1 Hazard Evaluation, HE, Techniques

The following HE, techniques have been used in chronological order:

1960 - 2001 1960 - 2001 1965 - 2001 1970 - 2001 1972 - 1974
Safety Check Lists Relative PHA What if
Review Ranking

Walk Historical ICI Mond Preliminary Brainstorming

Through Lists Index Hazard
Inspection Analysis
Yes / No Dow FEI
Hazardous Mtls
Hazardous Opns

This presentation only considers the HAZOP technique.

Press Page Down for 9 pages of further information on HAZOPS.

(Best viewed with 24 lines per screen - adjust your Zoom% to suit)

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2 HAZOP Hazards and Operability Analysis

HAZOP was developed by Lawley (1974) of ICI. Based on early account by Elliott & Owen (1968)

Hazop studies are carried out by an experienced, multidisciplanary team, who review all physical
aspects of a process (lines, equipment, instrumentation) to discover potential hazards and
operability problems using a check list approach.

The basis for a HAZOP is a critical examination of information found in a word model, a process
flowsheet, a plant layout, equipment specification or a P&ID, (Piping and Instrument Drawing).

The principals of examination include: See tabs D1 to D3 for examples of computer forms.

1 Intention
2 Deviation
3 Causes
4 Consequences
(a) hazards
(b) operating difficulties
5 Safeguards
6 Recommendations / Actions
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 3 Early HAZOP studies used the following set of Guide Words to systematically review the process:

NO or NOT Negation of intention No Flow of A

MORE Quantitative increase Flow of A greater than design flow

LESS Quantitative decrease Flow of A less than design flow

AS WELL AS Quantitative increase Transfer of some component additional to A

PART OF Quantitative decrease Failure to transfer all components of A

REVERSE Logical opposite of intention Flow of A in direction opposite to design dire

OTHER THAN Complete substitution Transfer of some material other than A

More recent computerization techniques use a Standard Set Of Generic Deviations

For Specific Section Types. See Dev'ns tab for examples.

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4 Some Common HAZOP Analysis Process Parameters

Flow Time Frequency Mixing

Pressure Composition Viscosity Addition

Temperature pH Voltage Separation

Level Speed Toxicity Reaction

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5 Prepare for the review

 Attitude
Preparation Meeting Leadership

HAZOP
Review By Documentation
Team

Knowledge Info for study

Experience Teams HAZOP P&Ids, Layout
Experience

Table

Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards

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6 HAZOP analysis method flow diagram

Select a process
section or
operating step

Explain design
intention

Select a process
variable or task

Apply guide word

to process variable

Examine
Consequences
associated with
contiue page down deviation

6 con't
List possible
 causes of
deviation

Identify existing
safeguards to
prevent deviation

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7 Potential HAZOP Pitfalls

1 Poor understanding by management of the HAZOP procedure

An Ethylene plant has 100 P&IDs, 625 equip't items. 625

Consider 5 variables, Pressure, Temperature, Flow
Composition and Function. 5
Consider 6 Guidewords, None, More of, Less of
Part of, More than and Other than. 6
Questions to be answered = 18750
Consider 5 minutes per question = 5
Time for ethylene plant HAZOP study = 93750
4 hour, 240 minutes sessions per day = 250
No. working of days = 375
Days per week = 5
No. of weeks to complete HAZOP for plant = 75

2 Inexperienced HAZOP team

3 Inadequately trained or in-experienced leader

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8 Common Mistakes

1 Failing to establish a "safe" environment for team members

 2 Consequences of events not carried to conclusion.

3 Taking unwarranted credit for safeguards See example on page 9 - one page d

4 Too little credit given for safeguards

5 Making recommendations as specific as possible

6 Poor recording of HAZOPS

7 Failure to HAZOP start-up and shut-down procedures

8 Poorly up-dated P&IDs

9 A HAZOP is performed in lieu of properly executed design reviews

10 Wrong technique for system being reviewed (See spreadsheet titled Fig 5.3)
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9 HAZOP Example See page 8 - item No. 3

To Compressor Inlet

LAH
FV
Teams tend to quickly identify alarms, shut-dow
1 and controls, and claim them for safeguards.

