CASE: MUNNI DEVI ALIAS NATHI DEVI (D) & ORS. v.

RAJENDRA ALIAS LALLU LAL (D) & ORS.,

2022 SUPREME COURT
PARTIES’ NAMES-
Appellant- Munni Devi Alias Nathi Devi (D) & Ors.
Respondent- Rajendra Alias Lallu Lal (D) & Ors.
BENCH-
Hon’ble Justices Ajay Rastogi & Bela M. Trivedi.
FACTS OF THE CASE-

c o m
rs .
The case relates to the possession of Hindu undivided family (HUF) property. In the case suit was
filed by plaintiff D (predecessor of the present appellants) seeking possession of the suit property

k e
along with the mesne profits against defendant BD (predecessor of the present respondents) who is
widow of DH. Both plaintiff and defendant had common ancestor G from whom the property

an
devolved to HN (died issueless) & GN (father of DH). Plaintiff D is adopted son of BK (great

r
grandson of G) and according to him HN through will bequeath the suit property to him and on his

o p
death plaintiff became owner of the suit property along with other properties of HN by virtue of the
said will. But, upon death of HN, BD started harassing him for the property so he left it. Suit was

T
then filed by D claiming that after the death of HN, he being the only male member in the family as
well as the legatee under will, had become the sole owner of the suit property and, therefore, is
entitled totr-recover
5U7O4Q5Pthe
8F9G4G
4Ntr-5F7G4J5I of the suit property from the defendant who had no legal right or
8R9Spossession

interest in the suit property.

The defendant claimed that she being the wife of DH and daughter-in-law of GN is entitled to the
possession of the suit property as an owner and she is maintaining herself from the income derived
from the property. It was also contended that the limited right vested in her favor in the suit
property, had become full ownership by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
The suit was decreed by the Trial Court in favor of plaintiff agains which appeal was preferred to
9S4N
the High Court. High Court set aside the decree of5Ptrial
tr-5U7O4Q 8R
court holding that after the death of GN a
limited right in the suit property was created in favor of BD under which had a right of maintenance
even under the old Shastric Law, which then became a full right under Section 14(1) of the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956. Against High Court’s decision appeal was then filed before Supreme Court
raising issue whether BD had become an absolute owner on coming into force of Act of 1956.
RATIO DECIDENDI-
The Court held that when a Hindu woman is in exclusive and settled possession of an HUF property,
then such possession will create a presumption that it is with respect to her pre-existing right of
maintenance. The presumption will be more definite in the case where the surviving coparcener did
not leave any other property recognizing her pre-existing right.
The Court noted that, according to Section 14(1) in order to become a full owner of a property a
female Hindu whether before or after the commencement of 1956 Act must be in possession of the
property and it must have been acquired by her….. or in lieu of her maintenance or arrears of
maintenance..." Thus, where a Hindu widow is in possession of the property of her husband or of

o m
the husband’s HUF, she has a right to be maintained out of the said property and she is entitled to
retain the possession of that property in lieu of her right to maintenance.

c
rs .
It was also observed that, “her pre-existing right to maintenance, coupled with her settled legal
possession of the property, would be sufficient to create a presumption that she had a claim in the

her right to maintenance in the property.”

k e
property, though no document was executed or specific charge was created in her favor recognizing

OBITER DICTA-

r an
o p
The Court observed, “There remains no shadow of doubt that a Hindu woman’s right to maintenance
was not and is not an empty formality or an illusory claim being conceded as a matter of grace and

Law, which existed

tr-5U
T
generosity. It is a tangible right against the property, which flows from the spiritual relationship
between the husband and the wife. The said right was recognized and enjoined by pure Shastric Hindu
7O4Q5Peven before
8R9S4N
8F9G4G
5I
tr-5F7G4Jthe passing of the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1937 or the
Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Those Acts merely gave statutory backing recognizing the position as was
existing under the Shastric Hindu Law.”

CASES RELIED ON-

1. V. Tulasamma and other vs. Sesha Reddy (Dead)1- in this case Supreme Court elaborately
considered the pre-existing right to maintenance of a Hindu woman while analyzing Section
9S4N
14 and amongst other things, held that the
tr-5U7O words
4Q5P8R
"possessed by" used in Section 14(1) are
of wide amplitude and includes the state of owning a property, even though the Hindu
woman is not in actual or physical possession of the same.

1
(1977) 3 SCC 99.
 2. Raghubar Singh & Ors vs Gulab Singh & Ors.2- In this case the observations made in
Tulasamma case were reiterated were the Court.

RELEVANT PROVISION-
The main issue before the Court was related to the application of Section 14(1) of the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956 which states that-
“14. Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute property-
(1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the
commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner.

o m
Explanation.—In this sub-section, “property” includes both movable and immovable property

c
acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or

rs .
arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her
marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner

commencement of this Act.

k e
whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the

an
(2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or

r
under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award

o
restricted estate in such property.”
p
where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a

T
CASE: GURUKANWARPAL KIRPAL SINGH v. SURYA PRAKASAM & ORS. , 2022 SUPREME

tr-5U7O4Q5P8R
PARTIES’ NAMES-
9S4Ntr-5F7G4J
5I8F9G4G
COURT

Petitioner- Gurukanwarpal Kirpal Singh

Respondent- Surya Prakasam & Ors.
BENCH-
Hon’ble Justices Indira Banerjee & C.T. Ravikumar
FACTS OF THE CASE-
9S4N
A company called Ramkey issued tender tr-
inviting
5U7O4Q5Pbids
8R
for recycling of plastics and complainant
Gurukanwarpal submitted his bid through his company called JK. Later, complainant lodged FIR
against the directors of the Ramkey Company under Sections 285, 406, 420 and 427 read with
Section 34 of the Indian penal Code, 1860 alleging that the accused sent some composite material

2
(1998) 6 SCC 314.
which contained injurious, hazardous and volatile sulfuric chemicals for recycling. The accused then
filed a petition before Bombay High Court for quashing of such FIR which was allowed by the
Hon’ble Court on the ground that on prima facie analysis of the allegations, the essential ingredients
necessary to constitute the offence are absent. Against High Court decision, a Special Leave Petition
was then filed by complainant Gurukanwarpal before Supreme Court.

RATIO DECIDENDI-
The Hon’ble Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision of quashing the FIR and held as
follows-

o m
a) With respect to the offence of criminal breach of trust the Court upheld the observations made

c
by the High Court that Section 406 IPC is attracted only when the accused person had been

rs .
entrusted with the property and such property had dishonestly been misappropriated or
converted by him to his own use. The provision would also be attracted if the accused person

k e
dishonestly used or disposed of such property in violation of any direction of law. Thus, for
application of Section 406, entrustment of property to accused is a sine qua non. Since, there

an
was no entrustment in the present case no charge under Section 406 is made out.

r
b) The essential ingredients of the offence of cheating under Section 416 and 420 of the IPC are

o p
deception on the part of the accused or dishonest inducement by him, resulting in any person
delivering any property to such accused or alteration or destruction of whole or any part of

combustible
T
valuable security. In the present case, the court found these ingredients to be absent.
c) For offence of Section 285 IPC the accused must have done something with fire or any

tr-5U7O4Qmatter
5P8R9S4Nin a7G
tr-5F 8F9G4G
4J5I
rash and negligent manner to endanger human life. However, in the
present case, nothing shows that the accused did anything with fire or any combustible matter
as the act of recycling plastic waste or its supply cannot be said to be an act done with fire or
any combustible matter.

CASES RELIED ON-

The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dalip Kaur & Ors. v. Jagnar Singh & Ors., 3 has held that
9S4N
there has to be an intention to cheat from tr-
very
5U7Obeginning
4Q5P8R of the transaction. If there is absence of
the ingredients of deception and fraudulent intention on the prima facie analysis of the facts, then
the offence of cheating is not made out.

3
(2009) 14 SCC 696.
RELEVANT PROVISIONS-
In this case the charges were framed under Sections 406, 416, 420 and 285 read with Section 34 of
the Indian Penal Code.
Section 405- Criminal breach of trust-
Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property,
dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or
disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such
trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made touching
the discharge of such trust, or willfully suffers any other person so to do, commits “criminal breach
of trust”.
Section 406 prescribes its punishment.

c o m
Section 416- Cheating by personation-

rs .
A person is said to “cheat by personation” if he cheats by pretending to be some other person, or by

person other than he or such other person really is.

k e
knowingly substituting one person for or another, or representing that he or any other person is a

an
Section 420- Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property-

r
Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived to deliver any property to

o p
any person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security, or anything
which is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security, shall be

Section 285-
T
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and
shall also be liable to fine.

tr-5UNegligent
7O4Q5P8R9Sconduct
8F9G4G
5I
4Ntr-5F7G4Jwith respect to fire or combustible matter-
Whoever does, with fire or any combustible matter, any act so rashly or negligently as to endanger
human life, or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person, or knowingly or negligently
omits to take such order with any fire or any combustible matter in his possession as is sufficient to
guard against any probable danger to human life from such fire or combustible matter, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or
with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.
9S4N
tr-5U7O4Q5P8R
 CASE: BUDHADEV KARMASKAR v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS., 2022 SUPREME COURT

PARTIES’ NAMES-
Appellant- Budhadev Karmaskar
Respondent- State of West Bengal and Ors.
BENCH-
Hon’ble Justices L. Nageswara Rao, B.R. Gavai and A.S. Bopanna
FACTS OF THE CASE-
In 2010, the Supreme Court was hearing an appeal filed by appellant Budhadev Karmaskar against

o m
his conviction for murdering a sex worker in a red light area in Kolkata by battering her head

c
repeatedly against the wall and the floor of a room. The Court on one hand dismissed his appeal and

rs .
on the other suo motu converted the case into a PIL in order to address the problems of sex
workers in the country. Pursuant to such conversion, a Panel was constituted by the Court with Mr.

k e
Pradip Ghosh as the Chairman of the Panel, Mr. Jayant Bhushan, Senior counsel, Usha Multipurpose
Co-operative Society through its President/Secretary, Durbar Mahila Samanwaya Committee

an
through its President/Secretary, and Roshni through Ms. Saima Hasan for making observations on

r
the condition of sex workers in the country. The terms of reference for the Panel for making
observations were-

o
a) Prevention of trafficking
p
dignitytr-5U
T
b) Rehabilitation of sex workers who wish to leave sex work and
c) Conditions conducive for sex workers who wish to continue working as sex workers with
which
7O4Q5Pwas
8F9G4G
tr-5F7G4J5I modified to conditions conducive to sex workers to live with
eventually
8R9S4N

dignity in accordance with the provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

The panel submitted its report in 2016, and the Court was informed by the Centre that draft
legislation is under consideration on the basis of the recommendations made by the Panel. Given
that, the drafting has not yet been completed by the Parliament, the Supreme Court in exercise of its
powers under Article 142 of the Constitution passed certain guidelines in this matter.

