cooperative

The Piano problem

i
ii i
who should get it
Titanic

Property Right Tata Mano Example

Division A B C
of profit 100 200 300
Rule of seniority

jjii
É
Shapleyvalt
Payment based on marginal contribution

ACB
t
BCA
CAB
new

Vp 8787118
91
130 2 19 10210

546 9

11
g
Up 10 11711 to
919

12 11 6 11
ve 1041
12,711
A B C
ABC 8 10 103
ACB 8 9.3 11
Bac g
ga g g Y
10
 J 17.8 AB s
Y
VB 9.43
they tan break coalition
Unstable coalition

g
Dominant
f
strategy
o L
Players

Players

Players
 I

Players

mayor
I go
both dominant

Anymetric information us Incomplete information

9
q P q l pl
q

i.DE Fit
a 92

D
 11 Adverse selection Tybee areprivate
Assymetris game
knowledge
G cannot beproved
in court
21 Moral Hazard Actions are
unobservable

Adverse selection
not

ftp 18
42 good quality
Bad quality
G planning to sell cars

SO no idea by looking at car if it's Port

willingness to pay 100 7 150
willingness to sell 200

seller knows port buyer doesn't

only lemon will get sold
the seller will sell only lemon at
any price offered
cars
wastist will be sold good cars will
not
 week week
e strong strong the

ops are inevitable

t.IE

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I

1
11 11
MI p p m s

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il
 Gayle Shapley
algorithm

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8
rounds
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