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reference to the Public Sector and Less Developed Countries: A Critical Evaluation.
Junaid Ashraf
Essex Business School
University of Essex
And
Shahzad Uddin*
Essex Business School
University of Essex
* Corresponding Author
Review of Management Accounting Control Change Research with special
reference to the Public Sector and Less Developed Countries: A Critical Evaluation
Abstract
1.0 Introduction
2
This paper stems from interests in management accounting control change, the public
sector1 and less developed countries (LDCs)2. Many studies have been devoted to
various theoretical perspectives (e.g., Burns and Scapens, 2000) in different settings.
Certain geographical and country-specific cultural factors have been examined in respect
(Granlund and Lukka, 1998; Burns and Vavio, 2001, p. 391-92; Busco et al., 2007).
However, few studies have provided critical accounts of the theoretical approaches to the
The public sector in both developed and LDCs is key to overall economic growth and
development. The strong presence of the public sector in both developed and LDCs may
have led to a number of studies of management accounting control in the public sector.
sector management (NPM) during the last two decades have put a dent in state
interventions and growth in the public sector. Recent transformation in the public sector
understand the complex phenomena of public sector reforms and associated changes to
on the public sector, a critical review of management accounting control change research
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in the public sector especially in LDCs would be useful for new entrants in this area
change especially in the public sector. The literature review also encompasses
management accounting control change research carried out in the public sector in LDCs.
The authors believe that this review stimulates interest in the area of management
accounting control change in the public sector, gives voices to LDCs and provides debate
on fruitful ways forward, and hopefully contributes to better policies and practices. This
namely LDCs.
The chapter will proceed thus. Firstly, the extant accounting literature on management
accounting control change is divided into two camps i.e. ‘mainstream’ and ‘alternative’.
The alternative camp is further subdivided into three perspectives namely ‘agential’,
management accounting control change in general, research carried out in public sector
organizations and in LDCs is also reviewed. The last section deals with a synthesis of this
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2.0 Review of Management Accounting Control Change Research
Figure One describes the classificatory scheme used for the review of management
accounting control change literature. With respect to each perspective, the inherent
physical realism. The mainstream research, also termed the positivistic tradition, looks
for universal laws from ‘objective’ empirical observations (Ryan et al., 1995). The
that managers are economically rational agents with an overarching goal of ‘utility
research (Lapsely and Mitchell, 1994; Bruns and Waterhouse, 1975). Contingency theory
adopted by accounting researchers as early as the 1960’s, suggests that the content and
the style of the use of management accounting controls changes with various contingent
situations such as the level of competition, environmental uncertainty, the size of the
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organization and lately the strategy of the firm. Among the earliest managerial
classic field work, which found that economic, technological and sociological
considerations have a significant impact on the way budgeting systems function. The
environments to pressurize workers; but in lucrative environments, the budget was used
management accounting control development and change (Innes and Mitchell, 1990;
Amat, et al., 1994; Cobb et al., 1995; Vaivio, 1999; Sulaiman and Mitchell, 2005;
Chanegrih, 2008). Inns and Mitchell (1990) attempted to explain management accounting
control change in the electronic sector drawing on seven field studies. Driven by
contingency tradition, they identified and classified at least three sets of factors namely
motivators, facilitators and catalysts that are involved in the process of change in
management accounting control. Amat et al., (1994) recognized some internal and
technologies that are responsible in transforming the nature of controls (informal control
into a formal control style). Suliaman and Mitchell (2005)’s work sought to categorise
management accounting control change utilizing a simple typology. ‘This was derived
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with information on the incidence, location, importance and success of management
accounting control changes to provide some analytical insights into the variety and
patterns of change within these companies’ (p.422). More recent studies such as
and Mitchell's study. The study found the Sulaiman and Mitchell’s typology useful but
further argues how national culture and macroeconomic context influence the nature and
While the positivistic tradition gives us important information about generally reported
has its limitations. These limitations stem from both ontological and methodological
explaining management accounting control change. For instance, most of research that
has been done on management accounting control research involves cross sectional
analysis (Chenhall, 2003, p. 156). Since cross-sectional analysis presents a static picture,
non-positivistic researchers argue it does not capture change per se. The positivistic
tradition is claimed to be more focused on predictions than the explanations (Ryan et al.,
1995). For example, positivist research will be concentrating more on, for example,
whether the firm size has anything to do with a change in the budgeting system than on
how and why those changes occur. Contemporary researchers argue that it limits the
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2.2 Alternative Research
Contrary to the ‘mainstream’, which flourished in North America and is still considered
research has found fertile grounds in the UK, Australia, New Zealand and Europe.
approaches that have been used to explicate management accounting control change
(Laughlin, 1995). The alternative management accounting control research does not
assume that managers are being driven by exclusive concerns of economic efficiency and
‘corporate objectives’ are unproblematic. Thus, the varied theoretical perspectives used in
(family, business organization, society) is nothing but the sum total of actions of a
number of individual actors. Management accounting control practices are seen as social
practices and meaning systems that have arisen out of interaction sequences between
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organizational actors. These practices are a ‘reality’ constituted through social interaction
and play a part in creating ‘other realities’ within corporate life. Accounting practices are
For example, Dent (1991) in his famous study highlighted the significance of
organization that was being previously driven by engineering and operations logic.
