The Transcendental Fallacy

by Humphrey Palmer, Cardiff/Wales

The central arguments of Kant's first Critique all share a certain structural peculiar-
ity, here called 'presumptive circularity'; which does not make them formally invalid,
but does render them incapable of proving anything. Kant's transcendental deductions
are especially liable to this particular debility, which also affects most other 'transcen-
dental arguments'.
It will be best to explain and illustrate the fallacy first, quite independently of Kant,
before trying to trace it in his more complex and disputed arguments.

/. Presumptive Circularity

Circularity. An argument is called circular if its conclusion is employed in reaching it

(B, C so C). A circular argument is valid, for its conclusion must be true where the
premisses are so. Such an argument is however incompetent as proof, i. e. as showing C
true because it follows from the given premisses. For if B and C are indeed given as true
before the argument begins, there is nothing for the argument to prove. And if C does
need proving, then it is not truly 'given' in the premisses. The support C may need is
not to be had by C standing on itself.
Semi-Circularity. Consider now a valid argument (A, B so C) in which the
conclusion implies one of the premisses (C, so B). That is: the information found in C,
which is all contained in (A + B), happens to contain all that is found in B. For example
'All human beings are rational, for men all are, and so are women too': here feminine
rationality is implied by that of humans generally. Now this 'extra' relation between
human and feminine rationality does not make it circular to argue to human rationality
from (feminine & masculine). The argument (A, B so C) remains reliable even if B is
implied by C. This does however make possible a double argument
CsoB; A and B so C
and this two-step inference as a whole is evidently circular. Thus if someone uncon-
vinced about feminine rationality were first to infer it from that of humans generally,
and then combine it with (the observed fact of) male rationality to establish that humans
in general are rational, his overall inference would seem open to obvious objection on
logical grounds alone1.
1
See also H. Palmer, Do Circular Arguments Beg the Question?, Philosophy 56 (1981), 391-398.

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388 Humphrey Palmer

An argument whose conclusion implies one of its premisses could thus be called
'semi-circular'. Such an argument is quite respectable provided the premisses are given
'independently', i. e. without appeal to C. Where such appeal is required to establish
the premisses (A, B) the argument from them to C is 'presumptively circular*, since its
only satisfactory completion would be circular.
Presumptive Circularity. The completed chain of argument (C so B; A, B so C) is
obviously circular. How should this affect our assessment of its second half? Given that
B cannot be established without appeal to C, surely B should not be accepted in
advance of C: and C is not available at the beginning of the argument. The argument
(A, B so C) is inadmissible in proof of C, as one premiss, B, is unobtainable, its only
visible means of support being circular.
Refutation. To prove C is, to show that C is true, by means of a valid inference from
premisses already known to us as true. For a presumptively circular argument, one
premiss is not already known, though it receives sham-support by (genuinely) follow-
ing from the conclusion, C. The same argument could, however, be quite properly
used to show something else concerning C.
Suppose Smith is denying or doubting C while accepting A and B. Brown presents to
him the argument (A, B so C), and requires that Smith concede C, on pain of
inconsistency. Brown's argument is valid. Is it circular?
Brown's own opinions are irrelevant. He can press the consequence on Smith
without himself accepting A or B or C. Nor need he establish the truth of A or B; it is
enough that Smith has accepted them. In this sense, Brown's argument is ad hominern.
Not that the result is personal to Smith; it affects anyone affirming A and B2. Any such
person is precluded from denying C.
In this application the argument does not prove to anyone that C is true, but only
that C is undeniable for persons granting A and B. Smith will have to admit C (or else
drop A or B) once it is shown that the three propositions A, B, not-C cannot be true
together. Such a demonstration of inconsistency does not rely on any of the items being
known to us as true: so no inconvenience results if one of them cannot 'yet' be justified.
A presumptively circular argument can thus properly serve in refutation. It can show
that Smith has no business to be denying C.

II. Backward Argument

The statement (S) that 'all John's children are in bed' is said to presuppose that John
has children (P). P is a special element or 'ingredient' in S; it presents, as available for
discussion, the item which S is all about. Without P, S cannot possibly be true or even

2
An argument from premisses only So-and-So will grant is called ad bominem, since no-one else
is committed to the consequence. Some also apply this term to personal attacks which seek to
undermine an argument by discrediting the arguer; a fallacious move, but quite a different one.

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 The Transcendental Fallacy 389

false. The truth of P is thus a necessary condition for the truth (or falsity) of S; a pre-
condition, we may say> for the propriety' of saying 'S*.
A necessary condition makes possible a Modus Ponens inference: 1. S presupposes P
(i. e. if 'S* is proper P is true), 2. but 'S' is proper, / 3. So P is true. This argument moves
'back' from the propriety of S to the truth of its presupposition, P; in this sense it is a
'backward' argument. The inference is clearly* valid. Is it circular? That depends on
your route for arriving at the premisses:
1. That S presupposes P is evident to native-speakers, once their attention is drawn
to this relationship. They have only to reflect on how they talk and they will just-see
(intuit) that John's having children is an element ingredient in their being all in bed, so
that the statement S could not even (properly) be made if P were not the case.
2. To ensure that 'S' is proper involves listing S's presuppositions and verifying all of
them - including P. This imports circularity into the argument; the conclusion has to be
verified while establishing the premisses.
It might be held that S can be verified independently of P; for if S is true there can
hardly be impropriety in saying 'S'; so that the backward argument can be carried
through in two stages, without circularity:.

I S is true, therefore CS' is proper (Truth demands Propriety)

II S presupposes P, 'S' is proper, therefore P is true.

