Beyond Gender Difference to a Theory of Care

Author(s): Joan C. Tronto

Source: Signs, Vol. 12, No. 4, Within and Without: Women, Gender, and Theory (Summer,
1987), pp. 644-663
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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BEYOND GENDER DIFFERENCE
TO A THEORY OF CARE

JOAN C. TRONTO

The workofCarol Gilliganand herassociates,whichdescribes"an ethicof

care" thatcomplementsan understanding ofmoralityas concernedwith
justice,has been cited frequentlyas proofofthe existenceofa "women's
morality."'Gilliganhas assertedfromthefirstthatshe does notregardthe

The researchforthispaperwas conductedwithsupportfroma Scholar'sIncentiveAward

fromthe CityUniversity ofNew Yorkand withthe aid ofthe researchfacilitiesofficeofthe
LibraryofCongress.I am grateful to theseinstitutions
fortheirsupport.Earlierdraftsofthis
paper were read at the University ofMinnesotain May 1985,at HunterCollege in October
1985,and attheseminaron "FeministWaysofKnowing"heldat DouglassCollegeinOctober
1985. I wish to thankthe manylistenerswho raised questionson these occasions.Special
thanksare due MaryDietz and AnnmarieLevins,who commentedon earlierdraftsofthis
paper.
See Carol Gilligan,"In a Different Voice:Women'sConceptionsofSelfandofMorality,"
HarvardEducationalReview47, no. 4 (November1977):481-517,"Woman'sPlace in Man's
LifeCycle," Harvard EducationalReview49, no. 4 (November1979):431-46, "Justiceand
Responsibility:Thinkingabout Real Dilemmas of Moral Conflictand Choice," in Toward
Moral and ReligiousMaturity:The FirstInternationalConferenceon Moral and Religious
Development(Morristown, Voice:Psychologi-
N.J.: SilverBurdettCo., 1980),In a Different
cal Theoryand Women'sDevelopment(Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversity Press,1982),
"Do theSocial SciencesHave an AdequateTheoryofMoralDevelopment?"in Social Science
as Moral Inquiry, ed. Norma Haan, RobertN. Bellah, Paul Rabinow,and William M.
Sullivan (New York: Columbia UniversityPress, 1983), 33-51, and "Reply" in "On In a
DifferentVoice: An Interdisciplinary Forum," Signs:Journalof Womenin Culture and

[Signs:Journalof Womenin Cultureand Society1987, vol. 12, no. 4]

C 1987 by The UniversityofChicago. All rightsreserved.0097-9740/87/1204-0003$01.00

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 1987/ SIGNS
Summer

ethicofcare as a categoryofgenderdifference.2 Nonetheless,herworkis

widely understoodas showingthatwomen are different frommen, as
evidencedin the Signsforumon In a Different Voice.For example,Linda
K. Kerberwrote,"But by emphasizingthe biologicalbasis ofdistinctive
behavior... Gilliganpermitsherreaderstoconcludethatwomen'salleged
for'relationshipsof care' is both biologicallynaturaland a good
affinity
thing."CatherineG. Greeno and Eleanor E. Maccobywronglyassert,
"The factremains,however,thatGilliganclaimsthattheviewsexpressed
bywomenin herbookrepresenta different voice-different,thatis, from
men." Zella Luria also notesthatthe book seems to belie Gilligan'slater
assertionsthatshe is not callingfordistinctivepsychologiesformen and
women. Carol Stack seems to accept Gilligan'sworkas representing"a
femalemodel of moraldevelopment."3
Gilligan'spointis a subtleone. On the one hand,she wantsto sayher
argumentgoes no further thanthe claimthatthe moraldomainmustbe
extendedto includejusticeand care. On theotherhand,shealso notesthat
"the focuson care ... is characteristically a femalephenomenonin the
advantagedpopulationsthathave been studied."4
In consideringthe issue ofgenderdifference and morality,I shalluse
Gilligan'stheory as the primaryway to understand the natureof "women's
morality."Although other writersmight also be with
identified women's
morality,5 none has been so widely read and so widelyinterpreted as an

Society11, no. 2 (Winter1986):324-33. Amongcollaborativeworksand worksbyassociates,

see Carol Gilliganand MaryField Belensky,"A naturalistic StudyofAbortionDecisions,"
New Directionsfor Child development 7 (1980):69-90; Carol Gilligan,SharryLangdale,and
Nona Lyons. "The Contributionof Women's Thoughtto DevelopmentTheory:The Eli-
minationof Sex Bias in Moral DevelopmentResearchand Education"(Washington,D.C.:
NationalInstituteofEducation,1982); Susan Pollakand Carol Gilligan,"ImagesofViolence
in ThematicApperceptionTest Stories,"Journal ofPersonalityand Social Psychology 42, no.
1 (January1982): 159-67, "Differing about Differences: The Incidenceand Interpretation of
Violent Fantasies in Women and Men," ibid. 45, no. 5 (November1983): 1172-75, and
"Killing the Messenger," ibid. 48, no. 2 (February 1985): 374-75; Nona Lyons, "Two
Perspectives:On Self,Relationships,and Morality,"Harvard EducationalReview53, no. 2
(May 1983): 125-45; and JohnM. Murphyand Carol Gilligan,"Moral Developmentin Late
Adolescenceand Adulthood:A Critiqueand Reconstruction ofKohlberg'sTheory,"Human
Development23, no. 2 (1980): 77-104.
2
Gilligan,In a DifferentVoice, 2, and "Reply,"327.
3 See "On In a DifferentVoice: An Interdisciplinary Forum,"in Signs 11, no. 2 (Winter
1986): Linda K. Kerber,"Some CautionaryWordsforHistorians,"304-10, esp. 309; Cather-
ine G. Greeno and Eleanor E. Maccoby,"How Different Is the 'Different
Voice'?" 310-16,
esp. 315; Zella Luria, "A MethodologicalCritique,"316-21, esp. 318; and Carol B. Stack,
"The Cultureof Gender: Women and Men of Color," 321-24, esp. 324.
4 Gilligan,"Reply,"330.
5 Nel Noddings,Caring:A FeminineApproachto Ethicsand Moral Education(Berkeley
and Los Angeles:University ofCaliforniaPress, 1984); Sara Ruddick,"MaternalThinking,"
FeministStudies6, no. 2 (Summer1980):342-67, "PreservativeLove and MilitaryDestruc-
tion:Some Reflectionson Motheringand Peace," in Mothering:Essays in FeministTheory,

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Tronto / THEORY OF CARE

advocate of this concept as Gilligan.6I do not mean to misrepresent

Gilligan'swork.The equationofGilligan'sworkwithwomen'smorality is a
culturalphenomenon,and not of Gilligan'smaking.Nonetheless,the
contemporary discussionabout Gilligan'sworksetsthecontextfordiscus-
sions ofwomen and morality.
This essayarguesthatalthoughan ethicofcare could be an important
intellectualconcernforfeminists, the debate aroundthisconcernshould
be centerednotin discussionsofgenderdifference butin discourseabout
the ethic's adequacy as a moraltheory.My argumentis threefold.The
equationof"care" with"female"is questionablebecause the evidenceto
supportthe linkbetweengenderdifference and different moralperspec-
tives is inadequate. It is a strategically
dangerouspositionforfeminists
because the simpleassertionofgenderdifference in a social contextthat
identifies themaleas normalcontainsan implication oftheinferiorityofthe
distinctly female.It is because,
stultifying
philosophically iffeminists
think
ofthe ethicofcare as categorizedby genderdifference, are
they likelyto
become trappedtryingto defendwomen'smoralityratherthanlooking
criticallyat the philosophicalpromisesand problemsofan ethicofcare.

