Received: 24 February 2015 Revised: 28 July 2016 Accepted: 31 August 2016

DOI 10.1111/phc312384

ARTICLE

Hegel’s social and political philosophy: Recent

debates†
Michael Nance

University of Maryland, Baltimore County

Correspondence
Michael Nance, Assistant Professor of
Philosophy, University of Maryland, Baltimore
County, 1000 Hilltop Circle, Baltimore, MD
21250, USA.
Email: nance@umbc.edu
Abstract
This article discusses three topics that have been the subject of
debate in recent scholarship on Hegel’s social and political philoso-
phy: first, the relevance of Hegel’s systematic metaphysics for
interpreting Hegel’s social and political writings; second, the relation
between recognition (Anerkennung), social institutions, and rational
agency; and third, the connection between the constellation of
institutions and norms that Hegel calls “ethical life” (Sittlichkeit)
and Hegel’s theory of freedom. This article provides a critical over-
view of the positions in these three debates. In the case of the first
debate, I clarify the conceptual terrain by distinguishing between
several kinds of systematicity that are at issue. In the case of the
second debate, I argue that the views of two of the major partici-
pants, Axel Honneth and Robert Pippin, are in fact compatible. In
the case of the third debate, I seek to clarify the connection in Hegel
between two different ideas of freedom in ethical life, each of which
has been emphasized by different interpreters of Hegel: the idea of
freedom as non‐alienation and the idea of freedom as social freedom.
I conclude with a discussion of the ways in which ethical life, for
Hegel, enables the freedom of individuals.

1 | I N T RO DU CT I O N

This article discusses recent work on Hegel’s social and political philosophy. In Section 2, I introduce two basic
concepts of Hegel’s social and political thought, familiarity with which is presupposed in the rest of the discussion:
Hegel’s concept of recognition (Anerkennung) and his doctrine of ethical life (Sittlichkeit). The rest of the article is
organized around three topics that have been both prominent and controversial in recent scholarship: first, the
relation of Hegel’s social and political philosophy to his philosophical system as a whole (Section 3)1; second, the
function of social and political institutions and institutionally‐mediated recognition in Hegel’s account of action
and agency (Section 4); and third, Hegel’s theory of social and political freedom and its relation to his theory of
ethical life (Section 5).

†
For helpful feedback on this paper, I thank Fred Neuhouser, Jeppe von Platz, Whitney Schwab, and an anonymous referee for this
journal. For research assistance, I thank Elise Bonin. For funding, I thank the Office of the Vice President for Research at UMBC.

804 © 2016 The Author(s) wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/phc3 Philosophy Compass 2016; 11: 804–817
Philosophy Compass © 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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2 | R E C O G N I T I O N A N D E T HI C A L L I F E I N H E G E L

The concept of reciprocal recognition as a unique normative relation between practical agents was first introduced by
J.G. Fichte in his 1796/1797 Foundations of Natural Right (Fichte, 2000) and subsequently adopted by Hegel during his
early years in Jena (Hegel, 1977; Hegel, 1979; Hegel, 1983, §§166–196).2 The following gloss of “recognition” pro-
vides a rough working definition of central instances of the concept:
Person A recognizes person B as C just in case

1. A expressly acknowledges B as C; and

2. B expressly accepts A’s acknowledgement, where acceptance involves both the belief that A’s view of B as C is
correct, and the belief that A is competent to judge B under aspect C; and
3. the acknowledgement and acceptance reconcile person B to person A.

The first two conditions here are modifications of a proposal in Ikäheimo, 2002, 450–452. I add the third condi-
tion because, for Hegel, “recognition” is an achievement, the outcome of a process that plays a positive function in his
social and political thought (Pippin, 2008, 190–192).3 Interactions that meet the first two conditions but alienate A
and B from each other are not genuine instances of recognition in Hegel’s sense. Here is an example of Hegelian rec-
ognition: imagine that I expressly acknowledge you as a fellow citizen, and you expressly accept my acknowledge-
ment, and that this interaction reconciles us to each other by constructing a bond of solidarity between us. In such
a case, I successfully recognize you as a fellow citizen. What is distinctive here is the reciprocity or mutuality of the
relation.
Now I turn to Hegel’s notion of ethical life. Hegel’s most significant work of social and political philosophy,
Elements of the Philosophy of Right (Hegel, 1991), is divided into three parts, which Hegel calls “Abstract Right,” “Moral-
ity,” and “Ethical Life.”4 “Ethical life” refers to the constellation of social institutions characteristic of modern social and
political life, as well as the values, customs, and social norms that are embodied in these institutions (Knowles, 2002,
Chapter 9). Hegel subdivides his discussion of ethical life into three parts, corresponding to what he regards as the
three key institutions of modern life: the family, civil society, and the state. The family and the state, as general kinds
of institutions, are easy enough to understand in a general way, although Hegel’s accounts of these institutions are in
some ways contentious.5 The notion of “civil society” requires more comment. “Civil society” refers in Hegel to market
society as described by Smith, as well as to the cluster of institutions—labor groups, community associations, regula-
tory agencies, and so on—that “embed” the market (Hegel, 1991 §§182–256; Herzog, 2013, 53). In Civil Society, indi-
viduals pursue their particular private ends (Hegel, 1991 §§187, 199; Patten, 1999, 170–173). In so doing, they may
unknowingly contribute to the “universal” end of the common good as well, but that is not their conscious intention
(Hegel, 1991 §§199, 255H; Neuhouser, 2000, 88).
Hegel’s overall aim in his account of ethical life is to situate his earlier discussions of “Abstract Right” and
“Morality” in the context of a concrete, rational system of social life, political economy, and state institutions. Hegel’s
view, very roughly, is that the requirements of abstract principles of right and morality, such as those discussed in the
first two parts of the Philosophy of Right, become determinate only within the context of communities that embody
those principles in their concrete social and political institutions; that is, in the context of ethical life. Thus, there is
an important sense in which ethical life completes the Philosophy of Right by providing the full set of social and political
conditions required for the existence of a stable scheme of subjective rights and moral duties (Moland, 2011, 45;
Knowles, 2002, 223; Honneth, 2010, 48–54).
As I discuss in Section 4 below, recognition and ethical life are closely connected in Hegel’s thought. For the
institutions of ethical life provide us with concrete identities and sites of recognition, and the norms embedded
in these institutions provide us with rules for recognizing each other in various social contexts and under various
descriptions.
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3 | H E G E L ’S S O C I A L A N D P O L I T I C A L P H I L O S O P H Y A N D H I S
P H I L O S O P H I C A L SY S T E M

