Outsourcing War: Mercenaries and the Privatization of Peacekeeping STEVEN BRAYTON “If other nations, individually or collectively, are not willing to contribute to multilateral peacekeeping or peacemaking forces, why should a state not have the right to hire « force able ta keep order? Fe nearly three centuries the accepted international norm was that only nation-states fought wars. Today, however, or- ganizing units unrelated to the nation-state, from terrorists, mercenaries, guerrillas and warlords to non-state militias and private military corporations, conduet war worldwide. Although the form of non-state force varies from one society to the next, the collective effect is the erosion of the state’s monopoly on the use of violence. A growing number of states are unable to protect the political, military, economic, social and cultural life of their citizens. This has important implications for international peacekeeping and peacemaking. In the post-Cold War era, global phenomena such as supra- national governing regimes, transnational business, population movements, environmental degradation and the universalization of culture have challenged the cohesion of the nation-state. Some of the most pressing security threats in the post-Cold War era stem from the demise of what Martin van Creveld calls “trinitarian warfare’—the rule bor at Westphalia that has guided modern conflict with the principle that in war “it is the government that directs, the army that fights, and the people Journal of tncernational Affairs, Spring 2002. $5, no. 2. © The Trustees of Co- lumbia University in the City of New YorkSteven Brayton who suffer.”' Although the people still suffer in most cases, in- creasingly it is neither the government that directs nor the army that fights. Instead, individuals and groups taking up arms for self-protection, or to defend interests that their state can no longer guarantee, generate widespread intrastate conflicts. These conflicts, in tum, produce dysfunctional or disintegrating states; the United Nations and other international organizations are asked to address the resulting complex emergencies. At the same time, the international community is increasingly reluctant to provide peacekeeping forces for difficult, expensive and po cally unrewarding operations. In response, private corporations are offering to fill the void with commercially contracted mili- tary and security forces In 1994, the United Nations became sufficiently alarmed about the role of mercenaries to appoint an official to investigate the issue. Enrique Bernales Ballesteros, the UN special rappor- icur on mercenaries, reported a growing number of hired fighters appearing in Angola, Rwanda, Tajikistan, Armenia, Azerba Afghanistan, the former Zaire and the former Yugoslavia. report expressed particular concern about the involvement of large, well-organized and well-equipped private military corpora- tions.’ The rise of these corporations in the 1990s, with their view of armed conflict as legitimate business opportunity, has provoked outrage and prompted calls to outlaw such organiza- tions.’ This kind of alarm is not surprising, as the United Nations is an organization of states, and states have long guarded their monopoly on the use of force. From the perspective of the United Nations, mercenary activity is a violation of the prin ples of sovereign equality, political independence and the tetri- torial integrity of member states. However, as hired fighters are ie * Martin van Creveld, Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict (New York: Free Press, 1993) p. 20, United Nations. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Mercenaries, BICN.A/1995/29, 29 August 1995 * David Shearer, “Outsourcing War,” Foreign Policy 112 (Fall 1998) p. 68. 3041 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFPAIRSOutsourcing War most commonly used in intrastate conflicts, little effective action has been taken to regulate them. In a critical examination of the general privatization of pub- lic security, it is useful to focus particularly on cases in Sierra Leone, Angola, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. These examples: illus- trate the post-Cold War debate regarding the strategic impact of private military companies in intrastate conflicts, as well as the potential role of private security in military operations and peacemaking, especially given the absence of UN and Western peacekeeping in low-intensity conflicts. The analysis also raises the troubling link between low-intensity conflicts and strategic minerals, examining how liberal, market-oriented, globalization forces provide economic opportunity for mercenary companies. The growing use of the private sector in national security matters has created a clientele politics in which civie and politi- cal loyalty, rooted in the need for protection, has devolved to sub-state military actors with questionable motives.