A critique of the gender-diffee-ence

perspective
Carol Gilliganoriginallydevised her ethic of care when she soughtto
address problemsshe saw in Lawrence Kohlberg'spsychologyof moral
development.7Her argumentprovidesa psychological and developmental
accountofwhywomen'smoralstatementsare oftenexpressedin termsof
caring,butherapproachleaves manyquestionsunexplored.8 In suggesting
thatan ethicof care is genderrelated,Gilliganprecludesthe possibility

ed. JoyceTrebilcot(Totowa,N.J.: Rowman& Allanheld,1983),231-62, and "Pacifying the

Forces: DraftingWomen in the Interestsof Peace," Signs 8, no. 3 (Spring1983): 471-89.
6
See as evidencethe Ms. articlein whichGilliganis proclaimedthe magazine's"Woman
oftheYear": LindsyVan Gelder,"CarolGilligan:Leader fora Different KindofFuture,"Ms.
12, no. 7 (January1984): 37-40, 101. A quick perusal of the entriesin the Social Science
CitationIndexwillrevealhowwidely,and in whatdiversescholarlyfields,Gilligan'sworkis
being cited. In her surveyofdevelopmentsin psychology ofwomenfor1983-84, Sarah B.
Watsteinnoted, "The veryname Gilliganhas become a buzzwordin both academic and
feministcircles"(Watstein,"Psychology,"in The Women'sAnnual,Number4: 1983-1984,
ed. Sarah M. Pritchard[Boston:G. K. Hall & Co., 1984], 167-86, esp. 178).
7 See Lawrence
Kohlberg,withCharles Levine and AlexandraHewer, "The Current
FormulationoftheTheory,"inEssaysinMoralDevelopment, vol. 2, ThePsychology
ofMoral
Development:The Natureand Validityof Moral Stagesby LawrenceKohlberg(New York:
Harper& Row,1984),212-319. One extensivebibliography isJamesS. Leming,Foundations
ofMoralEducation:AnAnnotatedBibliography (Westport,Conn.: GreenwoodPress,1983).
8 Gilliganherselfnotedthewayin whichtheoriesare confined bythequestionstheyseek
to address. See her "Do the Social Sciences Have an Adequate Theoryof Moral Develop-
ment?"(n. 1 above), 36.

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thatcare is an ethic created in modernsocietyby the conditionof sub-

ordination.If the ethicofcare is separatedfroma concernwithgender,a
muchbroaderrangeofoptionsemerges.These are optionsthatquestion
the place of caringin societyand morallife,as well as questioningthe
adequacy of Kohlberg'scognitive-developmental model.9
Lawrence Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental theoryis today the
mostwidelyaccepted theoryof moraldevelopment.10 Accordingto this
theory,individualsdevelop morallyas theircognitiveabilitiesto under-
stand the nature of moral relationsdeepen. Kohlbergclaims that the
process of moral developmentproceeds throughset, hierarchically ar-
rangedstagesthatcorrespondto different levels of moralreasoning.
An associateofKohlberg's,Gilliganwas disturbedby an earlyfinding
thatgirlsgenerallywere at lowerstagesofmoraldevelopmentthanboys."
This findingled her to examineKohlberg'sworkforpossiblegenderbias.
She discoveredthat,in general,men and womenfollowdifferent pathsto
moraldevelopment,thatthereexistsa morally"different voice" fromthe
one that Kohlbergidentifiedas definitiveof maturemoraljudgment.12

9 Linda J. Nicholsonmade a similarpoint when she warned againstovergeneralizing

genderdifferences in "Women, Moralityand History,"Social Research50, no. 3 (Autumn
1983): 514-36, esp. 515.
10See, e.g., WilliamM. Kurtinesand JacobL. Gewirtz,eds., Morality,Moral Behavior,
and Moral Development(New York:JohnWiley & Sons, 1984).
n Gilligan,In a DifferentVoice (n. 1 above), 18.
12 Some scholarshave
challengedGilligan'sclaimofgenderdifference. JohnM. Brough-
ton, reviewingthe interviews,foundbothmen and womenexhibiting bothmodes ofmoral
expression.See his "Women'sRationality and Men's Virtues:A CritiqueofGenderDualism
in Gilligan'sTheoryof Moral Development," Social Research50, no. 3 (Autumn1983):
597-642. Debra Nails also believes that Gilligan has exaggeratedthe extentof gender
difference in herfindings.See her"Social-Scientific Sexism:Gilligan'sMismeasureofMan,"
ibid., 643-64. CynthiaJ.Bentonet al., "Is HostilityLinkedwithAffiliation amongMales and
withAchievementamongFemales?A CritiqueofPollakand Gilligan,"Journal ofPersonality
and Social Psychology 45, no. 5 (November1983):1167-71,reporta failedattempttoreplicate
Gilligan'sfindingsaboutviolence.Othermethodological criticisms
are raisedby Greenoand
Maccoby, and Luria (both n. 3 above). JudyAuerbach, Linda Blum, Vicki Smith,and
ChristineWilliamsobserve thatsince Gilliganleaves out considerationssuch as class and
religion,"Gilliganattributes all thedifferencesshe does encounterto gender"("On Gilligan's
In a Different Voice," FeministStudies11, no. 1 [1985]: 149-61, esp. 157). Kohlberg'sown
positionon genderdifference has changedsincehisinitialfinding: he nowfindsno significant
genderdifference. His challengeto Gilligan'sfinding restson LawrenceJ.Walker'sextensive
reviewoftheliterature(Walker,"Sex Differences in theDevelopmentofMoralReasoning:A
CriticalReview,"Child Development55, no. 3 [ June1984]:677-91; also citedbyGrennoand
Maccoby,and Luria). Moststudiesin Walker'sreviewreportedno genderdifferences; those
that did finddifferencesfoundthem among women who have been more isolated from
"role-taking" opportunitiesin society,whichis how Kohlberghas alwaysexplainedgender
difference(see Lawrence KohlbergwithCharles Levine and AlexandraHewer, "Synopses
and Detailed Replies to Critics,"in Kohlberg[n. 7 above], 345-61, esp. 347). Insofaras
Walkerreviewed"justice-reasoning" tests,Gilliganis willingto concede thatthereare no

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Fullyelaborated,Gilligandescribedthis"different voice"as expressingan

ethic of care thatis different fromthe ethicofjustice thatstandsat the
pinnacleofKohlberg'smoralhierarchy.As Gilliganexplainedtheethicof
care:"In thisconception,themoralproblemarisesfromconflicting respon-
sibilitiesratherthanfromcompetingrightsand requiresforitsresolutiona
mode of thinkingthatis contextualand narrativeratherthanformaland
abstract.Thisconceptionofmorality as concernedwiththeactivity ofcare
centersmoraldevelopmentaroundtheunderstanding ofresponsibility
and
relationships,just as the of
conception morality as fairness
ties moral
developmentto the understanding of rightsand rules."13
In thispassage, Gilliganidentifiesthreefundamental characteristics
thatdifferentiate theethicofcarefromtheethicofjustice. First,theethic
ofcare revolvesarounddifferent moralconceptsthanKohlberg'sethicof
justice,thatis, responsibilityand relationshipsratherthanrightsand rules.
Second, thismoralityis tied to concretecircumstances ratherthanbeing
formaland abstract.Third,thismoralityis best expressednotas a set of
principlesbut as an activity,the "activityofcare." In Gilligan'sdifferent
voice, morality is notgroundedin universal,abstractprinciplesbut in the
daily experiences and moral problems of real people in their every-
day lives.
Gilliganand herassociatesfoundthisethicofcaretobe genderrelated.
Researchby Nona Lyonstied the twodifferent moralperspectivesto two
notionsofthe self:thosewho viewed the selfas "separated"fromothers
and therefore"objective"were morelikelyto voice a moralityofjustice,
whilethosewhoviewedtheselfas "connected"to othersweremorelikely
to expressa morality ofcare. Since menare usually"separate/objective"in
theirself/other perceptions,and women moreoftenview themselvesin
termsof a "connected"self,the difference betweenjustice and care is
genderrelated.Further,menusuallyexpressthemselvesonlyinthemoral
voice ofjustice,thoughwomenare morelikelyto use bothformsofmoral
expression.14
Lyonsand Gilligando notattempttoexplainwhythemalesandfemales
theyintervieweddevelopeddifferent is
notionsoftheself.One possibility
thatcaring"is theconstitutive throughwhichwomenachievetheir
activity
femininityand againstwhichmasculinitytakesshape." Suchpsychological
theoriesofgenderdifference providethestrongestevidenceforthinking of

genderdifferences, but, sincejustice reasoningis onlyone partofmorality,

his findingdoes
not address the issue of genderdifference in moralreasoning.See Gilligan's"Reply"(n. 1
above), 328. It is perhapsinterestingto notethatthisdisputefollowsa patternthatshouldbe
methodologiestendto producedifferent
familiarto social scientists:different results.Here
two groupsof investigators are lookingat relatedbut different phenomena.Each group
claims,usingits method,thatthe findingsofthe othergroupare invalid.
13
Gilligan,In a DifferentVoice, 19.
14 See Lyons (n. 1 above).

