We humbly ask for peace

in our hearts, our bodies, our minds, and our

souls, as we wait patiently and confidently.

Not once did you leave us despite our failures and sins.
We recognize and accept the death of your Son, Jesus on the
cross, as a symbol of your unconditional love for us. We thank
you for the assurance of eternal life upon acceptance of Jesus
as our Savior.

Father, we humbly come before you as one family to ask that for your
Divine providence we implore the help of the Holy Spirit to work in
the hearts of those who are preparing for the 2021 Bar
Examination, especially members of our Bedan family.
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 POLITICAL LAW

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1

I. PRELIMINARY CONCEPTS ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1

A. NATURE OF CONSTITUTION ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1
B. INHERENT POWERS OF THE STATE -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1
C. RELEVANCE OF THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES ---------------------- 3
D. DYNAMICS AMONG THE BRANCHES OF THE GOVERNMENT ------------------------------------------- 4
E. STATE IMMUNITY ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5
F. THE NATIONAL TERRITORY ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6
II. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7
A. NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 7
B. BICAMERAL CONGRESS ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7
C. LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGES, DISCLOSURE OF FINANCIAL AND BUSINESS AFFAIRS,
PROHIBITIONS, INHIBITIONS, AND DISQUALIFICATIONS ------------------------------------------------- 8
D. DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 9
E. PROCESS OF LAW-MAKING ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 9
F. POWERS OF CONGRESS -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------10
III. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10
A. NATURE OF EXECUTIVE POWER ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10
B. CONCEPT OF PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 11
C. QUALIFICATIONS, ELECTION, TERM OF THE PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT,
AND RULES OF SUCCESSION ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 11
D. POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12
IV. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 16
A. CONCEPT OF JUDICIAL POWER ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 16
B. JUDICIAL REVIEW -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 16
C. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND FISCAL AUTONOMY ----------------------------------------------------- 18
D. APPOINTMENTS TO THE JUDICIARY ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 18
E. THE SUPREME COURT ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 19
V. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS --------------------------------------------------------------- 19
A. POWERS, FUNCTIONS, AND JURISDICTION ------------------------------------------------------------------- 20
B. COMPOSITION AND QUALIFICATIONS OF MEMBERS ---------------------------------------------------- 20
C. PROHIBITED OFFICES AND INTERESTS ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 21
D. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FINAL ORDERS, RESOLUTIONS, AND DECISIONS -------------------------- 22

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

I. CITIZENSHIP -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 22
A. CITIZENSHIP ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 22
II. BILL OF RIGHTS ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 23
A. DUE PROCESS ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 23
B. EQUAL PROTECTION --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 25
C. ARRESTS, SEARCHES, AND SEIZURES ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 25
D. PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS AND CORRESPONDENCE ------------------------------------------- 27
E. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 27
F. FREEDOM OF RELIGION ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 28
G. LIBERTY OF ABODE AND RIGHT TO TRAVEL ---------------------------------------------------------------- 28
H. RIGHT TO INFORMATION --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 28
 I. EMINENT DOMAIN ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 28
J. RIGHT TO ASSOCIATION --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 29
K. NON-IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACTS ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 29
L. CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 29
M. RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 30
N. RIGHT AGAINST EXCESSIVE FINES, AND CRUEL AND INHUMAN PUNISHMENTS -------------- 32
O. NON-IMPRISONMENT OF DEBTS ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 33
P. WRITS OF HABEAS CORPUS, KALIKASAN, HABEAS DATA, AND AMPARO ----------------------- 33
III. SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS --------------------------------------------------------- 34
A. CONCEPT OF SOCIAL JUSTICE -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 34
IV. EDUCATION, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ARTS, CULTURE, and SPORTS --------------- 34
A. ACADEMIC FREEDOM -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 33

NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY

I. REGALIAN DOCTRINE -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 34

II. PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 35
III. EXPLORATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND UTILIZATION OF
NATURAL RESOURCES ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 36
IV. Acquisition, Ownership, and Transfer of Public and Private Lands --------------------- 36
V. Practice of Professions ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 37

LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, ELECTION LAW, AND LOCAL

GOVERNMENT
I. LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 37
A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 37
B. MODES OF ACQUIRING TITLE TO PUBLIC OFFICE ---------------------------------------------------------- 37
C. DISABILITIES AND INHIBITIONS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS ---------------------------------------------------- 38
D. RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 38
E. ILLEGAL DISMISSAL, REINSTATEMENT, AND BACK SALARIES –--------------------------------------- 38
F. DE FACTO AND DE JURE OFFICERS ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 39
G. TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL RELATION ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 39
H. THE CIVIL SERVICE ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 40
I. ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 40
i. The Ombudsman and the Office of the Special Prosecutor -------------------------------- 43
ii. The Sandiganbayan ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 43
J. TERM LIMITS --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 43
II. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 44
A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 44
B. ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 45
C. JUDICIAL RECOURSE AND REVIEW ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 45
i. Doctrine of Primary Administrative Jurisdiction --------------------------------------------------- 45
ii. Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies --------------------------------------------- 45
iii. Doctrine of Finality of Administrative Action ------------------------------------------------------- 45
III. ELECTION LAW ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 46
A. SUFFRAGE ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 46
i. Qualifications and Disqualifications of Voters ------------------------------------------------------ 46
ii. Local and Overseas Absentee Voting ------------------------------------------------------------------- 46
B. CANDIDACY ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 47
i. Filing of Certificates of Candidacy -------------------------------------------------------------------- 49
ii. Call for Special Election ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 50
iii. Election Protest ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 50
iv. SET, HRET ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 51
 v. Recall ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 51
IV. LOCAL GOVERNMENT ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 52
A. PUBLIC CORPORATION --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 52
i. Classifications ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 52
ii. Elements ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 52
iii. Nature and Functions ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 52
iv. Requisites for Creation, Conversion, Division, Merger or Dissolution --------------------- 53
B. PRINCIPLES OF LOCAL AUTONOMY --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 53
C. AUTONOMOUS REGIONS AND THEIR RELATION TO THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT ---------- 54
D. LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 54
i. Requisites of Valid Ordinance ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 54
ii. Liabilities of LGUs ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 55
iii. Vacancies and Succession of Local Officials ---------------------------------------------------------- 55
iv. Recall ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 56

PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

I. SOURCES OF OBLIGATION -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 58

A. TREATIES ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 58
i. Concept of JUS COGENES ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 58
ii. Obligations ERGA OMNES ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 59
B. APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY DOMESTIC COURTS --------------------------------------- 59
C. JURISDICTION ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 59
D. SUBJECTS ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 61
E. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 61
 1

I. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1

A. PRELIMINARY CONCEPTS

NATURE OF A CONSTITUTION
(1)Is the constitution a conferment of powers or a limitation of the same?
It is both a conferment of powers and a limitation of the same. The constitution allocates powers to the three
(3) departments of the government. It also provides for limitations on the exercise of such powers, like the
provisions of the Bill of Rights. (ALBANO Political Law Reviewer, p. 2)

(2)What does a Self-Executing and a Non-Executing provision mean?

A Self-Executing provision denotes a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the
aid of supplementary or enabling legislation. It is a provision that supplies a sufficient rule by means of which
the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected. A Non-Executing provision, on the other hand, is that which
lays down a general principle. (NACHURA, Outline Reviewer in Political Law (2016), p. 4 [hereinafter
NACHURA]).

(3)What are the two aspects of self-determination?

1. Internal Self-determination - the right of the people of a state to govern themselves without outside
interference.
2. External Self-determination – the right of the people to determine their own political status and to be free
of alien domination, including formation of their own independent state. (Province of North Cotabato vs.
RP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, G.R. No. 183591,October 14, 2008).

(4)What are the distinctions between de jure and de facto governments?

The distinction between the two are:
1. A de jure government is a government of right; a government established according to the Constitution of
the State, and lawfully entitled to recognition and supremacy and the administration of the State but is
actually ousted from power or control. It is the true and lawful government (Gonzales, Phil. Political Law,
1966 Edition, P. 16, citing Aruego, pp. 133-136).
2. A de facto government, on the other hand, is that government which unlawfully gets the possession and
control of the rightful legal government, and maintains itself there by force and arms against the will of
the rightful legal government, and claims to exercise the powers thereof. It is a government of fact. (Co
Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil. 113).

(5)What are political laws and non-political or municipal laws?

Political laws are those laws regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign. Examples
are laws on citizenship, right of assembly, freedom of speech, press, etc.

Non-political laws are those which regulate the social, economic, or commercial life of the country of the
inhabitants with each other. Examples are civil, or commercial laws. (ALBANO Political Law Reviewer, p. 17)

(6)What are the effects of change of sovereignty on the laws of the ceded territory?
The political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are
automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by the affirmative act of the new sovereign.
While, municipal laws remain in force (Macariola v. Asuncion, A.M. No. 133-J, May 31, 1982).

INHERENT POWERS OF THE STATE

(7)What are the requisites for a valid exercise of Police Power?

1. Lawful Subject – the interests of the public, generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class
requires the interference by the State; and
 2

2. Lawful Means – the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought,
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals (Lucena Grand Central Terminal v. JAC Liner, G.R. No.
148339, February 23, 2005).

(8)What are the basic limitations on the exercise of Police Power?

The basic limitations on the exercise of police power are:
1. Due Process Clause; and
2. Equal Protection Clause (CONST. Art. III, Sec. 1).

(9)May the Power of Eminent Domain be used as an implement of Police Power?

Yes. There are traditional distinctions between the Police Power and the Power of Eminent Domain that
logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time on the same subject. Recent trends,
however, would indicate not a polarization but a mingling of the police power and the power of eminent domain,
with the latter being used as an implement of the former (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines,
Inc., v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989).

(10)Petitioner Republic instituted expropriation proceedings with the RTC over a parcel of land owned by
A, for the purpose of establishing a military reservation for the Philippine Army. The RTC ordered the
land to be expropriated upon payment of just compensation. For failure of the petitioner to pay the just
compensation, in 1961, B and C, the successors-in-interest of A filed a suit for damages and recovery
of possession of the land against the AFP. The RTC ruled in favor of B and C but held that they were
not entitled to the return of the property because of the notation in the TCT. They were ordered to
execute a deed of sale in favor the Republic. In 1964, since the Republic still failed to pay the just
compensation B and C mortgaged the land to D, who later foreclosed the mortgage in 1976 for the
former’s failure to pay. In 1991, D instituted a suit for quieting of title against AFP and the Republic.
Did the Republic retain ownership of the land despite its failure to pay B and C’s predecessor-in-
interest the just compensation?
No. The Republic did not retain ownership of the land. While the prevailing doctrine is that "the non- payment
of just compensation does not entitle the private landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots,
however, in cases where the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the finality
of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover
possession of their property. In Cosculluela v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-77765, August 15, 1988), the Court
defined just compensation as not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the property owner
but also the payment of the property within a reasonable time. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot
be considered "just." (Republic v. Lim, G.R. 161656, June 29, 2005)

(11)Respondent B, Inc. (B) is a domestic family corporation and the registered owner of several parcels of
land, which were later placed under the coverage of the agrarian reform program under P.D. No. 27 in
1972. In 1987, pursuant to Sec. 2 of E.O. No. 228 which determined the value of remaining unvalued
rice and corn lands subject to P.D. No. 27, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) computed the just
compensation to be paid to B. On the other hand, the RTC computed the just compensation based on
the recent fair market value of the property, instead of using the prevailing factors at the time of the
taking. Was just compensation properly computed by DAR?
No, just compensation was not properly computed by DAR. In Lubrica v. Land Bank of the Philippines, the
Court declared that just compensation should be computed using the values at the time of payment judicially
determined and not at the time of taking. In the same manner, B, Inc. was deprived of its landholdings since
1972 and until now, it has not been paid just compensation for its properties. It would certainly be inequitable
to determine just compensation based on the guidelines provided by P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 considering
the lapse of a considerable length of time. Just compensation should be determined in accordance with R.A.
No. 6657, and not P.D. No. 27 or E.O. No. 228 considering that just compensation is the full and fair equivalent
of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full, and ample.

The determination of just compensation is a judicial function which cannot be curtailed or limited by legislation,
much less by an administrative rule. Section 57 of R.A. No. 6657 vests the Special Agrarian Courts the "original
and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners." While
Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 requires the due consideration of the formula prescribed by the DAR, the
determination of just compensation is still subject to the final decision of the proper court. Thus, The RTC
properly disregarded the valuation presented by the LBP using the formula provided in EO No. 228. (Land
Bank of the Philippines v. Del Moral, G.R. No. 187307, Oct. 14, 2020 penned by J. Hernando).
 3

(Note: R.A. 6657 has been amended by R.A. 9700 on July 1, 2009. However in the case of Republic v. Del
Moral, the Court ruled that since Del Moral's claim was approved by the LBP as early as 1992, or 17 years
before July 1, 2009, the amendments introduced by R.A. No. 9700 and its implementing rules with respect to
the factors to be considered in computing just compensation shall not be applicable.)

(12)What is taxation?
The term “taxation” defines the power by which the sovereign raises revenue to defray the necessary expenses
of government. Taxation is merely a way of apportioning the cost of government among those who in some
measure are privileged to enjoy its benefits and must bear its burdens (51 Am. Jur. 341; 1 Cooley 72-93).

(13)The City Treasurer issued a Notice of Assessment to LMN Electric Co. for non-payment of business tax,
license fee, and other charges. Within the period prescribed by law, LMN Electric Co. protested the
assessment. When the City Treasurer denied the protest, LMN Electric Co. filed with the RTC a petition
praying for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), which was granted. The city
government appealed the order on the ground that the collection of taxes cannot be enjoined. Is the
city government correct?
No. Sec. 218 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) expressly provides that no court shall have the
authority to grant an injunction to restrain the collection of any national internal revenue tax, fee or charge
imposed by the code. However, the rule is different in the case of collection of local taxes as there is no express
provision in the Local Government Code (LGC) prohibiting courts from issuing an injunction to restrain local
governments from collecting taxes. Thus, the city government is incorrect in its contention since the collection
of local taxes may be enjoined (Angeles City v. Angeles City Electric Corp., G.R. No. 166134, June 29, 2010).

(14)What is the principle of strictissimi juris in tax exemption?

The principle of strictissimi juris means that laws granting tax exemption are construed strictly against the
taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing power. Taxation is the rule and exemption is the exception. The law
does not look with favor on tax exemptions and that he who would seek to be privileged must justify it by words
too plain to be mistaken and too categorical to be misinterpreted (Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation v. BIR, G.R. No. 172087, March 15, 2011).

RELEVANCE OF THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

(15)What is the doctrine of parens patriae?
When actions concerning the child have a relation to the public welfare or the well- being of the child, the State
may act to promote these legitimate interests. As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right and duty to
aid parents in the moral development of their children, and, thus, assumes a supporting role for parents to fulfill
their parental obligations (Samahan Ng Mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August
8, 2017).

(16)SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), questioning oil companies'
business practice of increasing the prices of their petroleum products whenever the price of crude oil
increases in the world market despite that fact that they had purchased their inventories at a much
lower price long before the increase. SJS argued that such practice constitutes monopoly and
combination in restraint of trade, prohibited under Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Public
respondent RTC issued an Order referring the matter to the Joint Task Force of the Department of
Energy (DOE) and Department of Justice (DOJ) to investigate the oil companies. Upon receipt of the
report of the DOE-DOJ Joint Task Force that there was no violation committed by the oil companies,
the RTC, instead of dismissing the case, issued an order for the COA, the BIR, and the BOC to open
and examine the books of accounts of the oil companies. RTC invoked the doctrine of parens patriae
in issuing such order. Is the doctrine of parens patriae applicable in this case?
No. Under the doctrine of parens patriae (father of his country), the judiciary, as an agency of the State, has
the supreme power and authority to intervene and to provide protection to persons non sui juris — those who
because of their age or incapacity are unable to care and fend for themselves.

This doctrine, however, cannot be applied in this case considering that there is a law assigning the DOE-DOJ
Joint Task Force to protect the interest of the Filipino consumers. The RTC, therefore, cannot create a new
 4

panel of examiners to replace the DOE-DOJ Joint Task Force. (Commission on Audit v. Pampilo, G.R. Nos.
188760, 189060, & 189333; June 30, 2020).

DYNAMIC AMONG THE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT

(17)What is the basic purpose of the principle of separation of powers?
Basically, it is designed to prevent the accumulation of powers in the same hands, which, according to Madison,
"may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny." In People v. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328, it was said that
the theory of separation of powers is designed by its originators to secure action and at the same time to
forestall overaction which necessarily results from undue concentration of powers and thereby obtain efficiency
and prevent despotism. (ALBANO Political law Reviewer, p. 481)

(18)When is there a violation of the Doctrine of Separation of Powers?

Broadly speaking, there is a violation of the Separation of Powers when one branch of government unduly
encroaches on the domain of another. US Supreme Court decisions instruct that the Principle of Separation of
Powers may be violated in 2 ways:
1. Firstly, "one branch may interfere impermissibly with the other's performance of its constitutionally
assigned function"; and
2. Alternatively, "the doctrine may be violated when one branch assumes a function that more properly is
entrusted to another."

In other words, there is a violation of the principle when there is impermissible (a) interference with and/or (b)
assumption of another department's functions (Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013).

(19)What is the rule on the Delegation of Powers?

The rule is potestas delegata non delegari potest – what has been delegated cannot be delegated. It is based
upon the ethical principle that such delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by
the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another
(Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita, G.R. No. 168056, September 1, 2005).

(20)When is delegation of powers permissible? (PETAL)

There is permissible delegation in the following cases:
1. Delegation to the People at large, such as:
a. System of initiative and referendum (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 32 and The Initiative and Referendum Act
(R.A. 6735)); and
b. Requirement of plebiscite in the creation, division, merger, and abolition of LGUs (CONST. Art. X, Sec.
10);
2. Emergency Powers of the President (CONST. Art, VI Sec. 23(2));
3. Tariff Powers of the President (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 28(2));
4. Delegation to Administrative Bodies of the power of subordinate legislation 7. (Gerochi v. DENR, G.R.
No. 159796, July 17, 2007); and
5. Delegation to Local Government Units (People v. Vera, G.R. No. L-45685, November 16, 1937).

(21)What are the tests for a valid delegation?

The following are the tests for a valid delegation:
1. Completeness test – the law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out,
or implemented by the delegate; and
2. Sufficient standard test – to be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate’s authority
and identify the conditions under which the legislative policy so announced is to be implemented
(Abakada Guro Partylist v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008).

Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed
to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative (Eastern Shipping Lines v.
POEA, G.R. No 76633, October 18,1988).

(22)What are the purposes of the principle of checks and balances?

The purposes are:
 5

1. To prevent encroachment of power, thus preserving the will of the sovereign expressed in the
Constitution; and
2. To restrain impulsive, hasty, and improvident action of one branch, except where full discretionary
authority has been delegated to it by the Constitution (Gonzales, Phil. Political Law, 1966 Ed., p. 102).

(23)What is the principle of blending of powers?

Blending of powers is necessary to properly address the complexities brought about by a rapidly developing
society and which the traditional branches of government have difficulty coping with. Although the principle of
separation of powers must be observed, it does not necessarily follow that an entire and complete separation
is either desirable or was ever intended, for such a complete separation would be impracticable if not
impossible; there may be-and frequently are-areas in which executive, legislative, and judicial powers blend or
overlap; and many officers whose duties cannot be exclusively placed under any one of these heads (Ople v.
Torres, et.al., G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998).

STATE IMMUNITY
(24)Is there any Constitutional provision forbidding any suit against the State?
Yes. The Constitution provides expressly that the State cannot be sued without its consent (Sec. 3, Art. XVI,
1987 Constitution).

(25)May the consent to be sued be given by a lawyer of an unincorporated agency of the State?
No, because the consent to be effective, must be given by the State through a duly enacted statute. The
consent given by the lawyer of the unincorporated agency of the State is not binding upon it as he is considered
to have gone beyond the scope of his authority (Republic v. Purisima, 78 SCRA 470, G.R. No. L-36084).

(26)Is the rule absolute that the State may not be sued at all?
No. The rule is not really absolute for it does not say that the State may not be sued under any circumstances.
On the contrary, the doctrine only conveys, "the State may not be sued without its consent" ' its clear import
then is that the State may at times be sued. (ALBANO Political Law Reviewer, p. 21)

(27)How may consent of the State to be sued given?

The State's consent may be given either expressly or impliedly. (ALBANO Political Law Reviewer, p. 21)

(28)How should the waiver of State immunity be construed?

Waiver of the State's immunity from suit, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be lightly inferred, but must
be construed strictissimi juris (Republic v. Feliciano, 148 SCRA 424). The consent of the State to be sued must
emanate from statutory authority, hence, from a legislative act, not from a mere memorandum.

(29)Are government funds subject to garnishment?

As a general rule, no. It was held that whether the money is deposited by way of general or special deposit, it
remains as a government fund and may not be subject to garnishment. The exception is when a law or an
ordinance has been enacted appropriating a specific amount to pay a valid government obligation, then, the
money can be garnished. (Pasay City Gov't. v. CFI of Manila, G.R. No. L-32162, September 28, 1984).

(30)May local government units be sued?

Yes, because their charters provide that they can sue and be sued. This is so even if they are performing
governmental functions (San Fernando, La Union V. O Judge Firme, G.R. No. 52179, April 8, 1991).

