Caltex vs. Palomar (G.R.

L-19650, 09/29/1966)
FACTS:
 Caltex conceived a promotional scheme which will increase its patronage for oil products
called “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest.
 To participate, entry forms are only needed which can be made available upon request at
each Caltex station
 Foreseeing the extensive use of mails to publicize the promotional scheme, Caltex made
representations with the postal authorities to secure advanced clearance for mailing
 The Postmaster General Palomar declined the grant of the requested clearance. Caltex
sought a reconsideration. Palomar maintained that if the contest was pursued, a fraud
order will be issued against Caltex. Thus, this case at bar.
Issues: Whether or not the proposed contest violates the Postal Law
Held: Using the rules of Statutory Construction in discovering the meaning and intention of the
authors in a case clouded with doubt as to its application, it was held that the promotional
scheme does not violate the Postal Law in that it does not entail lottery or gift enterprise
Note: Using the principle “noscitur a sociis’, the term under construction shall be
understood by the words preceding and following it. Thus, using the definitions of lottery
and gift enterprise which both has the requisites of prize, chance and consideration, the
promo contest does not clearly violate the Postal Law because of lack of consideration.
National Federation of Labor (NFL) v. Eisma GR L-61236, 31 January 1984 (127 SCRA 419)
FACTS:
 The National Federation of Labor filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment), a
petition for direct certification as the sole exclusive collective bargaining representative
of the monthly paid employees at the Lumbayao manufacturing plant of the Zamboanga
Wood Products, Inc. (Zambowood).
 employees charged the firm before the same office for underpayment of monthly living
allowances.
 the union issued a notice of strike against the firm, alleging illegal termination of
Dionisio Estioca, president of the said local union; unfair labor practice; nonpayment of
living allowances; and “employment of oppressive alien management personnel without
proper permit
 Zambowood filed a complaint with the trial court against the officers and members of the
union, for “damages for obstruction of private property with prayer for preliminary
injunction and/or restraining order.” The motion was denied. Hence, the petition for
certiorari.
Issue: Whether construction of the law is required to determine jurisdiction.
Held: The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. Construction and
interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or
inadequate without them.
Note: Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the
sovereign authority which organizes the court; and it is given only by law. Jurisdiction is
never presumed; it must be conferred by law in words that do not admit of doubt. Since the
jurisdiction of courts and judicial tribunals is derived exclusively from the statutes of the
forum, the issue should be resolved on the basis of the law or statute in force.
Paat vs CA Admin Law Digest
Leonardo PaatvsCourt of Appeals, et. Al.GR No. 111107, 10 January 1997266 SCRA 167

FACTS
The truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman was seized by the DENR personnelwhile on
its way to Bulacan because the driver could not produce the required documents for theforest
product found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, CENRO ordered the
confiscation of the truck and required the owner to explain. Private respondents failed to submit
required explanation. The DENR Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan sustained
Layugan’s action for confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck. Private respondents
brought the case to the DENR Secretary. Pending appeal, private respondents filed a replevin
case before the RTC against petitioner Layugan and Baggayan. RTC granted the same.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the case contending, inter alia, that private respondents had no
cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court denied their
motion. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners aver that the trial court could not
legally entertain the suit for replevin because the truck was under administrative seizure
proceedings.
ISSUE
Whether or not the instant case falls within the exception of the doctrine.
HELD
The Court held in the negative. The Court has consistently held that before a party is allowed to
seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the
means of administrative processed afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative
machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every
opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be
exhausted first before court’s judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of court’
intervention is fatal to one’s cause of action.
The doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness
of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded
(1) when there is violation of due process,
(2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question,
(3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
(4) when there are estoppels on the part of the administrative agency concerned,
(5) when there is irreparable injury,
(6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President
bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter,
(7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable,
(8) when it would amount to nullification of a claim,
(9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings,
(10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and
(11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
A suit for replevin cannot be sustained against the petitioners for the subject truck taken and
retained by them for administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Sections 68-A of
OD705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of the
private respondents’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have been the proper
course of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and
consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck.