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femalecharacteristic.
an ethicofcare as an intrinsically 15Yet Gilligan'sown
workhintsat anotherpossibleexplanation ofthe originsofcaring.In her
descriptionof women in the abortionstudyshe and MaryBelenkycon-
ducted, Gilliganwrote:
What begins to emerge is a sense of vulnerability
thatimpedes
thesewomenfromtakinga stand,whatGeorgeEliot regardsas the
to adversejudgmentofothers,whichstems
girl's"susceptibility"
fromher lackofpowerand consequentinabilityto do somethingin
the world .... The women'sreluctanceto judge stems... from
theiruncertainty about theirrightto make moralstatementsor,
perhaps, priceforthemthatsuchjudgmentseemsto entail....
the
Whenwomenfeelexcludedfromdirectparticipation in society,
theysee themselvesas subjectto a consensusor judgmentmade
and enforcedby the men on whose protectionand supportthey
depend and by whose names theyare known. . . . The conflict
betweenselfand otherthusconstitutes thecentralmoralproblem
forwomen .... The conflictbetweencompassionand autonomy,
between virtueand power .... 16

This passage suggeststhatwhateverpsychologicaldimensionsthere

mightbe to explainwomen'smoraldifferences, theremayalso be a social
cause: women's different moralexpressionmightbe a functionof their
subordinateor tentativesocial position.Alternatively,the psychological
causes maybe intermediate causes,restingin turnon thesocialconditions
ofsecondarystatus.These possibilitiessuggestthatGilligan'sworkmaybe
vulnerableto the same kindofcriticismthatshe raisedagainstKohlberg.
Gilligan'ssamples may lead her to draw a wrongconclusionabout the
natureofthemoralvoicethatshe has identified.For ifmoraldifference is a
functionofsocial positionratherthangender,thenthe moralityGilligan
has identifiedwithwomenmightbe betteridentified withsubordinateor
minoritystatus.
There is littledoubt thatclass statusaffectsthe level ofjustice rea-
soning.'7A studythatcomparedmoralcognitive-development levels of
15HilaryGraham,"Caring:A Labour ofLove," in A Labour ofLove: Women,Workand
Caring,ed. JanetFinchand Dulcie Groves(London:Routledge& KeganPaul, 1983),13-30,
esp. 17. Grahamdrawsthisconclusionfromher examination oftheworksofKarenHorney,
Jean Baker Miller, and Nancy Chodorow. Greeno and Maccobyalso reviewthe basis for
psychologicalgenderdifferences.
16
Gilligan,"In a DifferentVoice: Women's Conceptionsof Selfand of Morality"(n. 1
above), 486, 487, and 490. For furthersupportof thisfinding,see Gail Goldingand Toni
Laidlaw, "Womenand Moral Development:A Need to Care," Interchange10, no. 2 (1979-
80): 95-103, esp. 102.
17
AnneColby,LawrenceKohlberg,J.Gibbs,and M. Lieberman,"A LongitudinalStudy
ofMoralJudgment," MonographsoftheSocietyforResearchin ChildDevelopment48, nos.
1-2 (1983): 1-96, esp. 70.

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whites,blacks,and Chicanosdiscoveredthatwhitechildrenwereahead of
the minoritychildren.'8Would a studyof these groupsindicatethat,as
Gilliganfoundto be trueforwomen,theirmoralviewswere notunderde-
veloped but simplynot capturedby Kohlberg'scategories?"9
To myknowledge,no one has examinedminority groupmembersusing
Gilligan'smethodology to see if they fitthe moralityofcare betterthan
fit
they Kohlberg'scategories.Gilligan's abortionstudy,like Kohlberg's
work, is limitedin thatitfocuses solely on the Yet circumstan-
privileged.20
tial evidence stronglysuggests that the moral views of minoritygroup
membersin theUnitedStatesare muchmorelikelytobe characterized by
an ethicofcare thanby an ethicofjustice. For example,RobertColes's
discussionswithChicano,Eskimo,and Indianchildrenrevealedfrequent
criticisms ofAnglosfortheirinattention to propermoralconcernsand for
theirlackofcareforothers and for the earth.2' in hisdepictionof
Similarly,
coreblackculture,JohnLangstonGwaltney revealsthatblacksfrequently
expresssimilarmoralconcerns.22 Core blackculture,accordingto Gwalt-
ney,emphasizesbasicrespectforothers,a commitment tohonesty,gener-
ositymotivatedby theknowledgethatyoumightneed help someday,and
respect forthe choices of others. In the case historiesthat Gwaltney
recorded,one personafteranotherinvokedthesevirtuesand contrasted

18
AnthonyCortese, "A ComparativeAnalysisof Cognitionand Moral Judgmentin
Chicano,Black,and AngloChildren"(paperpresentedat theannualmeetingoftheAmerican
SociologicalAssociation,San Francisco, September 1982), and "Moral Development in
Chicano and AngloChildren,"HispanicJournalof BehavioralScience4, no. 3 (September
1982): 353-66.
19In askingthisquestionI certainlydo notmeantoimplythatthetypeofmoralreasoning
foundamongprivilegedAmericanwomenshouldbe substituted forthemorality foundamong
privilegedAmericanmen as a universalmodelformoraldevelopment.Kohlberg'sworkhas
oftenbeen criticizedfor being an ideological embodimentof liberal values. See, e.g.,
Edmund V. Sullivan,Kohlberg'sStructuralism: A CriticalAppraisal,OntarioInstitutefor
Studiesin Education,MonographSeries 15 (Toronto:OntarioInstituteforStudiesin Educa-
tion,1977). However,ifwe knewwhyprivilegedwomen,lower-classchildren,and minority
groupmembersdiffer fromprivilegedmalesin Kohlberg'smodel,we wouldknowa greatdeal
moreaboutthelimitsofthismodelas well as aboutthepsychosocialoriginsofcare itself.See
Stack (n. 3 above), 321-24.
20The abortionsampleconsistedofinterviews conductedwithwomenfromvarioussocial
and ethnicbackgrounds, butno analysisofthismaterialhas been done fromthestandpoint of
See Gilliganand Belenky(n. 1 above). The othersamplethathas
racialor class differences.
been used to generatemostofthefindings ofGilliganand herassociateswas thatused forthe
longitudinalstudyby Murphyand Gilligan(n. 1 above). Those subjectswere initially chosen
because theytooka course in moraldevelopmentat college. Thus, the sample is already
limitedbytheopportunity, interest,and abilityofindividualswhogo to college. I knowofno
analysisthatconsiderstheracial,ethnic,and classcomposition ofthesesamples.For a related
criticismof the samples,see Luria (n.3 above).
21RobertColes, Eskimos,Chicanos, Indians (Boston:Little,Brown& Co., 1977).
22
JohnLangstonGwaltney,Drylongso:A Self-Portrait of Black America(New York:
RandomHouse, 1980).

