RG 46 Records of the U.S.

Senate
103rd Congress

Intelligence Committee
Select Committee to Study
Government Operations with
Respect to Intelligence
Activities
"Church Committee 11

JFK ASSASSINATION RECORDS

 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTE
Date:OS/04/94
Page:1
IDENTIFICATION FORM
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sscrA
157-10011-10052

·----------DOCUMENT-iNFORMATiON ____________________________ _
I
SSC IA
MCCONE, JOHN A.

CC ONE
6/06/75
6

EIGN INTELLIGENCE
>ER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
lC, DONOR REST., REFERRED
)4/94
 j RELEASED PER P.L.-102-5 26( JFK ACT) i

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Date:OS/04/94
Page:l
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
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AGENCY INFORMATION
AGENCY SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER 157-10011-10052
RECORDS SERIES
. TRANSCRIPT
AGENCY FILE NUMBER
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
g::r: 1 ·
ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
I FROM MCCONE, JOHN A.
TO :
TITLE :
TESTIMONY OF JOHN A. MCCONE
(:
DATE 06/06/75
PAGES 86
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p.. SUBJECTS
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t) MCCONE, JOHN A.
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• MEMO RE: CONDUCT OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
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~ DOCUMENT TYPE PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
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RESTRICTIONS lB, lC, DONOR REST., REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS x
DATE OF LAST REVIEW 05/04/94
OPENING CRITERIA

COMMENfS :
SSC! Box 252, Folder 16

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Vol: 1

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5 of 5
SSCl Box 252, Fo1der 16

..--.. Report of Proceedings

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UNCLASSIFIED
EXECUTIVE SESSION

Friday, June 6, 1975

United States Senat9,

Select Com.mi ttee to Study Govern:nen tal I

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Operations with Respect to !.
1
Intelligence Activities,

Washington, D. C.

The Committee ~et, pursuant to notice, at ln:l7 o'cloc~

a.m., in Room S.407 ·, the ·Capitol Building, Senator Frank

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Church (Chairman) presiding. II
Present: Senators Church (presiding) , Ea~t of ~!ichi]an, I I

~ ~onca.le, ::art of ColoraC:o, ?ower, I·1athias, anC. Schw2i}:·2:::_

2\lso presnt: ~·Jillian Miller, Staff Director; ~:-i-r- .:: C. e:r-ic '.·:

A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel; Curtis R. Smothers,

Minority Counsel; Charles Kirbow, Charles Lonbard, ~Hllian

Bader, Professional Staff .L·! embers.

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..;. The Chairr.lan. The hearing will please come to order.
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2 Mr. McCone , in accordance with the custom of the Committe ,
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!.. 3 would yo u please stand and be sworn.

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5 in proceeding will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing
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15 Mr. Schwarz. Just two formalities, ~lr. ~·'.cCone. Are I

16 you aware that you have the right to have counsel present hereJ

17 Mr. McCone. Yes, I was aware of that. But I know we l

18 are in a very sensitive area. And .the only counsel that I kne\1·
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Committee as a witness or would be. And therefore I elected
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. Mr. Schwarz. If at any time you would like to stop
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23 because you want counsel, you have that right. And you have

ii all your rights under the Constitution in appearing ~efore

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Mr . McCo ne . Thank yo u very much .
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M~ . McCone. I was appoin ~e d Director ab out the 20 t h of
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15 other things that I didn't know about, but which h ave been

16 brought to my attention about the staff, most particularly

17 Mr. Halter Elder, who was my Executive Officer through my

18 term as Director.

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23 t o h ave had it reconstr ucte d i n t he last few months.

24 The Chairman . \'!e can understand that, ~v1r. !!cCone.

25 Mr . Schwarz. I s~ould state for the record that Mr.

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1 McCone is here under very short notice, and that he rear!:"anged

2 his schedule -- it was inconvenient for nim to come today, but

3 he did rearrange his schedule to be here, flying in from

4 California yesterday afternoon.

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that he want s to make to the Cor:unittee -if there is time . And

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or any plan ning that migh t lead t o a r equest for authorizationL
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Of c o ur x e, duri ng t hose d a y s i t wa s a l most common for one
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person or a noth er to say , we wo ugh t t o di s pose of Castro, we
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ought t o d o thi s or ~ve o ugh t t o do that. But at no time did
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ascertain at the outset if there are other figures that we
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to the . discussions with respect to Castro which we are g o ing

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to get into, and the matter with respect to Nhu and Gener a l
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Khanh which we were going to get into, there were any oth er I

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discussions or attempts or plans with respect to the ass a ssi- I
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nation of anybody else of which you were aware while you were it
t h e Central Intelligence Agency? I
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Mr . McCone. No, not that I can recall, Mr . Schwarz. I
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must say , howeve r, t hat the situati o n in Vi etnam was unlike i
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was ffiore en the basis of considered judgement that the action 1
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15 Mr .. HcCone. I don't recall exactly. I k:iow that ?1r •
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with my confirmation. But nevertheless, he was there during
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the last two months. And I assune that he played a part in
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:1r. Schwarz. And your best recollection is t hat !1r.
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Helms as well played a part in the Cuba briefing?
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ID 1 Mr. McCone. I assume that that is the case.
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5 against Fide l Castro?

6 Mr. McCo ne . No s ir.

7 Mr . Schwar z . Th ey advis ed y ou t ha t there were ongoing

8 as s a ssi na tion e f for t s d irected ag aint Mr. Fi de l Castro?

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16 Mr . Schwarz. Were you at any time ma de aware .Jf a

17 p ro g ram k nown as ZR RI FLE?

Mr. McCone. No, I was not.

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Mr. Schwarz. \le re you made aware o f a n agent called
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Mr. Schwarz• . Hithout limiting the question at all wit!:.
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~espect to the time period, in other words, not limiting it
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1 to the period of your briefing, \·1ere you ever made aware of t!1e
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~ 3 Mr . McCone. Well , yes. Recently I have been made aware
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5 Mr. Schwarz. During the period that you were Director

6 did you know of the Executive Action program?

7 Mr. McCone. No, I did not know of the Executive Action

i:= 8 program during the time that I was Director.

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Mr. Schwarz. ~foen did you first know about the Hai1eu
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operation?
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Hr. McCone. According to the records of my office, I
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apparently I knew about it in mid-August 1963.

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(Documents were marked for in.:lenti-1
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'°..,.t Mr . Schwarz. Mr. Reporter, would you put before Mr .
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which is a memorandum f r om Ri chard He lms to the Director of
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16 , 1 9 63. Th i s document is in · all your fol d ers.

Is that the noti f icat ion i n mid-August 1963 wh ich y ou

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15 t h e Attorney General about an o p eration involving th e Mafia
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16 in Cuba?

17 Mr. McCone. No, I was not.

18 Mr. Schwarz. If you look at the memorandum o f May 14, I

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19 1962 you will see it does not use the term assas sination.
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23 which reads: "I assume you are aware of the nature o f t h e II
24 operation discussed ln the attachment." Were y ou aware of i
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25 the nature of the operation?

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IO 1 Mr. McCone. I believe in the discussion that I had with
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- ~ 3 operation and its purpose. But I would like to point out

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5 records that I have recently seen -- and I am not speaking

6 from my own memory at this point -- wa s generated in late

7 1960, and was stood down shortly after the Bay of Pigs in the
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8 Spring of 1961. And we are tall~ing here about the discussicn I

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;:: 14 1963, revealed to y ou at that time the operation had in fact
4-1 .
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~:· __ continued after the Bay of Pigs and during your administration?
15

16 Mr . McCone. To the best of my knowledge, he .did net.

17 Mr. Schwarz. Did y ou ask him whether it had continued?

Mr. McCone. I can't recall.

18
Mr. Schwarz. I call the Committee's attention to the
19
M
0
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N entry on the chronology that is in your folders for i!ay 14,
II
u 20 I
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c0 1962, the date of tJ1e memorandu.i-:l submitted to the Attorney II
a.c 21
~ General. I want to call your attention to t'\·10 entries in that
"'
~ 22 j
u.i
..,; chr~nology on the left hand colunmn • The first one is under i
23 l
i
t h e date April 1962, in 1·:hich, according to the 1967 CIA stud~· :
24
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bf those events, Mr. Harvey, who had taken over the Mafia -o a-
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25
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18 P !!C!l!T .._ UNCLASSIFIED.
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1 of the operation, briefed Hr .. Helms on the ... fact that he had
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0

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~ 3 Helms' approval not to brief Mr . McCone.