In the preface to the Philosophy of Right, Hegel makes clear that he regards his political thought as closely intertwined
with the speculative metaphysical system he articulated most fully in the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences,
especially the part of that system he called the Logic (Hegel, 1991, p. 10).6 Hegel’s claim here poses immense problems
for interpreters of the Philosophy of Right, for Hegel’s metaphysical system is 1) very difficult to understand, and 2)
regarded by many contemporary philosophers as highly implausible (Honneth, 2010, 4–5; Rosen, 1982, 179–180;
Rosen, 2012; Taylor, 1979, 66–72; Wood, 1990, Introduction, esp. 4–6; Wood, 2012). One fault line in recent work
on the Philosophy of Right concerns whether we should follow Hegel’s advice and read the Philosophy of Right in light
of Hegel’s metaphysics in the Logic. Despite its title, Hegel’s Logic is not an account of what we would now call “formal
logic”; rather, the Logic lays out Hegel’s metaphysical account of the structure of all rationally intelligible processes
(Horstmann, 2014, 72–74; Neuhouser, 2000, 41, 133; Nuzzo, 2006). Thom Brooks refers to intepretations that take
Hegel’s claim about the dependence of the Philosophy of Right on his Logic seriously as “systematic interpretations”
(Brooks, 2007, 3).7 “Non‐systematic” interpretations, by contrast, bracket Hegel’s Logic and attempt to develop a read-
ing of the Philosophy of Right that does not depend upon premises taken from Hegel’s speculative metaphysics.
I go on to complicate Brooks’s nonsystematic/systematic distinction below, but for now, these are useful labels
for two broad trends in Hegel scholarship. Both approaches have virtues and vices. Given Hegel’s self‐understanding,
systematic interpretations are more faithful to the letter and the spirit of his project in social and political philosophy.
But most interpreters also aim to render Hegel’s views relevant to contemporary philosophical concerns. Against sys-
tematic interpreters, nonsystematic interpreters argue that their approach best achieves this aim by freeing Hegel’s
political philosophy from his outdated and implausible metaphysics (Wood, 1990, 6–8). In the rest of this section, I
discuss some recent systematic interpretations. In the last two sections of the paper, I turn to what Brooks calls
nonsystematic interpretations.
Brooks (2007) argues that a systematic approach is preferable to nonsystematic readings because it best captures
Hegel’s own understanding of his project (Brooks, 2007, 8). He aims to show the merits of his systematic approach by
providing short, logically based studies of seven issues in Hegel’s political philosophy. A number of the chapters of
Brooks’s book succeed in casting light on aspects of the Philosophy of Right that, absent systematic contextualization,
appear obscure or arbitrary.8 To take one example, Brooks’s discussion of Hegel’s analysis of marriage and the family
in terms of “speculative logic’s syllogism” clarifies why child‐rearing and an essentialist conception of gender differ-
ences are crucial for the family to have a “rational” structure within Hegel’s system, and why alternative structures
of family life or gender identity would be regarded by Hegel as rationally inferior (Brooks, 2007, 67–81). The basic idea
is that, for Hegel, “Logic is a creative unity. It brings together opposites into a unity where their opposition vanishes in
the production of a third term, or category” (Brooks, 2007, 68). For Hegel, the bourgeois family embodies this logical
structure: It brings together the two sexes in their difference, creates a unity out of this difference (marriage), and gen-
erates a “third term” that preserves and supercedes the prior two moments, namely, a child (Hegel, 1991 §§165–66).
The bourgeois family thus embodies the logical structure that, for Hegel, is characteristic of all rationally intelligible
processes.9
This account is genuinely illuminating, for it explains why Hegel regards a specific family structure as rationally
ideal. But Brooks’s interpretation also shows Hegel to be committed at a deep level to views about gender essential-
ism10 and the proper function of love and marriage that few readers of Hegel today would find appealing or plausi-
ble.11 Indeed, Brooks himself makes clear throughout his book that his aim is merely to state Hegel’s views, not to
endorse or defend them (Brooks, 2007, 80–81, 113, 130). Thus, this example illustrates both the benefits and the lim-
itations of Brooks’s approach, which is oriented primarily towards clarifying Hegel’s views, not making them relevant
in a present‐day context.12
I conclude this section by noting two kinds of methodological criticisms that might be directed at systematic inter-
pretations. First, a systematic approach is plausibly a necessary but not sufficient condition for getting clear about
NANCE 807

