same time,

it indicates that “individuals share a formally equal status in civil society as political

subjects and so can be seen as sharing an equal (and vertical) political obligation.”65

Where there is no consent from individual human beings, there is no political obligation.

The argument that no one is naturally born a ruler, and that any political authority has to

be based on consent, was originally directed towards the doctrine of “Divine Right” of

62
Quoted in Sabine and Thorson, A History of Political Theory, p.299.
63
Ibid., p.471.
64
Democracy is a system of government in which each citizen has an equal say in drafting the
policies by which all members of the society shall be governed.
65
Carole Pateman, The Problem of Political Obligation: A Critical Analysis of Liberal Theory, John
Wiley &Sons, New York and Toronto, 1979, p.74.
kings, the longest-lived political doctrine. For many years, it was claimed that the ruler

and in particular the king (monarch) was God’s (or the gods’) appointed agent on earth,

therefore, to challenge the ruler was to challenge divine authority. This claim legitimated

the king’s power and made it both unquestionable and unassailable. The origin of this

theory is perhaps the following letter by the Apostle Paul (written in the first century),

which is found in the New Testament. He wrote to his Christian followers in Rome urging

them to accept as legitimate the power of Rome’s emperors however oppressive because

it is God’s will:

“Let every person be subject to the governing authorities. For there is no

authority except from God, and those that exist have been instituted by God.
Therefore he who resists the authorities resists what God has appointed, and
those who resist will incur judgment.”66

In his The Social Contract, Rousseau argued that, “Man is born free, but everywhere he is

in chains.”67 By this he meant that the legitimacy of the modern state and people’s

obligation to it did not depend on the legitimacy or reality of their consent or voluntary

submission. A government that is not based on people’s voluntary submission is

unconstitutional in the liberal point of view and it is therefore legitimate to overthrow it.

The state of nature is not an actual historical state of affairs, but rather a hypothetical one.

One of its aims is to defend the claim that there are certain rights people possess that are

natural. The social-contractarians unanimously agree that every individual human being

has a natural right to “property” and “freedom.” Besides these two there is difference of

66
See Romans 13: 1-6.
67
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, p.141.
opinion among them regarding other rights that are natural. John Locke added one more

to these two; that is, a right to “life” to make a list of three.68 Proudhon added two: a right

to “equality” and “security.”69 Thomas Jefferson added: a right to “life” and the “pursuit

of happiness.” The UN Declaration of Human Rights, like Proudhon, states a right to

“equality” and adds another right, which is a right to “security.”70

A critical examination of the above natural rights reveals that the difference is structural.

Property implies happiness and happiness is generally attained through having property.

Both Locke and Jefferson did not state “security” and “equality” in their list of natural

rights probably because a right to “life” requires a right to “security” and “liberty” implies

“equality.”

Natural rights are rights that exist prior to any convention or agreement.71 Such rights are

also called “general rights” because they are “uniformly applied to each human being in a

social context regardless of that individual’s particular desires, goals or circumstances.

Another term for natural rights is “absolute rights.” They are considered “absolute”

because they cannot be alienated or overridden in any circumstances. According to

68
John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, chapter VII, par. 87.
69
P.J. Proudhon, What is Property?: An Inquiry into The Principle of Right and of Government,
trans. Benj. R. Tucker, New York, Howard Fertig, Inc., 1966, p.47.
70
See Ibid., p.44.
71
Rights which are conventional or a result of human activity are civil or legal rights. These are
rights that are enshrined in law and are therefore enforceable through the court. The status which these legal
rights enjoy within a political system varies from one country to another and from state to state, or province
to province within one country, especially in federal states; that is, states which are based on division of
governmental powers between the national government and constituent units (states, provinces, regions, or
cantons). Legal or civil rights are not permanent rights; they are subject to change based on the constitution.
As the constitution is amended some legal or civil rights may be amended as well. Therefore rights which
are characterized as legal or civil rights are not said to be inviolable, in the sense that they cannot be done
away or, overridden in any situation like it is the case with natural rights.
Waldron, they can never be justifiably infringed and they must be fulfilled without any

exception.72They take priority over all other considerations one might wish to take into

account when comparing alternative political and social institutions or practices.