9S4N
RATIO DECIDENDI- tr-5U7O4Q5P8R

Until now, the Hon’ble Court has passed following orders in the case-
1) The Court has directed all the States to provide dry rations to sex workers, who are identified
by National Aids Control Organization (NACO), without insisting on any proof of identity.
2) The Court has also directed the Government to issue sex workers voter IDs and ration cards.
3) The Court has directed the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) to issue Aadhaar
Cards to sex workers on the basis of a proforma certification submitted by a Gazetted Officer at
NACO or the Project Director of the State Aids Control Society. While doing so, the Court said,
“There shall be no breach of confidentiality in the process, including assignment of any code in
the Aadhaar enrolment numbers that identify the card holder as a sex worker.”
4) The Court has directed that the police should treat sex workers with dignity and should not
abuse them, verbally or physically.
5) The Court has also directed that media should not publish pictures or reveal their identity of sex
workers while reporting rescue operations and stated that the offence of voyeurism under

o m
Section 354C of the Indian Penal Code should be enforced if media publishes the pictures of sex

c
workers with their clients. The Court has directed the Press Council of India to issue
appropriate guidelines in this regard.

rs .
The Court has also ordered the States and Unions to act in strict compliance with the following
recommendations made by the panel:

k e
a) “Any sex worker who is a victim of sexual assault should be provided with all facilities available

an
to a survivor of sexual assault, including immediate medical assistance, in accordance with

r
Section 357C of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 read with "Guidelines and Protocols:

o
Welfare (March, 2014).
p
Medico-legal care for survivor/victims of sexual violence", Ministry of Health and Family

releasetr-5U
in7O
T
b) The State Governments may be directed to do a survey of all ITPA Protective Homes so that
cases of adult women, who are detained against their will, can be reviewed and processed for
a 4Q
time-bound
8F9G4G
7G4J5I
5P8R9S4Ntr-5Fmanner.

c) The police and other law enforcement agencies should be sensitised to the rights of sex workers
who also enjoy all basic human rights and other rights guaranteed in the Constitution to all
citizens. Police should treat all sex workers with dignity and should not abuse them, both
verbally and physically, subject them to violence or coerce them into any sexual activity.
d) Measures that sex workers employ for their health and safety (e.g., use of condoms, etc.) must
neither be construed as offences nor seen as evidence of commission of an offence.
9S4N
e) The Central Government and the State tr-
Governments,
5U7O4Q5P8R through NLSA, SLSA & DLSA should carry
out workshops for educating the sex workers about their rights vis-a-vis the legality of sex
work, rights and obligations of the police and what is permitted/ prohibited under the law. Sex
workers can also be informed as to how they can get access to the judicial system to enforce
their rights and prevent unnecessary harassment at the hands of traffickers or police.”
OBITER DICTA-

While exercising its power under Article 142 of the Constitution the Court observed, “In a catena of
decisions of the Court, this power has been recognized and exercised, if need be, by issuing necessary
directions to fill the vacuum till such time the legislature steps in to cover the gap or the executive
discharges its role.”
Reiterating the importance of dignified life which is guaranteed to every individual by virtue of
Article 21 irrespective of their profession, the Court also observed, “right to life goes beyond the
protection of limb or faculty to include the right to live with human dignity and all that goes along

o m
with it, namely, the bare necessities of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter and also the

c
right to carry on such functions and activities as constitute the bare minimum expression of the

rs .
human-self. Needless to say, this basic protection of human decency and dignity extends to sex workers
and their children, who, bearing the brunt of social stigma attached to their work, are removed to the

to their children.”

k e
fringes of the society, deprived of their right to live with dignity and opportunities to provide the same

CASES RELIED ON-

r an
o p
1. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India4- The Court observed that, human rights jurisprudence in
India has acquired a constitutional status and sweep, owing to the full potential breathed by

explicitly
T
this Court into Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India since the Maneka Gandhi
judgment in which the constitutional regard for human decency and dignity has been

tr-5U7O4Qincorporated
8F9G4G
7G4J5I
5P8R9S4Ntr-5F into Article 21 by Supreme Court.

2. Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi5- in this case the scope of
Article 21 was extended to include the right to live with human dignity and all that goes
along with it, namely, the bare necessities of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing and
shelter and also the right to carry on such functions and activities as constitute the bare
minimum expression of the human-self.

9S4N
tr-5U7O4Q5P8R

4
(1978) 1 SCC 248.
5
(1981) 1 SCC 608.
RELEVANT PROVISIONS-
The Court in the present case has issued directions in exercise of its powers under Article 142 of the
Constitution which enables the Supreme Court to pass such decree or make such order as is
necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it. According to Article
142, “The Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or make such
order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it, and any
decree so passed order so made shall be enforceable throughout the territory of India in such
manner as may be prescribed by or under any law made by Parliament and, until provision in that
behalf is so made, in such manner as the President may by order prescribe.”

o m
The Court has identified the right to live with dignity of sex workers under Article 21 of the

c
Constitution which states- “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty. except
according to procedure by law.”

rs .
e
CASE: CHANDRAPAL v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH, 2022 SUPREME COURT

k
PARTIES’ NAMES-
Appellant- Chandrapal

r an
Respondent- State of Chhattisgarh
BENCH-

o p
FACTS OFtr-THE
T
Hon’ble Justices Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud & Bela M. Trivedi

CASE-
5U7O4Q 5P8R9S4Ntr-5F
8F9G4G
7G4J5I

In this case, four accused namely Bhagirathi, Chandrapal, Mangal Singh and Videshi were charged
and convicted by Court of Sessions under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code
and Section 201 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. Against the judgment all four
accused filed appeal before the High Court of Chhattisgarh. The High Court dismissed the appeal of
accused Chandrapal and confirmed his conviction aggrieved by which Chandrapal filed appeal
before the Supreme Court challenging his conviction on the ground that the extra-judicial
9S4N
confession made by his co-accused Videshi tr-
cannot
5U7O4Qform
5P8R the sole basis of his conviction.
RATIO DECIDENDI-
The Court examining the evidentiary value of an extra- judicial confession stated that, an extra-
judicial confession can be admitted only as a corroborative piece of evidence. If no substantive
evidence is adduced by the prosecution against the accused person then the extra-judicial
confession made by his co-accused becomes weak by losing its significance and there cannot be any
conviction on the basis of such confession unless it is fully corroborated by other evidences. The
Court also observed, “an extra judicial confession attains greater credibility and evidentiary value if it
is supported by chain of cogent circumstances and is further corroborated by other prosecution
evidence.”

OBITER DICTA-

c o m
rs .
Since, in the present case, the entire prosecution case was based on the formation of chain of
circumstantial evidences the Court held that the circumstances concerned ‘must or should be’

them for his conviction.

k e
established and not ‘may be’ established so that conclusion of guilt of accused can be drawn from

an
In the case, the prosecution gave evidence on the basis of last seen together theory, on which the

r
Court observed that, “in absence of any other links in the chain of circumstantial evidence, the accused

o p
cannot be convicted solely on the basis of "Last seen together", even if version of the prosecution
witness in this regard is believed.”

CASES RELIED ON-

1. Shivajitr-5U
T
Sahabrao Bobade
7O4Q5P8R9S 4Ntr-5F7G4J
8F9G4G
&5IAnr. v. State of Maharashtra6- in this case the Court observed
regarding circumstantial evidence that, “the accused “must be” and not merely “may be” guilty
before a court can convict him. The conclusions of guilt arrived at must be sure conclusions and
must not be based on vague conjectures. The entire chain of circumstances on which the
conclusion of guilt is to be drawn, should be fully established and should not leave any
reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused.”
2. Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra7- In this case the Supreme Court laid down
9S4N
five golden principles of circumstantial tr-
evidence
5U7O4Q5Pand
8R
held-
a) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully
established

6
(1973) 2 SCC 793.
7
(1984) 4 SCC 116
 b) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the
accused
c) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency
d) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and
e) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the
conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human
probability the act must have been done by the accused
3. State of M.P. Through CBI & Ors. v. Paltan Mallah & Ors.8- in this case it was stated that, “an
extra judicial confession made by the co-accused could be admitted in evidence only as a

o m
corroborative piece of evidence. In absence of any substantive evidence against the accused, the

c
extra judicial confession allegedly made by the co-accused loses its significance and there

rs .
cannot be any conviction based on such extra judicial confession of the co-accused.”
Observations similar to that of Paltan Mallah case were made in Sahadevan & Anr. v. State of

v. State of Haryana12.

k e
Tamil Nadu9, Jagroop Singh v. State of Punjab10, S.K. Yusuf v. State of West Bengal11 and Pancho

RELEVANT PROVISION-

r an
o p
The Court in this case is concerned with relevancy of confession of accused against co-accused with
respect to which Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act states-

into consideration
T
“when more persons than one are being tried jointly for the same offence, and a confession made by
one of such persons affecting himself and some other of such persons is proved, the court may take

tr-5U7O4Q5Psuch
8F9G4G
tr-5F7G4J5I as against such other person as well as against the person who
confession
8R9S4N

makes such confession.”