G.R. No. L-34568 March 28, 1988RODERICK DAOANG, and ROMMEL DAOANG, assisted
by their father, ROMEO DAOANG, petitioners. THE MUNICIPAL JUDGE, SAN NICOLAS,
ILOCOS NORTE, ANTEROAGONOY and AMANDA RAMOS-AGONOY, respondents.
Principle: The rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear and unambiguous on
its face need not be interpreted; stated otherwise, the rules that only statutes with an ambiguous
or doubtful meaning may be the subject of statutory construction.
Facts:
Sometimes in March, 1971, the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy, here in respondents, filed a
petition with the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, seeking the adoption of the
minors QuirinoBonilla and Wilson Marcos. The petition was set for hearing on April 24,1971
and notices thereof were caused to be served upon the office of theSolicitor General and ordered
published in the ILOCOS TIMES, a weeklynewspaper of general circulation in the province of
Ilocos Norte.On 22 April 1971, the minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang,assisted by their father
and guardian ad litem the petitioners herein, filedan opposition on the ground that the spouses
Agonoy has a legitimate daughter, the mother of the oppositors and therefore said spouses
weredisqualified to adopt under Art 335 of the Civil Code. After the required publication of
notice had been accomplished,evidence was presented. Thereafter, the Municipal Court of San
Nicolas,Ilocos Norte rendered its decision, granting the petition for adoption.Hence, the
petitioner file a review for certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the Municipal Judge erred in granting the petition for adoption on the
basis of Art 335 of the Civil Code.
Held:
No, the Municipal Judge did not err in granting the petition for adoption on the basis of Art 335
of the Civil Code. The court ruled that “that the words used in paragraph (1) of Art. 335of the
Civil Code, in enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous. The
children mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning in law and, as pointed out by the
respondent judge, do not include grandchildren. “Well known is the rule of statutory
construction to the effect that a statute clear and unambiguous on its face need not be
interpreted; stated otherwise, the rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful
meaning may be the subject of statutory construction. Thus, the petition is DENIED and the
previous ruling is AFFIRMED.
DANILO E. PARAS v. COMELEC, GR No. 123169, 1996-11-04
Facts:
Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won
during the last regular barangay election in 1994. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay
was filed by the registered voters of the barangay.
Acting on... the petition for recall, public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
resolved to approve the petition, scheduled the petition signing on October 14, 1995, and set the
recall election on November 13, 1995.[1] At least 29.30% of the registered voters... signed the
petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by law. The COMELEC, however, deferred
the recall election in view of petitioner's opposition. On December 6, 1995, the COMELEC set
anew the recall election, this time on December 16, 1995. To prevent the... holding of the recall
election, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City a petition for
injunction, docketed as SP Civil Action No. 2254-AF, with the trial court issuing a temporary
restraining order. After conducting a summary... hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining
order, dismissed the petition and required petitioner and his counsel to explain why they should
not be cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay recall election was without
COMELEC approval.
Issues:
Citing Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code, which states that "no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the
official's assumption to office or one (1) year... immediately preceding a regular local election"...
the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK)
election was set by Republic Act No. 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996, and every three
years thereafter
Ruling:
We do not agree
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the
other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole... enactment.[4] The evident
intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall election once during his term
of office. Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period
when such elective local... official may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the second
year of his term of office. Thus, subscribing to petitioner's interpretation of the phrase regular
local election to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the
Local Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by initiation of the
people before the end of his term. And if the SK election which is set by R.A. No. 7808 to be
held every three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase
"regular local election", as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall election can be
conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code.

