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Territorial Democracy Caste Dominance and Electoral Pratice in Postcolonia India
Territorial Democracy Caste Dominance and Electoral Pratice in Postcolonia India
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Jeffrey Witsoe
University of Pennsylvania
This article examines the relationship between caste identities and electoral democ
racy in India. Drawing from fieldwork in Bihar, I suggest that at the center of what
is popularly referred to as "caste politics " is the influence of local relations of
dominance and subordination on electoral practice, resulting in what I refer to as
"territorial democracy. " The article examines how a politics of caste empowerment
has challenged a long history of upper caste hegemony, contributing to a break
down of state institutions as newly elected lower-caste politicians have clashed with
an overwhelmingly upper-caste bureaucracy. The article seeks to demonstrate the
radical potentiality of democracy and argues that an ethnographic mapping of the
ways in which electoral practice is embedded within local power configurations is
necessary in order to understand the dynamics and implications of democracy in the
postcolonial world, [caste, politics, democracy, postcolonial, territoriality, crime, Mafia,
Bihar, India]
I was visiting a friend at his village situated about 60 kilometers west of Patna, the
capital of Bihar. The region in which my friend's village is located is infamous for
criminal activity, most notably the activities of a handful of men with reputations
of being powerful "mafia dons." There were three main mafia dons in the region,
all elected politicians. The most powerful of these three was recently elected as a
member of parliament, and the brother of another was a previous minister in the Bihar
government. Most importantly, these men are popularly perceived to be (upper caste)
Bhumihar leaders, and this region is commonly referred to as a "Bhumihar belt," an
area of Bhumihar dominance.
Local people told me that these mafia dons patronize a large number of smaller
level criminals. My friend's brother, Shiv, happens to be such a character, referred to
locally as a goonda or, in English, as a "gangster."1 Shiv's prize possession was his
Kalashnikov assault rifle, and whenever I met him a younger sidekick armed with
an American-made Springfield rifle accompanied him. My friend recounted that ten
years earlier criminals had gunned down his elder brother, a postman, while he was
delivering mail. His youngest brother Shiv took it upon himself to take revenge
and acquired a gun for the purpose. After accomplishing the act of revenge, he had
acquired a reputation as a goonda and continued with this lifestyle.
My visit was just a few weeks before elections were to be held for local government
bodies (panchayati raj) in April 2001, and there was a great deal of election-related
PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review, Vol. 32, Numbers 1, pps. 64-83. ISSN
1081-6976, electronic ISSN 1555-2934. © 2009 by the American Anthropological Association.
All rights reserved. DOI: 10.111 l/j,1555-2934.2009.01024.x.
As state institutions have weakened in Bihar and other parts of north India over the
last two decades, power has shifted from the bureaucracy and police to informal
"democratic" networks of politicians, an expanding class of political middlemen, and
criminal organizations, so much so that these informal democratic networks surpassed
the postcolonial state as a source of patronage and protection for most people. Since
democratic practice in Bihar is territorially articulated, it makes sense that democratic
networks could provide an alternate structure of governance.
The next section situates the concept of territorial democracy within anthropology's
larger engagement with democracy. I then turn to a brief examination of the colonial
and postcolonial history that is crucial for understanding the development of territorial
democracy. I next turn to Rajnagar, a village where I lived in Bihar, in order to
demonstrate the ways in which territoriality, caste, and electoral practice play out
within a specific site. In conclusion, I summarize the argument and reflect on the
recent political change that has occurred in Bihar.
Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, "democracy" has achieved an almost global
hegemonic status; most countries now claim to be democracies, even if this claim is
I now turn to a brief account of the relationship between caste and territoriality in
the colonial and postcolonial periods, the historical context for the remainder of the
analysis.
From the late colonial period, land scarcity resulting from India's burgeoning popu
lation, and a fragmentation of landholdings (caused by the division of inherited land
among brothers), forced landed elites to tum to the state in order to reinforce their
dominance. Caste facilitated relationships between landlords in the countryside and
an expanding and predominantly upper-caste urban elite. Caste organizations founded
universities and patronized caste-based educational scholarships. In this way agri
cultural surplus and rural power were channeled into urban pursuits, educational
capital, and access to government—on the basis of emerging caste networks that be
came instrumental for accessing state resources and public employment.13 Privileged
access to administrative jobs, in tum, allowed patronage relationships that dispro
portionately transferred public resources to already dominant castes. It is important
to keep in mind that the centrality of caste as political identity and the continued
influence of local dominance on electoral practice are both products of the colonial
legacy.
The newly independent Indian state, under the leadership of Nehm, embraced a
socialist vision intended to catalyst a broad and radical societal transformation.
Nehm and other Congress leaders believed that caste inequality would wither away
as socialism was progressively established in India, an understanding based on
the Marxist emphasis on class as the primary contradiction to be overcome. The
class-based character of
caste identities in elector
The superior access by m
contacts within the adm
trative recruitment at bo
caste in public life blun
expansion of state instit
in the 1950s, actually se
(due to the fact that th
The gap between the em
caste at the state, distr
ures of planning—prom
champion of caste empo
socialism."