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themto theviewsofthewhitemajority, whowerecharacterized as greedy,

cheap, and self-involved, and as people who lie when it proves advan-
tageous.Is thismorality less coherentbecause itis notexpressedabstract-
ly?As Gwaltneysuccinctly putit,"BlackAmericansare,ofcourse,capable
ofthesamekindofabstractthinking thatis practicedbyall humancultures,
but sane people in a conquest environment are necessarilypreoccupied
withthe realitiesof social existence."23
Gerald GregoryJacksonalso has identifiedcharacteristics of West
Africanand Afro-American patternsofthoughtthatare closelyreminiscent
ofGilligan'sdifferentvoice, exceptthattheyare partofa large,coherent
accountoftheplace ofhumansin thecosmos.In contrasttothe"analytical,
logical,cognitive,rational,stepby step"thinking ofEuropeansand Euro-
Americans,Africanthoughtrelies on "syncretistic reasoning,intuitive,
patternsofthoughtin which"comprehension[comes]
holistic,affective"
throughsympathy."2' Indeed, Wade W. Nobles relates this different,
connectedpatternofthoughtto thefactthatblackAmericansdo notseem
to have the same self-concept as whites.Nobles characterizesthisviewof
the self,whichstresses"a sense of'cooperation,''interdependence,'and
'collectiveresponsibility,'"as the "extendedself."The parallelto Lyons's
argumentis striking.25
The possibilityofa social and notjust a psychologicalcause forGilli-
gan's differentvoice greatlybroadens the implicationsof and possible
interpretationsofresearchon an ethicofcare. One possibleimplicationis
thatKohlberg'stheoryofpropermoraldevelopmentis correct,so thatthe
failureofwomenand minority groupsto developproperlyis just a reflec-
tionofa regrettably unequal social order.Accordingto thisexplanation,
social forcesretardthe moraldevelopmentofwomen and minorities.A

3 Ibid., xxix.
24Gerald GregoryJackson,"Black Psychologyas an EmergingPointofView," cited by
Anne C. Richardsin Sourcebookon the Teaching of Black Psychology,comp. and ed.
ReginaldL. Jones(n.p.: Associationof Black Psychologists, 1978),2:175-77. See also Jack-
son's "Black Psychology:An Avenue to the Study of Afro-Americans," Journalof Black
Studies 12, no. 3 (March 1982): 241-60.
25Wade W. Nobles, "Extended Self: Rethinkingthe So-called Negro Self-Concept,"
Journalof Black Psychology2, no. 2 (February1976): 15-24, esp. 19. Incidentally,we can
raise the same questionsabout the originsofcare amongblackAmericansas we can among
women. Jacksonand Nobles providea culturalexplanationthatdescribesblacksas morally
differentfromwhitesbecause oftheirAfrican roots;thisidea parallelsthenotionthatwomen
care because culturallythatis whatbeinga womanis about. Otherauthorshave suggesteda
more positionalcause: JanetD. Ockermansuggeststhatsocial subordination producesthe
psychologicalresponseof greatergroupsolidarityin Self-Esteemand Social Anchorageof
AdolescentWhite,Blackand Mexican-American Students(Palo Alto,Calif.:R and E Research
Associates,1979). V. H. Zimmermanexplainsthe different tasksforpsychologicaldevelop-
mentthatblackwomenfaceas a resultofracialdiscrimination in "The BlackWomanGrowing
Up, "in The WomanPatient,vol. 2, Conceptsof Feminityand theLifeCycle,ed. Carol C.
Nadelson and MalkahT. Notman(New York:Plenum PublishingCorp., 1982), 77-92.

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second interpretation rejectsthe view of women and minoritiesas pas-

sivelyaffectedby society.One could claim thatwomen and minorities
proudlyclingto theirmoralviews, even iftheyare considered"lesser"
moralviews by the society,as a way ofassertingtheirdistinctiveness.
A thirdpossibilitydiffers
fromthe previoustwoin its rejectionofthe
assumptionthatfromthe startKohlberg'sjustice reasoningis somehow
superiorto an ethicofcare. By stressing
thepositivequalitiesofan ethicof
care, thisapproachwould turnKohlberg's"naturalistic"26 moralpsychol-
ogyon itshead. Whilewhitewomenand minority menandwomenoccupy
vastly differentpositionsin the social order, they disproportionately
occupythecaretakingrolesin our society.Thus,thesegroups,in termsof
havingan ethicofcare,are advantagedbytheirsocialroles.It maybe that,
in orderforan ethic of care to develop, individualsneed to experience
caringforothersand beingcaredforbyothers.Fromthisperspective,the
dailyexperienceofcaringprovidesthese groupswiththe opportunity to
develop this moral sense. The dearthof caretakingexperiencesmakes
privilegedmales morallydeprived. Their experiencesmislead them to
thinkthatmoralbeliefscan be expressedin abstract,universalistic
termsas
iftheywerepurelycognitivequestions,likemathematical formulae.27This
interpretationfitsbest withLyons'sfindingthatwomen,moreoftenthan
men, are capable of usingboth typesof moralreasoning.

Is women's morality inferior?

Even ifan ethicofcare could primarily be understoodas a genderdiffer-

ence, however,the unsituatedfactofmoraldifference betweenmen and
women is dangerousbecause it ignoresthe broaderintellectualcontext
withinwhich"facts"about genderdifference are generallyreceived.De-
spitedecades ofquestioning,we stilllive in a societywhere"man"stands
forhuman and where the normis equated withthe male.28Gender dif-
ference,therefore,is a concept that concernsdeviationfromthe nor-

26See LawrenceKohlberg,"From Is to Ought:How to Committhe Naturalistic Fallacy

and Get AwaywithIt in theStudyofMoralDevelopment,"in Essaysin MoralDevelopment,
vol. 1, The Philosophyof Moral Development:Moral Stages and the Idea of Justice,by
Lawrence Kohlberg(New York: Harper & Row, 1981), 101-89. The essay was originally
publishedin 1971.
'operations'ofreciprocity
27 "Justice and equalityin interaction parallellogicaloperations
ofrelationsofequalityand reciprocity
inthenonmoralcognitivedomain"(see Kohlberg,"The
CurrentFormulationofthe Theory"[n. 7 above], 306).
28See Gilligan,In a DifferentVoice(n. 1 above), chap. 1. See also Nicholson(n. 9 above);
and the Introductionby Sandra Hardingand MerrillB. Hintikka,eds., to Discovering
Reality:FeministPerspectiveson Epistemology,Metaphysics,Methodand Philosophyof
Science (Dordrecht:D. Reidel PublishingCo., 1983).

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mal. Given the conservativenatureof our perceptionsof knowledge,29

evidence ofa genderdifference in and ofitselfis notlikelyto lead to the
widespread questioningof establishedcategories,such as Kohlberg's.30
Instead,it is likelyto lead to the denigrationofthe"deviation"associated
withthe female.
Kohlberg'sresponse to Gilliganis instructive.He has decided that
althoughGilliganhas identifieda morallydifferent voice, thisvoice is of
limited application.31 Kohlberg distinguishes"two senses of the word
moral":

The firstsense of the wordmoralcorrespondsto ... "the moral

pointofview" [that]stressesattributes
ofimpartiality,
universaliza-
bility,and the effortand willingnessto come to agreementor
consensuswithotherhumanbeingsin generalaboutwhatis right.
It is this notionof a "moralpointof view" whichis mostclearly
embodied psychologically in the Kohlbergstage model ofjustice
reasoning.
Thereis a secondsense ofthewordmoral,whichis capturedby
Gilligan'sfocus upon the elementsof caringand responsibility,
mostvividlyevidentin relationsofspecialobligationto familyand
friends.32

Kohlberg'sexampleofthe second typeofmoralconcernis a woman's

descriptionofher decisionto divorce.33
AlthoughKohlbergdoes notdeny

29 See the descriptionof "normalscience" in Thomas Kuhn, The Structureof Scientific

Revolutions,2d ed. (Chicago:University ofChicagoPress,1970). Knowledgeis conservative
in thatwe tendtoconceivenewknowledgeinexistingframeworks; unlessknowledgecontains
a challengeto the contextin whichitwilllikelybe placed, it reinforces
existingperceptions.
Since genderdifferences are currently
perceivedin termsofa malenorm,we can expectthat
newlyidentified genderdifferenceswillbe perceivedinthesameway.Ofcourse,LorraineB.
Code is correctwhenshewrites,"To asserta difference...is not,inevitably,toevaluate.That
is an additionalstep: one whichno epistemicallyresponsibleperson,male or female,should
take withoutcarefulconsideration.This is a fundamentalcognitiveimperative"(Code,
"Responsibility and the EpistemicCommunity:Women'sPlace," Social Research50, no. 3
[Autumn1983]: 537-54, esp. 546-47). But the worldsof power and knowledgeare inter-
twined;we do notlive in a worldthatadheresto Code's ideal oftheepistemically responsible
community.
30See, e.g., BenjamineR. Barber,"BeyondtheFeministMystique,"New Republic
(July
11, 1983), 26-32. An argumentsimilarto mine is made by Nails (n. 12 above).
31
Kohlberg,in "Synopsesand Detailed Replies to Critics"(n. 12 above), denies thathis
stagesofmoraldevelopmentdo reflecta genderdifference. KohlbergbelievesthatGilligan's
most importantcontributionis her identification of "responsibility"
as a separate moral
dimension.See LawrenceKohlberg,"A ReplytoOwen Flanaganand SomeCommentson the
Puka-GoodpasterExchange,"Ethics 92, no. 3 (1982): 513-28, esp. 513.
32
Kohlberg,"The CurrentFormulationof the Theory,"229.
33 Ibid., 230-31.

