Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vol. 38, No.

3, 2004

Educational Critique, Critical Thinking

and the Critical Philosophical Traditions

MARIANNA PAPASTEPHANOU

Responding to Jan Masschelein’s discussion of critical

distance and the trivialisation of critique in his ‘How to
Conceive of Critical Educational Theory Today?’, I draw
attention to the antinomic character of immanence and
transcendence—that is, to the way that it entails both
non-circumventible necessity and omnipresent risks. I argue
that the discourse of critical thinking in education is
exemplary of the tensions generated by such consolidated
meanings. Through this prism, I aim to offer a nuanced
account of ways in which the trivialisation of critique nurtures
narcissistic and conformist tendencies that do not leave
unaffected any critical philosophical line of thought. To
illustrate my critique of contemporary critical education of all
persuasions, I deal with an ethics of reading and writing.
I suggest that, rather than encouraging cynicism and an
abdication of responsibility, this antinomic character of
critique should discourage any complacent and one-sided
reliance on one’s own tradition.

Giovanni Gentile, an Italian fascist, idealist philosopher and educator,

wrote:

The language that every man uses is that of his fathers, the language of his
tribe or of his clan, and his city or his nation . . . he cannot use it to say
‘This is my view’ unless . . . he can say ‘This is our view’, for at the root
of the ‘I’ there is a ‘We’. The community to which an individual belongs
is the basis of his spiritual existence; it speaks through his mouth, feels
with his heart, and thinks with his brain (in Noddings, 1996, p. 254).

Thought through, the above passage manifests an annihilation of the

distance between the self and the community, a suffocating identification
with and absorption by the order and an effacement of the reflective space
of the ‘I’. Ultimately, this kind of cultural and linguistic determinism turns
people into manipulable masses. It may take a variety of forms and new
contents but its spectre haunts philosophy and pushes it to critique, to
leaving space for critique. Education must also keep a distance from this

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370 M. Papastephanou

negation of distance; thus it has to be or to become critical. By

acknowledging the hiatus between the I and its community, the gap
separating generations and the prerogative of the young to orient
themselves critically to tradition, educational theory aspires to save the
pupils from being the mere echo of their teachers and hence to give them
voice.
Can a critical educational theory be theorised in a vocabulary that
breaks with distance? The dangerous proximity of immanence to
determinism, pessimism and cynicism, the fact that, as critique, it does
not go further than the system it refines (and to which it belongs) presses
education for transcendence. What kind of transcendent critique does or
should education comprise? Answers to this question vary and reflect
deeper philosophical presuppositions about the notions of knowledge,
individual autonomy, reason and reflection. Such presuppositions are in a
complex relation with the rest of philosophical conceptions and priorities
as well as the historical moment. What is crucial, however, is that almost
all answers to the above question rely on an initial affirmative position on
the necessity of critical distance.
This celebration of a criticality that generates autonomous egos
beginning, evidently, with the learner, seems to have resulted in what
Jan Masschelein rightly considers a trivialisation of critique. The ideal
of a critical learner and its corollaries, that is, those of autonomy,
independence and self-reflection are now ubiquitous and institutionalised.
Critique and autonomy have become common places (and placeholders, I
would add) and a reference to them in educational texts or in descriptions
of one’s pedagogical practices and techniques supposedly guarantees that
one is on the right track. They have come to signify an educational
panacea and appear as pedagogical clichés that gloss over dependencies
rather than free teachers and pupils from stagnant modes of thinking.
Worse, by being no longer fresh and radical but rather accommodated in
and utilised by the system itself, these ideals have become ancillary to the
established order. Drawing on the work of Jean-François Lyotard,
Masschelein views critique as that limited empty space that the
immanence of the system contains and from ‘which all initiatives are
judged with respect to their contribution to further development’ (p. 3561).
In this way, critical educational theory cultivates the ‘critical’2 minds that
the system requires for optimising its functions and securing its
development. In fact, Lyotard radicalises a well-known Marxist argument
that mild criticisms of capitalism turn out to support the system by
rendering it self-recoverable.3 As this was famously expressed in
Visconti’s film, The Leopard, ‘the best way for things to remain the
same is to change’.
I shall illustrate Masschelein’s diagnosis of this kind of trivialisation of
critique in educational theory by drawing on the issue of critical thinking
but, prior to that, I would like to register a further complicity of critique
with autonomy. This complicity is the flip side, and accomplice, of the
trivialisation that Masschelein detects and concerns the consolidation of
the subject in the role of the isolated arbiter of right and wrong. The more