That Truth (or Falsity) demands Propriety is not in doubt; for propriety, in
propositions, consists in being true or being false. The question is, can S be shown true
without first verifying P, in a case where S presupposes P? For example, one might go
round John's house checking slumbering youngsters against a family photo-group.
And one could certainly complete this process without attending to the question,
whether John has children. So one may confirm S as true without bothering with
P. Still, in the process of confirming S one would in fact have established P as well. That
this is necessary is shown by considering a case of doubt: one could hardly report 'all
present and asleep' while in actual doubt about P, i. e. still wondering whether John is
childless.
Perhaps too much has now been said, on a point that only a philosopher could fail to
see; a situation which our saying more is not guaranteed to remedy. Of course you can't
make sure that all John's children are in bed and remain uncertain that he has any. If
you think John could be childless then you don't know that all his children are in bed,
for you don't know it's his children you are referring to.
It follows that if S presupposes P then S cannot be known to be true without
verifying P, so that any later argument from S to P is circular. All backward arguments,
from a presupposing item to the thing it presupposed, must be presumed to suffer from
such circularity; and are therefore incompetent as proof.
All backward arguments are presumptively circular; but it may be disputed just
which arguments move 'backwards* in the sense defined. To avoid this dispute, the
point may be put as a challenge: when Smith propounds an argument, ask if'its

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390 Humphrey Palmer

premisses can be established independently, i. e. without covert appeal to the conclu-

sion of the argument.
This challenge may be tried out on the Cogito of Descartes.

///. Cogito presupposes Sum

The only reason why Sum follows from Cogito is that Cogito presupposes Sum.
Set out in full, the argument takes the longer form:
L I think, so it is proper to say I do. (Truth demands propriety.)
II. º think* presupposes that I exist, º think* is proper, so I do exist.
Without the quotation marks this naturally telescopes into the single-step, single-
premiss argument stated by Descartes.
Whether he always thought of it in just this way is hard to say. The term
'presuppose* is recent; yet in discussion he refers very clearly to this relationship. And
this reading, unlike others, makes the argument valid; a result he may well have
intended to achieve. He denied that it was a 'syllogism', to avoid being left with a major
still to prove, and because his argument did not come under any then recognized
principle of inference. An investigation of this reading of the argument, then, could
well contribute to a better understanding of Descartes3.
Our purposes are rather different. We just want a non-Kantian example, on which to
try out our critique of backward argument, before considering whether Kant's more
complex reasoning also takes that shape. For this purpose, it hardly matters whether
Descartes thought of such an argument, or we first made it up. Either way, the
familiarity of the terms will set us free to concentrate on the structure of the argument.
Considered as a proof, the argument offers to establish that I do exist from the fact
that I am thinking now. This proof is valid and would be satisfactory if the fact that I
think (or, the propriety of saying so) could be established independently of my
existence; i.e. if it were alright to say that I think irrespective of whether I exist. As
however my existence is a necessary ingredient in my thinking, so that º think' can be
reached only via º exist', the proof fails for circularity.
A Cartesian might reply that Cogito is an immediately given fact, which needs no
establishing, and so can serve in proof of other things like *I exist'. It is of course
difficult to decide with finality what is or is not 'immediately given' even to myself. Let
us however grant this much: that anyone attending to the matter must notice that he
thinks. This surely includes his noticing some he. (We shall hardly credit that he comes
across the thinking first, and independently, and infers a he later, to be doing it; as if
one could advertise Thinker required, for a thought-experiment already going on'.) So
the alleged immediacy of our knowledge that we think does nothing to rehabilitate the

3
This reading of Descartes' argument is considered further in H. Palmer, The Cogito is Semi-
Circular, International Logic Review, 23-21(1981), 5-15.

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 The Transcendental Fallacy 391

argument. It seems evident, and almost immediately so, that a dubious T could not be
made less so by Descartes' line of argument. Sum is an ingredient in Cogito, so Cogito
cannot serve in proof of Sum.
For all that, it is still inconsistent to deny Sum while affirming Cogito: which
inconsistency can be established by his argument, without fear of circularity: - Smith is
a sceptical philosopher, the sort that likes denying things. Today he is busy denying, to
all that will listen, that he (Smith) is really there at all. Along comes Brown, who is
against this sort of thing. Seifcing on "one of Smith's statements that envisions thought,
he infers therefrom a Cogito on behalf of Smith, from which he draws a Sum (qua
Smith). Before a learned audience Brown now dares Smith - on pain of public
inconsistency - to persevere in denying Sum.
Brown's inference is certainly valid, and shows that someone who grants or asserts
tfyat he thinks cannot consistently go on denying that he is, unless he drops the
statement of ingredience (º think' presupposes that I am).
Brown's argument is not a proof, i. e. it does not show any statement to be true, but
only, that some statement is incompatible with the given premisses. Those premisses
need not be established, to deduce this inconsistency; they need only be given, i.e.
asserted-by-Smith, for Brown to apply it in refutation of his sceptical stance.
Brown has shown Smith that, while sticking to Cogito, it won't do to go denying
Sum. He offers Smith a choice: stop thinking, or start granting that you are. For the
purpose of refuting Smith's peculiar and absurd position (never really held by anyone),
the Cogito argument turns out to be ideal, and is not vitiated by circularity.