~- ~
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- :: ADd I call the Committee's attention further to the
a.. 4

5 entry for May 14, 1962, again corning from the 1967 CIA s':udy,

6 in which Hr. Harvey stated that he had briefed Mr. Helms on

7 the meeting that had taken place with Robert Kennedy, ancl !1ad

i:: 8 advised against briefing ~1 r. i'lcCone and General Carter, ..mcl

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u lO Sena tor norgan. ~!r. Chairillan, may I ask a ques tio ~ 1?
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11 The Chairman. Yes .
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12 Sena tor Horgan.h'hen this inforf:'la ti on came, Nr. S.::h\..·ar z ,;
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13 from the 1967 report, is this a conclusion that was inse~ted 1

into the record by those making the report, or is it takdn f=oQ

14
documented records of the CIA?
15
Hr. Schwarz. Hhat happened, we examined the author of
16
the report earlier this week. He stated that the report was l
I
17
I
18
done at the request of Mr. Helms, that the metJ1odology used
I I
was to undervl.ew all of the living known participants, except I
19
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~ 22
people including Mr. Bissell and Mr. Harvey, and that the I
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report was based largely upon the recollections of the person I
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u; involved. There are some documents as well. There are ~o
I
24
documents on this subject, that is, the non-ad'lice to !·~r.
25

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c 1 McCone. That comes entirely from the statements made by
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~ 3 Senator Morgan. And .Mr . Helms was the Director at the

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e 6 and questioned by the author whethe r he, in returnin g it,

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8 said that Mr. Helms had not disagreed with any of the state-
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u Senator Morgan. And the author was Mr. Breckinridge ·
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Hr. Schwarz. ~-1r . Breckinridge was ·one of the two writers.
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14 General then, who is now dead.
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Mr. McCone, what is your opinion of· the =eliability of
15
Mr. Earman?
16
Mr. McCone. I thought Hr . Earman was a very reliab2.2
17
man in retrospect. Ar.d not referring to this particular
18
instance, I think I was defici.ent in my management of the
19
I

Agency by not elevating the Inspector General to a sufficientl'l

20
I
high post sc that he · would report to me at all time$, and als ~
21
to insiste that his staff on a · compartmented basis be given
II
22

23
access on all sections of the Agency. I think that was a
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24
~istake. And one of my recor.~endations, as the tiwe goes on, '
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25
is to urge that the Inspector General of the Agency b e

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1 el evated , be caref u l l y sele c ted , be p r operly staffed , and that
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5 of the Agency. This is very important.
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t:, 6 I recall -- just to go back into a little bit of history
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7 -- i t is kind of interesting to me -- Senator Symington b ecan e
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p 8 Secretary of the Air Force in 1917. And h e wasn't there very
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~- - · 15 him to come over here and be ray Ins p ector S er.e ral.

Hoover rather reluctantly gave him one of ~is p r i nci pal

16

17 deputies, who as it happened turned out to be Major Gener al

Carroll. So Symington got him, and put a star on his s h o ulcer

18
and hed him reporting directly t,.o him. lmd this was a ver
M 19
0
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N wise move on the Senator's part, because he got some body that
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~. I just cite that as evidence t h at act ion of this kind
~ 22
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23
Mr . Schwarz . As of August 1963, based upon your receipt
24
of McCone Exhibit l and yot:r conversation with !1r. Helms,
25

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TQ P lliAE1 Uf~ClASSIFIED 13

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1 you were aware that there had been a effort to assassinate
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2 Mr. Castro using the Maf ia which had commenced in the fall of
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~ 3 1960, and according to what you then knew had been terminated
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& 4 in an~ ~round the time of the Bay of Pigs, is that right?
......... '
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I 5 Mr. McCone. In the fall of 1963 I was not told when it

,::, 6 was started, and I didn't kn ow whether it was started in late

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8 started in 1961 in the Kennedy Administration. I have since
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11 Attorney General that was sent to you, the date of August
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13 Mr. McCone. Was that in there?
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14 Mr. Schwarz. Yes.
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15 Mr. McCone. Yes, I see that.

Mr. Schwarz. But in any event -- I

16 I

17 Mr. McCone. This matter was handled in a very -- I I!

would like to explain tl1is to t..'1e Committee -- in a very, let
18
me say, casual way. The reason that Mr. Helms brought this
I
,., 19 !
0
0
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N memorandum to me was that about that time I was told t hat the I
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~ 22
statements about an interrelationship between the ;1af ia and I
I
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.ii the CIA • So I called Helms and asked him, what about it.
23
And he brought this nemorandum to me . And I read it. I
24
And he said, this is something that has long since been put
25

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to bed. This is the only copy of this memorandum in the files

0 of the Agencj. I would like you to read it an~ I would like

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~., 3 to take it back •

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a.. 4 v- Sch warz. He did t e l l y ou that it had be e n lor;
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5 sin ce pa t to bed on t h at occasion?
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~ 6 Mr. McCone. That is ri g ht.

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9 one question on that without e laboration.
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13 Mr. Schwarz. August 16, 1 9 63. I
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15 he tell ~rou that as of August 1 96 3 t he re were s till o t :ier

16 attempts to assassinate !!r. Castro which were at least b ei ng

17 discussed if not underNay?

18 Mr. McCone. I knew of no such attempts.

I
.., 19 Mr. Schwarz. Getting back to the one brie f a..11 s wer about !
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20 the Mongoose program I would like to get here, a nd then we i
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. 22 You had hea rd in August 1 962 t he sug g e s tion that the II
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23 liquidation of Cuban leaders had been considered, is that rig hl?
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... 24 McCone. Yes, that is correct. I
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25 Mr. Schwarz. And we will deal with what you said about !

T41 P tJ!tJMlft I
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IO 1 it later. But as of August 1963 you had in your mind that
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2 there had been a suggestion in August 1962, and you had been
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&· 4 said, b~tween August 1960 and roughly the Bay of Pigs. Now,

5 having those two things in your mind, did you take any action

6 to tell persons within the CIA that they should not engage in

7 assassination activity?

8 Mr. McCone. No, I don't think that I took any action

9 within the organization. My position was clearly known. And

( •

10 when a .:nemorandum, which you ·were going to refer to later,

11 came out, I insisted that it be withdrawn and modified.

.J 12 Mr. Schwarz. But is it fair to say, Mr. McCone, that

::>
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d$ 13 not everybody within the Agency was privy to what you had
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3 14 done with respect to that oemorandum? In other '·mrds, you
_..,..· :,-

15 had told certain persons in August of 1962 that you were

16 opposed to assassinations, which we are going to come to.

17 how were the ret of the people in the Agency to know whether

18 or not assassinations were a proper activity?

Mr. McCone. I think it was generally understood within

,.,
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19
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N the .P.gency that I would not tolerate planning, or the
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think it was proper from the standpoint of the US Government
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.,; and the Central Intelligence Agency. And I think that was I
23
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.ii unders toed, al though I don't knm·1 that, -- I a!~ sure I did r:c-: I
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iss'..le a directive. But it ·was understood. A.1d that was a i
• 25

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1 position that I adhered to . And I think that e xp lains a grea t
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~ 2 deal that we might discuss later this morning.

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~ 3 Mr. Schwarz. \·7a s i t understoo d by Mr. Helms?
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A: 4 Mr . McCone. You will have to ask Mr. He lms.

