OTC 3200

SIMPLIFYING MANNED SUBMERSIBLE SAFETY CRITERIA

by Michael R. Witt. Martech International

" Copyright 1978, Offshore Technology Conference

This paper was presented at the 10th Annual OTC in Houston, Tex., May 8-11,1978. The material is sUbject to correction by the author. Permissfon to copy is restricted to an abstract of not more than 300 words.

INTRODUCTION All of these may sound serious and some can be,
either by themselves or in combination. However, the
Manned-submersible safety is examined by looking potential dangers can be greatly reduced by following
at various risks, analyzing the severity of these recognized design standards, testing, and operational
dangers, and determining what is really important in procedure. As an initial minimum requirement, every
regard to personnel and equipment safety. Design vehicle employed in commercial or scientific work
and operation of these vehicles is a highly should be CLASSIFIED.
specialized aspect of offshore technology and a
complete understanding of this subject has been The three largest groups that provide guidelines
limited to a few people. This paper is a compilation and rules for classification are American Bureau of
and simplification of numerous guidelines, rules, Shipping (ABS), Lloyds Register of Shipping (Lloyds)
accident reports, and experiences. Basic and and Det Norske Veritas (DNV). Chart I is a summary
uncomplicated criteria are established as a guide of major classification design criteria as it
for determining what safety requirements should be pertains to safety factors for maintaining hull and
satisfied. system integrity. Besides protecting the occupants
from hydrostatic and gas pressure, each of these
This discussion Will be limited to attended groups makes statements about the other factors
manned-submersible vehicles and more specifically to influencing submersible design and operation. The
I!mall, dry, one-atmosphere observation work vehicles amount of discussion and how specific the require-
that are self-propelled and operate to moderate ments are varies. Chart II is a summarization of
depths. All vehicle systems such as electrical power general design requirements.
and life-support systems are self-contained. Diver
lockout and subsea personnel transfer submersibles Classification safety criteria covers many
are excluded as they encompass another set of safety details, but which ones are the most important?
criteria that need to be covered separately. Which items should be considered in greater detail?
Chart III and the follOWing discussions examine some
What questions or proof should an insurance of the possible problems and probable seriousness.
company, potential customer, or regulatory group ask
when concerned about safety and personnel liability? PRESSURE-HULL COLLAPSE
What are the risks? Below is a random assortment of
possible problems. Flooding of the manned compartment is a failure
mode that usually would be catastrophic and fatal.
Pr~ssure-hull collapse Main propulsion failure_ These vehicles operate at depths where free ascents
Seal failure and leakage Control surfaces to the surface either are impossible or hazardous for
Flooding inoperative even an experienced diver. Below a couple hundred
Internal gas leak Loss of communications feet, the high-pressure air and certainly oxygen
Depletion of H.P. air Lighting-system failure emergency breathing systems are not suitable to
supply Fire sustain life in a nooded compartment. Small bail-
Depletion of oxygen supply Loss of navigational out systems might be used for shallower depths, but
Handling-system failure instrumentation the flooded submersible at greater depth probably has
Entanglement while Personal injury or taken its crew's life. Fortunately, the integrity of
submerged sickness the pressure hull is not a frequent problem; that is,
Lost from surface support Electrical grounds if the vehicle is classified by the American Bureau
Loss of normal power Explosion of Shipping, Lloyds, or Det Norske Veritas. By the
Carbon dioxide scrubber Exceeding operational time classification is achieved, the probability of
failure depth catastrophic failure of the pressure hull is
extremely remote. Every piece of metal or plastic
References and illustrations at end of paper.
has been identified, strength known and recorded.
Every weld has been inspected. The entire hull has
been subjected to an unmanned external pressure
check to at least deeper than its rated operating
depth and the finished submersible undergoes a
manned test to its rated operating depth.
SEAL FAILURE AND LEAKAGE
Cut "0" rings, dirt or paint imperfections in
"0" ring grooves, and loose fittings can be a cause
for alarm. However, most of these create small leaks
that can be corrected while submerged, or there is
sufficient time and capability to surface. Once
submerged, the large hydrostatic pressure usually
reduces viewport or mating flange leaks to the
annoyance category.
FLOODING
The most persistent danger of manned compartment
flooding is through hatches and damage by collison.
Large openings like man-way hatches provide the real
danger due to flooding. It is on the surface that
the catastrophic occurrence of hundreds of pounds of