‘visibilities’ within the organization which led managers to make different choices, which
would not have been possible otherwise. In this research genre, the highly subjective
organizational actors assign different meanings to these practices and take different
actions accordingly (Boland and Pondy, 1983; Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1986; Boland
Many management accounting control change studies in the interpretive paradigm have
raised the issue of conflict and politics in the change processes (Boland and Pondy, 1983;
Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1986). For example, Covaleski and Dirsmith (1986) show the
power struggle and political bargaining process between nurses, administrators and other
health professionals in terms of the budgeting process. Similarly, Covaleski and Dirsmith
(1988a) describe the politically rife budget development process between University
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officials, the Governor of the State and the State Legislative Assembly of the State of
Wisconsin.
The major criticism often attributed to interpretive researchers is the neglect of ‘social
relations of production’, which may shape the management accounting control change
processes within which actors operate. This neglect also influences their interpretation
their behaviour (Armstrong, 2008). While interpretation and human subjectivity are
important, reducing social reality to this subjectivity creates problems for interpretive
researchers that are not easy to solve - a problem that has been described by Margaret
Archer (1995) as ‘upward conflation’. Take the example of Covaleski and Dirsmith’s
(1988a) case study (details in the section below). Can the relationship between the
and actions of present generation actors? And when all three are operating within larger
economic and political relationships, can these material relationships and their effects
e.g. economic downturn, also be reduced to thinking and action of present role
occupants? Are these (material) relationships not affecting these individuals, independent
of their conceptions and perceptions? The same can be said about ‘ideas’ and ‘principles’
previous generations and they stand in independent logical relationship with each other,
10
This upward conflation is also evident in interpretive research’s treatment of ‘conflict’
which inevitably arises in management accounting control changes (see , for example,
Covaleski et al., 1986, 1988; Mourtisen, 1999). This research reduces conflict to an
‘interpersonal issue’. In this research, actors are struggling for pursuit of interests
industrial sociologists have found a particular class of employees in conflict with another
research, highlighted its exclusive focus on social interaction. He argues that the social
interaction is the structural conditions with which this interaction is taking place, and
below this is the subjectivity of individuals, which itself is shaped by what is above
(ibid).
The structural perspective, commonly associated with Marxism, claims that social
collectivities (i.e. structures) have properties and powers that are more than the sum of
individuals that make up the structure. Structures and their properties are seen in
relational terms. So, structure can be defined as a system of human relationships between
social positions (referred to as class positions) which create a social system that Marxists
characteristically call modes of production. In every mode of production, there are classes
with interests objectively defined according to their position in the mode of production,
which also determines their particular way of acting or tendencies. So, domination,
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exploitation and competition, are all behavioural tendencies of the capitalist mode of
production associated with the ‘position’ of capitalists’ vis-à-vis other ‘positions’ in the
system.
In accordance with the tradition of this research, accounting researchers have tried to
explain the emergence, changes and use of specific management accounting controls (e.g.
standard costing, overhead accounting, Activity Based Costing etc.) in relation to changes
in macro structures prevalent in society. For example, Armstrong (1987) finds the reasons
for the eminence of financial controls in the relationship between capitalist organizations,
the state and investors in different historical times which led to the importance of the
seminal paper, Hopper and Armstrong (1991) traced the history of the emergence of
multi-division bureaucracies and the interface between these control regimes and cost
accounting. The formation of large companies with divisional structures in the early part
of twentieth century created its own problems of control for corporate headquarters.
Johnsons and Kaplan (1986) contended that cost accounting techniques have not
developed since 1930 and attributed this to the influence of financial accountants over
managerial accountants. On the contrary, Hopper and Armstrong (1991) claimed that the
was due to the ‘new deal’ era in which lay-offs and speed-ups in the primary labour
market of large monopoly organizations went down. This ‘new deal era’ was again linked
12
with larger political economic conditions of ‘under-consumption’ and intervention of the
In another paper employing a structural perspective, Bryer (2005) traced the evolution of
during the British industrial revolution. In tracing this history, Bryer (2005) contends that
standard costing, integration of financial and managerial accounts etc.) was linked with
variations in the social relations of production within capitalist firms of the era. In a
similar vein, Toms (2005) traced changes in financial and managerial controls within the
British cotton industry from the early 18th century all the way to the present times. Toms
(2005) linked these changes with changes in industrial structure and capital and credit
markets in the time period under study. These papers primarily look at organized
accounting control changes taking place over a time tract of more than a hundred years.
These papers are also very insightful in the sense that they not only look at the top-down
relations which necessitate management accounting control relations but also examine
accounting control practices. However, given the time scale and canvas of these historical
accounts, the role of individuals, their perceptions and reflections and their identities
could not have been prominently highlighted in the narrative. These papers thus account
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for management accounting control changes using a more ‘structural’ perspective
either agency or structure is given primacy at the expense of the ontological status of the
other, there have been quite a few social science theories that suggest ways out of this
problem. In this chapter, these different theories, which have been used extensively in
grouped together for the purpose of the review. These theories vary substantially from
each other in terms of their ontological and epistemological assumptions but have all
change. This section discusses three such theoretical perspectives/theories, i.e. Post
perspective), Old Institutional Theory and New Institutional Sociology. The other ‘third
ways perspectives’, i.e. Habermesian Critical Accounting Research and Cultural Political
While there have been several post-modernist and post-structuralist scholars whose work
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change, only two such works have been selected in this paper, i.e. the works of Michael
Foucault and Anthony Giddens. The selection is primarily based on the extensive use of
these two approaches for the explanation of management accounting control change
Michael Foucault’s (1970, 1977, 1991) work exemplifies post-modernism, and has been
used extensively in accounting research (Hopwood, 1987; Miller and O’Leary, 1987,
1993; Ezzamel and Willmott, 2004). Broadly speaking, Foucault’s inspired work on
management accounting control change focuses on discourses and how these create a
particular form of subjectivities and practices, including changes therein, such as the
introduction of standard costing within factories (Miller and O’Leary, 1987), the
O’Leary, 1993).