(31)Why is the doctrine of state immunity also available to foreign states?

The doctrine of State immunity is also available to foreign States in so far as they are sought to be sued in the
courts of the local State (Syquia v. Lopez, G.R. No. L- 1648, August 17, 1949). Immunity is enjoyed by all
States consonant with the public international law principle par in parem non habet imperium that all states are
sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another (Minucher v. CA, G.R.. No. 142396, February
11, 2013).
 6

(32)Can a government agency be sued?

In the case of government agencies, the question of its suability depends on whether it is incorporated or
unincorporated. An incorporated agency has a Charter of its own with a separate juridical personality while an
unincorporated agency has none. The Charter of an incorporated agency shall explicitly provide that it has
waived its immunity from suit by granting it with the authority to sue and be sued. This applies regardless of
whether its functions are governmental or proprietary in nature. (Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Central Bank
of the Philippines. G.R. No. 197593; October 12, 2020).

(33)B bank found discrepancies in its inter-bank reconciliation statements in the Cental Bank of the
Philippines (CBP). B bank requested CBP to credit back to its deposit account the amount of 9 million.
However, CBP credited only half of the amount due to B bank. B Bank filed a complaint for a sum of
money against CBP. CBP argued that its operation is purely governmental in nature. CBP's capacity
to sue and be sued does not necessarily mean that it is generally liable for torts committed in the
discharge of its governmental functions. Is CBP correct?
No. The CBP, which was created under RA No. 265 as amended by PD No. 72, is a government corporation
with separate juridical personality and not a mere agency of the government that functions as the central
monetary authority is a purely governmental function. While the CBP performed a governmental function in
providing clearing house facilities, it is not immune from suit as its Charter, by express provision, waived its
immunity from suit. (Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Central Bank of the Philippines. G.R. No. 197593; October
12, 2020).

NATIONAL TERRITORY
(34)What comprises the national territory of the Philippines?
The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein,
and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial,
fluvial and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other
submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of
their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines (Article I, 1987 Constitution).

(35)Why is the demarcation of the baselines important?

The demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone, reserving
solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone. Such maritime
delineation binds the international community since the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the
maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will of course reject it and will
refuse to be bound by it.

UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines. UNCLOS III creates a sui generis maritime
space - the exclusive economic zone - in waters previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS III grants new rights
to coastal States to exclusively exploit the resources found within this zone up to 200 nautical miles. UNCLOS
III, however, preserves the traditional freedom of navigation of other States that attached to this zone beyond
the territorial sea before UNCLOS III (Prof. Merlin Magallona, et al. v. Hon. Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No.
187167, August 16, 2011).

(36)What is the Archipelagic Doctrine?

The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and
dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines (CONST. Art. I, second sentence). Under this
doctrine, a straight baseline is drawn by connecting the outermost points of the archipelago and considering
all the waters enclosed thereby as internal waters (CRUZ, Constitutional Law (2015) p.24 [hereinafter, CRUZ,
Constitutional Law]).
 7

B. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER

(37)What is legislative power?
Legislative power is the power or competence of the legislature to enact, ordain, alter or modify, repeal or
abrogate existing laws (Govt. of the P.1. v. Springer, 50 Phil. 259, 276).

(38)Upon whom is the legislative power vested?

The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a
House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and
referendum (Sec. 1, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution).

(39)What are the two (2) kinds of legislative power?

They are the original and derivative powers. Original legislative power is possessed by the sovereign power.
Derivative legislative power is that which has been delegated by the sovereign people to legislative bodies and
is subordinate to the original power of the people. (ALBANO Political Law Reviewer, p. 509)

(40)How may a bill become a law?

1. Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he
approves the same, he shall sign it, otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to
the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to
reconsider it.
2. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it
shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered,
and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases,
the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for
or against shall be entered in its Journal.

The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after
the date of receipt thereof, otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it (Sec. 27[1], Art. VI, 1987
Constitution).

(41)What is meant by the provision of the Constitution that revenue or tariff bills must originate from the
House of Representatives?
What the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an
increase of the public debt, private bills, and bills of local application must come from the House of
Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be
expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are
elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both views are
thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws.

Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the
bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill
(Tolentino v. Sec. of Finance, G.R. No. 115931, August 25, 1994)

BICAMERAL CONGRESS
(42)Petitioners A and B seek to nullify as unconstitutional Republic Act 9716. In substance, the said law
created an additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur. The petitioners posit that
existing legislative districts may be reapportioned and severed to form new districts, provided each
resulting district will represent a population of at least 250,000. On the other hand, if the
reapportionment would result in the creation of a legislative seat representing a populace of less than
 8

250,000 inhabitants, the reapportionment must be stricken down as invalid for non-compliance with
the minimum population requirement. Is R.A. No. 9716 unconstitutional?
No. The second sentence of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: "Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative." For
while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a city must
first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled. The use by the subject provision
of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand" from the
phrase "or each province" point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only
required for a city, but not for a province. (Aquino III v. COMELEC, GR 189793, April 7, 2010)

(43)In Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), it was argued by the
petitioners that pursuant to the second clause of Sec. 11 of R.A 7941 which provides that "those
garnering more than 2% of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes," there should be a proclamation of the others to complete the 20% representation of
the party list groups as provided by the Constitution. Is the contention of BANAT, etc. correct? Explain.
Yes. In computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for
the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 is
unconstitutional. The two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum
number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued
operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the
permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list
representatives.

The 2% threshold should be stricken down as unconstitutional only in relation to the distribution of the additional
seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. (Barangay Association for National
Advancement & Transparency (BANAT) V. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009).

(44)How are the seats for party-list representatives allocated?

1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for
the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGES, DISCLOSURE OF FINANCIAL AND BUSINESS

AFFAIRS, PROHIBITIONS, INHIBITIONS, AND DISQUALIFICATIONS

(45)What are the constitutional privileges and immunities of the Members of Congress?
A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six
years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned
nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in Congress or in any committee thereof (Sec.
11, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution).

(46)What are the disqualifications and disabilities of the Members of Congress?

No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to
any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he
was elected (Sec. 13, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution).
No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any court
of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial or other administrative bodies. Neither shall he,
directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted
by the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or
controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before
 9

any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefits or where he may be called upon to act on account of
his office (Sec. 14, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution).

DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS

(47)What is the constitutional provision on the power of Congress to punish its members?
Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and with
the concurrence of 2/3 of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed,
shall not exceed sixty days (Sec. 16[3], Art. VI, 1987 Constitution).

(48)What is the nature of such power of Congress to punish its members?

It is a power expressly granted to it by the Constitution. Even if not expressly granted, Congress can still
exercise it under the doctrine of necessary implication.It is an inherent power designed for self-preservation
which the courts cannot ordinarily inquire into, except if there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. It is one belonging to the legislative body which ordinarily cannot be reviewed by the courts,
otherwise, the courts would play or assume appellate Jurisdiction (Osmeña v. Pendatun, G.R. NO. L-17144,
109 Phil. 863. October 28, 1960).

PROCESS OF LAW-MAKING
(49)What is an appropriation bill?
It is one where its primary and specific aim is to appropriate a certain sum of money from the public treasury.
It is an item which in itself is a specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of law which
happens to be put into an appropriations bill (Bengzon v. Sec. of Justice, 62 Phil. 912).

(50)What is meant by the provision of the Constitution that revenue or tariff bills must originate from the
House of Representatives?
It simply means that the initiative for filing such bills must come from the House on the theory that, elected as
they are from the districts, they are expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the
other hand, Senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national
perspective (Alvarez v. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 118303).

(51)Does the Congress have the power to authorize the President the power to fix tariff rates and its
limitations?
The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations
and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other
duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government (Sec. 28[2],
Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)

(52)May the President veto particular items in the appropriations bill?

Yes. The Constitution provides that only a particular item or items may be vetoed. The power to disapprove
any item or items in an appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve
the remaining portion of the same item (Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr., 191 SCRA 452, 464 [1990]).

(53)May Congress pass a law authorizing any transfer of appropriations? Is the rule absolute?
No. As a rule, no law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations. The rule, however, is not
absolute because the Constitution authorizes the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional
Commissions to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings
in other items of their respective appropriations, provided they are authorized by law (Sec. 25[5], Art. VI, 1987
Constitution).
 10

POWERS OF CONGRESS
(54)What is the constitutional provision on the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation?
The Constitution provides that the Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights
of persons appearing in, or affected by, such inquiries shall be respected (Sec. 21, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution).

(55)Is the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation the same with congressional
oversight?
No. While closely related and complementary to each other, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation the same with congressional oversight should not be considered as pertaining to the same power
of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is
to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question
hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress' oversight function. (Senate, et al.
V. Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 174106, April 2, 2009).

(56)Which body exercises the power of impeachment?

The HOR shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment (CONST. Art. XI, Sec. 3, Par. 1).
The Senate has the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment (CONST. Art. XI, Sec. 3, Par. 6).

(57)Under the Constitution, which appointments need the concurrence of the Commission on
Appointments? (HAAC)
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint:
1. Heads of executive departments (CONST. Art. VII, Sec.16);
2. Ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls (CONST. Art. VII, Sec.16);
3. Officers of the AFP from the rank of colonel or naval captain;
4. Officers whose appointments are vested in him by the Constitution:
a. Regular members of the Judicial and Bar Council (CONST. Art. VIII, Sec. 8, par. (2));
b. Chairmen and members of the Constitutional Commissions (CONST.Art. IX-B, Sec.1, par.
(2)); and
c. Sectoral representatives during the three-consecutive terms after the ratification of the Constitution
(CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 5(2); CONST. Art.XVIII, Sec. 7; Quintos-Deles v. Commission on Appointments,
G.R. No. 83216, September 4, 1989).

C. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
NATURE OF EXECUTIVE POWER
(58)Is the President’s power in case of emergency absolute?
No. Executive, legislative, and judicial powers are dispersed to the President, the Congress, and the Supreme
Court, respectively. Each is supreme within its own sphere. But none has the monopoly of power in times of
emergency. Each branch is given a role to serve as limitation or check upon the other. This system does not
weaken the President, it just limits his power, using the language of McIlwain. In other words, in times of
emergency, our Constitution reasonably demands that we repose a certain amount of faith in the basic integrity
and wisdom of the Chief Executive but, at the same time, it obliges him to operate within carefully prescribed
procedural limitations. (David v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006).

(59)In the exercise of his military powers, can the President create military tribunals?
Yes, because they are considered agencies of executive character which is derived from the military power of
the President. (Ruffy v. Chief of Staff L-533 August 20, 1946).

(60)What is the faithful execution clause?

 11

The second sentence of Section 17, Article VII is referred to as the “take care power” of the President and also
sometimes called the “faithful execution clause.” Under this provision, the President is bound to ensure the
faithful execution of laws regardless of his belief in the legality of said laws. Until and unless a law is declared
unconstitutional, the President has a duty to execute it regardless of his doubts as to its validity (CONST. Art.
VII, Secs. 1 & 17).

CONCEPT OF PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY

(61)What is the rationale behind the President's privilege of immunity from suit?
The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of
Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance of distraction, considering that being the Chief
Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holder's time, also demands
undivided attention. (Nepomuceno vs. Duterte, 16838, May 11, 2021)

(62)What is the extent of the President’s immunity from suit?

Presidential immunity in this jurisdiction attaches during the entire tenure of the President. The immunity makes
no distinction with regard to the subject matter of the suit; it applies whether or not the acts subject matter of
the suit are part of his duties and functions as President (De Lima v. Pres. Duterte, G.R. No. 227635, October
15, 2019). While the President is immune from suit, she may not be prevented from instituting suit (Soliven v.
Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585, November 14, 1988).

(63)What is executive privilege or the Presidential communications privilege?

It pertains to “communications, documents or other materials that reflect presidential decision-making and
deliberations and that the President believes should remain confidential.” Presidential communications
privilege applies to decision-making of the President. It is rooted in the constitutional principle of separation of
power and the President’s unique constitutional role. (NERI v. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY
OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008).

(64)What is the extent of the executive privilege?

The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power
textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. The
information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others. (NERI v. SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, G.R. No. 180643,
March 25, 2008)

(65)What are the 3 elements of the Presidential communications privilege?

1. Quintessential and non-delegable presidential power: Power subject of the legislative inquiry must be
expressly granted by the Constitution to the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive
agreement with other countries.;
2. Operational proximity test: The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close
advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in
“operational proximity” with the President.
3. Qualified privilege: Privilege may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information
sought “likely contains important evidence” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority. (NERI v. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC
OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008).

QUALIFICATIONS, ELECTION, TERM OF THE PRESIDENT AND VICE-

PRESIDENT, AND RULES ON SUCCESSION
(66)What are the qualifications of the President?
The qualifications of the President are:
1. He must be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines;
2. He must be a registered voter;
3. He must be able to read and write;
 12

4. He must be at least 40 years of age on the day of the election; and

5. He must have resided in the Philippines for at least ten (10) years immediately preceding the election;
(Sec. 2, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution).

(67)What are the qualifications of the Vice-President?

The Vice-President shall have the same qualifications as that of the President (Sec. 3, Art. VII, 1987
Constitution).

(68)What is the term of office of the President and Vice-President?

The President and Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the people for a term of six years which
shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the election and shall end at noon of
the same date six years thereafter (Sec. 4, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution).

(69)How long may a person serve as President?

The President shall not be eligible for any re-election. No person who has succeeded as President and has
served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time. (Sec. 4,
Art. VII, 1987 Constitution).

(70)How long may a Vice-President serve?

No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term for
which he was elected. (Sec. 4, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution).

(71)X, the President of the Philippines, dies eighteen (18) months before the next presidential elections. May
Congress call for a special election?
No, because under the Constitution, no special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen
(18) months before the date of the next presidential election (Sec. 10, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution).

(72)When can a special election for President and Vice-President be held?

The following requisites must concur before special election may be held:
1. Death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President and the Vice-
President;
2. If the vacancies occur more than 18 months before the next regular presidential election; and
3. A law passed by Congress calling for a special election to elect a President and Vice-President to be
held not earlier than 45 days nor later than 60 days from the time of such call (CONST. Art. VII, Sec. 10).

POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT

(73)What are the military powers of the President?
1. Calling out powers
2. Suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus
3. Declaration of martial law

(74)What is the calling out powers of the President?

The President is the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines. As such, he/she may call out
the armed forces to suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion, whenever it shall be necessary. It is the
most benign of the military powers of the president and is merely incidental to his authority to determine the
disposition of the armed forces and what degree of force a particular crisis demands. It is however limited to
ordinary police action necessary to maintain public order. (IBP v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15,2000).

(75)What are the limitations to the power of the President to suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus?
The grounds for the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus under the c1987 Constitution are invasion or
rebellion, or when public safety requires it;
1. Such suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days, following which it shall be lifted, unless otherwise
extended by the Congress;
 13

2. Such suspension shall not impair the right to bail. (Section 13, Art. III, 1987 Constitution);
3. The suspension applies only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent or directly
connected with invasion;
4. During such suspension, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three (3)
days, otherwise he shall be released;
5. The President has the duty to report such action to the Congress within forty-eight (48) hours, personally
or in writing;
6. The Congress may revoke, or so extend upon the request of the President, the effectivity of the
proclamation by a majority vote of all its members, voting jointly;
7. The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ, or the extension thereof, and
must promulgate a decision thereon within thirty (30) days from filing.
8. The suspension of the privilege of writ shall only apply to persons judicially charged for rebellion or
offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
9. During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person arrested, or detained shall be judicially
charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released. (Section 18, Article VII, 1987 Constitution).

(76)What are the nature and guidelines of the President’s power to declare martial law?
The martial law is the joint power of the President and the Congress.
The following are the guidelines in order that the President can declare martial law?
1. There must be an invasion or rebellion
2. Public safety requires the proclamation of martial law all over the Philippines or any part thereof
3. Should not exceed 60 days, following which, it will be automatically lifted unless the Congress extends
such period
4. Within 48 hours, the President must report to the Congress, either personally or in writing
5. The Congress has the power to either affirm or revoke or allow the lapse or extend the effectivity of the
proclamation by majority votes of its members voting jointly
6. The citizens have the authority to question the factual basis for such declaration and the Supreme Court
needs to decide the case within 30 days from its filing.
Once revoked by the Congress, the President cannot set aside the revocation. The state of martial law does
not suspend the operation of the Constitution nor supplant the functioning of the civil or legislative assemblies
nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are
able to function nor automatically suspend the privilege of writ.

(77)What is the difference between regular and ad interim appointments?

Regular appointments - made by the President while Congress is in session. It takes effect only after the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments (CA). Once approved, it continues until the end of the term
of the appointee.

(78)Ad Interim appointments - made by the President while the Congress is in session. It takes effect
immediately but ceases to be valid if disapproved by the CA or upon the next adjournment of Congress.
Its purpose is to prevent a hiatus in the discharge of official duties.
(79)What is the effectivity and duration of ad interim appointments?
Ad interim appointments are effective immediately. It is permanent until it has been bypassed or denied by the
CA or until the next adjournment of Congress.

(80)What are the steps in the appointment process?

1. The President makes the nomination.
2. The same is submitted to CA for confirmation
3. The corresponding commission is issued.
4. The appointee makes an acceptance of the appointment.

(81)Does the power of appointment carry with it the power of removal?

As a general rule, the power of removal is implied from the power of appointment. However, the President
cannot remove officials appointed by him where the Constitution prescribes certain methods for separation of
such officers from public service. To cite an example, Commissioners of Constitutional Commissions can only
be removed by impeachment.
 14

(82)What is the effect of designation?

A designation, like a temporary appointment, is not subject to confirmation by the CA. When a person is merely
designated, and not appointed, he shall hold office in a temporary capacity and may be removed at will by the
appointing power.

(83)What are midnight appointments?

Midnight appointments are appointments made by a President within 2 months before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term. Such appointments are prohibited by the Constitution except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety (CONST. Art. VII, Sec. 15). This is based on the principle that after the election of a
new President, the outgoing president becomes no more than a "caretaker" administrator, whose duty is to
"prepare for the orderly transfer of authority to the incoming President” (Aytona v. Castillo, G.R. No. L-19313,
January 19, 1962).

(84)Who has the power to deport?

The President has the power to deport. As an act of State, the President has the inherent right to order the
deportation of an alien while at the same time that power may be deemed vested in him through delegation by
the legislative through the enactment of appropriate statutes (Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board, L-10280,
September 30, 1963; Kishu Dalamal v. Deportation Board, L-16812, October 31, 1963).

(85)What is the nature of the pardoning power of the President?

The exercise of the pardoning power is discretionary in the President and may not be interfered with by
Congress or the Court, except only when it exceeds the limits provided for by the Constitution (Risos-Vidal v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015). In granting the power of executive clemency upon the
President, the Constitution does not distinguish between criminal and administrative cases (Llamas v.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 99031, October 15, 1991).

(86)Is signing a treaty the same as ratification?

No. Signing of the treaty and ratification are not the same. The signature is primarily intended as a means of
authenticating the instrument and as a symbol of the good faith of the parties. It is usually performed by the
state's authorized representative in the diplomatic mission. Ratification, on the other hand, is the formal act by
which a state confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its representative. It is generally
held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the government (Pimentel, et al. v.
Executive Secretary, et al., supra).

(87)Who has the power to ratify a treaty and what is the role of the Senate on the treaty-making power of
the President?
Under the Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of 2/3 of the
members of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding consent, or
concurrences to the ratification (Bayan v. Zamora, 342 SCRA 449 [2000]).

(88)What are the differences between a treaty and an executive agreement?

A treaty is "an international agreement concluded between states in written form and governed by international
law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular
designation" (The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 2 [hereinafter VCLT]). An executive
agreement is similar to a treaty, except that the former does not require legislative concurrence, is usually less
formal, and deals with a narrower range of subject matters (Bayan Muna v. Romulo, G.R. No. 159618, February
1, 2011).

(89)What are the guidelines concerning the President’s withdrawal from international agreements?
The Court adopted the following guidelines as the modality for evaluating cases concerning the president's
withdrawal from international agreements:
1. The president enjoys some leeway in withdrawing from agreements which he or she determines to be
contrary to the Constitution or statutes. In the event that courts determine the unconstitutionality of a
treaty, the president may unilaterally withdraw from it. Owing to the preeminence of statutes enacted by
elected representatives and hurdling the rigorous legislative process, the subsequent enactment of a law
that is inconsistent with a treaty likewise allows the president to withdraw from that treaty;
2. The president cannot unilaterally withdraw from agreements which were entered into pursuant to
congressional imprimatur;
 15

3. The President cannot unilaterally withdraw from international agreements where the Senate concurred
and expressly declared that any withdrawal must also be made with its concurrence (Pangilinan v.
Cayetano, G.R. No. 238875, March 16, 2021).

(90)Is the Philippines’ withdrawal from the Rome Statute through a Note Verbale delivered to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations valid, binding, and effectual?
Yes. Article 127 of the Rome Statute provides mechanisms on how a state party may withdraw from it:
1. A State Party may, by written notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations,
withdraw from this Statute. The withdrawal shall take effect one year after the date of receipt of the
notification, unless the notification specifies a later date.
2. A State shall not be discharged, by reason of its withdrawal, from the obligations arising from this Statute
while it was a Party to the Statute, including any financial obligations which may have accrued. Its
withdrawal shall not affect any cooperation with the Court in connection with criminal investigations and
proceedings in relation to which the withdrawing State had a duty to cooperate and which were
commenced prior to the date on which the withdrawal became effective, nor shall it prejudice in any way
the continued consideration of any matter which was already under consideration by the Court prior to
the date on which the withdrawal became effective.