water pouring into this opening can send the helpless
submersible plunging to the bottom. Most of these
vehicles operate in sea-state conditions where
hatches should be sealed befnre launch, locked,
checked, and never opened until safely back on board
with the vehicle secure. Protection from collision
with underwater obstacles depends on proper guards
and obstacle-avoidance equipment, but generally the
speed of the submersible is slow enough that
catastrophic damage is avoided. If this type of
operating procegure is not observed, collision could
occur with fatal results and it is the responsibility
of the pilot to use good judgment.
Flooding through systems open to sea water can
result from component fallure or human error.
Component fallure is minimized by classification
requirements for double hull stop valves. Incorrect
operation of trim, variable buoyancy and compartment
vents sometimes occur; however, if the crew is
trained properly, no significant damage is done.
The possible panic and confusion of people not
familiar with the submersible operations could be
serious.
INTERNAL GAS LEAKS
Gas leaks into the compartment are sensed· by
noise, a barometer or altimeter, and hull stop or
isolation valves can be shut off until the problem
is solved, or the submersible can surface. Two
separate sources of 02 and H.P. air are classifica-
tion requirements, so the consequences of this
problem are not too serious and should have a
compartment vent to relieve internal pressure.
DEPLETION OF AIR SUPPLY
If through carelessness of the operating crew
or leaks, the H.P. air supply is depleted or pressure
ineffective, it still is possible to surface by
dropping weight or pumping sea water from the
buoyance tanks. It is impossible in this system for
the gas pressure to go lower than the ambient water
pressure except in the case where the vehicle dives
deeper after equalizing its air pressur.e at
shallower depth. Unless there is a serious external
1288
leak in both normal and emergency supplies, there
should be air available to blow ballast tanks, once
the ascent has started. Even i f this is not the
case, recovery still can be made at the surface
Without ballast tanks blown.
DEPLETION OF OXYGEN SUPPLY
Oxygen is easy to store in high-pressure
containers and there is no reason to send any
vehicle diving without at least enough oxygen for the
mission plus 72 hours.
HANDLING SYSTIM FAILURE
Hydraulic-system problems, broken lines, and
numerous electrical, mechanical, or hydraulic faults
can make a normal launch or recovery turn into a
nightmare of broken fairings, dented pressure hulls,
and other expensive damage. Proper equipment and
quick action by a well-trained crew can minimize
damage.
ENTANGLEMENT WHILE SIJ:EMERGED
Inability to surface has created crisis and will
continue to be a persistent problem and a worry to
every submersible pilot. Entanglement from known and
unknown ropes, cables, nets, and debris is a real and
potentially dangerous threat. Often in the area
where the vehicle is working, trash cable, fishing
lines, and the frequent culprit, floating ''Poly Line",
is there to be wrapped around propellers and
protrusions from the hull. Guards and screens can
help, but often reduce thrust to a point where the
submersible is not maneuverable.
LOST FROM SURF ACE SUPPORI' SHIP
Being lost from the surface support ship can
occur while submerged or on the surface. It can be
both an uncomfortable rolling wait and dangerous if
surface exit from the vehicle is not possible because
of design or weather. Extended life support may be
required.
LOSS OF NORMAL POWER
This will cause the dive to be terminated, but
no system, either normal or emergency, required for
surfacing should require electrical power for
operation. The submersible still can surface and be
recovered.
C02 SCRUBBER FAILURE
This problem in itself would simply result in
termination of the dive and recovery. Carbon dioxide
buildup in the volume of a small submersible is
gradual enough to permit time to surface. For some
people, it can be annoying and result in headaches
and nausea, but with no further complications, there
should be time for ascent, surfacing, and recovery.
Independent extended life support systems could be
used i f necessary.
MAIN PROPULSION FAILURE
This problem may occur in the power source,
electrical distribution, or main motors themselves.
It is irritating, as the dive must be terminated, but
not a serious threat to the safety of the crew. The
submersible does not depend on main propulsion to
surface.
CONTRJJL SURFACE INOPERATIVE
This is definitely a problem and would result in
termination of the dive. However, unlike vehicles
such as aircraft, it is not cause for great alarm.
The small submersible does not use rudders, diving
planes, or other hydrodynamic adjustments to surface.
As long as the water column above the submersible is
clear, a simple change of buoyancy to slightly
positive will bring the crew safely to the surface
and recovery.
LOSS OF COMMUNICATION
This can occur on the surface or submerged.
SUbmerged communications are disrupted by thermal
layers, being out of range, or equipment problems.