After this illustration, a definition is in place:

An argument is p-circular if and only if
(i) its conclusion implies or supports one of its premisses,
(ii) that premiss cannot be established without that support.
Point (ii) may depend on circumstance. For example, it is said that the stars are all
moving rapidly apart, as may be inferred from the observed 'redshift' of spectral lines in
the light they send to us. Now if this happens to be our only way to detect their
divergence, this fact should limit the arguments we base on it, but not those of some
other being who observed the divergence, instead of inferring it.
In other instances, point (ii) is unavoidable, from the nature of the case. Thus
arguments 'back' from presupposition are all p-circular by the nature of presupposition;
for the item presupposed (P) has always to be verified in the course of establishing that
(S) from which the presupposing starts.
Kant's arguments could also be said to turn on presupposition; though some may be
found to dispute this term* To avoid this dispute, let us consider an abstract pattern of
argument which (whether or not it involves presupposition) is bound to p-circular: -
Given three propositions, of which 1 states or implies that 2 cannot be known withput
the aid of 3, then

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392 Humphrey Palmer

(a) , 2 so y is a valid argument,

(b) this argument is bound to be p-circular.
It will be sufficient to show that Kant's main arguments are of this character.

IV. Kant's Vindication of Geometry

Kant set out to show how there could be a Science of pure mathematics, and notably
Euclidean Geometry (B20). By 'Science* he meant a deductive system of theorems, the
first principles of which were evident: just-seen, on inspection, to be true; so that all the
other theorems, which flowed from them, could be known true, with certainty, of all
the real world. By 'pure* he meant non-empirical.
Through the senses we get to know one thing at a time, a series of individuals. We
can collect similar items, and compare related ones, by the aid of memory; but the
generalizations thus attained would never be quite universal, for we could never be sure
that the next item would be like those observed before. True Science, then, can never be
based on observation that is serial and paniculate, as sense-observation always is. Its
foundation must be 'pure*, i. e. non-empirical, prior to experience.
Geometry could be such knowledge-in-advance if its theorems simply spelt out the
content and relations of the concepts involved. But Kant is sure they are not of this
'analytic* character. Advance-theorems might, again, be deduced with certainty, but
only from axioms similarly guaranteed. Deduction only shifts the problem of justifica-
tion one stage back.
Kant then suggests that we could have geometrical knowledge in advance of the
relevant geometrical experience if only the formal or structural elements in perception
were contributed by us - and that we could have such knowledge only if we 'put in* our
own structure of relationships in 'Space*. This latter negative thesis is not of course
open to proof, for who can tell what alternative and satisfactory explanation the
morrow may vouchsafe4? Still, there have been quite a few morrows, since 1781; all
disappointing ones, in this respect.
This fascinating suggestion is now formulated in an argument: 1. Geometry can be
known if and only if the formal elements in perception are contributed by us,
2. Geometry is known, / 3. The formal elements in perception are contributed by us.
Things, then, are not quite what they seem to be. Everyday and seemingly indepen-
dent objects are really composites, partly home-made: 'phenomena*.
The argument as stated suffers from presumptive circularity. If 1 is true, 2 cannot be
known without the aid of 3, therefore 3 cannot be proved from 1 and 2. Transcendental
Idealism may be true, but cannot be shown true by this line of argument.

4
Cp. S.Körner, The Impossibility of Transcendental Deductions, Monist 1967, 317 f.

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 The Transcendental Fallacy 393

But surely Geometry can be achieved even though the true nature of Space is never
realized? Transcendental Idealism was not even considered in Euclid's time, yet he was
quite a good geometer. This seems to count against premiss 1.
Yes, Kant could say, Euclid did discover some theorems while holding mistaken
views of what Space really is. Premiss 1, however, does not link geometry with
geometers' opinions, but with facts. Never mind what somebody may think of Space
and Time: Kant's claim is that they are contributed by us, otherwise we could not have
the Science of geometry we have.
Kant's reasons for holding this view of premiss 1 derive from his view of geometry as
a deductive system of truths known for certain in advance of experience and for all parts
and sorts of Space (B3, 16). It may be better to write this into the argument:
1. Geometry (as a deductive system of universal non-analytic truths known in advance
of experience) can be known if and only if the formal elements in spatial perception are
contributed by us. 2. Geometry (as etc., etc.) is known. / 3. the formal elements in
spatial perception are contributed by us.
Geometrical knowledge, we know, is not something effortless or instantaneous, or
universally enjoyed. Just how, then, could it result from Space being our contribution
to phenomena? Kant says this comes by "construction of concepts' - an unilluminating
phrase.
In modern parlance, 'construction' refers to extra lines put into a diagram to assist
the proof. For Kant, the whole diagram has this abstract and arbitrary status: it is
something we think up and then put in front of ourselves to think about. The diagram
we draw need not derive from any particular experience, but is created imaginatively 'in
advance' (B 741-744). Deduction and discovery are then required: the hard work every
schoolboy knows geometry to be. For 'the true method was not to inspect what he
discerned either in the figure, or in the bare concept of it, and from this, as it were, to
read off its properties; but to bring out what was necessarily implied in the concepts
that he had himself formed a priori, and had put into the figure in the construction by
which he presented it to himself (B xii; cp. B 762: Kemp-Smith version).
You think of a triangle. You draw it. You discover its properties, e. g. it must have a
mid-point. Although discovered in an individual diagram, this property seems general,
as the diagram did not specify the actual measurements of the angles or the sides: 'we
consider only the act whereby we construct the concept, and abstract from the many
determinations .. which are quite indifferent, as not altering the concept 'triangle''
(B742).
This explains, with no great novelty, how a particular diagram could serve in a proof
of a general theorem. But Kant has a further problem: why should such properties
recur at all? Why should the next bit of Space display the same version of triangularity?
We need to be sure that all parts of Space are uniform; and we can be sure of this only if
Space is contributed by us (B 66). Geometry is a Science for us because we are just
reading off Nature what we first read into it (cp. Bxviii).
There is a further question here, less evident to Kant: Why should all of us read into
Nature just the same Geometry? Can I rely on you to contribute to your perceptual

