CoROLLARY DISCHARGE,

THE FoRorrrEN LINK

Remarks on the body-mind problem

Yochanan Rywerant

Freeperson Press Novato, California

Copyright © 2008 Yochanan Rywerant

All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any pro-
cess or technique, without the express written consent of the author and
publisher.

ISBN 0-918236-09-6
ISBN 978-0-918236-09-8

First published in 2008

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 Contents

Foreword by Eleanor Criswell Hanna, Ed.D. v

Preface ~
Acknowledgments xi

I. Introduction I
2. H. L. Teuber and Corollary Discharges 5
3. M. Feldenkrais and Relative Conjugate Movements II
4. Habitual and Non-Habitual Patterns of Action I7
5. Corollary Discharge in Everyday Life 23
6. The Self's Boundaries 25
Z Impairment and Rehabilitation 29
8. Conclusion: The Body-Mind Link Reconsidered 33
References 37

iii
 Foreword
Eleanor Criswell Hanna, Ed.D.

W HEN YocHANAN RvwERANT asked me to publish his mono-

graph, Corollary Discharge, The Forgotten Link, I was de-
lighted and honored. The term corollary discharge first caught
my attention in a lecture by Rywerant in the early 1990s. Later I
read references to it in Vernon Brooks's The Neural Basis ofMotor
Control. The concept of corollary discharge, and the related term
efference copy, have intrigued me over the years, but they have
remained somewhat elusive as I pondered motor mechanisms
and worked somatically with myself and others. In this mono-
graph, Rywerant gives us a clear understanding of corollary dis-
charge, a neural mechanism that is so important for our effective
movements.
Rywerant begins with an introduction to corollary discharge.
A history of the discovery of corollary discharge by H. L. Teuber,
a neuroscientist from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, in the 1960s and the exploration of
it by other neuroscientists follows. Rywerant discusses the use
of the understanding of corollary discharge in Feldenkrais's rela-
tive conjugate movements (a function named by Rywerant). The
role of corollary discharge in habitual and non-habitual patterns
of action is discussed. Then these understandings are applied to

v
vi COROLLARY DISCHARGE, THE FORGOTTEN LINK

everyday life. The boundaries of the self are explored from the
perspective of corollary discharge. Next, the situation of impair-
ment and rehabilitation with regard to corollary discharge is dis-
cussed. In his conclusion, Rywerant reconsiders how corollary
discharge relates to the link between the mind and body.
What is corollary discharge? Corollary discharge is a discharge
from the motor system to sensory systems regarding intended vol-
untary movement or postural change, "preparing those sensory
systems for changes that will occur as a result of the intended
movement:' Because corollary discharge is unconscious, sublimi-
nal, or below the level of our awareness, it is valuable to be aware
of what it is, why it is important, and how it enhances our func-
tion. Rywerant says, "The corollary discharge is the mechanism
by which a nonhabitual pattern of action changes gradually into
being more habitual:'
Corollary discharge and efference copy are related concepts.
Efference copy is a special case of corollary discharge. According
to Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, corollary refers to
"something that incidentally or naturally accompanies or paral-
lels:' Discharge means "to relieve of a charge, load or burden:' Ef-
ference is a term for information moving out from the central ner-
vous system to cause muscle contractions or glandular secretions.
Efference copy is a copy of the expected sensations that may arise
because of motor action. The copy is sent to the sensory cortex to
prepare the organism to ignore self-generated sensations. There-
fore, Rywerant says, "the consequences of the intended actions
are already anticipated:'
My sense of efference copy is that as a movement plan is cre-
ated by the brain, information is sent to all parts of the body no-
tifying it of what is to come and preventing interference with the
activities. All too often we do not consider this necessity in our
motor planning. Frequently, the person interferes with the very
action he or she intends. This is very common in the unnecessary
co-contractions that people frequently exhibit that interfere with
ease of movement.
 Foreword vii
With the sense of corollary discharge expressed by Rywer-
ant we can see the importance of developing the learned corol-
lary discharge for skilled movement. The athlete or musician has
a highly developed capacity for this. This is a huge area of un-
tapped potential for all of us. In the various awareness-enhancing
disciplines, such as the Feldenkrais Method, the person may be
instructed to recover awareness of reafference or to decrease the
prior editing effect of the efference copies. This deliberate allow-
ing of awareness of the sensory feedback from one's own move-
ments permits the person to remain aware of the results of his
or her movements. This increases the complexity of the sensory
experience and allows the person to appreciate more of the sen-
sory world.
Rywerant brings his mastery of the field of mind-body edu-
cation to bear in understanding a very present, but little under-
stood aspect of neuromuscular function. It brings this sometimes
subliminal aspect of our worlds to our conscious awareness both
for the appreciation of the function and to begin to make more
conscious use of it. The expansion of our awareness of corollary
discharge has huge potential for enhancing motor functioning.
In writing this foreword, I have pondered corollary discharge
again and again. Finally, with a thorough study of Rywerant's
monograph, I understand the concept on a much deeper level.
I have grown to appreciate the role of corollary discharge in our
ongoing behaviors. The benefit of Rywerant's monograph is that
it is brief, well written, and brilliant. That is the way Rywerant
writes, as seen in his previous books The Feldenkrais Method:
Teaching by Handling and Acquiring the Feldenkrais Profession.
His writing style is well organized, comprehensive, and concise.
He writes abou~ what he knows. He was originally a physicist and
a teacher of physics. He brings his knowledge of physics into his
understanding of the body. He began studying with Feldenkrais
in 1952 in the Awareness Through Movement classes in Tel-Aviv.
Trained by Moshe Feldenkrais in Israel in the first professional
training course, which began in 1969, he was one of the original
viii COROLLARY DISCHARGE, THE fORGOTTEN LINK

Feldenkrais assistants. He worked side-by-side with Feldenkrais

in the Feldenkrais Institute in Tel-Aviv with pupils from all over
the world. He assisted Feldenkrais in the two training programs
in the United States, San Francisco and Amherst. With Felden-
krais's death in 1984, Rywerant began conducting professional
training programs. Since his original training with Feldenkrais, he
has practiced the Feldenkrais Method with thousands of pupils
and conducted basic and advanced training programs around the
world. Currently, his primary teaching of the Feldenkrais Method
is advanced training programs in Israel and Switzerland.
May you enjoy the guidance of Yochanan Rywerant, a master
teacher, as you explore the world of corollary discharge.
 Preface