Naturally, it is cause for concern as this is the
only link between vehicle and surface support that
confirms the normal status of the dive. Most
operating companies require the submersible.to
surface if communication is not re-established
within a predetermined period of time.
LIGHTING SYSTEM FAILURE.
This is an equipment failure that may severely
hamper navigation and video recording if ambient
light is not sufficient. Self-contained lights are
carried for emergency internal lighting so the dive
may be terminated safely by surfacing.
This occurrence is usually limited to a
defective or overloaded electrical component. The
problem probably will be brief and create some acrid
fumes and discomfort, which may require emergency
breathing and surfacing.
LOSS OF NAVIGATIONAL :EgUIPMENT
Sonars, gyrocompasses, and transponder systems
can fail as any other electronic instrumentation.
Depending on visibility, the bottom terrain and the
basic requirements of the mission, it may be possible
to go on without danger. At worse the submersible
must surface, be recovered, and repairs made.
PERSONNEL INJURY OR SICKNE3S
Seasickness and nausea from rolling about on the
surface certainly is high on the list as a common
occurrence.. Small lacerations, abrasions, and smoke
or dust inhalation can and do happen. Yet none of
these are catastrophic in nature and safe termination
of the mission is possible.
ELECTRICAL GROUNDS
Equipment faults will blow fuses or open circuit
breakers, which protect personnel and other equipment
from serious damage. The submersible is not
dependent on electrical power to surface.
EXPLOSION
Hydrogen created. by batterie6 i6 the explo6ive
gas creating a potential danger for the submersible.
For the small submersible the solution is simple;
place main power supplies external to the manned
compartment. Devices also are available to
neutralize hydrogen in pods by turning it into
harmless water. Earlier submersible designs carried
batteries Within the manned compartment, and
classification agencies still allow this if adequate
protection from explosion can be shown. However, the
safest situation is external batteries.
EXCEEDING OPERATIONAL DEPTH
In most instances this is never a problem as the
bottom depth is less than the rated operating depth
of the submersible. In those cases where operations
are being performed at some midwater depth or at the
surface where the bottom lies below the operating
depth of the submersible, there are redundant methods
of insuring the operating depth will not be exceeded.
Buoyancy can be changed by varying volume of water in
variable buoyance tanks, blowing high-pressure air
into ballast tanks, or as a last resort, dropping
emergency weights.
CRITERIA FOR SAFErY REQUIREMENTS
In studying these hazards several observations
are evident. If the problem is not initially
catastrophic, such as pressure-hull collapse, the
items, emergency and extended life support and
surface and recover are mentioned frequently as
action items. Being able to surface and be recovered
and having sufficient life support are critical to
all safety requirements. These important subjects
need further discussion.
Surfacing
In most conditions, a classified submersible can
surface if the manned compartments are secure and the
submersible not entangled, when designed to their
guidelines or rules. However, some earlier designs
had isolated unmanned external compartments that, if
flooded, will not allow the vehicle to surface no
matter what action was taken. Assuming the manned
compartment is not flooded, ascent can be
accomplished by pumping oil into external bladders or
water out of tanks, releasing the manned compartment,
displacing water in tanks with high-pressure air, or
dropping weights. Some designs have the capability
of all four methods. The submersible should still be
able to surface With the largest single isolated
unmanned compartment completely flooded.
Extended Life Support
Adequate life support for the crew in small
submersibles primarily means simply continuing to
breathe. A 72-hour plus normal mission duration
should be a minimum requirement and mission plus 7
days is recommended by several commercial operators.
This period of time should enable rescue efforts to
reach an entangled or partially flooded submersible
at world-wide locations. It is assumed .that locating
devices are installed and working •.
What about water, fo.od, and blankets? Even
these items are not absolutely essential for the
period of time being discussed. However, in order to
keep the vehicle crew alert and able to assist in a
rescue attempt, water is required. About 4 to 6 pinta
per man per day should suffice. Additional supplies
1289
such as high-energyfood, thermalprotection,and
waste storagewill further help the plight of the
vehicle crew.
It is the additf.on of oxygen and removal of
carbon dioxide that is critical. Oxygents stored
easily in high-pressurecylindersand not a problem
to supply or monitor. Carbon dioxide removal is the
difficulty. C02 absorbingefficiencyof the chemi-
cals used depends on temperature,humidityand
exposureto reactive surfacesof the chemical.
Normally these chemicals are placed in a container