9S4N
tr-5U7O4Q5P8R

8
(2005) 3 SCC 169.
9
(2012) 6 SCC 403.
10
(2012) 11 SCC 768.
11
(2011) 11 SCC 754.
12
(2011) 10 SCC 165.
 CASE: NANJUNDAPPA & ANR. v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA, 2022 SUPREME COURT

PARTIES’ NAMES-
Appellant- Nanjundappa & Anr.
Respondent- The State of Karnataka
BENCH-
Hon’ble CJI N.V. Ramana and Justices Krishna Murari and Hima Kohli

FACTS OF THE CASE-

o m
In this case, the deceased was watching TV when he heard a sudden sound in the TV caused due to

c
the entwining of the TV connection wire and the telephone wire. When be separated both wires he

rs .
felt an electric shock and then died because of such electrocution. On investigation it was found that
the said incident took place because of the negligent act on the part of the accused, the supervisor

k e
(an employee in the telephone department) and a daily wage worker employed by him. Trial Court
convicted both the accused under Section 304A read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. Their

an
conviction was confirmed by the First Appellate Court and thereafter by High Court of Karnataka

r
which dismissed their criminal revision petition. The accused then challenged the High Court’s
dismissal before Supreme Court.

o p
RATIO DECIDENDI-

the Indiantr-Penal
T
The Supreme Court acquitted both the accused and held that for conviction under Section 304A of
Code
5U7O4Q5P
8F9G4G
tr-5F7G4J5I
prosecution
8R9S4N must first prove negligence of the accused and then establish
direct nexus between his negligence and the death of the victim.
The Court observed that the allegations against accused were of technical nature and no proper
enquiry or inspection was conducted by any technical expert to identify the true cause and to check
the veracity of the allegations made in the complaint and also there was no eye witness to
conclusively proof that the accused were in fact executing the work at the place where accident
occurred.
9S4N
The Court referring to its decision in Syad Akbar
tr-5U 138Rcase held that doctrine of on the basis that
7O4Q5P

doctrine of res ipsa loquitur stricto sensu would not apply to a criminal case as its applicability in an
action for injury by negligence is well known.

13
1979 CriLJ 1374.
OBITER DICTA-
Making observations regarding application of doctrine of res ipsa loquitur stricto sensu when case is
based on circumstantial evidence, the Court stated, “In case of circumstantial evidence, there is a risk
of jumping to conclusions in haste. While evaluating such evidence the jury should bear in mind that
inference of guilt should be the only reasonable inference from the facts. That is why the doctrine does
not apply in such case.”

CASES RELIED ON-

1. Syad Akbar v. State of Karnataka14- the Supreme Court held, “such simplified and pragmatic

o m
application of the notion of res ipsa loquitur, as a part of the general mode of inferring a fact in

c
issue from another circumstantial fact is subject to all the principles, the satisfaction of which is

rs .
essential before an accused can be convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence alone. These
are: Firstly, all the circumstances, including the objective circumstances constituting the accident,

k e
from which the inference of guilt is to be drawn, must be firmly established. Secondly, those
circumstances must be of a determinative tendency pointing unerringly towards the guilt of the

an
accused. Thirdly, the circumstances should make a chain so complete that they cannot reasonably

r
raise any other hypothesis save that of the accused's guilt. That is to say, they should be

o p
incompatible with his innocence, and inferentially exclude all reasonable doubt about his guilt.”
2. S.L.Goswami Vs. State of M.P.15- In this case the Court while making observations regarding

accused.
T
onus of proving the ingredients of an offence, held that, “In our view, the onus of proving all the
ingredients of an offence is always upon the prosecution and at no stage does it shift to the

tr-5UEven in8R9S
7O4Q5P cases
8F9G4G
7G4J5I the defence of the accused does not appear to be credible or is
where
4Ntr-5F

palpably false that burden does not become any less. It is only when this burden is discharged that
it will be for the accused to explain or controvert the essential elements in the prosecution case,
which would negative it.”

RELEVANT PROVISION
The case involves the conviction of accused persons under Section 304A of the IPC which states-
9S4N
Causing death by negligence- tr-5U7O4Q5P8R

14
Ibid.
15
1972 CRI.L.J.511 (SC).
Whoever causes the death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act not amounting to
culpable homicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.

CASE: MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH, 2022 SUPREME COURT

PARTIES’ NAMES-
Appellant- Manoj & Ors.
Respondent- State of Madhya Pradesh
BENCH-
Hon’ble Justices Uday Umesh Lalit, S. Ravindra Bhat and Bela. M. Trivedi

c o m
FACTS OF THE CASE-

rs .
k e
The case involves conviction of three accused under Section 302 of the Indian Penal by Trial Court
imposing death penalty Code for committing murder during the course of robbery. The sentence of

an
death was later confirmed by division bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court. Against such

r
confirmation, appeal was then filed by the accused before the Supreme Court which was under

p
consideration in the present case.

o
RATIO DECIDENDI-

Court made
T
While commuting their death sentence to life imprisonment for a minimum term of 25 years, the
observations
tr-5U
tr-5F7G4J5I8F9G4G
7O4Q5P8R9S4N regarding the role of the public prosecutor, and trial court, in arriving at

the truth of the case before deciding on conviction or acquittal of the accused person.
The Court held, “the role of the public prosecutor is intrinsically dedicated to conducting a fair trial,
and not for a ‘thirst to reach the case in conviction’”. The court observed that a public prosecutor
who is appointed under Section 24 CrPC occupies a statutory office of high regard, and rather than a
part of the investigating agency, they are instead, an independent statutory authority who serve as
officers to the court. Thus, he shall furnish the list of even those statements, documents, material
9S4N
objects and exhibits which are not relied upon
tr-5Uby the
7O4Q investigating officer.
5P8R

The Court also held “the omission of some of the prosecution witnesses to mention a particular fact
which is deposed by other witnesses does not ipso facto favor an accused. What is important is
whether the omission to depose about a fact is so fundamental that the prosecution version becomes
shaky and incredulous and unless it is shown that the omission to examine a witness, who had
previously participated during the investigation and whose statement was recorded by the police,
undermines the prosecution case, or impacts on it significantly, the foundation of the fact or facts
which are sought to be proved, remains unshaken as long as that fact is deposed to or spoken about by
other witnesses, whose testimonies are to be seen in their own terms.”

OBITER DICTA-
Since, the case of prosecution was based testimony of chance witness, the Court observed, a chance
witness is one, who appears on the scene suddenly. Such witnesses have the habit of appearing
suddenly on the scene when something is happening and then of disappearing after noticing the

o m
occurrence about which they are called later on to give evidence. The Court, thus, sounded a note of
caution about dealing with the testimony of chance witnesses.

c
rs .
In the case TIP was conducted and the Court observed, “A popular and widely used method of
accused identification, by witness, in criminal trials, is the identification parade. TIP procedures are

k e
used, where witnesses who claim to have seen the accused at, or about the time of occurrence to
identify such accused from the midst of other individuals, who bear physical attributes similar to

an
them, without any aid or other source. TIPs are meant to test witness veracity and their capability

r
to identify unknown persons. TIPs should normally be conducted at the earliest possible time to

o p
eliminate the chance of accused being shown to witnesses before the identification parade, which
might otherwise affect such witnesses’ memory.”

CASES RELIED ON-

1. Siddharth
tr-5U7O
T
Vasisht
4Q5P8R9S@ Manu
4Ntr- 5I8F9G4G
5F7G4JSharma v. State of NCT Delhi16- in this case Supreme Court made
observations on the due process and protection afforded to the accused and its effect on fair
disclosure responsibilities of the public prosecution.
2. In re v. State of Andhra Pradesh17- in this case, the Court held that every accused shall be
supplied with statements of witness recorded under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.PC and a list of
documents, material objects and exhibits seized during investigation and relied upon by the
police in accordance with Sections 207 and 208, Cr. PC.
9S4N
tr-5U7O4Q5P8R

16
(2010) 6 SCC 1.
17
(2021) 10 SCC 598.
3. Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab18- In this case the Court held that, “the evidence of a chance
witness requires a very cautious and close scrutiny and a chance witness must adequately explain
his presence at the place of occurrence.”
4. Malkhan Singh v. State of MP.19- it was held that there is no provision of law enabling an accused
to claim test identification parade as a matter of right.