T HIS MONOGRAPH ADDRESSES the lay reader about Certain aspects

of the human brain's functioning that are involved in learn-
ing, habituation, control of actions, and, eventually, rehabilita-
tion. I am not intending to present here a learned scientific article
or paper, but rather to bring into focus a continuously occurring
event or activity within our brain called "corollary discharge" that
usually accompanies intentional actions. There will be a few con-
clusions as well, some in matters of principle, like certain under-
standings concerning the mind-body gap, and some of a practi-
cal nature. The latter will draw attention towards some everyday
activities seen in this context, and also present insights and ex-
periences attained in the framework of the Feldenkrais Method,
which addresses people, either through verbal advice or through
gentle manipulation, with the purpose of enhancing their adapta-
tion to limiting, or adverse, circumstances. The method attempts
to achieve this by increasing the awareness of their self-produced
actions and expanding their self-images so that they might in-
clude alternative options for acting.

ix
 Acknowled9ments

M Y THANKS AND my respect to Dr. Eleanor Criswell Hanna for

publishing this monograph and for adding an exceptional
foreword to it. Thanks to Marsha Calhoun for copyediting; Satri
Pencak for the cover design; TBH Typecast, Inc., for book design
and typesetting; and McNaughton & Gunn, for printing and bind-
ing and for helping this monograph come out so nicely.

xi
 CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

W HEN wE WANT to express in words some state or happening

within ourselves, we usually use words taken from two
areas: the body (as when we name parts of the body and their re-
lationship to each other) and the mind (as when we describe what
we sense, what we know, what we feel, and what we remember,
but also what we think, what decisions we might make, and what
our fears, our doubts and our hopes might entail).
In philosophy, we have what is called the dualism of impres-
sion and reflection, of knowledge and belief, of body and soul, all
this going back to Plato and continuing to the present day. Our
modern languages provide us with words and concepts defined
for these two areas: mind and body. We might even have some
difficulty in finding words that could express a unity that com-
prises both mind and body. One nice exception is the word "self:'
In the biological sciences, we have anatomy, physiology, neu-
roscience, etc., that describe ways of functioning and acting in
terms of bodily parts and concepts taken from the realm of the
material world. These include muscles, joints, nerves, and diverse
parts of the central nervous system (CNS); on a smaller scale, the
description includes neurons (neural cells), their constituent parts
(nuclei, etc.) and connections (synapses), nervous impulses, and
neurotransmitters.

1
2 COROLLARY DISCHARGE, THE FORGOTTEN LINK

Then we have psychology, sociology, etc., using concepts

taken from the realm of thoughts, feelings, beliefs, and memo-
ries: the realm of the spirit. Of course, the question arises: since
the body and mind seem to influence each other, how could one
describe the causal link between the two realms? What precisely
is the connection between an injury I endure and the feeling of
pain that comes with it? What is initiating the nervous impulses
that move my muscles and joints when I intend to bring a glass
of water to my lips? Clearly, there is a "gap" between the physical
and the mental; we would expect science to explain, or rather
describe, what is going on.
Scientists of several specialties have turned their attention to-
wards the problem and, especially during the second half of last
century, two areas of investigation have come into the forefront
of interest. One deals with the question of memory. How is mem-
ory encoded into the brain? How do we recognize faces? Could
we describe "meaning" in objective terms? The other deals with
the question of consciousness. Is there such a thing? How do we
know that we know? Is consciousness just a byproduct of happen-
ings in the brain, as they are described in material terms? Or is
consciousness a special phenomenon, connected to several of the
self's attributes, such as self-awareness, intentionality, morality,
and responsibility?
Books and articles have been written on these subjects, and
symposia have been convened with participants from several re-
lated professions, including physiologists, neurologists, psycholo-
gists, ethologists, philosophers, and cyberneticists. The special
purpose was to elucidate if there is any way to bridge the "gap"
between the mental and the physical, between consciousness,
memory, perception, and other cognitive functions and the physi-
ological or neurophysiological aspect of those functions.
Francis Crick and Christof Koch I suggested that an investi-
gation should start on a better-known aspect of brain function,
1Crick, F., & Koch, C. (1992). The problem of consciousness. Scientific American, 267,
152-159.
 Introduction 3
the visual system, "because humans are very visual animals and
because so much experimental and theoretical work has already
been done on it:' Such an endeavor is likely to yield a possible
scientific description of consciousness.
An alternative to this idea could be to investigate the way
we control our actions and thoughts by consciously monitoring
them. The function of "monitoring the self" has an advantage in
that this function is going on during most of our waking state,
and it is amenable to everybody's introspection. It should be said
here that the scientific world, especially during the last half of
the twentieth century and the first few years of this century, has
gradually been recognizing introspection as a valid process of sci-
entific investigation.
 CHAPTER TWO

H. L. Teuber
and Corollary Dischar9es

I N A SYMPOSIUM held in Rome at the Vatican Science Academy

in 1964 on the subject of "Brain and Conscious Experience,"
the late Professor Hans Lukas Teuber2 of the Massachusetts In-
stitute of Technology in Cambridge, Mass., put forth the idea of
corollary discharge. There is the subjective awareness of experi-
encing directions in space (a left, a right, above, below); moving
the eyes or tilting the head leaves the perception of the space
invariant. There is also the awareness of the space behind (the
absent space), and hence, we have the ability to make maps and
plans. Teuber proposes that the three aspects of spatial order
are distinct and should be considered separately: the immediate
perception of visual space, the mechanism of compensation for
voluntary changes in posture, and the level of representation of
spatial relations not immediately given (as defined by the envi-
ronment, hence showing the ability involved to find routes and
make maps). The distinction of these aspects can be shown by
considering their selective vulnerability to different cerebral le-
sions: injury of the occipital lobes interferes with presentation, in-
jury of the frontal lobes interferes with compensation, and injury
of the parietal lobes interferes with representation (p. 183).
2 Teuber, H. L. (1966). Alterations of perception after brain injury. In J. Eccles (Ed.), Brain

and conscious experience (pp. 271-276). Berlin, Heidelberg, New York: Springer.