and air circhted through the containerby electri-
cti powered blowers. What happens when the blower
stops is that chemicallyreactive surfacesof the
scrubbingcompoundwithin the canister are no longer
exposedto air circulation. IL is a very real
possibilitythat an emergency,such as entanglement,
comes at the end of a working mission when normal.
battery capacitates are depleted. Separateemergency
battery sources are carriedby most submersibles.
A typical.scrubbercan draw about 2 amps at 2&volts.
For the minimum 72 hours, this would mean about 1~
SMP hours power consumptionon a continuousbasis.
Fortunately,the scrubberdoes not need to be run
continuously,but certainlymost current emergency
battery packs could not keep up tith 002 removal over
7 days with even intermediateuse. Sometimes
spreadingthese absorbingchemicalsover decks,
wrapped in clothing, etc., is mentionedin emergency
procedures. Opening canistersof chemicalslike
lithium hydroxidewould form a very causticdust
difficultto breathe. Also, scrubbingefficiency
under these conditionsis hard to establish. More
equipmentdevelopmentand testing is being done, but
for the time be= at least, an abundant supply of
carbon dioxide absorbingchemical shouldbe carried.
Man-poweredemergencyscrubberswith a face mask that
still permits voice communicationshouldbe
considered.
&ergency Life Support
In the event of a contaminatedatmospheresuch
as fumes from an electricalfire or flooding at
shsll.owdepths, some form of protectivebreathing
apparatushas to be installed. It might be simply
a scuba-typediving regulatorand face mask or a more
complex, completelyself-containedunit with its own
oxygen and C4)2-removalcapability. Whatever the
system,it should offer the submersiblecrew completx
life supportin a compartmentwhere the atmosphereis
unbreathable. Some of the systems are limited in
time because of capacityor pressurebuildup within
the manned compartment. However, it generallyis
agreed by classificationagenc~esand operatorsthat
at least enough time to reach the surfacewith a
normal.ascent rate from maximum operatingdepth, and
still have a jo-percentsafety margin is adequate.
Launch and RecoverySystem
At the surface,launch and recovery is a tense
time for both the surface support and submersible
crew. Many tons of weight must be handled from a
rolling,heaving, and pitchingvessel. The vehicle’~
mass is so small comparedwith a ship, barge, or
platform and a small error or misjudgmentcan result
quickly in major dsmage. Except in the case of
improperprelaunchpreparationof the vehicle, the
major damage risk is to equipment. NO doubt this
phase of the operationsis the largest single source
1290
of expensiveequipmentdamage. Some handling systems
are accidentsasking to happen when trying to modify
shore-basedcranes ~o meet”~he specializedrequire-
ment of the offshore system. Control is tihesecret a
it is not a game of flipping a submersibleback on
deck swiftlylike a new-caughtfish, nor moving it
slowly as it crashesback and forth across the ship.
The proper systemthrough design and operator skill.
keeps control of the submersiblesafely and without
accidentin the sea state for which it is intended.
Watch the systemin films of its operationor at sea
if there are any doubts.
Experienceand Procedureof the
Operatw Personneland Company
No matter how safe the equipment,the ability
to use it correctlyis extremelyimportant. The
company should have both a general operating
procedureavailableand an operationalplan for the
specificmission availablefor examination. As a
minimum requirement,the people responsiblefor
decision making should have past submersible
experiencewhere they demonstratedgood judgmentwhen
decisionswere made.
CONCLUSIONS
Proof of Vehicle Classificationand Last Survey
Descriptionof Life Support-Normal and
Emergency
Descriptionof Handling System
Procedure and Experienceof the Operating
Personnel and Company
If the points above are questionedand the
answers satisfythe requirementsdiscussedpreviously
there can be a high degree of confidencethat the
safety of personneland equipnenthas been conside-
red. If ignored,there is the potentialfor a
serious accident.
For further discussionand details, Ref. 6 is ax
excellentsource of information. Also, the Marine
TechnologySociety has publishedtwo books on safety
and is working on a third book to be publishedin
the near future.
Manned submersiblesoperatedproperly are
effectiveunderwatertools that greatly increaseour
capabilityfor both scientificand commercialwork.
REFERENCES
1. Safety and OperationalGuidelinesfor Undersea
=Book II, Marine TechnologySociety
.
2. Guide for the Classificationof Manned
Submersibles,American Bureau of Shipping (1968)
3. Guide for the Classificationof Underwater
Vessels and I?ElatedSystems,proposed,American
Bureauof Shipping (1974).
4* Submersibles‘fie=,“Re&ations and Guidance
Notes for the Construction,Classificationand
Planned Inspectionof Submersibles,TiLoyd’s
Register of Shipping (1973).
5. TentativeRules for the Constructionand Classif-
ication of Submersibles,Det Norske Veritas
11971+).
6. Eusby, R. Frank: Manned Submersibles,Office of
the Oceanographer,US Navy (1976).
 !!!M?-L ..
Pressure Proof Test And Design Cviterla

