Support Aeon

‘Keep your wonderful work going. !e broadest collection of interesting things I've ever seen
online.’
Martin K, USA, Supporter

Aeon is a registered charity committed to the spread of

knowledge and a cosmopolitan worldview.
But we can’t do it without you.

Donate Now

CLASSIC

Lucius Annaeus Seneca

On the happy life

A woman walks alone to her community in the Peruvian Andes. All photos by Karla Gachet/Panos

Introduction

For the person who lives a virtuous life, of steadfastness and good
judgment, happiness is always within reach

Massimo Pigliucci

L ucius Annaeus Seneca is a towering and controversial figure of

antiquity. He lived from 4 BCE to 65 CE, was a Roman senator and
political adviser to the emperor Nero, and experienced exile but came back
to Rome to become one of the wealthiest citizens of the Empire. He tried to
steer Nero toward good governance, but in the process became his indirect
accomplice in murderous deeds. In the end, he was ‘invited’ to commit
suicide by the emperor, and did so with dignity, in the presence of his
friends.

Seneca wrote a number of tragedies that directly inspired William

Shakespeare, but was also one of the main exponents of the Stoic school of
philosophy, which has made a surprising comeback in recent years.
Stoicism teaches us that the highest good in life is the pursuit of the four
cardinal virtues of practical wisdom, temperance, justice and courage –
because they are the only things that always do us good and can never be
used for ill. It also tells us that the key to a serene life is the realisation that
some things are under our control and others are not: under our control are
our values, our judgments, and the actions we choose to perform.
Everything else lies outside of our control, and we should focus our
attention and efforts only on the first category.

Seneca wrote a series of philosophical letters to his friend Lucilius when he

was nearing the end of his life. !e letters were clearly meant for
publication, and represent a sort of philosophical testament for posterity. I
chose letter 92, ‘On the Happy Life’, because it encapsulates both the basic
tenets of Stoic philosophy and some really good advice that is still valid
today.

!e first thing to understand about this letter is the title itself: ‘happy’ here
does not have the vague modern connotation of feeling good, but is the
equivalent of the Greek word eudaimonia, recently adopted also by positive
psychologists, and which is best understood as a life worth living. For
Seneca and the Stoics, the only life worth living is one of moral rectitude,
the sort of existence we look back to at the end and can honestly say we are
not ashamed of.

!at said, and contrary to popular lore, the Stoics weren’t killjoys. Indeed,
in his essay ‘On Tranquillity of Mind’, Seneca himself wrote:

Socrates did not blush to play with little boys, Cato used to refresh
his mind with wine after he had wearied it with application to
affairs of state, and Scipio would move his triumphal and soldierly
limbs to the sound of music … It does good also to take walks out
of doors, that our spirits may be raised and refreshed by the open
air and fresh breeze: sometimes we gain strength by driving in a
carriage, by travel, by change of air, or by social meals and a more
generous allowance of wine: at times we ought to drink even to
intoxication, not so as to drown, but merely to dip ourselves in
wine: for wine washes away troubles and dislodges them from the
depths of the mind, and acts as a remedy to sorrow as it does to
some diseases.

Stoics are often contrasted with Epicureans, and ‘On the Happy Life’
includes passages where Seneca comments on that contrast. Epicureanism,
however, should not be interpreted in the modern sense of laissez-faire
hedonism (à la sex, drugs and rock’n’roll), as it actually was a philosophy of
moderation aimed mostly at avoiding pain (both physical and mental) and
at enjoying the simple pleasures of life (like healthy meals and good
friendship).

Both the Stoics and the Epicureans valued the practice of virtue and the
MENU / DONATE / NEWSLETTER / SIGN IN
pleasures of life. !e difference was one of priorities: the Epicureans, for
instance, withdrew from political life because it was bound to cause pain
(consider the recent US elections and you might sympathise). !e Stoics,
by contrast, would never trade moral rectitude for either the pursuit of
pleasure or the avoidance of pain.

