Alexandra Totolici

Security and Diplomacy - 2nd year

START treaties: between security and stability

Full security and stability represent the ideal concept from the beginning of times which un-
derlies in all the actions of the states part of the international community. In the idealistic
world this can be attained and also maintained for a long time, but the real world is far from
the idealistic one and in the real world there is no place for full security and stability as the
race for the unattainable is always on and packed with instability and confrontations. Thus,
the international community can just hope to get as close as possible to this concept, but there
is always the degree of chaos specific to the anarchy of the international world.

The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks are part of a permanent process of maintaining a desir-
able level of security for all the states of the international community in order to coexist as
peaceful as possible in the international arena. The security concept that is the foundation is
the collective security concept that aims to reduce the conflictual state of the anarchic world.

The current paper has the aim of explaining the reasons behind the START treaties and
whether there is a positive or a negative impact of those on the international world for the
present and the future. The question that is to be asked is: Are the START treaties efficient in
their intention of being a backbone for the security and stability of the international commu-
nity or are they just an exhaustion of resources, time and diplomatic capabilities? Pursuing
this, we are going to explain the concept of collective security. It represents the foundation of
arms control and subsequently the START treaties, then we will better explain and provide
information about the main subject, the START treaties, and the application of the concept to
the practical world and finally, the conclusions.

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As mentioned before, collective security represents more of the idealistic concept rather than
the practical solution for the international community, but finally the best way of dealing with
the current anarhic world. The reason behind this is that the other choices are ineffective or
impractical, like the unilateralism that is impossible by default in the case studied by this pa-
per, as we already have more than one state with nuclear power and none are willing to re-
nounce at it, or the second case, impractical as an alliance is empty without a common adver-
sary that doesn’t exist, at least for now. Thus, the only obvious concept solution for the nu-
clear race represents the concept of collective security.1

A collective security system considers an enemy against a single state to be an enemy against
all other nations, which act in concert to repel the invader. Collective security systems have
always been envisaged as having a worldwide reach with member nations that have accepted
some constraints on selfdefense as the equivalent of its pledge of collective security.

A.F.K. Organski said it best: “The link between conflict and power balance appears to be the
complete antithesis of what was asserted. Eras of balance, whether genuine or perceived, are
times of battle, whereas periods of recognised preponderance are times of peace”. The goals
of collective security are consequently to dissuade aggression by threatening a disproportion-
ate response and to properly defend victims if deterrence fails. The logic of collective secu-
rity is based upon the deterrent effect of aggregate, preponderant power”.2
Collective security promises to lessen tensions since it is founded on the cooperative concept
of one for all and all for one, rather than a competitive balance. A global assurance would
comfort each state, allowing it to act boldly with rivals rather than weighing each occurrence
against worst-case scenarios. 3

The idea of peace's indivisibility underpins collective security. According to President

Woodrow Wilson, the top general of collective security, “every matter which is likely to af-
fect the peace of the world is everybody's business.” Anywhere there is war, there is a peril
to international peace. As a result, it is in every state’s best interest to put a stop to hostility

1 Betts, Richard K. “Systems for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Eu-
rope.” International Security, no. 1, JSTOR, 1992, p. 15. Crossref, doi:10.2307/2539157.
2 Idem p. 25
3 “---.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/topic/deterrence-
political-and-military-strategy. Accessed 15 June 2022.
2
wherever it happens. Collective security punishes anybody who employs force as a policy in-
strument, regardless of the validity of that policy. There is no differentiation between "fair"
and "poor" intentions in terms of violence. The issue is the process of resolving a disagree-
ment rather than the conflict itself.