The Congress relied heavily on landed elites as a base of political support in the
countryside, which served to buttress their elite position. Akhil Gupta (1998), for
example, described a shift in the reproduction of caste dominance from a patronage
that was based on control of land to a "brokerage" that was based on control over
the distribution of development resources. As Paul Brass put it, "Local power cannot
persist without control over or influence in government institutions" (1997:334).14
Territorial democracy emerged as a mechanism for reproducing caste dominance;
while upper-caste control of state institutions facilitated the dominance of upper
caste landlords, the votes that these landlords delivered elected members of their own
castes to office, enabling upper-caste control of the state and the village in a mutually
reinforcing pattern.
Popular participation in the electoral process surged in north India from the late 1980s,
especially among people from lower caste and class backgrounds as well as from
an increase in rural participation, a phenomenon that Yogendra Yadav (2000) has
termed the "second democratic upsurge."'5 This upsurge in voting turnout by people
from lower-caste backgrounds coincided with a progressive increase in the number
of members of state legislative assemblies and members of the national parliament
from lower-caste backgrounds. This has been especially true of representatives from
what are officially termed the "Other Backward Classes," castes that are officially
designated as "backward" but that did not suffer from a history of untouchability,
the latter officially designated as the "Scheduled Castes" or Dalits (literally, "the
oppressed").16
By the mid 1990s, OBC politicians dominated the state assemblies in north India,
especially in what were then the two most populous states, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar.17
The increasing number of members of state legislative assemblies from OBC back
grounds has been accompanied by the formation of state governments in Bihar and
Uttar Pradesh led by regional parties claiming to represent "backward caste" interests
and, in the case of Uttar Pradesh, a party claiming to represent Dalit interests (the
Territorial Democracy i
While Rajput landlords had, until a few years before, controlled all of the sand mining
from the banks of the Sonne river (the most important non-agricultural enterprise
in the region surrounding Rajnagar), an RJD-protected lower-caste group, locally
referred to as the Baloo mafia (sand mafia), now controlled a substantial portion of
this activity. Specific sites of mining, as well as informally recognized rights to levy
"taxes" on vehicles using access roads, were divided into distinct territories controlled
by different groups. None of the members of this group were from the previously
dominant Rajput caste.
These changes in regional political economy were strongly reflected within Rajna
gar. In Rajnagar's colonial past and well into the post-independence period, Rajput
tola, the residential area of the Rajpur ex-zamindars (colonial landlords), occupied
the political, social, and ritual center of the village. At the center of Rajpur tola is
Rajnagar ghar, a relatively wide hill about a hundred feet high, that villagers claimed
was manmade and was at one time considerably larger. Local historians told me that
Rajnagar was the site of a Rajput chiefdom with Rajnagar ghar as its military center.
The earlier presence of such a visible military establishment within the heart of the
village emphasizes the historical use of direct force in order to capture and maintain
territorial caste dominance, what David Ludden (1999) refers to as "agrarian territo
riality." During the colonial period, Rajput zamindars "owned" most of Rajnagar as
well as sizable land in nearby villages, and this dominance continued as ex-zamindars
became commercial landlords. Rajput landlords supported the Congress party and
were rewarded with privileged access to the local administration and police, judiciary
(a Rajput from an ex-zamindari family in a neighboring village, for example, had been
a High Court Justice), and cooperative institutions (of which almost every member
Electoral Territoriality
We are now in a position to distinguish two types of "caste politics" that are frequently
conflated. This will help to expose both the conservative and the radical potentials of
territorial democracy. First, there has been a long history of a caste politics involving
the discretionary implementation of state policy in order to protect the interests of
upper castes. Upper-caste landlords exchanged the votes that they controlled because
of their dominant position within the agrarian economy for protection and privileged
access to public resources supplied by upper-caste politicians. This mutually benefi
cial relationship between upper-caste landlords and politicians, however, was always
Notes
7. According to Freedom
representing 62% of coun
8. Michelutti ( 1999), for e
themselves as a "caste of p
the Hindu god Krishna, w
9. See also Hansen (1999) a
Lefort's political philosop
10. As Khilnani writes, "T
imagination and has begu
paternalistic state. Democ
is changing the relations
11. See Witsoe (2005) and W
of caste empowerment in
12. See Guha (1996), Mitr
power of zamindars in la
13. See, for example, Bay
14. See also Jeffrey and L
15. The first "democratic up
of opposition parties.
16. There have been consti
since Independence.
17. See Jaffrelot (2003),
the time when it bifurcat
ranked as the third most
18. See Witsoe (2006) for a
2005 elections in Bihar.
19. In 2002, out of a total
groups, while only seven
groups (Witsoe 2006).
20. See Louis (2002) and M
history of agrarian strug
in Bhojpur at the time o
Rajnagar or Koilwar, whe
(as political parties fieldin
21. Harijan, meaning "child
mer untouchables. Many
use the term dalit, "the
Castes.
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