which was later subject to severe criticism by realists, is Miller and O’Leary’s (1993)
within an American heavy vehicle manufacturing plant. It was claimed that changes in
the plant were linked with new discourses at firm and national level and spatial
rearrangement within the plant. This, according to Miller and O’Leary (1993), amounted
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to the creation of a ‘new economic citizenship’ discourse, with its own requirements of
the subjects and practices within this discourse. However, the Foucauldian approach is
often criticised for not providing due attention to structural and wider issues such as class
analysis, economic conditions and resistance (Arnold, 1998; Froud et al., 1998). Arnold
(1998), in her interviews with workers at the same plant studied by Miller and O’ Leary
(1993), reported that these workers were feeling of insecurity, frustration and work
overload which was characterised by Miller and O’Leary (1993) as ‘new economic
citizenship’. Thus, critics argue, in the absence of consideration of the material structural
conditions and the effects of these conditions on the subjectivities of the individuals
concerned (Arnold, 1998), the resulting analysis was of a very dubious nature
(Armstrong, 2006).
structure and agency, tried to incorporate both in his theory, which he termed
human agency. They are constituted by human agency, and yet at the same time are the
very medium of this constitution; what he termed as ‘duality’. Structures, in effect, are
memory traces in the minds of actors in the form of rules and resources, instantiated only
when action takes place. There is a fairly large body of accounting research that has
change (Capps et al., 1989; Scapens and Roberts, 1993; Conrad, 2005). Macintosh and
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Scapens, (1990)’s paper was amongst the first papers that introduced structuration theory
to management accounting control research4. The seminal nature of this paper is evident
from its extensive quoting in accounting papers that have used structuration theory ever
since its publication. Using Structuration theory, Macintosh and Scapens reframed the
empirics of a field study originally published by Covaleski and Dirsmith (1988a). The
accounting control research in the alternative paradigms. The paper argued that Covaleski
and Dirsmith (1998a)’s paper failed to explain the process of management accounting
control change e.g. “Why and how do control systems become the mechanisms through
which interests are negotiated” (p 463). Papers inspired by structuration theory generally
involved in linking structure with agency (Macintosh and Scapens, 1990; Conrad, 2005).
However, this conceptualisation is subjected to criticisms not only in terms of the absence
of material structural conditions from the theory, but also due to the denial of the
independent existence of ideas (Archer, 1995). Critics argue that management accounting
control ideas not only exist in the minds of actors but also have an independent existence,
management accounting control, thus gives a totally ‘virtual’ and ‘subjective’ status to
change research in the structuration tradition often leaves the power and external
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2.2.3.2 Management accounting control Change Research Using Old Institutional
Economic Theory
maximization rational behaviour’ and instead suggests that human action is influenced by
and prevalence, which is embedded in the habits of a group of people (Burns and
actors. According to Burns and Scapens (2000) framework, accounting activities and
granted assumptions of a group of people about some action or thought) and institutions
are in turn influenced by actions. Rules and routines are influenced by existing
institutions, i.e. these rules and routines are enacted and reproduced through actions. Yet,
through this ongoing enacting and reproduction, changes to rules and routines emerge,
and under specific conditions, can be institutionalised. Once rules and routines have been
arrangements and therefore routines may become somewhat resistant to change’ (Burns
and Scapens, 2000, p. 10). These institutional arrangements comprise the taken-for-
granted assumptions that a certain pattern of behaviour is the norm for the social group of
which one is part. Management accounting control practices, according to the Burns and
Scapens (2000), are ‘rules and routines’ which link the realm of thought to realm of
action.
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A number of accounting researchers adopted OIE to study the process of management
accounting control change (Granlund and Malmi, 2002; Scapens and Jazayeri, 2003;
Nabiha and Scapens, 2005). Nevertheless, OIE is subject to the same criticism as the
structuration theory which is the confluence of structure and agency (Archer 1989: 103-
104). Management accounting control Practices, according to Burns and Scapens (2000),
are ‘rules and routines’ which link the realm of thought to the realm of action. But can
world during the last three hundred years. There have been major changes in management
However, can these changes be explained with reference to the ‘habits’ of managers and
employees, or the ‘thoughts’ of managers? Can these habits be explained with reference
to changing rules and routines within the organization, as suggested by the Burns and
Scapens (2000) model? Changes in the ‘habits’ of managers towards employees in terms
of tougher management accounting control practices are actually linked with declining
opportunities for employees in the labor market, which in turn are linked with weak
economic conditions (Sayer, 1992; p 113). These habits can change in the opposite
structural conditions.
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As discussed above, both general habits of thought of employees, and rules and routines
(i.e. the nature of the relationship between the position of managers and employees),
which in turn are linked with political and economic structures prevalent in society. It is
positions within firms), which are interlinked with wider political and economic
structures (relationship of firm with other entities, such as the political and economic
system; political and economic systems themselves are relational in nature), that OIE has
management accounting control practices within the firm, it remains totally ignorant
about changes in the wider political and economic context in which the organization
New Institutional Theory in sociology is an evolved and radically different form of Old
of firms. This new line of sociological thinking emphasized the role of institutions in
terms of their rules, like taken-for-granted status that orders social behaviour (Dimaggio
and Powell, 1991; p.21). In this regard, Berger and Luckmann (1967) emphasised the role
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‘reciprocal typifications’ or rules of conduct that, over time, acquire the ontological status
of ‘facticity’.