* This shift of power to private, non-state military interests occurs primarily n so-called failing states, where local authorities cannot, or will not, protect citizens.” To an extent unprecedented in modern times, entities other than nation-states wage war across multiple physical and ideo- logical boundaries. The Cold Wat's clear dichotomi ind array of proxy wars have devolved into myriad intrastate conflicts and cross-border wars of uncertain and shifting ideological founda- tion. The SIPRI Yearbook recorded 25 major armed conflicts in 2000, only two of which were between states.” Although these new warring entities include terrorists, mercenaries, guerrill warlords and non-state militias, private military companies, in the absence of UN and Western commitment to peacekeeping in low-intensity conflicts, represent a serious threat to interna- * Ulric Shannon, New Political Science 22:1 (2000) p. 103. “Increasingly unwilling to use national armed forces for national security activi- ties, political Icaders in developed states engage the services of private military corporations as well. Highlights, Armed Conflicts and Regional Security” in SIPRI Yearbook 2001 (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 200]) p | ‘SPRING2002 1 305Steven Brayton tional security, DEFINING MERCENARIES Three widely accepted criteria define mercenaries: they are for- cign to the conflict; they are motivated chiefly by financial gain; and, in some cases, they participate directly in combat. The mer- ary companies that emerged in the 1990s exhibit all these traditional criteria, They also display several more modern characteristics: they present a distinctly corporate image; they openly defend and advertise their usefulness and professionalism; they use internationally accepted legal and financial instruments to secure their commercial arrangements; and, to date, they support only recognized governments, avoid- ing regimes unpalatable to the international community.’ Private military companies differ from ordinary security firms that pro- vide private guards and security advice, Such local security firms do not use or provide training in military methods, leadership or equipment. The new private mititary companies, however, offer all these services. A 1997 study by the Center for Defense Information lists dozens of such organizations with international operations. South Africa is the leading home of international securi yy com panies, such as Executive Outcomes, Combat Foree, Investment Surveys, Honey Badger Arms and Ammunition, Shield Security, Kas Enterprises, Saracen International and Longreach Security. International military firms based in other parts of the world in- clude Alpha Five, Corporate ‘Trading International, Omega Sup- port Led., Parasee Strategic Concept, Jardine Securicor Gurkha Services (of Hong Kong); Gurkha Security Guards (of the Isle of Man, UK): Special Project Service Ltd, Defence Systems Ltd., Sandline International (of the UK); and Science Applications Intemational Corporation, Vinnell Corporation, DynaCorp, and cenary or private mili ' Shearer, pp. 68-70 306-1 JOURNALOF INTERNATIONAL AFEAIRS:Outsourcing War Military Professional Resources, Inc. (of the US).* For analytical purposes, three functional types of mercenaries and private military companies can be distinguished.” The first type. centuries old, comprises groups and individuals that have military skills directly applicable to combat or immediate com- bat support, They offer combat training, leadership and combat support skills (artillery support, aviation, military engineering, nd the fike). They are almost always trained veterans from ma- jor powers. They may conduct training for basic troops, provided by the client, and even lead them in combat. Typically, these mercenaries are ad hoe collections of individuals who have re- sponded ta advertisements placed by the sponsoring state, but in recent years more sophisticated organizational forms have ap- peared, such as corporations or their subsidiaries. Executive Outcomes, for example, has been described as the modern world’s first fully equipped private army. The second type of mercenary and private military company is a late-20th-century phenomenon. This type, involving fairly large commercial companies, offers services that general staff in national armies of more developed countries usually provide: high-quality tactical, operational and strategic advice for the structuring, (raining, equipping and employment of armed forces. These companies are staffed almost exclusively by retived senior officers and noncommissioned officers of major armed forces, usually including former generals, With a ready supply of subcontractors, they are capable of providing most of the ser- vices