Floresca v. Philex G.R. No. L-30642 (1985)

upxateneo Uncategorized September 22, 20183 Minutes
Topic. Purpose of Construction: Limitation on the power of courts to construe
Case. Petition to review lower court decision dismissing a civil complaint lodged against Philex
Facts. It is alleged that prior to the accident, Philex failed to address safety concerns in the
mining site. Much water accumulated in an open pit area which caused pressure in the working
shafts below. As a result, said area collapsed. Out of 48, 5 escaped, 22 rescued within the week.
But 21 were left to die due to Philex’s order to stop rescue mission.
Heirs of the 21 filed a civil complaint in CFI. Philex filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the
accident falls under the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) and thus outside of CFI jurisdiction.
WCA provides that (1) such work-connected deaths are within the jurisdiction of Workmen’s
Compensation Commission (WCC) and (2) if the employer is negligent, employer shall pay the
compensation plus 50% of same compensation. But in essence, the respondents invoke Section 5
of the WCA which states: “Exclusive right to compensation — The rights and remedies granted
by this Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall
exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives,
dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws because
of said injury.” Because the heirs have already received compensation, they are no longer entitled
to a damage suit.
The heirs of the deceased filed the present petition.
Issue. (1) Does CFI has jurisdiction? -Yes
(2) Whether the petitioners can only avail of WCA action or have a choice between WCA action
and civil damage in regular court or can avail of both WCA and civil damage? –Choose either
one but not both.
Ratio. To answer the two issues, (2) should be addressed before (1). (2) Generally, petitioners
must choose between a WCA action and civil suit. This is what the Section 5 of WCA provides
and what has been applied in various court decisions. But the court decided to render leeway to
the petitioners given the peculiarity of the instances. Petitioners have already received
compensation under the WCA. Afterwards, they learned of the true cause of the accident which
was Philex’s negligence. And then they filed a civil suit. The court reasoned that had the
petitioners learned of the cause much sooner, petitioners would have filed for a civil suit instead.
Petitioners’ initial resort to WCA action, the court said, is based on ignorance or mistake of fact.
Because petitioners were not informed of the true cause, they had not the choice between a WCA
and a civil suit. This then creates an exception to Section 5 of WCA. Hence, court remanded the
case to lower court for proper judgment. (1) CFI now has jurisdiction because of the court’s
making an exception of the case.
Doctrine: The topic, limitation on the power of courts to construe, can be found within court’s
discussion of the second issue. The two dissenting opinions posit that a careful reading of
Section 5 of WCA would demonstrate that when a complainant has already availed of
compensation via WCA, his/her right to sue in civil or other courts are understood to have been
extinguished. After passage of WCA, legislature had plenty of occasion to modify relevant
provision but did not do so. This, according to dissent, is manifest of legislative’s continuing
intent to retain the exclusivity provided therein. In the majority opinion’s decision to allow
petitioners to file case despite having received their WCA compensation, dissent argues that the
court has exercised a power outside of its capacities, i.e. that it has legislated.
To this, the majority opinion enunciates that it has not legislated. What it did was a mere
implementation of the Constitution and relevant statutes. Secs. 6, 7, and 9 of Art. II of 1973
Constitution guarantees social justice, establishes adequate services in employment, and protects
labor. With these provisions, the present court only gave effect to the rights petitioners are
entitled to. No legislation occurred, because the principles are already present and need only be
applied.
Republic of the Philippines v. CA and MolinaG.R. No. 108763February 13, 1997Panganiban, J.
FACTSRespondent Roridel Molina married Reynaldo Molina on April 14, 1985. After a year of
marriage,
Reynaldo showed signs of “immaturity and irresponsibility” as a husband and a father exhibited
by his
preference to spend time with friends, squandering money, dependence on his parents and
dishonesty involving finances. Inevitably, this resulted in quarrels and by March 1987, Roridel
quit her job and moved in with her parents in Baguio. Reynaldo left her and their child a few
weeks thereafter. On Aug. 16, 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage on the grounds of psychological incapacity of the husband. The trial court declared the
marriage void, which the CA affirmed in toto; hence, the petition for certiorari.
ISSUE Whether there is psychological incapacity
HELDNo. The case of Roridel and Reynaldo merely constituted incompatibility among the
estranged spouses. The law intended to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity only to
the most serious cases of personality disorders that must have existed at the time marriage is
celebrated. Irreconcilable differences or conflicting personalities are not incapacities that would
hinder the fulfillment of the essential marital obligations of the parties. The characteristics of
gravity, judicial antecedence and incurability are not present in the case. Due to the improper
interpretations and applications arrived at by the lower courts on this particular issue, the SC
found it wise to construe the law and lay down guidelines in interpretation and application of Art.
36. Here, the SC sought the help of two amici curiae
considered an external aid in statutory construction. The guidelines set forth are thus:
(1) the burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff;
(2) the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged
in thecomplaint, sufficiently proven by expert, and clearly explained in the decision;
(3) the incapacity must beproven to be existing at the time of the celebration of marriage;
(4) the incapacity must be medically orclinically permanent or incurable;
(5) such illness must be grave enough to disable fulfillment of essentialmarital obligations;
(6) the essential marital obligation must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as
regards husband and wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as regards parents and their
children;
(7) interpretation made by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
are to be given great weight;
and (8) the fiscal and the Solicitor-General must appear as counsel for the State.