Seneca wrote a much longer essay on the same topic of what makes for a
happy life, one that includes a set of seven ‘commandments to himself’
(from book XX ‘Of a Happy Life’). !ey provide a way to philosophically
structure our own lives:

I) I will look upon death or upon a comedy with the same

expression of countenance.

II) I will despise riches when I have them as much as when I have
them not.

III) I will view all lands as though they belong to me, and my own
as though they belonged to all mankind.

IV) Whatever I may possess, I will neither hoard it greedily nor

squander it recklessly.

V) I will do nothing because of public opinion, but everything

because of conscience.

VI) I will be agreeable with my friends, gentle and mild to my foes:

I will grant pardon before I am asked for it, and will meet the
wishes of honourable men half-way.

VII) Whenever either Nature demands my breath again, or reason

bids me dismiss it, I will quit this life, calling all to witness that I
have loved a good conscience, and good pursuits.

Massimo Pigliucci is the K D Irani Professor of Philosophy at the City

College of New York. He blogs at platofootnote.org and
howtobeastoic.org. His latest book is How to Be a Stoic: Using Ancient
Philosophy to Live a Modern Life (2017).

27 April 2017

Classic Text

Lucius Annaeus Seneca

On the happy life

From ‘Moral letters to Lucilius’, translated by Richard Mott Gummere

With a new commentary by Massimo Pigliucci

1 Seneca here
You and I will agree, I think, that outward
is using
things are sought for the satisfaction of the ‘soul’ in
the
body, that the body is cherished out of regard
Aristotelian
for the soul, and that in the 1soul there are tradition,
as the seat
certain parts which minister to us, enabling us
of human
to move and to sustain life, bestowed upon us reason. The
Stoics were
just for the sake of the primary part of us. In
materialists,
this primary part there is something irrational, so the word
‘soul’ had
and something rational. !e former obeys the
none of the
latter, while the latter is the only thing that is modern
connotations
not referred back to another, but rather refers
derived f...
all things to itself. For the divine reason also is READ MORE

set in supreme command over all things, and is

itself subject to none; and even this reason
which we possess is the same, because it is
derived from the divine reason.

2 ‘Perfect’
Now if we are agreed on this point, it is natural
here means
that we shall be agreed on the following also – something
like the
namely, that the happy life depends upon this
highest
2
and this alone: our attainment of perfect degree
achievable
reason. For it is naught but this that keeps the
by a human
3
soul from being bowed down, that stands its being, it is
not a
ground against Fortune; whatever the
reference to
condition of their affairs may be, it keeps men a universal,
abstract,
untroubled. And that alone is a good which is
ideal of
never subject to impairment. !at man, I perfection.
The Stoic
declare, is happy whom nothing makes less
goal was to
strong than he is; he keeps to the heights, make on...
leaning upon none but himself; for one who READ MORE

sustains himself by any prop may fall. If the

case is otherwise, then things which do not
pertain to us will begin to have great influence
over us. But who desires Fortune to have the
upper hand, or what sensible man prides
himself upon that which is not his own?

In the town of Ollantaytambo in the Peruvian Andes.

3 This is, in
What is the happy life? It is peace of mind, and
essence, the
4
lasting tranquillity. !is will be yours if you Stoic recipe
for the good
possess greatness of soul; it will be yours if you
life:
possess the steadfastness that resolutely clings nothing can
keep us from
to a good judgment just reached. How does a
exercising
man reach this condition? By gaining a good
judgment,
complete view of truth, by maintaining, in all
which leads
that he does, order, measure, fitness, and a will to a good
conscience,
that is inoffensive and kindly, that is intent
and
upon reason and never departs therefrom, that therefore to
inner
commands at the same time love and
tranquillity.
admiration. In short, to give you the principle in
brief compass, the wise man’s soul ought to be
such as would be proper for a god.

What more can one desire who possesses all

honourable things? For if dishonourable things
can contribute to the best estate, then there will
be the possibility of a happy life under
conditions which do not include an honourable
life. And what is more base or foolish than to
connect the good of a rational soul with things
irrational?