required to field « credible armed force: strategic planning; force development: research and threat analysis; general staff training, including air and naval operations; training in multi- service, combined operations including intelligence and elec- and combined arms training for tactical units. tronic warfare; * David Isenberg, Soldiers of Fortune Lid.: A Profile of Today's Private Sector Corporate Mercenary (Washington DC: Center for Defense Information, No- vember 1997), ° Thomas K. Adams, Parameters:US Army War College Quarterly (Summer 1999) pp, 103-109. Sprinc 2002 1 307Steven Brayton ‘These organizations specialize in helping industrial-age armies enter the 21st century by incorporating the techniques of infor: mation and technical warfare. Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) is an example of this type of service. The third type of mercenary provides highly specialized ser- vices with military application, although these groups are not themselves primarily military or paramilitary in organization or in method. Although members of such an organization may not necessarily have military experience or training, they posses skills and abilities with military as well as civilian use. ‘These companies, usually smaller than the first qe types, perform such functions as personal protection, signal interception, com- puter cracking, secure communications or technical surveillance One such company is AirScan, based in. Titusville, Florida, which provides day and night airborne surve of customers. lance to a variety THE RISE OF THE NEW MERCENARIE! The increasing inability of weak governments to counter internal violence has created a ready market for private military forces. Fueled by a post-Cold War shift away from the strategic con- frontation of major powers in such countries as Mozambique, Rwanda and Sierra Leone, Western countries are more reluctant to intervene militarily in weak states, and their politicians are disinclined to explain casualties to their electorates, Most West- ern armies are designed to fight the sophisticated international conflicts envisioned by Cold Wat strategists. ‘The armies are ni ther trained nor equipped for low-intensity civil wars, which in- volve complicated ethical agendas, blurred boundaries between combatants and civilians and loose military hierarchies. At the same time, Western governments’ fears of sustaining casualties, entanglement in expanding conflicts and the escalating costs in- volved in ill-defined missions have resulted in slower, less ambi- tious and, sometimes, vetoed UN peacekeeping miss Into this vacuum have stepped private military entrepre- neurs. Their commercial goals are (o improve their clients’ mili- tary capabilities, permitting more clfective combat performance 308 1 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL, AFFAIRSOutsourcing War and deterrence capability. The companies provide military as- sessments, training or weapons procurement. Direct involvement in combat is less common, although some companies advertise their skill in this ar Unlike national armed services, private companies are unfet- tered by political constraints. They view conflict as a business opportunity and take advantage of the pervasive influence of economic liberalism in the late 20th century. Furthermore, they have quickly adapted to the complex agendas of civil wars— unlike most national armed forces, An expanded pool of military expertise made available by reductions in major powers’ forces has enhanced their ability to operate. Many recruits come from highly disciplined units, such as the British Special Air Service, and South African, American, Israeli and Russian special forces. Affordable Soviet weaponry, easily purchased on the open mar- ket, has helped strengthen the companies’ capabilities. Papua New Guinea provided an opportunity for private mili- tary action in 1997. When help from other quarters was un- available, Sir Julius Chan, prime minister of Papua New Guinea, claimed that he was forced to resort to the private sector to counter Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) insurgents. When negotiations with the BRA collapsed, Chan signed a $36 million contract with Sandline International to train his national forces and plan an offensive against the separatists. The govern- ment was particularly anxious to reopen Bougainville's Panguna copper mine, then the source of 30 percent of the country’s ex- port carnings. ‘The lure of rich resources and the risks of exploiting them in unstable regions provide powerful incentives for international corporations to offer to maintain the stability of weak states commercially. This motivation often cuns parallel to the local governments’ own wishes. For example, if a mining company depends on security to protect its investment, a beleaguered government may