CASE: MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT ADVOCATES BAR ASSOCIATION & ANR. v. UNION OF
INDIA & ANR., 2022 SUPREME COURT
PARTIES’ NAMES-
Petitioner- Madhya Pradesh High Court Advocates Bar Association & Anr.
Respondent- Union of India & Anr.

c o m
BENCH-
Hon’ble Justices K.M. Joseph & Hrishikesh Roy

rs .
FACTS OF THE CASE-

k e
an
In this case the Madhya Pradesh High Court Advocates Bar Association and District Advocates Bar

r
Associates challenged the constitutionality of Section 3 of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010.
The issues raised in the case were-

o p
a) Whether the NGT ousts the High Court's jurisdiction under Sections 14 & 22 of the NGT Act?

c) Whether
tr-5Uthe
T
b) Whether a seat of the NGT should be in every State? If yes, should they invariably be established
at the principal seat of High Court?
7O4Qremedy of5Fdirect
5P8R9S4Ntr-
8F9G4G
7G4J5I appeal to the Supreme Court from the decisions of the NGT under

Section 22 of the NGT Act is ultra vires to the Constitution? Whether an appeal mechanism be
provided to the High Courts from the decisions of the NGT?
d) Whether Section 3 of the NGT Act is ultra vires to the Constitution as suffering from the vice of
excessive delegation?

RATIO DECIDENDI-
9S4N
The Court while examining the power oftr-judicial
5U7O4Q5Preview
8R
and Article 32 and 226 of the Indian
Constitution along with Section 14 and 22 of the NGT Act held that, “nothing contained in the NGT
Act either impliedly or explicitly, ousts the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 and 227

18
(2009) 9 SCC 719.
19
(2003) 5 SCC 746.
and the power of judicial review remains intact and unaffected by the NGT Act. The prerogative of
writ jurisdiction of High Courts is neither taken away nor it can be ousted, as without any doubt, it
is definitely a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. The High Court’s exercise their
discretion in tandem with the law depending on the facts of each particular case.”
With respect to the second issue the Court observed that, with the low case load, if the NGT Benches
are set up in all 28 States and 8 union territories as is suggested by the petitioners, the judges and
other members in these forums might be left twiddling their thumbs.
On third issue, the Court held, “even when a direct appeal to the Supreme Court is provided by the Act
against the decision of a tribunal the remedy under Article 226 or 227 before the High Court remains

o m
un-extinguished. Moreover, the Appeal under Section 22 of the Act is limited to the grounds under

c
Section 100 of the CPC and the Supreme Court does not function as a regular first appellate Court.

rs .
However, under Article 226 or 227, remedies on issues of jurisdiction and also under the principles set
out in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation20 are available for an

k e
aggrieved party. Subject to discretion being exercised, the affected litigants can move High Court
under Article 226 or 227 and in such cases, a SLP under Article 136 of the Constitution could also be

an
maintained to the Supreme Court from the High Court’s verdict.” The Court, thus, stated with such

r
choices being available for a party no rational justification is found for striking down Section 22 of

o p
the Act which provides for a direct appeal to the Supreme Court.
With respect to last issue, the Court held that, the operation of NGT is closely monitored by the

environment
T
Supreme Court. It is further seen that the Union Government is to specify the ordinary place of
sitting of NGT and its territorial jurisdiction under Section 3 being mindful of the demand for
litigation
tr-5U7O within
4Q5P8R9S4Ntr-5F7G4J 8F9G4G
a5Iparticular territorial area. The Government is also guided by the
objects of the Act and also the directions given by the Supreme Court from time to time. Since, the
Government is acting according to the guidance of this Court, and the Government is obliged to
follow the objectives of the NGT Act, Section 3 of the NGT Act is therefore not a case of excessive
delegation of the Union Government.

CASES RELIED ON-

9S4N
1. L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India - the
217O
tr-5U 4Q5PSupreme
8R
Court categorically declared that the
power of judicial review under Articles 226, 227, and 32 are part of the basic structure of
our constitution and the same is inviolable.

20
[1948] 1 KB 223.
21
1995 SCC (1) 400.
 2. Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank Ltd22- in this case the implication of the Supreme Court
being conceived as the first appellate forum was considered and Centre was directed to do a
study on the effect of direct appeals to the Supreme Court and place the resultant report
before Parliament. But, the Supreme Court had no occasion to say that direct appeals to the
Supreme Court is constitutionally impermissible as n that issue is within the policy domain
of the legislative wing of the State.

RELEVANT PROVISION-
Since the case challenges the constitutionality of Section 3 of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010,
the Section states-

c o m
Establishment of Tribunal. -The Central Government shall, by notification, establish, with effect

rs .
from such date as may be specified therein, a Tribunal to be known as the National Green Tribunal
to exercise the jurisdiction, powers and authority conferred on such Tribunal by or under this Act.

k e
CASE: SP VELUMANI v. ARAPPOR IYAKKAM & ORS., 2022 SUPREME COURT

PARTIES’ NAMES-

r an
Petitioner- SP Velumani

o
Respondent- Arappor Iyakkam & Ors.
p
BENCH-

T
CJI NV Ramana, Justice Krishna Murari and Justice Hima Kohli

tr-5U7O4Q5P8R
FACTS OF THE CASE-
9S4Ntr-5F7G4J
5I8F9G4G

In 2018, allegations were made against former Tamil Nadu Minister SP Velumani that he
deliberately reduced the number of bidders who bid on the tenders for public works and awarded
contracts to his close aids, in violation of the Tamil Nadu Transparency in Tenders Act and the
Competition Act. Arappor Iyakkam an NGO the approached Madras High Court for issuance of writ
of Mandamus directing DVAC to register FIR against the minister. Investigation was conducted and
9S4N
preliminary report was submitted in 2019. tr-
But, nothing
5U7O 4Q5P8R was done after that.

Then in 2021, Arappor Iyakkam and MP R.S. Bharathi again filed a plea before Madras High Court in
which the petitioner requested the copy of the preliminary report to be supplied to him. In
November 2021 the Court passed an order which instructed the Directorate of Vigilance and Anti-

22
( 2020) 6 SCC 1.
Corruption (DVAC) to submit within ten weeks, the final report/ charge sheet in corruption probe
against the minister. The Court also rejected his request stating that the law must be allowed to
take its own course and that in any case, the investigation has almost come to an end and the
charge-sheet or final report, if any, will be filed within next ten weeks. If any charges will be framed
on the basis of preliminary report after final submission then in accordance with Section 207 CrPC
the petitioner will be supplied a copy of the report. He then approached the Supreme Court filing a
SLP and challenging the said order of the Madras High Court.

RATIO DECIDENDI-

o m
The three judge bench of the Supreme Court held that the High Court has committed a patent error

c
in not taking the matter to its logical conclusion and directed the Madras High Court to spply the

rs .
copy of preliminary report to the petitioner along with other documents submitted with the report.
The Court further stated that, “the contention of the State may be appropriate under normal

k e
circumstances wherein the accused is entitled to all the documents relied upon by the prosecution
after the Magistrate takes cognizance in terms of Section 207 of CrPC. However, this case is

an
easily distinguishable on its facts. Initiation of the FIR in the present case stems from the writ

r
proceedings before the High Court, wherein the State has opted to re-examine the issue in

o p
contradiction of their own affidavit and the preliminary report submitted earlier before the High
Court stating that commission of cognizable offence had not been made out. It is in this background

The CJI while

T
we hold that the mandate of Section 207 of CrPC cannot be read as a provision etched in stone to cause
serious violation of the rights of the petitioner as well as to the principles of natural justice.”
referring
tr-5U7O the
4Q5P8R9S4N matter
tr-5F 8F9G4G
7G4J5I as ‘regime revenge’ came down heavy on the Madras High Court

decision to not supply copy of preliminary report to the petitioner. The Court stressed on the
importance of Investigating Agencies to be fair without being influenced by the party in power. It
emphasized that prosecution by the State ought to be carried out in a manner consistent with the
right to fair trial, as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution.
It was further observed, when the initial PIL was filed in Madras High Court seeking investigation
against the petitioner, investigation was conducted by a police officer appointed in this behalf by
9S4N
the Madras High Court and preliminary report was
tr-5U7O submitted
4Q5P8R
which suggested no misdemeanor on
part of the petitioner. The report was then accepted by the vigilance department which stated that
no further action would be taken against petitioner as there was no material in allegations and it
was only for political vendetta. But, later when the government changed, FIR was filed against him
and when he applied to High Court for supply of copy his request was rejected without any real
reason.