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thatsuch decisionsinvolvemoralchoice,he believes it is clearthatthese

concernsare parochialand privateratherthanuniversaland sociallysig-
nificant.If we accept Kohlberg'sexplanationthatthere are two differ-
ent typesofmoralconcerns,and ifthe twoare connectedto gender,the
patternis a familiarone: what is male is important,broad, and public;
what is female is narrow,special, and insignificant. Feministscholars
have stressedthe need to reject a simplisticevaluationof the "public/
privatesplit,"withits implicitdevaluationof the female.34 Accordingly,
then,the conceptofwomen'smoralityshouldbe disassociatedfromthe
privatebecause the public and the privateare not separate-but-equal
moralrealms.35
The contoursofpublic moralityin largepartdeterminethe shape of
privatemorality. Indeed, itis inthepublicrealmthattheboundariesofthe
private are drawn. To use Kohlberg'sexample,iftheuniversal,consensual
normsofsocietydid notpermitdivorce,thenthe womanwho expressed
her personal moral dilemmaabout divorcewould have faced no moral
dilemmaat all; theboundariesaboutwhatwouldbe rightandwrongwould
alreadybe fixed,and she would know thatchoosingdivorcewould be
wrong.
This last point raises a troublesomepossibility.Perhaps women's
moralityis just a collectionof "moralleftovers,"of questionsthatgain
significance onlybecause theyare leftsomewhatopen-endedby thecom-
mandmentsand boundariesofpublicmorality.Gilliganhas notedthatthe
ethicofcareis a relationalethic,thatitis tiedtowhoone is,towhatposition
one occupies in society.Such concernshave been consideredof a sec-
ondaryimportancein themorallifeofanycommunity. In otherwords,the
requirementsofjustice have traditionally set the boundariesofcare.
As longas women'smorality is viewedas different and moreparticular
thanmainstream moralthought,itinevitably willbe treatedas a secondary
formof moralthinking.This is truebecause, as the etymology suggests,
that which is privateis deprived in at least one sense: insofaras the
boundariesof the private(in thiscase, privatemoralityas expressedby
care) are set by the categoriesand definitions ofthe public (in thiscase,
public morality,i.e., the ethicofjustice), thatwhichis relegatedto the
34See M. Rosaldo,"The Use and Abuse ofAnthropology: Reflections on Feminismand
Cross-culturalUnderstanding,"Signs 5, no. 3 (Spring1980): 389-417. Linda Imrayand
AudreyMiddletonsuggestthatthe problemis not in the public/private dichotomyitself
but in our failureto understandthatwhat is essentialin the public/private split is not
"activity"or "sphere"but power (Imrayand Middleton,"Public and Private:Markingthe
Boundaries,"in The Publicand thePrivate,ed. Eva Gamarnikow, David H. J.Morgan,June
Purvis,and Daphne Taylorson[London: Heinemann,1983], 12-27).
35A differentperspectiveon theproblemofpublic/private
lifeis presentedinJeanBethke
Elshtain's"Antigone'sDaughters,"Democracy2, no. 2 (April1982):46-59. For a responseto
Elshtain,see MaryG. Dietz, "Citizenshipwitha FeministFace: The ProblemwithMaternal
Thinking,"PoliticalTheory13, no. 1 (February1985): 19-37.

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privateis notjudged on itsownterms.Privatemorality is notperceivedas

independentofthe "moreimportant" publicrealm.It is bynaturedepen-
dent and secondary.
Thinkerswho advocate a women's moralityhave almostalways as-
sumed thatit is a necessarycorrective,not an alternative,to prevailing
moralviews.3 By so doing,theyhave made it relativelyeasy forcriticsto
dismisswomen'smorality as secondaryand irrelevant tobroadermoraland
politicalconcerns.37To argue thatwomen's moralityis a correctiveto
prevailingmodes ofmoralityis to makea functionalist argument.To the
extentthatwomen's moraldifference is viewed as functionalto the im-
provementofthemorality ofsocietyas a whole,itremainssecondary. 3 If,
armedwithGilligan'sfindings and similarwork,thebestfeminists can do is
to claimthatlettingwomenasserttheirmorality in moreimportant partsof
publiclifewillimprovelife,39 or thatpubliclifeis unimportant and women
shouldcultivatemorality in thedomesticrealm,40 thentheyare doomedto
failure.Such arguments,all ofwhichtake the form"we can be usefulto
36Carol Gilligan,in "Do theSocial SciencesHave an AdequateTheoryofMoral
Develop-
ment?"(n. 1 above), seems to suggestthatcare is such a complementary moraltheory.
37 A
goodexampleofthisphenomenonis thefateofJaneAddams.Addamswasenormously
popularforher good worksduringthe firsttwo decades ofthiscentury.When the United
States enteredWorld War I, though,and she continuedto maintaina steadfastbeliefthat
moralvalues, includingpacifism,shouldguide politicalaction,she was vilifiedas a traitor.
AlthoughAddamswas honoredwiththe Nobel Prize forPeace in 1931, her reputationand
political influencenever recovered their prewar levels. See Allen F. Davis, American
Heroine:The Lifeand LegendofJaneAddams(New York:OxfordUniversity Press,1977).An
argumentsimilarto theone I makehere is foundin EmilyStoperand RobertaAnnJohnson,
"The Weaker Sex and the Better Half: The Idea of Women's Moral Superiorityin the
AmericanFeministMovement,"Polity10, no. 2 (Winter1977): 192-217. I shouldnotethat
my criticismof the misuse of thisargumentis not directedagainstCarol Gilliganherself.
Auerbach,Blum,Smith,and Williams(n. 12 above) raisea different objectionto thepolitical
implications ofGilligan'swork.WhileI haveemphasizedhowthewomen'smorality argument
can be turnedto conservativepurposes(a pointtheymakeon 159),theyalso assertthat"the
problemwith [Gilligan's]book is not thatits politicsare bad, but thatit lacks a politics
altogether"(160). Gilliganhintedat a responseto thiscriticismwhenshe alludedto theneed
forbothmoralitiesto playa partin "publicas well as privatelife"("Reply"[n. 1 above], 326).
Yet she has not made clear whatthatinteractionmightmean.
38Several authorshave made argumentssimilarto thisone. See especiallyJamesC.
Walker,"In a DiffidentVoice: Cryptoseparatist Analysisof Female Moral Development,"
Social Research50, no. 3 (Autumn1983): 665-95; JudithStacey,"The New Conservative
Feminism," FeministStudies 9, no. 3 (Fall 1983): 559-83. My use of the language of
functionalism is inspiredhere by my readingof Susan Moller Okin, Womenin Western
PoliticalThought(Princeton,N.J.: PrincetonUniversityPress, 1978).
39See, e.g., Alice Rossi, "Beyond the Gender Gap: Women's Bid forPolitical
Power,"
Social Science Quarterly64, no. 4 (December 1983): 718-33, esp. 731; and KatherineE.
Kleeman'spamphlet,Learningto Lead: PublicLeadershipEducationProgramsforWomen
(n.p.: Public LeadershipEducationNetwork,1984),3: "Psychologist CarolGilliganprovides
us withadditionaljustification forbringingmorewomenintopublic life."
40See, e.g., Susan Tenenbaum,"Womenthroughthe PrismofPolitical
Thought,"Polity
15, no. 1 (Fall 1982): 90-102.