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394 Humphrey Palmer

Space just those geometrical properties that I do to mine? Confronted with a pyramid,
can we be sure its builders also saw it as triangular? This rather basic point cannot be
settled, it seems, by agreement in verbal description, or in pictorial representation - or
even by the pyramid itself. Neither my experience, nor yours on the same occasion, can
guarantee that the experiences we are having are the same! Once again, the solution lies
in the fact of our shared geometry.
We may not know for certain how'the Pharaoh saw the pyramids, but we do know
what Euclid said about such shapes. We can read him with understanding, and carry
out his proofs. So we must share the same Space with him, to be arguing about.
So we share a Space with Euclid. Why must it be Ours' (and 'his')? What evidence
has Kant for this unconscious salting of the mine to produce nuggets of geometry?
Simply that there is no other way for us to have a Science. Transcendental Idealism is
our only hope of acquiring synthetic a priori truth.
And can we be sure we do possess such truth? Whether 'starting from Science' is
sensible will be considered later on (section VIII). Our present concern is only with the
argument employed by Kant in going on from there. If premiss 1 of that argument is
correct then the conclusion does follow but the argument is circular. Kant's proof of
Transcendental Idealism thus fails for presumptive circularity.

Refutation. Although Kant's argument about geometry cannot prove what he meant
it to, it can and did help to eliminate a certain constellation of opinions, as incompat-
ible: 1. Transcendental Idealism is required by our universal a priori science of
Geometry, 2. The Geometry we have is of that character, 3*. The things we perceive
are ultimately real (i.e. Transcendental Idealism is untrue).
For the argument (1,2, so 3) is valid, although circular: so its rejection (1, 2 with 3*)
must, and plainly does, involve inconsistency. This inconsistency can be perceived
without relying on any of the propositions as correct; so the refutations to which it
leads remain reliable, and are not infected by circularity. Kant can thus properly claim
that anyone who accepts propositions 1 and 2 cannot consistently regard Transcenden-
tal Idealism as untrue. (A proof would do this and more: it would show that 3 is true
because 1 and 2 are so).
This refutation proceeds from an inconsistent triad of propositions (1, 2, 3*), one of
which must be false if the other two are true. From his triad two further refutations
could derive (cp. B 64-66):
(ii) accept 2, 3* so reject 1,
(iii) accept 3*, 1 so reject 2.
On version (ii) we keep our old familar vision of Geometry and claim, 'naively', that
the things we see are real, denying that knowledge of Geometry requires that
perception be phenomenal. This version has not been popular; perhaps because Kant
has convinced us all that 1 is true: i. e. that Transcendental Idealism would be required
by an universal a priori science of Geometry.

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 The Transcendental Fallacy 395

On version (iii) we admit this requirement, and keep real things so reject the notion
of a human a priori science of Geometry. That is, we alter our account of the Science we
actually have: a scientific revolution of considerable magnitude. This was the unin-
tended outcome of Kant's work. He put a price-tag on a priori science: 'available to
those who only see phenomena*. So we bought another model, being not prepared to
pay that price.

V. Making Worlds

Physics, or Natural Science, is partly empirical and partly 'pure'. Since the pure part
is known without reference to experience, it can be known 'in advance* (Bx). Pure
physics became a Science when it was realized that "reason has insight oiily into that
which it produces after a plan of its own' (Bxiii). Such principles as 'Action and reaction
are equal and opposite' must be true of our world, for they are our contribution to that
world. But how is that contribution made?
We receive many perceptions all at once, jumbled together in a single 'Manifold'.
Next moment, another jumble comes in through the letter-box; then another... and so
on. To make sense of even some of this input we have first to sort it out, collecting
similar items (as in Snap!), then looking for links between dissimilars (a Run or Flush)
as signs of process and development. Kant describes this activity of sorting and
assembling as the application of certain 'concepts' to the Manifolds. As these 'concepts'
are used to son the sensory input in the process of perceiving it, they must be 'prior' to
the resulting experience. Using these 'Categories' we make up bits of sensory informa-
tion into a connected story which makes sense to all of us. The Categories are our
contribution to this World. Their application to phenomena must therefore yield a
consistent Truth about that World. But we do possess such truth, in physics. On this
perceptual theory, then, the existence of physics proves that the Categories are our
contribution to Experience5: 1. Pure physics can only be known if the formal elements
in thing-and-world construction are contributed by us. 2. Pure physics is known. / So
3. the formal elements in thing-and-world construction are contributed by us.
This argument from Physics is formally parallel to the argument from Geometry;
and suffers from the same defects. It cannot prove that Categories are contributed by
us, since that conclusion would be needed for establishing the premisses. Despite this
parallelism, there is an important divergence in the 'point' of these arguments, in what
really required to be proved.
No-one before Kant thought Space and Time were contributed by us. No-one
doubted that they 'apply* to things, for we have no choice about what to see in
diagrams. Kant's argument was therefore mainly concerned with the 'advance' charac-
ter of Space and Time. It did also show that these advance-items must apply to things,