According to Robert Nozick, they are “side-constraints;”73meaning, they constrain the

range of alternatives from which one may choose in a strict way.74

It is important to point out that the theory of the state of nature, which dominated the

Western political thought in the seventeenth century, has now been abandoned,75and so is

the theory of natural rights, which instead, has been substituted by another theory called

“human rights.”76

Human rights are rights that are possessed equally by all human beings irrespective of

their nations, race, religion, gender, social class or whatever. In Rawls’ view they (human

rights) are universal in the sense that they are intrinsic to the Law of Peoples and have a

political (moral) effect whether or not they are supported locally.77 In other words, their

72
See Jeremy Waldron (ed.), Theories of Rights, Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 1995,
p.92 and Charles K. Rowley, “Liberty and the State” in Charles K. Rowley (ed.), Property Rights and the
Limits of Democracy, Edward Elgar Publishing Company, USA, 1993, p.72.
73
Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, pp. xi, 28-42, 293.
74
David Johnston, The idea of Political Theory, p.40
75
See Noberto Bobbio, The Age of Rights, trans. Allan Cameron, Polity Press, Cambridge, UK,
1996, p.15. The theory of natural rights is abandoned because it is not well supported. Jeremy Bentham
called it a pernicious nonsense. [See H.L.A. Hart, ‘Bentham on Legal Rights’, in A.W.B. Simpson (ed.),
Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, Oxford University Press, Second series, Oxford, 1973, pp.171-201.
76
In his The Law of Peoples, p. 81, John Rawls defines the term ‘human rights’ as “a proper subset
of the rights possessed by citizens in a liberal constitutional democratic regime, or of the rights of the
members of a decent hierarchical society.” Many others including Andrew Heywood and Norberto Bobbio
are of the opinion that ‘human rights’ are rights, which are due to a man in as much as he is a man. See
Andrew Heywood, Political Ideas and Concepts, p.142, and Norberto Bobbio, The Age of Rights, trans.
Allan Cameron, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1996, p.5, respectively.
77
John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, p.80.
political (moral) force extends to all societies, and they are binding on all peoples and

societies, including outlaw states.78

In addition to the above Rawls’ argument, human rights are considered assertable; i.e.

they are “against the whole world.”79 On the basis of this, argues Rawls, “Any outlaw

state that violates human rights is to be condemned and in grave cases may be subjected

to forceful sanctions and even to intervention.”80

While some thinkers have further suggested that human rights are ‘fundamental,’

meaning; they are inalienable -- they cannot be traded away or revoked -- many others are

of the opinion that they are “absolute” in the sense that they must be upheld at all times

and in all circumstances.81

Another aim of the theory of the state of nature is to describe the nature of individual

human beings, how they would necessarily behave if there were no civil State or authority

to enforce law or contract.

In Hobbes’ view, men are naturally morally corrupt; they are violent, emotional,

aggressive, egotist (selfish) and egocentric, that is; they are concerned chiefly about their

own survival and identify goodness with their own appetites. Egoism and egocentricity

drive men towards war and attempts to dominate or destroy each other. Based on this

78
Ibid.,
79
For details about human rights, see James Rachels (ed.,) Moral Problems: A Collection of
Philosophical Essays, p.12.
80
Rawls, The Law of Peoples, p.81.
81
See Andrew Heywood, Political Ideas and Concepts, p.142.
pessimistic view of human nature, Hobbes remarked that the state of nature is a state of

war (of every man against every man),82quarrel,83continual fear and danger of violent

death.84 In such a situation, he argued:

“there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and
consequently no Culture of the Earth;85no Navigation, nor use of commodities
that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of
moving and removing such things as require much force…and which is worst
of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary,
poor, nasty, brutish and short.”86

Further still, he argued that in a state of nature, there is “no Mine and Thine distinct; but

onely that to be every mans that he can get; and for so long, as he can keep it.”87 Physical

strength is important to survive in such a situation but absolutely not enough. A few

people who are physically weak may gather and terminate the life of a strong person or

take away his property.