5
6 COROLLARY DISCHARGE, THE fORGOTTEN LINK

Teuber assumed that the appropriate compensation for head

tilts or head movements has to be provided by a central mecha-
nism ("central" meaning here "of the central nervous system").
Any voluntary movement or change of posture involves, simul-
taneously with the efferent discharges to the peripheral effectors,
a central discharge from motor to sensory systems, the corollary
discharge, preparing those sensory systems for the changes that
will occur as a result of the intended movement. For example, any
intentional eye movement obvieusly moves certain contours over
the retina, but leaves the spatial order of perceptign undisturbed,
because the corollary discharges that accompany the motor im-
pulses to the eye muscles preset the visual system to anticipate
the changes and produce a compensatory action that keeps the
perception of spatial order invariant. By contrast, pushing your
eyeball with your finger, without involving the eye muscles, elic-
its the perception that the visual scene jumps (p. 198).
Versions of an "outflow theory"-about the role of eye move-
ments in perception-were formulated by Holst and Mittelstaedt,
and also by R. W. Sperry, by 1950. Teuber intended to give these
notions "the broadest possible meaning," so much so that the
presence or absence of a corollary discharge would then serve as
a physiological marker of whether a movement was voluntary or
involuntary, self-produced or reflex (p. 198).
A series of experiments has been done that underscored the
importance of distinguishing active from passive movement. Teu-
ber gives an account of an experiment in which a person was
made to wear prismatic spectacles that displaced all visual input
by 15° to the left. In this experiment, it was found that in the be-
ginning, the person will misreach for objects by 15° to the right
of their true location. However, after an hour or so, during which
the person walks actively in an optically structured environment,
a compensation for the visual displacement occurs. Reaching un-
der visual control has now become accurate again. After remov-
ing the spectacles, a misreaching again occurs, this time in the
direction opposite to the former one, but this disturbance may
 H. L. Teuber and Corollary Discharges 7
last only a few minutes. On the other hand, if the wearer of the
spectacles moves passively, for example, by being pushed around
in a wheelchair for an hour, no compensation for the prismatic
spectacles will occur. The perceived contours sweep over the per-
son's eyes in the same way as in the first instance, but the absence
of self-produced movement, and hence, the absence of corollary
discharge, prevents the reorganisation of the visuo-motor func-
tion (p. 201 ).
Teuber assumes that during the first months of life, a transi-
tion occurs from various automatisms towards voluntary move-
ment and the performing of various actions under visual control.
This requires the spatial order of perception to remain invariant
during changes of posture (p. 203).
Other neurophysiologists have used the term "efference copy"
to refer to corollary discharge because, together with the outgo-
ing (efferent) impulses from the motor centers to the peripheral
effectors (the muscles), a "copy" of those impulses goes to the re-
spective sensory brain centers, so that the sensory consequences
of the intended action are already anticipated.
One may sum up what Teuber wrote about the meaning of
corollary discharges in their "broadest possible" sense: a) they
enable the sensory centers in the brain to anticipate the conse-
quences of self-produced actions, b) perceiving the invariance of
the spatial order of perception is accomplished by a compensat-
ing mechanism, c) corollary discharges are learned by experience,
d) corollary discharges have a special role during the first few
months of the individual's life, and, finally, e) they determine, by
their presence or absence, whether a movement is voluntary (in-
tentional) or involuntary (reflex).
It is interesting to mention that contemporary neurophysi-
ology largely ignores the notion of corollary discharge (or effer-
ence copy), despite the fact that neural pathways that can assume
these inner connections have been established in the brain, and
despite the fact that those connections might indicate a way to
clarify certain aspects of the body-mind issue. After all, you have
8 CoROllARY DISCHARGE, THE FoRGOTTEN LINK

here a controllable connection between sensation, perception,

and intention.
Anyway, I am going to present two (out of several) instances
that consider corollary discharges as facts that deserve to be taken
seriously.
R. H. S. Carpenter3 presents a control system that involves
modification of behavior through experience, using internal feed-
back. The notion of "efference copy" explains that one can form an
advance estimate, a predicted outcome, of what position a body
part is going to adopt in respon~e to any particular pattern of
(intentional) motor commands that is sent to it. Such an estimate
is formed entirely within the brain, and it may well be available
long before any feedback from the actual movement has found its
way back from the periphery. The desired result is then compared
not with the actual result, but with the predicted result. This pre-
dicted result in turn is derived by sending a copy of the motor
commands (the efference copy) to a neural model of the mechani-
cal properties of the body and of the outside world, which is used
to predict the probable result. Later, the actual result may also be
compared with the predicted one, and any errors may be used to
correct the model itself, continuously improving the accuracy of
the predictions. Learning motor skills becomes a matter of learn-
ing to predict the behavior of one's own body (pp. 237-239).
Walter J. Freeman4 refers to the goal-directed actions that
the brain constructs; the brain also primes the sensory cortex to
select the sensory perceptions that are predicted as the conse-
quences of the impending actions. This is a central process that
he calls preafference, which is the basis for what we experience
as attention and expectation. The sensory cortices can thus pre-
dict how the performed actions might change the relation of our
senses to the world. The messages are the above-mentioned cor-
ollary discharges. They help us to distinguish between changes

3 Carpenter, R. H. S. (1990). Neurophysiology. London, Melbourne, Aukland: Edward

Arnold.
4 Freeman, W. J. (2000). How brains make up their minds. London: Phoenix.
 H. L. Teuber and Corollary Discharges 9
in the environment and apparent changes that are due to the
intentional movements of our bodies. The somato-sensory cor-
tex also receives messages from the muscles and joints, which
confirm whether an intended action has been performed. This
feedback process, called proprioception (as well as interoception),
coming from the internal organs, and exteroception, coming from
the world, connect brain and body, whereas preafference resides
entirely within the brain. Preafference enables us to imagine what
things may be like, if or when they come (pp. 44-45).
Preafference precedes feedback by proprioception and intero-
ception. The corollary discharges convey information about what
is to be sought by looking, listening, reaching, etc., and the re-
turning afferent discharges convey the current state of the search.
When the expected stimulus is there, then we experience it; when
it is not, then we imagine it (p. 145).
Freeman puts the emphasis on this preconfiguration involv-
ing preafference and sensory recursion, considering this to be the
basis of search, perception, and intentional action.
 CHAPTER THREE

M. Feldenkrais and
Relative Conjugate
Movements

A S ALREADY MENTIONED in the preface, the Feldenkrais Method

addresses people in group sessions through verbal advice,
by proposing that they perform easy actions, while drawing at-
tention to the sensory feedback that comes with these actions.
In individual sessions, the Feldenkrais Method addresses people
through gentle manipulations, also with the purpose of enhanc-
ing their adaptability to limiting or adverse circumstances. The
method attempts to achieve this by increasing their awareness
of self-produced actions, and expanding their self-images, so that
they might include alternative options for acting. We can say that
the Feldenkrais Method is a dialog between teacher and pupil,
mostly on a sensory level, on the issues of intention and action.
We have the ability to plan self-produced intentional action,
and we can decide to postpone its realization or even to give it up
altogether. When performing it, we can monitor it, and change its
course if it seems appropriate to do so. We have, in other words,
an image of any intentional action that precedes that action, and,
while that action is being carried out, we can follow it and com-
pare any intermediate phase with the intended result, and per-
haps correct the doing, if needed.
One could say that the ingredients (or components) of an in-
tentional action are several. We are considering them here from