5 Mr. Schwarz. In your opinion was it understoo d by Mr .

6 Helms?

? Mr. McCone. I would prefer him to answer that question j

8 The Chairman. Senator Hart.

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9 Senator Hart of Michigan. I wonder if Mr. McCone beli ev~s
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0 that he made clear to Mr. Helms, h is, Mr. McCone's opp os itio n
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14 Mr. Schwarz. Hn en l1 e gave y ou t h e d escri pti o n oi the
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15 Bafia effort in August of 1963, which in h is conve rs ation i1e

16 admitted had constituted an assassination at t e mpt, d i dn ' t you ,

I
I
discuss your view of whether or not that was a prope r t hi ;1g I
17

18 to do? I
l
,., 19 Mr. McCone. I don't recall the conversation. But I can l
0
0

I
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only assume that we said this was stood down two and a half
u 20
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then, be ca u s e i t e a s c all ed off -- a lth ough I do not have a
~ 22
Iii
Iii record of that conversation.
23

24
Hr. Schwarz. Let's turn to t...1-ie subject of Mongoo se. A.rid
I
would you tell the Cor:unittee --
25
UNCLASSlFlED
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UNCLASSIFIED 17

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1 Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. McCone, could I ask one
: '~ ~
~. ~ 2 question?
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~ 3 Did you ever discuss the subject of assassinations with

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5 Mr. McCone. r\o , I did not .
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6 Mr. Schwarz. Turning to. the subject of Mongoose, 1 vould I
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7 you tell the Committee what the code word Mongoose stands for? i
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Q 8 Mr. McCone. The code word Mongoose stands for an
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r 9 operation that was participated in by several departrnents, the I
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u l'O DeparG~ent of Defense, the CIA, the USIA, US Infornation
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12 to harass and disturb the Castro Regine, through a variety
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14
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14 developed against Castro into Cuba, and all such things as I
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15 that. That operation was started sometime after the Bay of i
I
Pigs, maybe as late as early 1962. ~ t e. I,
I am not sure of the c.a
16
iI
General Lansdale was put in charge. And a Committee was
17

18 established to supervise i t and to authorize each specific i

I
19 and individuai activity undertaken by General Lansdale. I
Certain people were designated to General Lansdale's staff.
I 1

20
General Lansdale was attached to the Secretary of Defense's I,
21

22
Office. As I recall, he was assistant to one of Mr. -•AcN·.~amara'
"i sj
I

.Assistants.
23
Mr. Schwarz. He was not a direct assistant to
24
!·!c :·Ja.'tlar a?
25
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T8 P 8 EIR IJ UNCLASSIFIED 18

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1 Mr. McCone. He wasn't a t t h e s t art, he may have become
'°!
2 one later on, but at the start he was no t .

3 Mr. Schwarz. Was the group established known b y th e

4 name of the Special Group Augmented?

5 Mr. McCone. Yes. It was known as the Special Gro u p

6 Augraented. And the reason for that name was that the Spe c ia l

7 Group traditionally was made up of the Secretary of State or

§ I__, 8 his Undersecretary, the Secretary of Defense or his D e pu ~ y,

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Q) I 9 the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Executive
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10
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interested, we developed the Special Group Augoented. A~ d t ha ~

12

13 included the Attorney General and Mr. Murrow, who then was

directing USIA, and perhaps one or t wo others that I ~av3

14
forgo.tten about.
15
Mr. Schwarz. And on behalf of t11e Cil1. you participate d
16
in those meetings, and who else?
17
Mr. McCone. I participated and I usually would have
18
with me one of the staff, frequently Mr. Harvey, and q uit e
..,
0
19
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N often a Mr. Parrott. I think Mr. Parrott served some wh at
u 20
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~ sent me when I was otherwise engaged.
~ 22
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I would like to point out for the record t h at this was

8 ..
' f
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ii:
24
a ve r y acti v e Coffil'!li ttee . Betwee n Fe b ruar y 1 9G2 and Octcbe=

~ 1962 there were 27 meetings of it.

• 25
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ID 1 Mr. Schwarz. Now, Mr. Harvey was the man who had sort
~
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2 of action responsibility for Cuba in the CIA, is that correct?
N

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~ 3 Mr. McCone. He was at that time, yes sir .
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Cl. 4 Mr. Schwarz. And you had frequent contact with Mr.

5 Harvey during this period of time?

6 Mr. McCone. Not frequent, but occasional.

7 !'·1 r. Sch~·rnrz. On any of those occasions did Mr . .~a rvey

8 tell you that he was engaged in efforts to assassinate Cuban

g leaders?

~r. McCone. Not that I have any recollection of.

11 Mr. Sc~~arz. · You stated that the S~ecial Group

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12 considered and approved a variety of means under the Mongoose
0 :::> I
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H < be over~hrow o~ the Castro Regi2e, or was there some other
QJ 3: 14
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;::.:: ' objective?
. ~- 15
Hr. McCone. Well, I think the ultimate objective was
16
the overt:'1 row. But I don't think that &ny of the particular
17
operations that the Special Group Augmented considered or
18
approved would accomplish that objective of more harassment
..,
0
19
0
0

"' and making trouble.

<..i 20
d
c Senator Hart of Colorado. Do we know who chaired the
.3C7I 21
c:
~ Special Group Augmented?
~ 22
w
..,; nr. Sch«varz. t;·7ould you describe the membership of the
23
Special Group Augnented, who chaired it and who staffeC. l.·~
.... ,
24

25
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1 Mr. McCone. The Attorney General chaired it.
:~
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. .
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2 Mr. Schwarz. Robert Kennedy?
. ..
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~ 3 Mr. McCone. Robert Kennedy. And he attended it quite

.>·· g
a: 4 often, but not always.

5 Mr. Schwarz. Hho were the other members?

6 Mr. McCone. As I said, the Secretary of Defense.

7 Mr. Schwarz. Mr. McNamara?

Q I 8 Mr. McCone. Frequently represented by his Deputy, Mr.

0
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t 9 Gilpatric, Rosnell Gilpatric.
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0 10 The Secretary of State --
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11 Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Rusk?
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14 Mr. Schwarz. Has General Taylor on that group?
ClJ I 3:
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-:..· .;. Mr. McCone. I think he was, if I remember, as Chairman
15
of the Joint Chiefs.
16
Mr. Schwarz. And did Mr. Parrott staff it?
17
Mr. McCone. Well, he participated in the staff rather
18
as a secretary.
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or only for some limited period of it?
w Mr. McCone. For the entire pe~iod as far as I remember.
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Senator Hart of Colorado. Hr. McCone, did the Special
24
Group Augmented keep minutes of the meetings?
25
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5 that they could be carried out.

6 Senator Mondale. ~'lho else attended those mee ti ngs ? You

7 say you had a Secretary of Defense, or his representative , a

8 Secretary of State or his representative, General Lans d ale

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17 in your place?

Mr. :'1cCone. General Carter, who was my Deputy.

18
Senatoi Mondale. And were there any others who we re
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Senator Mondale. Of USIA?
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23
Senator Mondale. ~'7ere there any others who at.te nded. ?
24
Mr. McCone. Not that I recall as nernbers. The r e ~e re
25

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15 up ships?

16 Mr. McCone. There was a great deal of talk about it.

17 There were some rather exotic plans. But I don't think there was

18 ever any explosive planted in a ship.

,., 19 Now, I may be wrong on that, but I do not recall it.

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22 Mr. McCone. I would have to go to the record to a nswer

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that q uestion.

Mr. Schwarz. Do y ou re c all wheth er t h e plans included

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5 Mr . .~hwarz. Did any of those sabotage plans involve the

6 . likelihood if successful that lives would be lost?

7 Mr. McCone. Well, any infiltration of a sabotage group

8 must anticipate the possibility of a confrontation and the

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Mr. McCone. I think it was nickel mining. It might have
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kind of mines. What were the means that were going to be
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Mr. Schwarz. Okay. i

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16 August 19E2 in terms of, Hhat was the threat as perceived by

17 you, if any, that Cuba held for the U.S., as of August 1962?

18 Mr. McCone. Hell, in August 1962 I was deeply co n cer n e d

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ID 1 the pur p o s e of d i scussing t his possi b ility. It was for that
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5 I anticipated leaving for a month, from the 23rd of

6 August -- which I did

7 Mr. Schwarz. For what purpose?

8 Mr. McCone. To get n.arried and to go on a wedding trip.

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12 the first of two or three meetings that we had over the next

13 two weeks.

But this was the situation that existed. I can see

14
that we had reports from several thousand Soviets, and many
15
shiploads of material. The contention was that this was just
16
putting surface to air missiles in for the defense of Cuba.
17
Surf ace to air missiles on the perimeter of an island are
18
useless for defense, because you can come in on the deck and
19
destroy their operational capability at the crack of dawn a n y
20
day without detection by radar, you are under the radar.
21
It seemed to me that they were coming in for another p u rpose.
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This wa s my rationale, whi c h I c ouldn't support by
23
hard intelligenc e . But we had been overflying Cuba with
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U~2 ' s , and i f Cuba was ringed with surface to air missiles,
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5 But were the other participants in this group of meetings before!

6 you left to get married skeptical about your view that the
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8 missiles in Cuba?
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Mr. McCone. That is correct.

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Mr. Schwarz. And when you came back, what was the
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situation with respect to the question of whether missiles were !
being installed in Cuba?
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that I was away.
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out on the unique characteristics of the U-2 configuration,

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which was different than anything else that existed. This requii~d
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a few days.
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So time went on, with me very impatient. And finally
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Mr. Schwarz. And that was the photographic evidence that I
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And then ensued the so-called missile crisis, is that correct?
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Mr. McCone. That is correct.
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1 Mr . Schwarz. Let's g o b a c k t o t he Augu s t 1962 meeting ,
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15
from John A. McCone to the Director. I
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These memoranda, Mr. McCone -- you have had an opportuniti
17

18
to read those before this meeting, have you not? I
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Mr. McCone. Yes, sir. I
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Mr. Schwarz. These memoranda all concern a mee t i ng Ii
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Mr. McCone. That is c o r r e ct .