purchase private security on the mine’s behalf and use the subsequent mining revenues to supplement its own coffers, At the same time, a private military company will not only strengthen its client government's military performance but Spin 2002 | 309Steven Brayton also protect the mining company’s operations because these revenues guarantee its payment. The crucial difference between the intervention of a military enterprise and that of the United Nations is the souree of funding: The United Nations is not on the payroll of the state requesting assistance, When the external security force is a component of a multi- national corporation, the corporation potentially gains powerful Jeverage over a government and its affairs, In proffering security to collapsing, mineral-rich states such as Sierra Leone and An- gola, multinational corporations accentuate the international exploitation and marginalization of the states in question, Some argue that corporate mercenary forces who support the search for strategic minerals represent neocolonialism operating under the banner of liberal market policies." Although mineral explo tation is not the motive behind all private military activity, it clearly has been the driving factor in Sierra Leone and Angola. Nonetheless, the motivating force in every case has been com- ul advantage, new business and fresh profit opportunities, Private military companies are also willing to act as proxies for Western governments, MPRI has specialized exclusively in military services, originally for the privatization-inclined US De- partment of Defense. MPRI landed its first two major interna- tional contracts in 1994 with the Croatian government to up- date its Warsaw Pact-oriented military. When the sophisticated Croatian offensive, Operation Storm, took the Serb-held enclave of Krajina in August 1995, there was widespread suspicion that MPRI was involved. The operation played an important role in reversing the tide of war against the Serbs and-—consistent with American policy—in bringing both sides to the negotiating table. MPRI denied involvement but benefited from the rumors none- theless, Following the Dayton accord in 1995, the company wat hired to strengthen the Maslim-Croat Federation's army in order to deter Bosnian Serb aggression “ David J. Francis, “Mercenary Intervention in Sierra Leone: Providing Na- tional Security or International Exploitation?” Thied World Quarterly 20:2 (1999) p, 319, 3101 JOURNAL OFINTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS,Outsourcing War Funded by the contracting government, MPRE thus delivered a less expensive and less politically risky American foreign policy victory than would have been possible had US troops been used, ‘This scenario demonstrates how private military companies can help policymakers achieve their goals free from the need to se- cure public approval and safe in the knowledge that, should the situation deteriorate, official participation can be denied Other American companies have also worked to further ad- ministration policy through private military activity. Corporate giants such as Science Applications International Corporation and Braddock, Dunn & McDonald, Inc, and its subsidiary Vin- nell Corporation are high-tech suppliers to the military- industrial market but have diversified into providing military training. They have been contracted by the Saudi government to upgrade and ‘train its armed forces in the use of US weaponry. Some British companies have also supported government inter ests: London-based Saladin Security trains Omani government forces working alongside British military officers. For all practi- cal purposes, Saladin runs a fully equipped air force for Oman, with most aircraft: maintained and flown by experienced and highly trained British personnel. On the whole, British military companies are smaller and less diversified than their US coun- terparts and tend to focus on protecting commercial interests. Nonetheless, they maintain close contacts with the UK Ministry of Defense and are important sources of intelligence. Elsewhere on the African continent, the Angolan government hired South African military veterans in large numbers to counter the offensive launched by the rebel leader Jon: Savimbi. While the ground war progressed, South African and Russian fighter pilots flew Angolan Air Force MiGs and Sukhoi fighters. Early in 2000, news agencies reported that former So- viet pilots were on Savimbi’s payroll, Russian and Ukrainian pi lots also flew MiG fighters on both sides of the Ethiopian- Eritrean war that raged throughout most of 2000, During an catlier phuse of hostilities, US News and World Report described lonel Vyacheslav Myzin Russian Ce one of Ethiopi merging from the cockpit of newly acquired Su-27s after a demonstration SPRING 2002 | 311Steven Brayton