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you," ignorethe factthatprivilegedmen are the adjudicatorsofwhatis

useful,ofwhatis important, ofwhatstandsmostin need of
and, therefore,
correction.Rather than presentingan alternativemoral theory,then,
privatizedwomen'smoralityis a supplementalmoraltheory.And when
and how thatdifferent moralvoice getsheardis beyondthepowerofthe
"different" to decide. In thisway,as has happenedbefore,women'smoral
voice, the ethicof care, is easilydismissed.
In arguingthatthereis a strategic problemwithwomen'smorality, I do
notmeanto implythatstrategy overshadowstruth.Ifwomenweremorally
different frommen, thenstrategy would notallow us to dismissthisfact.
Yetthefactsare notso simple,and itis thuslegitimate tosee ifthedirection
in which the factsare likelyto lead requiresthatwe place them in a
differentintellectualcontext.I havetriedto showthattheconsequencesof
a simplisticembraceoftheethicofcareas specifically women'smorality are
potentially harmful. This is not to say that an ethic of care is morally
undesirablebutthatitspremisesmustbe understoodwithinthecontextof
moraltheory,ratherthanas thegivenfactsofa gender-basedpsychological
theory.

A contextual theory of care

If an ethic of care is to be takenseriouslyas a moralposition,then its
advocatesneed to exploretheassumptionson whichsucha moralposition
is founded.Unless the fullsocialand philosophicalcontextforan ethicof
careis specified,theethicofcarecanbe dismissedas a parochialconcernof
some misguidedwomen. In makingthisclaim,I differ fromsome recent
feministtheoristswho have eschewed full-scaletheoryconstruction and
have instead focusedon the practicalimplicationsof an ethic of care.
Several writers,forexample,have focusedon the questionof peace as
exemplaryofthe way in whichcare can inform our treatment ofa crucial
politicalissue.41 Their approach,however,ignoresthe contextin which
questions of war and peace appear. Out of the contextof any broader
politicaland socialtheory,thequestionofpeace can easilybe dismissedfor
failingto considerothervalues (e. g., defenseor honor),whichothersmay
view as broaderor more important.42 Only when care is assessed in its
41
See Sara Ruddick,"PreservativeLove and MilitaryDestruction,"and "Pacifying the
Forces" (bothn. 5 above). JeanElshtainoftenseemsto supporta similarposition,butin her
mostrecentessays, she is criticalof a simplistic"beautifulsouls" argumenton the partof
women. Nevertheless,she has not yet providedany fulltheoreticalalternativeto naive
pacifismexceptto demuraboutstatism.See Elshtain,"On BeautifulSouls,JustWarriorsand
FeministConsciousness,"in Womenand Men'sWars,ed. JudithStiehm(Oxford:Pergamon
Press,1983),341-49,and "Reflections on Warand PoliticalDiscourse:Realism,JustWar,and
Feminismin a NuclearAge," PoliticalTheory13, no. 1 (February1985): 39-57.
42Consider,e.g., howephemeralthetremendouswaveofinterwar pacifismprovedtobe.
See Peter Brock,TwentiethCenturyPacifism(New York:Van Nostrand,1970).

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relativeimportanceto other values can it begin to serve as a critical

standpointfromwhich to evaluate public life. Such an assessmentwill
requirea full-fledged
moraland politicaltheoryofcare.
In additionto definingthe concept of care, I suggestthree sets of
concernsthatbegin to address "care" at the theoreticallevel.43

The metaethicalquestion
One reasonwhy,fromthestandpoint ofan ethicofjustice,careseemstobe
suchan inadequatemoralposition thatan ethicofcare necessarilyrests
is
on a differentsetofpremisesaboutwhata goodmoraltheoryis. As Alasdair
Maclntyrenoted,the prevailingcontemporary notionofwhatcountsas a
moraltheory is derivedfrom Kant.44Accordingto thisview,a moraltheory
consistsof a set ofmoral chosenafterconsideration
principlesrationally of
competingprinciples.WilliamFrankenarefersto thisas "themoralpoint
of view": it is universalizable,impartial,and concernedwithdescribing
what is right,and we would expect chosen moralprinciplesto embody
these standardnotionsof morality.45
An alternativemodelformoraltheoriesis contextualmetaethicalthe-
ory.46Such theoriesconsistofpresumptions about the natureofmorality
that are different fromKantian-inspired metaethics.In any contextual
moraltheory,moralitymustbe situatedconcretely,thatis, forparticular
43Noddings (n. 5 above) distinguishesbetween the "one-caring"and the "cared-for."
Caring,she claims,is notofitselfa virtuebut rathertheoccasionfortheexerciseofvirtues.
44Alasdair Maclntyre,A Short Historyof Ethics (New York: Macmillan,
1966), 190.
Indeed, Gilliganhas been criticizedfornotpresentinga Kantianformofethicaltheory.See
GertrudNunner-Winkler, "Two Moralities?A CriticalDiscussionofan Ethic of Care and
Responsibility versusan Ethic ofRightsand Justice,"in Kurtinesand Gewirtz,eds. (n. 10
above), 348-61. For a critiqueofKantthatfollowssomeofthedirectionsfoundin an ethicof
care, see JeanBethkeElshtain,"Kant,Politics,and Persons:The ImplicationsofHis Moral
Philosophy,"Polity14, no. 2 (Winter1981): 205-21.
45
See William Frankena,Ethics, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs,N.J.: Prentice-Hall,Inc.,
1973). KohlbergrecitesFrankena'sargumentin the quotationcited by n. 32 above.
46Contextualmoraltheoriescan be teleological,deontological,axiological,oraretaic.The
common theme in contextualmoral theoriesis that they eschew a formaland absolute
resolutionofmoralquestions.The readermaysuspectthatI am coininga new phraseonlyto
weaken the positionof myopponents.Afterall, even Kohlbergbelieves thathis theoryis
situationspecificand notuniversalistic.
Indeed, perhapsonlythe Kantianperfectdutiescan
be describedas an unqualifiedly nonsituatedmorality.Ifthatis thecase, thenmyargument
for introducingcontextualmoralitygrows strongerbecause it requires that moral phi-
losophersdroptheconvenientfiction thattheirworkstopsonce theyhave clarifiedthemoral
rules.Contextualmoraltheoriesinvolvea shiftoftheessentialmoralquestionsawayfromthe
question, What are the best principles?to the question, How will individualsbest be
equipped to act morally?Manymoralphilosophersare beginningto claimtheneed to return
to a contextualethicaltheory.A good recentcollectionofessaysthatshowsboththediversity
and core concernsof this emergingperspectivecan be foundin AlasdairMacIntyreand
Stanley Hauerwas, eds., Revisions:Changing Perspectivesin Moral Philosophy(Notre
Dame, Ind.: Universityof Notre Dame Press, 1983).

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actorsin a particularsociety.It cannotbe understoodby the recitationof