The President's withdrawal from the Rome Statute was in accordance with the mechanism provided in the
treaty. The Rome Statute itself contemplated and enabled a State Party's withdrawal. A state party and its
agents cannot be faulted for merely acting within what the Rome Statute expressly allows (Pangilinan v.
Cayetano, G.R. No. 238875, March 16, 2021).

(91)Former President A issued Presidential Decree No. 1234 which provides that government employees
may be granted allowances, honoraria, and other fringe benefits, subject to the approval of the
President. Pursuant to this provision, former President B issued Administrative Order No. 987, which
authorized government agencies and government-owned and controlled corporations to establish an
annual medical checkup program. Philippine Institute for Developmental Studies (PIDS), a government-
owned and controlled corporation (GOCC), sought for the President's approval before establishing its
annual medical checkup program. It likewise sought the Office of the President's approval to continue
the annual medical checkup program's implementation after Notice of Disallowance No. 2006-01 had
been issued. The Executive Secretary, acting through the authority by the President, wrote a letter
stating that upon the recommendation of the Department of Health and Department of Budget and
Management, PIDS is allowed to continue its implementation of its annual medical checkup program
through an accredited health organization, subject to the usual accounting and auditing rules and
regulations. Thereafter, PIDS entered into an agreement with PhilCare, a duly accredited health
organization for its annual medical checkup program. The Commission on Audit (CA) argued that said
agreement is not allowed since it is an irregular expenditure. The CA based its argument upholding
the validity of the Notice of Disallowance. Does the President, acting through its executive secretary
have the power to reorganize and allow a GOCC to continue its annual medical checkup program
despite the issuance of the Notice of Disallowance?
Yes, the President has the power to reorganize. As expressly provided in Article VII, Section 17 of the 1987
Constitution, “the President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed." The doctrine of qualified political agency acknowledges the
multifarious executive responsibilities that demand a president's attention, such that the delegation of control
power to his or her Cabinet becomes a necessity. Unless the Constitution or law provides otherwise, Cabinet
members have the president's imprimatur to exercise control over the offices and departments under their
respective jurisdictions, which authority nonetheless remains subject to the president's disapproval or reversal.
In the present case, the Executive Secretary, as the President's alter ego, had the authority to let petitioner
continue implementing its annual medical checkup program through enrollment with health maintenance
organizations. Consequently, the exemption granted by the Executive Secretary, as the President's alter ego,
is valid. It will remain so, unless disapproved or reprobated by the President. Thus, PIDS is allowed to continue
its annual medical checkup program.

(92)Does the President have the power to enter into contract or guarantee foreign loans without the
concurrence of the Congress?
No. The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the
prior concurrence of the Monetary Board and subject to such limitations as may be provided under law. The
Monetary Board shall, within thirty days from the end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit to the
Congress a complete report of its decisions on applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the
 16

government or government-owned and controlled corporations which would have the effect of increasing the
foreign debt, and containing other matters as may be provided by law.

(93)Republic Act No. 5678, also known as the Aurora Special Economic Zone Act of 2007, established a
unique economic zone called the Aurora Special Economic Zone (Aurora Ecozone) in the province of
Aurora. The primary objectives of this Act are to boost tourism and attract investments to the area.
The proposed Aurora Ecozone covers 500 hectares of land where the current petitioners reside. This
land is inhabited by 250 Agta and Dumagat families, who are primarily engaged in farming and fishing
for their livelihoods. The petitioners argue that the mentioned laws violate specific sections of the
Constitution. They contend that the laws go against Article XII, Section 21 of the Constitution because
they grant the APEZA (Aurora Pacific Economic Zone and Freeport Authority) the power to secure
foreign loans without needing approval from the President, the Department of Finance, or the Central
Bank. Additionally, the laws allegedly breach Article XII, Section 11 of the Constitution by allowing
foreign investors to operate public utilities without restrictions. On the other hand, the respondents
countered that the contested laws still uphold citizenship requirements and investment regulations
concerning public utilities. They further argue that it is permissible to delegate the authority to secure
foreign loans to APEZA, which functions as a government-owned or controlled corporation. They
assert that obtaining the approval of the Central Bank Monetary Board is not an absolute requirement
for contracting foreign loans. The allegations on the violation on rules concerning foreign loans and
foreign investment are likewise untenable. Does the President have the power to enter into contracts
or guarantee foreign loans?
Yes, the president is allowed to contract and guarantee foreign loans, and the Constitution does not distinguish
as to the kind of loans or debt instruments that it covers. The president shares this authority with the Central
Bank. Congress has no part in contracting foreign loans except to limit and regulate how the loans may be
contracted. It cannot expand the constitutional provision and determine who may exercise this power. Hence,
APECO cannot contract foreign loans on its own. Even though the power to contract and guarantee foreign
loans may be delegated by the President, the Secretary of Finance or any designated alter ego of the President
is bound to secure the latter's prior consent to or subsequent ratification of his acts. (Kilusang Magbubukid ng
Pilipinas v. Aurora Pacific Economic Zone GR 198688, November 42, 2020).

D. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

CONCEPT OF JUDICIAL POWER

(94)Upon whom is judicial power conferred?
Judicial power courts are tested in one Supreme court and in such lower courts as may be established by law
(Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution).

(95)What is the concept of judicial power?

Judicial power includes the duty on the courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legal,
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government (Sec.
1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution; Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center v. Garcia, et al., 239 SCRA 386, G.R. No.
115381, December 23, 1994).

(96)What is the reason as to why the framers of the 1987 Constitution expanded the Supreme Court's power
of judicial review?
The framers of the 1987 Constitution deliberately expanded the Court's power of judicial review to prevent
courts from seeking refuge behind the political question doctrine and turning a blind eye to abuses committed
by the other branches of government. (Leonen, J Concurring Opinion in Belgia v. Ochoa, 721 Phil. 416 (2013)

JUDICIAL REVIEW
(97)What are the requisites of judicial review? (ASEL)
The requisites of judicial review are:
1. There must be an Actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
 17

2. The person challenging the act must have the Standing to question the validity of the subject act or
issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
3. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the Earliest opportunity; and
4. The issue of constitutionality must be the very Lis mota of the case (Villafuerte v. Securities and
Exchange Commission, G.R. No. 208379. March 29, 2022).

(98)What is the rule of the necessity to settle the constitutionality of a law?

As a general rule, courts will not settle the constitutionality of a law if it can pass upon the merits on other
grounds (Alger V. CA, 135 SCRA 37; Zandueta v. dela Costa, 66 Phil. 615). The reason for the rule is that,
there is a presumption of constitutionality of a law. The exception is when there is a necessity to determine the
merits of the suit in which the constitutionality of such law has been drawn in question. Here the court cannot
avoid the resolution on the validity of the law.

(99)What is the concept of the term "transcendental importance"?

There is no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance. There are, however, instructive determinants like:
(1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard
of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack
of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised (Francisco, et
al. v. House of Representatives, supra, citing Kilosbayan v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110).

(100)What is the requirement in rendering judicial decisions?

Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution provides that "no decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based," and that "no petition for
review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without
stating the basis therefor." Rule 36, Section 1 of the Rules of Court embraced this constitutional mandate,
directing that "a judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and
directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed
by him, and filed with the clerk of the court." (Pastora Ganancial v. Betty Cabugao, G.R. No. 203348; July 6,
2020)

(101)What is legal standing?

Legal standing is a requisite for judicial review. What is required is "a material interest, an interest in the issue
affected by the decree as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental
interest."

There are several exceptions that can be invoked, such as suing as a taxpayer, concerned citizen, and a public
interest advocate raising issue of transcendental importance. Another exception is the concept of third-party
standing. Under this concept, actions may be brought on behalf of third parties provided the criteria are met.
(Luis Villafuerte v. Securities and Exchange Commission, G.R. No. 208379, March 29, 2022)

(102)Who is a proper party?

He is one who has a personal and substantial interest in the case and that he has sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a consequence of its enforcement (Tan v. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677; Dumlao V. Comelec, 95
SCRA 392).

(103)Give the concept of actual controversy.

An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims,
susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute
(Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation V. Thunderbird Pilipinas Hotels and Resorts, Inc., et al., 730
Phil. 543, 562 [20141).

There must be a contrast of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence. The Court can decide the constitutionality of an act, either by the Executive or Legislative, only
when an actual case between opposing parties is submitted for judicial determination (Citing Didipio Earth
Savers' Multi-Purpose Association, Inc. v. Sec. Gozun, 520 Phil. 457 [2006]; Phil. Constitution Assn.
(Philconsa) v. Phil. Government, G.R. No. 218406, November 29, 2016).
 18

(104)When is a question ripe for judicial determination?

Closely linked to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question
is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual or entity
challenging it (Guingona v. Court of Appeals, 354 Phil. 415, 427 [1998]). For a case to be considered ripe for
adjudication, it is a prerequisite that an act had then been accomplished or performed by either branch of
government before a court may interfere, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action (Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., 8 April 2014, 721 SCRA
146, 280). Petitioner must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct
injury as a result of the act complained of (Phil. Constitution Assn. (Philconsa) v. Phil. Government, G.R. No.
218406, November 29, 2016).

(105)What is the direct injury test in determining whether a citizen has the right to raise a public issue in
court?
It simply means that for a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an executive
or legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it is not
sufficient that he has a general interest common to all members of the public. The purpose is to prevent just
about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official policy or act with which he disagreed with,
and thus, hinders the activities of government agencies engaged in public service (David, et al. v. Arroyo, G.R.
No. 141284, August 15, 2000)

(106)What is a political question?

The term "political question" connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers
to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity,
or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislature or executive branch of
the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure
(Tañada v. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-10520, February 28, 1965).

(107)When will a case be considered as moot and academic?

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervising
events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical value. As a rule, courts decline jurisdiction over
such a case, or dismiss it on ground of mootness. (Deutsche Bank Ag London v. Kormasinc, Inc. G.R. Nos.
201700 & 201777; April 18, 2022)

JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND FISCAL AUTONOMY

(108)Does the SC’s power to decide on the requests and other matters of collegiate courts include fixing
budgets for said courts?
Yes. The SC has the authority and discretion as part of its constitutional power of administrative supervision
over all courts and personnel thereof. This power includes having the discretion and approval on the retirement
program budgets of Justices of collegiate courts. (Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution)

(109)Does the power of having fiscal autonomy include increasing the budget even for retiring members of
collegiate courts?
Yes. Although retirement program budgets of retiring Justices of collegiate courts are not expressly provided
under any law, such retirement program budgets are more in the nature of administrative expenses which are
allotted by the collegiate courts, with the approval of the SC En Banc as part of its constitutional power of
administrative supervision over all courts and personnel thereof. (Re: Expenses of Retirement of Court of
Appeals Justices, A.M. No. 19-02-03-CA (Resolution); June 25, 2019)

(110)What is the effect of SC’s absolute control over Judiciary’s appropriations?

The power of fiscal autonomy of the Court encompasses the power to review, then approve or deny budget
and appropriations for the Judiciary. The Court ruled that any subsequent increase will still be subject to the
review and approval of the Court and will depend on the availability of funds and prevailing circumstances.
(Re: Expenses of Retirement of Court of Appeals Justices, A.M. No. 19-02-03-CA (Resolution); June 25, 2019)

APPOINTMENTS OF THE JUDICIARY

 19

(111)What is the principal function of the JBC?

The JBC shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the judiciary. It may exercise such
other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it (Sec. 8[5], Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution).

(112)The Judicial Bar Council submitted six lists for six vacancies to the President for the appointment of
Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan, a practice known as “clustering”. The President in choosing
appointees over-reached and disregarded the short lists for each vacancy. Does the practice of
clustering constitutional?
NO. The duty of JBC is to give all qualified nominees fair and equal opportunity to be appointed. The clustering
by the JBC of nominees for simultaneous or closely successive vacancies in collegiate courts can actually be
a device to favor or prejudice a particular nominee.

THE SUPREME COURT

(113)What is the purpose of judicial privilege?

The purpose of judicial privilege as a child of judicial power is principally for the effective discharge of such
judicial power. If the matter upon which Members of the Court, court officials and employees privy to the Court's
deliberations, are called to appear and testify do not relate to and will not impair the Court's deliberative
adjudicatory judicial power, then judicial privilege may not be successfully invoked (Agcaoli, Jr., et al. v.
Hon.Rodolfo C. Farinas, et al., G.R. No. 232395, Tijam, 1).

(114)Is the principle absolute?

No. Traditional application of judicial privilege cannot be invoked to defeat a positive Constitutional duty.
Impeachment proceedings, being sui generis, Gonzales III v. Office of the President of the Philippines, et al.,
725 Phil. 380, 207 (2014), is a Constitutional process designed to ensure accountability of impeachable
officers, the seriousness and exceptional importance of which outweighs the claim of judicial privilege.

(115)Does the failure of the Clerk of Court to safe-keep court records, submit financial reports, and remit
collections is an act constitutive of grave misconduct?
Yes. It is stated under Section 14, Rules 136 of the ROC, "no record shall be taken from the clerk's office
without an order of the court except as otherwise provided by these rules.” Since the Clerk of Court is the
designated custodian of the court's properties, it is his responsibility to ensure that relevant rules are followed
for their proper safekeeping and organization. In addition, the OCA Circular Nos. 50-95 and 113-2004 and
Administrative Circular No. 35-2004 also provides that Clerks of Court have the responsibility to immediately
deposit with authorized government depositories their collections on various funds. The conduct required of
court personnel, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, must always be beyond reproach and
circumscribed with a heavy burden of responsibility. Respondent failed to perform with utmost diligence his
financial and administrative responsibilities. (OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. ALAUYA, A.M.
No. SCC-15-21-P; December 09, 2020)

(116)Can the Supreme Court review the finding of probable cause even if the trial court has already ruled
on the merits of the case?
No. Once the information has been filed before the courts, the dismissal, conviction, or acquittal of the accused
rests on their sound discretion; they are not bound by any change in the opinion of the prosecutor or his
superior regarding probable cause.

A petition for certiorari filed to assail the executive determination of probable cause (and the subsequent appeal
therefrom) becomes moot once an information has been filed before the court and a warrant of arrest has been
issued; more so if the trial court has already ruled on the merits of the criminal case. (Debuque v. Nilson, G.R.
No. 191718, May 10, 2021)

E. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
(117)What are the Constitutional Commissions defined by the Constitution?
 20

They are the Commission on Civil Service, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit
(Section 1, Art. IX-A, Constitution). They are declared independent by the Constitution.

(118)What are the independence safeguards of the Constitution with regard to the Chairmen and members
of constitutional commissions?
The following are the constitutional safeguards for independence of commissions as regards its members:
1. The Chairmen and members may not be re-appointed or appointed in an acting capacity
2. The Chairmen and members are subject to certain disqualifications calculated to strengthen their
integrity (CONST. Art. IX-A, Sec. 2).
3. The Commissions shall appoint their officials and employees in accordance with the law (CONST. Art.
IX-A, Sec. 3).
4. The salaries of the Chairmen and members are fixed by law and may not be decreased during
continuance in office (CONST. Art. IX-A, Sec 3; Art. XVIII, Sec. 17).
5. The Chairmen and members are given a long term of office of 7 years (CONST. Art. IX-B, C, and D, Sec.
1, Par. 2).
6. The Chairmen and members cannot be removed, except by impeachment (CONST. Art. XI, Sec 2).
7. The Commissions enjoy fiscal autonomy (CONST. Art. IX-A, Sec. 5).

POWERS, FUNCTIONS, AND JURISDICTION

(119)May the salaries of the members of the Constitutional Commissions be reduced during their tenure?
No. Under the Constitution, the salaries of the members are fixed by law and shall not be decreased during
their tenure. The rule is intended to promote their independence (sec. 3, Art IX-A, 1987 Constitution)

(120)What is the jurisdiction of Commission on Audit over government-owned and controlled corporations?
A corporation, whether with or without an original charter, is under the audit jurisdiction of the Commission on
Audit so long as the government owns or has controlling interest in it.
The Constitution vests in the Commission on Audit jurisdiction over "government-owned and controlled
corporations with original charters," as well "government-owned or controlled corporations" without original
charters. Government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters are subject to the Commission's
pre-audit, while government-owned or controlled corporations without original charters are subject to the
Commission's post-audit. Government-owned or controlled corporations without original charters refer to
corporations created under the Corporation Code but are owned or controlled by the government. The nature
or purpose of the corporation is not material in determining the Commission's audit jurisdiction. Neither is the
manner of creation of a corporation, whether under a general or special law. (Feliciano v. COA, G.R. No.
147402, January 14, 2004)

COMPOSITION AND QUALIFICATIONS OF MEMBERS

(121)What does the civil service embrace?

The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters (Sec. 2[1], Art. IX-B, 1987
Constitution).

(122)Who administers the Civil Service?

It is administered by the Civil Service Commission composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners.
(ALBANO Political Law Reviewer, p. 751)

(123)What are the qualifications of the Chairman and members of the Civil Service Commission?
They must:
1. be natural-born citizens of the Philippines;
2. be at least 35 years of age at the time of their appointment; and
3. not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately preceding their
appointment (Sec. 1[1], Art. IX-B, 1987 Constitution).

(124)How are the Chairman and Commissioners of the CSC appointed? What is their term of office?
 21

They are appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.Their term of office
is seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven (7)
years, a Commissioner for five (5) years and another Commissioner for three (3) years, without reappointment.

Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any
Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity (Sec.1[2], Art. IX-B, 1987 Constitution).

(125)What is the composition of the Comelec?

The Comelec is composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners. (ALBANO Political Law Reviewer, p. 763)

(126)What are the qualifications of the members of the Comelec?

The following are the qualifications of the members of the Comelec:
1. natural-born citizens of the Philippines;
2. at least 35 years of age at the time of their appointment;
3. holder of a college degree; and
4. must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. A
majority of the members, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years (Sec. 1, Art. IX-C, 1987 Constitution).

(127)How are the members of the Comelec appointed?

They are appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments (Sec. 1[2], Art IX-
C, 1987 Constitution).

(128)What is the term of office of the Chairman and the members of the Comelec?
The term of office of the members of the Comelec is seven (7) years without reappointment. Of those first
appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members
for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary capacity (Sec. 1[21, Art.
IX-C, 1987 Constitution; Brillantes v. Yorac, December 18, 1990).

(129)Who has the power to investigate and prosecute election offenses?

The COMELEC has the power to investigate and prosecute election offenses. It can, however, deputize the
fiscal to conduct preliminary investigation on election offenses and prosecute them. This power is
indispensable to the task of ensuring free, honest and orderly elections (People v.Basilla, 179 SCRA 87). If not
deputized, the fiscal has no power to assume the role of prosecutor of election offenses (People v. Inting, 187
SCRA 788, G.R. No. 88919; Kilosbayan, Inc., et al. v. Comelec, et al., 280 SCRA 892, G.R. No. 128054,
October 16, 1997).

(130)May the Supreme Court take cognizance of a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 to review an
interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC?
Yes. As an exception, the Supreme Court may take cognizance of a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 to
review an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC on the ground of the issuance being made
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it does not appear to be specifically provided under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that
the matter is one that the COMELEC en banc may sit and consider, or a Division is not authorized to act, or
the members of the Division unanimously vote to refer to the COMELEC en banc. Of necessity, the aggrieved
party can directly resort to the Court because the COMELEC en banc is not the proper forum in which the
matter concerning the assailed interlocutory order can be reviewed (Cagas v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 194139,
January 24, 2012).

PROHIBITED OFFICES AND INTERESTS

(131)What are the inhibitions on the members of the Constitutional Commissions?

Their inhibitions are the following:
1. They cannot hold any other office or employment;
 22

2. They cannot engage in the practice of any profession;

3. They cannot take part in the active management or control of any business which are affected by the
functions of their office; and
4. They shall not be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or
privilege granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including
government-owned or -controlled corporations (Sec. 2, Art. IX-A, 1987 Constitution).

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FINAL ORDERS, RESOLUTIONS, AND DECISIONS

(132)What is the remedy of an aggrieved party from a decision, order, or ruling rendered by the
Constitutional Commissions?
Art. IX-A, Sec. 7 of the Constitution states that "unless, otherwise provided by law, any decision, order, or ruling
of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty
days from receipt of a copy thereof"

Particularly, Rule 64, Sec. 2 of the Revised Rules of Court (ROC) provides that "(a] judgment or final order or
resolution of the COMELEC and the COA may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on
certiorari under Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided." The time for filing such petition must be within 30
days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed.

However, for decisions of the SC, a party may elevate such decision of the CSC within 15 days from notice
before the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court
(Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), Rule 13, Sec. 70).