flight. Apparently, the Russian contractor had inchided pilots and maintenance crews in its sales arrangement with both gov: ernments. |! MERCENARY COMPANIES IN THE PEACEKEEPING VACUUM One problem with this peacekeeping model is that recent em- pirical studies have shown that outright victories, rather than negotiated settlements, have concluded the majority of 20th- century conflicts, Nonetheless, the international community has tended to resist battlefield diplomacy in conflict resolution. In- stead, it has continued to press for negotiated settlements and maintain impartiality even in cases when the success of these approaches is doubtful. The resulting vacuum creates a demand that private military companies have been eager to fill.” In the 1990s, these companies began to undertake military activities that closely resembled the kind of peacemaking, peace- enforcement and peacekeeping operations formerly conducted by multinational and UN-sanctioned forces. Evecutive Outcomes in Angola and Sierra Leone Executive Outcomes was one of the first companies to serve this function. An expanded version of & military contractor, it was founded by veterans of the South African Defense Forces and registered as a business in Britain in 1993. The company at- tained prominence in March 1993, when rebels from National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) captured an oil storage area during the Angolan civil war, Government forces, the Forgas Armadas Angolanas (FAA), were unable to eject the rebels. Executive Outcomes assembled a group of 50 former officers, who organized and led an FAA attack against the storage area compound, quickly recapturing it, Casualties were minimal (only three South Africans were wounded), and the drilling equipment suffered only superficial damage. Executive ' The Russians Are Coming.” US News and World Report, 1S March 1999. © Shearer, pp. 75-76. 3121 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRSOutsourcing War Outcomes was then awarded the responsibility of maintaining security in the area, '" This success was followed in September 1993 with a contract to protect a diamond mine in Canfunfo, Angola, Income from diamond sales appeared crucial for vietory in the conflict. Esti- mates put the contract at $40 million (approximately 50 percent for soldiers and 50 percent for equipment and supplies). Execu- tive Outcomes’ personnel were described as “military taine but were allowed to carry out pre-emptive strikes against UNITA if they felt they or the mine were threatened. In March’ 1995, an Executive Outcomes team went to the aid of the rebel-beleaguered Kono diamond mines in Sierra Leone. The force was assembled and put into action by April, taking just 11 days to drive the rebels away from the capital and force them out of the diamond fields. Perhaps the most interest- ing aspect of this incident, however, is the method of payment The chronically impoverished government of Sicrra Leone ap- parently paid for these services by giving the Branch Energy Company the concession to operate the Koidu diamond field. Strategic Resources Group, a British company based in the Ba- hamas, reputedly owns Branch Energy—as well as Executive Outcomes. It seems that Strategic Resources Group bartered the services of Executive Outcomes for a large share of its client na- tion's resources and commodities." A second major contract between Executive Outcomes and the Sierra Leone government, signed in May 1995, fasted 22 months and cost $35 million, Working with local militias, Ex- utive Outcomes battered the rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) into submission. Costing only about one-third of Sierra Leone’s defense budget, Executive Outcomes’ accomplishment a relative bargain. In comparison, the UN observer force, which spent only cight months in Sierra Leone after the peace agreement was signed, cost $47 million. RUF leader Foday wats Diamond Mercenaries of Africa, ground Briefing, 4 August 1996. Adams, p. 107. ABC Radio National Transcripts: Back- ‘SpRinG 2002 1313Steven Brayton ankoh claimed that, had Executive Outcomes not intervened, the RUF would have captured Freetown in 1995 and won the war, Executive Outcomes significantly bolstered the govern: ment’s strategic position, with a clear link between the results of Executive Outcomes’ military operations and RUF's willingness fo negotiate. Military successes made elections possible, and most of the | million people displaced by the fighting were able to return to their homes," On 30 November 1996, after the government authorized another Executive Outcomes attack on the rebels, the govern- ment and the RUF signed the Abidjan peace aceord to end five years of fighting. The government agreed that Executive Out- comes would depart from Sierra Leone as part of the accord Once the company pulled out, Sierra