—...————- —. m ,68 Ar3S‘74 Proposed — DNV ,74

—.——. .. .’!3..———
-L!!u!E
INILLANAL’frl
CAL 1.5 x OP pro$wm - design I.5 x OP preswre - ii,sign 1.5 x OP pressure - d.sign 1,5 x OP pressure -
OISIGN WFNOOT submi~ted for approval. sutinitlcdfor approval. suhmitted for approval. de, ign SUbl,,t
ttcd
FAILURC fr?rapproval.

..- ——-. —.— —..

TCSTING ELECTRICA 1.5 x OP pressure - drawings 1.5 X OP p,~SSUP, for 6 hrs. UIWCC Ified. Unspc!ci
fled.
PINETMIOR sub!,tl
tlcd. and 2.0 x OP pressure on ncw
ASSE14DL1ES designs with cycle Test.

INJLLFADRICATION Full pmetration !eIds with Full penetration welds with Full penetration kmlds with F!IllpeneLvation
OF STCSL TOO% fn5pection. Material 100X inspection. Material ltW inspection. Material welds with TOO%
CONSTRUCTION properties Identified and properties identified and properties {dent{fied and inspection. Matcvial
docunanted. domnnented. documented. properties ideotiried
and docu,,entcd.

—.—. — —
UNWWED tiULL I.10 x OP pressure. 1.10 x OP pres,”re for 2000 1.30 x OP pressure. 1.30 x or pv.%,”,, or
PROOF TEsT fsw or greater. 1.20 x OP I.40 x OP pressure in
~wssure for less than ZOW tc$t cha”,t,er$
wf Lh di,wnsion
check of test chamher.
(Notice fl)
——--——.——— .— . . ... . .. . . .. . . ...

GAS STORAGE I.C.C. or equivalent. 0.0.1. or e9. ivalent. Ship rules - Chapter V and Recognized national
PFKSSURE CONTAINERS I ,5 x OP pressure. stmhrd k “Rules For
INSIDE HULL Steel Ships’,

GAS STORAGE Recognizcd $tandards & Recognized stand?rds 6 Ship rules . Chapter V 1.5 x normal working
PRESSURE CONTAINCRS wcfal considcr,lt
ion. weclal Conslderati.n. and 1.5 x OP Dressure Drcscure
DUTSIDE NULL

.——
——. —..-, —-.——.— —— ,.....- .—...__... . . . . . .
PIPlt4GSYSTEM TEST I,5 x working p~,WW 1.5 x workfng pressure 1.5 x kvrking pv,WN’e 1.5 x .0,king pVe,S”l’C
do,,ble,.1,,s on SYSt,m “p,” double valves on system open double “alV,, 0“ system open rio”bleva 1,,s on sy,te,n
to sea w3t,r. to sea water. to sea water. “p,” to ,,,?water.

-. .. ...—.—--. —-.-—- . .......-. — ...—— .—. . ... ..... . . . . .

CYCLE LIE U“spe. ifred. Unspecified. Oesign to minimum 500D ~“511?Ci
ffed.
dives to OP depth or specify.

.——.
.-———
..——-—
- —. .. . -.
NANNFD PROOF TEST Rated operational pressure Rated operational pressure Prefer operational pressure I.11 x ope,aLional
depth. depth. depth. pressure d?pth.