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Educational Critique, Critical Thinking and the Critical Philosophical Traditions 371

education manages to equip students with the capacity to have their own
‘clear’ and ‘solid’ criteria for judging themselves and others, the more
successful it is considered. And the more education promotes excellence
and individual achievement, the more critical it is thought to be, regardless
of the fact that this arbitrarily raises ideals of excellence and individual
achievement beyond critique. What is often assumed is that (self)-
reflection provides a supposedly absolute, disinterested and infallible
knowledge of objects (or the self) unmediated by any kind of intrusive
otherness.
The myth of Narcissus serves as a pattern for depicting (albeit in an
extreme fashion) the kind of subjectivity that critical educational
confidence in the I may produce. In the ancient Greek original version
of the story, Narcissus is condemned by the Gods to fall absolutely in love
with himself for failing to respond to the desire of the others—in other
words, for keeping too much distance. The ultimate voyeur lost in a
subject-object relation of misrecognition and indifferent to otherness finds
himself in an absence of consensus, that is, feeling with the others. He is
silent due to a lack of desire for, and withdrawal from, the community of
his co-subjects and immerses in a preoccupation with the present at hand
(the mirrored image) as his object of desire. Understanding thinking as
only what is produced by a subject in its encounter with an object reduces
reflection to an auto-erotic introspection. During the self-affirmative and
eventually lethal moment of isolating reflection, the sole other that is
present is a female figure, Echo, who, being in love with Narcissus, can
only repeat eternally the loving words he addressed to himself. Quite
often, even when educational theory perceives the significance of eros in
classrooms (fundamentally through the Platonic Symposium) erotic
openness is conceived as assimilation of the other’s desire to one’s
own. We ought to take the desires of others seriously out of fairness and
tolerance or even because this makes teaching and learning easier or more
effective. But this liberal educational moralist or strategic ‘reading’ of
response does not constitute a proper responsiveness to the other’s desire:
what is missing is the destabilising quality of eros that questions the
subject’s sovereignty instead of glorifying it. Too much educational
emphasis on the preoccupation with the self and serving its needs
produces one self-referential voice, a limited entrapping order of
articulation (system) and many echoes.4
The dividing line of autonomy and narcissistic individualism is not as
sharp as one would wish. Despite Kant’s distance from Cartesian
solipsism (the sensus communis and the emphasis on the intersubjective
approval that norms have to meet—all leading many critics to exaggerate
Habermas’ proximity to Kantianism), Habermas charges Kant’s critical
idealism with monologism. Rather than applying to Habermas, Massche-
lein’s following critique of the autonomous subject (that he takes to be
identical with the subject of communicative theory) should be more
appropriately directed at any philosophy that does not break with
monologism. Compare Masschelein’s criticism of Habermas and Haber-
mas’ criticism of Kant. An autonomous, self-reflective life

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372 M. Papastephanou

would imply that we relate critically to the desires, the needs and thoughts
that we have by asking: ‘what do I really want and think myself?’ It would
imply the ability to free oneself from what is forced upon one as well as
from what is just self evident and easygoing. To think and act by oneself
means to judge oneself according to the validity or legitimacy of one’s
own desires and thought. Or, put differently: it is to subjugate oneself
under the claims of (communicative) reason. Autonomy is then: to
subjugate oneself in thinking and acting under the ‘nomos’ (the law of
reason) that we ourselves (autoi) give to ourselves when we recognise
ourselves to be part of a universal humanity (Masschelein, p. 355).

The last sentence defining autonomy echoes the Kantian element that has
attracted Habermas’ critical attention instead of appreciation.

Discourse ethics rejects the monological approach of Kant, who assumed

that the individual tests his maxims of action foro interno or, as Husserl
put it, in the loneliness of his soul. The singularity of Kant’s
transcendental consciousness simply takes for granted a prior under-
standing among a plurality of empirical egos; their harmony is
preestablished. In discourse ethics it is not. Discourse ethics prefers to
view shared understanding about the generalizability of interests as the
result of an intersubjectively mounted public discourse (Habermas, 1992,
p. 203).