5
Writing 'Experience* (widi capital) for the intelligible world into which all our experiences are
knit.

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396 Humphrey Palmer

since the 'things' in question must conform to the 'forms' by which they are perceived
(B 43); but this point required little emphasis and Kant only draws attention to it later,
as an afterthought: 'we have already, by means of a transcendental deduction, traced
the concepts of space and time to their sources, and have explained and determined
their a priori objective validity' (B 119).
By the time of Kant it was painfully obvious that the concept of Cause was non-
empirical in origin. The same could be said for Substance and Interaction, even for
Degree and Quantity. The problem was, by what right these unusual concepts came to
be applied. The Metaphysical Deduction (which proves the 'advance* nature of the
Categories, B159), is therefore presented briskly, almost carelessly, whereas great
labour goes into the two-stage Transcendental Deduction, to show their application
'justified'.
A transcendental 'deduction' or vindication of advance-concepts will show how they
'must necessarily relate to objects, and how independently of all experience they make
possible a synthetic knowledge of objects' (B 121). The deduction proceeds by recog-
nising those concepts as æá priori conditions of the possibility of experience' (B 126).
The latter, much-repeated phrase may suggest that a pragmatic vindication would be
adequate: showing Categories just as something we must use to make the sense we do
of things, if we are to turn our random and jumbled observations into orderly, plausible
Experience. But the notions of 'fate' and 'good luck' can also help us to make a sort of
sense of life, to build up a picture of what is going on. The difference is that these
'usurpatory concepts' (B 117) do not lead to any Science. A transcendental deduction
vindicates an advance-concept like Cause as making knowledge possible (B 40). It is
pure Natural Science (mostly Newton's mechanics) that vindicates the Categories by
which we 'work up the raw material of the sensible impressions into that knowledge of
objects which is called experience' (B 1).
The geometrical properties of Space are true of perceived objects because they are put
in by us while perceiving them (we having no alternative, except to not-perceive). The
Science of Geometry, in consequence, although worked out 'in advance' by studying
imaginary diagrams, must hold good of those objects. Thus the fact of geometry both
proves (what everyone doubts) that Space is contributed by us (Metaphysical Deduc-
tion) and vindicates (what few would query) our right to apply to our world these
'properties of Space'.
Likewise, the physical properties studied by scientists are true of our familiar things
and processes, being put in by us in the process of assembling them (we could perceive
the bits and not assemble them, but no alternative ways of assembling them are
authorised, other than our apostolic twelve). The science of pure physics, in conse-
quence, although worked out 'in advance' by studying these combinatory powers as
exercised on imagined things, must hold good of our assembled perceptions, our
'Experience'. Thus the fact of physics proves both (what no-one doubts) that Cause,
Substance, Interaction etc., are non-empirical (Metaphysical Deduction), and vindi-
cates (against substantial scepticism) our right to apply to our world of things these
'laws of Nature' or physical properties."

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 The Transcendental Fallacy 397

The argument from physics may now be set out more fully for comparison: -1. Pure
physics (as a deductive system of universal non-analytic laws known in advance of
experience) can be known true of things only if the formal elements in the constructive
assembly of perceptions are contributed by us. 2. Pure physics (as etc., etc.) is known: /
So 3. the formal elements in the constructive assembly of perceptions are contributed
by us.
Being presumptively circular, this argument can provide no proof of the a priori
nature of the Categories.
Few doubt this, though, so it is less in need of proof. Moreover, anyone who, for
good or bad reason, grants propositions 1 and 2 can properly be invited to subscribe to
3, on pain of inconsistency.

VI. Cogito ergo sunt Res

Kant has many other transcendental arguments. Each starts from some given item of
knowledge, and concludes to some 'prior' fact which 'makes that knowledge possible'.
Those already considered set out from a public system of guaranteed knowledge, a
Science. But in the 'Refutation of Idealism' the argument sets out from something each
reader realizes for himself; that he is thinking just now. This private recognition is said
to require the existence of public, continuing, external things (B274).
This argument is meant to prove that external things exist. It would thus refute both
sorts of idealism: dogmatic (we know that things do not exist independently) and
problematic (we can't be sure they do).
According to Kant, I don't just realize that I exist, but that I am existing at such-and-
such a time. Such timing, he says, requires permanent external things, against which to
reckon the flux of time in my sequence of ideas. So I could not realize (as I do) that 'it's
now I am', unless there were such things about, to use as clocks.
This argument employs extra and clearly contingent premisses, such as 'all timing
requires permanent external things, as clocks'. Its overall shape is however similar to
those already analysed: 1. The statement º am (now)' requires things, as clocks. 2. º
am' is undeniable. / So 3. there are external things.
Here 2 could not be known before 3, if 1 is true, so there is built-in circularity. The
argument is incompetent as proof of 3, though it is certainly valid and the premisses
appear quite plausible.
Will the argument serve in refutation? That is, can it rightly be used to dissuade
someone holding 2 from denying 3? Yes, presumptive circularity is no obstacle to such
a use. The inconsistency (of holding 1 and 2 while deny ing. 3) remains, even if progress
from 1 and 2 to 3 is impermissible. So if Smith, the well-known problematical idealist,
goes round saying that Smith is, but things are dubious, anyone who agrees with
premise 1 can tell him that things like clocks are as certain as anyone's º am', since the
I-am-ing itself requires clocks.
Kant's 'Refutation of Idealism' cannot serve as proof, since the minor premiss cannot
be verified without appeal to the conclusion in support. A proof which needs such

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398 Humphrey Palmer

support is like a pillar standing on the roof. But the argument could serve - as far as this
formal feature of it goes - to discourage some people from affirming themselves and
denying clocks*