—. —. —..— ——
BALLAsT TANK TEST - 1.5 x calculated differential 1.5 x calculated differential Un<p.cificd.
NVEIRDSTATICTEST Pressure. Pressure.

—ADS ‘6LT -.–— Jw—————— —Llwds.- .. ....-––.—. ..-_.

T
LIFE 14iss
ion up to 24 hrs. to have 24 qission up to 24 hrs. to have 72 72 houvs l’e,,,”.beyond longest 1. arcwda.ce wi 1!,manning and
SUPPORT hrs. additional margin. Great,-, ?rs. additional margr”. Greater planned mis$io.. planned diviog .iss{orm, b“t
than one day to have two days p]”, than o“e day 10 havo tbrce days should be suff{c{w.t for a
two hrs. pcr pla.”cd mi S$ion day. ,1”s two bo”?s per plan.ed m{ssio, mini,n”.of 48 hours,
______
CONf40N
ICAT10N fico”$
tic device w{th ,a”ge II. ;amc as ,68 guidel{.c, rtf.
MY .O,,l)uni.at
10.M th U“dcrwater terephone ,,,d
11.ssthan 1.5 times .?,$.. $Uvfac. support V.$scl is to surface conm,unicaticm
operating depth. !fad{otrans- >. nm{ntaincd, Su!,,,,c,.ged .wry!ng .itb NatfOtI.
I
nitter/recefver for surface rang. at re,qt r.5ti~s ax. Iiccnsmg authovilics,
communication with I“tetnati.anal 1P depth,
.—. — d{stress frequency.
—.—.—
lNSTRUl.llN- Submit details-vital instruments SuLmit details - vital i“strunmnt Subm{t detail, - must include Subn,it details for
TArl@N “my require back-up. req”fre back-tip. monitor a“d control of erectric consideration.
power air !qencratio. depth
cm”icat ion bairast system
maneuvevi”g control. Vital
———
—--- ~m>onent$ to have back-up. _._— — —.—.
NAV1GATION UnspcL{Fied. Un<pccificd. Unspecified. Ht”im”m rquiren,ml
.— —-. . ——. — ______ -. -msn:~.f:-50JWS
... ..-. . ... . ..
UKRGENCV Entcrgcncydcballasting or San,?as ,68. Able to surface from max. OP Emqc,,cy blowinq of ha]last
ASCENT jettisoning system, depth without prOp”lSiO” by tanks a“d jetti:”oi”g kright
blowing tanks or droppfng in W event of powor fail”ve.
w?igbts. Operat!?dfrom within press”rc
.—-— .—.— .—
ENCRGENCY W2rg?ncy breathing at least Dreathing apparatus or f~ce mask Enw’gency oxygen systcm com- Emerge”cy bvcathing apparattm

---.-J
OMATNING 2 hrs. or recouue.d tiow to plugg@d into em?rgency bre?.thing plctely independent of main appliances with a rewrv. suppiy
reach surface from max. op systrm rO~ cacb person PIUS O“C Systc.. Sufficient t{m to of oxygc”, or air, efthev built-
dcptt,P1“s 50X margin. spare. Sam? duration as ,68. rcach surface by normal ascc”t in or p“rtsble units to provid.
plus 50% margin. sufffcic”t thm to enable the
.—— .s~b~crs[b~e_tgJ~.achs“,r.C.
EMERGENCY Power i“depc”dent of primary Vot spocificd. Individual S,1f r.””ta{ncdPower for
POliTR s0”,,? for underwater conm,”
- considerat{o”. I{ghti”g, F3i1ure of electri-
.Ication, Depth indication cal q“fp”,cnt wi 1r nut ptWcnL
and internal I{qhtit,
g. Al the stdmwrsfhle surracing or
Icast one pmvnw source icmted the oprration of the life
in?Idc Prc$-.urchul1. $Wlrlort
t.im
sy=, {n an ml,rgmlcy
modo
Al rEN Annual dnd <pee18I SUrVQyS hmual viwal r.,min lb”]] firm.arviWaT wiLh Anwm I v isu.)
I ,a”dte?l ff
CUNSIRUCrION for Wpa{ r ,,,,?1
te,at1,,”s md arI nor,”ai and CIIWTC.CY elocLrical vesfst,,nce
SURVEY ,Ystcllls
examined. Special checked. Two year vi<”al
Iequcv ted on a 1r SYStPnt5
with test dive to ,1.qrccd
RHlN[RE14F.NT ;UrVCYS rOr rcpaiF ~r mith Cunction check of d,olh, Sp.cfal ,Urvl?yat
!Ttcratio”$. m?cllanical,ele~tricsl. 1 y~ar
fntcrnais
with
];fa suppn;t, [rim tes; complete check of prc.s.re
wid recalibratto” of cmuges. hull.
t years chc!-kof hui I
thickness and dimensions
and every two
years ~rt~~.
 ..
..