what views Hegel actually held in the area of social and political philosophy. To achieve this aim, an interpretation
would also need to be historically contextualist. Brooks’s interpretation moves beyond Hegel’s Philosophy of Right into
Hegel’s Logic, but still appeals only to interpretative resources within Hegel’s philosophy. To understand the historical
Hegel, we also would need to look at the political and philosophical trends and controversies during Hegel’s time. To
my knowledge, no systematic interpreter has done for Hegel’s political philosophy the kind of historical scholarship
that, for example, Dieter Henrich has done for early German Idealism (Henrich, 2004b), or that Frederick Beiser
and Reidar Maliks have done for German political philosophy in the 1790s (Beiser, 1992; Maliks, 2014; see also
Morris, 2010).
Second, in his critique of Brooks, Wood argues that his (1990), labeled by Brooks as “unsystematic,” is in one
important respect more systematic than Brooks (2007): unlike Brooks, Wood adheres in his commentary to the inter-
nal structure of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (Wood, 2012, 18–19). Given that Hegel clearly has a systematic logical
rationale for the progression of the argumentative stages in the Philosophy of Right, Wood claims that his study tracks
Hegel’s systematic intentions in the Philosophy of Right more closely than Brooks’s book. In light of Wood’s argument,
we can distinguish two kinds of systematicity to which a reading of Hegel’s social and political philosophy might
aspire: “internal‐systematicity” and “external‐systematicity.” An internal‐systematic reading adheres closely to the
internal structure and argumentation of the Philosophy of Right, while an external‐systematic reading brings in consid-
erations from the Logic.13 Using this terminology, Wood (1990) is internal‐systematic, while Brooks (2007) and Ross
(2008) are external systematic.
Relatedly, Lisa Herzog (2013) argues that the structure of Hegel’s metaphysics actually provides a compelling
rationale for an internal‐systematic approach to the Philosophy of Right, such as that of Wood. As Herzog puts it,
Hegel’s systematic metaphysics in the Logic commits him to the view that: “…the rational structure of the real – what
Hegel calls the ‘actual’ – must show up in all parts of reality, and hence in all areas of philosophy” (Herzog, 2013, 44).14
Now, if each particular part of reality exemplifies the logical (rational) structure of the whole, it will follow that by
studying the internal structure of any particular part of reality, such as the domain of “Objective Spirit” that is the topic
of the Philosophy of Right, we will at the same time gain an understanding of the structure of the whole. Hence Herzog
argues that an internal‐systematic approach has an external‐systematic justification.15
The arguments of Wood and Herzog make clear that Brooks’s (2007) division of interpretations into “systematic”
and “non‐systematic” needs to be re‐conceived to allow for different kinds of systematicity. Still, Brooks’s categoriza-
tion is useful in distinguishing a divide in the literature. Readers interested in Hegel’s own understanding of his project
in social and political philosophy will find external‐systematic interpretations that appeal to the Logic useful. External
systematic readings are also useful for understanding the reception of Hegel’s social and political thought in the mid‐
19th century, because Hegel was clearly regarded as a speculative metaphysician by, for example, Marx (Marx, 1970).
On the other hand, readers interested primarily in the relevance of Hegel’s ideas for contemporary social and political
thought will likely be better served by studies that bracket the Logic. I turn to such readings in the next two sections.

4 | T HE SO C I A L A N D P O L I T I C A L CO N D I T I O N S OF A G E N C Y :
RECOGNITION‐THEORETIC APPROACHES

Much of the most interesting recent work on Hegel’s social and political philosophy concerns Hegel’s view of the
social and political dimensions of action, agency, and freedom.16 In this section I focus on the way in which social rela-
tions of mutual recognition shape agency within ethical life as discussed in recent work by Axel Honneth and Robert
Pippin. The next section continues the same thread by discussing Hegel’s theory of social and political freedom in rela-
tion to his accounts of recognition and ethical life.
Honneth’s Pathologies of Individual Freedom: Hegel’s Social Theory develops an explicitly nonsystematic,
nonmetaphysical reading of the Philosophy of Right that is centered on Hegel’s idea of recognition (Honneth, 2010,
4–5).17 Honneth aims to “reactualize” the Philosophy of Right, that is, to update Hegel’s theory in response to
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present‐day concerns in political philosophy and social theory. There are two related strands of argument in
Honneth’s reconstruction of Hegel’s position. First, Honneth argues along broadly Aristotelian lines that certain forms
of recognition relations are necessary for the development of flourishing human subjectivity. On Honneth’s recon-
struction, Hegel’s account of ethical life describes the institutional structures within which modern subjects can
engage in these various recognition relations.18 Second, following up on Hegel’s suggestion in the Introduction to
the Philosophy of Right (Hegel, 1991 §4), Honneth reads the three main parts of the text as offering progressively more
elaborate and satisfactory accounts of free agency and action (Honneth, 2010, 20–22). On Honneth’s reading, the
organizing principle of the work can be made intelligible entirely in terms of the progressively more demanding
requirements of progressively richer forms of freedom, without recourse to the Logic.
For both Honneth and Pippin, forms of free agency and modes of recognition are closely related: To the degree
that my relation to another is mediated by reciprocal recognition, I am free in relation to that other (more on this in
Section 5 below). For Honneth, the first two parts of the Philosophy of Right, Abstract Right and Morality, both
describe forms of recognition—as legal rights‐bearers and morally autonomous agents, respectively—that are neces-
sary for human beings to realize themselves as free. But if the kinds of freedom described in Abstract Right and Moral-
ity are regarded by a society as the only freedoms of importance, members of that society will experience what
Honneth calls social pathologies (Honneth, 2010, 28–41).19 For example, if I conceive of my interactions with others
only in terms of our private legal rights, then I will be unable to experience relationships of love, care, or solidarity.20
This is a social pathology, for the fixation on private legal rights prevents me from experiencing the full range of
recognition relations that are necessary for flourishing and freedom.
Hegel’s project, for Honneth, is therapeutic in that the social structure of ethical life is intended to mitigate the
development of social pathologies by providing appropriate opportunities to all persons to participate in the full spec-
trum of recognition relations (Honneth, 2010, 42–47, 49). This is what makes a form of recognition more “complete”
than another: Societies that provide their members with opportunities for fully adequate recognition enable their
members to experience the full spectrum of intersubjective relationships that are required for freedom (Honneth,
2010, 46). In earlier work, Honneth describes these recognition relations as “love, rights, and solidarity,” which take
place in the family, civil society, and the state, respectively (Honneth, 1995, Chapter 5; compare Honneth, 2010,
60, 73–80). For Hegel, there is social space for all members to experience all of these forms of interaction only within
the institutional arrangement he calls ethical life (Honneth 48–57). In such societies, free individuals are able to flour-
ish. Thus, for Honneth, Hegel’s social and political philosophy can be understood as offering a social‐psychological
thesis about the social preconditions for the development of healthy human subjectivity, as well as a set of institu-
tional recommendations about how to meet these preconditions, and a diagnosis of the forms of social suffering that
result when these preconditions are not met.
Pippin agrees with the second strand of Honneth’s argumentation, that Hegel’s social and political philosophy
should be interpreted in action‐theoretic terms, but he objects to the first, psychologistic strand of Honneth’s reading,
as well as to Honneth’s view of recognition relations as something like social goods that can be subject to norms of jus-
tice (Pippin, 2008, 183, 255–257).21 On Pippin’s interpretation, the most compelling and unique feature of Hegel’s prac-
tical philosophy is Hegel’s strong form of social constructivism about action and agency. A highly simplified version of
Pippin’s very complex interpretation could be reconstructed as follows: To be a free agent is to be responsive to reasons
(Pippin, 2008, 191); but what counts as a reason is socially conditioned and institutionally mediated (Pippin, 2008,
198–199, 220–221, 246)22; therefore, what counts as free agency is socially conditioned and institutionally mediated
(Pippin, 2008, 198–199).23 Given that the social institutions and norms that construct us as reason‐responsive agents
vary and evolve across time and culture, historicism about agency falls out of Pippin’s argument (see, e.g., Pippin, 2008,
17). On Pippin’s reading of Hegel’s practical philosophy, then, our conceptions of action, reasons, and agency are social
constructs that we should view as historical achievements, not as a‐historical givens.24 Pippin’s view of Hegel’s account
of recognition is thus quite different from Honneth’s interpretation. Unlike Honneth’s intepretation, for Pippin, Hegel’s
theory of recognition should not be understood primarily as a social‐psychological thesis about the social conditions for
human flourishing. For Pippin, recognition matters because being recognized as an action, reason, or agent is at least
NANCE 809