abstractprinciples.Bythisaccount,morality is embeddedinthenormsofa
given society. Furthermore,contextualmoral theorydirectsattention
away fromthe moralityof singleacts to the broadermoralcapacitiesof
actors.To be moralis to possess a moralcharacter,or, as Aristotleput it,
virtueis a disposition.47Thus, moralitycannotbe determinedby posing
hypothetical moral dilemmas or by assertingmoralprinciples.Rather,
one's moralimagination, character,and actionsmustrespondto thecom-
plexityof a given situation.Amongprominentexamplesof contextual
morality, I wouldincludeAristotle's moraltheory,the"moralsentiments"
viewsofthe ScottishEnlightenment, and some contemporary writerson
morality.48
As a resultofa startingconcernwithcharacter,any contextualmoral
theorymust embody a complexportraitof the self. Theories that are
suspiciousofnonrationalmoralmotivesoftenexplainmoralactionas the
resultofrisingabove selfishpassions.Noncontextual moralphilosophers
rely on rational tests to check self-interested inclinations.Hence the
rationaland the moralbecome identified.49 In contrast,advocatesofcon-
textualmoraltheoriesoftenstressmoralsensitivity and moralimagination
as keys to understandingmaturemorallife. Ratherthanpositingsome
ideal rationalhumanbeing,contextualmorality standsorfallson itsability
to describe the ways in which individualsprogressmorallyto exhibit
concernforothers.
As a fullydevelopedmoraltheory,theethicofcarewilltaketheformof
a contextualmoraltheory.Perhapsthemostimportant characteristicofan
ethic of care is thatwithinit, moralsituations are definednot in terms
of rightsand responsibilities Put in termsof relationshipsof care. The
morallymaturepersonunderstands thebalancebetweencaringfortheself
and caringforothers.50 The perspectiveof care requiresthatconflictbe
workedout withoutdamage to the continuingrelationships.Moralprob-
lemscan be expressedin termsofaccommodating theneeds oftheselfand
of others,of balancingcompetitionand cooperation,and of maintaining
the social web of relationsin whichone findsoneself.
47Aristotle,The NichomacheanEthics, trans.J. A. K. Thomsonand H. Tredennick
(Harmondsworth: PenguinBooks, 1976), 91-92 (1103al4-b25).
48Amongtraditionalmoraltheorists,I have in mindespeciallyDavid Hume and Adam
Smith.Amongcontemporary moralphilosophers,a succinctstatementofa contextualmoral
positioncanbe foundinJohnKekes,"MoralSensitivity," Philosophy 59, no. 227 (1984):3-19.
49JohnRawls'sdescriptionofthe "originalposition"in A TheoryofJustice(Cambridge,
Mass.: HarvardUniversity Press,1971)is probablythebest-known exampleofthisapproach.
LawrenceKohlberg'sdescription ofreciprocity
ultimatelyhingeson an applicationofrational-
The Claimto MoralAdequacyofa HighestStage
ityas well. See his "Justiceas Reversibility:
of Moral Judgement,"in Essays in Moral Development(n. 26 above), 1:190-226;esp. 198.
50Gilligandescribes the stages of care in "Do the Social Sciences Have an Adequate
Theoryof Moral Development?"(n. 1 above), 41-45.

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Quite obviously,if such caretakingis the quintessentialmoraltask,

the contextwithinwhichconflicting demandsoccurwill be an important
factorin determining themorallycorrectact. To resortto abstract,univer-
sal principlesis to go outsideof the web of relationships.Thus, despite
Kohlberg'sdismissalof care as secondaryto and dependenton justice
reasoning,froma different metaethicalperspective,care may set the
boundariesofwhenjustice concernsare appropriate.5'
If feministsrecognizea moraltraditionthatis non-Kantian,theywill
be able to groundan ethicofcare moresecurelyin philosophicaltheory.
Yet thereare some seriousproblemswithall contextualmoralities,and
specificallywithan ethic of care. Consequently,as the followinganaly-
sis will show,an ethicofcare requiresmoreelaborationbeforefeminists
can decide whetherto embrace it as the appropriatemoraltheoryfor
feminism.

and thelimitsofcare
Conventionalism
moraltheoriespresumethattheyapplyto all cases; contex-
Universalistic
tual moraltheoriesmustspecifywhen and how theyapply.52Advocates
ofan ethicofcare face,as Gilliganputsit,"themoralproblemofinclusion
thathingeson thecapacityto assumeresponsibilityforcare."53It is easyto
imaginethattherewillbe somepeople or concernsaboutwhichwe do not
care. However, we mightask if our lack of care freesus frommoral
responsibility.54
This questionarisesbecause we do notcare foreveryoneequally. We
care moreforthosewho are emotionally,physically, and even culturally

51
This inversionofKohlberg'spositionis recommendedtous bythelogicalrequirements
ofmakingan ethicofcareintoa full-fledged moraltheory.How thecaringpersonwouldknow
when to invokethe more remotecriteriaofjustice is obviouslya crucialquestion.
52
"We have been toldnothingaboutmorality untilwe are toldwhatfeaturesofsituations
context-sensitive people pick out as morallysalient,what weightingstheyput on these
differentfeatures,and so on" (Owen Flanaganand Jonathan Adler,"Impartiality and Particu-
larity,"Social Research50, no. 3 [Autumn1983]: 576-96, esp. 591-92). A similarpointis
made by JonathanDancy, "Ethical Particularism and MorallyRelevantProperties,"Mind
92, no. 368 (1983): 530-47.
53Gilligan,"Do the Social Sciences Have an AdequateTheoryofMoral Development?"
44. Aristotleinsistedthatto tryto extendthe bounds of familiallove to everyonesimply
destroysfamilybonds (The PoliticsofAristotle,trans.E. Barker[New York:OxfordUniver-
sityPress, 1946], 47; 1262b [2.4.8]).
54Thus, David Hume understoodjustice,an artificial
passion,as a necessarycomplement
to the naturalpassion, benevolence. Hume argued thatif benevolencewere sufficiently
strong,therewould be no need ofjustice. Yet the limitedrangeofbenevolencemade it an
insufficient basis formoral life in human society. See David Hume, Treatiseof Human
Nature,ed. L. A. Selby-Biggeand P. H. Nidditch(Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press, 1978),
bk. 3, pt. 2, 494-95.

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closerto us.55Thus, an ethicofcare couldbecome a defenseofcaringonly

forone's ownfamily, friends,group,nation.Fromthisperspective,caring
could become a justification foranyset ofconventional relationships. Any
advocateofan ethicofcarewillneed toaddressthequestions,Whatare the
appropriateboundariesofourcaring?and moreimportant, How farshould
the boundariesof caringbe expanded?
Furthermore, in focusingon thepreservation ofexistingrelationships,
the perspectiveofcare has a conservativequality.Ifthepreservation ofa
web ofrelationships is thestarting premiseofan ethicofcare,thenthereis
littlebasis forcriticalreflection on whetherthoserelationships are good,
or of
healthy, worthy preservation. Surely, as we judge our own rela-
tionships, we are likely to favor them and relationships likethem. It is from
suchunreflective tastes,though,thathatredsofdifference can grow.One
ofthereasonswhyimpartiality is suchan appealinguniversalmoralcharac-
teristicis thatin theoryitcan preventthekindofspecialpleadinginwhich
we all otherwiseengage.Yetitmaybe possibletoavoidtheneed forspecial
pleadingwhile at the same time stoppingshortof universalmoralprin-
ciples; ifso, an ethicofcare mightbe viable.56
The possibilitythatan ethicofcare mightlead to thereinforcement of
existing social patterns also raisesthe question of relativism. It is difficultto
imaginehow an ethicofcare could avoidthechargethatitwouldembody
differentmoral positionsin different societies and at different times.
Philosophersdo notagree about the seriousness ofthis of
type relativism,
however,and contextualmoraltheoriesmayentailonlya milderformof
relativism,one thatDorothyEmmetcalls "softrelativism."Viewed from
the perspectiveof "softrelativism,"culturalvariationin certainmoral
principlesdoes not preclude the discussionof moralissues across cul-
tures.57 The onlyway an ethicofcare could entirelybypassthe chargeof
relativismwould be to posit some caringrelationship,forexample,the
relationshipofparentand child,as universal.This path,however,seems
fraught witheven greaterdifficulties forfeminist scholarsand prejudgesin
an unacceptablynarrowway who "caretakers" should be.
Insofaras the difficulty withjustice reasoning is that it ignoresthe

5 This pointwas illustratedgraphically by the ScottishEnlightenment thinkerFrancis

Hutcheson,who drew an analogybetweenthe relativestrength ofour closestand furthest
emotionalties and the ties ofgravity(InquiryintotheOriginalof Our Ideas of Beautyand
Virtue[1726] in CollectedWorksofFrancisHutcheson,ed. BernhardFabian [Hildesheim,
West Germany:George Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1971], 1:198-99). Perhapssome indi-
viduals,the saintsamongus, can resistthe greaterpull ofthoseclosestto us. A provocative
accountofmoralsaintsis SusanWolf,"MoralSaints,"JournalofPhilosophy89, no. 8 (August
1982): 419-39.
6 Peter Winch,"The Universalizability of Moral Judgments," in his Ethicsand Action
(London: Routledge& Kegan Paul, 1972), 151-70.
57 See
DorothyEmmet,Rules,Rolesand Relations(New York:St. Martin'sPress, 1966),
chap. 5, esp. 91-92.