What decisions of the Constitutional Commissions may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari?
The certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is limited to decisions rendered in actions or proceedings taken
cognizance of by the Commissions in the exercise of their adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. It does not
refer to purely executive powers such as those which relate to the COMELEC's appointing power (ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corporation v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133486, January 28, 2000)

(133)Can the court review the decisions rendered in the exercise of quasi-judicial functions?
Yes, the Supreme court can review decisions rendered by the Constitutional Commissions if there is a grave
abuse of discretion committed in the exercise of quasi-judicial powers and not those arising from the exercise
of its administrative functions. (Chavez v. COMELEC GR 105323, July 3, 1992)

Quasi-judicial function is a term which applies to the action, discretion, etc. of public administrative officers or
bodies, who are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw
conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. (Civil
Service Commission v. Magoyag, GR 197792, December 9, 2015)

(134)How about the decisions rendered in the exercise of the administrative functions?
No, only those awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of a quasi-judicial agency or body in the exercise
of its quasi-judicial functions are the subjects of an appeal under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. (Civil Service
Commission v. Magoyag, GR 197792, December 9, 2015)

II. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

A. CITIZENSHIP
(135)Who are the citizens of the Philippines under the 1987 Constitution?
Under the 1987 Constitution, the following are the citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law (CONST. Art. IV, Sec. 1).
 23

(136)What is the difference between naturalization and repatriation?

Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. On the other hand,
repatriation, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to:
1. Desertion of the armed forces;
2. Service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;
3. Service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time;
4. Marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
5. Political and economic necessity (Bengson III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No.
142840, May 7, 2001).

(137)What is the citizenship status of a foundling found in the Philippines and/or in Philippine embassies,
consulates and territories abroad?
A foundling found in the Philippines and/or in Philippine embassies, consulates and territories abroad is
presumed a natural-born Filipino citizen regardless of the status or circumstances of birth. As a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, a foundling is accorded with rights and protections at the moment of birth equivalent
to those belonging to such class of citizens whose citizenship does not need perfection or any further act. (R.A.
No. 11767, Section 5.)

Note: The presumption of natural-born status of a foundling may not be impugned in any proceeding unless
substantial proof of foreign parentage is shown. The natural- born status of a foundling shall not also be
affected by the fact that the birth certificate was simulated, or that there was absence of a legal adoption
process, or that there was inaction or delay in reporting, documenting, or registering a foundling. (R.A. No.
11767, Section 5.)

If the parentage of one foundling is established, and the foundling cannot acquire the citizenship of the parents
which will result in statelessness, the foundling shall retain Philippine citizenship until such time that it can be
established that the foundling is able to benefit from the citizenship of either parent. (R.A. No. 11767, Section
11, paragraph 2.)

B. BILL OF RIGHTS

DUE PROCESS

(138)What is the concept of due process of law?

It is a law that hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial. It
is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice (Ermita-Malate Hotel and
Motel Operators Assn. v. City of Manila, G.R. No. L-24693, 20 SCRA 849).

(139)What are some basic standards of due process?

Due process must not overrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. It must be free from
arbitrariness and it must be based on the sporting idea of fair play (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Assn. v.
City Mayor, 20 SCRA 849).

(140)What is the essence of due process?

Due process requires a hearing before conviction and before an impartial and disinterested tribunal. But due
process as a constitutional precept does not, always and in all situations, require a trial-type proceeding
(Zaldivar V. Gonzales, 166 SCRA 316 [1988]).

(141)What is the Doctrine of Void-for-Vagueness?

It holds that a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application (Sps. Romualdez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 167011, April 30, 2008).
 24

Void-for-vagueness doctrine can only be invoked against that species of legislation that is utterly vague on its
face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction (Celdran v. People, G.R.
No. 220127, November 21, 2018).

(142)What is Overbreadth Doctrine?

The overbreadth doctrine is a ground to declare a statute void when "it offends the constitutional principle that
a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms"
(Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 212140-41. January 21, 2015). Generally applied to statutes infringing
on the freedom of speech, the Overbreadth Doctrine applies when a statute needlessly restrains even
constitutionally guaranteed rights (White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, G.R. No. 122846, January 20,
2009).

It decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state
regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area
of protected freedoms (Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001).

(143)What is grave abuse of discretion?

Grave abuse of discretion exists when "an act is (1) done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence
or (2) executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias." It has been
described as follows: "Grave abuse of discretion" implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
as to he equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; in other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all
in contemplation of law. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Spouses De
Jesus, G.R. No. 221133, June 28, 2021).

(144)Is the right to due process waivable?

Yes. The right to be heard is as often waived as it is invoked, and validly so, as long as the party is given an
opportunity to be heard on his behalf. If he opts to be silent where he has a right to speak, he cannot later be
heard to complain that he was unduly silenced (Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc. V. CA, G.R. No. 88050, January
30, 1992).

(145)Does due process protect the property of a person only?

The protection afforded by the Constitution does not limit to the property alone. Property is more than the mere
thing which a person owns. It includes the right to acquire, use and dispose of it. Property consists of the free
use, enjoyment and disposal of a man's acquisitions without control and diminution save by the law of the land.
The Constitution protects these essential attributes (Blo Umpar Adiong v. Comelec, G.R. No. 103956, March
31, 1992).

(146)Complainant A seeks the disbarment of respondent B for violation of Administrative Matter No. 02-8-
13-SC or the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice (Notarial Rules) and the CPR. Acting on the respondent’s
Motion for Reconsideration, the IBP Board of Governors' (IBP BOG) issued a resolution imposing the
penalty of disqualification from being commissioned as notary public for two years. B claims that the
IBP violated his right to due process because the case was already submitted for resolution when it
came to his knowledge. He also insists that the IBP's resolution was solely based on A’s evidence as
the IBP did not act on his motion for reinvestigation.
The IBP duly notified him of the proceedings by sending the notices via registered mail to St. Dominic
Savio College of Law, where he used to teach and was the College Dean. Notably, upon being informed
of the notices, respondent B filed a Manifestation with Motion for Reinvestigation and a subsequent
Answer to Letter-Complaint Requesting for Formal Investigation dated September 22, 2015. He even
filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the IBP assailing the April 29, 2016 Resolution which was in
fact given due course by the IBP.
Was B’s right to due process violated?
No, B’s right to due process was not violated.
While respondent B claimed that the notices were not sent to his registered address of place of business, such
bare assertion deserves scant consideration as he failed to sufficiently prove that the service of notices was
highly irregular.
It is a settled rule that there is no denial of due process when a party has been given an opportunity to be
heard and to present his case. There is only denial of due process when there is total absence or lack of
 25

opportunity to be heard or to have one's day in court. The technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied
in administrative proceedings and administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its
strict judicial sense.

EQUAL PROTECTION

(147)A is a Chinese businessman who entered the Philippines to engages in the retail business. When the
Congress passed Republic Act 1180, or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act, it reserved to Filipinos the
right to engage in retail business. A contends that RA 1180 is unconstitutional as it violates his right
to the equal protection of the laws. Is A correct?
No. The equal protection of the law clause “”does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely
requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced””; and, that the equal protection clause “”is not infringed by legislation which
applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class,
and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who
do not.””

The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for
the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of
law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged
in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege. (Ichong v. Hernandez, G.R. No. L-7995, May 31,
1957).

(148)What is the purpose of constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures?
The purpose of the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures is to prevent violations of
private security in person and property, and unlawful invasion of the sanctity of the home, by officers of the law
acting under legislative or judicial sanction, and to give remedy against such usurpations when attempted
(People v. Pastrana, G.R. No. 196045, February 21, 2018).

ARREST, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

(149)What is the constitutional guarantee on the right of the people against unreasonable searches and
seizures?
The Constitution provides that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized" (Sec. 2, Article III,
1987 Constitution).

(150)What is the effect of a general warrant?

A general warrant is defined as a warrant that does not particularly describe the place and to be searched and
persons or things to be seized. The particularity of the place described is essential in the issuance of search
warrants to avoid the exercise by the enforcing officers of discretion to decide on their own where to search
and whom and what to seize. A general warrant is both proscribed by jurisprudence and the 1987 Constitution.
| (Diaz v. People, G.R. No. 213875, July 15, 2020)

(151)In support of his application for a search warrant before the RTC, PO2 submitted 2 sketches by
informant C of the house of B. The first was a floor plan of a studio type apartment and the second
sketch depicted three buildings one of which is marked X indicating B’s house. On the basis of the
application filed by PO2 and examination under oath of applicant PO2 upon the judge’s satisfaction
after examining under oath by searching questions and answers PO2 and informant C, that there exists
a probable cause for Violation of RA 9165 which has been committed and there is a good sufficient
reason to believe that B has possession and control of undetermined amount of shabu in her house,
a warrant was issued. B filed a Motion to Quash the Search Warrant on the ground that it was in nature
of a general warrant which failed to describe with particularity the place to be searched. B averred that
 26

her house number was not in the search warrant and it failed to distinguish petitioner’s unit intended
for the search. Was the Search Warrant a general warrant?
No. It would be unreasonable to expect PO2 and informant C to have extensive knowledge of the interior set-
up or floor plan of B's house without, however, having apparent authority or opportunity to access the premises
prior to the search. In this regard, the validity of the warrant must be assessed on the basis of the pieces of
information made available to the judge at the time PO2 applied for the issuance of the search warrant which,
in this case, were sufficiently supported by the sketches of informant C, and the testimonies of PO2 and C,
who were, in fact, personally examined by the judge in the form of searching questions and answers.
The requirement of particularity as to the things to be seized does not require technical accuracy in the
description of the property to be seized, and that a search warrant may be said to particularly describe the
things to be seized when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow it to be
described (Diaz v. People, G.R. No. 213875, July 15, 2020).

(152)Does the waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest carry the admissibility of evidence seized during the
illegal warrantless arrest?
No. The legality of an arrest only affects the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. The failure
of the accused to object to the validity of his arrest before arraignment has the effect of curing the defect in the
jurisdiction of the court but a waiver a waiver thereof does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of
evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. (People v. Racho, G.R. No. 186529 August 3, 2010)

(153)Is search while a bus or a plane is in transit valid?

Yes. The search of persons in a public place is valid because the safety of others may be put at risk. Given
the present circumstances, the Court takes judicial notice that public transport buses and terminals, just like
passenger ships and seaports, are in that category. Aside from public transport buses, any moving vehicle that
similarly accepts passengers at the terminal and along its route is likewise covered by these guidelines.

Hence, whenever compliant with this guideline, a routine inspection at the terminal or of the vehicle itself while
in transit constitutes a reasonable search. Otherwise, the intrusion becomes unreasonable, thereby triggering
the constitutional guarantee under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution (Sullano v. People (G.R. No. 232147,
June 08, 2020).

(154)Is the rule applicable if it is a private courier?

No. To emphasize, the guidelines for searching of persons in a public place do not apply to privately-owned
cars. Neither are they applicable to moving vehicles dedicated for private or personal use, as in the case of
taxis, which are hired by only one or a group of passengers such that the vehicle can no longer be flagged
down by any other person until the passengers on board alight from the vehicle .

In search of persons in a public place, the following guidelines should be observed:

1. As to the manner of the search, it must be the least intrusive and must uphold the dignity of the person
or persons being searched, minimizing, if not altogether eradicating, any cause for public
embarrassment, humiliation or ridicule.
2. Neither can the search result from any discriminatory motive such as insidious profiling, stereotyping and
other similar motives. In all instances, the fundamental rights of vulnerable identities, persons with
disabilities, children and other similar groups should be protected.
3. As to the purpose of the search, it must be contained to ensuring public safety.
4. As to the evidence seized from the reasonable search, courts must be convinced that precautionary
measures were in place to ensure that no evidence was planted against the accused. (Saluday v. People
(G.R. No. 215305. April 03, 2018)

(155)When is warrantless arrest valid? (ICH-BED-DE)

Warrantless arrests are valid under the following circumstances:
1. When caught In flagrante delicto – When person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense (RULES OF COURT, Rule 113, Sec. 5 (a));
2. In cases of Continuing offense – membership in organizations like NPA is a continuing offense, thus, a
person guilty thereof can be arrested anytime under the in flagrante delicto principle (Umil v. Ramos,
G.R. No. 79731, July 9, 1990);
3. Doctrine of Hot Pursuit – When an offense has just been committed and the arrestor has probable cause
to believe, based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested has
committed the crime offense (RULES OF COURT, Rule 113, Sec. 5 (b));
 27

4. Bondsmen may arrest the accused, or upon written authority endorsed on a certified copy of the
undertaking, cause him to be arrested by a police officer or any other person of suitable age and
discretion (RULES OF COURT, Rule 114, Sec. 23, par. (1));
5. If a person lawfully arrested Escapes or is rescued, any person may immediately pursue or retake him
without a warrant at any time and in any place within the Philippines (RULES OF COURT, RULE 113,
Sec. 13);
6. When a person to be arrested has escaped Detention facility (RULES OF COURT, Rule 113, Sec. 5 (c));
7. If the accused released on bail attempts to Depart from the Philippines without permission of the court
where the case is pending (RULES OF COURT, Rule 114, Sec. 23, par. (2)); and
8. Doctrine of Exigent Circumstances – under such urgency and exigency of the moment where a search
be lawfully dispensed with (People v. De Gracia, G.R. Nos. 102009-10, July 6, 1994).

(156)How is a Terry search different from a search incidental to a lawful arrest?

Searches incidental to a lawful arrest require that a crime be committed in flagrante delicto, and the search
conducted within the vicinity and within reach by the person arrested is done to ensure that there are no
weapons, as well as to preserve the evidence. On the other hand, "stop and frisk" searches are conducted to
prevent the occurrence of a crime (People v. Cogaed, G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014).

(157)Members of PNP in San Fernando, Bukidnon, established a checkpoint due to a gun ban. During the
checkpoint, they stopped U and asked for his motorcycle documents, which he failed to provide.
Suspicion arose, leading the police officers to ask U to open the compartment on his motor vehicle,
revealing bundles of marijuana totaling 248 grams. U is taken to a police station, interviewed, and the
marijuana is sent for testing. The RTC found U guilty of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, citing
his failure to prove ownership of the marijuana therefore, justifying the warrantless arrest. U argues
that his arrest was unlawful, violating his constitutional rights, and challenges the validity of the police
officers' actions. Was the warrantless arrest of petitioner Rolando Uy justified in this case?
Yes, the warrantless arrest in this case is a lawful warrantless arrest. The circumstances of the case involve a
lawful arrest made during a checkpoint search. The arrest was not solely due to the gun ban or a traffic violation.
Instead, it was based on U’s failure to present the required documents for his motorcycle during the routine
inspection at the checkpoint. This failure raised suspicions on the part of the police officers, leading to further
inquiry and the subsequent search of the motor vehicle. The arrest was conducted under the belief that U might
be committing a crime or that the motor vehicle itself could be involved in a crime. Lawful arrests can be made
without a warrant, particularly in situations where there is probable cause to believe that an offense is being
committed, has just been committed, or the individual is attempting to commit an offense. The arrest made in
this case was found to fall within the parameters of a justified warrantless arrest based on the circumstances
presented. (Uy y Sayan v. People, G.R. No. 217097, February 23, 2022)

PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS AND CORRESPONDENCE

(158)Does marriage diminish right to privacy of communication?

A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and
the constitutional protection is ever available to him to her. The law only insures absolute freedom of
communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or
against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be
examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the
other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions (Zulueta v. CA, G.R. No.107383, February 20, 1996).

FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION

(159)What does the guarantee of free speech protect?

The guarantee of free speech was enacted to protect not only polite speech, but even expression in its most
unsophisticated form. Criminal libel stands as a necessary qualification to any absolutist interpretation of the
free speech clause, if only because it prevents the proliferation of untruths which if unrefuted, would gain an
undue influence in the public discourse. But in order to safeguard against fears that the public debate might
be muted due to the reckless enforcement of libel laws, truth has been sanctioned as a defense, much more
 28

in the case when the statements in question address public issues or involve public figures (Ciriaco "Boy"
Guingguing V. CA, et al., G.R. No. 128959, September 30, 2005).

FREEDOM OF RELIGION

(160)To what extent is the freedom of religion guaranteed?

The freedom of religion is guaranteed to the extent that a person may -
1. worship God according to the dictates of his conscience;
2. not to worship God at all; and
3. entertain notions respecting his relationship with God;
4. exhibit sentiments in such form of worship not injurious to the equal rights of others;
5. prohibit any legislation for the support of religion because the State cannot establish a church, aid one,
aid all and participate in purely religious activities. (ALBANO Political law Reviewer, p. 282)

LIBERTY OF ABODE AND RIGHT TO TRAVEL

(161)Can the DOJ issue a Watch-List Order or HDO?

No. The right to travel may only be impaired by a law that concerns national security, public safety or public
health. There is no law particularly providing for the authority of the Secretary of Justice to curtail the exercise
of the right to travel, in the interest of national security, public safety or public health. DOJ Circular No. 41 is
not a law.

It is a compulsory requirement that there be an existing law, complete and sufficient in itself, conferring the
expressed authority to the concerned agency to promulgate rules. On its own, the DOJ cannot make rules, its
authority being confined to execution of laws (Genuino v. De Lima, G.R. No. 197930, April 17, 2018).

RIGHT TO INFORMATION

(162)What is the nature and concept of the right to information?

The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of
information in a democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public of the nation's problems, nor a
meaningful democratic decision making if they are denied access to information of general interest. Information
is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times.

The information to which the public is entitled to are those concerning "matters of public concern,” a term which
"embraces a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly
affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary Citizen. In the
final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case to case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest
or importance, as it relates to or affects the public (Legaspi v. CSC, 150 SCRA 530)

EMINENT DOMAIN

(163)On September 5, 1980, the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of petitioner RP, filed a Complaint for
Expropriation before the CFI (now RTC) of Dagupan City against respondents C and B, who are co-
owners of the subject property. Respondents opposed the valuation made by petitioner RP because it
was based on the 1974 tax declaration and not on the current fair market value for the year 1980 when
the Complaint for expropriation was filed. Petitioner RP contends that even if the taking is not reckoned
from its actual taking in 1947, the just compensation should be computed based on the filing of the
original Complaint in 1980 and not from the date of the filing of the Amended Complaint in 1989. It
avers that the Amended Complaint did not raise any new issue that would have warranted using the
date of the filing of said Amended Complaint as the reckoning date in the determination of just
compensation for the taking of the subject property.
 29

When should the just compensation be determined, from the filing of the original complaint or from
the filing of the amended complaint?

Just compensation should be determined from the filing of the original complaint. Evidently, there was no actual
taking in this case prior to the filing of the Complaint, thus, the time of taking should be reckoned from the filing
of the Complaint. Hence, the value of the property at the time of filing of the original Complaint on September
5, 1980, and not the filing of the Amended Complaint in 1989, should be considered in determining the just
compensation due to the respondents. Relevant herein is the ruling in National Power Corporation (NPC) v.
Tiangco, wherein NPC filed a complaint for expropriation on November 20, 1990 and then later on amended
the said complaint in 1993. The Court ruled that the landowners should be paid the value of the property as of
the time of the filing of the complaint which is deemed to be the time of taking of the property. (Republic v.
Castillo, G.R. No. 190453, February 26, 2020).

(164)What is the expansive concept of “public use”?

Public use, as an eminent domain concept has now acquired an expansive meaning to include any use that is
of “usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive of general benefit of the public” (Vda. De Ouano v.
Republic, G.R. No. 168770, February 9, 2011).

RIGHT TO ASSOCIATION

(165)What is the constitutional provision on the right of the people to form associations?
The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form associations, unions
or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged (Sec. 8, Art. III, 1987 Constitution).

(166)May employees of the government form unions? Why?

Yes. Under the Constitution, the right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees (Sec.
2[5], Art. IX-B, 1987 Constitution).

(167)Are government employees entitled to strike?

No, by reason of public policy. Public service would be impaired or imperiled if government employees can
strike (SSS Employees Assn. v. CA, 175 SCRA 686, G.R. No. 85279; Rep. V. CA, 180 SCRA 428, G.R. No.
87676; MPSTA v. Carino, G.R. No. 95445).

NON-IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACTS

(168)What is the contract that is protected by the non-impairment clause?

Only contracts which are legal and lawful are protected (Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323).

(169)When is there impairment of the obligation of contracts?

When a right is taken or when a person is deprived of the means for enforcing such right, there is impairment
(Gov't. v. Visayan Surety Ins. Co., 66 Phil. 326; Manila Trading Co. v. Reyes, 62 Phil. 461).

CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION

(170)When does a custodial investigation begin?

Investigation begins when it is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a
particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession
from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense (People v. Tan, G.R. No. 117321, February 11, 1998).
 30

(171)What is the exclusionary doctrine in relation to the violation of the rights of a person under custodial
investigation?
Any information or admission given by a person while in custody which may appear harmless or innocuous at
the time without the competent assistance of an independent counsel should be struck down as inadmissible.
It has been held, however, that an admission made to news reporters or to a confidant of the accused is not
covered by the exclusionary rule (People v. Bravo, G.R. No. 135562, November 22, 1999).

(172)How is a person’s right to counsel under custodial investigation (Sec. 12) different from one in a
criminal prosecution (Sec. 14)?
In custodial investigation, a person has the right to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice (CONST. Art. III, Sec. 12 (1)). In a criminal prosecution, the accused has the right to be heard by
himself and counsel (CONST. Art. III, Sec. 14 (2)). The preference in the choice of counsel pertains more aptly
and specifically to a person under investigation rather than one who is the accused in criminal prosecution
(Amion v. Chiongson, A.M. No. RTJ-97-1371, January 22, 1999). Thus, while the right of the accused to be
represented by counsel is immutable, his option to secure the services of counsel de parte, however, is NOT
absolute (People v. Serzo, G.R. No. 118435, June 20, 1997).

RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED

(173)Mrs. A was awakened in the middle of the night and witnessed his husband, Mr. B being repeatedly
stabbed while next to her. Mrs. A proceeded to the police station and executed a sworn statement, but
she does not know the name of the attacker, but she vividly remembered his face after having
witnessed the stabbing. The police acting on a tip invited C to the police station for an interview
regarding the killing, Mrs. A positively identified C as the person who stabbed her husband, it was only
at this point that she learned of C's name, C was arrested.
Was the appellant’s identification invalid and as such deprives him of his constitutional right to due
process?
No, the appellant identification was valid and admissible. Applying the totality of circumstances test, appellant's
out-of-court identification to be reliable and thus admissible. Here, the interval between the time A witnessed
the crime and her identification of the appellant, was merely a matter of hours, leaving no room for her
recollection to be tainted. Verily, it was A’s own description that led to the apprehension of the appellant. There
was no evidence on record indicating any hint of a suggestion from the police officer who presented the
appellant to A. Hence, the identification of the appellant as the culprit of the crime stands. (People v. Moreno
y Tazon, G.R. No. 191759 , [March 2, 2020])

(174)Can C raise the issue of the legality of his arrest for the first time on appeal?
No. Questions on arrest shall be made before arraignment and failure to object to the illegality of arrest
constitutes a waiver on the part of the accused. It is settled that any objection to the manner of arrest must be
opportunely raised before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. (People v. Moreno y
Tazon, G.R. No. 191759 , [March 2, 2020])

(175)When is bail a matter of right?

Bail is a matter of right under the following cases:
1. All criminal cases within the competence of the MeTC, MTC, or MCTC because these courts have no
jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment;
2. Prior to conviction by the RTC for any offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment; and
3. Prior to conviction by the RTC for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not strong (CONST. Art. III, Sec. 13; Enrile v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015).

(176)When is bail a matter of discretion?

Bail is a matter of discretion under the following cases:
1. Upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment; and
2. If the RTC has imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of the
circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as follows:
 31

a. That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated
by the circumstance of reiteration;
b. That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions
of his bail without valid justification;
c. That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
d. That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
e. That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal (Enrile
v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015).

(177)Differentiate right to speedy disposition of cases from the right to speedy trial.
While the rationale for both rights is the same, the right to speedy trial may only be invoked in criminal
prosecutions against courts of law. The right to speedy disposition of cases, however, may be invoked before
any tribunal, whether judicial or quasi-judicial. What is important is that the accused may already be prejudiced
by the proceeding for the right to speedy disposition of cases to be invoked (Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
Nos. 206438, 206458 & 210141-42, July 31, 2018).

(178)A complaint for Unlawful Appointment, defined and penalized under Article 244 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), was filed against A alleging that he appointed Atty. B as the Provincial Legal Officer of
the province despite knowing that he did not meet the minimum requirement of five (5) years in the
practice of law under Section 481 of the Local Government Code of 1991. Approximately 6 years had
elapsed from the time when the complaint-affidavit was filed to the time when the case was filed before
the Sandiganbayan. The prosecution offered no explanation regarding the delay in conducting the
preliminary investigation.
A seeks to reverse and set aside the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan on the ground that said court
gravely abused its discretion when it refused to dismiss the criminal case despite the fact that there
was undue and unjustifiable delay in the resolution of the said case in grave violation of her
constitutional right to due process and speedy disposition of the case against her.
Was there a violation of Perez's right to the speedy disposition of her case?
Yes, there was a violation of Perez’s right to the speedy disposition of her case.

The right to speedy disposition of cases enshrined in Section 16, Article III of the Constitution declares in no
uncertain terms that “all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial,
quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.” Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether that
right has been violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are as follows: (1) the length of delay;
(2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the
prejudice caused by the delay. Valid reasons for the delay identified and accepted by the Court include, but
are not limited to: (1) extraordinary complications such as the degree of difficulty of the questions involved, the
number of persons charged, the various pleadings filed, and the voluminous documentary and testimonial
evidence on record; and (2) acts attributable to the respondents.

In this case, approximately six years had elapsed from the time when the complaint-affidavit was filed before
the OPP-Antique to when the case was filed before the Sandiganbayan. It is not for the petitioner to ensure
that the wheels of justice continue to turn. Rather, it is for the State to guarantee that the case is disposed
within a reasonable period. Lastly, A was prejudiced by the inordinate delay in the conduct of the preliminary
investigation since it placed her in a situation of uncertainty. (Zaldivar-Perez v. First Division of the
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 204739, November 13, 2019)

(179)A offered B a job as a domestic helper in Malaysia. Upon their arrival in Malaysia, B was informed by
A that the job intended for her was no longer available. A promised B that the latter will have a job
upon B’s return to Malaysia. However, upon B's arrival at the Indonesian Airport, she was apprehended
by the police officers for carrying 2.6 kilograms of heroin inside her luggage. She was subsequently
convicted of drug trafficking with a penalty of death by firing squad.
The State filed a "Motion for Leave of Court to Take the Testimony of Complainant B by Deposition
Upon Written Interrogatories.” It averred that the taking of B's testimony through the use of deposition
upon written interrogatories is allowed under Rule 23 of the Revised Rules of Court because she is out
of the country and will not be able to testify personally before the court due to her imprisonment. A,
on the other hand, objected arguing that such a method of taking testimony will violate their right to
confront the witness, B, or to meet her face to face as provided under Section 14(2) of the 1987
Constitution.
 32

Was there a violation of the constitutional right to confrontation of a witness when B’s testimony
through the use of deposition upon written interrogatories was permitted?
No, the deposition by written interrogatories will not infringe the constitutional right to confrontation of a witness
of A.

The terms and conditions laid down by the trial court ensure that they are given ample opportunity to cross-
examine Mary Jane by way of written interrogatories so as not to defeat the first purpose of their constitutional
right. The second purpose of the constitutional right to confrontation has likewise been upheld. As aptly stated
in the terms and conditions for the taking of deposition, the trial court judge will be present during the conduct
of written interrogatories on Mary Jane. This will give her ample opportunity to observe and to examine the
demeanor of the witness closely.

The right to confrontation of a witness is one of the fundamental basic rights of an accused. It is ingrained in
our justice system and guaranteed by no less than the 1987 Constitution as stated under its Article III, Section
14(2). The right to confrontation is part of due process not only in criminal proceedings but also in civil
proceedings as well as in proceedings in administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers. It has a two-fold
purpose: (1) primarily, to afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony of the witness by cross-
examination; and (2) secondarily, to allow the judge to observe the deportation of the witness. (People v.
Sergio, G.R. No. 240053, October 9, 2019)

(180)There was a procurement of fertilizer by the City Government of Surigao without public bidding. The
COA investigated the transaction and found that there was an overpricing. The Ombudsman filed
charges against the government officers involved, but the case was not filed in court until 11 years
later. The government officers argued that their right to speedy disposition of cases had been violated,
and the Supreme Court agreed, dismissing the case. Was the respondents’ right to speedy disposition
of cases under the Constitution of the Philippines violated when the COA investigation happened in
2006 while the filing of the Information before the Sandiganbayan occurred in 2017?
Yes, the respondents’ right to speedy disposition of cases were violated. The Constitution guarantees every
person's right to speedy disposition of cases. The prosecution failed to prove that the delay in this case was
inevitable because of the peculiar circumstances of each specific case. The OMB failed to show that this
specific procurement of fertilizer had peculiar circumstances to make delay inevitable. Records show that the
instant case involves only one transaction: the procurement of fertilizer that was paid in two tranches. There is
also no allegation that respondents here conspired with other government officials involved in the other
Fertilizer Fund Scam cases elsewhere in the country. Hence, for the Court, the delay was unreasonable.
(People v. Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division), G.R. No. 239878, February 28, 2022)

(181)Where may the right against self-incrimination be invoked? (CC-APP)

The right may be invoked in the following cases:
1. Criminal cases;
2. Civil actions;
3. Administrative cases/proceedings (Rosete v. Lim, G.R. No. 136051, June 8, 2006; Secretary of Justice
v. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, January 18, 2000);
4. In a Proceeding that can result in the loss of the privilege to practice a Profession (Pascual, Jr. v. Board
of Medical Examiners, G.R. No. L-25018,
5. May 26, 1969); or
6. In a Proceeding which may result in forfeiture of Property (Cabal v. Kapunan, G.R. No. L-19052,
December 29, 1962).

RIGHTS AGAINST EXCESSIVE FINES, AND CRUEL AND INHUMAN

PUNISHMENTS

(182)What are the provisions of the Constitution against the imposition of excessive, cruel or inhuman
punishment?
1. Excessive fines shall not be imposed nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall
death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress
hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua
(Note: Death penalty has been abolished by virtue of R.A. 9346).
2. The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee or
the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by
law (Sec. 19, Art. III, 1987 Constitution).
 33

(183)What is the concept of cruel or unusual punishment?

A punishment is cruel or unusual or disproportionate to the nature of the offense if it is barbarous, unknown to
law, or wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community
(Legarda v. Valdez, 1 Phil. 146). That the penalty is out of proportion to the crime does not warrant the
declaration of unconstitutionality of the law on the ground that it is cruel or unusual. The fact that the
punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel or unusual. In People v. Dela Cruz, 92
Phil. 906, it was said that it is the form of punishment as fixed in antiquity and not the severity of the same that
makes it cruel and unusual penalty. Likewise, in People v. Puda, 133 SCRA 1, it was said that punishment is
cruel when it involves torture or lingering death.

NON-IMPAIRMENT FOR DEBTS

(184)Has B.P. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law, transgressed the constitutional inhibition
against imprisonment for debt?
No. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a
check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which
the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law
is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation.
Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes
the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. (Lozano v. Martinez, G.R. No.
L-63419, December 18, 1986).

WRITS OF HABEAS CORPUS, KALIKASAN, HABEAS DATA AND AMPARO

(185)What is a citizen suit?

Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or generations yet unborn, may file an action
to enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue
an order which shall contain a brief description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all
interested parties to manifest their interest to intervene in the case within 15 days from notice thereof. The
plaintiff may publish the order once in a newspaper of a general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all
affected barangays copies of said order (Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, A. M. No. 09-6-8-SC,
Rule 2, Sec. 5).

(186)M was informed that her son, J, was arrested and detained in the house of a barangay tanod. Later on,
M went to the barangay hall, however, J was already released from custody of the barangay as evidence
of Johnson’s signature in the barangay blotter. Thereafter, M went to the Northern Police District (NPD)
to report that her son is missing. An investigation was conducted but was later on terminated due to
lack of witnesses. Rumors circulated in their barangay that J had been extrajudicially killed which
prompted Morada to institute a petition for issuance of writ of amparo before the RTC. The RTC held
that there is no enforced disappearance since there is no showing of any refusal on the part of
respondents to acknowledge or to give information on J’s whereabouts such that there is no intention
to remove him from protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. Was there an enforced
disappearance?
No. There was no enforced disappearance.
The elements of enforced disappearance under RA No. 9851 are as follows:
1. There must be an arrest, detention, abduction, or any form of deprivation of liberty.
2. The deprivation of liberty must be carried out by, or with the authorization, support, or acquiescence of
the State or political organization.
3. The State or political organization must refuse to acknowledge or give information on the fate or
whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition.
 34

4. The intention for such refusal is to remove the person from the protection of the law for a prolonged
period of time.

In this case, M failed to show that the State or political organization refused to acknowledge or give information
on the fate or whereabouts of her son, J. M herself admitted that she was informed by the barangay hall that J
was released from detention the same day he was captured. The NPD also investigated J’s disappearance,
but the investigation was terminated due to the lack of witnesses. (Morada v. Rias, G.R. No. 222226, February
14, 2022)

C. SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

CONCEPT OF SOCIAL JUSTICE

(187)What is the concept of social justice?

Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but the humanization of laws
and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively
secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the
people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the
competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the
interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally
justifiable, or extra- constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments
on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex (Calalang v. Williams, G.R. No. 47800, December
2, 1940).

D. EDUCATION, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ARTS, CULTURE AND

SPORTS

ACADEMIC FREEDOM

(188)Upon whom does the Constitution grant academic freedom? What does it comprise and what are
subsumed in it?
Section 1(2), Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher learning academic freedom.
This institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and
objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the
overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. The essential freedoms subsumed in the term "academic
freedom" encompass the freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds:
1. Who may teach;
2. What may be taught;
3. How it shall be taught; and
4. Who may be admitted to study.

III. NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY

A. Regalian Doctrine
(189)What is the Regalian Doctrine?
 35

The Regalian Doctrine or Jura Regalia is the universal feudal theory that all lands were held from the Crown.
All lands not otherwise clearly appearing to be privately owned are presumed to belong to the State (Cariño v.
Insular Government, 212 U.S. 449, February 23, 1909).

It is embodied in the 1987 Constitution, which provides that “All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests, or timber, wildlife, flora
and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all
other natural resources shall not be alienated” (CONST. Art. XII, Sec. 2).

(190)What are the goals of the national economy as provided for in the Constitution?
The following are the goals of the national economy:
1. A more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth;
2. Sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the
people; and
3. An expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the underprivileged
(Sec. 1, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution).

B. Public Trust Doctrine

(191)What is the import of the Public Trust Doctrine?
The people are the ultimate owners of the country's resources, over which the State is a trustee, a subservient
manager, a mere nominal holder. The Doctrine enjoins all public service providers that earn their keep primarily
through paychecks funded by the people, in the strict compliance of the regulatory laws relevant to them. The
public is regarded as the beneficial owner of trust resources, and courts can enforce the public trust doctrine
even against the government itself. (Maynilad Water Services v. Secretary of DENR, G.R. No. 202897, August
6, 2019)

(192)What is the basis of the Public Trust Doctrine?

The doctrines of jura regalia, police power, and parens patriae. While the Regalian doctrine is state ownership
over natural resources, police power is state regulation through legislation, and parens patriae is the default
state responsibility to look after the defenseless, there remains a limbo on a flexible state policy bringing these
doctrines into a cohesive whole, enshrining the objects of public interest, and backing the security of the people,
rights, and resources from general neglect, private greed, and even from the own excesses of the State. The
void is filled through the Public Trust Doctrine (Maynilad Water Services v. Secretary of DENR, G.R. No.
202897, August 6, 2019).

(193)What is the framework underlying the Public Trust Doctrine?

In this framework, a relationship is formed — "the[s]tate is the trustee, which manages specific natural
resources — the trust principal — for the trust principal — for the benefit of the current and future generations
— the beneficiaries." (Maynilad Water Services v. Secretary of DENR, G.R. No. 202897, August 6, 2019).

(194)What is the implication of water management as a public trust?

Since the Public Trust Doctrine speaks of an imposed duty upon the State and its representative of continuing
supervision over the taking and use of appropriated water, parties who acquired rights in trust property only
hold these rights subject to the trust and, therefore, could assert no vested right to use those rights in a manner
harmful to the trust.

In the same manner that the right to distribute water was granted by the State via utility franchises, under
express statutory regulation through its delegated representative, the MWSS. The State conferred the
franchise to concessionaires, working under the firm belief that they shall serve as protectors of the public
interest and the citizenry. In this regard, water rights must be secured to achieve optimal use of water
resources, its conservation, and its preservation for allocative efficiency. For this purpose, water users who are
subject to regulation by the State or by its own franchise must obtain permits and comply with the sanctions
imposed on them. Thus, the state can re-evaluate prior allocations and must act to preserve the right of present
and future generations (Maynilad Water Services v. Secretary of DENR, G.R. No. 202897, August 6, 2019)
 36

(195)Distinguish imperium from dominium.

Imperium is embraced in sovereignty; while dominium is the capacity of a State to own or acquire
properties.Imperium is the power to govern. Dominium is used with respect to land owned or held by the State
in its proprietary capacity.

C. Exploration, Development, and Utilization of Natural Resources

(196)Who has the power to explore, develop and utilize the natural resources?
It is the State. The Constitution provides that the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources
shall be under the full control and supervision of the State (Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution).

(197)May the State takeover or direct the operation of privately-owned public utilities?
Yes. The Constitution provides that in times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the
State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct
the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest (Sec. 17, Art. XII,
Constitution).

(198)May the State establish and operate vital industries?

Yes, provided it is in the interest of national welfare or defense (Sec. 18, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution).

D. Acquisition, Ownership, and Transfer of Public and Private Lands

(199)Which of the lands of the public domain may be alienated?
Only agricultural lands may be alienated. The Constitution provides that with the exception of agricultural lands,
all other natural resources shall not be alienated (Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution).

(200)May private corporations or associations hold alienable lands?

Yes. They may hold alienable lands by lease for a period of 25 years, renewable for another 25 years but not
to exceed 1,000 hectares (Sec. 3, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution).

(201)How many hectares of land may citizens of the Philippines lease or acquire by purchase, homestead
or grant?
Citizens of the Philippines may lease alienable lands not more than 500 hectares, or acquire not more than 12
hectares by purchase, homestead or grant (Sec. 3, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution).

(202)Can a foreigner, by way of implied trust, own a lot in the Philippines?

No. Section 7, Article XII, 1987 Constitution is clear on the right of Filipinos to own lands in the Philippines to
the exclusion of foreigners: “Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain.” An implied trust is not a mode of legal succession, and there is no implied trust if the enforcement of
the trust would be against law or public policy. (Gaw v. Chua, G.R. No. 206404, February 14, 2022)

(203)President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order (EO) No. 30 revoking Manila International Ports
Terminal Inc’s (MIPTI) franchise, and on the same day, Philippine Ports Authority took over MIPTI’s
business operations, facilities, and properties. Then, the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) placed
another private domestic corporation to take over the operation of the MIPTI. As such, MIPTI filed an
action for damages against PPA for violation of its rights to due process of law and non-impairment of
contract when it recommended the revocation of its franchise without first investigating or inquiring
on the complaints of port users. MIPTI also argued that based on their MOA, PPA can revoke or cancel
the franchise provided that there is notice and hearing. On the other hand, PPA asserts that the
cancellation of MIPTI’s franchise was valid because of breach of its contractual undertaking and that
that under the MOA, it was not required to make an investigation before recommending the cancellation
of the franchise since either Presidential Decree No. 1284 or the MOA did not provide for it. Is the
seizure of MIPTI’s private properties and the revocation of its franchise valid?
No, MIPTI’s properties were unjustly seized. PPA immediately took over MIPTI’s business operations, facilities
and properties. MIPTI was not given sufficient notice since EO No. 30, which is a legislative act, was not
 37

published. The immediate control of PPA over MIPTI’s operations was evident that there is a predetermined
plan to oust MIPTI from business. The Court held that in seizure, there must be proper notice and that the
party must be given the opportunity to explain and raise their arguments before there was an actual takeover.
This is aligned to the constitutional right of due process.

While the power to repeal a franchise is broad and plenary, it cannot be exercised arbitrarily or on a whim. The
Constitution expressly limits such power in that its exercise must be necessitated by "common good" or "public
interest." A franchise cannot be revoked or forfeited without due process of law. In our jurisdiction, a franchise
is broadly defined as a special privilege that is not demandable as a matter of right, and when granted, is
subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by Congress.

The revocation of MIPTI’s franchise was unconstitutional as it was done without regard to the rudiments of fair
play and the standard of freedom from arbitrariness. Under the MOA between the MIPTI and PPA, the latter
has the power to recommend the revocation of the former’s franchise, however, there must be a justification
or proof presented. It is undisputed that PPA did not conduct any investigation on the alleged complaints
against MIPTI. (Manila International Ports Terminal, Inc. v. Philippine Ports Authority, G.R. Nos. 196199 &
196252, December 7, 2021)

E. Practice of Professions
(204)Who may practice his/her profession in the Philippines?
The practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens, save in cases prescribed
by law (Sec. 14[2], Art. XII, 1987 Constitution).

IV. LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS

A. LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS

GENERAL PRINCIPLES
(205)What makes a public officer different from a public employee?
The most important characteristic which distinguishes an office from an employment or contract is that the
creation and conferring of an office involves a delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions
of government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public; that some portion of the sovereignty of the
country, either legislative, executive or judicial, attaches, for the time being, to be exercised for the public
benefit. Unless the powers conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a public officer (Laurel v. Desierto,
G.R. No. 145368, April 12, 2002).

(206)Why is a public office a public trust?

It is so because public officers are servants of the people. They are not rulers. Under the Constitution,
sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them (Sec. 1, Art. II, 1987
Constitution).

The Constitution provides that "public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times
be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives" (Article VI, Sec. 1, Constitution; Antonio v. Villa, G.R. No. 144694,
March 28, 2005; Amil v. COA, et al., G.R. No. 176172, October 20, 2012).

MODES OF ACQUIRING TITLE TO PUBLIC OFFICE

(207)What is the difference between permanent and temporary appointees as to the enjoyment of security
of tenure?
Permanent appointees cannot be removed without cause. On the other hand, one who holds a temporary
appointment has no fixed tenure of office; his employment can be terminated at the pleasure of the appointing
power, there being no need to show that the termination is for cause (Ong v. Office of the President, G.R. No.
 38

184219, January 30, 2012). It is also provided under the law that a temporary appointment shall not exceed
twelve months, and the appointee may be replaced sooner if a qualified civil service eligible becomes available
(REV. ADM. CODE, Book V, Title 1-A, Sec. 27, par. (2)).