Monologism assumes that the truly autonomous and critical subject will
find the universal maxims within herself by continuously subjecting her
interests and desires to the test of the categorical imperative in order to
check their generalisability. Two elements are secondary (or in some
versions of Kantianism even excluded) in this process: the others and
feelings. ‘In Kant, autonomy was conceived as freedom under self-given
laws which involves an element of coercive subordination of subjective
nature’ (emphasis mine) (Habermas, 1992, p. 207). The lack of adequate
attention to others and feelings sets autonomy in a dangerous proximity
with the individualism that produces self-appointed prophets and manipul-
able masses (in alternating roles) and, in other words, trivialises critique.
Now let me return to the illustration of the trivialisation of critique with
the example of critical thinking. One of the most widely discussed and
researched issues in educational theory has been the cultivation of critical
thinking. The two basic tendencies that seem to have consolidated around
this issue could be termed rationalist and technicist, as the former
emphasises reflection and rational scrutiny of one’s views whilst the latter
stresses successful performance of a thinking task. Contrast, for instance,
Robert Ennis’ famous definition of critical thinking as ‘reasonable
reflective thinking that is focused on deciding what to believe or do’ (in
Smith, 2001, p. 349) with a definition of critical thinking as the successful
use of skills. In Diane Halpern’s terms,

critical thinking is the use of those cognitive skills or strategies that

increase the probability of a desirable outcome. It is used to describe

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Educational Critique, Critical Thinking and the Critical Philosophical Traditions 373

thinking that is purposeful, reasoned, and goal directed—the kind of

thinking involved in solving problems, formulating inferences, calculating
likelihoods, and making decisions, when the thinker is using skills that are
thoughtful and effective for the particular context and type of thinking
task (Halpern, 2003, p. 6).

In most recent literature, the rationalist tradition appears to give way under
the pressure of the growing association of critical thinking with skills,
tasks and their effective coupling. From the assumption (or illusion,
according to some critics—e.g. Bramall, 2000) of an objective rationality
leading pupils to firm beliefs in the light of evidence and argument,
educational theory moves to the assumption of a goal-oriented, purposive
rationality. The rationalist perspective assumes the highest critical
distance from emotions, context and prejudice and almost no distance at
all from what it perceives as universally valid criteriology. But the latest
skills perspective reinstates situatedness and appropriates it only for the
sake of optimising outcomes. In this way, it minimises the distance from
the criteriology of the system since it focuses so much on successful
performance that inevitably remains silent about pupils’ (dis)ability to
critique the task itself and question its appropriateness or moral
acceptability. It is no accident, then, that some educational theorists have
already charged the skills paradigm with a narrow and flat dealing with
critical thought (Alston, 2001) and a dangerous dependency on
instrumental reason (Blake, Smith and Standish, 1998). In the end, both
tendencies, that is, the so-called liberal rationalist and the emphasis on
skills, appear to effect a ‘taming’ (for a discussion of this term, see
Claudia Ruitenberg in this volume) and trivialisation of critique and may
lead to an education that produces Narcissi and Echoes. They effect this
either in the form of uncritical identification with one’s implicit criteria
elevated to the status of ahistorical truths or in the form of uncritical
subjugation to the imperatives of the socio-economic system.5 Lastly, they
may often effect this by combining forces.
Given the trivialisation of critique, where does critical educational
theory stand today? The influential Freirean line of critical pedagogy is
often charged with too much dependence on emancipation, reflection,
autonomy and other ‘suspect’ notions of Enlightenment. Its notion of
critique meant as a revocation of a present and an invocation of a better
future resonates with Marxian and Marxist eschatology. The Anglophone
tradition, which has produced fascinating debates6 regarding criticality
and open-mindedness, has been accused of an excessive attachment to
evidence and argument. And in fact the influence of such enlightened
conceptions of criticality on practice has been fatally undermined by the
emergence of a narrow preoccupation with skills and competences. It is
said that due to the attachment to evidence and arguments, this tradition
ends either in a crude empiricism that always seeks factual evidence or a
crude rationalism that wants arguments in a discourse to be deductively
valid, that is, to be derived from a self-referential formal logic. The
continental line of critical educational thought is usually attacked for

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374 M. Papastephanou

being over-optimistic. Or it is criticised for employing the notions of

intersubjectivity and communicative rationality, which, for many post-
modernists, are suspect from the start, regardless of how they are actually
meant or reformulated by the theorists themselves.7
Does this mean that all traditions are complicitous whereas post-
modernist educational thought stands out as the critique par excellence?
Some versions of postmodernism (and especially poststructuralism) attack
reflective distance because they see it as irreparably contaminated with a
God’s eye outlook, but, in perceiving the danger of absolute absorption by
the system and a cynical political abdication, they reintroduce distance by
the back door. For Lyotard, the only way for a pagan self to outwit the
system is to use ruse and trickery (Lyotard, 1977, p. 49) but this hardly
explains the urge to outwit the system. What is the source of the distance
that is tacitly presupposed in the suggestion to reformulate critique but
simultaneously cancelled out by the fact that ‘the life-world offers no basis
on which to limit and restrict the system’ (Masschelein, p. 356)? If
Habermas’ reformulations of autonomy and reflection are condemned for
assuming a potential transcendent critique within intersubjectivity, then
what kind of critical subjectivity should be assumed by other reformula-
tions? Lyotard’s position on this is unclear. I believe that Masschelein
perceives this lacuna and astutely bridges the gap by introducing
Foucault’s analysis—an analysis that relies on immanence and assumes
a conditioned self. Yet, in my opinion, this move pushes the problem of
the leap to a deeper layer of theory rather than accounts for the distance it
assumes. For lack of space, here I shall confine my demonstration of this
problem to Axel Honneth’s criticism of the Foucauldian theory of
subjectivity. I interpret his criticism as pointing to a leap from social
influences to the representation of the human self.