11
12 COROLLARY DISCHARGE, THE fORGOTTEN LINK

the functional point of view, leaving out the more difficult issue
of their localizations in the central nervous system. The compo-
nents are as follows:
• The above-mentioned image of action (encoded now
somewhere in the planning part of the brain).
• The decision to start the action proper, with the activation
of the executive parts of the self: the motor cortex, etc.,
and the outgoing (efferent) nervous impulses reaching the
muscles.
• Any emotional state linked with the action, whether an-
ticipated or emerging while the action is carried out.
• The corollary discharge (efference copy), informing (pre-
setting) the sensory centers about the feedback that is
going to come with the realization of the action.
• Movement, produced by the relevant muscles, while they
obey the efferent impulses that have reached them.
• The sensory feedback that informs the sensory centers, as
well as the planning center, about the state of affairs while
the action is going on, and, eventually, the perception of
the environment as invariant.
• The decision of the planning (monitoring) center to
compare this upcoming image with the original image of
action.
• If needed, the planning center changes something in the
efferent impulses, in order to diminish a possible devia-
tion between the two images (negative feedback); that last
component might relate to any object connected with the
action, as well as to the orientation of the self within the
environment, while coming nearer, for example, to such an
object or to a certain part of the environment, or avoiding
it, as the case might be.
• The feed forward, which is the beforehand information
that leads to control of action, one kind being the above-
mentioned image of action that precedes it, and the other
 M. Feldenkrais and Relative Conjugate Movements 13
kind being the information that stems from the immediate
environment and/or from the self's bodily parts relevant to
the activity.
• The parts of the environment that are connected to the
self by action (energy exchange) or by information-flow
should also be considered as components of the image of
intentional action.
The above-mentioned components of intentional actions
emerge in one assembly. Some appear simultaneously, some sub-
sequently, whether they stem from different realms (body and
mind) or not, whether the action is a trivial, everyday action or a
newly planned and more important one. They enable the self to
monitor and to control its actions and to realize its intentions.
Sometimes an image of action is incomplete, perhaps not in-
cluding detailed participations of certain parts of the self or ap-
preciation of the effort involved, distances (fixed or changing) be-
tween parts of the self, or a required change of supports, etc.
A more complete image might increase the versatility, adapt-
ability, and efficiency of the action. Hence, drawing the attention
of the person to details of that kind, while performing certain easy
actions, will be perceived as a welcome help.
One category of details that might be incomplete is the sen-
sory feedback that comes with the action. This incompleteness
might be due to a lack of attention, or to the fact that certain
parts of a totality of sensory information are just "filtered out,"
that is, they do not reach the conscious parts of the self. One
could say the same about the anticipation of the sensory outcome
of the ensuing action, as when the person doesn't know what pre-
cisely to expect. However, after some repetitions, the anticipated
sensory outcome is perhaps learned (in other words, no surprises
anymore!), and it becomes included in the image of action that
precedes the action. The corollary discharge is the mechanism
by which a nonhabitual pattern of action changes gradually into
being more habitual.
14 CoROLLARY DISCHARGE, THE FoRGOTTEN LINK

The sensory outcome of the action might sometimes have

an inhibiting character, as when it provides a sense of inability
or inadequacy, an unusual effort, danger (real or imagined), or
even pain. After some repetitions of that action, an anticipation of
that kind will become part of the image that precedes the action,
and, hence, be a hindrance to that action, sometimes stopping it
altogether.
Dr. Feldenkrais, in the framework of his method, showed a
possible way to solve such a difficulty. To circumvent the restrict-
ing anticipation, he used what I cal.led a relative conjugate move-
ment, which is simply moving a proximal part of the body relative
to a motionless distal part (movement B), instead of moving that
distal part relative to the said proximal part, which is motionless
(movement A). The two movements (A and B) use the same joint,
but are part of different images of action, the latter (A) attempted
habitually and possibly being connected with restricting anticipa-
tions, whereas the former (B) is done in a nonhabitual way and is
devoid of such restrictions. When the B movement is perceived
by the teacher as having been allowed and accepted (in other
words, cortically controlled), the teacher can propose the original
A movement. The pupil might now perceive-even with some sur-
prise-the ease of doing the action without sensing the habitual
restriction. If it happens that a structural limitation is causing the
restriction in movement, then this approach might not work. I
should say here that in the framework of the Feldenkrais Method,
there is no attempt to overcome structural limitations. One has to
know them and respect them.
It is an empirical fact that, with any voluntary action that uses
movement, the participation of the distal parts of the self (hands,
feet, head, lips) is more clearly represented in the image of action
than is the participation of the proximal parts (pelvis, chest, hip
joints, shoulder joints). This circumstance is applicable to relative
conjugate movements, and with some other approaches as well.
Let us look at one example in which the idea of relative conju-
gate movement is applied. A man had difficulty in raising his right
 M. Feldenkrais and Relative Conjugate Movements 15
arm overhead; he complained of pain. The teacher invited him to
lie down on a couch on his back. The teacher then gently took
the man's right arm by the elbow and moved it overhead, only so
far as it went easily, up to an obtuse angle between the chest and
the upper arm. The next step was not to increase that angle by
lowering the elbow to the couch, but instead for the practitioner
to hold that elbow fixed in space with one hand, and to lift the
right shoulder blade, slightly away from the couch, with his other
hand. Doing this repeatedly, the teacher might eventually sense
that this movement was starting to get easier. The teacher could
then lower the shoulder blade towards the couch while lowering
the elbow, which would thus become the new and easy way to
act. One might repeat this process, starting from the newly gained
situation, and thus achieve another small amount in the exten-
sion of the shoulder joint.
 CHAPTER FOUR

Habitual and Non-Habitual

Patterns of Action

W E MIGHT BE INTERESTED in changing SOme of Our non-habitual

actions, as mentioned in the previous chapter, into ha-
bitual ones. This change occurs in everybody during the early
stages of our lives, for example, with activities like using forks
and knives, writing, and so many others. When one is performing
an action the habitual way, there is no real need to pay attention
to certain details that are part of the pattern. These details may
include filtered-out items of sensory feedback that come with the
action, like participation, or lack of participation, of certain parts
of the self in that action. The effort of paying attention to a num-
ber of details connected with that action, which is done when the
action is still new and non-habitual, might ultimately be spared.
This is actually in everybody's interest, and enables us to enact
the habitual doing in a more expedient way, perhaps without the
preparation or deliberation that we might need before enacting
something non-habitual.
As an example, let's take handwriting. A child learning to write
remembers first of all the form of the letter he is going to write,
then chooses the strokes that will form the character, watches to
see that the letter will be nicely aligned with the other letters, etc.
The adult writer, habitually, will almost ignore much of this and
shift his attention towards the whole word, the sentence, and so