OBITER DICTA-
On the actions of Madras High Court, the Supreme Court observed, “Without considering the
material before it, and by merely relying on the submissions made by the learned counsel for the
State, the High Court has made sweeping observations. It was the High Court which had ordered
that a preliminary enquiry be conducted and a report be submitted by the special investigating
officer. However, once the enquiry was completed, the High Court failed to even peruse the said

Government.

c o m
report. Rather, the High Court left the decision completely in the hands of the State
Such an approach, as adopted by the High Court in the present matter, cannot be
countenanced in law.”

rs .
RELEVANT PROVISION-

k e
Right of accused under Section 207 of CrPC to obtain copy of police report and other documents is

an
referred in this case. Section 207 states-

r
In any case where the proceeding has been instituted on a police report, the Magistrate shall

o
(i) the police report;
p
without delay furnish to the accused, free of cost, a copy of each of the following:-

prosecution
T
(ii) the first information report recorded under section 154;
(iii) the statements recorded under sub- section (3) of section 161 of all persons whom the
proposes
tr-5U 7O4Q5P8R9Sto
4Nexamine
8F9G4G
tr-5F7G4J5I as its witnesses, excluding therefrom any part in regard to which

a request for such exclusion has been made by the police officer under sub- section (6) of section
173;
(iv) the confessions and statements, if any, recorded under section 164;
(v) any other document or relevant extract thereof forwarded to the Magistrate with the police
report under sub- section (5) of section 173:
Provided that the Magistrate may, after perusing any such part of a statement as is referred to in
9S4N
clause (iii) and considering the reasons given by
tr-5U the
7O4Q 5Ppolice
8R
officer for the request, direct that a copy
of that part of the statement or of such portion thereof as the Magistrate thinks proper, shall be
furnished to the accused: Provided further that if the Magistrate is satisfied that any document
referred to in clause (v) is voluminous, he shall, instead of furnishing the accused with a copy
thereof, direct that he will only be allowed to inspect it either personally or through pleader in
Court.
CASE: VEERENDRA v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH, 2022 SUPREME COURT

PARTIES’ NAMES-
Appellant- Veerendra
Respondent- State of Madhya Pradesh
BENCH-
Justices A.M. Khanwilkar, Dinesh Maheswari and C.T. Ravikumar

FACTS OF THE CASE-

c o m
rs .
The prosecution case is that, the deceased, who was 8 years of age was stripped, raped and
strangled by the accused. Trial Court convicted him under Sections 302, 376A and 376(2) (i) of the

k e
IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO and awarded death sentence. The conviction was based on
circumstantial evidence. The High Court affirmed the death sentence, but set aside the conviction

an
and sentence of offence under Section 376A on technical reasons. Against the order of the High

r
Court appeal was then preferred by the accused before the Supreme Court challenging his

p
conviction under Sections 302 of the IPC and confirmation of his death sentence by High Court.

o
RATIO DECIDENDI-

well as the High

tr-5U
T
The Supreme Court commuted the death sentence of the accused and held that the Trial Court as
7O4QCourt has
5P8R9S4N
8F9G4G
7G4J5I to apply the ‘crime test’ and the ‘criminal test’ in awarding and
tr-5Ffailed

affirming death penalty of the accused. The Court held that is cases of death penalty, the statutory
requirement under Section 354(3) Cr.P.C. need to be fulfilled. Court stated, “the Trial Court did not
give proper attention to the tests enunciated and even though the brutal and heinous nature of the
crime is an aggravating circumstance, but the mitigating circumstances like, the appellant had no
criminal antecedents, he hails from a poor socio-economic background, his unblemished conduct
inside the jail, he was 25 years old at the time of offence, cannot be ignored.”
9S4N
With respect to the relevancy of expert opinion of5Pdoctor
tr-5U7O4Q 8R
under Section 45 of the Indian Evidence
Act and the post-mortem report the Supreme Court held that, the expert opinion of the doctors like
other evidence also requires proper appreciation and corroboration by the Courts. The Court held
though the opinion of the doctor with the post- mortem report is entitled to get great weight, it
cannot be taken out of the ambit of judicial scrutiny.
The Court further observed that, omission or delay in carrying out DNA profiling of accused under
Section 53A of CrPC is not fatal to shake the prosecution case in rape cum murder offences and
acquittal only on account of such a flaw or defect in the investigation will be prejudicial to the
interest of the case.
The Court also held that, the reason that witness is related to the deceased gives no justification to
court to discard the testimony of such witness. In this case the chance witness saw the accused
coming out from the place of occurrence. Court held his testimony to be res gestae and thus
relevant under Section 6 of the Evidence Act.

CASES RELIED ON-

c o m
1. Shankar Kishanrao Khade v. State of Maharashtra23- in this case the Supreme Court observed

rs .
that “in death penalty cases, apart from the 'rarest of rare test', the Courts are required to apply
'crime test' (aggravating circumstances) and 'criminal test' (mitigating circumstances).”

k e
2. Sunil v. State of Madhya Pradesh24- in this case it was held that “a positive result of DNA test
would constitute clinching evidence against the accused. But, a negative result of DNA test or DNA

an
profiling having not been done would not and could not, for that sole reason, result in failure of

r
prosecution case. So much so, even in such circumstances, the Court has a duty to weigh the other

o p
materials and evidence on record to come to the conclusion on guilt or otherwise of the appellant
herein and that exactly what was done by the trial Court and then by the High Court, in the instant
case.”

RELEVANT
T
PROVISIONS-
tr-5U 7O4Q5P8R9S4N
tr-5F7G4J5I 8F9G4G

1. Section 53A of the Code of Criminal Procedure deals with examination of person accused of
rape by medical practitioner. It provides for a detailed examination according to Explanation
(a) to Section 53A Cr.P.C. of a person accused of an offence of rape or attempt to commit rape,
by a registered medical practitioner employed in a hospital run by the Government or by a local
authority and in the absence of such a practitioner within the radius of 16 kilometers from the
place where the offence has been committed, by any other registered medical practitioner.
9S4N
2. Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act deals with
tr-5U7O the doctrine of res gestae. The essence of the
4Q5P8R

doctrine is that a fact which, though not in issue, is so connected with the fact in issue "as to
form part of the same transaction" that it becomes relevant by itself.

23
(2013) 5 SCC 546.
24
(2017) 4 SCC 393.
M.P. High Court Advocates Bar Association v. Union of India WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 433 OF 2012;
MAY 18, 2022

Coram: Justices KM Joseph Hrishikesh Roy

Issue:

1. Challenge to the vires of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010.

2. What is the constitutionality of Section 3 of the National Green Tribunal Act 2010.
3. Whether a seat of the NGT should be in every State?

m
Ratio:

the Constitution of India.

. o
1. The remedy of direct appeal to the Supreme Court under Section 22 of the NGT Act is intra vires

c
2. It must be borne in mind that the operationalization of the NGT, including the location of its

rs
Benches, was closely monitored by the Supreme Court. Therefore, Section 3 of the NGT Act is
not a case of excessive delegation.

k e
3. The location of the Bench to the extent possible, should be convenient and accessible to
litigants of all three States. Here the respondents project that Bhopal is centrally located in

n
relation to Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, & Chhattisgarh.

in every State.

p r a
Orbiter: Seat of the NGT benches can be located as per exigencies and it is not necessary to locate them

o
Provisions: Section 3 of the NGT Act, Article 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India, Section 14 & 22 of
the NGT.

226 & 227tr-as5Uthe

T
Judgement: Section 3 of the NGT Act is not a case of excessive delegation of power to the Central
Government. Section 14 & 22 of the NGT
same
7O4Q
5F7G4J5I8F9G
4G
Act does not oust the High Court's jurisdiction under Article
is4Natr-part of the basic structure of the Constitution. The remedy of direct appeal to
5P8R9S

the Supreme Court under Section 22 of the NGT Act is intra vires the Constitution of India. It cannot be
seen as denial of access to justice to the litigants in the field of environmental law. The seat of the NGT
benches can be located as per Page 37 of 37 exigencies and it is not necessary to locate them in every
State. Prayer for relocating the Bhopal NGT to Jabalpur is unmerited and is rejected. The role of the NGT
was not simply adjudicatory, but it also had the equally vital role which is preventive, ameliorative, or of
the remedial category. The power of judicial review under Articles 226, 227, and 32 are part of the basic
structure of our constitution and the same is inviolable. Even when a direct appeal to the Supreme Court
is provided by a statute against the decision of a tribunal, the
9S 4N remedy under Article 226 or 227 before
tr-5U7O4Q5P8R
the High Court remains unextinguished.

Manoj v. State of M.P. CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 248-250 OF 2015; May 20, 2022

Coram: Justices Uday Umesh Lalit, S Ravindra Bhat and Bela M Trivedi
Issue: Whether prosecution in all criminal cases should furnish list of statements, documents, material
objects & exhibits not relied upon by investigating officer.

Ratio: As per Draft Criminal Rules of Practice, 2021, the prosecution, in the interests of fairness, should
as a matter of rule, in all criminal trials, furnish the list of statements, documents, material objects and
exhibits which are not relied upon by the investigating officer.

Orbiter: The presiding officers of courts in criminal trials shall ensure compliance with such rules.

Provisions: Section 24, Section 235(2) CrPC, Draft Criminal Rules of Practice, 2021, Circumstantial
evidence Circumstantial evidence.

Cases Referred:

c o m
rs .
Collection and Preservation of Evidence- DNA may be more useful for purposes of investigation but
not for raising any presumption of identity in a court of law.

k e
1. R v Dohoney & Adams, Dharam Deo Yadav v. State of UP, District Attorney's Office for the Third
Judicial District v. Osborne, Surendra Koli v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.

an
Evidence relating to footprints- evidence of an expert relating to presence of a footprint, at the best is
of a weak nature.

r
o p
2. Balbir Singh v State of Punjab
Circumstantial Evidence- based on circumstances only.

T
3. Sharad Birdi Chand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116 et al, Hanumant v. The State
of Madhya Pradesh, Tufail v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Ram Gopal v. State of Maharashtra.
5P8R9S4Ntr-5F
5U7O4Q
Capitaltr-punishment-
7G4J5I8F9G4G
Bachan Singh laid down the foundational principle of ‘rarest of rare

Judgement: The role of the public prosecutor is intrinsically dedicated to conducting a fair trial, and not
for a "thirst to reach the case in conviction”. A public prosecutor (appointed under Section 24 CrPC)
occupies a statutory office of high regard. Rather than a part of the investigating agency, they are
instead, an independent statutory authority who serve as officers to the court. The state, must, for an
offence carrying capital punishment at the appropriate stage, produce material which is preferably
collected beforehand, before the Sessions Court disclosing psychiatric and psychological evaluation of
the accused. Information regarding the accused's jail conduct 9S4N
and behaviour, work done (if any),
tr-5U7O4Q5P8R
activities the accused has involved themselves in, and other related details should be called for in the
form of a report from the relevant jail authorities. Public opinion neither an objective circumstance
relating to crime, nor the criminal, and the courts must exercise judicial restraint and play a balancing
role. According to Section 235(2) CrPC, the sentencing hearing, is not confined merely to oral hearing
but intended to afford a real opportunity to the prosecution as well as the accused, to place on record
facts and material relating to various factors to show mitigating circumstances to impose a lesser
sentence or aggravating grounds to impose death penalty. Test identification parade should normally be
conducted at the earliest possible time to eliminate the chance of accused being shown to witnesses
before the identification parade, which might otherwise affect such witnesses' memory. The need to
ensure quality in the testing and eliminate the possibility of contamination of evidence, being an
opinion, the probative value of such evidence has to vary from case to case.