Charl III
rAI1.lJRC
—-—— NOD[ AlhU.YS
IS

P robl
———— cm ———. ..&o.hlLl lC c!]!
Ise _____ ._ .Jki4LU_.-_ -.-._-Ac Linn.RcrIu
—.. ircd Pos>ible Sevg& . ..— 4
1. Pressure hul1 InmicquaterJosign/corro<ion/ loss of b!loyancy Little Lime 10 react Fnlal
collapse cxcocding (IPdepth and flooding

2. Sezl railure - “O” rings/gaskelWalve Leak FSivo!orminal(d

submerged filtings

3, rlooding Hatch or viewport Loss of buoyancy LiLtle time Lo react - Fatal

emergency cscnpe or mncrqcncy
life support, if feasible

4. tntcrnal gas leak Filting or valve Compartmcnt Fix or sccut’esystem at hul1 IlivcLcrminatcd- vent cnmuart.ment
prcssur~ increased stop valve

5. Drplction nf Fitting or v~lve GcIs SUPP]Y 10St Surface

H.P. air

6. Dr?pletionof Extended submerged Lifc support Emcrgimcy rmruc Fatal within sI1oI’I.
period of time
oxygen supply duration incomplete

7. }Iandl
ing system Jnzdcquat.e
design Surface impact [mcrqencyretrieval Dive torminatrdwiIh major
fail,tre with ship equipment ddmagc

t?. [ntanglmnentwhile Ropes in prnpcllers, Infibility

to [xtcnrJcdIife s[lpport Fatal if oxygon an{iC(32rmnoval
<ubmcrged debris, soft bottom surface awaiting rescue not sufficient

9. Lost from surf?ce Fog, currents,bad Mission duration Extended 1ife suppo~t Fatal unlpss surface exit is
Sllflpot-t woaUmr extended awaiting rv,cue possible

10. 1.0ssof normal Doplc?tion

of baLLcry Propulsion/electrical Surfoce & rrcovcry f)ivetwminaled
power capacity/electrical and clccLranics non-
fault functional

11. Carbon ,iioxide Electricalfault Life support Surface & rccovcry ftivetrrminatod
scrubber failore incomplete

12. Main prnplllsion Motor cnntrollcr No monouverability Surface ,!rccnvcry Dive terminated
failure

13. Control surface Electrical or No mancl!vwahi1ity Surface k rccnvery Ftivctmninaloil

inopcrative hydraulic fault

14. Loss of Out of rar,gcj Surface supporL Surface after spccifird Dive terminaterl
communications elccLrical fault unaware of vehicle time
status .

15. Lighting system Electrical fa!llt Insufficientlight Isolate fault if Dive terminated
failure for video and possihlc or surface
navfgaLion and recnve~y
t
16. Fire Electrical wire Smoke & fumes Extinguishwith fire Dive terminalcd
or component suppression equipmonl if
requirect- emergency 1ife
support may be necried-
surface and recover

17. Loss of navigational Electronic fault Visual reference Surface and recovery if Dive terminated
insl.rumcn
Latinn only conditions do not permit
visual only

18. Personal injury Rough surface Crew eff”fc

iency If problem persists or Oivr Ierminatccl
or sickness conditions degraded if serious injury - cancel
dive - recnvery

19. Electrical grounds Moisture/componentfault Circuit breaker or Electrically isolaLe component 1f necessary
fuse protection dive terminated
activitatr?d

20. Explosion Nydrogcn F ire and fumes Emergency breathing Could br fetal if
baLlerics in manned
compartmrnL

21. Exceeding opcraLinq fluoyancynot Pressure collapse Change hmyanc y Fatal

depth under control possible to posiLivr