17
18 CoROLLARY DISCHARGE, THE FoRGOTTEN LINK

on, and to the meaning or idea that is to be expressed through the

writing. On the other hand, if it happens that the adult writer has
to write something on a blackboard (for an audience, for example),
he might revert his attention towards those above-mentioned ele-
ments, having to act differently from his acquired habitual way.
Among so many examples that we can take from everyday
life, we will consider riding a bicycle. The youngster learning to
ride the bicycle pays attention to the way he keeps the balance,
how he controls the speed, and how he negotiates a curve. In due
time, as he acquires the habit, he ceases to worry about those
things while riding, and his attention is free to shift to other aims,
like looking around, talking, or speeding on in order to get to
his destination faster. On the other hand, if it happens that he is
riding within a group of people who are walking around, and he
intends to slow down, then he might worry about keeping his bal-
ance and avoiding someone by making an appropriate curve.
Considering what we said in chapter 3 about the ingredients
of an intentional pattern of action, it follows from examples of
this kind that with new and nonhabitual patterns, the image of
action preceding the action might not have a clear outline. This
is connected, for example, with the fact that the participation of
proximal parts of the self is barely represented; the corollary dis-
charge, informing the sensory centers about the sensory feedback
that comes with the action, is still only tentatively present, or per-
haps not present at all. In other words, is any expected outcome
really there? Moreover, when perceiving a deviation from the ex-
pected outcome, how much change in the response (the "gain"),
in muscular effort, for example, will the person need, so that the
deviation will diminish, as it is desirable, and the action will not
"overshoot"?
The self is dealing with the situation by being attentive to
these elements, which means that it is using the conscious parts
of the brain-the cortical level-in controlling and monitoring
the action. With some repetition of the same action, or a simi-
lar action, the corollary discharge is learned; it consolidates and
 Habitual and Non-Habitual Patterns ofAction 19
becomes a regular ingredient of the pattern. Any deviation from
the goal will then elicit a controlled change in the effectors, so
that the action gets nearer to the goal. Gradually, those elements
need less attention, and the control is assumed by a "lower" level
of the central nervous system. The term "lower" implies a hier-
archy of levels of control: a lower (subcortical) level controls the
habitual patterns, but in nonhabitual or changing conditions,
the higher level takes over, and full attention is paid to issues
that otherwise are left to the care of a lower level. That lower
level is, for the time being, repressed, but its control over the
action reinstates itself when the self no longer perceives the spe-
cial conditions.
Patterns of action that have been learned in the earlier stages
of our lives are more deeply ingrained in the central nervous sys-
tem, and the corresponding level of control is lower than the level
that controls more recently acquired patterns. It is known that
after having a stroke, people who previously had the command
of several languages sometimes lost their ability to speak any lan-
guage besides their mother tongue. This can be considered a re-
gression: the higher level of control has been damaged, so a lower
level takes over the control.
Congenital and hereditary patterns that exist at the time of
birth, like breathing, sucking, swallowing, coughing, and the like,
are still more deeply ingrained, and so are patterns of defense
(such as the actions done to protect the vulnerable parts of the
body), all of which derive from the instinct of self-preservation.
We can now return to the idea stated at the beginning of this
chapter about changing a nonhabitual pattern of action into a
habitual one. All learning by the brain amounts, in the end, to
the formation of physical connections between neurons, in such
a way as to represent the associations that exist in the real world.
Memory thus represents the world within our brain.
We can distinguish several aspects of the ongoing processes
that result in habituation. One is synaptic facilitation. A synapse
is a tiny space that exists between the axon of one neuron and
20 COROLLARY DISCHARGE, THE FORGOTTEN LINK

the dendrite of another, in which those neurons exchange infor-

mation. Almost all attempts to describe the way memory and the
process of learning might be encoded in the brain imply some
notion either of synaptic growth (an enlargement of the site of
contact between neurons), of strengthening of local synaptic ac-
tion by neurotransmitter synthesis, or of generation or regulation
of new receptor sites (new synapses).
Another aspect of the process of habituation is the use that
one makes of an action in various conditions and in different con-
texts. The more one applies the same element of action with a
variety of associations and goals, the more this element will be in-
tegrated and habituated. As an example drawn from the practice
of the Feldenkrais Method, let us suppose that the easier move-
ability of a client's shoulder blade has been clarified. Very often,
this calls for a further integration, so that this new ability will
not remain a passing experience. One efficient way to do it is to
use the now easily movable shoulder blade for pulling or pushing
something in different directions, for pointing in various direc-
tions, or for reaching for a high-situated object (or for one's own
foot, for that matter). The same can also be done in different posi-
tions, such as sitting, standing, or lying down. The more that ac-
tions like these, taken from everyday behavior, are tried out, the
greater the chance that the easier-moving shoulder blade will be
integrated and habituated.
A further aspect of the process of habituation is clarifying,
while acting, what to expect sensorily (in other words, to learn the
corollary discharge). Any nonhabitual pattern of action might be
carried out, while certain sensory outcomes, about the acting self
or about the immediate environment, are outside one's aware-
ness. The teacher could just divert the person's attention toward
details of that kind. By the way, we do this routinely in the frame-
work of the Feldenkrais Method. After only a few repetitions, the
sensory details will already be anticipated; in other words, the
corollary discharges will become part of the image of action that
preceded the action. The action starts to become habitual.
 Habitual and Non-Habitual Patterns ofAction 21
As a practical example, we can consider a teacher leading a
group of people in an "Awareness through Movement" session.
They sit on the floor with their legs to the left and their right
hands held a comfortable distance in front of their eyes. The
teacher instructs them to turn their hands and eyes a little to the
right, only as much as is comfortable without straining, and then
to return to the initial position While doing this a few times, they
are instructed to observe the places on the wall towards which
their right hands are projected. Now, the teacher diverts the stu-
dents' attention while they are doing the same moves, first to the
turning of the neck, then to the movement of the shoulders, then
to the change of the floor's pressure that supports the left but-
tock. All these details might participate now more clearly in the
initial turning, or, at will, be prevented from participating as a vol-
untarily chosen alternative. Ultimately, by observing the places
on the wall behind their outstretched hands, the people find that
their twists reach further than they did before, even when they
are trying to move with the same ease as at the beginning, and
the places on the wall behind their hands have shifted an easily
detectable amount to the right.
This example shows that it is possible for details of the sen-
sory consequences of an action to escape conscious awareness.
When one pays attention to them repeatedly, one establishes the
anticipation of what is going to happen. In other words, one learns
the corollary discharge. Again, this corollary discharge becomes
an ingredient of the image of action that preceded the action,
which starts to become habitual.
The acquisition of bodily skills occurs in a similar way, of first
learning the corollary discharge, and then having it become in-
cluded as an ingredient of the action's image.
 CHAPTER FIVE