Mr. Schwar z. \vas the subject of assassination or liqui-

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dation raised at that meeting?
25
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1 First, was that a meeting of the special group augmented?

2 Mr. McCone. That is correct.

.,
3 Mr. Schwarz . Who was there at this particular meeting?
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5 said earlier, it was called by me for the purpose of again

6 expressing my concern about missiles in Cuba. But since at that

7 time it· had been decided to intensify the Mongoose program, it

8 turned into a 54-12 augmented corr~ittee with several people

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' 15 I was there. And two or three people of my staff were there .

16 Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Harvey included? i

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It seems to me that there were others from State there, .

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but I don't recall who they were. And it was quite a large meet-
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looked over the list in recent weeks. And if I recall p r operly, ,
24 !
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the Attorney General was not there.
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Mr. McCone and I met yesterday evening to have an I
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opportunity to go over these matters. And during the course II
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15
August 10 meeting, stating that he then believed that t hose

minutes showed that there was opposition at the meeting

16
to the subject of assassination.
17
Now, Mr. McCone, is it your current understanding t h a t
18
the minutes show that there was opposition to the sub ject of
M 19
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assassination?
u 20
d Mr. McCone. I can't answer that. I haven't see n those
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~ minute s , a nd I don't know what is in them. I
~ 22
w Senator Monda l e . This may b e out of order, I don't
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know. In the August 14 memo point 3 says: "The question of l
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; 25 I

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 RELEASED PER_~.L.-102-526 (lFKACT) I

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ID 1 Secre t ary Mc Namara a t the me e ting of t h e Spec ial Group
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4 M.r . McCone . Yes.

5 Senator Mondale. Is that your recollection?

6 Mr. McCone. I am not sure that McNamara used the word

7 "assassination". He could have used another word,

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might have said elimination, which could nean nany oth er !
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things. I am not quite clear on that.

15
Mr. Schwarz. The written record uses the words
16
liquidation of readers.
17
Senator Mondale. That is the Lansdale memo.
18
Mr. Schwarz. Yes. The words were blocked out in t h e
19
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The Chairman. And I might say that the memo o f John McCone
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to the Director -- I t a ke that t o be a memo t o yourself -- l
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or Helms had then become the Director.
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It contains the following language:

UNCLASSIFIED I
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top people in the Castro regime, including Castro. I took
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5 subject was corapletely out of bounds as far as the U.S.

6 Government and the CIA were concerned, and the idea should not

7
be discussed, nor should it appear in any papers, as the U.S.

i:: Government could not consider such actions on moral or et~ical

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I was not alone in that. Mr. Murrow took exception. I
15
remember that very clearly.
.. , 16
Senator Mondale. Who made the suggestion to which you
17
ref er in your memo?
... ., - 18
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Mr. McCone. According to the record, it was Mr. McNamara, I
19
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Mr. McCone. No, I can't recall from memory. I can only
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Senator Schweiker. And who was chairing that meeting?
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~ Who chaired that meeting?
• 25
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Tep· !EC!tET UNCLASSIFIED 34
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N' 2 Attorney General was not there.

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7 Senator Mathias. Mr. Chairman, the memorandum of Augus-q.
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. .,. intensified activity -- andI presume it was -- in exploring
15
the alternatives that were available.
16
Senator Mathias. In other words, it was brought up in
17
context that this was one of a number of operations that t h e
18
group might consider?
M 19
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u.i · Senator Math ias. I f my ?Wn me mor y of that time is at
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24
accurate -- it may not be but this was about the ti~e that Ii
Senator Keating was beginning to publish information about t h e
25

TQR EiC P §T UHCLASSlf IED

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1 missiles in Cuba .
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-- & 4 Senator Mathias. So that actually nothing h a d s u r fa c ed

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10 notyet developed at the time of this meeting?
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I talked to Senator Keating a number of times about it. I
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being Senator Keating's source of information, which I was i
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16

17
tion. I met him only a few months before his death in I
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Paris, and I said, Senator, where did you get this in ormat i on? I!
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~ about ~he mis s ile build u p, d id t h e Mo ngoo se. operations acceler-
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23
Mr. McCone. No, the Mongoose operation was not related
24
to the missile crisis. The Mongoose op~ration had been going
25

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FOP SECKl!T UNClASSifQfD 36
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1 along, for the reasons I have mentioned, and since almost all
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5 the problems of the missile crisis.

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T8 P HlllH UNCLASSIFIED 37
3 Shelbour ne
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1 Th e Cha irma n . At that .. mee ting are you t h ro ugh ,
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Mr. McCone. No, thera was ~o such statament made that I

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recall, Senator. Tha subj:ct was just dropped.
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CJ I ~ 14
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q~astion of assassination, particularly of Fidel Castro, was
15
brought up by Secretary McNamara at the meetipg of the Sp~cial
16
Group Augmentad, in Secretary Rusk's office on 10 August. It
17
was the obvious consensus at that meeting in answer to a
18
conunent by Mr • . Ed Murrow that this is not a subject that ha s
19
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been made a matter of official record. I took careful n o te s
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; 23
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Vi Then going on to paragraph 4, "Upon recaipt of the
"' 24
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; 25

~~TSP S! CttET nNrl A SIFl D

 RELEASED PER P.L.-102-526( JFKAcTfl

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5CACT UNCLASSIFIED 38

1 absance pointad out to Frank Hand tha inadmissibility and

2 stupidity of putting - this typa of comment in writing in such a

3 document. I advised Frank Hand that as far as the CIA was

4 concerned, we would write no document pertaining to this, and

would participat: in no open meeting discussing it. I strongly

6 urged · Hand to recommend to Lansdala that he excise the phrase

7 in question fron all' copies of this memorandum, including those

8 disseminated to Stata, Defense and USIA. Shortly thereafter,

9 Lansdale called back and laft the m~ssage that he agreed, ar.d

10 that h::: had done so.''

11 I cannot read those b10 paragraphs •.vi thout concludir~~r tha "'::
>-. tha principal concern ~xpr:ssed by Mr. Harvey runs not to tha
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14 an action plan, but runs rath:r to making c~rtain t~at "'::h e r~

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. ,. 15 is no written record that would establish that assassinat~on

16 might ba any consid~ration or such a ~lan might be undarway.

17 Do you read thos; two paragraphs th: same way?

18 Mr. McCone. Yes, I don't think that you can't read

them any other · way, Sena~or. My action as I have reconstruc t:d

19
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N it is that immediately upon r~ceiving the Lansdale m:morar.durn
u 20 I

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of August 14 in which h~ -- thsra ar~ several words dcl~t~d,
21 I
22 and I have forgotten exactly what those words are.
\
Mr. Schwarz. Including liquidation of leaders.
II
23
I
24 Mr . McCone. Including liquidation of lead~rs. I
I
25 I call:d Hr. !1cNarnara an1 insisted that that m::Mora!'l<llli'!\

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1 be withdrawn because no decision was made on this subject, and
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0

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.........
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N
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6 all kinds of int::rpretatio:i, but you will have to ask

7 Harvey about that.

The Chairman. Did Mr. i·1cNarnara agr~e that the memorandu.-n,

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11 The ·c hairman. should be withdrawn?

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~
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Mr. McCona. W~ll, I cannot answer that, ~xcapt that as

15
I recall our conversation, he s~~m~d highly disturb~d that this
16

17
matter should be initiatad by G~neral Lansdale and readily i
i
I
agra;d that it be removed, because it was not a matter that I
18
was given consideration.
I
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Senator Schwaikt:r. Mr. Chairman? I
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The Chairman. Yes, Sanator Schweiker. I
..
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Senator Schweiker. Hr. McCone, in view of hindsight and I
w what .you know now, someone obviously made a decision to go
vi
23

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24
forward and to :xclude you. IVho, in your judgm:nt, from t.vhat

you new know, made this decision and why did th~y exclud e ycu?
•
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5 going ah.::ad with th : sc: assassination att e.TTlpts, and th_e p roj e ct
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11 Mr. McCone. Hell, under the plan of orc:-ranization, any
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13 of ~he 54/12 Committee Augm~nt6d. ~ow this was a plan that
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3
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15 know that anyona would violate that plan of organization .