Foucault’s argument [as to the human self] deduces first from social
influences (which are themselves presented as merely external coercive
procedures that produce subjects) the formation of a sort of psychic life of
humans, and it then connects the representation of the ‘human soul’
directly to this. If Foucault really supposes he has in this way worked out
the origin of human subjectivity, then he must have been led astray by a
very crude version of behaviourism that represents psychic processes as
the result of constant conditioning (Honneth, 1991, p. 169).

These leaps we notice in both cases, Lyotard’s and Foucault’s, reveal a

gap, a distance, an empty space that most poststructuralist thought fills
with silence or enlarges to an abyss of anarchy. Critical distance has no
further source than resistance and strategic alliance; it is self-posited. Or it
is just ineffable, that is, as soon as it acquires voice it takes a place in the
system, thus its only force lies in its non-articulation, its escape from
order.
The above critical comments do not aim to diminish the significance of
what is usually described as postmodernist thought for a critical
educational theory but rather to problematise the impression that it

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Educational Critique, Critical Thinking and the Critical Philosophical Traditions 375

might be the locus of critique par excellence. Furthermore, it has to be

avowed that to some extent at least some versions of poststructuralism
also trivialise critique in a performative manner. By this I mean that,
despite their intentions or programmatic declarations, in the way these
versions are voiced or performed, they make common cause with systemic
and unreflective affirmation of dominant modes and habits of thought.
The growing tendency to give up reflective distance and associate
critique with proximity, piecemeal politics (Rorty), adaptability and
modification unwittingly contributes to the performative narrowing of
critical thinking to the skilling perspective. In our effort to break with
totalising narratives of rationality we end up in justifying a shallow social
constructivism of subjectivity that is often manifest in educational theory
itself.
To illustrate my critique of contemporary critical education of all
persuasions, I shall deal with an ethic of reading and writing, which, in my
view, should be one of the major educational issues especially in higher
education. Apart from what Masschelein has shown, another path to
the trivialisation of critique is paved by the growing tendency for a
simplification of thought that is expressed not only in a modernism that
assumes a world-understanding that is reducible to meta-narratives, but
also in the postmodernist idiom. In the latter case, this is accomplished
through a refusal to be truly entangled in dialogue with other ‘camps’ of
educational thought and a glorification of repetitive, faddish and jargon-
ridden injection of postmodernist authority in educational discourse. And
many postmodernist educators resort as much as many of their modernist
opponents to a recycling of the ideas they value encouraging students and
reading groups to study what reaffirms rather than challenges their views.
Adorno (1972) used to name ‘educationalisation’ of knowledge the
tailoring of taught material to the needs of the learner or her already
acquired knowledge. He considered this phenomenon a Halbbildung and
contrasted it to the openness and readiness of the learner to let herself
be cognitively challenged by a text and perhaps undergo a change of
perspective.
I regard the domestication of critique described above as a combination
of narcissism and yielding to performativity. We frequently fall in the trap
(or notice others doing so) of the performative (in Austin’s sense) self-
contradiction of a critical educational theory that expects or promises to
students something that it finds hard to do itself. When I teach my
students, I expect them to ‘reach standards’ and ‘digest’ the ‘appropriate’
taught material regardless of whether they find it engaging or uninterest-
ing, inaccessible or irrelevant. But if something appears incomprehensible
to me, e.g. a written text or a film (in my capacity as a lifelong learner),
then it is not I that has the problem but definitely the other. If it does not
entertain me or please me, it bores me and does not go down well. I have
no time to linger further; I must search for whatever unmistakably echoes
the authority I have already accepted or is downright digestible. Thereby I
shall refine my position effectively and become more critical of my
opponent; in a nutshell, I shall perform better.