(208)Under what circumstances may an appointive officer be allowed to hold any other office in the
government?
An appointed officer may hold another position in the government or any of its subsidiaries, including
government-owned or -controlled corporations if the law allows the same or when allowed by the primary
functions of his office. ([Sec. 7[2], Art. IX-B, 1987 Constitution; Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,
G.R. No. 83896).

(209)May an elective or appointive officer receive double compensation?

Yes, provided it is specifically authorized by law. Under the Constitution, no elective or appointive public officer
or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law.
Under the Constitution, no elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or
indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law (Sec. 8, Art. IX-B, 1987 Constitution).

(210)May a public officer receive any present, emolument or title from any foreign government?
Yes, provided the receipt is with the consent of the Congress. The Constitution provides that no elective or
appointive public officer or employee shall accept without the consent of the Congress, any present,
emolument, office or title of any kind from any foreign government (Sec. 8, Art.IX-B, 1987 Constitution).

DISABILITIES AND INHIBITIONS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

(211)Who are disqualified from holding a public office?

The following persons are disqualified from holding public office:
1. A person convicted in an impeachment proceeding may be disqualified from holding any office under the
Republic of the Philippines (CONS. Art. XI, Sec. 3, Par. (7));
2. One who suffers from perpetual special disqualification is ineligible to run for public office (Aratea v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 195229, October 9, 2012);
3. A defeated candidate may not be appointed or re-appointed to any office in the Government or any
government-owned or controlled corporation or in any of its subsidiaries within one year from the date of
the election (CONS. Art. IX, B, Sec. 6);
4. Dual citizens may not qualify for election or appointment to public office without renouncing their foreign
citizenships (R.A. 9225, Sec. 5);
5. Dual citizens are disqualified from running for any elective local position
(Chua v. COMELEC,G.R. No. 216607, April 5, 2016);

RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

(212)What are the rights and privileges of public officers?
The rights and privileges of public officers are:
1. Right to hold office, which is the just and legal claim to enjoy the powers and responsibilities (Paredes v.
Manebad, L-36927, April 25, 1974);
2. Security of tenure, which is granted to civil service employees. No public officer can be removed without
cause;
3. Compensation. The basis is a public officer's legal title to the office. The law attaches the compensation
to the position. If there is no compensation, attached to the office, and the public officer accepted it, he is
not entitled to recover as he is presumed to have accepted it without pay. (ALBANO, Political Law
Reviewer, p. 1159)

ILLEGAL DISMISSAL, REINSTATEMENT, AND BACK SALARIES

(213)Why is an illegally dismissed government employee entitled to back pay and benefits?
 39

An illegally dismissed government employee who is later ordered reinstated is entitled to back wages and other
monetary benefits from the time of his illegal dismissal up to his reinstatement, because he is considered as
not having left his office and should be given a comparable compensation at the time of his reinstatement
(Gabriel v. Domingo, G.R. No. 87420, September 17, 1990).

DE FACTO AND DE JURE OFFICERS

(214)Who is a de jure public officer?
He is one who has a lawful right or title to the office in all respects. (Lina v. Rodriguez, 37 Phil. 191).

(215)Who is a de facto public officer?

He is one who has no legal title to the office, but in actual possession of the same, under a colorable title. He
is not a good officer in point of law. (ALBANO, Political Law Reviewer, p. 1161)

(216)Are the acts of de facto officers valid?

Yes, acts of de facto officers are valid insofar as the public is concerned. This is so by reason of public policy.
The people cannot always inquire as to the authority of a public officer.

But with respect to himself, his acts are not valid against him. He cannot use it as a defense or weapon to
secure the fruit of the usurpation. If he is sued for his acts he Cannot use the de facto nature as defense.
(ALBANO, Political Law Reviewer, p. 1161)

(217)What happens to the salary received by the de facto officer during the time of wrongful tenure?
The general rule is that the rightful incumbent may recover from a de facto officer the salary received by the
latter during the time of wrongful tenure even though the latter is in good faith and under color of title (Monroy
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-23258, July 1, 1967).

In case there is no de jure officer claiming the office, the de facto officer is entitled to salaries for the period
when he actually discharged functions. (Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, February
22, 1991)

TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL RELATION

(218)Distinguish between term and tenure.

Term means the time during which the officers may claim to hold the office as a matter of right and fixes the
interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The term of office is not affected by the
hold-over.

On the other hand, tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds the offices. Tenure
may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent (Memo, et al. V. Angelus,
76 Phil. 12).

(219)What are the modes of terminating official relationship?

The modes of terminating official relationship are:
1. Expiration of term or tenure;
2. Reaching the age limit;
3. Resignation;
4. Recall;
5. Removal;
6. Abandonment;
7. Acceptance of incompatible position;
8. Abolition of office;
9. Prescription of right to office;
10. Impeachment;
11. Death;
12. Failure to assume elective office within six (6) months from proclamation (Sec. 11, B.P. Blg. 881);
13. Conviction of a crime; and
 40

14. Filing of certificate of candidacy for those candidates holding appointive office or position (Sec. 66, B.P.
Blg. 881).

(220)B, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, was declared by the Senate unfit to hold his position and
removed him from his office on the ground of his non-disclosure of his SALN. B’s health declined
which led to his death. Necessarily, the criminal charges against him were dismissed. B’s spouse prays
for the grant of post-employment and survivorship benefits arguing that the impeachment merely
divested B’s political capacity as Chief Justice. On the other hand, the Office of the Chief Attorney
(OCAt) posits that the removal cannot be considered tantamount to resignation by reason of incapacity
to discharge duties of the office he held. Hence, the OCAt recommended the denial of B’s spouse
claims for the release of her late husband’s retirement benefits and survivorship pensions. Does B’s
removal from public office constitute involuntary retirement and therefore entitled to the benefits
provided for in the Retirement Law?
Yes. An impeached public officer whose civil, criminal, or administrative liability was not judicially established
may be considered involuntarily retired from service, without forfeiture of his retirement benefits and other
allowances. Retirement laws are liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be
benefited, and all doubts are resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve their humanitarian purpose. (RE:
LETTER OF MRS. MA. CRISTINA ROCO CORONA REQUESTING THE GRANT OF RETIREMENT AND
OTHER BENEFITS TO THE LATE FORMER CHIEF JUSTICE RENATO C. CORONA AND HER CLAIM FOR
SURVIVORSHIP PENSION AS HIS WIFE UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9946, A.M. No. 20-07-10-SC;
January 12, 2021)
THE CIVIL SERVICE

(221)On March 6, 1998, Republic Act 8551 was enacted transferring the power to administer and conduct
entrance and promotional examinations of police officers from the Civil Service Commission (CSC) to
the National Police Commission (NPC) on the basis of the standards set by the latter. On March 8, 2001,
after an investigation conducted by the CSC, Police Officer X was charged with dishonesty for allegedly
allowing another person to take, on his behalf, the Police Officer I Examination held on March 29, 1998.
Petitioner filed for a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the CSC has been divested of its authority
and jurisdiction to conduct entrance examination or promotional examination to the members of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) by virtue of RA 8551. Rule on the motion to dismiss.
The motion to dismiss filed by Petitioner X should be denied. Section 28, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service
Rules and Regulations provides that: “The Commission shall have original disciplinary jurisdiction over all its
officials and employees and over all cases involving civil service examination anomalies or irregularities.” The
CSC, as the central personnel agency of the government, has jurisdiction to take cognizance of cases involving
examination anomalies and irregularities which the commission itself administered. Furthermore, despite the
fact that the CSC had no authority to administer entrance and promotional examinations for police officers, this
did not divest the CSC of its jurisdiction to investigate on the veracity of the facts stated by a civil servant in his
or her Personal Data Sheet. (MELVIN SAN FELIX v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, G.R. Nos. 198404;
October 14, 2019)

ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

(222)What is the Arias Doctrine?

All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good faith of those
who perform functions within their power of control or supervision, such as specific clerical or administrative
tasks, or even limited exercises of discretion (Arias v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 81563, December 19, 1989).

The mere fact that a public officer is the head of an agency does not necessarily mean that he is the party
ultimately liable for administrative acts or omissions of their subordinates (Albert v. Gangan, G.R. No. 126557,
March 6, 2001). When infraction consists in the reliance in good faith, albeit misplaced, by a head of office on
a subordinate upon whom the primary responsibility rests, absent a clear case of conspiracy, the Arias doctrine
must be held to prevail (Magsuci v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-101545, January 3, 1995).

(223)What is the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency (Alter Ego Principle)?

 41

The acts of the Secretaries of the departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business
are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the President, presumptively the acts of the President (Carpio v.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 96409, February 14, 1992).

(224)When can a public officer be held liable for the wrongful acts or omissions of another public officer?
Generally, a head of a department or a superior officer shall not be civilly liable for the wrongful acts, omissions
of duty, negligence, or misfeasance of his subordinates. However, he can be held liable when he has actually
authorized by written order the specific act or misconduct complained of (REV. ADM. CODE, Book I, Sec. 38,
par. (3)).

(225)Can a public official holding a supervisory position be held liable for the acts or omissions of his
subordinate?
Yes. A public official can be charged with gross neglect of duty or gross negligence which pertains to
"negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, or by acting or omitting to act in a situation where
there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to the
consequences, insofar as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care [which] even inattentive
and thoughtless men never fail to give to their own property." In cases involving public officials, there is gross
negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable.

It is the responsibility of public officials to supervise his subordinates and to make sure that they perform their
respective functions in accordance with the law. (CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. BERAY, G.R. Nos. 191946
& 191974; December 10, 2019).

(226)How do nonfeasance, malfeasance, and misfeasance differ from each other?

Nonfeasance is the neglect or refusal to perform an act which is the officer's legal obligation to perform.
Malfeasance means the doing, through ignorance, inattention or malice, of an act which he had no legal right
to perform.
Misfeasance is the failure to use that degree of care, skill and diligence required in the performance of official
duty. (ALBANO Political Law Reviewer, p. 1153)

(227)A held the position of Secretary in the Passport Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs.
Complaint-affidavit from B was filed before the CSC alleging that C married A in February 1997 while
being married to B. Because of C's second marriage while in an existing marriage, B filed a criminal
case for Bigamy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). A and C were convicted for the crime of Bigamy.
Through a formal charge, the CSC indicted A for the administrative offense of Conviction of a Crime
involving Moral Turpitude. The CSC found A guilty of the administrative offense and meted the penalty
of dismissal from service along with imposable accessory penalties. A filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied and affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA). Was the imposition of the
penalty of dismissal proper?
Yes, the dismissal was proper. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal from the service of a A on the ground
of being guilty of a crime involving moral turpitude. The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service clearly stated that the offense of Conviction of a Crime Involving Moral Turpitude is punishable with
dismissal from service upon first commission. It is expected that a public servant shall at all times exhibit the
highest sense of discipline and integrity not only in the performance of duties, but also in the personal and
private dealings with people. (ROSA C. GONZALBO-MACATANGAY VS. HONORABLE CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION G.R. No. 239995; June 15, 2022)

(228)A, an on-the-job trainee working in the City Government Employees Cooperative, filed a complaint
against B, Records Officer IV in the Council Secretariat and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the
City Government Employees Cooperative, for Sexual Harassment. The complaint was addressed to the
Mayor C and was endorsed to the Personnel Complaints and Ethics Board of the City. Thereafter,
Mayor C created the committee to implement the Anti-sexual Harassment Act of 1995. The committee
recommended to Mayor C to file a formal charge against B for sexual harassment and place under
preventive suspension. The Office of the City Mayor issued the recommended formal charge and order.
B filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration before the committee to recall the charge and order. B
then alleged that since only the Vice-Mayor, not the mayor, has the sole power to appoint officials and
employees of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, the Vice-Mayor then has the sole power of removal, in
accordance with the Local Government Code of 1991. Does the Mayor have the authority to take an
action to remove an official that was appointed by the Vice-Mayor when the rule that the power to
remove is inherent to the power to appoint exists?
 42

Yes, the Mayor has the authority to take an action to remove an official that was appointed by the Vice-Mayor
even when the rule is the power to remove is inherent to the power to appoint exists. The power to remove is
impliedly included in the power to appoint except when such power to remove is expressly vested by law (in
this case, the Local Government Code of 1991 and the Charter of Valenzuela City) in an office or authority
other than the appointing power. In short, the general rule is that power to appoint carries with it the power to
discipline. The exception is when the power to discipline or to remove is expressly vested in another office or
authority.
In this case, there is a clear contrary statutory provision expressed in Section 8(b)(1)(jj) of RA 8526
or the Charter of the City. The section specifically provides that the city mayor has the duty to ensure
that the city's executive officials and employees faithfully discharge their duties and functions, and
cause to be instituted administrative or judicial proceedings against any city official or employee who
may have committed an offense in the performance of his official duties. (SHERWIN GATCHALIAN V.
ROMEO URRUTIA, G.R. No. 223595; March 16, 2022)

(229)Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) awarded the contract for the supply of finished banknotes with a
French Firm. A was tasked by the BSP to travel to France as its representative to ensure that the quality
of the printed sheets conformed to the BSP’s prescribed specifications for the 100-peso and 1000-
Peso denominations. It was because of A’s length of service and experience that he was chosen.
Unfortunately, it was discovered that the surname of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the
100-Peso outsourced notes was misspelled as "Arrovo'' instead of "Arroyo." BSP charged A with gross
neglect of duty and was dismissed from service. A filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that his
length of service be considered as a mitigating circumstance when the offense is grave or serious. Is
A’s contention correct?
No, A’s length of service should not be considered as a mitigating circumstance. Length of service cannot be
considered as a mitigating circumstance when the offense committed is found to be serious. It is “not a magic
word that, once invoked, will automatically be considered as a mitigating circumstance in favor of the party
invoking it. (BSP v. Bool, G.R. No. 207522, April 18, 2021)

(230)A contends that dismissal is not warranted in his case as this was his first offense. Is A correct?
Under Section 52 (A) (2), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (Uniform
Rules), gross neglect of duty is a grave offense. The Uniform Rules prescribe the penalty of dismissal from
service for gross neglect of duty even if committed for the first time. Even if it was B’s first offense, Section
52(A)(2), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules and Section 46 (A) (2), Rule 10 of the Revised Rules provides that gross
neglect of duty is punishable by dismissal even if committed for the first time. (BSP v. Bool, G.R. No. 207522,
April 18, 2021)

(231)May a local elective officer be suspended preventively within 90 days prior to a local election?
No, because the law mandates that no preventive suspension shall be imposed within 90 days prior to a local
election. If preventive suspension has been imposed prior to the 90-day period immediately preceding a local
election, it shall be deemed automatically lifted upon the start of the aforesaid period (Sec. 62[c], R.A. No.
7160).

(232)Who may impose preventive suspension?

Preventive suspension may be imposed:
1. By the President, if the respondent is an elective official of a province, a highly-urbanized or an
independent component city;
2. By the Governor, if the respondent is an elective official of a component city or municipality; or
3. By the Mayor, if the respondent is an elective official of the barangay (Sec. 63[a], R.A. No. 7160).

(233)For how long may preventive suspension last?

Any single preventive suspension of local elective officials shall not extend beyond sixty (60) days (Sec. 63161,
RA No. 7160).

(234)What happens after the expiration of the preventive suspension of a local elective official?
The suspended official shall be deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the
proceedings against him, which shall be terminated within 120 days from the time he was formally notified of
the charge against him (Sec. 63[c], R.A. No. 7160).
 43

(235)X, the mayor of Angeles City, Pampanga was preventively suspended by the Governor. During that
period, is he entitled to his salary?
No. The law says that the official preventively suspended from office shall receive no salary or compensation
during such period (Sec. 64, R.A. No. 7160). The reason is that he is not performing his duties as a public
servant.

The Ombudsman and the Office of the Special Prosecutor

(236)What is the composition of the Office of the Ombudsman?

The office shall be composed of an Ombudsman who shall be known as the Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy
and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military
establishment may likewise be appointed (Sec. 5, Art. XI, 1987 Constitution).

(237)What are the qualifications of the Ombudsman and his Deputies?

They must:
1. be natural-born citizens of the Philippines;
2. be at least 40 years of age at the time of their appointment;
3. be of recognized probity and independence;
4. be members of the Philippine Bar;
5. not have been candidates for any elective office in the immediately preceding election; and
6. on the part of the Ombudsman, must have, for at least 10 years or more, been a judge or engaged in the
practice of law in the Philippines (Sec. 8, Art. XI, 1987 Constitution).

(238)How are the Ombudsman and Deputies appointed?

They are appointed by the President from a list of at least 6 nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council
and from a list of at least 3 nominees for every vacancy thereafter. All vacancies shall be filled within three (3)
months (Sec. 9, Art. XI, 1987 Constitution).

(239)What is the term of office of the Ombudsman and the Deputies?

The Ombudsman and his deputies shall serve for seven (7) years without reappointment (Sec. 11, Art. XI,
1987 Constitution).

(240)Can the Ombudsman act on anonymous complaints?

Yes. The law provides that the Ombudsman may investigate and prosecute on its own or on a complaint by
any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. This provision does not specifically require that the
complaint be made in writing or that the identity of the complainant be disclosed. However, the Ombudsman
will only act on anonymous complaints if they are credible and contain sufficient information to warrant an
investigation. (Sec. 15(1), Republic Act No. 6770).

The Sandiganbayan

(241)What is the composition of the Sandiganbayan?

The Sandiganbayan is composed of a Presiding Justice and 8 Associate Justices, with the rank of Justice of
the Court of Appeals. It seats in three (3) divisions with three members each (P.D. 1606).

(242)How are decisions of the Sandiganbayan arrived at?

A unanimous vote of all the three members is required for the pronouncement of a judgment by division.
(ALBANO, Political Law Reviewer, p. 777)

TERM LIMITS
(243)What is the Three-term limit rule?
 44

The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall
be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation
of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for
the full term for which he was elected. (Sec. 8, Article X, 1987 Constitution)

(244)Is the suspensive condition interrupts the three-term limitation rule of COMELEC?
No. The preventive suspension of public officials does not interrupt their term for purposes of the three-term
limit rule under the Constitution and the Local Government Code (RA 7160).The temporary inability or
disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective post, even if involuntary, is not an effective interruption
of a term (Aldovino, jr., vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 184836;December 23, 2009).

(245)What are the conditions for the application of the disqualification under the Three-term Limit Rule?
For the application of the disqualification under the three-term limit rule, therefore, two conditions must concur,
to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms to the same local government
post; and (2) that he or she has fully served three consecutive terms (Tallado vs. COMELEC,G.R. No.
246679;September 10, 2019).

(246)What is "interruption" of a term exempting an elective official from the three- term limit rule?
Interruption of term entails the involuntary loss of title to office, while interruption of the full continuity of the
exercise of the powers of the elective position equates to failure to render service (Tallado vs. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 246679, March 02, 2021).
"Sandiganbayan" And For Other Purposes, as amended by R.A. No. 10660, Sec. 4.

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders
of RTCs whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein
provided (P.D. 1606, as amended, Sec. 4). All other subordinate employees of the Sandiganbayan shall be
governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Law; Provided, that the Sandiganbayan may, by resolution en
banc, remove any of them for cause (P.D. 1606, as amended, Sec. 12).

B. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

(247)What is administrative law?

Administrative law is that part of public law which fixes the organization and determines the competence of the
administrative authorities and indicates to the individual, remedies for the violation of his rights. (ALBANO
Political Law Reviewer, p. 940)

(248)What is the basic purpose of administrative law?

The basic purpose of administrative law is the protection of private rights. (ALBANO Political Law Reviewer, p.
940)

(249)How are administrative agencies created?

They are created by the Constitution, law, and by authority of law (ALBANO Political Law Reviewer, p. 940)

(250)Are administrative officers tasked to implement a law also authorized to interpret the law?
Yes, because they have the expertise to do so. In a long line of cases, the SC reasoned out by saying that to
deprive administrative bodies of that power to interpret would be to defeat the law. The law will practically be
nullified and will remain unenforced because of inaction (Atlas Consolidated Mining and Dev't. Corp. v. CA,
182 SCRA 166, G.R. No. 54305 [1990]).
 45

ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

(251)What is the nature of due process in administrative proceedings?

Technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied in administrative proceedings and administrative due
process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. (Ang v. Belaro, Jr., A.C. No. 12408,
December 11, 2019). In administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one’s side
suffices to meet the requirements of due process (Philcontrust Resources, Inc., v. Santiago, G.R. No. 174670,
July 26, 2017). Procedural due process simply means the opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity
to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. “To be heard” does not mean only verbal
arguments in court; one may also be heard through pleadings (Casimiro v. Tandog, G.R. No. 146137, June 8,
2005).

(252)What is substantial evidence?

It is more than mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion (Ang Tibay v. CIR, 69 Phil. 635; Police Commission v. Lood, G.R. NO. L-34637, 127
SCRA 757 [1984]).

JUDICIAL RECOURSE AND REVIEW

(253)What are the requisites of judicial review of administrative action?