Alliances and collective security are not the same thing. While the latter is directed towards a
particular vulnerability, the former is directed at an unknown adversary. Collective security is
founded on the concept of all against all, as opposed to the traditional and exclusive concept
of some versus certain specific others. According to Henry Kissinger, "alliances always as-
sume a specific possible foe, collective security protects international norms in the abstract.” 4

It is a global agreement to control the employment of force that applies to all nations within
its sphere and strives to establish predominance in the face of potential attack. It is founded
on the broad concepts of peace's indivisibility and diffuse reciprocity. The primary premise is
that war is not unavoidable, either because there is a fundamental harmony of interest among
nations or because reason is adequate to resolve eventual conflicts of interest.5

Collective security tries to balance the short-term interests of friends in the face of a mutual
danger with the long-term universal goals of world peace. It requests that alliances be
avoided, but it offers a positive future where each is safeguarded by all and alliances are thus
unnecessary. Collective security is not only distinct than an alliance, but it may also be in-
compatible with it. The concept of indivisibility of peace, like neutrality, does not accept de-
viations lightly. States would be forced to punish both allies and adversaries. It would be
hard to separate the aggressor otherwise and only a large coalition of several governments
could expect to resist the world community's will. Alignments should be determined by broad
standards outside the nations' power instead of by their own interests and preferences. In
other words, governments are being encouraged to forego the precise reciprocity of alliances
in favor of the broad altruism of collective security.

4 Betts, Richard K. “Systems for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Eu-
rope.” International Security, no. 1, JSTOR, 1992, Crossref, doi:10.2307/2539157.
5 Betts, Richard K. “Systems for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Eu-
rope.” International Security, no. 1, JSTOR, 1992, Crossref, doi:10.2307/2539157.
3
Promotion of the idea of collective security has created a psychological situation in which the
United States cannot turn its back on the concept, not because of what collective security can
accomplish, but because of what millions of people believe it may accomplish in time. Col-
lective security has come to be the chief symbol of hope that a community of nations will de-
velop in which there will be no more war. - Arnold Wolfers. 6

The main point of collective security represents the idea of deterrence where each state that
might want to change the state of peace is opposed by a great force of allied states. Deter-
rence is a military method in which, one power effectively utilises the prospect of retaliation
to prevent an opponent power from attacking. Since the introduction of nuclear weaponry, the
word deterrence has generally been ascribed to the core strategy of nuclear powers and major
alliance systems.7

The strategy's premise is that each nuclear force preserves a high level of immediate and
alarming destructive capability against any aggression—that is, the ability to inflict unaccept-
able damage on a would-be aggressor with forces that survive a surprise attack that is visible
and credible to the attacker. A degree of ambiguity on the side of a would-be aggressor as if
the target power, after being attacked and substantially injured, will nevertheless fight back at
the risk of suffering more, serious harm in a second attack—is a key component of successful
deterrence. Thus, nuclear-deterrence method depends upon two basic circumstances: the ca-
pacity to react even after a surprise offensive must be regarded as reliable; and the will to
fight back must be perceived as an option, though not necessarily as a serious possibility.8

Arms control is any international restriction or constraint on the research, testing, manufac-
turing, deployment, or application of weapons based on the assumption that certain national
military institutions would persist indefinitely. The term suggests some type of coordination
in fields of military strategy between normally competing or antagonistic governments in or-
der to reduce the possibility of conflict or, if war occurs, to decrease its destructiveness.
Arms-control proponents often have a more or less pragmatic attitude to international affairs,

6 Wolfers, Arnold. Discord and Collaboration Essays on International Politics. Franklin Classics, 2018.
7 “---.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/topic/deterrence-
political-and-military-strategy. Accessed 15 June 2022.
8 “Deterrence.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/deterrence-political-and-military-strategy. Accessed 15 June 2022.
4
rejecting pacifism in a system they see as anarchic and empty of any centralised leadership
for conflict resolution.9

Practitioners have an analysis of what dual arms control may accomplish: make public the
fact that both sides respect each other as important equals; avoid an arms race whereby each
side develops new systems in expectation of similar movements by the other. It may be possi-
ble in certain situations to prevent the militarisation of a given technology; spending on new
systems should be limited to save money; facilitate communication during stressful situa-
tions; provide transparency, which leads to predictability, which improves stability; reduce
incentives to anticipate in times of crisis (give first-strike stability) by altering force structure
(for example, by emphasizing bombers over missiles or decreasing the importance of fixed–
and hence vulnerable–intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple warheads) and reduce
the possibility of unintentional escalation induced by poor crisis management.10