Nanjundappa v. State of Karnataka CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 900 OF 2017; MAY 17, 2022

Coram: CJI NV Ramana, Justices Krishna Murari and Hima Kohli

Issue: Whether 'res ipsa loquitur' under section 304A IPC stricto sensu apply.

m
Ratio: According to Section 304A IPC, doctrine of res ipsa loquitur stricto sensu would not apply to a

o
criminal case. For bringing home the guilt of the accused, prosecution has to firstly prove negligence and

c
then establish direct nexus between negligence of the accused and the death of the victim.

Provisions: 304A IPC.

rs .
Cases Reffered:

k e
1. Syad Akbar Vs. State of Karnataka- doctrine of res ipsa loquitur stricto sensu would not apply to

n
a criminal case as its applicability in an action for injury by negligence is well known.

a
2. S.L.Goswami Vs. State of M.P- the onus of proving all the ingredients of an offence is always

r
upon the prosecution and at no stage does it shift to the accused.

o p
T
tr-5U7O4Q5P8R
9S4Ntr-5F7G4J
5I8F9G4G

9S4N
tr-5U7O4Q5P8R
Judgement: In case of circumstantial evidence, there is a risk of jumping to conclusions in haste. While
evaluating such evidence the jury should bear in mind that inference of guilt should be the only
reasonable inference from the facts. In the present case however, the conviction of the accused persons
seems wholly unjustified against the weight of the evidence adduced. Perusal of the record reveals that
out of various witnesses arrayed by the prosecution, there are no eye witnesses. Any evidence brought
on record is merely circumstantial in nature. The Appellants therefore are entitled to be given the
benefit of doubt; more so, when there is no report of a technical expert to corroborate the prosecution
story.

Ravinder Singh@ Kaku v. State of Punjab CrA 1307 OF 2019

Coram: Justices UU Lalit and Vineet Saran

c o m
rs .
Issue: Whether certificate U/Sec 65B(4) Evidence Act mandatory for production of electronic evidence.

Ratio: According to Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act, 1872, Certificate under Section 65B(4) is a

certificate cannot possibly suffice.

k e
mandatory requirement for production of electronic evidence. Oral evidence in the place of such

an
Provisions: Section 65B(4) Evidence Act, 1872.

r
Cases Referred:

o p
T
1. Hukam Singh v. State of Rajasthan AIR, Eradu and Ors. v. State of Hyderabad, Earabhadrappa @
Krishnappa v. State of Karnataka, State of U.P. v. Sukhbasi and Ors., Balwinder Singh @ Dalbir
Singh v. State of Punjab, Ashok
5U7O4Q5P8R
tr-5F7G4J5I8F
9S4Nevidence,
ontr-circumstantial
Kumar Chatterjee v. State of M.P. - Where a case rests squarely
9G4G
the inference of guilt can be justified only when all the incriminating
facts and circumstances are found to be incompatible with the innocence of the accused.
2. Arjun Panditrao Khotkar vs Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal- Oral evidence in the place of such
certificate cannot possibly suffice as Section 65B(4) is a mandatory requirement of the law.
Judgement: Where a case rests squarely on circumstantial evidence, the inference of guilt can be
justified only when all the incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be incompatible with the
innocence of the accused. The circumstances from which an inference as to the guilt of the accused is
drawn have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and have to be shown to be closely connected with
the principal fact sought to be inferred from those circumstances.
8R9S4N
tr-5U7O4Q5P

S.G. Vombatkere v. Union of India/Editors Guild of India v. Union of India WPC 682/2021

Coram: Justices N.V. Ramana, Surya Kant, Hima Kohli.

Issue: Whether all of pending trials, appeals and proceedings with respect to the charge framed under
Section 124A be kept in abeyance.

Ratio: According to Section 124A IPC, that deals with sedition, all pending trials, appeals and
proceedings with respect to the charge framed under Section 124A of IPC be kept in abeyance.

Orbiter: Adjudication with respect to other Sections, if any, could proceed if the Courts are of the
opinion that no prejudice would be caused to the accused. If any fresh case is registered under Section
124A IPC, the affected parties are at liberty to approach the concerned Courts for appropriate relief.

Provisions: Section 124A IPC.

c o m
rs .
k e
r an
o p
T
tr-5U7O4Q5P8R
9S4Ntr-5F7G4J
5I8F9G4G

9S4N
tr-5U7O4Q5P8R
Judgement: The Courts are requested to examine the reliefs sought, taking into account the present
order passed as well as the clear stand taken by the Union of India - We hope and expect that the State
and Central Governments will restrain from registering any FIR, continuing any investigation or taking
any coercive measures by invoking Section 124A of IPC while the aforesaid provision of law is under
consideration. Centre’s affidavit that it has decided to re-examine and re-consider the provision, it is
clear that the Union of India agrees with the prima facie opinion expressed by this Court that the rigors
of Section 124A of IPC is not in tune with the current social milieu, and was intended for a time when
this country was under the colonial regime. In light of the same, the Union of India may reconsider the
aforesaid provision of law.

Prabha Tyagi v. Kamlesh Devi CrA 511 OF 2022

c o m
Coram: Justice MR Shah and BV Nagarathna

Issue:

rs .
k e
1. ‘Whether the consideration of domestic incident report is mandatory before initiating the
proceedings under the D.V. Act in order to invoke substantive provisions of Sections 18 to 20
and 22 of the said D.V. Act?’

an
2. ‘Whether it is mandatory for the aggrieved person to reside with those persons against whom

r
the allegations have been levelled’

p
3. ‘Whether there should be a subsisting domestic relationship between the aggrieved person and
the person against whom the relief is claimed’.
Ratio:

To
Issue 1- Domestic Incident Report received by a Magistrate from the Protection Officer or the service
provider as the case may be in which case, it is mandatory for the Magistrate to consider the report. But,
if no such report is received by the5IMagistrate
9S4Ntr-5F7G4J
8F9G4G then the Magistrate is naturally not to consider any such
tr-5U7O4Q5P8R
Domestic Incident Report before passing any order on the application

Issue 2- It is held that it is not mandatory for the aggrieved person to have actually lived or resided with
those persons against whom the allegations have been levelled at the time of seeking relief.

Issue 3- A subsisting domestic relationship encompass not only a subsisting domestic relationship in
presentia but also a past domestic relationship.

Provisions: Provisions: Section 17, 19, 12, 2, 9S4N

tr-5U7O4Q5P8R

Cases Referred:
Interpretation of Section 2 DV Act.
1. Juveria Abdul Majid Patni vs. Atif Iqbal Mansoori and Another
2. V.D. Bhanot vs. Savita Bhanot
3. Krishna Bhattacharjee vs. Sarathi Choudhury and Another
 4. Saraswathy vs. Babu
5. Rashmi Kumar vs. Mahesh Kumar Bhada
6. Ajay Kumar vs. Lata alias Sharuti and Others
7. Satish Chander Ahuja vs. Sneha Ahuja
8. S.R. Batra vs. Taruna Batra
9. Harbhajan Singh vs. Press Council of India
10. Smt. Bharati Naik vs. Shri Ravi Ramnath Halarnkar and Another
11. Vandhana vs. T. Srikanth and Krishnamachari
Relationship in the nature of marriage.

12. D. Velu Samy v. D. Patchaiammal

m
13. Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma

o
Judgement: If a woman has the right to reside in a shared household, she can accordingly enforce her

c
right under Section 17(1) of the D.V. Act. If a woman becomes an aggrieved person or victim of domestic

.
violence, she can seek relief under the provisions of the D.V. Act including her right to live or reside in

rs
the shared household under Section 17 read with Section 19 of the D.V. Act. The Parliament has

e
intentionally used the expression ‘domestic relationship’ to mean a relationship between two persons
who not only live together in the shared household but also between two persons who ‘have at any

n k
point of time lived together’ in a shared household. We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court
was not right in holding that the application filed by the appellant herein was not accompanied by a

a
r
Domestic Incident Report and therefore under the proviso to Sub-Section (1) of Section 12 of the D.V.
Act, the Magistrate had no authority to issue orders and directions in favour of the appellant.

o p
T
tr-5U7O4Q5P8R
Mahima Datla v. Renuka Datla CA 2776 OF 2022

Coram: Justices Vineet Saran and J K Maheshwari

9S4Ntr-5F7G4J
5I8F9G4G
Issue: Whether duomatic principle in Company Law applicable even in Indian context.

Ratio: Duomatic Principle applicable even in the Indian context - Strict adherence to a statutory
requirement may be dispensed with if it is demonstrated otherwise on facts, if the same is consented by
all members. Principle is only applicable in those cases wherein bona fide transactions are involved.

Orbiter: Fraud is a clear exception.