Leone began to fall apart again, The promise of elections was destroyed in May 1997 when a group of junior army officers, led by Johnny Paul Koro- mah, staged a successful coup. When President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah fled to Guinea, Koromah declared himself leader of a military junta. Soldiers looted Freetown and burned down the Ministry of Finance. An attempt by Nigerian peacekeepers to n move the new junta failed." Executive Outcomes has claimed to supply men and exper- tise to seven countries in Africa, including Kenya, Angola and Uganda. In 1998, the company also claimed to be in discussion with customers in Malawi, Mozambique and Sudan. According to a British government evaluation reported by Inter Press Set vice, “On present showing, Executive Outcomes will. become even richer and more potent, capable of exercising real power, even to the extent of keeping military regimes in being. Wit cor tinues to expand at the present rate, its influence in sub-Sahara Africa could become crucial." However, the heyday of Executive Outcomes ended abruptly on | January 1999, when the company went out of business due * William Shaweross, Deliver Us From Evil (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000) pp. 203-24, “ Thid.. p. 205, Adams. p. 107. M41 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS,Outsourcing War to new South African laws banning mercenary activity by i tionals. '* Nonetheless, Executive Outcomes continues to staff its Pretoria offices, and its employees in Sierra Leone are working for an affiliate called Lifeguard. In Angola, Executive Outcomes personnel ate still under the direction of the Pretoria office, and employees are reportedly working for the national government as well as for the UNITA rebels who oppose it.” MPRI IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA MPRI is a prime example of the second type of mercenary activ- ity, based on providing services akin to general staff, Rather than focus on actual combat, MPRI prioritizes strategic planning and the disciplined routine of military headquarters, Formed in 1986, the firm has more than 350 full-time employees and an estimated 2000 more available to work on contracts that can run from a few days to several months. According to MPRI, “the company’s business focus is on military matters, 10 Include train- ing, equipping, force design and management, professional de- velopment, concepts and doctrine, organizational and opera- tional requirements, simulation and war gaming operations, hu- manitarian assistance, quick reaction military contractual sup- port, and democracy transition programs for the military forces of emerging republics,” MPRI has carried out a number of smaller tasks, including a US contract in 1994 to send 45 border monitors to Serbia to ensure that arms were not being smuggled to Bosnian Serb fighters inside Bosnia-Herzegovina. The company first gained its reputation, however, with a major project in Croatia that began in September 1994.7! With the explicit consent of the US State '* Sophie Pons, “Executive Outcomes to Close on its Own Terms and Guardian, 12 November 1999. "Can Anyone Cur Africa's Dogs of War?” The Economist, 16-22 Jan, 1999, gal MPRI (Military Professional Resources Ine.), at . *' Cohim Lyneb. “For US Firms War Becomes a Business,” The Boston Globe, 997. p. 1 | February SpRING 2002, | 3)Steven Brayton and Defense departments, the company began to modernize and retrain the command structure of the Croatian national army, This is the type of tasic that had routinely been assigned to the US armed forces, With MPRI’s assistance, the Croatian army mounted Operation Storm in the summer of 1995, a successful offensive into a region of the Krajina, In less than a month they ejected Serh-supported forces and 150,000 Croatian Serb eivil- ians with remarkably little bloodshed. Control of the region, long held by the Serbs, returned to Zagreb. According to observ ers, the Croat forces used typical American combined-arms tac- ies, including integrated air, artillery and infantry movements, as well as mancuver warfare targeted against Serbian command, control and communication systems. French and British officials accused MPRI of helping to actually plan and direct the Cron- tian invasion, an allegation denied by the company. Correctly or nol, MPRI received credit for a major success This was quickly followed by a renewable 13-month contract with Bosnia. The country's UN ambassador, Muhamed § bey, valued it at tens of millions of dollars. According to news- paper reports, the contract was financed by a number of Islamic countries, Although the Bosnian army received more than $100 million in surplus military equipment from the US government, MPRI contractors helped with everything from long-term de- fense strategy to conducting war games and