VII. How Requirements are Realised

The argument from Geometry, the argument from Physics and the argument from
Present Thought are central to Kant's Critique and typical of his transcendental
arguments. As proofs, we say all of them fail for circularity. As refutations, all can
stand ad hominem, to the man professing certain views.
This critique itself invites further comment, on the logical patterns allegedly detected
in Kant's arguments. Three such comments will be considered here. The overall result
for Kant's system will then be summarized.
The first premise in each argument states a 'requirement' for knowledge of a certain
sort. This requirement supplies a link between the other premise (2) and the conclusion
(3). It also ensures the circularity of the inference. Now, how do we get to know of this
'requirement'?
Kant suggests that phenomenal perception would make possible a Science of
geometry, which could not be had in any other way. The latter claim involves his
knowing about explanations yet to be devised (see IV above). Is that a final objection,
in this and every case?
The general thesis is not easy to evaluate. It suggests that no-one can ever prove an
Only-if, as it is possible in every case that someone might later formulate alternatives.
Even in a case where no-one ever does formulate alternatives, or ever will, the
theoretical possibility suffices, apparently, to inhibit proof. But surely there are cases
where no-one will formulate alternatives because there are none to formulate; and here
an Only if may be provable. If we were never to dogmatize saying 'no'alternative to X
is possible' we should have to abandon reasoning. This returns us to the special case:
how are we to detect 'requirements'?
That S presupposes P is known, we suggested, with the intuitive certainty every
native language-user feels: One has only to reflect on how we talk...' Some regard this
as a poor sort of evidence. It will perhaps be agreed that our acquaintance with such
facts (as S presupposing P), whether weak or sure, is a direct; acquaintance, not
mediated from other facts by inference. So, however good or bad may be our evidence
on this matter, it is already the best that we shall ever have.
The arguments from Kant's critique all turned on presupposition of some sort,
though not quite the same referential sort as that illustrated by 'All John's children are
asleep'. But we had better not argue from 'how presupposition works' while that
relation is itself the topic of vigorous debate. Instead, we may enquire for each of
Kant's arguments how the relation stated in premise 1 is supposed to be revealed.
Kant says that a certain and universal Science of geometry can apply to'things
perceived only if we in perceiving them contribute their spatial (and temporal)

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 The Transcendental Fallacy 399

elements. Many would question the Only', while granting him the 'if. Now Kant holds
that with perception such as ours (which is atomic and serial), general truths can only
be reached inductively, and induction never reaches certainty. Many more would grant
him this 'only'. So the first one turns out to depend on a certain view of perception,
shared by Kant with others of his time but not, perhaps, entirely by us.
In the case of physics, it is less obvious how our contribution of the Categories
would enable us to know the axioms, and Kant devotes many pages of bad argument to
establishing this 'if. The Only' raises the same problem as before, a problem faced
head-on in the Transcendental Deduction (first part). This suggests that an atomic and
serial perceiver who had so far unified his perceptions as to think of himself as
perceiving them would thereby have imposed those 'necessary connections' by which
things seem to operate; which connections thereafter need only be detected, not proven
by induction from experiment. Now this argument does go some way towards proving
the Only'; but it does so only for those who already think perception atomic and serial.
In the Refutation of Idealism the major premiss seems clearly incorrect, for it
assumes the unlikely and unprovable thesis that clocks have to be material. Indeed, it is
far from clear why clocks are needed before Smith can say º am conscious of my own
existence as determined in time' (B 275), i. e. º am (now)'6.
These detailed doubts can be made more general. Why expect to know with certainty
whether or not S 'requires' P? Perhaps we should regard this as just one theory or
hypothesis, among many others, regarding the nature of Science and the character of
Space? Why rest such weight on a half-formulated Gedankenexperiment? Maybe we
can't imagine a universal geometry without pure intuitions - but what sort of evidence
is that7?
It may also be suggested that 'requirement' is something personal: that I know S
requires P for me and perhaps for people like me, for Our society'. Should we then say
that 'in my way of talking S cannot be known while P is dubious'? Or 'English idiom
does not permit,..'? Or, more ambitiously but still quite cautiously, 'our conceptual
scheme does not allow of such an S being made sure of while P is still to prove'? Maybe
the circularity complained of in a backward argument depends on an accidental feature
of our language or our way of thought. If so, the argument might be all right, really,
and fallacious only for folk who talk or think like us.
On this view it was evident-to-Descartes that thoughts need thinkers, but is evident-
to-Buddhists that they don't, Neutral Monists maintaining meanwhile a non-committal
stance on its evidence-or-otherwise. Each party is right in his own eyes, and none may

Cp. H. Palmer, Must clocks be material*, Ratio 1972, 36 f.

R. Chisholm regards the statement of presupposition (or 'transcendental principle') as just an
explanatory hypothesis: What is a transcendental Argument? Neue Hefte f r Philosophie 14:
Zur Zukunft der Transzendentalphilosophie (1978), 21; For a similar criticism, based on a
different view of transcendental arguments, see L, Wood, The Transcendental Method, in The
Heritage of Kant, ed. G.T. Whitney and D.F. Bowers (1962), 22, 32.

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400 Humphrey Palmer

tell another what conceptual connections he should realize. This view is not open to
disproof: nor is it available to those who would engage in argument.
Let us put our uncertainty about the premiss into the argument itself: 1. Probably 2
requires 3. 2. ... / So probably 3.
The uncertainty weakens the proof, of course, but seems thereby also to lessen the
circularity, leaving it possible that 2 be supported independently. But this way of
putting it fudges the alternatives: either 2 does require 3 so the move from 2 to 3 is
sound and circular; or 2 does not require 3, the circularity vanishes and so does the
argument.
For any argument advanced in proof the test is still the same: are the premisses true,
and is the argument valid? Our critique of Kant's arguments comes down to this:
because of their shape, one of the premisses cannot be known: for if 1 is certain then
you would need that argument to get to 2.