Aisporna v Court of Appeals and the People of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-39419
12 April 1982
TOPIC: Statutory Construction, Doctrine of Associated Words (Noscitur a Sociis)
FACTS:
Petitioner Aisporna was charged for violation of Section 189 of the Insurance Act.
Petitioner’s husband, Rodolfo S. Aisporna (Rodolfo) was duly licensed by the Insurance
Commission as agent to Perla Compania de Seguros. Thru Rodolfo, a 12- month Personal
Accident Policy was issued by Perla with beneficiary to Ana M. Isidro for P50,000. The insured
died by violence during lifetime of policy.
Subsequently, petitioner was charged because the aforementioned policy was issued with her
active participation, which is not allowed because she did not possess a certificate of authority to
act as agent from the office of the Insurance Commission.
Petitioner contended that being the wife of Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in his work, and
that the policy was merely a renewal and was issued because her husband was not around when
Isidro called by telephone. Instead, appellant left a note on top of her husband’s desk.

The trial court found petitioner guilty as charged. On appeal, the trial court’s decisions was
affirmed by respondent appellate court, finding petitioner guilty of a violation of the first
paragraph of Sec 189 of the insurance act.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a person can be convicted of having violated the first paragraph of Section 189 of
the Insurance Act without reference to the second paragraph of the same section.
RULING:
The petition is meritorious. Petition appealed from is reversed, and accused is acquitted of the
crime charged.
A perusal of the provision in question shows that the first paragraph thereof prohibits a person
from acting as agent, sub-agent or broker in the solicitation or procurement of applications for
insurance without first procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the Insurance
Commissioner, while its second paragraph defines who an insurance agent is within the intent of
this section and, finally, the third paragraph thereof prescribes the penalty to be imposed for its
violation.
The definition of an insurance agent as found in the second paragraph of Section 189 is intended
to define the word “agent” mentioned in the first and second paragraphs of the aforesaid section.
More significantly, in its second paragraph, it is explicitly provided that the definition of an
insurance agent is within the intent of Section 189.
Applying the definition of an insurance agent in the second paragraph to the agent mentioned in
the first and second paragraphs would give harmony to the aforesaid three paragraphs of Section
189. Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The
particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions,
but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its
parts and in order to produce harmonious whole. A statute must be so construed as to harmonize
and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible. More importantly the doctrine of
associated words (Noscitur a Sociis) provides that where a particular word or phrase in a
statement is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its true
meaning may be made clear and specific by considering the company in which it is found
or with which it is associated.
Considering that the definition of an insurance agent as found in the second paragraph is also
applicable to the agent mentioned in the first paragraph, to receive compensation by the agent is
an essential element for a violation of the first paragraph of the aforesaid section.
In the case at bar, the information does not allege that the negotiation of an insurance contracts
by the accused with Eugenio Isidro was one for compensation. This allegation is essential, and
having been omitted, a conviction of the accused could not be sustained. It is well-settled in Our
jurisprudence that to warrant conviction, every element of the crime must be alleged and proved.
The accused did not violate Section 189 of the Insurance Act