Like Hobbes, Kant had a pessimistic view of human nature. He believed that men are

naturally imperfect creatures, unsociable and untrustworthy. They are cursed by love of

glory, possession, power and passions, which makes happiness something forever

unattainable, by them.88

82
See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C. B. Macpherson, Penguin Books, London, USA, Australia
etc, 1985, Chap. 13, p. 185.
83
There are three principal causes of quarrel in the state of nature. First, competition; second,
diffidence; third, glory. The first makes men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third for
reputation. See Ibid., Chap. 13, p. 185.
84
Ibid., Chap. 13, p. 186.
85
This is because in such a natural state of freedom, the notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and
Injustice are non-existent. See Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapt. 13, p. 188.
86
Ibid., Chap. 13, p. 186.
87
Ibid., Chap. 13., p. 188.
88
Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, p.46.
In contrast to Hobbes, Kant believed in human moral evolution. According to him, the

capacities implanted in men by nature are not all for evil: they are, he wrote, “destined to

unfold themselves completely in the course of time, and in accordance with the end to

which they are adapted.”89The end of humanity, according to Kant, is the evolution of

man from the stage of moral imperfection to a high state of civilization.90

Kant agreed with his predecessor, Thomas Hobbes, that the state of nature is a state of

war of every man against another,91 and fear that an outbreak may occur. The absence of

peace and stability in the state of nature, he argued, is not only due to human nature,

which is bad, but also to lack of objectivity in interpreting the good and the bad; justice

and injustice.92

In contrast to Hobbes and Kant, John Locke (1632-1704) had an optimistic view of

human nature; he did not believe that the state of nature is a state of war. Instead he said:

“Though man in that state have an uncontroulable liberty to dispose of his

person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy himself, or so much as
any creature in his possession, but where some nobler use than its bare
preservation calls for it. The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it,
which obliges every one: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind,
who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to
harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions….”93

The law that governs the state of nature is called the “natural law” or the “law of

nature.”94 Not only Locke, but also Hobbes, his predecessor, and Kant believed in the
89
Ibid., pp.46 – 47.
90
Ibid., p.47.
91
Ibid., pp.117-118.
92
Ibid., p.76.
93
Locke, Second Treatise of Government, Par. 6.
94
The law of nature is defined as “the expression of God’s will which humans can discover by
reflecting on their function in a teleological world in which everything is designed to perform a special
existence of this law, however, they contended that due to the absence of a supreme judge

to control human nature, the circumstances for living by this law are not always present.

Locke argued that since everyone in the state of nature has a right to punish the offender,

and be executioner of the law of nature,95 “there will be situations when self-love will

make men partial to themselves and their friends: and on the other side, that ill, nature,

passion and revenge will carry them too far in punishing others; and hence nothing but

confusion and disorder will follow.”96

Not withstanding the condition in the state of nature, sooner or later, people would agree

on the formation of one protective agency known as the “civil State” to protect them

against the inconveniences found in that state. They would agree to sign a contract of

peace called the “social contract.”