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Postmodernist educational thought displays more awareness of the

complicities of transcendence than its modernist counterparts but at times
less vigilance regarding the dangers of the tendency to dissent rather than
make concessions (Papastephanou, 2002). Postmodernist critique often
appears as necessarily negative judgement and resistance to any
textuality—frequently on a par with some versions of post-Freirean
critical pedagogy. This may find an explanation in the fact that
postmodernism has invested much in the critique of consensus, resorted
wholeheartedly to the notion of agonistics and conflict and ignored the
uncritical effects that polemics may lead to. The uncritical setting up of
straw (wo)men is one such example as well as the fact that it is
more fashionable to be a dismissive rather than an attentive reader
without noticing that polemics often pushes in the direction of losing sight
of the merits of the opponent’s position. The uncritical consolidation of
binary oppositions is not only the effect of modernist identitary logic
(Adorno) but also of the caricatures of thinkers and tradition(s) at which
we tilt.
Foucault placed himself, along with the Frankfurt School, in a tradition
of philosophy that has yet much to offer to a critical education and
educational theory and Masschelein’s elaboration on Foucault’s theory is
apposite and succinct. This is how Foucault comments on the positioning
of his own work:

it seems to me that the philosophical choice confronting us today is this:

one may opt for a critical philosophy that will present itself as an analytic
philosophy of truth in general, or one may opt for a critical thought
that will take the form of an ontology of ourselves, an ontology of the
present; it is this form of philosophy that, from Hegel, through Nietzsche
and Max Weber, to the Frankfurt School, has founded a form of reflection
in which I have tried to work (Foucault, 1994, p. 148, emphasis added)8.

Along with Foucault, we may discern lines of argument that frame our
thought better and acknowledge our embeddedness in a variety of
traditions that are echoed in one way or other in all our attempts to
articulate our own voice. But, whilst for Foucault the choice was clear and
enabling, the same dilemma for educational theory would be false.
Whereas each educator may have her own preference and specialisation,
critical education must continue to research in both directions, because
exclusiveness in the end entails uncriticality and self-absorption.
Traditions and ideas must be revisited and reworked, communicated and
debated, entangled and disentangled. (Self)-critique can be carried out
neither in narcissistic isolation nor in the silence of the ineffable. In the
gap between acknowledging your echoing and refusing to echo, and the
gap between one’s own pure voice and its simulacrum, critical educational
theory of all persuasions struggles with words. Perhaps it is more critical
when its loving words are addressed to others and when it harkens to their
response, though in this case too, the teacher-pupil relation is one of
articulation. For, to echo Derrida here, ‘a master who forbids himself the

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Educational Critique, Critical Thinking and the Critical Philosophical Traditions 377

phrase would give nothing. He would have no disciples but only slaves’
(1995, p. 147).

Correspondence: Marianna Papastephanou, Department of Education,

University of Cyprus, Nicosia, P. O. Box 20537, Cyprus.
Email: papastef@spidernet.com.cy

NOTES
1. All references to Masschelein, unless otherwise indicated, will be to his ‘How to Conceive of
Critical Educational Theory Today?’, the preceding paper in this collection.
2. For the reason why I am using inverted commas here, see Papastephanou (2002).
3. By ‘self-recoverable’ I mean capitalism’s capacity to re-adjust itself to new situations and to
incapacitate or neutralise any opposing force by incorporating it. For instance, the Welfare State
and compensation policies exemplify the capitalist capacity to cover up dysfunctions and social
pathologies by activating off-setting mechanisms in order to silence discontent.
4. One of those echoes being education itself to the extent that it resonates with the imperatives of
the socioeconomic system and another being educational theory to the extent that it limits itself to
the role of the passive recipient of the tenets of modern or postmodern philosophical ‘heroes’.
5. The individualism that inspires some Anglo-American critical thinking discussions is so pervasive
that the feeling one gets when following them is that the pupil is expected to reach sound
argument almost apocalyptically by the sheer force of her mind, as if accumulated collective
experience had little to contribute. As if, by concentrating on and thinking about a problem, all our
prejudices recede magically. True this may also emanate from an otherwise justified reaction to
encyclopaedic learning but it has led to the other extreme. On the other hand, all this talk of skills
and dispositions neglects the pupil’s existential and moral need to critically review the ‘big
picture’ that frames goals and tasks and even revise or discard them precisely in light of this big
picture. Thus it loses sight of the fact that enlarged thought is a precondition of criticality not an
optional or dispensable element.
6. For example, see the debate between Peter Gardner, William Hare and Terence McLaughlin on
criticality and open-mindedness conducted through the Journal of Philosophy of Education in the
1980s.
7. Those critics lose sight of Habermas’ anti-foundationalist protests and Apel’s rejection of the
noumenal versus phenomenal distinction that grounded old assumptions of an authentic core of
subjectivity.
8. See another reference to his alignment with the Frankfurt School again by Foucault himself in the
same edition, p. 118.

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