VIII. Starting from Science

In the first two arguments the second premise asserts that we do have this or that
deductive Science. Some think that a silly place to start from, in epistemology.
Certainly our whole tradition here is foundational: superstructures get justified in
terms of basic uncontroversial elements. Thus Locke starts out from the ideas each of us
will have and never gets to chemistry, so infers that we have no real knowledge of the
properties of things. One reply would be to change the starting point. Surely we do
know some chemistry, and this fact is more secure than Locke's psychological theory
of how such knowledge is to be obtained. In terms of comparative assurance, the fact of
knowledge is not always a silly starting-point. For while the basic ideas, the primary
input, may in the end be more reliable, our account of how we get to-them comes first,
in our order of getting to know, and is largely fictional.
To decide where to start from, we had better make clear where we are heading for.
The aim is not, to prove Euclid true (he's done it once), or even to establish his axioms
as truly "worthy of belief, for example by deducing them from something else found
more reliable. Instead, Kant proposes to show what we and our world must be like in
order for us to know what we do know. For that, he says, the world must conform to
what we know of it: thus the Analogies, for instance, elucidate the properties Nature
must display, for Physics to be mathematical.
These comments simply re-iterate the direction of Kant's argument, from the fact of
Science to the sort of knowing which that fact requires. Such repetition would be
unmannerly, had not so many supposed Kant to be arguing the other way.
This 'starting from knowledge' has lately been called 'self-referential': find some-
thing you know, and ask how you could be knowing it. The method goes back to
Descartes: having decided the Cogito was the most reliable thing in sight, he asked what
made it so reliable. The name 'self-referential' is unfortunate: 'reflexive' would indicate

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 The Transcendental Fallacy 401

better the turn of thought involved8. In the Groundwork, Kant adopts this 'analytic'
approach to morality. But some deny that he used it in the first Critique.

IX. Does the Critique Proceed Transcendentally?

Some say that the argument back from the fact of science (which was criticized
above) was not used by Kant to prove, his revolutionary theory, but only to help explain
it, in the later, nursery edition he called Prolegomena. Why publish Prolegomena in
1783 to explain what he had already explained in the Critique in 1781? Kant offers more
than one explanation of this point. The later, shorter work, he says, is just an outline, a
sketch of the results achieved in the Critique: true enough, Analytic of Principles,
Dialectic and Method are just summarized in Prolegomena (§§ 24-60). This work, Kant
also says, is ^analytic' in method, whereas the Critique was 'synthetic' in approach: a
contrast possibly suited to the first two-fifths of Prolegomena, in which the matter of
Introduction, Aesthetic and Analytic of Concepts is indeed re-presented, but hardly
'summarized*. But this distinction of method (or mode of presentation) itself is none
too clearly explained9; so we shall have to compare and contrast the actual arguments
employed.
The Aesthetic offers reasons for supposing that Space and Time are somehow given
in advance (A 23-5, 30-32), inferring that they are 'two sources of knowledge, from
which bodies of a priori synthetic knowledge can be derived' (A 38). Were Space and
Time not thus prior to phenomena, geometry and dynamics could not achieve their
universal certainty (A24, 31). Indeed, if Space and Time were 'in themselves objective'
then seeing that 'the propositions of geometry are synthetic a priori, and are known
with apodeictic certainty, I raise the question, whence do you obtain such proposi-
tions?' and the only answer is to grant that Space and Time are 'subjective conditions'
after all (A 46^49).
8
R. Descartes, Meditation III. cp. R. Bubner, Kant, Transcendental Arguments, and the Problem
of the Deduction, Review of Metaphysics, 1974/5, 453 f.; N. O. Bernsen speaks of the 'cognitive
situation' in which any investigation, including one into knowledge, has to start: Knowledge
(1978), ii. J.F.Fries also 'started from knowledge', claiming an acquaintance with basic
principles which was immediate yet needed to be realized: cp. L. Nelson, Progress and Regress in
Philosophy (1971), II, 197 f.
9
A set mathematical problem may either be tackled 'forwards', combining the given data bit by
bit until the answer has been reached, or by working 'back' from that answer to prior
'conditions' it would follow from, then to their pre-conditions, and so on back towards the
starting-point. This contrast fits well with Kant's explanations of synthetic and analytic method
(Prolegomena Akademie edn. 274-6, 279: cp. B395n, 416). It originally applied to ways of
working, i.e. of finding the solution; but Kant applies it more to modes of presentation
(Prolegomena 263, 276, 278). He does not use it to classify individual arguments. (He speaks
abo of 'analysis of concepts' e, g. in working out corollaries Axxi, cp B 23,27, Prolegomena 273,
326; but carefully distinguishes the resulting analytic propositions from analytic method,
Prolegomena 276. His freedom in use of the contrast analytic/synthetic is particularly marked at
B115). · '

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402 Humphrey Palmer

Prolegomena develops this argument from the fact of science: 'certain pure synthetic
knowledge a priori is real and given, namely pure mathematics and pure natural
science* (§4)10. By enquiring how such sciences (which are real) are 'possible' Kant
deduces that Space is contributed by us, and that we apply unifying concepts or
categories to make the resulting phenomena up into an intelligible world.
In the second edition of the Critique the argument that actual sciences must be
possible is added to the Introduction (B20). In the Aesthetic the reasons for supposing
Space and Time given-in-advance are marked off (as 'Metaphysical Exposition*) from a
new 'Transcendental Exposition', which is to provide an 'explanation of a concept, as a
principle from which the possibility of other a priori synthetic knowledge can be
understood11. In fact, it presents the argument from the fact of science (B 40-41; cp.
B 47).
In all those passages the same three propositions appear:

(P) The Science of geometry is possible if and only if Space is contributed by us.
(S) Space is contributed by us.
(G) We do have a science of geometry.
But these propositions are combined to form two quite different arguments. In the
Critique Kant first produces reasons for believing S, and then uses the 'if'-bit of P to
establish G. Later on (using the Only if) he argues back from G to S. Prolegomena
develops this 'backward* argument from the fact of science, which might well be called
'analytic', as moving from given knowledge back to its enabling conditions as revealed
by analysis. This backward argument is then inserted at several points in the Critique
(second edition), under a new name which links it with the Deduction of the Categories
and with Kant's overall conception of his work.
The Analytic provides a 'Metaphysical Deduction' of the Categories as unitive
functions like those found in judgements, to show their 'a priori origin' (A67f.; cp.
B159: paralleled Prolegomena §§21-22). There is, however, within the Transcendental
Deduction a considerable section to show how perceived items are put together into
objects, and in just what way a perceiver is needed, to be doing this (A 92-114; cp.
B129-142)12. This material is not found in Prolegomena, and could well be called
'synthetic', since it starts from the supposed elements of perception and proceeds^by
several syntheses towards knowledge or Experience.
In contrasting 'synthetic' Critique with 'analytic' Prolegomena Kant may have been
pointing to the 'backward' movement of the argument from the fact of science, or to the
constructive character of parts of the Deduction of the Categories; or both. In any case

10
Cited from Prolegomena to any future metaphysics, trs. P. G. Lucas (1953), 29, .
11
The 'Transcendental Exposition', added in B replaced similar material positioned differently in
A (item 3, A24; cp. A31/B47 with B 48. Similar arguments also at B 64 f., 741 f.).
12
Cp. D. Henrich, The Proof-Structure of Kant's Transcendental Deduction, Review of Metaphy-
sics 1968/69, 640 f. for a similar division otthe argument.

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 The Transcendental Fallacy 403

it seems clear that the backward line of argument became central to the Critique as
conceived by Kant.
The forward argument had obvious weaknesses. It is not all that clear how contri-
buted-Space makes possible a science of geometry (cp. section IV above). The polemic
against Newton and Leibniz (A 23-25) is far from compelling; and in any case showing
their theories wrong would not show Kant's theory right, unless we knew in advance
that no others are available. The backward argument by contrast is clear and valid. No
wonder Kant moved across to it.
In sum: certain parts of the Critique (Metaphysical Exposition, Transcendental
Deduction, first part) do not fall under our analysis, since they follow a different line of
argument. The major fact remains that 'backward' arguments from the fact of science
do occur, irreplaceably, in both Critique and Prolegomena; ma. that these arguments
do suffer from presumptive circularity.

X. Kant's remaining Theories

The arguments so far considered all fit together in a step-ladder:

a) Our knowledge of Geometry requires that perception be phenomenal;
b) Our knowledge of Physics requires a continuing T using Categories to assemble
perceived phenomena into things and processes;
c) A continuing and self-conscious T requires distinct continuing other things as
well (so a solipsistic rendering of a and h is incorrect).
All these arguments suffer from presumptive circularity, so can provide no proof.
Yet all supply compelling reasons to grant the conclusion if one insists on sticking by
the premisses: they do work ad hominem. How does this leave Kant's theory of
knowledge? How much of his system stands, if all the transcendental 'proofs' are
undermined?
If the same points which he argues transcendentally were also proved by some other
argument, our critique would only remove an unnecessary extra strut. But Kant has no
other sufficient arguments to prove these points. As he emphasised repeatedly, he had
been able to go beyond his predecessors only because he discovered and exploited this
new type of argument (Axii, Bxvi, 24, 748).
If you come across someone in the precise position indicated by Kant's premises,
you can still require him to accept Kant's conclusions, by applying Kant's arguments ad
hominem. Such persons, however, are in very short supply - partly because of Kant's
philosophy. For example, people used to accept without question that geometry is a
certain and deductive Science applying universally. Now, partly because of Kant's
work, they question this premise, and no support for it is found. No argument in
which it is a premise can remedy that lack!
Certain parts of the Critique are independent of the new transcendental style of
argument (i) an essay in philosophical psychology regarding the construction of
phenomena (Transcendental Deduction, part I); (ii) a critique of previous cosmology

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404 Humphrey Palmer

and theology (Dialectic); (iii) an attempt to deduce Newton's axioms from thin air
(Principles). The first two are valuable essay*: they show what might be achieved, on
certain assumptions» The third would still be hopeless, even if all his transcendental
arguments were proofs.
Kant was not the last person to use transcendental arguments, and anything wrong
with them as arguments will infect everyone else's too. Fallacy is no respecter of
persons. But as the definition of this class of inferences is the subject of dispute, one
may not deduce that everything called a transcendental argument will involve the
transcendental fallacy. Such arguments must be tested one by one, just by asking: Are
the premises of this argument known independently, or can they be established only by
appeal to the conclusion of this argument13?

13
The following also bear closely on the points discussed: K. Ameriks, Kant's Transcendental
Deduction as a regressive argument, Kant-Studien 1978, 273-287; A.C.Genova, Kant's Tran-
scendental Deduction of the Moral Law, Kant-Studien 1978, 299-313; T.Govier, Presupposi-
tions, Conditions and Consequences, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 1972, 443-456; A.Phil-
lips Griffiths, Transcendental Arguments, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplement,
1969,165-180; M.G. Kalin, What makes an argument transcendental?, Idealistic Studies 1977,
172-184. O.Leaman, Transcendental Reasoning, Ph.D. thesis, Cambridge, 1980. R.Robinson,
Analysis in Greek Geometry, Mind 1936, 464-473. B.Stroud, Transcendental Arguments,
Journal of Philosophy 1968, 241-256.
Valued personal guidance and attempted correction came to me, in the course of the work, from
Messrs. G.Buchdahl, E.Förster, A.P.Griffiths, O.Leaman and A. Montefiore, among others;
and it was helped forward by periods of study at Corpus Christi College, Cambridge and at the
Universities of Oxford and Madras.

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