demonstrating the new tanks and artillery? SANDLINE INTERNATIONAL IN SIERRA LEONE In March 1998, employees of Sandline International (filling a yacaney created by the withdrawal of Executive Outcomes) helped restore the elected president of Sierra Leone to power a year after he was ousted by a military coup. Officers of the Si- era Leone army had seized control in May 1997 and begun a series of murders targeting possible political opposition, Despite the coup and the public killings, Washington and other govern- ments were unable to mount effective action, In October of that en * Ibid... pp. 2-4, 316 1 JOURNAL.OF INTERNATIONAL, AFPAIRS.Outsourcing War year, after all diplomatic attempts to oust the generals failed, the UN Security Council imposed an ineffective arms embargo. Al- though publicly depicted as a private security firm guarding 1 ing and construction interests, Sandline told the press that it had been asked by the British High Commissioner in Sierra Leone to equip and assist a local force capable of removing the yenerals. The US State Department was apparently kept fully informed, and the US government lent at least tacit support.” RWANDA In Rwanda in 1994, the international community was concemed with the threat (o peace and security posed by Hutu-run refugee camps, which harbored refugees as well as participants and pro- moters of genocide. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali informed the Security Council that a force of up to 12,000 troops would be needed to separate the genuine refugees from murderous leaders. To establish minimal security, without even attempting separation, would require a force of between 3,000 and 5,000 troops. Only Bangladesh offered troops for this option. Under- seeretary-general for peacekeeping Annan then commissioned a study from ADL, a British company, on subcontracting a private security service to control the camps. Executive Outcomes and Sandline were discussed as the most likely contractors. In the end, the UN decided against private subcontracting and eventu- ally hired a Zairian police contingent, a measure that ultimately proved inadequate.” PRIVATIZATION OF MILITARY FORCE: PROBLEM OR MODEL. FOR THE FUTURE? The apparently successful track record of companies like Execu: tive Outcomes, MPRI and Sandline International makes them a realistic option for governments that see privatized military ac- tivity as an effective way to stretch their military budget. For the * David Graves and Hugo Gurdon, “US Says Sandline Experts Helped to Over- throw Rebels,” The Telegraph, London, 14 May 1998, * Shaweross. p. 144, Serine 2002 | 317Steven Brayton risk-averse—like the US Department of Defense—employing private contractors can help to overcome political reluctance to becoming involved in situations where risks are high and there is little domestic support for the involvement of national troops. One example is the US decision to contract DynaCorp, a Vire ginia-based firm, to provide monitors to verify the withdrawal of Serb forces in Kosovo, while other countries involved provided officers from their national militaries.” Private corporations that encroach on what has traditionally been the responsibility of , the UN or regional alli- ances such as NATO raise a basic question of accountability, Governments are accountable to their people and their legisla tures. Soldiers in most national armies take oaths of allegiance to some entity representing national sovereignty. Private corpo- vations, on the other hand, are accountable only to their share- holders and are, to some degree, shielded from public and gov- ernment scrutiny. This lack of accountability has caused most of the public discomfort with the laissez-faire approach to private military activity. Although most companies have worked only for legitimate governments, there is little to stop them from working for virtually anyone in the future. As Herbert Howe, Georgetown University professor who analyzes the privatization of armed conflict in Africa, says, “I think the major worry that everyone has about this sort of thing is, will thes a force unto themselves, like rogue elephants?” James L. Woods, a partner in the Washington defense con- sulting firm Cohen & Woods Intemational, observes, “If the in- ternational community cannot get its act together and help these countries keep themselves together and protect commerce and protect the citizenry, you're going to sce more and more exam- ples of private contractors doing the job.”"” Woods adds, “I's the same in the American cities where forces of law and order avernments, forces become * Johnathan Steele, “Private Military to Monitor Pullout.” The Guardian, 31 October 1998. p. | 2” “private US Companies Train Armies Around the World.” US News and World Report 8 February 1997, p. 13 Lynch. BIS | JOURNAL-OF INTPRNATIONAL AFFAIRS