A social contract is a compact that is believed to have put people out of a state of nature

into that of a commonwealth97by setting up a sovereign known as the great Leviathan or

judge on earth, “with authority to determine all the controversies and redress the injuries

that may happen to any member of the commonwealth.”98

function.” [David Muschamp (ed.), Political Thinkers, Macmillan education Ltd., London,1986, p.95.
95
He said: “And that all men may be restricted from invading others Rights, and from doing hurt to
one another, and the Law of Nature be observed, which willeth the Peace and Preservation of all Mankind,
the Execution of the Law of Nature is in that state, put into every Mans hands, whereby every one has a
right to punish the transgressors of that Law to such a Degree, as may hinder its Violation.” [Locke, Second
Treatise,
96
Locke, Second Treatise of Government, Chap. II, par. 13.
97
By a commonwealth here we mean a civil society.
98
Ibid., Chap. VII, par. 89.
The social contract theory constitutes the basis of modern political thought. Like the state

of nature, this theory is hypothetical. The idea behind it is that; firstly, the legitimate

moral rules emanate from agreement: that people are bound not by the dictates of an

(alleged) objective morality but by commitments voluntarily made;99 secondly, the

establishment of a political power to which each individual is subject, and the continuing

legitimacy of that power depends upon the consent of the people.100 Because each person

is naturally free, equal and independent in the so-called “state of nature,” no one should

become politically subjected to another person without his or her consent. This implies

that binding political obligations are the ones that are self-imposed. Kant said in reference

to this:

“To our knowledge, no philosopher has admitted the most paradoxical of all
paradoxes, namely, the proposition that the mere Idea of sovereignty should
necessitate me to obey as my lord anyone who has imposed himself upon me
as a lord, without my asking who has given him the right to issue commands
to me. Is there to be no difference between saying that one ought to recognize
sovereignty and a chief of state and that one ought to hold a priori that this or
that person, whose existence is not even given a priori, is one’s lord?”101

It is important to point out that, the foundation of the civil State through a social contract

is taken by those who believe in the theory of the social contract to be the first

establishment in history of a peace institution:

“It changed the character of warfare, it gave its method and system; but it did
not bring peace in its train. We have now, indeed, no longer a wholesale war
of all against all, a constant irregular raid and plunder of one individual by

99
Norman P. Barry, An Introduction to Modern Political Theory, Macmillan Education Ltd.,
London, 1991, p. 116.
100
Social contract theorists imply that since the State is created by consent of the people it must
serve the interests of all citizens and so be neutral or impartial.
101
Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice (Part I of The Metaphysics of Morals)
trans. John Ladd, p.138.
 another; but we have the systematic, deliberate war of community against
community, of nation against nation.”102

Many scholars have written on the possible ways of promoting perpetual peace among

nations and Kant is one of them. In his essay, “Perpetual Peace”103 and in his other

political writings, Kant attempted to show what such peace requires and how it might be

brought into being and maintained. He proposed for a republican mode of government;

that is, a system of government that is founded on a rule of law which is guaranteed by a

constitution and the separation of legislative and executive powers.104A republican

government is based upon the consent of the governed and represents their will, but at the

same time it ensures that this will is bounded by constitutional requirements and can be

rationally and impartially executed.105

According to Kant, only a republican mode of government is hoped to bring an end to the

abominable practice of war;106 a hindrance to peace. He condemned war or the use of

force except that which is aimed at maintaining and preserving one’s property.107 Kant

was convinced that as long as war or the threat of war exists, the security of citizens

cannot be assured and civilized life is not truly possible.108 By signing a social contract or

102
See the Translator’s Introduction in Immanuel Kant’s Perpetual Peace, p.6.
103
Published in 1795.
104
Kant, Perpetual Peace, p.125.
105
Janna Thompson, Justice and World Order: A Philosophical Inquiry, Routledge, London and
New York, 1992, p.47.
106
Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice (Part I of the Metaphysics of Morals),
Sect. 354, p. 128.
107
Ibid., p. 120.
108
Kant advocated the abolition of standing armies (miles perpetuus) as he found them to be a threat
to other states. He said that, standing armies “incite the various states to out rival one another in the number
of their soldiers, and to this number no limit can be set. Now, since owing to the sums devoted to this
purpose, peace at last becomes even more oppressive than a short war, these standing armies are themselves
the cause of wars of aggression, undertaken in order to get rid of this burden.” [Kant, Perpetual Peace,
p.110.]
a “treaty of peace” (pactum pacis) as Kant called it,109 people, nations or states put an end

to just one war that is prevailing among them at that time, and not to the wars that might

happen in future. “Hence there must be an alliance of a particular kind,” said Kant