Yet there are certain philosophers 5 who hold 4 Namely,

philosophers
that the Supreme Good admits of increase belonging to
the
because it is hardly complete when the gifts of
Aristotelian
fortune are adverse. Even Antipater, one of the and Academic
great leaders of this school, 6 admits that he (Platonic)
schools.
ascribes some influence to externals, though ‘This
school’
only a very slight influence. You see, however,
refers to
what absurdity lies in not being content with Stoicism.
the daylight unless it is increased by a tiny fire.
What importance can a spark have in the midst
of this clear sunlight?

5 In Greek:
If you are not contented with only that which is
ataraxia, or
honourable, it must follow that you desire in the kind of
tranquillity
addition either the kind of quiet which the
that comes
Greeks call ‘undisturbedness’, 7 or else from
equanimity
pleasure. But the former may be attained in any
with respect
case. For the mind is free from disturbance to outside
events. This
when it is fully free to contemplate the universe,
is a dig to
and nothing distracts it from the contemplation the rival
8 Epicurean
of nature. !e second, pleasure, is simply the
school,
good of cattle. We are but adding the though
Seneca
irrational to the rational, the dishonourable to
several...
the honourable. A pleasant physical sensation READ MORE

affects this life of ours;

6 Here and
Why, therefore, do you hesitate to say that all is
elsewhere
well with a man just because all is well with his talk of
‘gods’ is
appetite? And do you rate, I will not say among
not to be
heroes, but among men, the person whose taken
literally.
Supreme Good is a matter of flavours and
In other
colours and sounds? Nay, let him withdraw places
Seneca
from the ranks of this, the noblest class of living
writes about
beings, second only to the gods; 9 let him herd ‘god’ in the
singular,
with the dumb brutes – an animal whose
and we know
delight is in fodder! that the
Stoics
equated god
with nature,
or the...
READ MORE

!e irrational part of the soul is twofold:10 the 7 This follows

Plato’s tri-
one part is spirited, ambitious, uncontrolled; its partite
subdivision
seat is in the passions; the other is lowly,
of the soul:
sluggish, and devoted to pleasure. Philosophers appetitive,
spirited,
have neglected the former, which, though
and
unbridled, is yet better, and is certainly more rational.
courageous and more worthy of a man, and
have regarded the latter, which is nerveless and
ignoble, as indispensable to the happy life.

8 One of a
!ey have ordered reason to serve this latter;
pair of
they have made the Supreme Good of the mythological
monsters
noblest living being an abject and mean affair,
(the other
and a monstrous hybrid, too, composed of one being
Charybdis)
various members which harmonise but ill. For
guarding the
as our Vergil, describing Scylla,11 says: ‘Above, a strait
between
human face and maiden’s breast, / A beauteous
mainland
breast, – below, a monster huge / Of bulk and Italy and
shapeless, with a dolphin’s tail / 12
Joined to a Sicily.
Odysseus
wolf-like belly.’ And yet to this Scylla are managed to
successfully
tacked on the forms of wild animals, dreadful
navigate
and swift; but from what monstrous shapes between them
d...
have these wiseacres compounded wisdom!
READ MORE

13 9 The Stoics
Man’s primary art is virtue itself; there is joined
thought that
to this the useless and fleeting flesh, fitted only the practice
for the reception of food, 14
as Posidonius of virtue
was the goal
remarks. !is divine virtue ends in foulness, of human
life, and
and to the higher parts, which are worshipful
that meant
and heavenly, there is fastened a sluggish and applying
reason to
flabby animal. As for the second desideratum –
social
quiet – although it would indeed not of itself be living, as
Seneca
of any benefit to the soul, yet it would relieve
himself says
the soul of hindrances; pleasure, on the in ‘On
Tranquillity
contrary, actually destroys the soul and softens
of Mind’.
all its vigour. What elements so inharmonious Howev...
as these can be found united? To that which is READ MORE

most vigorous is joined that which is most

sluggish; to that which is austere, that which is
far from serious; to that which is most holy, that
which is unrestrained even to the point of
impurity.