Corollary Discharge
in Everyday Life

W E como ~oNSIDER any intentional action done b! ~ur~elves

and reahze that the action comes with the ant1opat10n of
the appropriate sensory outcome. Consider, for example, the use
of a ladder. Having climbed up a few steps, we decide to step
down, and since we do not easily see where to step, we rely rather
on sensing with the foot where the next lower rung is situated.
After taking two or three steps this way, we know where to expect
the next rung, and we can continue with more confidence. lhe
corollary discharge has been learned. Now, if by chance one rung
has been broken or misplaced, we experience a surprising jolt.
lhe expectation of the next rung was already part of the pattern,
and something unexpected has happened.
If we take as a further example the actiorl of reaching for a
nearby object, then it is advisable to distinguish two aspects of the
way the self is monitoring the action. lhe self follows the ongo-
ing movement, compares the state of the reaching hand with the
intended goal, and eventually decides to correct a possible devia-
tion; on the other hand, the self acknowledges and confirms the
sensory feedback that comes while touching or lifting the object,
since this feedback has been anticipated by corollary discharges.
Alternatively, if the object, known to the self from before, happens
to stick to the underlying surface, for example, or happens to be

23
24 COROLLARY DISCHARGE, THE fORGOTTEN LINK

very hot, then there is a surprise - the senses provide information

that differs from what was expected.
We may look at an object nearby and will probably remember
something about it. When we look again, we might already know
what to expect to see. lhe short-term memory, in other words,
becomes part of the expected sensory feedback for our actions.
When talking to someone, we listen to our own voices and
monitor our own speech. It will never occur to us to wonder who
is speaking because the corollary discharge presets our auditory
cortex for receiving the auditory feedback; it is as if the auditory
cortex is stating, "I am speaking and that is what I am hearing:'
If it happens that my voice gets hoarse for an instant, I know
what to do: I either cough for a second before I go on, or I repeat
the word or the sentence. lhe corollary discharge enables me to
monitor and control my action.
lhe classical issue of perceiving the invariance of the envi-
ronment when moving our eyes has been mentioned before (in
chapter 2). When we handle an object, turn it around, or change
its distance from our eyes, it remains the same object. lhe visual
sense and the sense of touch are here participating with their cor-
responding corollary discharges. If we bend or cut the object, then
the expected outcome enables us to monitor the changes, and to
adjust, say, the amount or the direction of the applied force.
If the object is a musical instrument and we are playing it,
the auditory sense has its appropriate corollary discharges very
clearly involved as well, as we expect to hear sounds that are part
of the musical image, whether remembered or represented in mu-
sical notation. We monitor the outcome, taking into account quite
a number of aspects: pitch, force, rhythm, quality of tone, etc.
Situations like these, where we do intentional actions, mon-
itoring them and checking whether the sensory outcome is as
expected or not, happen during most of our waking life. A super-
ficial introspection might confirm this.
 CHAPTER SIX

The Self's Boundaries

W HEN REACHING ouT for some object in order to touch it, the
corollary discharge presets our senses about the way it will
feel in our fingers. Moreover, when touching some place on our
own body, an additional corollary discharge presets our senses
about the feel of that place on the body that is being touched.
All this involves a learning process, and, ultimately, the expected
sensory feedback will be there habitually. Touching our own body
creates for us the image of self, which is different from the rest
of the world. We know consciously that "this is me and that is
not-me:' The boundary between the self and the outside world is
clearly set. A little child, while touching places on his or her own
body, learns that kind of distinction very early. The child's think-
ing, translated, as it were, into some rational language, could go
this way: "That is a toy, I can play with it, and I can throw it away,
but this is me; mommy is here and there, but this is me at the
center of all interest:'
Sometimes, when there is a disturbance in the feedback that
comes from the site on the body that is being touched, the bound-
ary between the self and the nonself is disordered. For example,
during a dental treatment when local anesthesia is used, and the
tongue and cheek are affected by the anesthetic, one might feel

25
26 COROLLARY DISCHARGE, THE fORGOTTEN LINK

one's own tongue as a foreign thing inside the mouth, and per-
haps even try to chew it, until one realizes that this is actually
the tongue, a part of the self. A person with a paralyzed arm that
is not sensitive to touch might consider the arm as a useless ap-
pendage, and not a genuine part of the body.
On this issue, an acquaintance of mine remarked jocularly
that if God is omnipresent, or without boundaries, then He cannot
have an image of Himself, or be self-conscious, for that matter.
A person's self-image is not only static Oike a photo, or like
one single frame of a movie film), but dynamic as well, consisting
of actions and procedures that continue in time. Actions have
their limits set by several categories of constraints. One kind, for
example, involves the physical limits of the joints. When we try
to overstretch the elbow joint, we know what to expect; earlier
experiences will make us apprehensive, even when we are only
approaching that point.
The nearby environment provides another kind of constraint,
for example, when we are doing a fast movement in the middle
of a room, compared to doing a similar fast movement near a
wall or some other nearby obstacle. The sensory outcome of such
an action is anticipated. This is again a learning process, and
the appropriate corollary discharges establish the action's limits
accordingly.
The habits we acquire during our lifetimes, with the corollary
discharges already settled, create in themselves limitations for
acting nonhabitually. The nonhabitual action, devoid of a clear
expectation of the sensory outcome, brings the person to pay spe-
cial attention to that outcome. In due time, perhaps, a similar ac-
tion will come equipped with the appropriate corollary discharge,
and the action might, in other words, be rather habitual. A per-
son usually has a good reason for trying a nonhabitual action.
Sometimes it might be due to necessity, and sometimes just due
to curiosity. Doing a nonhabitual action is a way to transgress a
certain constraint, a limitation of the way of acting. Any of the
everyday actions that one does in a habitual way could serve as
 The Self's Boundaries 27
an example. We put on a jacket by inserting first, say, the right
arm. Trying it the other way, starting with the insertion of the left
arm, seems odd.
We perform some actions while considering limitations of a
social nature, as when we act according to custom or to tradi-
tional rituals. Sometimes the limitations are of an ethical nature,
as when we act according to moral or legal requests, whether we
are guided by inner convictions or by a desire to avoid reproba-
tion or punishment. As an extreme example, think of a reckless
driver who might behave lawfully when he sees or suspects that
there is a police officer patrolling nearby.
The last paragraph presupposes "corollary discharges" that
are not purely sensory in nature, but that are presetting anticipa-
tions all the same, and the feedback that comes with the action
provides corroboration with the intention that the action had in
the first place.
Very often, we encounter limitations of intentional actions
that are connected with changes in bodily structure, like those in-
flicted by injuries, accidents, operations, or degenerative changes
that happen during various stages of life. Some structural limita-
tions are congenital. Actions done under these constraints come
with the anticipated limits or inabilities set by the corollary dis-
charges, as one learns them through experience.
A person who is aware of her or his restricted way of function-
ing might often give up actions that are not affected by the struc-
tural changes. The image of inability to do certain things often
has the tendency to spread needlessly to other things. Let us see
circumstances of this kind allowing a first approach to produce
an improvement in that person's way of functioning, perhaps as
the teacher might try to regain any movement elements that have
been unnecessarily given up by the person.
 CHAPTER SEVEN