“which…. would seek to put an end to war forever.” He called this alliance a ‘covenant of

peace’ (foedus pacificum).110

Any conflict that happen to arise among states, Kant suggested, should be resolved “in a

civilized way by judicial process, rather than in the barbaric way (of savages), namely,

through war.”111 He further suggested that there should be a union of states called the

“permanent congress of states” whose purpose is to preserve peace.112 It is the judicial

arbitrator in the states’ conflicts.

Kant made a distinction between republican and despotic states. While the former rule by

the consent of the governed, the latter rule by force and citizens are not given an

opportunity to participate in decision-making. In Kant’s view, only a republican state

could reliably guarantee individual rights and uphold a constitution.113 “This [republican]

constitution,” he wrote, “is the only enduring political constitution in which the law is

autonomous and is not annexed to any particular person. It is the ultimate end of all

public Law and the only condition under which each person receives his due
109
Ibid., p.134.
110
Ibid., p.134.
111
Ibid., p.125.
112
Ibid., p.124.. This “permanent congress of states” is for Kant the commonwealth formed through
a social contract that puts an end to the state of nature described by him as a state of war of nations against
nations.
113
Kant also pointed out that republican states are the only states which can be perpetually peaceful
with respect to each other. This argument is supported by W.M. Doyle, who points out that liberal
democracies have, in fact, a good record of peaceful relations in respect to each other. This, according to
him, is because there is no war between liberal democratic states that can disrupt the peace. [See Janna
Thompson, Justice and World Order, pp.57-88].
peremptorily.”114He further wrote, “Every true republic is and can be nothing else than a

representative system of the people if it is to protect the rights of its citizens in the name

of the people.”115

Besides having a republican state, Kant saw moral training of individual citizens to be an

effective means to perpetual peace and happiness. He stressed that neither rewards nor

punishments ought to be the grounds for doing good and avoiding evil deeds respectively.

The impulsive ground ought to be moral.116He gave an example that:

“A man who is rewarded for good conduct will repeat that conduct not
because it is good, but because it is rewarded; one who is punished for evil
conduct will hate not the conduct but the punishment; he will repeat the evil
deed and try with Jesuitical craftiness to escape punishment.”117

Like the “state of nature” and the “social contract”, the “original position” is hypothetical.

However, although hypothetical, Rawls contends that, the theory of the original position

“enables us to be impartial, even between persons who are not contemporaries but who

belong to many generations.”118

As regards the hypothetical nature of the “original position”, Rawls writes:

“I have emphasized that this original position is purely hypothetical. It is

natural to ask why, if this agreement is never actually entered into, we should
take any interest in these principles, moral or otherwise. The answer is that
the conditions embodied in the description of the original position are ones
114
Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, pp.112 – 113.
115
Ibid., p.113.
116
See Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, trans. Louis Infield, London Methuen& Co. Ltd., 1930,
p.56.
117
Ibid., p.56.
118
Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p.587.
 that we do in fact accept. Or if we do not, then perhaps we can be persuaded
to do so by philosophical reflection. Each aspect of the contractual situation
can be given supporting grounds. Thus what we shall do is to collect together
into one conception a number of conditions on principles that we are ready
upon due consideration to recognize as reasonable. These constraints express
what we are prepared to regard as limits on fair terms of social cooperation.
One way to look at the idea of original position, therefore, is to see it as an
expository device which sums up the meaning of these conditions and helps
us to extract their consequences. On the other hand, this conception is also an
intuitive notion that suggests its own elaboration, so that led on by it we are
drawn to define more clearly the standpoint from which we can best interpret
moral relationships. We need a conception that enables us envision our
objective from afar: the intuitive notion of the original position is to do this
for us.”119

After the above analysis of the concept of “original position” we now

analyse the concept of the “veil of ignorance”.