16 Sanator Schwt:ikar. Well, as I understand what we hava

bsfor~ us, it indicates that the Special Group Augmented w~n t

17

18 ahc:ad without your knowledge or cut you out of the proces s .

I

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Do you not agr~e with tha~ assumption now, or not? I
M 19 I
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22
Se nator Schweiker. You what? I !
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; 23
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u; Th~ matter was dropped af~:r that msating of August the 11th.
... 24
~
2 To my knowle4g~, it never came up again in any way that I knaw
• 25

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 RELEASED PER P.L.-102-5 26(JFK ACT) I

amt 5
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ur~CL~SSIFIED
1 anything about.

2 Senator Schweik::r. Well, that you knew about at the

3 time. But in view of what the staff has turned up, subsequent
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5 i t on with some authority, and I just wondered from your

6 knowlc:dqe of the pcwer structure how would 'this b: done without :

7 the DCI knowing about it?

8 i1r. McCone. Hell, I have hE:ard about this only recently

9 and therefore I can only sp2culate.

l 'O Senator Schweikar. That's right, ar..d my qu~stion is o:i.-::

11 of your . judgment and speculatio~.

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OS 13 want the record to clearly show that this is speculation and
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~ 14
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_._ ,: ~ was initiat~d what was known as an Exscutiva Action Plan .
15
Now an Ex~cutive Action Plan in the jargon of th~ int~lligence
16
world m~ans a plan for the ra~oval by any means of an undesirabl=
17
head of state or senior person in a country. It doesn't
18
necessarily means assassination. It might mean s~tting th~8
..,
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19
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getting rid of them. I
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Whan the earliar operation that we have been talking about!
~ 22 ~
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23
the Maheu oparation, was stood down after- · the Bay of Pigs,
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24
appar-e:itly this Executi,r-: Ac~io!l Plan was not stood dowa, was
I

2 not call&d off, and that is understandable, becaus~ it ~as a

• 25

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ant6 42·

1 planning op~ration, it was not an authoriz9d action operation.

2 Well, for several months, Mr. Harvey was in charge of

3 the Executiva Action Plan. Just what he did, I don't know,

4 but this I am told. I never knew of the: Executive Action Plan.

5 I was never briefed on it, I was never told about it, to my

6 memory or any r=cord on it. Then ~ r. Harvey was moved over

7 in charge of the Cu~an operation, and I think whatever ac~ion

he took -- and I have heard of two or three, all of which we re I

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9 abortive and, in my opinion, stupid -- he did it under wha t l

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11
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14 goi~g to see Mr. qarvey, I am sure, if you haven't already
~
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~-:: saen him and you ar~ going to _ sea Mr. Helms. Unfortunately
15
one important link in this whole thing is Mr. Desmond
16
Fitzgerald and he has passed away.
17
It's hard to get to th= bottom of these things. ~fusn you
18
think about it; here is tha Pr;sident gone, the Attorney
,.., 19
0
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N General gone, Allen Dulles gona, Allen Dulles' Deputy Cabell
u 20
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~ Herter gone. It's rather hard to get to the bottom of th~se
~ 22
:i.i
..; things •
23
. ..... 24
Senator Schweiker. The question we have bafore us -- and
u:
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0 ag~in, this is only you4 axpertisa -- is whether this was an
• 25
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ID 1 instance of soma section of our government -- say tha CIA
. ., ..,.q.
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2 a portion of it, below your level, goin~ off half-cocked

3 and without authority to do something like this, or whether in

4 fact there was Presidential authority authorizing it and

5 keeping you in the dark.

6 We sort of have to nake a judgment, as I see it, that one

7 of two things occurre:d, and it is a. pretty kc:y point, as we

8 se~ it. I just wanted your judgme-nt as to which the most

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~-· authority. I do not think

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The Chairman. Mr. McCone, this is sp~culation on ~1 our
16
part.
17
Mr. McCone. Purely specula-tion.
18
Senator Schweiker. Yes, and I asked him tha~ in that
19
context.
20
Mr. McCor.e. Puraly speculation.
21
The Chairman. Yes.
22
Senator aart of Colorado. Mr. ChaiI'r:lan?
23
Mr. McCone, wa hava nev:r, to my knowL~dge, sean in
24
writing an Executiv~ Action Plan. Was this plan ~v a r r:duced
25
UNCLASSIFIED
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1 to writing?
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2 Mr. McCone. If so, Senator, I have not Seen it.
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5 you, did Pr~sident Kenn~dy or Robert Kennedy or any other I

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6 highly placed member of the AQ~ir.istration, Cabinet memb:r or I
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7 member of the White House staff, discuss with you assassinatior: I
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8 plots~ plans, operations or underfakings directed against ~r .

g Castro?

~r. ~cCone. No, sir.

~?

11 The Chairman. ~he subject r.ev~r came up in tha course of

12 any conversations you may have had with thd Prdsident or with

13 his brother?

14 Mr. McCone. Nell --

Tha Chairman. I asked that to give you an opportunity ,

15
having known both men well, to give us the b:nefit of your
16
judgmsnt of how you believe they may have felt about such an
17
undertaking.
18
Mr. McCone. ~vall, le':. me prsface my answar by statiing th2,':.
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in terms such as 'dispose of Cas.+:.ro', 're...1tlove Castro", 'knock off
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24
lines, but there was never, to my knowledge, any plan to do so.
25

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1 The Chairman. My question was meant -- because . we have,
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5 actual attempt, an actual undertaking, to assassinata Castro.

El 6 Mr. McCone. No, there was no such discussion.
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7 I would lika to introduce here a little history, if I
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8 could. You know, in th: fall of 1962, thera were 1100 prisoner~
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9 held on the Isle of Pines, and it was in the American

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,.,;:,,. 11 forgotten how many. And wa und~rtook to do that, and the

;:... way we did it was by intaresting a man by the nama of Donovan

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16 So he went to the Cuban Ambassador to the Unitad Nations

and explain that: he wanted to talk to Castro about this subjec~ !

17

18 and during the fall of 1962, he made innumerable trips to Cuba I:

.., in a chartered· plane that we provided him with the approval of

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23
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25 and sometime in late '62 the priso~ers were released.

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1 No w , this was p a ramount i n t he minds of the President and
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2 the Attorney General a n d all the r e st o f us . It was paramount
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~ 3 in the minds of a great many Ama ricans. We had a r e s ponsibilit ,

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5 The Chairman. These were the prisoners who wer e takan as
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15 is just totally out of character.

16 Tha Chairman. What I find so hard to believe is how it

17 could happen while you were the Director of the CIA and given
~ .

your own vi~w, which was against assassination, that

18
assassination attemp~s nevarthel~ss took placa without your
19
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2 Mr. McCona. Nell, I guess you must understand that this
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1 is disturbing to me, Senator, and.it is Very disturbing to ma

2 t~ come back here ten years later and find out something of thi1

3 type went on without my knowledge. But I think that the reason

4 that i t went on was it was cloaked under an authority that was

5 granted months before I took office. But that is not an

6 excuse.

7 However, I do think tha~ this is a subjact that perhaps

i::: 8 Mr. Helms and Mr. Harvey can throw some light on.
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15 Why did you make it knO\v_n by word of mouth, but not make

16 it th; subject of an order or a memorandum?

Mr. McCone. Well, had I known that any plans were afoot,
17
I would have made it an order, but I didn't know, so it va3
18
rather -- it would have been rather a strange thing for a
19
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in this area, to issue such an order.
21
The Chairman. Well, Itt. McCone, did you let your views I
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be known for the purpose of advising your subordinates that yo"-1
23 It
simply did not want to know about any such activity? I
24
I
25
Mr. McCone. No. I
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·~~ 1 The Ch airman. That was not your pur p o se ?

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2 Mr. McCo ne. No.
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standardr of conduct based on my views as to the moral ~t·'.ndardsl

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5 of the United States government and the Central Intelligen ce l

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6 Agency. I
7 Sanator Hart of Michigan. S~eculatively, Mr. McCone ,

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8 you believe that Mr. Harvey interpreted the Executive Acti on
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15 opposition to assassination.

16 Would this not mean that notwithstanding that expressed

17 opposition on August 10th, Harvey nonetheless went forward?

18 Mr. McCone. Well, the memorandum -- Mr. Harvey's memoran- •

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20 because as we said earlier after the Chairman had read t ha t I
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25 undertaken, at least, that was what I was trying to explain .