partially constitutive of being an action, reason, or agent. Hegel’s doctrine of recognition is, on Pippin’s reading, an
account of how our normative categories, including those categories we use to describe actions and agents, are
constructed and maintained through historically evolved, institutionally mediated recognition relations.
This is all relevant to social and political philosophy for at least two reasons. First, Hegel analyzes a number of key
social and political concepts in terms of recognition. For example, Hegel describes private rights in his discussion of
“Abstract Right” as consisting in relations of reciprocal recognition, which is to say that rights are inherently social
and second‐personal. Second, and relatedly, on Hegel’s account, social and political institutions play a key role in shap-
ing the ways in which we recognize, or fail to recognize, each other. They do so by providing us with templates for
mutual recognition: When we meet others at our local polling place, at a protest march, in the economic marketplace,
or in the jury box, we occupy determinate social positions that give particular content to the recognition relations we
enter into in these contexts.25 Thus for Pippin’s Hegel, the three spheres of ethical life—the family, civil society, and
the state—provide much of the context in which our actions and identities become determinate.26 For Pippin, how-
ever, Hegel’s theory of recognition operates at a level that is conceptually prior to questions of distributive justice
—recognition relations, for Pippin, structure the normative social space within which demands of right can become
intelligible at all. Thus, against Honneth, Pippin argues that to treat recognition as subject to demands of right “gets
the cart before the horse” (Pippin, 2008, 257; see also Pinkard, 2012).
The latter objection to Honneth seems unconvincing. Although it is surely correct that, for Hegel, any instance of
intelligible rational agency presupposes recognitively mediated social norms (see, e.g., Hegel, 1977 §347; Hegel, 1971
§§430–435), it does not follow that agents are thereby prevented from reflecting on the ways in which their social
institutions mediate and constitute those social norms. For example, an individual who grew up in a patriarchal society
could come to regard her socially recognized norms regarding gender identity—norms that have partially constituted
her own agency by shaping what she regards as good reasons for action—as deeply flawed and oppressive, and thus
aim to restructure those norms by means of political activism. In such a case, recognition relations are, first, the pre-
condition for the constitution of the activist as an agent, and then in a second step come to be regarded by her as
unjust. It is true that, on Hegel’s view, we cannot question all of our society’s norms at once, or we would lose our
grip on ourselves as practical agents (cf. Taylor, 1985, 34–35); but that does not forestall criticism of social injustice
and attempts at social reform. It also does not prevent us from using opportunities for recognition as a critical tool
for evaluating social and political institutions. Indeed, there is textual evidence to support the view that, for Hegel,
part of what makes the institutions of ethical life good and rational is that they allow members of those institutions
opportunities for various forms of recognition (see, e.g., Hegel, 1991 §§238, 253; Moland, 2011, 35–44). Thus, I think
it is a mistake to view Honneth’s psychologistic interpretation and Pippin’s normative social constructivist interpreta-
tion of Hegel on recognition, ethical life, and free agency as incompatible.
All of this may seem somewhat distant from the standard concerns of political philosophy—theories of property,
legitimate authority, and so on. But one of Hegel’s most distinctive theses in social and political philosophy is that the
normative evaluation of social and political institutions must pay close attention to the ways in which these institu-
tions construct the subjectivity of participants. For Hegel, participation in the institutions of ethical life plays a crucial
educative function: it shapes human animals into modern subjects who have the dispositions and rational capacities to
realize themselves as free agents, and to sustain the institutional structure of ethical life over time (see, e.g., Hegel,
1991, §187, §238; Neuhouser, 2000, 148–165). These issues are closely related to Hegel’s accounts of sociopolitical
alienation and freedom, to which I now turn.