The requisites are:
1. Administrative action must have been completed known as "the principle of the finality of administrative
action"; and
2. Administrative remedies must have been exhausted known as "the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.

Doctrine of Primary Administrative Jurisdiction

(254)What is the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction?

The doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction refers to the competence of a court to take cognizance of a
case at first instance. Under this doctrine, if an administrative tribunal has jurisdiction over a controversy, courts
should not resolve the issue even if it may be within its proper jurisdiction. This is especially true when the
question involves its sound discretion requiring special knowledge, experience, and services to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact (Republic v. Gallo, G.R. No. 207074, January 17, 2018).

Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

(255)What is the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies?

Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, recourse through court action cannot prosper
until after all such administrative remedies have first been exhausted. If remedy is available within the
administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to courts (Teotico v. Baer, G.R.
No. 147464, June 8, 2006). This doctrine is grounded on practical reasons, including allowing the
administrative agencies concerned to take every opportunity to correct its own errors, as well as affording the
litigants the opportunity to avail of speedy relief through the administrative processes and sparing them of the
laborious and costly resort to courts (Professional Regulation Commission v. Dayamon Didato Alo, G.R. No.
214435; February 14, 2022).

Doctrine of Finality of Administrative Action

(256)What is the Doctrine of Finality of Administrative Action?

 46

Courts will be reluctant to interfere with the actions of an administrative agency prior to its completion or finality.
Absent a final order or decision, power has not been fully and finally exercised, and there can usually be no
irreparable harm. It is only after judicial review is no longer premature that a court may ascertain in proper
cases whether the administrative action or findings are not in violation of law, or are free from fraud or
imposition or find substantial support from the evidence (Mendiola v. CSC, G.R. No. 100671, 1993).

C. ELECTION LAW

SUFFRAGE

(257)What is suffrage?
Suffrage is the right to vote in the election of all officers chosen by the people, and in the determination of all
questions submitted to the people (Paine, Law of Elections, p. 1).

(258)What is an election?
Election is the means by which the people choose their officials as their representatives, for definite and fixed
periods and to whom they entrust, the exercise of powers of government for the time being (Garchitorena V.
Crescini, 39 Phil 258).

Qualifications and Disqualification of Voters

(259)What are the qualifications of voters? (CARD)

To exercise the right of suffrage a person must be:
1. Citizenship – a Filipino citizen;
2. Age – at least 18 years of age;
3. Residence:
a. A resident of the Philippines for at least 1 year;
b. A resident of the place where he proposes to vote for at least 6 months; and
c. Not otherwise Disqualified by law (CONST. Art. V, Sec. 1).

(260)Joey, a concerned taxpayer, questions the validity of RA 10367, which creates the mandatory
biometrics registration for new voters. RA 10367 likewise directs that registered voters whose
biometrics have not been captured shall submit themselves for validation, otherwise, their voter
registration shall be deactivated. Joey contends that RA 10367 is unconstitutional since it creates a
new qualification for voters which is not provided by the Constitution. Is Joey’s argument tenable?
No, Joey’s argument is untenable. Biometrics validation is not a qualification to the exercise of the right of
suffrage, but a mere aspect of the registration procedure, of which the State has the right to reasonably
regulate. The concept of a “qualification”, at least insofar as the discourse on suffrage is concerned, should
be distinguished from the concept of “registration”, which is regarded as only the means by which a person’s
qualifications to vote is determined. The act of registering is only one step towards voting, and it is not one of
the elements that makes the citizen a qualified voter and one may be a qualified voter without exercising the
right to vote. Thus, although one is deemed to be a “qualified elector,” he must nonetheless still comply with
the registration procedure in order to vote (Kabataan Party-List vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 221318,
December 16, 2015).

Local and Overseas Absentee Voting

(261)Who has the right to vote under the local absentee voting system?
The Commission on Elections shall extend the right to vote under the local absentee voting system to the
following:
1. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police and other
Government officers and employees who are duly registered voters and who, on election day, may
temporarily be assigned in connection with the performance of election duties to places where they are
not registered voters (R/A. No. 7166, otherwise known as "Synchronized Elections Law of 1991," Sec.
12; EO No. 157, Sec. 1); Board of Election of Inspectors (B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 169); and
2. Members of Media, media practitioners, including the technical and support staff, who are duly registered
voters and who, on election day, may not be able to vote due to the performance of their functions in
 47

covering and reporting on the elections: Provided, That they shall be allowed to vote only for the
positions of President, Vice President, Senators and Party-List Representative (R.A. 10380, Sec.2).

(262)Who is an overseas voter?

It refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is qualified to register and vote, not otherwise disqualified by law,
who is abroad on the day of elections. A qualified overseas voter may vote for President, Vice-President,
Senators, and Party-List Representatives, as well as in all national referenda and plebiscites (R.A. No. 9189
as amended by R.A. No. 10590, Sec. 3).

CANDIDACY

(263)What are the qualifications for the President and Vice President? (N40-RAW- VR10)
The following are the qualifications:
1. Natural-born citizen of the Philippines;
2. At least 40 years old on the day of the election;
3. Able to Read And Write;
4. Registered Voter; and
5. Resident of the Philippines for at least 10 years immediately preceding the day of the election (CONST.
Art. VII, Secs. 2 and 3; B.P. 881, Sec. 63).

(264)What are the qualifications for Senators? (N35-RAW-VR2)

The following are the qualifications:
1. Natural-born citizen of the Philippines;
2. At least 35 years old on the day of the election;
3. Able to Read And Write;
4. Registered Voter; and
5. Resident of the Philippines for not less than 2 years immediately preceding the day of the election
(CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 3).

(265)What are the qualifications for District Representatives? (N25-RAW-VR1)

The following are the qualifications:
1. Natural-born citizen of the Philippines;
2. At least 25 years old on the day of election
3. Able to Read And Write; and
4. Registered Voter in the district in which he shall be elected; and
5. Resident of the same district for a period of not less than 1 year preceding the day of election (CONST.
Art. VI, Sec. 6).

(266)What are the qualifications for Party-list Representatives? (NVR-RAW-90-25)

The following are the qualifications:
1. Natural-born citizen of the Philippines;
2. Registered Voter;
3. Resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than 1 year immediately preceding the day of the
election;
4. Able to Read And Write;
5. A bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least 90 days
preceding the day of the election; and
6. At least 25 years old on the day of election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be 25 but not more than 30 years of age on the day
of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of 30 during his term shall be allowed to
continue in office until the expiration of his term (R.A. 7941, otherwise known as the "Party-List System Act",
Sec. 9).

(267)What are qualifications for Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, Vice-Mayor, Sanggunian Members, and
Punong Barangay? (CA-RAW-VR1)
The following are the qualifications:
 48

1. Citizen of the Philippines;

2. On election day, Age must at least be:
d. Twenty-three (23) years – for governor, vice-governor, member of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
mayor, vice mayor, or member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities;
e. Twenty-one (21) years – for mayor or vice mayor of independent component cities, component cities,
or municipalities; or
f. Eighteen (18) years – for member of the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan, or punong
barangay or member of the sangguniang barangay;
3. Able to Read And Write Filipino or any other local language or dialect;
4. Registered Voter in the barangay, municipality, city or province, or, in the case of a member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Panlungsod or Bayan,
5. the district where he intends to be elected; and
6. Resident therein for at least 1 year immediately preceding the election (LGC, Sec. 39).

(268)What are the qualifications for Sanggunian Kabataan? (CKR18-RAW-RM)

The following are the qualifications:
1. Citizen of the Philippines;
2. Qualified voter of the Katipunan ng Kabataan;
3. Resident of the barangay for not less than 1 year immediately preceding the day of the elections;
4. At least 18 years but not more than 24 years of age on the day of the elections;
5. Able to Read And Write Filipino, English, or the local dialect;
6. Must not be Related within the second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity to any incumbent elected
national official or to any incumbent elected regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay official, in
the locality where he or she seeks to be elected; and
7. Must not have been convicted by final judgment of any crime involving Moral turpitude (R.A. 10742,
otherwise known as the Sangguniang Kabataan Reform Act of 2015, Sec. 10).

(269)When should the citizenship qualification be possessed?

The citizenship qualification should be possessed when “the elective (or elected) official” begins to govern, i.e.,
at the time he is proclaimed and at the start of his term (Frivaldo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120295, June 28,
1996).

(270)What does “residence” mean for election law purposes?

The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to "dwelling" or "habitation,"
but rather to "domicile" or legal residence, that is, "the place where a party actually or constructively has his
permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return
and remain (animus manendi)” (Japzon v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180088, January 19, 2009).

(271)X filed his certificate of candidacy for Representative of the 4th District of Pasige City certifying that
he has been a resident thereof since birth. Y, a candidate for the same position filed with COMELEC a
petition to cancel and disqualify his certification because based on his evidence, X has only been a
resident of Pasige for 2 months because he has been staying and working at Rizalito City. X countered
that he has fulfilled the residency requirement since he was born in Pasige and he had no intention to
change his domicile. Is X correct?
YES. In election law, residence is equated with domicile and not necessarily where he or she currently resides.
"Residence" is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary while "domicile" denotes a
fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. To successfully effect a
change of domicile, one must demonstrate:
An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and
Acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria,
the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Since there is no clear and positive proof that X did
indeed change or transfer his domicile, he is deemed to be a resident of Pasige and has successfully complied
with the residency requirement. (Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 119976,September 18, 1995).

(272)Who are disqualified to be candidates?

Any person who has been declared by competent authority to be insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced
by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to
a penalty of more than eighteen (18). months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to
 49

be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty (Sec. 12,
B.P. Blg. 881).

(273)Petitioner RL was elected and had served as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in terms 1989-
1992, 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. However, his proclamation relative to the 1995 election was protested
and was eventually declared by the RTC and then by COMELEC null and void on the ground of failure
of elections. About three months before the May 1998 elections, the petitioner vacated the mayoralty
post in light of a COMELEC order. In the May 1998 elections, petitioner again filed his certificate of
candidacy. His opponent, EM, filed a petition for disqualification on the ground that petitioner had
already served three consecutive terms in the same post. The COMELEC granted the petition. Is the
three-term limit applicable in this case?
No. Two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that the official concerned has
been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served
three consecutive terms. The petitioner cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the
May 1995 elections, and second, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of
involuntary relinquishment of office because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the
term.

The intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary
renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people’s choice and grant their elected official full
service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced
term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of
time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service.

The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation
but in compliance with the order issued by the COMELEC. Such involuntary severance from office is an
interruption of continuity of service and thus, the three-term limit cannot be applied in this case. (Lonzanida vs
COMELEC, G.R. No. 135150, July 28, 1999).

Filing of Certificates of Candidacy

(274)What is the effect of filing a certificate of candidacy by a person holding public appointive office or
position?
Any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered
ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy (Sec. 66, Art. IX, B.P. BIg. 881).

(275)Does the constitutional provision conferring upon the Comelec the power to enforce and administer
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and
recall cover SK elections?
No, it is placed under the direct control and supervision of the Department of Interior and Local Government.
In the same way, contests involving elections of SK officials do not fall within the jurisdiction of the Comelec
(Alunan, III, et al. V. Mirasol, et al., G.R. No. 108399, July 31, 1997, citing Mercado v. Board of Election
Supervisors, 60 SCAD 468, G.R. No. 109713, April 6, 1995).

(276)Who are nuisance candidates? (MCI)

Nuisance candidates are those whose certificates of candidacy are filed to put the election process in Mockery
or disrepute, or to cause Confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered
candidates, or by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide
Intention to run for the office for which the COC has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the
true will of the electorate (B.P. 881, Sec. 69).

(277)Who is a substitute candidate?

A substitute candidate is one who takes the place of another who is no longer a candidate, otherwise, the
former would be an additional, not a substitute candidate (Pontawe v. Comelec, G.R. No. 59343, April 24,
1985).
 50

(278)Under what instances may the COMELEC deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy?
Under the following instances, the COMELEC may deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy:
1. Where the candidate is a nuisance candidate (B.P. 881, Sec. 69); and
2. Where the certificate of candidacy contains false material representations (B.P. 881, Sec. 78).

Call for Special Election

(279)When may special elections be held?

In case of a vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election may be called to fill
such vacancy in the manner provided by law, but the Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus
elected shall serve only for the unexpired term (Sec. 9, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution).

Election Protest

(280)How is election protest distinguished from quo warranto?

Election Protest
It is strictly a contest between the defeated and winning
candidates, based on grounds of election frauds or
irregularities, as to who actually obtained the majority of
the legal votes and therefore is entitled to hold the office.
Can only be filed by a candidate who has duly filed a
certificate of candidacy and has been voted for.
Lokin v. COMELEC, G. R. No. 179431-32 & 180443, June 22, 2010; Luison v. Garcia, G.R. No. 10981, April
25, 1958).
Quo Warranto
It refers to questions of disloyalty or ineligibility of the
winning candidate. It is a proceeding to unseat the
ineligible person from office, but not to install the
protestant in his place.
Can be filed by any voter. It is for this reason that it is not
considered a contest where the parties strive for
supremacy.

(281)Is the quo warranto proceedings in an elective office the same as an appointive office?
No. In quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by election, what is to be determined is the eligibility
of the candidate elect, while in quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by appointment, what is
determined is the legality of the appointment. In the first case when the person elected is ineligible, the court
cannot declare that the candidate occupying the second place has been elected, even if he were eligible, since
the law only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes,
and has presented his certificate of candidacy. In the second case, the court determines who has been legally
appointed and can and ought to declare who is entitled to occupy the office. (Nuval v. Guray, G.R. No. 30241,
December 29, 1928).

(282)What is the “second placer” rule?

The wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole
question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots (Topacio v. Paredes, G.R.
No. 8069, October 7, 1912).

(283)What is the effect if a candidate is disqualified by final judgment? Explain.

Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes
cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion
of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Section 6, R.A. No. 6646, The
Electoral Reforms Law of 1987)

(284)Petitioner A filed his certificate of candidacy for Mayor of Valenzuela City. B, another candidate for the
position, filed a petition to annul/nullify A’s certificate of candidacy and/or to disqualify him on the
ground that A had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Twenty-three days before the
election, A’s disqualification became final and executory. Subsequently, he won the election and was
proclaimed. B filed an electoral protest. Is the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer applies in
this case?
 51

No.The doctrine on the rejection of the second placer, which triggers the rule on succession, does not apply in
the present case because Bis not a second-placer but the only placer. The COMELEC’s Resolution cancelling
A's certificate of candidacy due to disqualification became final and executory twenty-three days before the
election. Thus, B was the only candidate for Mayor. (Cayat vs. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 163776. April 24, 2007).

(285)Does the second placer rule apply today?

No. In Maquiling v. Comelec, G.R. No 195649, April 16, 2013, the Supreme Court held that it does not even
have a legal basis to stand on. It was a mere pronouncement of the Court comparing one process with another
and explaining the effects thereof. As an independent statement, it is even illogical. In the same case, the Court
ruled that the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the winner
of an election. When there are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is
awarded to the next in rank who does not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications
set in the rules to be eligible as a candidate.

SET, HRET

(286)When may the Supreme Court review or inquire into the acts of the Electoral Tribunal of the House or
the Senate?
As a rule, the judgments of the HRET and SET are beyond judicial interference save only "in the exercise of
this Court's so called extraordinary jurisdiction, xxx upon a determination that the Tribunal's decision or
resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or paraphrasing
Morreno, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power which
constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated ERROR,
manifestly constituting such GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION that there has to be a remedy for such abuse."
(Morreno v. Bocar, 66 Phil. 429 [1938]).

(287)A was running as Representative of the district of Biliran. B, a registered voter and resident of the said
district, filed before the COMELEC a petition for the cancellation of A’s Certificate of Candidacy (COC)
on the ground that A misrepresented her marital status, residency, date of birth and citizenship.
COMELEC cancelled A’s COC on the basis that she is not a citizen of the Philippines. On May 18, 2013,
A was proclaimed winner and took her oath of office before the Speaker of House of Representatives
on June 5, 2013. She has yet to assume office at noon of June 30, 2013. COMELEC issued a certificate
of finality declaring the cancellation of A’s candidacy final and executory. A claims that COMELEC is
without jurisdiction over her who is duly proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath of
office as member of the HoR. Does the COMELEC have jurisdiction?
Yes. COMELEC has jurisdiction because A is not a member of the House yet. To be a member of the House,
the representative should have been (a) proclaimed winner; (b) taken her oath; (c) assumed office. The
COMELEC covers the matter of A’s certificate of candidacy, and its due course or its cancellation, which are
the pivotal conclusions that determines who can be legally proclaimed. At and after the COMELEC En Banc
decision, there is no longer any certificate cancellation matter then it can go to House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal who has exclusive jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election
returns and qualification of the members of House. Therefore, there was no basis for the proclamation of A as
the COMELEC has already cancelled her COC before the said proclamation. (Reyes v. COMELEC, 207264
October 22, 2013)

RECALL

(288)What is a Recall?
Recall is a mode of removal of a public officer by the people before the end of his term of office. The people’s
prerogative to remove a public officer is an incident of their sovereign power and in the absence of constitutional
restraint, the power is implied in all governmental operations (Angobung v Commission on Elections,G.R. No.
126576, March 5, 1997).

(289)When can a Recall be exercised?

 52

The power to recall for loss of confidence shall be exercised by the registered voters of a local government
unit to which the local elective official subject to such recall belongs (R.A. No. 7160, Sec 69).

(290)Who exercises the power of recall?

The power of recall for loss of confidence shall be exercised by the registered voters of a local government
unit to which the local elective official subject to such recall belongs (Sec. 69, R.A. No. 7160).

D. LOCAL GOVERNMENT

PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
(291)What are the forms of decentralization in the Philippines?
In its broad or general sense, decentralization has two forms in the Philippine setting, namely: the
decentralization of power and the decentralization of administration. The decentralization of power involves
the abdication of political power in favor of the autonomous LGUs as to grant them the freedom to chart their
own destinies and to shape their futures with minimum intervention from the central government. This amounts
to self- immolation because the autonomous LGUs thereby become accountable not to the central authorities
but to their constituencies.

On the other hand, the decentralization of administration occurs when the central government delegates
administrative powers to the LGUs as the means of broadening the base of governmental powers and of
making the LGUs more responsive and accountable in the process, and thereby ensure their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and more effective partners in the pursuit of the goals of national
development and social progress. This form of decentralization further relieves the central government of the
burden of managing local affairs so that it can concentrate on national concerns (Mandanas v. Ochoa, G.R.
No. 199802, July 3, 2018).

Classifications

(292)What are quasi-public corporations?

Quasi-public corporations are private corporations that render public service, supply public wants, or pursue
other eleemosynary objectives. While purposely organized for the gain or benefit of its members, they are
required by law to discharge functions for the public benefit (Philippine Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals v. COA, G.R. No. 169752, September 25, 2007).

(293)What are municipal corporations?

Municipal corporations are government entities recognized, supported and utilized by the National Government
as a part of its government machinery and functions; a municipal government actually functions as an extension
of the national government and, therefore, jt is an instrumentality of the latter (Surigao Electric Co., Inc. v.
Municipality of Surigao. G.R. No. L-22766, Aug. 30, 1968).
Elements

(294)What are the elements of a public corporation?

The elements of a public corporation are:
1. Legal creation - This refers to the law creating it;
2. Corporate name - It is the name by which the public corporation is known;
3. Inhabitants - This refers to the people residing in it or comprising it; and
4. Territory - This refers to the area wherein which the inhabitants are residing including the land, water,
space and air space. (ALBANO Political Law Reviewer, p. 961)

Nature and Functions

 53

(295)BCDA filed a Petition for Review with request for exemption from Payment of Filing Fees with the CTA
involving its claim for refund against CIR. The CTA informed BCDA through a letter that the Petition
for Review will be returned as it was not filed without the payment of the correct legal fees. BCDA
argued that being a government entity, they are exempted from the payment of docket fees pursuant
to Section 22, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court and stated that they are indeed a government instrument
under EO. No. 596, and under RA No. 10149.
Is BCDA, as a government instrumentality, exempt from the payment of docket fees?
Yes, BCDA is exempted from payment of filing fees. Section 22 of the Rules of Court provides that the Republic
of the Philippines, its agencies, and instrumentalities are exempt from paying the legal fees provided by the
law. The Supreme Court affirmed the status of BCDA as a government instrumentality as they are vested with
corporate powers and are exempted from the payment of filing fees.

BCDA is a government instrumentality because it falls under the definition of instrumentality under the
Administrative Code of 1987 which states that "any agency of the National Government, not integrated within
the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all
corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter.”

The BCDA is not considered as neither a stock or nonstock corporation but instead, it is organized for the
specific purpose of owning, holding and/or administering the military reservations in the country and
implementing their conversion to other productive uses. (BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 205466; January 11, 2021)

Requisites for Creation, Conversion, Division, Merger or Dissolution

(296)What is the concept of independent component cities?

Independent component cities are those whose charters prohibit their voters from electing provincial
officials.Likewise, voters of independent component cities are prohibited from running for an elective provincial
office of the province where it is a part (Abella v. Comelec, 201 SCRA 253, G.R. No. 100710).

(297)What are the conditions for the division or merger of local government units?
They are:
1. The division or merger shall comply with the same requirements on income, population, and land area
(Sec. 7, R.A. No. 7160)
2. The division shall not reduce the income, population, and land area of local government unit or units
concerned to less than the minimum requirements of the Code; and
3. The income classification of the original local government unit or units shall not fall below its current
income classification prior to such division (Sec. 8, R.A. No. 7160).