Provisions: Section 196 of Companies Act, 2013, Schedule V, Section 397 of Companies Act, 1956,
Section 10-F of Companies Act, 1956. 9S4N
tr-5U7O4Q5P8R

Cases Referred:

1. Salmon’s case- a company is bound in a matter intra vires by the unanimous agreement of its
members.
2. Bowthorpe Holdings Ltd. v. Hills- Fraud is a clear exception to application of these principles, be
it Duomatic Principle or Doctrine of Indoor Management.
 3. Sangramsinh P. Gaekwad v. Shantadevi P. Gaekwad- A dispute as regards right of inheritance
between the parties is eminently a civil dispute and cannot be said to be a dispute as regards
oppression of minority shareholders by the majority shareholders and/or mismanagement.
1. Dwarka Prasad Agarwal v. Ramesh Chander Agarwal- the jurisdiction of the civil court is not
completely ousted by the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956.
2. Hanuman Prasad Bagri v. Bagress Cereals (P) Ltd. the same principle has been reiterated.
Judgement: According to Section 196 of Companies Act, 2013, Schedule V, no person shall be eligible to
be a whole-time Director of a Company after attaining the age of 70 years unless such appointment is
approved by a special resolution of the Company. According to Section 397 of Companies Act, 1956, an
order could be made on application made under sub-section (1), if the Court is of the opinion that (i) the
Company's affairs are being conducted in a manner prejudicial to public interest or in a manner

o m
oppressive of any member or members, and; (ii) the facts would justify the making of a winding up order
on the ground that it was just and equitable that the Company should be wound up, and; (iii) the

c
.
winding up order would unfairly prejudice the Petitioners - An application for relief can be brought by

rs
any member who complain that the 25 affairs of the Company are being conducted in a manner
prejudicial to public interest or in a manner oppressive to any member or members. The intention of the

k e
legislature is that majority shareholders who oppress the minority shareholders and conduct the affairs
of the company prejudicial to public interest may invoke the jurisdiction of CLB. According to Section 10-

n
F of Companies Act, 1956, re-appraisal of entire evidence by the High Court is not permissible. It has to

a
restrict its determination to the purported questions of law arising from the order of CLB.

p r
To 9S4Ntr-5F7G4J
5I8F9G4G
tr-5U7O4Q5P8R

9S4N
tr-5U7O4Q5P8R
 Surendran v. State of Kerala CrA 1080 of 2019

Coram: CJI NV Ramana, Justice AS Bopanna and Hima Kohli

Issue: Whether wife's dying declaration can be used to prove cruelty even if husband is acquitted of
charges relating to her death.

Ratio: In some circumstances, the evidence of a deceased wife with respect to cruelty could be
admissible in a trial for a charge under Section 498A of the IPC under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act,
subject to meeting certain necessary pre-conditions.

Provisions: Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Sections 498A, 304B, 302, 306 of IPC.

Cases Referred:

c o m
.
1. Gananath Pattnaik v. State of Orissa- If a statement which otherwise is covered by the hearsay

rs
rule does not fall within the exceptions of Section 32 of the Evidence Act, the same cannot be
relied upon for finding the guilt of the accused.

e
2. Inderpal v. State of MP, Bhairon Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, and Kantilal Martaji Pandor
v. State of Gujarat, Gananath Pattnaik case- once the Court has acquitted an accused of the

k
charge relating to the death of an individual, the evidence of the deceased would not be

n
admissible to prove the charge under Section 498A of the IPC simpliciter as then the case would

a
no longer relate to the death of the deceased.

p r
3. Queen v. Bissorunjun Mookerjee- Section 32 of the Evidence Act refers to a statement made by
a deceased in a rape case which may be admitted under the section.

o
4. Lalji Dusadh v. King-Emperor- upheld the admissibility of statements made by the deceased in a
case concerning charges under Sections 302, 392 and 397 of the IPC.

tr-
T
5. Parmanand Ganga Prasad v. Emperor- mere fact that a charge of murder failed and was not
brought home to the accused would not make the statement inadmissible for the purposes of
other offences which were committed in the course of the same transaction.
6. Pakala Narayana
5U7O4Q5P8R
Swami 5Iv.8FKing-Emperor-
9S4Ntr-5F7G4J
9G4G The circumstances must be circumstances of the
transaction : general expressions indicating fear or suspicion whether of a particular individual
or otherwise and not directly releated to the occasion of the death will not be admissible.
7. Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra- Court summarized the principles of Section
32(1) of the Evidence Act, including relating to “circumstances of the transaction”.
Judgement: The evidence of a deceased wife with respect to cruelty could be admissible: (1) That her
cause of death must come into question in the matter - For instance, matters where along with the
charge under Section 498A of the IPC, the prosecution has also charged the accused under Sections 302,
306 or 304B of the IPC - As long as the cause of her death has come into question, whether the charge
relating to death is proved or not is immaterial with
tr-5U respect
7O4Q to admissibility. (2) Prosecution will have to
5P8R9S4N
show that the evidence that is sought to be admitted with respect to Section 498A of the IPC must also
relate to the circumstances of the transaction of the death. The cause of death must come into question
in that case, regardless of the nature of the proceeding, and that the purpose for which such evidence is
being sought to be admitted should be a part of the 'circumstances of the transaction' relating to the
death. The evidence tendered by the related or interested witness cannot be discarded on that ground
alone.
Indira Jaising v. Supreme Court of India Miscellaneous Application No.709 Of 2022 In Writ Petition
(Civil) No.454 Of 2015

Coram: Justices Uday Umesh Lalit, S. Ravindra Bhat, Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha
Issue: How many marks should be allocated to a counsel who has put in between ten to twenty
years of practice.
Ratio: For the Senior Advocate Designation, instead of ten marks to be allocated to a counsel who
has put in between ten to twenty years of practice, the marks be allocated commensurate with the
standing of the person at the Bar, that is to say, one mark each shall be allocated for every year of
practice between ten to twenty years.
Judgement: We, therefore, clarify the situation and direct that instead of ten marks to be allocated

o m
to a counsel who has put in between ten to twenty years of practice, the marks be allocated
commensurate with the standing of the person at the Bar, that is to say, one mark each shall be

c
.
allocated for every year of practice between ten to twenty years. Prayer (c) made in the application

rs
is, therefore granted. This modification shall be effective from the date of this order.

Coram: Justice M R Shah and B V Nagarathna

k e
Swadesh Kumar Agarwal v. Dinesh Kumar Agarwal Civil Appeal Nos. 29352938 Of 2022

an
Issue: Whether the High Court can terminate the mandate of arbitrator in application under section
11(6) of arbitration act.

r
o p
Ratio: A dispute/controversy on the mandate of the arbitrator being terminated on the ground
mentioned in section 14(1)(a) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act cannot be decided on an

T
application filed under section 11(6) of the Act.

Provisions: Section 13, 14, section 34 of the Act, 1996.

tr-5U7O4Q5P8R
9S4Ntr-5F7G4J
5I8F9G4G
Judgement: If the challenge to the arbitrator is made on any of the grounds mentioned in section 12 of
the Act, the party aggrieved has to submit an appropriate application before the Arbitral Tribunal itself.
Whenever there is a dispute and/or controversy that the mandate of the arbitrator is to be terminated
on the grounds mentioned in section 14(1)(a), such a controversy/dispute has to be raised before the
concerned "court" only and after the decision by the concerned "court" as defined under section 2(e) of
the Act, 1996 and ultimately it is held that the mandate of the arbitrator is terminated, thereafter, the
arbitrator is to be substituted accordingly, that too, according to the rules that were applicable to the
initial appointment of the arbitrator. The termination of the mandate of the arbitrator and/or
termination of the proceedings mentioned in tr- other
5U7O4Qprovisions
5P8R9S4N like in section 15(1)(a) where he
withdraws from office for any reason; or (b) by or pursuant to an agreement of the parties, the dispute
need not be raised before the concerned court.

Cox and Kings Limited v. SAP India Private Limited And Anr. Arbitration Petition (Civil) No. 38 Of 2020;
06.05.2022
Coram: Chief Justice of India, N.V. Ramana; Justices Surya Kant and A.S. Bopanna

Issue: Whether "Group of Companies" doctrine needs relook.

Ratio: Group of Companies doctrine needs a re-look at the doctrinal ingredients concerning the group of
companies doctrine.

Provisions: Sections 8 and 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

c o m
rs .
k e
r an
o p
T
tr-5U7O4Q5P8R
9S4Ntr-5F7G4J
5I8F9G4G

9S4N
tr-5U7O4Q5P8R
Cases Referred:

1. Chloro Controls India Pvt. Limited v. Seven Trent Water Purification Inc., Cheran Properties Ltd.
v. Kasturi And Sons Ltd., Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. v. Canara Bank, Reckitt Benckiser
(India) (P) Ltd. v. Reynders Label Printing (India) (P) Ltd. (2019) 7 SCC 62 and Oil and Natural Gas
Corporation Ltd. v. M/s Discovery Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.- he inconsistencies that exist in
terms of the judicial pronouncements of the Apex Court regarding the underlying basis for the
Group of Companies Doctrine.
2. Dow Chemical France, the Dow Chemical Company v. Isover Saint Gobain- doctrine originated
3. Sukanya Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Jayesh H. Pandya- under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act, that
causes of action cannot be bifurcated in an arbitration, and non parties to an arbitration
agreement cannot be included in the same arbitration.

m
4. Cheran Properties Ltd. v. Kasturi And Sons Ltd.- scope of the doctrine was expanded further.

o
5. Mahanagar TelephoneNigam Ltd. v. Canara Bank- group of companies doctrine can be utilized

c
to bind a third party to an arbitration, if a tight corporate group structure constituting a single
economic reality existed.

rs .
Judgement: It may be noted that the doctrine, as expounded, requires the joining of non-signatories

e
as 'parties in their own right'. This joinder is not premised on non-signatories 'claiming through or
under'. Such a joinder has the effect of obliterating the commercial reality, and the benefits of keeping

enforced as principles of law.

an k
subsidiary companies distinct. Concepts like single economic entity are economic concepts difficult to be

p r
o
Ms. P. v. The State Of Madhya Pradesh And Another Criminal Appeal No. 740 Of 2022 [Arising Out of
SLP (Crl.) No.3564 Of 2022]

T
Coram: Justices N. V. Ramana, Krishna Murari, Hima Kohli.