5 | E T H I C A L L I F E A N D F RE E D O M

The theme of freedom is the organizing principle of the Philosophy of Right. The kind of freedom I am concerned with
in this section—call it “Hegelian freedom”—is the most developed form of freedom in the book, the freedom of mem-
bers of ethical life. This is a specifically social and political form of freedom that cannot be reduced to the autonomy of
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individual moral agents or to the legally protected freedoms of individual persons. Hegelian freedom is highly uncon-
ventional and has been the source of a great deal of interpretative controversy. In this section, I first present several of
Hegel’s statements about Hegelian freedom. According to these statements, Hegelian freedom is a matter of “being
with oneself in another,” and it requires both subjective and objective conditions to be met. I then categorize and dis-
cuss recent interpretations of Hegelian freedom according to their characterization of these conditions.
Consider the following passage in which Hegel describes his concept of freedom:

Only in this freedom is the will completely with itself [bei sich], because it has reference to nothing but
itself, so that every relationship of dependence on something other than itself is thereby eliminated.
(PR §23)

This formulation emphasizes that freedom is a matter of “being with oneself,” which Hegel contrasts with a “relation
of dependence on something other” than oneself. Now, given that we are finite beings, dependence is unavoidable for
us; we are always “with an other.” But the intuitive idea of Hegelian freedom is that we can make forms of dependence
and determination by alien objects into forms of self‐dependence and self‐determination by overcoming the “other-
ness” or “externality” of the determining objects.27 If we could accomplish such a transformation, then in being “with
an other,” we would remain “with ourself” (for discussion, see Wood, 1990, 45–51; Neuhouser, 2000, 19–20).
Hegel frequently refers to friendship and love as illustrations of this idea. See, for example, this passage from the
Introduction to the Philosophy of Right:

But we already possess this freedom in the form of feeling [Empfindung], for example in friendship and
love. Here, we are not one‐sidedly within ourselves, but willingly limit ourselves with reference to an
other, even while knowing ourselves in this limitation as ourselves…Freedom is to will something
determinate, yet to be with oneself [bei sich] in this determinacy and to return once more to the
universal. (PR §7H)

In friendship and love, one constrains one’s agency in relation to the friend or beloved. But the fact that the needs
and desires of one’s friend or loved one constrain one’s agency does not detract from one’s freedom. There are dif-
ferent ways of explaining the latter point, which I explore below. But all of the explanations rely on the fact that
something about my relationship to the object of love or friendship—say, the fact that this is a relationship that I value
as part of my identity—converts what initially appears to be determination by an external object into an instance of
self‐determination (Patten, 1999, 192; Knowles, 2002, 229, 235–37; Neuhouser, 2000, 19–20, 109).
Hegel frequently states that two kinds of conditions must be met for Hegelian freedom, understood as being with
oneself in another, to exist: first, individuals must subjectively have certain dispositions or forms of consciousness; and
second, the objective world of social and political institutions must have certain features (see, e.g., Hegel, 1991,
§258Z). I first discuss interpretations of the subjective condition and then discuss interpretations of the objective con-
dition. Interpretations of the subjective condition can be divided according to whether they characterize this condition
as cognitive or volitional. What I will call “non‐alienation” interpretations of the subjective condition characterize
Hegelian freedom purely cognitively as consisting in a set of veridical beliefs about one’s social world. Hegel hints
at such a conception of freedom when he describes “patriotism” as

the consciousness that my substantial and particular interest is preserved and contained in the interest
and end of an other (in this case, the state), and in the latter’s relation to me as an individual [als
Einzelnem]. As a result, this other immediately ceases to be an other for me, and in my
consciousness of this, I am free. (PR §268)28

This passage suggests an idiosyncratically cognitive notion of freedom that makes freedom a matter of how we grasp
the world in our consciousness (cf. Neuhouser, 2000, 111–112 for discussion).
Michael Hardimon’s influential account of Hegel’s social and political philosophy holds that, for Hegel, citizens are
alienated from their social world if either (a) the social world they find themselves in is, as a matter of objective fact,
NANCE 811