9 “Arms Control.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/topic/arms-

control. Accessed 15 June 2022.
10 “Briefing Paper: New START - ICAN.” ICAN, https://www.icanw.org/briefing_paper_new_start. Accessed
15 June 2022.
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The nuclear weapon represents a device designed to release explosive energy from nuclear
fission, nuclear fusion, or a mixture of both methods. Fission weapons are also known as
atomic bombs. Fusion weapons are often known as thermonuclear bombs or hydrogen
bombs; they are nuclear weapons where at least some of the energy is produced by nuclear
fusion. Nuclear weapons generate massive amounts of explosive energy. Their importance is
best understood by using the terms kiloton (1,000 tons) and megaton (1,000,000 tons) to
characterise their explosion energy in terms of traditional chemical explosive TNT equivalent
weights.11

These arms have the direct power to kill millions, and their influence on agriculture has the
ability to kill billions. Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, nuclear weapons capability was de-
veloped. In August
1945, the first nu-
clear bombs
were ex- ploded
over Hi- roshima
and Na- gasaki.
Limiting the dif-
fusion of nuclear
bombs has been a
major topic in inter-
national re- lations
12
since then.

11 “Nuclear Weapon.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica,

https://www.britannica.com/technology/nuclear-weapon. Accessed 15 June 2022.
12 “Briefing Paper: New START - ICAN.” ICAN, https://www.icanw.org/briefing_paper_new_start. Accessed
15 June 2022.
6
The United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, and
North Korea are currently among the states having nuclear arsenal. As the figures show, the
use of nuclear weapons surged in the 1980s and has stayed stable since the early 1990s.13

Despite efforts in lowering nuclear arsenals during the Cold War, the world's cumulative

stockpile of nuclear weapons remained extremely high: nine nations owned around 12,700
nukes as of early 2022.

Russia and the United States hold around 90% of all nuclear warheads, with each having
more than 4,000 warheads in their strategic stockpiles; no additional nuclear-armed state feels
the necessity for more than a couple hundred nuclear devices for national defence issues.
Globally, the total number of nuclear weapons is decreasing, although the rate of
reduction is slower compared to the previous 30 years. Furthermore, these reductions are only

13 Idem
7
taking place because the US and Russia are continuously destroying previously retired
weapons.14

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), talks between the United States and the Soviet
Union to limit the production of strategic missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads.
The initial agreements, known as SALT I and SALT II, were signed in 1972 and 1979, re-
spectively, by the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to limit the
weapons rivalry in strategic (long-range or transcontinental) ballistic missiles equipped with
nuclear warheads. Strategic weapons limitation discussions, first proposed by US President
Lyndon B. Johnson in 1967, were agreed upon by the nuclear powers in the summer season
of 1968, and completed negotiations commenced in November 1969. The most important
agreements in the resultant complex (SALT I) have been the Treaty on Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) Systems and the Interim Agreement and Protocol on the Limitation of Strategic Of-
fensive Weapons. Both were signed on May 26, 1972, during a summit conference in Mos-
cow by President Richard M. Nixon representing the United States and Leonid Brezhnev,
secretary general of the Soviet Communist Party, representing the USSR.15

Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), arms control talks between the United States and
the Soviet Union (and, subsequently, Russia) aimed at lowering the arsenals of nuclear war-
heads and missiles and bombers capable of providing such weapons in both nations. The ne-
gotiations, which began in 1982, encompassed three tumultuous decades that saw the Soviet
Union collapse, the final stage of the Cold War, and the main crises of the early twenty-first
century.16

The United States and the Soviet Union signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START) I on 31 July 1991. This was the first deal that mandated the United States and the
Soviet/Russian Union to reduce strategic nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union disintegrated in
December 1991, leaving four sovereign governments with strategic nuclear armaments: Rus-