10 Here Seneca
‘What, then,’ comes the retort, ‘if good health,
softens his
rest, and freedom from pain are not likely to earlier
hinder virtue, shall you not seek all these?’ 15
Of dismissal of
the body’s
course I shall seek them, but not because they needs,
effectively
are goods – I shall seek them because they are
restating
according to nature and because they will be the main
Stoic view
acquired through the exercise of good
that good
judgment on my part. What, then, will be good health is a
‘preferred
in them? !is alone – that it is a good thing to
indifferent’,
choose them. For when I don suitable attire, or preferred
walk as I should, or dine as I ought to dine, 16
it is because it
is natura...
not my dinner, or my walk, or my dress that are READ MORE

goods, but the deliberate choice which I show

in regard to them, as I observe, in each thing I
do, a mean that conforms with reason.

Let me also add that the choice of neat clothing

is a fitting object of a man’s efforts; for man is
by nature a neat and well-groomed animal.
Hence the choice of neat attire, and not neat
attire, in itself is a good; since the good is not in
the thing selected, but in the quality of the
selection. Our actions are honourable, but not
the actual things which we do.

11 Note the
And you may assume that what I have said
frequent use
17
about dress applies also to the body. For nature of metaphors
and similes,
has surrounded our soul with the body as with
standard
a sort of garment; the body is its cloak. But who tropes of
Stoic
has ever reckoned the value of clothes by the
discourse.
wardrobe which contained them? !e scabbard
does not make the sword good or bad.
!erefore, with regard to the body, I shall
return the same answer to you – that, if I have
the choice, I shall choose health and strength,
but that the good involved will be my judgment
regarding these things, and not the things
themselves.

Another retort is: ‘Granted that the wise man is

happy; nevertheless, he does not attain the
Supreme Good which we have defined, unless
the means also which nature provides for its
attainment are at his call. So, while one who
possesses virtue cannot be unhappy, yet one
cannot be perfectly happy if one lacks such
natural gifts as health, or soundness of limb.’

12 ‘Happy’ here
But in saying this, you grant the alternative
does not
which seems the more difficult to believe, – that have the
modern,
the man who is in the midst of unremitting and
somewhat
extreme pain is not wretched, nay, is even vague,
connotation
happy; and you deny that which is much less
of feeling
serious – that he is completely happy. And yet, good. It
if virtue can keep a18man from being wretched, it means that
one is
will be an easier task for it to render him living a
eudaimonic
completely happy. For the difference between
life, that
happiness and complete happiness is less than is a life
worth
that between wretchedness and happiness. Can
living. For
it be possible that a thing which is so powerful the Stoics,
moral ...
as to snatch a man from disaster, and place him
READ MORE
among the happy, cannot also accomplish what
remains, and render him supremely happy?
Does its strength fail at the very top of the
climb?

19 13 This is a
!ere are in life things which are advantageous
crucial
and disadvantageous – both beyond our Stoic
concept:
control. If a good man, in spite of being
some things
weighed down by all kinds of disadvantages, is are under
our control,
not wretched, how is he not supremely happy,
other things
no matter if he does lack certain advantages? are not
under our
For as he is not weighted down to wretchedness
control. The
by his burden of disadvantages, so he is not first
category
withdrawn from supreme happiness through
includes our
lack of any advantages; nay, he is just as values and
judgments,
supremely happy without the advantages as he
the second
is free from wretchedness though under the one prett...
load of his disadvantages. Otherwise, if his READ MORE

good can be impaired, it can be snatched from

him altogether.

14 Again, the
A short space above, I remarked that a tiny fire
Stoics used
does not add to the sun’s light. For by reason of a number of
metaphors to
the sun’s brightness any light that shines apart
convey
from the sunlight is blotted out. ‘But,’ one may subtle
points of
say, ‘there are certain objects that stand in the
their
way even of the sunlight.’ !e sun, however, is philosophy,
and this is
unimpaired even in the midst of obstacles, and,
an excellent
though an object may intervene and cut off our example.
view thereof, the sun sticks to his work and
goes on his course. Whenever he shines forth
from amid the clouds, he is no smaller, nor less
punctual either, than when he is free from
20
clouds; since it makes a great deal of difference
whether there is merely something in the way
of his light or something which interferes with
his shining.