In organizational research, the general theme of the New Institutional theories has been
behaviour as much as to achieve high levels of production efficiency. Thus, many aspects
society's continued support (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Scott 1987; DiMaggio and Powell
1983, 1991). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) have identified three control mechanisms that
bring this isomorphism to firms operating in the same industry settings. These are
Another important concept that was prominent at least in early writings on new
institutionalism was the distinction between the technical environment and the
organizations can comply with norms and values in the society by having structures and
practices that are ceremonial, while the actual ways of working are not greatly affected.
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argue that this decoupling allows the organization to adhere
to various institutional demands, while organising its primary processes more efficiently
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Accounting researchers have followed the same general trend as was the case with
accounting and control practices and changes therein. However, there were two
peculiarities about this research and these peculiarities are interlinked. Institutional theory
is a theory that has a macro scope. This means that institutions (institutionalised
practices, rules, ‘culture’) develop and operate at the level of society or larger segments
within society. So, the appropriate scale for investigation was either organizational
instead of focusing within the organization (as was the case with old institutionalism),
On the contrary, in the majority of research that has been done in accounting on
institutionalism, the focus was on a single organization (Granlund, 2001; Tsamenyi et al.,
2006; Abernethy and Chua, 1996; Hussain and Hoque, 2002; Collier, 2001; Covaleski
and Dirsmith, 1988b). The majority of research reported two issues: firstly, institutional
forces (in terms of three forces bringing about isomorphism, as mentioned by Scott,
1987) could only be attributed as one of the factors in explaining the emergence,
Abernethy and Chua, 1996; Hussain and Hoque, 2002; Collier, 2001; Covaleski and
Dirsmith, 1988b).
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Secondly, nowhere in this body of research, were human actors shown as being totally
practices. In almost all the cases, the role of human agency in sustaining or changing
management accounting control change was ‘visible’. Human actors were reflected as
calculable agents who are actively trying to resist, implement or modify management
accounting control practices in accordance with their interests using the power available
at their disposal (Tsamenyi et al., 2006; Ezzamel et al., 2007; Granlund, 2001; Modell,
2002; Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988b; Abernethy and Chua, 1996). A case in point is
Abernethy and Chua’s (1996) paper, which specifically used Oliver’s (1991) framework
that deals with ‘strategic response to institutional power’. The central issue here is that
the moment these researchers focused within the organization, it became quite apparent
to them that management accounting control procedures are not an outcome of mere
routines or habits of managers and employees of organization. These are partly calculably
selected set of techniques that change with the level of competition and are an outcome of
There are some theoretical issues that stem from the basic tenets of neo-institutionalism:
for example, when action and actors are determined by institutions, then there is
obviously no place in this social theory for human agency. The role of the actor
(individual or corporations) in this exposition was that of a passive recipient that will
adjust its posture to gain legitimacy. However, this particular theoretical scheme lacked
the answers to some fundamental questions. One such question was institutional change.
What brings change in age-old practices within organization practices that can well be
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called institutionalised? Institutionalists had no answer here since individuals, who are
the only plausible change agents, are already immersed in a particular social action plan
(i.e. institution) to an extent that they take it for granted. “If institutions exert such a
powerful influence over the ways in which people can formulate their desires and work to
attain them, then how does the institutional change occur? (Dimaggio and Powell, 1991;
p 29).”
In order to explicate change, individual actors had to be given a place in NIE theory,
which has to be more than mere regurgitators of social scripts. Different researchers have
tried to overcome this issue by emphasizing the role of human agency. Oliver (1991)
suggested that firms (and managers within these firms) do not just passively adapt to
and Hinings (1996) combined concepts of old institutionalism such as power, politics and
vested interests within the firm with institutional theory to explain change in institutions.