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1 The Chairman. Senator Mondale?
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15 fact continued that or something li k e it, wha re would his

16 line of authority be, excluding you? I

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18 out what he was then =arrying out, whatever plan you called
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20 Mr. McCone. I think he was reporting , at th at time, to
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23
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24 at; that time.
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25 Senator Schweikar. And that was internal CIA structure
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~ 3 Senator Mondale. In that memo of April 1967, you say,

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~t 5 to liquidate top people in the Castro ~egime. I took

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6 immediate exception to this suggestion." And in your earlier

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15 my positive memory Secretary McNamara or anybody else in the

16 meeting brought the subject up.

17 Senator Mondale. But in 1967 when you prepared this memo,

18 apparently it was still a matter of very strong concern on your

,.., 19 part. You recalled then that you had strongly objected to the ·
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20 assassination suggestion. Despite that fact, you cannot recall :
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23 I would like to explain --

~J! 24 Senator Mondale. I would like to ask it a little

·~
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• 25 differently.

UHCLASSIF IED
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IO 1 Mr . McCone. I would like to exp lai n f or the record this
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2 mernorandu..~ of mine of April 14, 1967.
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~ 8 and he wondared if I would talk with Mr. Anderson. And I said

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15 concerned about it, I went to the Director's offica and

dictated this memorandum.

16
Senator Mondale. Can you tes~ify that it was not Secretary
17
McNamara who made the assassination suggestion?
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S enator Hart of Colorado. Mr . Chairman?

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Mr . Mc Cone, as y ou a r e well aware, rec e ntly Ganeral
ii:
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• 25

TOD '' •Ar·

 ......_.__
----- --~-------·-- --- ~---

ur~ClASSJflED 52

1 operations came from the very highest sources, right next to

2 the President, or some phrase like that.

3 Could you speculate, understanding that it is speculation,

4 first a ·s to what his motive would be for saying that, and two,

5 who that individual might be or might have been that was as

6 close to the President as you can get?

7 Mr. McCone. Well, I don't know exactly what he said,

8 because all I know is what is in the newspaper, but the infer-

9 ence was he was asked by the Attorney General, who was speaking
(.·~ -

10 for the President. Now it is very hard for me to believe

11 the Attorney General initiated an operation of this kind even

in the planning stages without discussing it with the Com.~ittee ·

12 j
I
of which he was the Chairman, and there again, I have no way
13
to either confirm or dispute what General Lansdale has said.
14
Mr. Schwarz. Senator Hart, could I put in somathing here
15
that bears on the question of Mr. Lansdale?
16
The Committee is obviously going to have to consid~r the
17
credibility of General Lansdale when he comes before us as a I
18
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witness and Mr. McCone, I would ask you if you can give any l
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One is · the fact that when it was proposed by the Ambassador
l
~ 22
iii
of the United States to Saigon that General Lansdale be
Ii
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23
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appointed as Chief of Station in Saigon, you sent a telegram
24
stating that he was personally unacceptable to you. First, do
.25

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ID 1 you recall doing that?
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2 Mr. McCone. Yes, I do.

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7 if you could read into the record, and then I would like to
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i:: 8 ask you why you held the views that you apparently did about
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1962. ".After reading.this," and I don't know · what . "this"
15

16 is, "it appears to me that the DCI and CIA should always

avoid any arrangements w1der which the CIA would be obligad

17
to accept a subordinate or a supporting position to Lansdale's
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18
management. " I
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N Mr. Schwarz. Could you tell the Committee why, on at
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least these two occasions, you took a strong position in
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• opposition to association with General Lansdale?
~ 22
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Iii Mr. McCone. It wasn't an opposition to association, I \
23
i
think. Having worked with him for some months on Mongoos':!, i
24
I was not impressed with his managerial capabilities, although
25
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1 he had a very fine recor~ he seemed to be kind of a loner to

2 me and the CIA station in Saigon was a very big and very

3 sensitive station, and I thought a man who was trained in that

4 type of ·i .n operation should be t!"Je Chief of Station, and

5 certainly that man should be selected by the organization and

6 not by- ·the Ambassador.

7 The Chairman. Mr. McCone, t~is Committee is going to call

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0 8 General Lansdale as a witness. Can you give us your opinion
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9 as to his credibility?
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10 Mr. McCone. I think, Mr. Chairman, that for me to

11 testify on the record concerning the credibility of another

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14 do.
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15 If you want me to go off the record, if that is permissibl ~ ,

16 I would like to tell you I

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.· 17 The Chairman. Very well. We'll go off the record.

18 (Discussion off the record.) I

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.., 19 The Chairman. Let's go back on the record. I
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Senator Schweiker. I have a question.
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,g The Chairman. Yes, Senator Schweiker.
21
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~ Senator Schweik~r. Mr. McCone, in your April 14, 1967
~ 22
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vi memo, you mentioned paragraph 3, Operation Mongoose, and you
23
s~y i t is an interdepartmentRl affair, · .under the o p erationa l
24
control of DOD through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That is
25

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1 your wording on paragraph 3 of your April 14, 1
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would this have been set up by the Special Group Augmented,
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15 a CIA operation. CIA participated and CIA people were

16 secunded to General Lansdal~. This memorandum of mine is

' 17 wrong in one respect. I say "operational control of DOD through

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18 the JCS." I was advised by General Lernnitzar when I appeared I

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~~ Secretary of Defense, to whom?
... 24
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...~ 25 Mr. McCon~. Through some assistant to Lansdale, who was

UHCLASSIFIED
 RELEASED PER P.L.-102-526 (JFK ACT) I

--·---~~·~· -·-~_.;..::.....-~ ..,_ ..__:.,:._ _ _.:.._ -~-·-· _._

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109 EECAET ur~CLASSIFIED 56
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5 in itself, I take it?

6 Mr. McCone. Well, he was a two star General, and I guess

7 this was a proper way or a reasonable way to do it rather than

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15 direction basically then?

16 Mr. McCone. Quite removed, quite removed. I think he was

17 housed there, but except for sitting in on the 54/12 Committee

18 or being repre~ented on the 54/12 Committee Augmente~, I don't

,., 19 think Mr. McNamara exercised any direct control over General
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c0 Senator Schweiker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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23 Mr. Scwharz. I just want to pin down a couple of points

. 24 on tha Castro story and move on to Diem, and then I'm finish ed
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; 25 with what we have planned.

UNCLASSIFIED-
 RELEASED PER P.L.-102-526( JFKAcTfl

--.........

amt 21
18 F lllAliT UMClASSlf\ED 57
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. ~ 1 On Mr. Castro and your comment about the importance of
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13 the Mongoose sabotage operations were going on and indeed being ·
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15 Mr. McCone. That is correct.

16 Mr. Schwarz. And they might also have upset the

17 prisoner negotiations, I take it?

18 Mr. McCone. They might have, yes.

,., 19 Mr. Schwarz. 'Were you awars that the CIA prepared a
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23 Mr. McCone. I have some recollection of such a scheme
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"-~ b~ing developed, but it . was after the fact.

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" 25

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& 4 to deliv I it, we would have int~rcepted .

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15 Mr. McCone. There wasn't any discipline but I said I

16 didn't want any more of that kind of nonsense going on.

17 Mr. Scwharz. Was that person Mr. Fitzgerald?

18 Mr. McCone. I cannot recall.

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19 Mr. Scwharz. The record demonstrates that Mr. Fitzgerald

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20 was probably r~sponsible for that scheme, although I think i t
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~ l. 24 Mr. McCone. No.
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... 25 Mr. Schwarz. Let's go off the record.
nNtUSS\f\f.0
 RELEASED PER P.L.-102-526 (JFK ACT) l

amt 23
Ia P lllltl! I . ~ - S\flED 59
UMCl.AS
1 {Discussion off the record.)

2 Mr. Schwarz. Back on the record.

3 I would like to draw the Corrrrnittee's attention to the

4 entry at the end of that chronology under the date November

5 22, 1963, which reads: "At the very moment President Kennedy

6 was shot a CIA officer was meeting with a Cuban agent in Paris

7 and offering him an assassination device for use against

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15
Mr. McCone. It's all right. I'm perfectly comfortable.
16
(Pause}
17
Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Reporter, would you mark as McCone
18
Exhibit S a cable which does not appear to be dated to me,
M 19
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but which from other information I believe was October 6th or
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c0 October 5, 1963, from Director -- yes, it's October S, 1963 --
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~ from Director to some locations, including Saigon.
~ 22
iJ (The dor:ument referred to was
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23
marked McCone Exhibit No. 5
24
for identification.)
25
 RELEASED PER P.L.-102-526( JFK ACT) :

________ ....:; _ '"-·-·.

1GF SECktT UNCLASSIFIED

unt 24 60
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1 Mr. Schwarz. Now, Mr. McCone, I think we should read
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~ 2 this into the record and then ask you the ' background to it.
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~ 6 for actions of any Of various cont~ndin~ . Vietnarnese groups.