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Summer

importanceofcontext,theexpansionofa care ethicsuggestsa muchmore

adequate moraltheory.Yet,howto makesurethattheweb ofrelationships
is spun widelyenough so thatsome are not beyondits reach remainsa
centralquestion. Whateverthe weaknessesof Kantianuniversalism,its
premiseof the equal moralworthand dignityofall humansis attractive
because it avoids thisproblem.
Past contextualmoral theoriesusuallyhave addressed the issue by
resortingto some abstractimpartialobserver.This solutionis also inade-
quate, however, since the impartialobserverusuallyplaces the same
limitationson caringas do conventionalmoralthinkers.5The onlyother
way to resolvethisproblemis to specifyhow social institutionsmightbe
arrangedtoexpandtheseconventional oftheboundariesof
understandings
care. Thus,thelegitimacy ofan ethicofcarewilldependon theadequacyof
the social and politicaltheoryofwhichit is a part.

Politicsand care
In the finalanalysis,successfuladvocacyofan ethicof care requiresthe
expositionof a social and politicaltheorythat is compatiblewith the
broadestlevels ofcare. All moraltheoriesfitbetterwithsome ratherthan
othersocial and politicalinstitutions.
Proponentsofan ethicofcare must
specifywhich social and politicalinstitutions
theyunderstandto be the
contextformoralactors.It perhapsshouldgiveus pause thatsome ofthe
mostcompellingvisionsofpolitiesofcare are utopian.59
Amongthe questionsa convincingtheoryofcare needs to addressare
themyriadquestionscrucialto anysocialand politicaltheory.Wheredoes
caringcome from?Is it learnedin the family?If so, does an ethicofcare
mandatesomethingabout the need for,or the natureof,families?Who
determineswhocanbe a memberofthecaringsociety?Whatshouldbe the
role ofthe marketin a caringsociety?Who shouldbear theresponsibility
foreducation?How muchinequalityis acceptablebeforeindividualsbe-
come indifferent to those who are too differentin status?How well do
currentinstitutions and theoriessupportthe ethicofcare?
8 For example, Adam Smithposited the existenceof an "impartialspectator"in The
Theoryof Moral Sentiments(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress, 1976), 3.1.2, 110. Richard
Brandtis a recentmoralphilosopherwho advocatedan "ideal observer"theory,but he has
since repudiatedit because it providedno wayto preventthe ideal observerfrominvoking
whatwould seem to him to be harmlesspreferencesthatmightseriouslyconstrictothers'
choices. (He uses as one example the preferenceagainsthomosexuality.)See Brandt,A
TheoryoftheGood and theRight(Oxford:ClarendonPress,OxfordUniversity Press,1979),
225-28.
59ConsiderCharlottePerkinsGilman,Herland,introduction byAnnJ.Lane (New York:
PantheonBooks, 1979); Marge Piercy,Woman on the Edge of Time (New York:Fawcett
Crest,1976). Lee Cullen Khannadrawsa parallelbetweenGilligan'sethicofcareand Piercy's
novel; see her "FrontiersofImagination:FeministWorlds,"Women'sStudiesInternational
Forum 7, no. 2 (1984): 97-102.

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Tronto / THEORY OF CARE

Finally,we need to thinkabouthowan ethicofcare mightbe situated

in the contextof existingpoliticaland social theory.An ethic of care
constitutesa view of self, relationships,and social order that may be
incompatiblewiththeemphasison individualrightsthatis so predominant
in Western,liberal,democraticsocieties.Yet,as itis currently formulated
bypoliticaltheorists,thedebatebetweenadvocatesofrightsand advocates
of communitydoes not offera clear alternativeto feministswho might
advocatean ethicofcare. As onerousas rightsmayseemwhenviewedfrom
thestandpointofourdesiresforconnected,extendedselves,theydo serve
at least somewhatto protectoppressedindividuals.While currentyearn-
ingsforgreatercommunity seem to manifesta viewofthe selfthatwould
allowformorecaring,thereis nothinginherentincommunity thatkeepsit
frombeing oppressivetowardwomen and others.60 Unless feministsas-
sume responsibility forsituatingthe ethic of care in the contextof the
rights/community discussions,the end resultmaybe thatcaringcan be
used to justifypositionsthatfeministswould findunacceptable.6'

Toward a theory of care

I have suggestedthatfeminists shouldno longercelebratean ethicofcare
as a factorofgenderdifference thatpointsto women'ssuperiority butthat
theymustnowbeginthearduoustaskofconstructing a fulltheoryofcare.
Takentogether,theargumentsin thisarticlesuggestthatthedirectionfor
futurefeministmoralthinkingmustbe broaderand moretheoretical.In
orderto demonstrate thisfinalclaimlet me considera less drasticresponse
to the question,What mightthe ethicofcare mean?
One could assertthatan ethicofcare is just a set ofsensibilitiesthat
everymorallymaturepersonshoulddevelop,alongsidethesensibilitiesof
justice morality.Ratherthanrethinking the natureofmoralphilosophy,
then,we need to change the educationalor familialinstitutions thatare
responsibleformakingthe differences betweenjustice and care gender

60See, e.g., MichaelSandel,Liberalismand theLimitsofJustice(Cambridge:Cambridge

UniversityPress, 1981). It seems doubtfulthatSandel's visionholdsany morepromisefor
womenthanRawls'stheorythatfeminists need to be somewhatsuspiciousofinvocationsof
community.See BrianBarry,reviewofSandel, in Ethics94, no. 3 (April1984):523-25; and
AmyGutmann,"Communitarian Criticsof Liberalism,"Philosophyand PublicAffairs14,
no. 3 (Summer1985): 308-21.
61 Consider the
argumentmade by JohnHardwig,"Should Women Thinkin Terms of
Rights?"Ethics 94, no. 3 (April1984): 441-55. Hardwiganswersthisquestionnegatively;
amonghis reasonsis that"rights"implya particularatomisticview ofthe self.To use rights
arguments,he claims, is to adopt this understanding of the self. Women would have to
surrendertheirsenseoftheirconnected,femalenatureiftheyused rightsarguments.Hence,
theyshouldnot.Alas, Hardwigdoes notexplainhowwomencan convincemenwhodo think
in termsof rightsto take themseriously.

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 Summer
1987/ SIGNS

specific.We shouldendorsethe developmentoftwoequal moralitiesfor

everyone and leave it to individualsto decide when to apply either
morality.
There are two problemswiththisalternative.First,such a response
ignoresthe evidence about the originsofthe currentgenderdifferences.
Whetherthe cause ofthe genderdifference in moralityis a psychological
artifactof femininity, a culturalproductofcaretakingactivity,or a posi-
tionalresultof social subordination,it is difficult
to imaginehow any of
these causes or some combinationof them could affectall individuals
equally.
In the secondplace, expressingsuchan ideal ignoresthe tendency,in
reality,to accommodatetwodesirablemoralities byfallingbackintoa rigid
gender division.If thereare two desirablemoralitiesand two genders,
what is wrongwithviewingone as predominantly male and one as pre-
dominantlyfemale? Having separate but, supposedly,equal spheres
allowsthe twodifferent moralitiesto flourishand delineatestheirbound-
aries clearly.
The mostpromisingalternative,I have suggested,is to face squarely
the difficult task of discussingthe ethic of care in termsof moral and
politicaltheory.This taskwouldincludelookingcritically at thenotionofa
women'smorality advancedbyinterpretations ofresearchon morality and
genderdifferences and by situatingsuch interpretations in the contextof
researchon moralityand class, racial,and ethnicdifferences as well. It
would also mean recognizingthe limitationsof a gender-specific moral
theoryin our culture.Finally,it would entailexploringthe promises,as
well as the problems,involvedin thinkingabout the ethicof care as an
alternativemoraltheory,ratherthansimplyas a complementtotraditional
moraltheoriesbased on justice reasoning.
Althoughthistaskwillbe a difficult one, thereis muchto gainfromit.
Attentivetotheplace ofcaringbothinconcretedailyexperienceand inour
patternsofmoralthought,we mightbe betterpreparedtoforgea societyin
whichcare can flourish.

Departmentof PoliticalScience
HunterCollege of the City University
of New York

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