14 “Status of World Nuclear Forces – Federation Of American Scientists.” Federation Of American Scientists,
https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/. Accessed 15 June 2022.
15 “Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica,
https://www.britannica.com/event/Strategic-Arms-Limitation-Talks. Accessed 15 June 2022.
16 “Strategic Arms Reduction Talks.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica,
https://www.britannica.com/event/Strategic-Arms-Reduction-Talks. Accessed 15 June 2022.
8
sia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. As a result, the treaty's entrance into effect was de-
layed. The United Governments and the four future nuclear satellite states to the Soviet
Union signed the Lisbon Protocol on 23 May 1992, making all five nations parties to the
START I accord. START I went into effect on 5 December 1994 and it was an indispensable
first step into a world of nuclear arms control and on the path of a more stable and secure in-
ternational community. 17

Nuclear weapons reductions were accomplished by the closing date of 5 December 2001, 7
years after the treaty's entrance into effect, and will be sustained for another 8 years. On-site
examinations and shared missile information were used to verify states. Even after attaining
the START limitations, both the US and the Russian Federation maintained their reduction
efforts.

Each side has 1,600 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-
launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy (long-range) bombers, including 154 heavy
ICBMs (only the Soviet Union possessed the latter type of missile, the SS-18 Satan)
6,000 "responsible" warheads on ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, with no more than
4,900 on ICBMs and SLBMs, 1,540 on heavy ICBMs, and 1,100 on portable ICBMs (this
last restriction essentially applied only to the Soviet Union with rockets like the RS-12M
Topol because the US chose not to deploy such missiles after the treaty's signing). Nuclear
missile throw-weight (lifting force) was limited to 3,600 metric tons on every side. START I
came to an end on December 5, 2009.

START II was signed in January 1993 by the United States and Russia, but it never went into
force. The treaty allegedly banned the use of multiple independently targetable re-entry vehi-
cles on intercontinental ballistic missiles and it was used as a condition for the survival of the
Anti-Ballistic Missiles Treaty. Both presidents signed the treaty in 1993, but Russia never rat-
ified it and tried to use it as a weapon in the diplomatic war over the USA intervention in
Irak, Kosovo and the expansion of NATO to the east. In 2000 the Duma finally ratified it
with the conditions of upholding the Anti-Ballistic Missiles Treaty and singing the 1997 pro-

17 “START I at a Glance | Arms Control Association.” Arms Control Association | The Authoritative Source on
Arms Control since 1971., https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/start1. Accessed 15 June 2022.
9
tocol, limiting the anti-ballistic missiles system. The USA never ratified the 1997 protocol
that was supposed to extend the period intended for the reduction of nuclear armaments from
January 2003 to December 2007.18

Soon after it was replaced by SORT. The Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (or the Mos-
cow Treaty) was signed in 2002 where by 2012, both parties committed to cut operationally
deployed strategic nuclear weapons from 2,200 to 1,700.19 Bush favoured unilateral cuts so
that the US could easily change the size and content of its weapons over time. However,
Putin proposed codifying decreases in a treaty to help maintain balance and predictability be-
tween the US and Russia. Faced with relentless push from both the Russians and prominent
US politicians, the Bush administration decided to establish a legally binding agreement. 20

The predictability and the stability are always the main idea in these cases as the goal of all is
for everyone involved to reduce de amount of the nuclear arsenal while there is also security
and no state feels threatened or in a position to attack.

Presidents Bill Clinton of the United States and Boris Yeltsin of Russia agreed on a founda-
tion for START III discussions in 1997. Clinton and Yeltsin restated their pledge to initiate
official discussions on START III as soon as Russia approved START II at the Moscow
Summit in September 1998. SORT does not cover strategic nuclear warhead elimination or
operational nuclear weapon restrictions, both of which were proposed for addition in START
III. The negotiations were never successful and thus the treaty was never signed by the par-
ties. The fact that the Duma stalled the ratification of the START II and USA’s plans to con-
struct a limited missile defence system were some key points in the failed attempt to close the
START III deal. 21