Salvatierra v. CA GR 107797, 26 August 1996 (261 SCRA 45)

Facts: In 1930, Enrique Salvatierra died intestate and without any issue. He was survived by his
legitimate brothers: Tomas, Bartolome, Venancio and Macario, and sister Marcela, all surnamed
Salvatierra. His estate consisted of three parcels of land (Cadastral Lot 25, covered by
Tax Declaration 11950, Cadastral Lot 26, covered by Tax Declaration 11951, and Cadastral Lot
27, covered by Tax Declaration 11949). On 4 May 1966, Macario Salvaterra’s Lot 26 to his son,
Anselmo Salvatierra by means of a deed of sale, and in consideration
of P1,000.00. Meanwhile, Marcela sold her share to Venancio. Bartolome’s share was sold by his
heirs to Tomas. On 24 September 1968, an “Extrajudicial Partition with Confirmation of Sale”
was executed by and among the surviving legal heirs and descendants of Enrique Salvatierra.
After the partition, Venancio owned 1041 square meters consisting of Lot 27and portion of Lot
26 (which is approximately 749 square meters), Anselmo owned 405square meters of Lot 26,
while the heirs of Tomas owned 1,116 square meters, the whole of lot 25. Thereafter on 15 June
1970, Venancio sold the whole of Lot 27 and a 149 square meter portion of Lot 26 to
spouses Lino Longalong and Paciencia Mariano. It was discovered in 1982 through a relocation
survey that the 149 square meter portion of Lot 26 was outside Longalong’s fence as Anselmo
Salvatierra was able to obtain a title in his name (Original Certificate of Title 0-4221) covering
the whole of Lot 26). Efforts to settle the matter at the barangay level proved futile because
Purita Salvatierra (widow of Anselmo) refused to yield to the demand of Lino Longalong to
return to the latter the 149 squaremeter portion of Lot 26.Longalong filed a case with the
Regional Trial Court for the reconveyance of the said portion of Lot 26.The court a quo
dismissed the case on the grounds that Longalong failed to establish ownership of the portion of
the land in question, and that the prescriptive period of four years from discovery of the alleged
fraud committed by defendants’ predecessor Anselmo Salvatierra within which plaintiffs should
have filed their action had already elapsed. Onappeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision,
ruling that a vendor can sell only whathe owns or what he is authorized to sell; and as to the
co- owner of a piece of land, he can ofcourse sell his pro indiviso share therein to, but he cannot
sell more than his share therein. Hence, the appeal.
Issue: Whether Longalong is entitled to reconveyance of the 149 square meters in Lot 26
Held: When the terms of the agreement are clear and unequivocal, the literal and plain meaning
thereof should be observed, pursuant to Article 1370 of the Civil Code (“If the terms of a
contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting
parties, the literal meaning of its stipulation shall control.”) Contracts which are the private
laws of the contracting parties, should be fulfilled according to the literal sense of their
stipulations, if their terms are clear and leave no room for doubt as to the intention of the
contracting parties, for contracts are obligatory, no matter what their forms maybe, whenever the
essential requisites for their validity are present. In the present case, there is no ambiguity in the
terms and stipulations of the extrajudicial partition (Extrajudicial
Partition with Confirmation of Sale). Since Macario’s share (later Anselmo’s) is only 405 of
the 749 square meters comprising Lot 26, Venancio was entitled to the remaining 344 square
meters of Lot 26, 149 square meters of which was sold to Longalong. Supplemented by the
holding that the prescriptive period on reconveyance is ten years and not four years, as held in
Caro v. CA, Longalong is entitled to reconveyance as his complaint was filed five years after the
constitution of Anselmo’s fraudulent Original Certificate of title. The Supreme Court denied the
petition for want of merit, with costs against petitioners