All these efforts improved the ability of new Institutional theory to explicate the
To sum up, alternative management accounting control change research is divided into
reflections and actions for bringing about management accounting control changes (Dent,
1990). On the other end of the spectrum is the structural perspective, which looks at
24
relationship with changes in management accounting control practices (Hopper and
Armstrong, 1991). While both these perspectives have something important to offer, the
neglect of the other side in each of these perspectives is very noticeable. The third ways
(other) perspectives, in their own ways, try to overcome the one sidedness inherent in
structural and agential perspectives. These perspectives also add to our understanding of
rules/principles, which can, over the years, acquire taken-for-granted status and are
In order to make robust social explanations i.e. management accounting control change,
framework. There are some other ‘third ways’ theoretical frameworks, used in accounting
literature, which do incorporate all three within their basic ontological recipe. Two such
management accounting control change in public sector entities in the West and in LDCs
are Habermasian theory (pioneered by Richard Laughlin and Jane Broadbent) and labour
process/cultural political economy respectively. The subsequent sections engage with the
literature that dealt with changes in management accounting control practices in the
There has been a ‘movement’ since the late 1970s and early 1980s to bring about changes
(Pollitt, 1995). In the management and accounting literature, the changed model of
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governance in public sector organizations is termed New Public Management (NPM)
(ibid). It is unclear as to what exactly inspired these changes but several reasons are
quoted in the literature for the initiation of these ‘reforms’ in the public sector. These
include the change agenda of the right-wing parties of Thatcher and Reagan, a response
time period, and the role of business schools, accounting and management consultant
In any case, the main question is, what does NPM entail? It entails disintegration of
larger public sector organizations into smaller units focused on a particular product or
market, bringing in market (or quasi-market) competitiveness within these units, private
sector management style, cost control and audit culture, greater managerial discretion and
freedom, clearly laid out performance measures linked with output rather than processes
and evaluation of performance against these standards (Hood, 1991). The move is
intended to make public sector organizations more ‘business like’ i.e. ‘performance-,
cost-, efficiency- and audit-oriented’ (Diefenbach, 2007). Since NPM involves the
control, was an inevitable feature of this movement. In fact, looking at the increased
importance of accounting in this new managerial regime within the public sector, NPM is
also described as ‘accountingnization’ of the public sector and services (Power and
Laughlin, 1992). Accounting researchers have thus spent a considerable time looking at
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the NPM-related accounting changes within public sector entities, their reception, their
In order to look at management accounting control changes within public sector entities,
from institutional theory (Abernethy and Chua, 1996; Brignall and Modell, 2000) to post-
change5. We can apply the same classificatory scheme that we used earlier to split this
body of research into mainstream vs. alternative or agential vs. structural vs. third ways
earlier, this section focuses on one theoretical framework, which incorporates within its
ontological basis the structural, cultural and agential perspectives. This framework is
from critical theorist Jurgen Habermas, whose work has been extensively used to
and Broadbent, 1993; Laughlin et al, 1994; Broadbent and Laughlin, 1998; Broadbent et
controls of different public sector areas, especially health and education in the UK. The
27
of some of the more intangible communicatively agreed Lifeworld elements.
humans’ belief about the importance of education and the nature of education
organizations;
consonance with the Lifeworld of members of society. But the Lifeworld and
the Organization system are subject to continuous change. So, for example,
educational organizations may start charging higher tuition fees. This creates
Government etc.
similar system. So, every system organization, such as a university, will have within it a
accounting systems, to steer the organization in accordance with the Lifeworld of its
28
members. Similarly, a steering mechanism organization such as a Ministry of Education
will have within it steering mechanisms to guide the organization in accordance with the
Lifeworld of its members. Organizational change can have an external locus: for
example, when universities are asked to make more profit by the Ministry of Education
because of change in the Lifeworld of the Government such that ‘educational institutions
should stand on their own feet’ and government funding should be spent on other
for example, changing reporting requirements to emphasize Break-even, Profits etc. This
change, when it reaches the concerned organization, will be received by the members of
this organization in accordance with their Lifeworld. If this change is in accordance with
the Lifeworld of members of the organization, in our example the university, its internal
steering mechanisms will be changed to reflect the changed Lifeworld of the members.
Changed steering mechanisms will include, for example, changes in the performance
measurement system whereby, say, the performance of deans of schools will be judged
by the university according to the Contribution Margin made rather than research
excellence. This change in the Lifeworld of organizational members, in line with changes
If, on the contrary, the change suggested by the external steering organization is not in
accordance with the Lifeworld of the members of the university, they will try to resist it.
This resistance, if it fails, will lead to what Habermas terms ‘colonization’, i.e. the system
organization does not represent the Lifeworld of actors (ibid). So, for example, if
university members still believe that teaching and research excellence are the raison
29
d'être of the university but it has been forced by the Ministry of Education to implement a
performance evaluation system that emphasizes financial performance, this will result in
Lifeworld is subject to colonization risk (after failed resistance) will have two options:
either to leave the organization or to accept the new imposed Lifeworld. In either case,
Presented in this theoretical light, B&L explain state-led management accounting control
changes within public sector entities, reaction to these changes, including resistance
strategies by members of the profession, and the outcome of these changes. B&L (with
some of their colleagues) in their various papers have examined various changes in the
al., 1994), and changes in the health sector, such as GPs’ contracts and changed fund
holding arrangements for GPs (Broadbent and Laughlin, 1998). These changes, in
general, were not in accordance with the Lifeworld of members of the concerned