Impairment
and Rehabilitation

I F wE INTENDto be of some help in overcoming another person's

impairment, then a good way to start is to distinguish structural
limitations from functional ones. Changes in structure (skeleton,
ligaments, etc.) or damage that has been incurred by some part
of the nervous system are the domain of the medical profession,
and I am not intending at all to look into possible ways to relate
to structural changes of any kind, at least not in the framework of
the Feldenkrais Method. If there is no explicitly declared contra-
indication from the structural point of view, then the way might
be clear to look into clarifying the way of functioning.
Functional impairment means that some, or perhaps all, in-
gredients of an intentional action might be inhibited or might
even not exist. The ingredients (or components) of voluntary ac-
tions have been mentioned in chapter 3. I intend to present a few
examples that show ways of enhancing and clarifying some of
those components, so that the likelihood of utilizing the action in
question might increase. The notion of corollary discharge might
again show its practical importance.
As already mentioned, anticipating a sense of inability, inad-
equacy, or pain when considering a certain action elicits the in-
stinctive tendency to avoid that action. Very often this is more
than just abstaining from doing; it can take the form of an active

29
30 CoROLLARY DISCHARGE, THE FoRGOTTEN LINK

defense pattern, an activation of the antagonist muscles simul-

taneously with the respective agonists, resulting in stiffness and
restricted freedom to move. This kind of "freezing" may become
habitual. One of the possible ways to change this, as proposed by
the Feldenkrais approach, is to consider, for example, other pat-
terns of action that involve or use the same antagonists, but this
tillle as agonists or synergists. Those alternative ways of acting
have different expectations and come with different corollary dis-
charges, and thus they circumvent the former expectations and
allow some easier way of acting. By utilizing alternative ways of
acting, the person might achieve better control over the muscles
involved, and the initially restricted action might become feasible.
We have thus a change in the level of control from a lower level
towards the more aware cortical level.
As an example, let us take low back pain. When one does
not have to worry about structural problems, one can look at the
state of the trunk's flexors (the belly muscles) that work as an-
tagonists to the tense and suffering back muscles. Both muscle
groups might simultaneously be in a state of increased tension.
Moreover, any additional tension in the belly muscles calls for
several degrees more additional tension in the back muscles in
order to maintain balance and not to flex the trunk, an action
that, probably, has not been intended at all. To clarify this last
Point, think of the upper part of the trunk as a lever pivoted on
some lumbar vertebra, and of the distances from the pivot of both
lines of the flexors and the extensors as "arms" of the lever. The
"arm" of the flexors is several times bigger than the "arm" of the
extensors, which is an other way of saying that the back muscles
are very near to the vertebrae, compared to the belly muscles, and
they suffer, hence, from an increased (and probably painful) ten-
sion. Alternative ways of using the flexors could be side flexion of
the trunk, rotation, or both combined, all attempted in a slow and
gradual manner and in a position that provides a sense of security
and comfort. When the practitioner feels that those movements
are getting easier (meaning that they have been accepted), then
 Impairment and Rehabilitation 31
he or she could gradually try some flexing or extending of the
trunk, both of which have been difficult and painful before.
A similar idea can be illustrated as follows. Many muscles are
involved in more than one pattern of action and thus have dif-
ferent antagonists connected to them. If one such pattern, per-
haps the habitual one, is inhibited by negative expectations or by
impaired cortical control and presents stiffness, then it is worth
trying the other pattern, perhaps a nonhabitual one, in order
to improve the control over the muscle in question. In cases of
hemiplegia following a cerebrovascular accident (CVA), such stiff-
ness might occur, for example, in one of the arms; the biceps and
triceps muscles work simultaneously and allow neither flexion
nor extension of the elbow joint. On the other hand, the biceps
functions also as a supinator (it rotates the forearm outwards),
and has in this function a different antagonistic connection. If the
rotation of the forearm seems acceptable, then doing it gently will
elicit corollary discharges that are less inhibiting and, ultimately,
the extension of the elbow will become possible. In other words,
the level of control will go up, towards the cortex.
The image of voluntary action might be incomplete in cases
where the afferent nervous fibers are damaged. Those fibers are
supposed to transmit the sensory feedback of the kinesthetic
sense, needed for monitoring the action that is going to happen.
To complete that image somehow, I have used the idea of substi-
tuting another sensory modality to enable the person to monitor
the action, until the impaired kinesthetic sense becomes clearer
and sharper. Here are two examples from my practice.
A woman in her thirties had undergone surgery on her lum-
bar spine for removal of a tumor, and was left with a paralyzed
left leg. She had to use a crutch in walking. Sitting with straight
legs, she could move voluntarily neither her left ankle joint nor
the toes of her left foot. When I tried to move those toes gently,
she succeeded at rrioving them by herself, but only while looking
at them. It turned out here that the respective sensory fibers had
been damaged, but not the motor ones. I advised her, of course,
32 COROLLARY DISCHARGE, THE fORGOTTEN LINK

to do those movements while looking, and to look away now and

then, until the impaired kinesthetic sense could take over in mon-
itoring and controlling the actions of her toes and ankle.
A flutist 5 had suffered a severe injury to his right arm when
a bullet pierced the arm, slightly above the elbow, disrupting the
median nerve almost completely. His right thumb, forefinger, and
middle finger were all impaired in their function in the severest
way. At a certain stage of our work, after having already achieved
some movement in those finge~:s, he took up the flute in order to
try to play it. The thumb of the rigl).t hand supports the flute from
underneath, and the other fingers close or open the "keys" from
above. Our flutist could not yet reach those keys with the finger-
tips, as required; he could, however, reach them with the middle
phalanges of those fingers. Moreover, the fingers' kinesthetic
sense being not yet refined, our flutist felt that the control of the
fingers' movements was not satisfactory. The visual feedback was
not applicable here, because he couldn't look at those fingers
while holding the flute in the playing position. For example, while
the right forefinger had to be kept on the key for a while, it was
slipping somewhat to the right and touching the nearby so-called
"trill-key," producing an annoying, unwanted tone. The flutist re-
acted with a grimace of disgust. I said to him that he shouldn't be
disturbed by those tones. They were, for the time being, the only
source of information about how these fingers were behaving on
the flute. He could take them as cues in knowing how to adjust
and coordinate the movements of the fingers. And so in this case,
the auditory sense provided an alternative channel of feedback
for the motor functions of the fingers.