(298)How and when may a local government unit be abolished?

A local government unit may be abolished when its income, population, or land area has been irreversibly
reduced to less than the minimum standards prescribed for its creation under Book III of the LGC, as certified
by the national agencies mentioned in Section 7 hereof to Congress or to the Sanggunian concerned, as the
case may be.
The law or ordinance abolishing a local government unit shall specify the province, city, municipality, or
barangay with which the local government unit sought to be abolished will be incorporated or merged (Sec. 9,
R.A. No. 7160).

PRINCIPLES OF LOCAL AUTONOMY

(299)P.D. 1869, creating the charter of PAGCOR, is being challenged by B, et. al. According to them, the
exemption clause provided under the charter, which exempts PAGCOR from paying any tax of any
kind, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether national or local, has intruded into
the local government’s right to impose local taxes and license fees which is in contravention of the
constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy. Is the contention correct?
No, the contention of the petitioner is not correct. The power of local government to impose taxes and fees is
always subject to limitations which Congress may provide by law. Since P.D. 1869 remains an operative law
until amended, repealed or revoked, its exemption clause remains as an exception to the exercise of the power
 54

of local governments to impose taxes and fees. It cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the
principle of local autonomy. Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means
“decentralization”. It does not make local governments sovereign within the state or an “imperium in imperio.”
(Basco v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991)

AUTONOMOUS REGIONS AND THEIR RELATION TO THE NATIONAL

GOVERNMENT

(300)L was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central
Mindanao, Region XII. L, in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly, accepted an invitation to have a
consultation with local government officials. He informed the Assembly members that there shall be
no session as his presence was needed in the house committee hearing of Congress. Despite such
notice, the Assembly held a session in defiance of L’s advice, where he was unseated from his
position. L filed a petition in the Supreme Court praying that the Assembly’s proceedings be declared
null and void and be declared that he was still the Speaker of the Assembly. Pending the proceedings
before the Supreme Court, the Assembly issued a resolution expressly expelling L. Now, M, et. al,
argue that the Court cannot inquire into the validity of the expulsion because the case should have
been resolved within the confines of the Assembly. Is the contention correct?
No, the Regional Autonomous Government, Region XII is not totally autonomous and self-governing.
Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. The second is abdication by
the national government of political power in favor of the local government; the first consists merely in the
delegation of administrative powers to broaden the base of governmental power. Against the first, there can
be no valid constitutional challenge. An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous
governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second
sense, that is, in which the central government commits an act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No.
1618, in the first place, mandates that “the President shall have the power of general supervision and control
over Autonomous Regions.” (Limbona v. Mangelin, G.R. No. 80391, February 28, 1989)

LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT (LGU)

(301)How do you characterize the general welfare clause?

The general welfare clause can be said to be a statutory grant of police power to local government units.
(ALBANO Political Law Reviewer, p. 984)

(302)City M enacted an ordinance which prohibits checking in for less than twelve hours in hotels, motels,
lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the city. Further, the ordinance
penalizes anyone who commits a violation thereof by imprisonment and fine. W Corporation who owns
and operates several hotels and motels questions the validity of the ordinance on the ground that it
infringes their property rights and affects their business interests. The trial court ruled in favor of W
Corporation and struck down the ordinance as unconstitutional. However, on appeal, the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court on the ground that it is a valid exercise of police power.
Is CA correct in maintaining that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power?

No, the CA is not correct. The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the
covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. It must appear that the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights
and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the
purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between
the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of
protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to
be arbitrarily invaded. Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as
an arbitrary intrusion into private rights. (White Light Corp. v. City of Manila, G.R. No. 122846, January 20,
2009).

Requisites of Valid Ordinance

(303)What are the requisites for a valid ordinance? (CUP3UG)

 55

To be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements:

1. It must not contravene the Constitution and any statute;
2. It must not be Unfair or oppressive;
3. It must not be Partial or discriminatory;
4. It must not Prohibit, but may regulate, trade;
5. It must be general and consistent with Public policy;
6. It must not be Unreasonable; and
(Manila Electric Co. v. City of Muntinlupa, G.R. No. 198529, [February 9, 2021])

(304)B Company is a holder of a legislative franchise, which allows it to establish and operate radio stations
for domestic telecommunications, radiophone, broadcasting and telecasting. Under its charter, it is
exempt from paying real estate taxes. Subsequently, RA 7160 otherwise known as the “Local
Government Code of 1991” (LGC) took effect. As a result of which, the exemption previously enjoyed
by Company B was withdrawn. Barely few months after the LGC took effect, Congress amended
Company B’s original franchise, an effect of which was to restore its exemption status. Thereafter, the
government of City Q enacted an ordinance withdrawing tax exemption privileges. B Company
contended that its real properties are exempt from real property taxes under its franchise. Is the
contention correct?
Yes, the contention of B Company is correct. B Company’s franchise has been amended by the Congress.
The amended franchise granted it real property tax exemption from real properties that are directly used in its
operations. Hence, City Q cannot levy real property taxes on the real properties of B Company that are located
within its area. The court has upheld the power of Congress to grant exemptions over the power of local
government units to impose taxes. (City Government of Quezon City v. Bayan Telecommunications, Inc., G.R.
No. 162015, March 6, 2006).

LIABILITY OF LGUS

(305)Are local government units liable for damages for the death or injury to persons or damage to
property?
Yes, because under the Local Government Code, local government units and their officials are not exempt
from liability for death or injury to persons or damage to property (Sec. 24, R.A. No. 7160).

Vacancies and Succession of Local Officials

(306)When does a permanent vacancy arise?

A permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office,
fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is permanently incapacitated to discharge
the functions of his office (Sec. 44, R.A. No. 7160).

(307)Suppose Governor A was serving his third term when he lost his governorship in a recall election.
(a) Who shall succeed Governor A in his office as Governor?
The candidate who received the highest number of votes in the recall will succeed Governor A. (RA 7160,Sec.
72)

(b) Can Governor A run again as governor in the next election?

Yes, Governor A can run again as governor. He did not fully serve his third term, because he lost in the recall
election. His third term should not be included in computing the three-term limit (Lonzanida v. COMELEC G.R.
No. 135150, July 28, 1999)

(c) Can Governor A refuse to run in the recall election and instead resign from his position as
governor?
No, Governor A cannot refuse to run in the recall election. The officials sought to be recalled shall automatically
be considered as duly registered candidate or candidates to the pertinent positions and, like other candidates,
 56

shall be entitled to be voted upon. (RA 7160, Sec. 71) The elective local official sought to be recalled shall not
be allowed to resign while the recall process is in progress. (RA 7160, Sec. 73)

(308)Section B, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that no elective official shall serve for more than
three (3) consecutive terms. Rule and explain briefly the reason if the official is prohibited to run for
another term in each of the following situations:
(a) If the Mayor has served for three consecutive terms and did not seek a fourth term but won in a
recall election
A Mayor who served three consecutive terms and did not seek a fourth term but ran and won in the recall
election can serve because the recall was not an immediate re-election (Socrates v. COMELEC G.R. No.
154512, November 12, 2002)

(b) If the position of mayor of a town is abolished due to conversion of a town to a city
If the municipality in which a mayor served for three consecutive terms was converted to a city, he cannot run
as city mayor in the first election. For purposes of applying the three-term limit, the office of the municipal
mayor should not be considered different from that of the city mayor (Latusa v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 154829,
December 10, 2003)

(c) If the official is preventively suspended during his term but was exonerated
The temporary inability of an elective official to exercise his functions due to preventive suspension is not an
interruption of his term since it did not involve loss of title to the office (Aldovino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 184836
December 23, 2009)

(d) If the official is proclaimed as winner and assumes office but loses in an election protest
If a candidate was proclaimed for a third consecutive term but did not serve in full because of loss in an election
protest is not disqualified to run again for the third term, it cannot be considered a full term of office for two
reasons. First, he cannot be considered elected as the proclamation was void and second, it cannot be
considered as voluntary renunciation of office, but an involuntary severance from office. (Lonzanida v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 135150, July 28, 1999)

(309)A Vice-mayor becomes mayor by succession. Suppose he is twice elected after that term, is he
qualified to run again in the next election?
Yes, he is qualified to run again in the next election. Two conditions must concur for the application of the
disqualification of a candidate based on violation of the three-term limit rule, which are (1) that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he
has fully served three consecutive terms. He was not elected to the office of the mayor in the first term but
simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had he served the full term because he only
continued the service of the mayor. Under Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution, voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
for which he was elected. (Abundo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 201716, January 8, 2013)

Recall

(310)Who may file a petition for recall?

The recall of any elective provincial, city, municipal or barangay official shall be commenced by a petition of a
registered voter in the local government unit concerned and supported by the registered voters in the local
government unit concerned during the election in which the local official sought to be recalled, is elected (Sec.
1[a], R.A. 9244 amending Section 70, Chapter 5 Title I, Book I of the Local Government Code [R.A. 7160]).

(311)When shall recall be effective?

The recall of an elective local official shall be effective only upon the election and proclamation of a successor
in the person of a candidate receiving the highest number of votes cast during the election recall. Should the
official sought to be recalled receive the highest number of votes, confidence in him is hereby affirmed, and he
shall continue in office (Sec. 72, R.A. No. 7160).
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V. PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

A. SOURCES OF OBLIGATIONS

TREATIES

CONCEPT OF JUS COGENES

(312)What is Jus Cogens?

It is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from
which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international
law having the same character (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [hereinafter VCLT], Art. 53).

(313)The following are examples of jus cogens:

1. Prohibition, prosecution, and punishment of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes;
2. Prohibition of torture;
3. Prohibition of slavery, slave trade, and piracy;
4. Prohibition of wars of aggression and territorial aggrandizement; and
5. Prohibition of apartheid (SARMIENTO, supra at 16)

(314)The Monarchy of Benedencia and Republic of Scholta are neighboring States. Desperate to end the
drug problem in their region, they entered into a Treaty of Joint Operation in order to suppress the
drug cartels and operations. Among the provisions of the treaty is the Obosen Clause which permits
both States to use methods such as electrocution, 60-day solitary confinement, starvation, and beating
against their own nationals apprehended by the other State in the latter’s territory, in order to extract
information relating to drug operations; provided, that the individual being interrogated should not die.
The People’s Republic of Mendio, a State from another continent, proceeded to institute legal actions
against both States contending that the Obosen Clause is void and enjoins both parties to cease from
implementing the clause. Benedencia argues that Obosen Clause is not void and Scholta argues that
Mendio has no legal capacity to sue as it is not a party to the treaty.
Is the treaty provision void?
Yes, the treaty provision is void. Under Art. 53 of the VCLT, a treaty provision is void if it conflicts with jus
cogens norms. The case of Prosecutor v. Furundzija (Trial), International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (1998) declares that torture, defined as any act of intentionally inflicting severe pain or suffering in
order to obtain from him or third person an information or confession or of punishing, intimidating, humiliating,
or coercing [JMMD1] the victim or a third person, or of discriminating on any ground against the victim or a
third person. In this case, it is clear that Obosen Clause allows parties Benedencia and Scholta to torture the
other party’s citizens to extract information from them regarding the drug trade. In doing so, they violate a jus
cogens norm which renders the Obosen Clause void.

(315)Is Scholta’s argument tenable?

No, Scholta’s argument is not tenable. The same case of Prosecutor v. Furundzija (1998) held that prohibition
against torture is an obligation erga omnes, or “owed to all” nations and breach of which constitutes a violation
of correlative right of all members and gives rise to claim for compliance from each and every member. In this
case, even though Mendio is not a party to the treaty, Benedencia and Scholta’s breach of an erga omnes
obligation gives Mendio a right to ask for compliance from Benedencia and Scholta.

(316)A dispute between State X and State Y concerning fishing boundaries and oil exploration was
submitted before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The parties allowed the ICJ to render a
decision on the basis of their legal rights, the political and economic factors between them, and other
considerations the Court may deem proper. The ICJ favored State X considering the economic status
of the two States and possible damage to the livelihood of State X’s local population brought by the
intrusion of State Y’s companies, although the latter had not violated any treaty, customary
international law, or general principles of law among nations. Was the decision defective?
No, the decision was not defective. Article 38(2) of the ICJ Statute allows the Court to decide the case on the
basis of ex aequo et bono if the parties agree thereto. Ex aequo et bono, which means “from equity and good
conscience” or “according to right and good,” allows the Court to render decision on equitable considerations.
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Here, because the two States expressly allowed the Court to decide on their dispute, not confined on any
treaty, customary international law, or general principles of international law, the Court may properly use as
basis what it deemed equitable or proper regarding the impact of the decision on the local population of State
X.

OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES

(317)What are Obligations Erga Omnes?

An obligation that a State owes in any given case to the international community, in view of its common values
and its concern for compliance, so that a breach of that obligation enables all States to take action (Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010; Barcelona Traction, Judgment)

(318)What is the principle of pacta sunt servanda?

Pacta sunt servanda (Latin for “pacts must be respected") is a basic principle of international law that is now
codified in Art. 26 of the VCLT, which states that “every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must
be performed by them in good faith.”

(319)When does a new State become subject to International Law?

A new State becomes subject to international law from the very moment of its establishment with respect to
peremptory norms (jus cogens) and obligations erga omnes under customary international law. Neither the
express consent of the new State to be bound nor the recognition by other States is necessary for the new
State to be bound by said norms and obligations. However, to enjoy the rights and privileges of States under
international law, the new State must first be integrated in the international community through co-optation,
that is, the individual and collective recognition on the part of the already existing States (SARMIENTO, PIL
Reviewer, supra at 53).

APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY DOMESTIC COURTS

(320)If there is an irreconcilable conflict between a statute and international law, which prevails in the
domestic setting?
It depends. If the conflict is between a law and an executive agreement, the law should prevail. The President
cannot, by executive agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited by laws enacted prior thereto. He
may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of law, by indirectly repealing the same
through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws
(Gonzales v. Hechanova, G.R. No. L-21897, October 22, 1963).

(321)What is Monism theory?

International law and domestic law belong to only one system of law. However, there are two monist theories.
One theory holds that municipal law subsumes and is superior to international law, and a second theory holds
that international law is superior to domestic law (BERNAS, Introduction to Public International Law p. 58).

(322)What is Harmonization?
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with
situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the
constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect
to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted
principles of international law in observance of the incorporation clause (Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, G.R.
No. 139465, January 18, 2000).

JURISDICTION
(323)What is the breadth of the territorial sea?
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Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea [hereinafter UNCLOS], the territorial sea of every
State shall not exceed 12 nautical miles, measured from its baselines (Art. 3); and in the case of an archipelagic
State, the breadth of its territorial sea shall be measured from its archipelagic baseline (Art. 48).

(324)What are the methods in determining the territorial sea?

These are:
1. Normal baseline method – the territorial sea is simply drawn from the low- water mark of the coast to the
breadth claimed, following its curvatures but excluding the internal waters in bays and gulfs; or
2. Straight baseline method – straight lines are made to connect appropriate points on the coast without
departing radically from its general direction. This method may be employed in localities where the
coastline is deeply indented or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in the immediate vicinity
(CRUZ, International Law supra at 122- 123).

(325)What are the rights of a State pertaining to its Territorial Sea?

In general, a state enjoys full sovereign rights and jurisdictional control over its territorial sea. In particular:
1. Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction – Generally, a coastal state cannot exercise criminal jurisdiction on a
foreign ship (or its passengers) passing through the territorial sea, except:
2. The consequences of the crime extend to the coastal state;
3. The crime disturbs the peace of the country or the good order of the territorial sea;
4. The assistance of the local authorities has been requested by the master of the ship or by a diplomatic
agent or consular officer of the flag state; and
5. Such measures are necessary for the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic
substances (UNCLOS, Art. 27).
6. Exercise of Civil Jurisdiction – Generally, a coastal state cannot exercise civil jurisdiction over a foreign
ship (or its passengers) passing through the territorial sea, except:
g. When the ship itself has assumed obligations or incurred liabilities in the course of its voyage through
the coastal state;
h. If civil proceedings are commenced or concluded against a foreign ship in internal waters, the coastal
state may subsequently levy an execution against or arrest the foreign ship even if it has already left
internal waters and reached the territorial sea (UNCLOS, Art. 28).

(326)What is the extent of a Coastal State’s sovereignty over its territorial sea?
The sovereignty of the coastal state over its territorial sea and the airspace above it as well as the seabed
under is the same as its sovereignty over its land territory (UNCLOS, Art. 2). It is, however, subject to the right
of innocent passage by other states (UNCLOS, Art. 17).

(327)The South China Sea Arbitration between the Philippines and China concerned an application by the
Philippines for rulings in respect of four matters concerning the relationship between the Philippines
and China in the South China Sea. First, the Philippines sought a ruling on the source of the Parties’
rights and obligations in the South China Sea and the effect of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea on China’s claims to historic rights within its so-called ‘nine-dash line’. Second, the
Philippines sought a ruling on whether certain maritime features claimed by both China and the
Philippines are properly characterized as islands, rocks, low-tide elevations, or submerged banks
under the Convention. The status of these features under the Convention determines the maritime
zones they are capable of generating. Third, the Philippines sought rulings on whether certain Chinese
actions in the South China Sea have violated the Convention, by interfering with the exercise of the
Philippines’ sovereign rights and freedoms under the Convention or through construction and fishing
activities that have harmed the marine environment. Finally, the Philippines sought a ruling that certain
actions taken by China, in particular its large-scale land reclamation and construction of artificial
islands in the Spratly Islands since this arbitration was commenced, have unlawfully aggravated and
extended the Parties’ dispute. How did the Tribunal decide on the four matters raised in the arbitration
case?
A) On the ‘nine-dash line’ and China’s claim to historic rights, the Tribunal concluded that there was no legal
basis for China to claim historic rights to resources, in excess of the rights provided for by the Convention,
within the sea areas falling within the ‘nine-dash line’. B) On the status of features in the South China Sea, the
Tribunal concluded that all of the high-tide features in the Spratly Islands (including, Itu Aba, Thitu, West York
Island, Spratly Island, North-East Cay, South-West Cay) are legally “rocks” that do not generate an exclusive
economic zone or continental shelf. C) On Chinese activities in the South China Sea, the Tribunal found that
China’s recent large scale land reclamation and construction of artificial islands at seven features in the Spratly
Islands has caused severe harm to the coral reef environment. The Tribunal also concluded that China had
breached its obligations under the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at
Sea, 1972, and Article 94 the Convention concerning maritime safety. D) On the aggravation of the dispute,
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the Tribunal recalled that there exists a duty on parties engaged in a dispute settlement procedure to refrain
from aggravating or extending the dispute or disputes at issue during the pendency of the settlement process.
The Tribunal noted that China has (a) built a large artificial island on Mischief Reef, a low-tide elevation located
in the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines; (b) caused permanent, irreparable harm to the coral reef
ecosystem and (c) permanently destroyed evidence of the natural condition of the features in question.

SUBJECTS
(328)What is the “auxiliary status” of international organizations?
The term “auxiliary status” of some international organizations, such as the Red Cross Society, means that it
is at one and the same time a private institution and a public service organization because the very nature of
its work implies cooperation with the state. The Philippine National Red Cross, as a National Society of the
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, can neither be “classified as an instrumentality of the
state, so as not to lose its character of neutrality” as well as its independence, nor strictly as a private
corporation since it is regulated by international humanitarian law and is treated as an auxiliary of the state
(Liban v. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, January 18, 2011).

(329)The Philippines and the State of Zedong had been engaged in a dispute in the Western Seas of the
Philippines since 2000. Because of the harassment from the State of Zedong, the fishermen of the
Philippines were not able to properly exploit the area. The State of Zedong also exploited exotic
animals and threw wastes in the waters which led to diverse change in the ecosystem of the area. In
2005, it was reported that because of these, way of life of the fisherfolks in the Philippines has changed
and only few chose to keep on fishing. The damages calculated amounts to 30 million dollars. In 2010,
the State of Zedong and the Philippines entered into an understanding wherein they ended the dispute
after the former agreed to pay the latter 20 million dollars as reparation. May the fisherfolks claim
against the State of Zedong for their suffered injuries as consequence of the acts of the latter under
international law?

No, the Philippines is not under any international obligation to espouse the fisherfolks’ claims. According to
Vinuya v. Romulo, G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010, the State may exercise diplomatic protection by whatever
means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the State is asserting. Should the natural or
legal person on whose behalf it is acting consider that their rights are not adequately protected, they have no
remedy in international law. The State, therefore, is the sole judge to decide whether its protection will be
granted, to what extent it is granted, and when will it cease. Considering that the Philippines has already
determined that the 20 million dollars is adequate reparation, the fisherfolks may not claim against the State of
Zedong, if not through the State.

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
(330)What is Genocide?
Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or
religious group such as:
1. Killing members of the group;
2. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
3. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in
whole or in part;
4. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and
5. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group (Article 6, Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court).

(331)What are the functions of the International Court of Justice?

To settle, in accordance with international law, legal disputes submitted by States, and to give advisory opinions
on legal questions referred to it by authorized UN organs and specialized agencies. The primary function is to
decide international legal disputes submitted to it by States in accordance with International Law
(SARMIENTO, supra at 193).
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