The Veil of Ignorance

By the “veil of ignorance,” Rawls means a device that conceals the parties that involve in

choosing the principles of justice, in the original position, particular knowledge of the

facts concerning them: They do not know their race, tribe, religion, gender, the countries

where they come from, the generations to which they belong, who their parents are,

whether they are physically or mentally able or disabled, poor or rich, and the like. They

also do not know their conception of the good, the particulars of their rational plan of life,

or even the special features of their psychology such as their aversion to risk or liability to

optimism or pessimism.120 Besides these, Rawls argues that the parties in the original

position are ignorant of the particular facts concerning their own society, “they do not

know its economic or political situation, or the level of civilization and culture it has been
119
Ibid., pp.21-22.
120
Ibid., p.137.
able to achieve.”121 The parties, however, know that “their society is subject to the

circumstances of justice and whatever this implies.”122 Rawls makes this exception to

ensure that justice and not injustice prevails in the well-ordered society. Without

knowledge of this particular fact, the parties might end up choosing unjust principles. One

may therefore argue that the parties in the original position are not in utter darkness about

particular facts of their society.

It is taken for granted, however, says Rawls, that the parties that take part in choosing the

principles of justice in the original position behind the veil of ignorance, know whatever

general facts affecting the choice of the principles of justice. They know that they are

contemporaries123 and they also “understand political affairs and the principles of

economic theory; they know the basis of social organization and the laws of human

psychology.”124

The main reason for denying the parties particular knowledge of the facts concerning

them and the society to which they belong, apart from that kind of knowledge described

above, is to ensure that particular inclinations and aspirations, and the persons’

conception of the good, do not affect the principles chosen.125 If this happens then the

chosen principles will be serving particular interests other than the interests of all. For

example, if one happens to know that he is materially well-off (rich), he will see it

appropriate to come up with principles that favour the rich. On the contrary, if he knows

121
Ibid.,
122
Ibid.,
123
Ibid., p.292.
124
Ibid., p.137
125
Ibid., p.60.
that he is poor or materially disabled, he will suggest that the principles adopted be in

favour of the poor and the needy.

Since the parties do not know particular things about themselves and the society to which

they belong, Rawls argues, “they must choose principles the consequences of which they

are prepared to live with whatever generation they turn out to belong to”,126 or whatever

situation they turn out to be in.

Because no one knows his social, political, and economic status, Rawls contends that the

parties or individuals in the original position will find it rational to choose two principles

of justice.

The “original position” and the “veil of ignorance” are fundamental in Rawls’ theory of

justice. To have a clear understanding of Rawls’ theory of justice in general, and his

principles of justice in particular, one has, first and foremost, to understand these two

concepts. The two are indeed the basis of Rawls’ theory of justice.

Concluding Remarks

Rawls’ argument that objective, fair, and unbiased principles of justice, especially

distributive justice, can never be chosen if what people say is influenced by a desire to

promote their own individual, particular interests is true. However, the way he proposes

to avoid subjectivity, bias, and unfairness in the principles of justice—that is, to go

behind the “veil of ignorance”-- is impractical. Many criticisms have been made by
126
Ibid., p.137.
several thinkers and scholars against Rawls’ theory. The following are some of these

criticisms:

First, Wolf argues that, Rawls pays much attention to the redistribution of income and

wealth, but little attention to the institutional arrangements by means of which the

redistribution is to be carried out127. In Wolff’s view, redistribution should be emphasized

more than redistribution of income and wealth. Rawls’ failure to focus on this has lead

Wolff to conclude that his model, despite the adjustments he (Rawls) has made to it,

remains ultimately unsatisfactory128.