not worthy of reconciliation—if it is not “a home,” as Hardimon and Hegel sometimes put it; or (b) citizens subjectively
believe that their social world is not worthy of reconciliation because it is not a home (Hardimon, 1994, 120–122).
There are two kinds of subjective alienation, both of which Hardimon characterizes in cognitive terms. Either (a)
people falsely believe that the social world is not worthy of reconciliation, even though it (objectively) is; or (b) people
truly believe that the social world is not worthy of reconciliation, because they see that it does not meet the objective
conditions necessary for it to count as a home (Hardimon, 1994, 120–121). In either case, people are not with
themselves in their social world, and therefore not free.29
Neuhouser and Franco acknowledge that the idea that freedom consists, subjectively, in a cognitive state departs
significantly from the modern liberal tradition of political thought, for which freedom is a matter of volition, not
cognition (Franco, 1999, 178–180; Neuhouser, 2000, 23–24, 105). Hegel’s critics have gone further, claiming that
Hegelian freedom is so far removed from modern understandings of freedom as an exercise of will that it ceases to
be freedom in any meaningful sense of the term (Riley, 1982, 192–199; Haym, 1857, 367–370).30
In response to such concerns about non‐alienation interpretations, Neuhouser has proposed a different account
of the subjective component of Hegelian freedom. Neuhouser distinguishes what he calls “social freedom,” a form of
“practical freedom” because it pertains to action and the will, from non‐alienation, which he describes as “speculative
freedom” because it is cognitive, not volitional (Neuhouser, 2000 19–23).31 Neuhouser claims that, unlike non‐alien-
ation, social freedom is a readily identifiable form of freedom in action. Thus, Neuhouser’s account of social freedom is
meant to avoid the objection that Hegelian freedom is not really freedom at all. Drawing on his reading of Rousseau
and the general will, Neuhouser formulates Hegelian social freedom in the following way: “the socially free individual
freely and effectively wills the laws and social institutions that are the real conditions of his or her own freedom”
(Neuhouser, 2000, 84). The reference to “free and effective” willing refers to the subjective side of social freedom,
while the claim that the laws and social institutions that individuals will are the conditions of individual freedom
characterizes the objective aspect.32
On Neuhouser’s view, the subjective side of social freedom involves acting from a particular kind of subjective
“disposition” [Gesinnung] toward the objectively good laws and institutions of ethical life. If one acts from this dispo-
sition, then in acting in accordance with the laws and norms of ethical life, one acts according to one’s own will.
Neuhouser characterizes this disposition as consisting in various kinds of unity between individuals and their social
institutions.33 Two of the senses in which individuals are united with the social institutions of ethical life are especially
important for understanding the subjective aspect of social freedom. The first kind of unity is unity of will (Neuhouser,
2000, 87). Unity of will refers to the fact that individuals identify with the “general wills”—the social norms and laws—
embodied in the social and political institutions of which they are members. This identification of particular and
general wills takes on different forms in different institutional contexts. For example, as an active member of my
neighborhood association, I will identify with the policies and ordinances adopted by that association as expressive
of my own will. When I act in accordance with those ordinances and policies, I follow my own will. As Hegel would
put it, I remain “with myself.” Hegel thinks that, in principle, our relations to all of the institutions of ethical life can
in this way become relations of social freedom because our wills can be freely united with the norms and laws of these
institutions.
The second kind of unity that characterizes the subjective disposition of socially free citizens is what Neuhouser
calls “unity of essence.” Under this heading, Neuhouser aims to articulate the sense in which, for Hegel, individuals’
practical identities flow from their social membership, which in turn is supposed to show how their identification with
the general wills of their social institutions is possible (Neuhouser, 2000, 94; Moland, 2011, 53). Neuhouser’s idea is
that, for Hegel, we get our particular ends and our sense of self‐esteem from recognition and participation in the social
roles we occupy, as parents, workers, citizens, and so on (see, e.g., Hegel, 1991, §261Z). The result is that we think of
our identities in terms of these roles and are thus able to identify with the general wills of the associations of which we
are members as expressing our own values and principles (Neuhouser, 2000, 110).
Now, Neuhouser’s account of the subjective condition of Hegelian freedom need not be regarded as in tension
with at least some non‐alienation accounts of the subjective condition, because Neuhouser allows that, in addition
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to the practical disposition just described, subjective social freedom involves a cognitive component—a set of veridical
beliefs about one’s social world that reconcile one to that world. As both Neuhouser and Pippin, 2008 recognize,
Hegelian freedom as a form of action presupposes at least some degree of non‐alienation on the part of agents. With-
out understanding the goodness, or potential goodness, of their social world, agents cannot endorse the norms of that
social world as expressive of their own wills, and therefore cannot act freely according to those norms. Thus, in my
view, the subjective component of Hegelian freedom requires both a high degree of cognitive non‐alienation, and
volitional commitment to act according to the norms of ethical life. Hardimon emphasizes the former, and Neuhouser
emphasizes the latter.
Now I turn to the objective conditions required for Hegelian freedom. On a traditional metaphysical reading,
Hegel advocates an organicist form of rationalist substance monism (Horstmann, 1990; Taylor, 1979, 23–28). This
metaphysical view certainly suffices as the objective component of Hegelian freedom. For rationalist monism
implies that there is an immanent rationality embedded in the world (and therefore also in the institutions of ethical
life) that is intelligible for us as rational beings because we share in the same immanent rationality (Taylor, 1979,
47). On such a metaphysical view, the institutions of ethical life would cease to appear to us as alien, for they
would be regarded as part of an objective reality that is known to be fundamentally rational. Such a reading is per-
haps suggested by Hegel’s famous Doppelsatz in the Preface to the Philosophy of Right, which states that “What is
rational is actual; and what is actual is rational” (Hegel, 1991, 20). However we read this cryptic passage, it suggests
that part of the point of the Philosophy of Right is to help its readers come to see the rationality of their objective
social world.34 The project of the Philosophy of Right can thus be seen as a form of “social theodicy” (Hardimon,
1994, 19–21).
Against such a strongly metaphysical reading of the objective condition, many interpreters have suggested that
much more modest objective conditions would suffice for Hegelian freedom. For although rationalist monism
entails the immanent rationality of social and political institutions, the latter can be established independently of
the former. Commentators have identified three kinds of objective conditions that are supposed to be sufficient,
either individually or jointly, to realize Hegelian freedom. These conditions specify objective requirements on the
institutions of ethical life. First, as we have seen, a number of commentators argue that the institutions of ethical
life must meet a recognition condition; that is, these institutions must provide individuals with opportunities for
recognizing and being recognized by others along various dimensions (Pippin, 2008, 207; Neuhouser, 2000, 152,
160–161, 239–240; Honneth, 2010, 42–47; Moland, 2011, Chapter 1; Franco, 1999, 197, 256). As Neuhouser
emphasizes, this objective condition is necessary for individuals to possess the subjective disposition necessary
for social freedom. Second, in a closely related point, commentators argue that the institutions of ethical life must
enable or express various forms of freedom. Importantly, these include what Hegel thinks of as the “arbitrary” free-
dom of abstract right, namely, the freedom to do and think as one pleases within a protected personal sphere
(Neuhouser, 2000, 146–148; Wood, 1990, 257–258).35 Institutions also express freedom by mediating recognition
relations between members of society and social institutions, such that individuals are able to “remain with them-
selves” in their subjective relation to others. Third, commentators argue that the institutions of ethical life must
meet a stability or social reproduction condition. To meet this condition, ethical life must be composed of discrete
processes that complement and stabilize each other in performing their social functions, such that each particular
social institution is organically integrated into the whole (Neuhouser, 2000, 122, 133–144). Now, it might seem
odd to refer to ethical life as embodying “objective freedom” because its institutions are stable and organically inte-
grated. But Neuhouser argues that part of what is involved in social reproduction, for Hegel, is the reproduction of
ethical life as a social organism composed of free individual members (Neuhouser, 2000, 130–131). Furthermore,
one of the primary ways in which ethical life meets the objective stability condition is by forming the subjectivity
of its members. In so doing, ethical life at the same time prepares these individuals to realize their individual free-
dom. In other words, part of why individual social members can view ethical life as embodying objective freedom is
because the stability of ethical life is both a precondition of their own agency, and allows the conditions of their
subjective freedom to continue to exist in a stable way over time.
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6 | C O N CL U S I O N

One recent debate regarding Hegel’s social and political thought, which I discussed in Section 3, has focused on its
relation to Hegel’s metaphysical system. Given the recent resurgence of interest in Hegel’s metaphysics (see, e.g.,
Kreines (2006) and Bowman (2013)), this debate is likely to continue. Another recent set of debates concern
Hegel’s account of social and political freedom, recognition, and ethical life. I discussed these debates in Sections
4 and 5. This is the area in which Hegel has the most to contribute to contemporary social and political philosophy.
His analyses of social and political institutions as enabling social freedom, solidarity, and non‐alienation are an
important antidote to excessive individualism in social and political philosophy today, just as they were during
Hegel’s own time.