professional organizations and were being driven by the government’s material concerns
perceived threat stemming from these changes (Broadbent and Laughlin, 1998). If the
level of threat was weak, this was coped with by ‘absorbing’ the strategies of
while accommodating the demands of the State (Laughlin et al., 1994). On the contrary,
30
if the level of threat was greater, a more open resistance strategy was followed
What is noteworthy about Habermasian theory is that Habermas, while recognizing the
(Danermark et al, 2002, p.202). Concepts like ‘Lifeworld’ emphasize the agential aspect
of the social world, while ‘systems’ reflect the independent existence of ‘collectivities’
within Habermasian theory. Broadbent and Laughlin (2005), while describing the basic
tenets of their approach, contend that; “We do see that organizations exist which have
their own accumulated histories – so, for instance, King’s College, London and Royal
maintaining that they are not independent of these human stakeholders – who have the
power to mould and change these organizational histories to be taken forward for future
generations to similarly mould these histories” (p.8). Apart from recognizing the
importance of structures and agency within this framework, the role of ‘ideas’ or ‘ideals’
believe in certain ‘ideas’ about how their respective practices should be conducted and
how these practices should be free from the ‘material concerns’ suggested in government
includes all three concepts of ‘structure’, ‘agency’ and ‘ideas’ and is thus a very useful
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4.0 Management Accounting Control Change Research in LDCs
In contrast to the developed world, LDCs have unique macro-economic, political and
cultural traits, all of which, as discussed in the chapter so far, have an important bearing
on the development and use of management accounting control systems. Over the last
twenty years or so, researchers have looked at various implications of this nexus between
regions) are spread all around the world (e.g. Africa, Asia, South America etc.) and have
their own idiosyncratic political and cultural conditions. However, extant accounting
literature can help us make a few generalisations about the political, economic and
To begin with, most LDCs, apart from obviously being in poor shape economically, also
have serious governance issues, including corruption and political malpractices serving
the vested interests of the powerful few (Hopper et al, 2009). The short-term history of
most LDCs also has a similar pattern, with freedom during the middle of twentieth
century, state-led industrialisation cum central planning during the 1950s and
privatisation and NPM related reforms during the 1980s and 1990s (Alawattage et al.,
2007). Most of these swings in policies are a function of international politics and the
economic dependence of these countries on economically stronger nations (ibid). The end
of the Cold War, with what seem like a decisive win of the Capitalist West over the
32
socialist block, has given impetus to privatisation and NPM-related reforms via the
This general historical trend for LDCs means a few general traits of organizations
which management accounting control research has been done either still are, or were in
the recent past, public sector organizations (courtesy of the 1950s era) (Hopper et al,
2009). Secondly, in the majority of these public sector organizations, while formal
management accounting control practices were in place to enable the State to make
rational decisions about resource allocations etc., these were in practice often ignored due
to the interference of state politicians in the affairs of these entities (Alawattage et al,
2009). While the majority of these public sector entities had ‘independent’ Boards, these
were, in essence, subject to controls by their respective ministries and hence interference
of ministers. Most of these public sector organizations suffered heavy losses due to this
management accounting controls within these organizations are generally linked with
poor financial performance followed by some kind of ‘reform’ program associated with
the intervention of international aid/loan agencies (Hopper et al., 2009). These reforms
take the shape of either partial or full privatisation or other changes in management
accounting control practices (Uddin and Hopper, 2001; Wickramasinghe and Hopper,
2005, Uddin and Tsamenyi, 2005; Xu and Uddin, 2008; Uddin, 2009).
33
However, in most of these cases, ‘reforms’ did not materialise because of a host of
factors normally linked with local politics and bad governance. In privatised firms,
management accounting controls took a more exploitative shape whereby labour and the
State were both ultimate losers, while the new owners benefited (Uddin and Hopper,
2001). In those organizations, where organizations were not privatised, not much was
2005). In most of these cases, bad governance, national and international politics and
local culture were recurring themes. Since most LDCs have undergone a similar
Hopper et al. (2009), while reviewing this literature, summarised this research in three
historical epochs, i.e. colonial despotism, state capitalism and market capitalism. Each
epoch characterises a different mode of production and associated culture, with remnants
of previous cultures lagging onto new modes of production, thus creating its own set of
changes, researchers have again adopted various theories. These theoretical approaches
positivist research (e.g. O’Connar et al., 2004) and a number of ‘alternative’ research
LDCs, it is the ‘alternative’ research which dominates the research landscape (Hopper et
al., 2009). Hence, one can easily invert the nomenclature of ‘mainstream’ and
‘alternative’ for accounting research within LDCs. Within alternative research (going
34
with the original nomenclature), again, theoretical approaches that were classified earlier
agential/interpretive research can also be seen (e.g. Ansari and Bell, 1991, Rahman and
accounting control change using institutional theory (Kholeif et al., 2007), a combination
of contingency and institutional theory (Hoque and Hopper, 1997) and post-modernist
theoretical approaches such as the work of Giddens (Uddin and Tsamenyi, 2005) and
Foucault (Jones and Sefiane, 1992) etc. All these theoretical approaches, with their
respective problems, have been discussed before. One ‘third way’ theoretical approach,
agential perspective within its theoretical ambit and which has been extensively used
process/ (cultural) political economy theory (Uddin et al., forthcoming; Uddin and
Hopper, 2001; Wickramasinghe and Hopper, 2005; Alam et al., 2004; Wickramasinghe et
al., 2004; Alawattage and Wickramasinghe, 2008). All these papers are set within a
historical materialist context whereby management accounting control practices are seen
in the context of the relationship between ‘management’ and ‘labour’, which are
themselves conditioned by the relationship between the state, the political system and the
economy.
Inspired by Burawoy (1979, 1983), Uddin and Hopper (2001) traced changes within the
changed ‘production politics’ in the context of a changed ‘production regime’. So, during
35
state capitalism, due to the influence of local political conditions and the power of trade
unions, management accounting controls were not geared towards commercial ends.