Issue: Whether the High

tr-5U7O4Q5P8R
Court or Sessions
9S4Ntr-5F7G4J
bail under Section 439 Cr.P.C.
5I8F9G4G Court have a wide discretion in deciding an application for

Ratio: High Court or Sessions Court have a wide discretion in deciding an application for bail under
Section 439 Cr.P.C. However, the said discretion must be exercised after due application of the judicial
mind and not in a routine manner.

Provisions: Section 439 Cr.P.C.

Cases Referred:
9S4N
tr-5U7O4Q5P8R
1. Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh and Others and Prahlad Singh Bhati v. NCT, Delhi and
Another- While granting bail the court has to keep in mind not only the nature of the
accusations, but the severity of the punishment, if the accusation entails a conviction and the
nature of evidence in support of the accusations.
2. Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. and Another- aspects relevant for consideration at the time of
granting bail, namely: (1) the nature of accusation and the severity of punishment (2)
 reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witness or complainant, and (3) prima facie
satisfaction of the Court in support of the charge.
3. Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan alias Pappu Yadav And Another- same as Chaman Lal.
4. Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee And Another- it is equally incumbent upon the High
Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic
principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point.
5. Masroor v. State of Uttar Pradesh And Another- Liberty of a person accused of an offence would
depend upon the exigencies of the case.
6. Ash Moham mad v. Shiv Raj Singh alias Lalla Babu And Another- The individual liberty is
restricted by larger social interest and its deprivation must have due sanction of law.
7. Dolat Ram And Others v. State of Haryana- bail once granted, should not be cancelled in a
mechanical manner.
8.

misuse of the bail.

c o m
Prakash Kadam and Others v. Ramprasad Vishwanath Gupta and Another- there is no absolute
rule that once bail is granted to the accused then it can only be cancelled if there is likelihood of

9.
10.

rs .
Ranjit Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh And Others- same as Prakash Kadam.
Abdul Basit alias Raju And Others v. Mohd. Abdul Kadir Chaudhary And Another- the concept of
setting aside an unjustified, illegal or perverse order is different from the concept of cancellation

11.
of a bail.

k e
Imran v. Mohammed Bhava and Another- once bail has been granted it would require
overwhelming circumstances for its cancellation.

an
Judgement: Circumstances where bail granted to the accused under Section 439 (1) of the Cr.P.C. can be

r
cancelled discussed. The gravity of the offence, conduct of the accused and societal impact of an undue

o p
indulgence by Court when the investigation is at the threshold, are also amongst a few situations, where
a Superior Court can interfere in an order of bail to prevent the miscarriage of justice and to bolster the
administration of criminal justice system…” Thus, while considering cancellation of bail already granted

tr-
T
by a lower court, would indeed require significant scrutiny at the instance of superior court, however,
bail when granted can always be revoked if the relevant material on record, gravity of the offence or its
societal impact have not been
5U7O4Q5P8R
considered
9S4Ntr-5F7G4J
5I8F9G4G by the lower court. In such instances, where bail is granted in
a mechanical manner, the order granting bail is liable to be set aside.

Jacob Puliyel vs Union of India WP(C) 607 of 2021

Coram: Justices L Nageswara Rao and BR Gavai

Issue: Granting emergency use authorization to covaxin & covishield.

Ratio: Policy of the Union Government on COVID-19 5P8R9S4N

tr-5U7O4Qvaccination policy is reasonable and restricted
emergency use approvals had not been granted to COVISHIELD and COVAXIN in haste, without thorough
review of the relevant data.

Provisions: Article 21, 32, 226 of the Constitution of India, 1950.

Cases Referred: Common Cause (A Registered Society) v. Union of India, Aruna Ramachandra Shanbaug
v. Union of India and K. S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India- Article 21.

Judgement: it is made clear that subject to the protection of privacy of individual subjects and to the
extent permissible by the 2019 Rules, the relevant data which is required to be published under the
statutory regime and the WHO Statement on Clinical Trials shall be made available to the public without
undue delay, with respect to the ongoing post-marketing trials of COVAXIN and COVISHIELD as well as
ongoing clinical trials or trials that may be conducted subsequently for approval of other COVID19
vaccines / vaccine candidates. Bodily integrity is protected under Article 21 of the Constitution of India
and no individual can be forced to be vaccinated. Judicial review of executive decisions based on expert
opinion - Courts do not ordinarily interfere with the policy decisions of the executive unless the policy

o m
can be faulted on grounds of mala fide, unreasonableness, arbitrariness or unfairness etc. Courts cannot
take judicial notice of facts stated in a news item published in a newspaper. A statement of fact

c
.
contained in a newspaper is merely hearsay and therefore, inadmissible in evidence.

k e rs
r an
o p
T
tr-5U7O4Q5P8R
9S4Ntr-5F7G4J
5I8F9G4G

9S4N
tr-5U7O4Q5P8R
State of Bihar And Ors. v. Shyama Nandan Mishra Civil Appeal No 7364 of 2014 | 05 May 2022

Coram: Justices K.M. Joseph and Hrishikesh Roy

Issue: Whether State can deviate from substantive legitimate expectation induced by it in the absence
of compelling public interest.

Ratio: Where the substantive legitimate expectation is not ultra vires the power of the authority and the
court is in a position to protect it, the State cannot be allowed to change course and belie the legitimate
expectation.

Cases Referred: Mohinder Singh Gill Vs. Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi- validity of an order by

the shape of affidavits must be excluded.

c o m
a statutory functionary must be judged by the reasons mentioned therein and supplementary reasons in

rs .
Judgement: Abuse of power is one of the criteria for testing whether a public body could resile from a
prima facie legitimate expectation. If the government authority induced an expectation which was
substantive, the upsetting of that expectation, through departure from the expected course of action in

k e
the absence of compelling public interest, would be so unfair, that it would amount to abuse of power.
Where the substantive legitimate expectation is not ultra vires the power of the authority and the court

n
is in a position to protect it, the State cannot be allowed to change course and belie the legitimate

a
expectation. Regularity, Predictability, Certainty and Fairness are necessary concomitants of

r
Government's action. Failure to keep commitment would permit the State's action to be interdicted.

o p
The Secretary of Govt. of Kerala Irrigation Department And Ors. v. James Varghese And Ors. Civil
Appeal No. 6258 of 2014

Issue: Validity
tr-
T
Coram: Justices L. Nageswara Rao and B.R. Gavai
4G
8F9G
4Ntr-5F7G4J5I of Arbitration Clauses and Reopening of Awards Act, 1998.
of Kerala9SRevocation
5U7O4Q5P8R

Ratio: The Act is liable to be held unconstitutional on the ground of encroachment upon the judicial
powers of the State. The Act has the effect of annulling the awards which have become “Rules of Court”,
is a transgression on the judicial functions of the State and therefore, violative of doctrine of “separation
of powers”.

Provisions: Arbitration Act, 1940, Entry 13 of List III of Seventh Schedule in Constitution of India, 1950,
Kerala Revocation of Arbitration Clauses and Reopening of Awards Act, 1998
9S4N
Cases Referred: tr-5U7O4Q5P8R

1. G.C. Kanungo v. State of Orissa and MP Rural Road Development Authority And Anr. v. L.G.
Chaudhary Engineers and Contractors- Entry 13 of the Concurrent List deals with arbitration.
2. Mohan Rao and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu And Ors.- in cases of repugnancy between State and
Central Legislations, Central law would prevail under Article 254(1), however when State law
 received assent of the President, it would prevail in terms of Article 254(2) of the Constitution of
India.
3. State of West Bench v. Kesoram Industries Ltd. And Ors. - if the State is competent to legislate
on the subject, any incidental encroachment on any entry in List I would not affect the State
Legislation.
4. State of Tamil Nadu v. State of Kerala- three-fold test of 'separation of powers' elucidated.
Judgement: Entry 13 of List III of Seventh Schedule in Constitution of India, 1950 provides that the
subject of arbitration is in the Concurrent List, the State can also make a law with regard to the same.
The only requirement is that to validate such a law, it is necessary to reserve the same for consideration
of the President of India and obtain his assent. When such an assent is obtained, the provisions of the
State Law or Act so enacted would prevail in the State concerned, notwithstanding its repugnancy with

o m
an earlier Parliamentary enactment made on the subject. - The powers exercised by the court under the
provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940 are judicial powers and that the power to make an award “Rule

c
.
of Court” is not a mechanical power. When the legislative competence of a State Legislature is

rs
questioned on the ground that it encroaches upon the legislative competence of the Parliament, since
some entries are bound to be overlapping, in such a situation, the doctrine of pith and substance has to

e
be applied to determine as to which entry does a given piece of legislation relate to.

k
r an
o p
T
tr-5U7O4Q5P8R
9S4Ntr-5F7G4J
5I8F9G4G

9S4N
tr-5U7O4Q5P8R