Most of the criticisms Rawls’ theory has encountered are focusing mainly on the “veil of

ignorance” and the “difference principle”. According to Wolff, these two had posed four

problems for Rawls. That is, prior to the publication of A Theory of justice. The four

problems are:

“First, it was not clear what, if anything, the players in the original position
were to be thought to know about their world; second, it was not clear how
they could engage in rational deliberation in the absence of any conception of
their purposes or interests; third, the scope of application of the principles on
which they were deciding was somewhat ill-defined; and, finally, the
apparently counterintuitive implications of the new difference principle called
for some rather more adequate account of the principles of rational choice to
which they could be expected to appeal.”129

127
Robert Paul Wolff, Understanding Rawls: A Reconstruction and Critique of A Theory of Justice,
Princeton university Press, New Jersey, 1977, p.202.
128
It is worth noting that most of the criticisms Rawls has faced are based on the papers he wrote in
1950s and 1960s. They are: “Justice as Fairness” (1958), “Distributive Justice: Some Addenda” (1968)
“Constitutional Liberty” (1963), “Distributive Justice” (1967), “Civil Disobedience” (1966) and “The Sense
of Justice” (1963). All these are brought together with some revisions, additions, and alterations into one
book called A Theory of Justice. He writes: “Although the main ideas” in the first published papers “are
much the same,” in the new publication namely A Theory of Justice says Rawls, “I have tried to eliminate
inconsistencies and to fill out and strengthen the argument at many points.”
129
Robert Paul Wolff, Understanding Rawls, p.71
Although it is possible to imagine like Rawls that the individuals in the original position

would be ignorant of the particular knowledge concerning them, it is something that can

never happen. Sandel, who is considered one of the severe critics of Rawls, says that the

original position “is a metaphysically suspect account of personal identity”; the

individuals cannot distance themselves from all their attributes (meaning the particular

knowledge concerning them) and yet remain significantly distinct individuals.130

Kolm, who is another critic of Rawls, has provided several criticisms against Rawls’

theory of the original position. First, he contends that to believe that individuals can be

ignorant of their particular knowledge is to believe in a utopian.131Second, he argues that

“justice stems from greater knowledge of relevant facts and reason, not from greater

ignorance” that “justice is open-eyed and informed objectivity, not blind-folded

egoism.”132Third, he remarks that the theory of the original position provides justice for

the individuals in the original position and not justice for the actual individuals.133 Last,

but not least, he says that “the original position theory mistakes ignorance for uncertainty:

My ignoring who I am is not my being uncertain about who I will be.”134

130
See David Boucher and Paul Kelly, The Social Contract from Hobbes to Rawls, Routledge,
London, n.d., p.25.
131
See Serge Christophe Kolm, Modern Theories of Justice, The Massachussets Institute of
Technology(MIT) press, Cambridge, 1996, p.189.
132
Ibid., p.193.
133
Ibid., p.191.
134
Ibid., p.192.
According to the observation made by Corlett, Rawls’ overall theory of justice is in need

of serious rethinking.135This is because he believes that the parties in the original position,

who are placed behind the veil of ignorance, will end up not rationally choosing the two

principles of justice.

Rawls’ second principle, “the difference principle,” is Nozick’s main focus of attack in

Anarchy, State and Utopia. In the course of presenting his own theory of justice, Nozick

argues among other things that to draw a distinction between individuals and their

attributes, or in other words, natural assets-as the difference principle suggests-is to fail to

treat individuals as ends in themselves.136 “Whether or not people’s natural assets are

arbitrary from a moral point of view,” he writes “they are entitled to them, and to what

flows from them.”137

All in all, Rawls’ theory of justice is an ideal theory. It provides a theoretical view of

justice but it fails to provide practical solutions. Today we do live in unjust societies and

we sincerely need practical solutions to the problems we are facing today such as wars,

poverty, and others.

135
See J. Angelo Corlett, Liberty and Equality: Analyzing Rawls and Nozick, Macmillan, London,
1991, pp. 177-178.
136
See Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, p.228.
137
Ibid., p.226.
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