Accounting, budgeting and other controls were made toothless and ceremonial to
state enterprises and the pressures of international donor and lender agencies led to
privatisation efforts by the State. A privatisation program by the State resulted in the
targets. The changed ‘production regime’ reduced workers’ powers to resist management
advances for work intensification. While workers were involved in ‘gaming’, these
resistance efforts, according to the authors, were counterproductive in the sense that they
took the steam out of the resistance boiler. These studies, which clearly have materialist
historical analysis tones within them, also incorporated ‘cultural’ elements within their
analysis. For example, Alam et al. (2004) discuss indigenous communal culture and how
this culture contradicts capitalist concerns with profitability and the implications of these
within a Sinhalese village in Sri Lanka. According to the authors, traditional management
accounting control practices were resisted by factory workers because these did not gel
with local culture. After a dismal financial performance, the mill was privatised and this
36
management accounting control practices did not suit the interests of middle managers
and workers and also collided with their cultural values. This led to resistance efforts by
workers, supported by middle managers, against these changed practices. The private
owners eventually fled after the discovery of financial irregularities in the affairs of the
mill, and the mill was again nationalised, bringing back the old management accounting
control practices.
telecom firm, which was partially privatised by the State. Part of the stake in the firm was
the foreign firm was sent in as the new chief executive. The new chief executive brought
a number of changes within the management accounting control system of the firm,
and reporting system linking, operations and performance measurement. These changed
management accounting control practices resulted in extracting further work from labour
and stopping illegal payments (as bribes for connections) to them. But at the same time,
the system also included higher compensations, especially to those employees who would
improving financial performance of the firm. However, they also resulted in creating
division within the employees of the firm. For example, engineers were given more
importance in the new control regime, whereas non-engineers felt ignored. Old, unskilled
and unwilling employees felt offended by the changes, whereas those who were young,
skilled and willing to embrace change were happy them. Labour compensations went up
37
and there was also a guarantee of ‘no redundancies’. However, the majority of workers
were unwilling to put in further labour efforts and their community links with supervisors
and managers meant a more forgiving attitude of superiors towards them. Change efforts
also made the chairman and members of the board of directors unhappy, as they thought
the new chief executive was getting a lot of credit for the company’s performance and
control of the company had been totally reverted to him. The efforts of government
bureaucrats and members of boards resulted in the Japanese firm replacing the old chief
executive with a new person. This change also marked the beginning of a reversal of the
change initiatives of the old CEO, thus bringing back the old public sector bureaucratic
rules and regulations. The paper thus traces changes in management accounting controls
and their linkage with material structural conditions, culture and actions and the
perceptions of individuals.
In most of these papers, the actions of individuals were seen as being influenced by
unchanged cultural values and changed material structural conditions (e.g. change from
theoretical hue also highlighted how actions of labour resulted in changing larger material
structural conditions. For example, Alawattage and Wickramasinghe (2008), using the
work of Scott (1985, 1990), explained how ‘hidden’ and ‘open’ resistance by tea plant
workers, which was supported by local politicians, resulted in changed material structural
conditions whereby large capitalist plantations were slowly replaced by smaller worker-
38
changed management accounting control practices whereby old coercive controls of
features of management accounting control change in LDCs. First of all, this research
involving national and international political and economic conditions. ‘Managers’ and
‘managed’ have vested interests and resource availability, which ‘push’ them to act in
one way or the other, depending upon the nature of the ‘larger relationships’ within
which firms are operating. So, change in larger relationships, e.g. state capitalism to
the case, for example, with Uddin and Hopper (2001). This research brings to light the
structured differences in vested interests of managers and managed: thus, all research
reports resistance efforts on the part of labour and lower level employees to stop the
2008). These resistance efforts were of different forms and shapes (e.g. open defiance or
hidden resistance) and at times were supported by their supervisors (Wickramasinghe and
Hopper, 2005). This research has also shown that changed management accounting
control practices can also entail antagonistic relationships between different managerial
39
societies are at odds with capitalist modes of production and hence the resistance to
terms of cultural values, this research also highlights how ethnic affinity between
supervisors and labour stop the former from extracting surplus labour from the latter in
LDCs (ibid). It was not just structural conditions and changes therein which were given
importance in this research. Individuals, their unique styles of acting and strategies also
featured prominently in it (e.g. Wickramasinghe et al., 2004). The research thus gives a
fairly comprehensive account of management accounting control change, tracing its links
to larger economic and political conditions (and changes therein), cultural values and
40
5.0 Evaluation and Concluding Remarks
general, with special emphasis on the public sector and LDCs in particular. Recent trends
clearly show some momentum in researching the public sector in LDCs, focusing on
management accounting control change. New researchers are coming and several
frameworks are being formulated in a number of theoretical avenues. Issues are being
further reshaped with increasing interest, as LDCs are still a ‘laboratory’ for both
researchers and investors. The authors believe that it is important to understand the
complex issues surrounding management accounting control change in the public sector,
especially in the context of LDCs. The following summarises some of the key theoretical
First, in terms of theory, earlier management accounting control change research in the
public sector in LDCs is mainly driven by mainstream accounting research. These studies
have assumed that organizational functions are independent of the countries in which
they operate and that organizational variables can be tested without referring to the
aspects of societies. These studies are mainly impressed by contingency theory and
our recent studies on management accounting control change in LDCs have given us
much confidence in adopting more varied perspectives (See Uddin et al., forthcoming;
Uddin and Hopper, 2001; Wickramasinghe and Hopper, 2005). Recent work in this area
suggests that issues in this area are complex, interrelated and chronic (Hoque and
Hopper, 1997; Uddin and Hopper, 2001; Wickramasinghe and Hopper, 2005). Politics,
41
culture, state imperatives, bureaucracy and traditional modes of production are all
accounting control research in LDCs does not stand with these issues, as they are
frameworks and systemic thinking. Their world-views have been formed by the dominant
thought and are inclined to address issues such as budgetary participation (Frucot and
Shearon, 1991), information characteristics (Chia, 1995) and decentralisation (Gul et al,
1995). Alternative research frameworks used in LDCs have found that management
Hopper, 2005). They argue that difficulties in changing traditional cultures and mores,
informal contractual arrangements, familial and community relations are all products of a
social system, especially in a LDC, and these are produced and reproduced as a result of
social arrangement and solutions cannot be found quickly by studying the surface. The
largest portion of an ‘ice-berg’ is not to be seen from the surface of the sea of social and
organizational reality.