NOTES
1
Readers interested primarily in Hegel’s relevance for contemporary social and political philosophy may skim much of
Section 3, which is of more interest for historically‐oriented readers.
2
For discussion of the Fichte/Hegel connection with regard to recognition, see Williams, 1992; Franco, 1999, Chapters
1–2; Honneth, 1995, Chapter 2; Siep, 1979; Siep, 1992, Chapter 3; Wildt, 1982; Wood, 2014, Chapter 9. I discuss Hegel’s
account of recognition in Section 4 below.
3
Hegel tends to treat recognition as a process that is mediated by conflict, but he is clear that the only true resolution of
this conflict consists in the achievement of genuine mutual recognition, which has the structure described in the account
above. This is most clear in the accounts in the Jena system drafts (Hegel, 1979 and 1983) and in the Encyclopedia discus-
sion of Subjective Spirit (Hegel, 1971, §432Z). For further discussion of Hegel and recognition, see among many others
Honneth, 2010 50–53; Knowles, 2002 91–103; Anderson, 2009; Moyar, 2011, Chapter 5; Wood, 1990, Chapter 4;
Williams, 1997.
4
This tripartite division can also be found in Hegel’s discussion of “Objective Spirit” in the Encyclopedia, Hegel, 1971,
241–291.
5
For discussion of Hegel on the family, see Franco, 1999, Chapter 7; Brooks, 2007, Chapter 5; Knowles, 2002, Chapter 10;
Blasche, 2004; Williams, 1997, Chapter 10. For discussion of Hegel’s account of the state, see Patten, 1999, Chapter 6;
Knowles, 2002, Chapter 13; Henrich, 2004a.
6
In the Preface, Hegel writes: “Since I have fully developed the nature of speculative knowledge in my Science of Logic, I
have only occasionally added an explanatory comment on procedure and method in the present outline…on the one hand,
it might have been considered superfluous to do so in view of the fact that I have presupposed a familiarity with scientific
method; and on the other, it will readily be noticed that the work as a whole, like the construction [Ausbildung] of its parts,
is based on the logical spirit. It is also chiefly from this point of view that I would wish this treatise to be understood and
judged.” For my very general purposes in this article, the differences between the two versions of the Logic—the Encyclo-
pedia Logic and the expanded Science of Logic—are not relevant.
7
Brooks thinks the systematic/nonsystematic categorization is superior to the more standard distinction between “meta-
physical” and “non‐metaphysical” approaches to Hegel, because in his view both of these latter approaches accept that
Hegel is a metaphysical thinker in some sense (Brooks, 2007, 3). The most influential discussions of a “non‐metaphysical”
Hegel are Pippin (1989), Pinkard (1996), and Hartmann (1972). These works focus on Hegel’s epistemology and meta-
physics, especially in the Phenomenology.
8
I found the chapters on “Property,” “Family,” “Monarchy,” and “War” to be illuminating. The chapters on “Punishment” and
“Law,” by contrast, while interesting in their own right, seemed to draw less on Hegel’s larger philosophical system.
9
For a “processualist” reading of Hegel’s Logic, see Nuzzo (2006).
10
It is important, for Hegel’s systematic purposes that men and women are essentially different, so that their unification can
overcome their difference. See Brooks, 2007, 76. See also Wood, 1990, 244–246.
11
Stone (2012) and Deranty (2000) argue that some of Hegel’s own commitments in fact push him in the direction of gender
egalitarianism, although he did not follow through on those commitments. Pateman (1996) and Mills (1996) are more
critical.
12
Other systematic studies of Hegel’s social and political philosophy include: Horstmann, 2004; Henrich, 2004a. Ross (2008)
focuses on a specific aspect of Hegel’s systematic metaphysics: his account of “absolute mechanism” in the Science of Logic
(Hegel, 1969, 721–726). Ross then relates Hegel’s logical account of absolute mechanism to Hegel’s evolving understand-
ing of “mechanistic” and “organic” elements in ethical life, particularly with regard to the relation between civil society and
the state in the Philosophy of Right. Franco, 1999 Chapters 1–2 contains a helpful account of Hegel’s influences and early
development as a political thinker. Franco, 1999 Chapter 4 and Avineri 1972 Chapters 3–4 deal with Hegel’s politics in the
814 NANCE