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However we naturally interested in intelligence on any such
15
plan. This message has b.een cleared with State Department."
16
Now, first, is that cable familiar to you?
17
Mr. McCone. I have been told of this cable.
18
Mr. Scwharz. Uh-huh.
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~ 22
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Now, the cable that I read is from you. You are the
~
~ Director referred to?
• 25
UNCLASSIFIED
 RELEASED PER P.L.-102-526. (JFK ACT)l

---------- ------ --....!...-------·-- -

TSP SECRET
· UNCLASSitlED 61

Mr. McCone. That's correct.

Mr. Schwarz. Okay.

Now, the CIA study on Diem says that another cable was

sent thP next day which is more ~xplicit than this cable. The

thrust of this cable, as you heard it, was essentially let's

know about it. We don't want to be in a position of being

responsible, but we are not respo~sible for interfering with

what other people are doing.

I
Now according to the CIA study of the Diem matter, another l
I
!
cable was sent on October 6th, which according to that study

at pages 28 and 29 includes the ::allowing language: "McCone

directs that you withdraw recommendation to Ambassador [con-

cerning assassination plan] under McCone instructions as we

cannot be in position, actively condoning such course of

action and thereby engaging our responsibility therefore."

We obviously need the full text of that second telegram,

I

but Mr. McCone, what light can you cast upon the subject of i
proposed suggested assassination~ in Vietnam in 1962 and
I I
II
I
whatever action was. taken by the CIA in connection therewith? I
Mr. McCone. Well, this was a very troublesome period I
i
in Vietnam, various groups of Vietnamese military plotting
l

to overthrow Diem, and we had -- the station had those groups I

pretty well infiltrated and every now and then the question of

a .s sassination would come up. I felt that we under no conditio1:s

should be part of it, and tha~'s why telegrams were sent. I

-on crscn;;r
 RELEASED PER P.L.-102-526(JFKAcTfl

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. ~., was very firm in that position.
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3 of it, and that is assassinations, was it your position that

-- a: 4 the CI~ qh6uld take steps to prevent assassinations or that

5 the CIA should take a hands off attitude as far as assassina-

6 tions are concerned?

7 Mr. McCone. I think our role was to assemble all

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=·:-;.
15 Parenthetically I might add, about the time those

16 telegrams were sent, I was called over by President Kennedy

17 and met privately with President Kennedy and the Attorney

18 General, and I took substantially that position.

19 The Chairman. . And what was the attitude of the President

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20 and the Attorney General in response?
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23

24 all the pressure we could on Diem to change his ways, to

25 encourage more support throughout the country. My precise

.• p &1115 1 UNCLA IFIFll~+~

 RELEASED PER P.L.-102-526(JFK ACT)[

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words to the Presiden t, and I r ememb e r them v e ry clearly,
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removed we would hava not one coup but we would have a
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P::_.· . ~ What about the Attorney General?
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15 Mr. McCone. The Attorney General was rather noncomittal

16 in the meeting. He and I walked downstairs together and he

l? said, John, are you sure you are , right? And I said I think

18 I am, and he said I'm rather surprised at the position you

,., 19 took. And I said, well, you didn't disagree with it.
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21 whether Diem should be replaced or to deal with t h e s pecif ics
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23 Mr. Mc Cone. No, t hi s d i scus sio n h a d nothing to do with

24 assassinations. This was whether we should let the coup go

25 or use our influences not to.

 RELEASED PERP.L.-102-526 (JF'KACT) l

-
----"----- - - -.-

amt 28 l8P &&IAET

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;~~ ~ 1 Then interestingly enough th~ President sent a series of ·
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c;; 2 messages to Cabot Lodge urging that he do all that he could

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4 failed, ~nd then he was called -- Cabot Lodge was called oy

N 5 Diem's office and Diem said you tell the President to tell me
t!>
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7 Unfortunately the forces wer~ surrounding the palace at

I

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11 The Chairman. Mr·. Smothers.

12 Mr. Smothers. Do you recall, Mr. McCone, the date of

13 that meeting with the President?

14 Mr. McCone. No, it was in October

15 Mr. Smothers. Was it early October?

16 Mr. McCone. I really don't know.

17 Mr.Smothers. Do you recall whether it was after you had

18 received, or the CIA had received, information from General

Minh outlining the three alternatives that were being considered

i
.., 19
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~ Mr. Smothers. Did it come to your attention that as a
~ 22
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23
groups there, that we then advised that assassination was
24
being considered as an alternative?
25

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15 It appears that this occurred about the same time that

16 CIA had been rather precisely advised ·of the alternatives

17 being considered by General Minh and General Don.

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18 Do you remember anything about the information that you

..., 19 received from that group?

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 RELEASED PER P.L.-102-526( JFK ACT) I

amt 30
TeP SEIR&T 66
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0 ? 1 Let me just try by way by way of summary, refreshment of

2 recollection or even solicitation of information, the curious

,i .
3 thing is that at the time of the Presidential meeting which you

4 have mP.n~ioned, General Minh had ~pparently requested a

5 statement of the U.S. position indicating that while no direct

6 support was expected, they wanted some assurances that we would

7 not intervene, much the same kind of thing that is reflected

Q 8 in the telegram which became Exhibit 5.

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15

16 this matter?

17 Mr. McCone. I canr.ot recall that. That all gets down

18 to the dates, whether this information was in when I met or

19 whether I met before.

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20
Mr. Smothers. Well, I raise the question, because as you
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23 the subject of assassination would not have come up in your
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24
Mr. McCone. The question of assassination did not c o~e
25
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4fOP seeRIT
 RELEASED PER P.L. -102-526 ( JFK ACT) 1

amt 31 T~ 67
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c 1 in my discussion with the President.
; ):'°
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c Mr. Smothers. With regard to the involvement in the coup
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6 Mr. McCone. Yes, it was very close.
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15 leadership. Did you have any information as to why that money

16 may have been supplied, what the purpose of the money would I

have been?
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5 Mr. McCone. Not to my knowledge • . I was never told.

6 Mr. Smothers. Well, maybe the question is, did you have
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Mr. McCone. No, I never discussed that subject. I!
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 RELEASED PER p .L.-102-526 (JFK ACT) 1

TQP &llltlT 69

Mr. Smothers. You mentioned, and we talked about it

several times, that the general guidance that you had provided

wi~h regard to the question of assassination, was there

anythinq in th~ way of either thP direction the Agency ha~

received or your contact with other high government officials

that had led you to believe that this guidance was necessary

as a cautionary factor?

Mr. McCone. Well, I think all one would have to do is

to scan the various articles and books that were published

at the time, some of which were vastly overstated, but they

reached the conclusion whether by no other source than for

public information, that this might have been something that

the CIA was involved in, for that reason

Mr. Smothers. You view this guidance as sort of

prophylactic at that point?

Mr. McCone. Yes.

Mr. Smothers. Just one final question, and that goes

back to the Special Group Augmented.

In your assessment of the personalities involved there,

who was· the dominant force on that group, the Special Group

Augmented in terms of influencing the . actions and decisions

of that body?

Mr. McCone. The Attorney General.

Mr. Smothers. Is it conceivable to you that the -- that

a group policy, unknown to you, but essentially sanctioning

UNCLA~SIFIED
 RELEASED PER P.L.-102-526( JFK ACTfl

TS P EiCRiJ
1 assassinat ions, could have been adop ted by that group without

2 the kno wledge and consent of the Attorney General?

3 Mr. McCone. Without the · ·!mow ledge and consent o f the

4 Attorney General? Oh, no .

5 Mr. Smothers. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

6 Senator Mondale. May I ask a question?

7 The Chairman. Yes.

8 Senator Mondale?

9 Senator Mondale·. We have received information, documents,

10 direct testimony, which clearly established that there were

11 attempts planned, although unsuccessfully implemented, to

l2 assassinate Castro. We also have unquestioned evidence that

13 we supplied guns to a cabal in the Dominican Republic which

assassinated Trujillo. l~e also have unquestioned evidence

14

15 that the CIA supplied at abouti the time Diem was assassina ted
I
$65,000 to the military group responsible for the assassination ~
16

17 All of these actions occurred while you were the Director of

18 Central Intelligance.

On Trujillo -- strike Trujillo. It was Castro and Diem.