An alarm not tested may not work when called

to do so.
LI
C
1 Nuisance alarms are frequently bypassed and ar
not effective as safeguards.

Often operators are not monitoring control pan

Automatic control routines are often set in man

mode.

end See tab Example for computer documentation example

 1974 - 2001
HAZOP

Brainstorming Hazards
Operability
Analysis

Line by Line
Deviation
Analysis

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s of computer forms.
 set page break 2

an design flow

design flow

mponent additional to A

l components of A

n opposite to design direction

aterial other than A

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Follow-up

Action

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Repeat for all

process sections

Repeat for all

process variables

Repeat for all

guide words

Develop action
items

Assess acceptability
 of risk based on
consequences

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items a

variables b

guide words c
questions d = axbxc
min./question e
minutes f = dxe
minutes/day g
days h=f/g
days/week I
weeks j=h/I

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ple on page 9 - one page down

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y identify alarms, shut-downs

m them for safeguards.

may not work when called upon

requently bypassed and are

not monitoring control panel.

utines are often set in manual

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Table 1 Example Standard Set Of Generic Deviations For Process Section Types
Source Lessons Learned From HAZOPS Reviews of FCCUs by P.E. McCluer et al, Hydrocarbon Processing, Aug 1992, p-1

Tank or Heat
ID No. Deviation Column Vessel Line Exchanger Pump
1 High Flow X
2 High Level X X
3 High Interface X
4 High Pressure X X X
5 High Temperature X X X
6 High Concentration X X X
7 Low / No Flow X
8 Low Level X X
9 Low Interface X
10 Low Pressure X X X
11 Low Temperature X X X
12 Low Concentration X X X
13 Reverse / Misdirected Flow X
14 Tube Leak X
15 Tube Rupture X
16 Leak X X X X X
17 Rupture X X X X X

Some other typical HAZOP deviations Press Page Down

More Flow
Less Flow
More Pressure
Less Pressure
More Level
Less Level
Part of, wrong concentration
As well as, contaminants
other than, wrong material
More Reaction
Less Reaction
No Reaction
More Mixing
Less Mixing
More Corrosion
More Erosion
Sampling
on Processing, Aug 1992, p-140-C

Compressor

X
X

X
X

X
X
 HAZOP STUDY REPORT
DATE: P & ID NUMBER:
NODE:
DESIGN INTENT OF THE SYSTEM:
HAZOP LEADER:
1)
2)
HAZOP TEAM MEMBERS
3)
4)
Guide Word Parameter Deviation Possible Cause Consequences Existing Safeguards Action Required Action by Action taken
1 Open
NO NO FLOW 2 Closed
etc

MORE FLOW

MORE MORE PRESSURE

MORE TEMPERATURE

LESS FLOW

LESS LESS PRESSURE

LESS TEMPERATURE

REVERSE REVERSE FLOW

AS WELL AS
Utility failure,
OTHER THAN Maintenance, Leak,
Safety, Corrosion,
Instrumentation etc
PART OF

www.CC0099Chemical0000CCEngineeringFF0000Site01+000.Com
 HAZOP STUDY REPORT
DATE: P & ID NUMBER:
NODE:
DESIGN INTENT OF THE SYSTEM:
HAZOP LEADER:
1)
2)
HAZOP TEAM MEMBERS
3)
4)
Guide Word Parameter Deviation Possible Cause Consequences Existing Safeguards Action Required Action by Action taken
1 Open
NO NO FLOW 2 Closed
etc

MORE FLOW

MORE MORE PRESSURE

MORE TEMPERATURE

LESS FLOW

LESS LESS PRESSURE

LESS TEMPERATURE

REVERSE REVERSE FLOW

AS WELL AS
Utility failure,
OTHER THAN Maintenance, Leak,
Safety, Corrosion,
Instrumentation etc
PART OF

www.CC0099Chemical0000CCEngineeringFF0000Site01+000.Com