18 “START II and Its Extension Protocol at a Glance | Arms Control Association.” Arms Control Association |
The Authoritative Source on Arms Control since 1971., https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/start2. Accessed
15 June 2022.
19 “The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) At a Glance | Arms Control Association.” Arms Control
Association | The Authoritative Source on Arms Control since 1971.,
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/sort-glance. Accessed 15 June 2022.
20 “START II and Its Extension Protocol at a Glance | Arms Control Association.” Arms Control Association |
The Authoritative Source on Arms Control since 1971., https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/start2. Accessed
15 June 2022.
21 “The START III Framework at a Glance | Arms Control Association.” Arms Control Association | The Au-
thoritative Source on Arms Control since 1971., https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/start3. Accessed 15
June 2022.
10
It was followed in 2011 by the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START).
On February 5, 2011, the New START Treaty went into effect. According to the pact, the
United States and the Russian Federation have seven years (by February 5, 2018) to satisfy
the treaty's fundamental restrictions on strategic offensive armaments and are then committed
to maintain those limits for the duration of the pact's validity. increases security by imposing
verifiable restrictions on all deployed Russian and American intercontinental-range nuclear
weapons The United States and Russia have decided to extend the pact through February 4,
2026. Both the USA and the Russian Federation fulfilled the New START Treaty's core limi-
tations by 5 February 2018, and have remained at or below them ever since. 22

These are the following limits: 700 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), im-
plemented submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and implemented heavy bombers
equipped for nuclear weapons and equipment; 1,550 nuclear warheads on deployed ICBMs,
deployed SLBMs, and implemented heavy bombers installed for nuclear armaments (each
such heavy bomber counts as one warhead towards the limit); 800 deployed and non-de-
ployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, New START restricts all Russian operational in-
tercontinental-range nuclear weapons, including every Russian nuclear warhead put onto an
intercontinental-range ballistic missile capable of reaching the United States in about 30 min-
utes. It also restricts the installed Avangard and the ongoing construction Sarmat, the Russian
Federation's two most operationally accessible new long-range nuclear missiles capable of
reaching the United States. Extending New START means that we will have verifiable re-
strictions on Russian nuclear weapons capable of reaching the US heartland for the next five
years. According to the central restrictions, each Party has the ability to decide the organiza-
tion of its forces. 23

The treaty includes specific procedures for implementing and verifying the central restric-
tions on strategic offensive weapons (described above) as well as all treaty commitments.
These processes control the conversion and deletion of strategic offensive weapons, the cre-

22 “The START III Framework at a Glance | Arms Control Association.” Arms Control Association | The Au-
thoritative Source on Arms Control since 1971., https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/start3. Accessed 15
June 2022.
23 “New START Treaty - United States Department of State.” United States Department of State,
https://www.state.gov/new-start/. Accessed 15 June 2022.
11
ation and management of a treaty-required information database, transparency measures, and
a commitment.24

On 26 January 2022, the United States and the Russian Federation decided to extend for five
years the bilateral cap on US and Russian nuclear arsenals, known as the New Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (New START). The prolongation of New START is appreciated since it
prevents a reversal of nuclear disarmament progress. It's a good start for the incoming US
government, but further actions are needed to achieve progress on disarmament.25

The START treaties are a living proof that collective security and arms control can be made
between the worlds most powerful states and for the last 20 years it worked out in the favour
of the greater good. Even though, there were tensions, like the prolongations for the ratifica-
tions of the START II and even not entering into force, the foundation for a better coopera-
tion when it comes to nuclear armaments was made.

The states have now a way to connect, cooperate and negociate without feeling necessarily
threatened by each other, having the degree of stability and prediction needed. The deterrence
is always the best option and deterrence in this case is made by knowing and controlling the
nuclear weapon arsenal of the others. The states and the international community can reduce
the tensions between the world’s most powerful and nuclear equipped states with these
treaties and also the reverse of the coin, if any of those tries to overthrow the status quo, they
already know that the others will retaliate with full force, meaning almost the same capabili-
ties as theirs.

Considering all of the above, START treaties are a way into a future that is more secure and
stable for the international community as a whole, which is at least for the moment the best
way of dealing with sensitive security matters as the nuclear weapons.

24 “New START Treaty - United States Department of State.” United States Department of State,
https://www.state.gov/new-start/. Accessed 15 June 2022.
25 “Briefing Paper: New START - ICAN.” ICAN, https://www.icanw.org/briefing_paper_new_start. Accessed
15 June 2022.
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https://www.icanw.org/briefing_paper_new_start. Accessed 15 June 2022.

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13
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14