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16 where I will have to reconstruct the whole scenario of events.

17 You are talking about 1963, two months of rapidly moving

18 evants, and I was in day to day contact, and it was impossible

19 for me to off the top of my head, without referring to my

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17 not really is an indicator as opposed to dispositive of our

18 intentions.

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17 would have been a very serious mistake, because we were t h e

18 conduit of information. If we had withdraw, our governmant

would have been without information.

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1 The Chairman. Any further questions~
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0 Senator Mondale. One final question.
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16 glanced ov·er them and thay are very helpful to people such as

17 us.

18 Mr. McCone. Well, I am very glad and I would consider

19 i t a privilege: to come back.

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1 existent at the time. Now this is not in defense of assassi~a-
2 tion or plans to assassinate, but you have to put yourself in

3 th~ frame of mind of this country, not only those that were
4 respon3i :Jle executives but also. ~ .he Congress and the pe0!' ~.e.

5 Here is a man who had spent a couple of years abusing

6 our country, our government, our people in the most violent

7 and incredible and unfair way. Concurrently he was pursuing

8 every avenua open to him to try to influence Latin American

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13 have had the capacity to destroy every city east of the

14 Mississippi and some west, with a capability if used to kill

15 many millions of Americans. And finally, if that had

16 succeeded we would have been on our knees to the Soviet Union

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15 well.

16 Senator Schweiker. I think also, Mr. Chairman, it should ·

17 be said that some of these attempts go back into '59 and I

18 think Mr. McCone, we have to ask ourselves the question, did

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16 and I took the position that this is the first piece of real

17 estate that they ever had their hands on where they could put

18 a short-range missile that could hit us and that couldn't be

.., 19 turned around and hit them. That was why thay don't put
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• 25
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5 We are about to conclude. If not, Mr. McCone, thank you

6 very much for your testimony here.

7 Mr. McCone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will be happy

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Q) 9 The Chairman. We will be calling on you again, I am
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 ·-- ----~
RELEASED PER P.L.-102-526 (JFK ACT) l

'.
Memorandum on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct
of Foreign &::~..i /l~Tl?<:Lt(;Lt ~~~E

Inquiry has been directed to me as to how I felt the intelligei;lce community

should be org~n,ized to me.e t .t he security needs of the country, provide necessary

, ·. intelligence reso urces for special purposes' prepare objective analyses of

intelligence findings and estimates on international trends derived therefrom and

other intelligence responsibilities. Inherent in the question was, ''How should

intelligence be handled in view of the criticism of the CIA which has damaged

, . CIA 's standing with the Congress, with our allies, ·with the news media and,
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My suggestions are based on three conclusions:
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A. The image and the name of the Central Intelli"gence Agency

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has been so seriously tarnished by reports and accusations,
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most. of which are exaggerated - many totally untrue - but
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and, therefore, our national intelligence effort must be

restructured.

B. In spite of criticism, the CIA remains a most able organization

in areas of it's special competence. This includes the capability

for objectively analyzing all int~lligence findings and to produce.

therefrom estimates important to the President and his policy

advisors. CIA 's commendable achievements in the development

and operation of sophisticated equipment for the collection of

technical intelligence - comint, sigint, satellite and other

 RELEASED PER P.L.-102-526 (JFK ACT)l

- 2 - '

aerial photography - represents a valuable national asset

. as does their skill in covert' operational undertakLngs .. All

of these assets must be preserved, encouraged and expanded

in certain areas, but always properly controlled.

c. Intelligence is _bas~cally the responsibility of the National

Security Council (NSC). It should be noted that this is an

organization created by the Congress, chaired by the

President, with the Vice President, Secretary of State,

Secretary of Defense, Director of the Central Intelligence

Agency and one or two others as members. NSC is well

<. respected throughout the country_, has never been subject

to serious criticism and decisions made by that body have

generally commanded the respect of the Congress, the pr_e ss

and the public.

Since the NSC is responsiblt;! for intelligence, I suggest that it is logical to

create a National Intelligence Authority (NIA) which would be responsible to the NSC

·and would have a broad charter, encompassing activities now assigned to CIA by law ·

and also certain responsibilities for the entire intelligence community now assigned

_to the DCI by executive order of the President. Understandably, the responsibilities

of the CIA, which have grown out of the National Security Act of 1947 ,as ~ amended, should

be re-examined and modified., if necessary. Such re-examination w~:mld establish the

"Roles and Missions" of the new National Intelligence Authority.

NIA wc:>uld absorb CIA and the Central Intelligence Agency's organization

G ou.Id become the o·r~anization up~~ which NIA would build.

 RELEASED PER p .L.-102-s26( JFKAcTfl

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The Director of NIA (D-NIA), appointed by the Preside nt and c onfirme d by

the Senate would be responsi~le to the National Security Council. TI1e ~SC control

should be absolute . . T o insure continuous surveillance , this control would proba bly

be best exercised by a sub -committee not un like the present "40 Committee" but
1

formalized , expanded and staffed.

The .D -NIA w ou~d exe r cise di re.ction and control ove r the inte lligence organiza-

tion (fo r merly CIA) through one or two de putie s appointed by the Preside nt and c.o n-

firme d by the Senate. The deputies would actually operate the Au thority and

exercise control over the intelligence community subject always to the policy
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·j · g uidance and ge neral direction of the D-NIA. ·
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0 , I.n addition, the D-NIA would serve as Chairman of the United States
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~ Intelligence Board which body would be reorganized to conform to the new pattern of.

~ i ··organization, would
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be responsible for all national estimates and special estimates
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and for establishing priorities and requirements for the entire intelligence community
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I in such fields as comint, sigint, aerial reconnaissance, etc. USIB would carry on
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-· · :; other responsibilities now assigned to it but all such responsibilitie·s must be

:- ·carefully restructured.

The Nat.i onal Security Agency (NSA) and the National Reconnaissance

Organization (NRO) would be operated under the authority of the Secretary of Defense

as executive agent. The SecDef would exercise this responsibility through an

Assista nt Secre tary of Defense (Intelligence) who would be endowed with the authority

of the Secreta r y a nd, therefore, would actually be in operational c ontrol of NSA and

NRO from the standpoi nt of budget, manpower, progra m ming, R & D, etc., taking

o uidance from an e~ecutive committee as d iscussed below.

 - 4 -·
An executive committee compose_d of the D-NIA as chairman and the

Assistant Secretary of De fense (Inte lligence ) wou ld give guidance to NS~ and NRO

t o insure tha t the requirements and prioritie s establis hed by USIB are met on a

t ime ly bas is a'nd a re not exceeded a nd a ls o, . insure a continuing resea~ch and ·

?evelopme_n t program. In exercising this resp.o nsibility, th~ e xecutive c ommittee

~ ·would unde rstandably have a strong voice in the budgets of these two orga nizatfons .
N _

e The Defense Intelligence Agency should continue, the DIA should have d irect
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~ .access to the Assistant SecDef (Intelligence) at all times and should be gra~ted broad

i= authority over the Service intelligence organizations.

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The control .of NSC over th~ NIA should be positive and should be kriown at ·
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u all times by the Congress, the press and the public. This should be handled in such
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a way that the accusations of an intelligence agency being undisciplined and uncontrolled
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Additionals checks should be:
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1. The President's Foreign Int~lligence Advisory Board
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(PFIAB) should be formalized,_ made a statuatory body

with members appointed by the President and confirmed

by the Seante. This Board should meet regularly and should

be sufficiently staffed to insure the Board is reasonably

informed on all operations and activities of the intelligence

community.

2. A joint committee made up of members from the House of

Representatives and the Senate should be formed to provide

0 Congressional oversight of the intelligence community. This

committee should be well staffed and should be kept c urrently

and fully informed of intelligence activities. Member s of the

 1 RELEASED PER P.L.-102-s26( 1FKAcTfl

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committee should preserve the confidentiality of

information given to them and such information should

not be passed on to non-members of the committee. This

joint committee should function as does the Joint Committee

on Atomic Energy. Oversight by this committee should

be accepted as responsible oversight by the Congress as

a whole.

The above plan, which, in my opinion, disposes of a great deal of cirticism

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.~ --: · now . directe~ at our intelligence operations, provides for control by NSC, review
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~ by a civilian advisory board responsible ·to the President and oversight by a joint
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~ . committee of Congress. This proposal does not attempt to dispose of the many
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However, it is .my belief, from my personal experience, that none of these problems
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