in the public sector, especially in the context of LDCs, we have argued that the
LDCs. Contrary to the ‘mainstream’, which flourished in the US and is still considered as
42
the only credible research methodology (Zimmerman, 2001), alternative accounting
research has found its place in management accounting control change research in the
public sector both in less developed and developed countries. Alternative accounting
research, very diverse in terms of theoretical perspectives and approaches, deals with the
three aspects of social and organizational life (i.e. structure, culture and agency), which
are indeed all intertwined. However, the majority of theoretical approaches adopted in
explaining management accounting control change focus on one aspect for in-depth
research. For example, the structural approach focuses on the importance of larger
the firms. In this tradition, accounting researchers have tried to explain the emergence,
changes, and use of specific management accounting controls (e.g. standard costing,
structures prevalent in society. The main criticism attributed to the structuralists is that
they tend to overemphasise the role of macro structures while ignoring the role of
The Agential approach gives importance to agents and their subjectivities but somewhat
research in this tradition raised the important issues of conflict and politics in the change
processes (Boland and Pondy, 1983; Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1986). On the contrary,
‘Third Ways’ perspectives privilege ideas or ‘culture’ in order to address the century old
sociological debate on structure vs. agency. Theories in this tradition have been very
43
has been a major source of ideas in explaining management accounting control changes,
inspired by Burns and Scapens’ (2000) paper. Similarly, Macintosh and Scapens (1990)
and this became the most cited paper in this area. New Institutional Theory has also
Third Ways perspectives limit themselves predominantly to the role of culture/ideas and
Laughlin and Jane Broadbent) and labour process/cultural political economy do seem to
provide some acknowledgements of all three aspects of our social and organizational life.
Without denying the contributions from other perspectives, we argue, research produced
by applying the above two theories seems to have provided a fuller picture of
Finally, in addition to theoretical choices promoted by the review, the paper points out
change research is predominantly about public sector entities with strong labour unions
with intense political interference and serious financial problems (Hopper et al., 2009).
Convergence of interests between strong politicians and local unions, combined with
weak law enforcement mechanisms, mean that in most of these public sector entities
44
documented in the accounting literature, commercially effective management accounting
controls are absent or incapacitated (ibid). As a result, most of the cases reported in
accounting literature in LDCs are about organizations that are in serious financial trouble
(ibid). The nexus between politicians and local labour unions would not allow the
2004). On the other hand, changes in larger politico-economic structural conditions (from
state capitalism to market capitalism) have, in some places, led to the complete
(Uddin and Hopper, 2001). This has created exploitative labour conditions within these
organizations in LDCs is weak at the moment (Hopper et al., 2009). Thus, this is an area
controls in a ‘profitable’ public sector entity and to understand the impact of adoption of
dominated by recent reforms such as NPM in both developed and LDCs. Some research
in LDCs, not surprisingly, takes the view that NPM are equally applicable in LDCs.
Future research could be devoted to interrogate two key assumptions in relation to NPM
in LDCs. First, the key assumption in relation to NPM is that LDCs are a homogeneous
group and accounting problems are common to all LDCs, so that international consensus
45
could be appropriate in resolving these problems. However, this is unrealistic. Most
LDCs are post-colonies and others are traditional societies with less exposure to the
Western world, e.g. China. Even within one country, there are regional discriminations,
characteristics of people’s behaviour that form different social, political and cultural
peculiarities. Second, the NPM and other reform advocates for the public sector have also
assumed that LDCs are in need of accounting technology whatever their form (Uddin et
al., forthcoming). This denies the possibilities that LDCs may be able to solve their own
problems in due course or the market may decide which way they would be resolved
(Peasnell, 1993). It was noted elsewhere that transferring accounting technology may be
expensive for LDCs as well (Peasnell, 1993). Nevertheless, there have been other studies
that have doubted the fact that transfer of accounting knowledge may be dysfunctional
considering the different socio-political and cultural factors operating in LDCs (Hove,
1986; Peasnell, 1993; Uddin et al., forthcoming). We have shown that there are a number
of diverse ways researcher could study the above issues in relations to NPM and Public
Sector in LDCs. This review, in particular, argues for a robust theoretical framework
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Examples
‘Mainstream’
1
For the purpose of this review, the public sector may include a ranges of institutions/organizations
controlled, managed, or owned by the state. This broader definition includes organizations such as local
government, central government, ministries, state-owned commercial enterprises etc
2
Less developed countries may include, at one extreme, countries with hardly any development attributes
lacking the rule of law, and at the other extreme, countries with more advanced attributes but lacking some
developed country attributes.
3
While third way perspective is commonly associated with work of Giddens (1984), this is not the sense in
which the term is used here. These are a variety of perspectives (which is why the term ‘ways’ rather than
‘way’ is used) which in their own ways, have tried to resolve or sidestep the structure-agency debate. For
details, please refer to the section on Third Ways Perspectives.
4
The first paper suggesting the use of structuration theory in management accounting was Roberts and
Scapens (1985)
5
For details of various theoretical perspectives employed to explicate management accounting control
change, please refer to Abernethy et al., 2007.
56