context of early 19th Century Germany. Angelica Nuzzo’s (2012) offers a systematic reading of Hegel’s theory of justice in
yet another sense: she focuses, not on the role that the system plays in Hegel’s political thought, but on the role that the
concept of justice plays in the overall system, especially in Hegel’s philosophy of history.
13
The two kinds of systematicity, of course, need not be mutually exclusive.
14
“Each of the parts of philosophy is a philosophical whole, a circle rounded and complete in itself. In each of these parts,
however, the philosophical Idea is found in a particular specificality or medium…The whole of philosophy in this way
resembles a circle of circles” (Hegel Enc. §15).
15
This is certainly not the only important aspect of Herzog’s study, which is an important scholarly contribution to our
understanding of the influence of Adam Smith’s economic thought on Hegel. Her comparative study of their differing atti-
tudes towards the free market as a social institution provides a framework for understanding recent neo‐Hegelian work on
freedom, work, the market, and the importance of complementary social institutions that embed the market. Related
studies include Schmidt‐am‐Busch, 2002 and Honneth, 2014.
16
For general discussion of these issues in Hegel, see the papers collected in Stepelevich and Lamb 1983 and Laitinnen &
Sandis, 2010, as well as Quante, 2007. In much of Honneth’s work, he supports his Hegelian thesis about the necessity
of recognition for human flourishing by appealing to empirical work in sociology and social psychology. See, for example,
Honneth, 1995, Chapter 4, where Honneth discusses Mead.
17
Honneth, 2014 extends the basic conceptual framework discussed here but goes into vastly more detail regarding the
ways in which this framework can be updated to arrive at a Hegelian defense of European social democracy.
18
In this connection, Honneth emphasizes Hegel’s early work on friendship and love, which was inspired by Aristotle. For
discussion of the Hegel/Aristotle connection, see Honneth, 2010, 8, 68.
19
The term “social pathology” originates with Durkheim, not Hegel, but Honneth reads Hegel as offering an account of the
phenomenon. One thinks here of Hegel’s Phenomenology accounts of the pathologies of moralism, such as the discussion
of the “Law of the Heart” (Hegel, 1977, §§367–380).
20
Compare Loick (2015). Unsurprisingly, Honneth (2014) discusses libertarianism as an illustration of this social pathology.
21
The chronology looks odd here, since I am claiming Pippin (2008) criticizes Honneth (2010). But Honneth’s (2010) was
originally published in German in 2001 as Leiden an Unbestimmtheit, and Pippin (2008) critically discusses the German
version of Honneth’s text.
22
To say that reasons are “institutionally mediated” is to say that institutions shape what count as reasons for action in a
particular context. If, for example, one is a firefighter, then the assertion “a building is on fire around the corner!” provides
one with a reason to perform certain actions—drive the fire truck, hook up the fire hoses, and so forth. Without the back-
ground context provided by the social institution we call the “fire department,” such reasons could not exist for
firefighters.
23
Pippin holds that actions are similarly constructed through relations of social recognition.
24
This theme is developed at great length in both Hegel, 1977 and Taylor, 1989.
25
Honneth’s term for this is “mutually‐complementary role obligations.”
26
Pippin says relatively little about why the institutions of ethical life are especially suited to play this role, a lacuna in his
argument that would need to be filled for us to understand precisely why the forms of recognition required for freedom
and rational agency can be provided only within the set of institutional arrangements of ethical life. For attempts to say
more about this issue, see Patten, 1999, 176–190.
27
The concern with dependence as a threat to freedom suggests a connection to Pettit’s republicanism. Three recent articles
dealing with Hegelian freedom, recognition, and republicanism are Laitinnen (2015); Bohman (2010); and Schuppert
(2013). Although I do not pursue this theme here, the avenue of research suggested by these articles is, in my view, highly
promising.
28
For an excellent discussion of Hegel’s conception of patriotism as discussed in this passage, see Moland, 2011, 5–8,
47–75. According to Moland, the meaning of “patriotism” during Hegel’s time was contested and quite different from
our contemporary understanding of the word: “patriotism for Hegel does not mean loyalty to one’s country” (Moland,
2011, 55). Moland convincingly shows how Hegel draws on the various traditions of “patriotic” thought that were known
to him in developing his own account of the patriotic disposition.
29
Hardimon sometimes equivocates between the claim that non‐alienation, understood as the social world being a home,
makes possible the freedom of social members, and the claim that non‐alienation—the social world being a home—is a kind
of freedom. The subjective criteria for the social world to count as a home are cognitive and affective, not volitional
(Hardimon, 1994, 95).
30
Franco, 1999, 180–87 and Wood, 1990, 41–42 contain helpful discussions of such criticisms, especially of the influential
arguments of Isaiah Berlin against conceptions of “positive freedom,” a category to which Hegelian freedom surely belongs
(Berlin, 1997).
NANCE 815

31
For the purposes of this article, I take “social autonomy” and “social freedom” to be equivalent. I adopt the latter term
instead of the former because Neuhouser has already popularized it. Neuhouser refers to non‐alienation readings as
“speculative freedom” interpretations (Neuhouser, 2000, 19–21). Hardimon’s term for “speculative freedom” is “absolute
freedom” (Hardimon, 1994, 112). Honneth, 2014 deploys Neuhouser’s analysis of social freedom as a core concept.
32
For a different interpretation, compare Patten, 1999, 45.
33
Neuhouser is explicating Hegel’s statement in PR §257: “...self‐consciousness, by virtue of its disposition, has its substantial
freedom in the state as its essence, its end, and the product of its activity.”
34
For discussion of the Doppelsatz, see Stern, 2006; Hardimon, 1994, Chapter 2.
35
The sphere of “arbitrariness” includes, crucially, the market economy. Hegel’s ambivalence about the market in PR is well‐
documented, and has been the subject of ongoing controversy. On the one hand, Hegel seems to regard the “arbitrary”
freedom of market exchange as a necessary part of a free modern society and an advance over ancient ethical life, in which
there was no room for such expressions of individual freedom (see, e.g., PR §206). But on the other hand, Hegel presciently
sees that the unimpeded operation of the market will tend to produce an underclass or “rabble,” which violates individuals’
rights within ethical life and leads to social instability and colonial expansion (PR §§241–253). For recent discussion of
Hegel on the rabble and the market, see Herzog, 2013, Chapter 3, and Whitt, 2013. Ruda, 2011 approaches these issues
from the perspective of contemporary contintental theory. Hudson, 2014 responds critically to Ruda, 2011.

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How to cite this article: Nance, M. (2016), Hegel’s social and political philosophy: Recent debates, Philosophy
Compass, 11, 804–817. doi: 10.1111/phc3.12384

AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY

Michael Nance is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County, where he
teaches courses in the history of modern philosophy, ethics, and social and political philosophy. His research focuses
on the modern German tradition of social and political philosophy, with special emphasis on Kant and post‐Kantian
Idealism. His current project, supported by an Alexander von Humboldt Fellowship, traces the development of J.G.
Fichte’s political philosophy during the 1790s. Recent publications include “Recognition, Freedom, and the Self in
Fichte’s Foundations of Natural Right,” European Journal of Philosophy, 2015; “Freedom, Coercion, and the Relation
of Right,” forthcoming in Fichte’s Foundations of Natural Right: A Critical Guide, Gabriel Gottlieb, ed., Cambridge Uni-
versity Press; and “Hegel’s Jena Practical Philosophy,” forthcoming in the Oxford Handbook of Hegel, Dean Moyar, ed.
Nance received his BA in Philosophy and German from Hendrix College in 2004 and his PhD in Philosophy from the
University of Pennsylvania in 2011.