5For a detailed description of this case, see Rywerant, Y. (2003). The Feldenkrais Method:
Teaching by handling(chapter 12). North Bergen, NJ: Basic Health Publications. (Origi-
nally published 1983)
 CHAPTER EIGHT

Conclusion:
The Body-Mind Link
Reconsidered

R ETURNING TO THE ISSUEOf the psychophysical gap that was men-

tioned in the preface, I can sum up a few ideas. It is difficult
to form an opinion or to assume a philosophical stance in the
question of the gap between mind and body, be it reductionism
or dualism, for example, given the antithetical discussions that
are going on among neurophysiologists and philosophers. On the
other hand, in any learning process, and in any monitoring of in-
tentional actions, the physical part and the mental part (sensation
and perception, doing and thinking) emerge together. Sometimes,
even the question of which causes which has no meaning, and
both parts appear to be just two aspects of the same occurrence,
like two sides of the same coin.
It seems that from the practical standpoint, at least, the phe-
nomenological stance is appropriate. Firstly, one evades the on-
tological issue of whether all is based on one single substance or
on more than one (mind and matter). Secondly, considering two
aspects of the same phenomenon, the question of which causes
which loses its relevance, and even its meaning. One can obtain a
helpful intuitive sense of what is meant by these notions through
the consideration of a device proposed by David Bohm. 6 Suppose
6Bohm, D. (1983). Wholeness and the implicate order (p. 187). London, Boston, Mel-
bourne, Henley: ARK.

33
34 COROLLARY DISCHARGE, THE fORGOTTEN LINK

we have a rectangular aquarium with fish swimming around; fur-

ther, we have two TV cameras positioned at a right angle so that
one takes in the aquarium's front and the other its side. UJ.en we
have two TV sets in another room that make visible those images.
We will see a certain relationship between the images appearing
on the two screens. For example, we might see an image of a fish
on one screen and another image on the other screen. At any
given moment, the two images will generally be different. Never-
theless, the differences will be related in the sense that any move-
ment done by one will correspond to the movement done by the
other. Moreover, the content of one screen is "passing over" into
the other, and vice versa. llius, at all times, the image content
of one screen will correlate with and reflect that of the other. Of
course, the two images refer to a single actuality, and this explains
their correlation, without the assumption that they causally affect
each other.
llie monitoring of one's own intentional actions is an activity
amenable to everyone's introspection. llie corollary discharges
that come with intentional actions and the changes that occur
with those corollary discharges during the adaptation and habit-
uation of the respective actions present a detailed and perhaps
easily analyzable connection between sensation and perception.
Sensing, perceiving, and their interactions are very frequently oc-
curring activities of the conscious mind. Consciousness involves,
after all, several processes: committing to memory, recalling from
memory, perception of sensory input, attention, ti:tning of per-
ceived or performed events, monitoring of intentional actions,
acts of understanding, planning future actions, making maps, and
many more. Some of the modern brain-imaging methods might
be required to elucidate and localize those changes, as those
brain-imaging methods have already clarified other brain activi-
ties. Investigations of that kind might be a good way of bridging
over the "body-mind gap:' llie various ingredients of the images
of intentional actions (their adaptation, clarification, and comple-
tion), as they are so notably applied in any learning process, and
 Conclusion: The Body-Mind Link Reconsidered 35
the pertinent role that corollary discharges have in that process,
present a fruitful field of investigation. 1he Feldenkrais Method,
as I tried to show, makes ample use of the notion of image of
action and of the relevant sensory anticipations, by relating to
the corollary discharges in question. 1he method and its practi-
cal application, already practiced by a great number of teachers
(practitioners of the method) as it were, just invites some further
elucidation, in scientific terms, of the body-mind issue, as well as,
for example, the issue of free will and the issue of interpersonal
communication.
We have a quite similar situation in quantum theory, where
subatomic objects (electrons, for example) behave more like
waves or more like particles, as their behavior is actualized in
different experimental arrangements. One considers this wave-
particle duality valid, despite the fact that there is some difficulty
in grasping this intuitively. We could see the body-mind "gap" in
a similar way. 1he event in question "behaves" body-like or mind-
like, depending on the specific arrangement or observation we
might be interested to follow.
 References

Bohm, D. (1983). Wholeness and the implicate order. London, Bos-

ton, Melbourne, Henley: ARK
Carpenter, R. H. S. (1990). Neurophysiology. London, Melbourne,
Aukland: Edward Arnold.
Crick, F., & Koch, C. (1992). The problem of consciousness. Scien-
tific American, 267, 152-159.
Freeman, W.]. (2000). How brains make up their minds. London:
Phoenix.
Teuber, H. L. (1966). Alterations of perception after brain injury.
In]. Eccles (Ed.), Brain and conscious experience (pp. 271-276).
Berlin, Heidelberg, New York: Springer.
Rywerant, Y. (2003). The Feldenkrais Method: Teaching by handling
(chapter 12). North Bergen, NJ: Basic Health Publications.
(Originally published 1983)

37
In Corollary Discharge, The Forgotten Link, Rywerant brings his 111,1\tny
of the field of mind-body education to bear in understandin g ,, vn y
present but little-understood aspect of neuromuscular ttllll'tioll . It
brings this sometimes subliminal aspect of our worlds to our co11sn< Hi s
awareness, both for the appreciation of the function and so t h.1t \\'< '
may begin to make more conscious use of it. The expansion o( o111
awareness of corollary discharge has huge potential f(>r enh .111CI11 g
motor functioning.

Yochanan Rywerant (b. 1922) was one of the main assistants of I >1 M"'"'
Feldenkrais. In 1952,Yochanan, then a physics professor in a secondary ,1·lu u •I •.J• >II H.' <I
theATM lessons given by Feldenkrais in Tel-Aviv and continued to p.11111 q> .ll t' 11 1
them once a week for fifteen years. Yochanan was one of the p.trtlllJ>.IIII S 111 II >< ·
first Professional Training given by Feldenkrais, starting in l 1)(, 1) . I 'm fllt< ' <' ll <'. I JS
from 1970, Yochanan worked in the same room with Feldenkr,Ji, ,,, lm ,1\sl ' l.>l ll
at the Feldenkrais Institute in Tel-Aviv. He was also one of the inv11ed ,1smt.11 11s
at the trainings given by Moshe in San Francisco, CA and Andwrst, MA '->1111 ,.
then, he has worked extensively as trainer in Professional Tr;llnings 111 tl11' l J\A ,
Canada, Europe, and Israel. His book, The FeldCIIkrais Alctlwd, 'Ji•ctrltiiiX b)' //,1/tclliu.t:.
appeared in English in 1983, and has been translated into (;nm.lll , SJ> .IIII ' h , lt.d1.11 1,
and Hebrew.