A Relational Frame Theory approach to

Perspective-Taking
Developing a Natural Language IRAP for Assessing Perspective-
Taking with Regards to Self versus Other
Word count: 20094

Lisa Van Raemdonck

Student number: 01402215

Supervisor(s): Prof. Dr. Dermot Barnes-Holmes, Dr. Ciara McEnteggart

A dissertation submitted to Ghent University in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Clinical Psychology

Academic year: 2018 - 2019

Preface

In the context of completing my masters degree in clinical psychology, I wrote the current thesis.
During the writing process of this thesis there are several people to whom I would like to express
my sincerest gratitude. For which I will take the appropriate time to do so in this ‘preface’.

First, I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Barnes-Holmes from the bottom of my heart, for introducing
me to the relational frame theory and guiding me through the entire writing process. I would also
like to thank Dr. Ciara McEnteggart and Deirdre Kavanagh whom supported me by answering a
multitude of questions and providing valuable advice and feedback on multiple occasions. As a
student novel to the broad field of the relational frame theory and the process of conducting and
reporting on an experimental study, I could not have asked for a more engaged and inspired
research team to be part of.

I would also like to thank my family and friends for supporting me through this challenging
experience and encouraging me during my entire school career. Their support has meant the world
to me and continuously motivated me to work hard and put in the effort.
 Abstract

Recently, a Relational Frame Theory (RFT) approach towards perspective-taking,

conceptualising this skill as deictic framing, has become more apparent. There have been several
procedures developed from an RFT-perspective to assess deictic relational responding, such as the
Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP). The current study investigates the applicability
of a newly developed version of the IRAP (NL-IRAP) to measure perspective-taking,
implementing natural language statements comprising of psychologically relevant stimuli. To
further investigate the role of diverging interpersonal boundaries, in contrast to previous studies,
the current study used two separate NL-IRAPs to assess whether performances differed
significantly when responding in relation to self versus a different other. On an exploratory basis,
several self-report measures were included, assessing interpersonal boundaries and clinical
concepts often related/ linked to perspective-taking, such as psychotic-like experiences. During the
process of analysing the data a three-way interaction was encountered for a specific trial-type
(Positive event-Negative reaction) that approached significance, suggesting differential responding
relative to self versus other. To pursue the robustness of the obtained trend, data from a related
study was included, also displaying this same pattern of responding. Not only did the three-way
interaction appear to be robust, the influence of the other (different or disliked) may indeed play
an important role. Finally, two correlational clusters were obtained that appeared relatively
consistent with the literature on psychosis and attachment related anxiety/ avoidance, suggesting
higher psychological distress is related to impaired flexibility in deictic relational responding on
the NL-IRAP.
 Abstract (Dutch/ NL)

Recent treed een Relationele Frame Theorie (RFT) benadering van perspectiefname steeds
meer op de voorgrond en conceptualiseert dit als deiktische kadering. Vanuit deze benadering zijn
verscheidene methodieken ontwikkelt om deiktische relationele reactiepatronen te meten,
waaronder de ‘Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure’ (IRAP). De huidige studie onderzocht
de functionaliteit van een nieuwe versie van de IRAP (NL-IRAP) om perspectiefname te meten
die gebruik maakt van natuurlijke taalstellingen, evenals psychologisch relevante stimuli. Om de
invloed van divergerende interpersoonlijke grenzen nader te onderzoeken, werd in tegenstelling
tot voorgaande studies, gebruik gemaakt van twee aparte NL-IRAPS om te exploreren of
reactiepatronen significant verschillen met betrekking tot het eigen perspectief versus dit van een
ander. Er werden eveneens zelfrapportage vragenlijsten afgenomen om verbanden te exploreren
tussen prestaties op de NL-IRAP en concepten geassocieerd met interpersoonlijke grenzen en
perspectiefname, zoals psychose. Tijdens de data-analyse werd een marginaal significante drie-
wegsinteractie geobserveerd voor een specifieke testconditie (Positieve gebeurtenis-Negatieve
reactie), die mogelijk duidt op verschillende zelf- en ander-gerelateerde reactiepatronen. Om de
robuustheid van deze trend nader te onderzoeken, werd data van een gerelateerde studie
geïncludeerd waarin ditzelfde patroon werd geobserveerd. De driewegs-interactie bleek niet alleen
robuust, maar ook de specificatie van de ander (verschillend of gehekeld) is hierbij mogelijk van
belang. Tot slot, werden twee correlationele clusters geobserveerd die relatief consistent bleken te
zijn met literatuur over psychose en hechtingsgerelateerde angst/ vermijding. Deze suggereren dat
een hogere mate van psychologisch lijden mogelijk gerelateerd is aan een verminderd vermogen
tot een flexible deiktische relationele wijze van reageren op de NL-IRAP.
 Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………….1

Relational Frame Theory: General Background………………………………….1

Relational Frame Theory and Deictic Relations…………………………………2

Sense of Self: Definition and Clinical Findings………………………………….3

Defining sense of self …………………………………………………….3

Clinical findings on sense of self………………………………………....4

Perspective-Taking: Definition and Clinical Findings…………………………...5

Defining perspective-taking as deictic relational responding…….……....5

Clinical findings on perspective-taking…………………………………..6

The Role of Perspective-Taking in Psychosis Symptomatology…………………7

General background……………………………………………………...7

A relational frame approach………………………………..…………….7

Assessing Perspective-Taking from an RFT Approach………………..…….…..8

Exploring alternative methodologies…………………………………......8

The implicit relational assessment procedure (IRAP)………..………......9

The IRAP and perspective-taking……………………………………….11

The Current Study…………………………………………..…….……….…....12

METHOD……………………………………………………………..….……….…....14

Participants……………………………………………………….…………….14

Design………………………………………………………………………......14

Materials and Apparatus………………………………………………………..15

Natural language-implicit relational assessment procedure

(NL-IRAP)……………………………………………………………...15
 Self-focused NL-IRAP……………………………………….......16

Other-focused NL-IRAP…………………………………….......17

The community assessment of psychic experiences (CAPE)….……….19

The psychological flexibility index (PFI)……………………………….19

The experiences in close relationship structures questionnaire – revised

(ECR-RS)……………………………………………………………….20

Experiencing of self scale (EOSS) ……………………………………...21

Inclusion of the other in the self scale (IOS)…………………………….22

Feelings about self thermometer………………………………………...22

Procedure……………………………………………………………………….23

Self-focused NL-IRAP………………………………………………….23

Other-focused NL-IRAP..……………………………………………....25

Self-report questionnaires………………………………………………25

RESULTS…………………………………………………………………………........25
IRAP Data…………………………………………………………………........26
Data preparation and preliminary analyses..……………………………26
Descriptive analyses..……………………………………………...…....27
Statistical analyses.……………………………………………….…….27
Questionnaire Data ...……………………………………………………..……32
Correlations between IRAP Scores and Self-Report Measures………………...33
DISCUSSION………………………………………………………………………......35
Discussion of the Current Findings……………………………………...…......35
Clinical and Theoretical Implications……………………………………..........40
Limitations and Future Directions………………………………………...…....41
CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………...…....43
REFERENCES…………………………………………………………………...…….44
APPENDIX 1 ………………………………………………………………...……......57
APPENDIX 2 ………………………………………………………………...……......59
APPENDIX 3 ………………………………………………………………...……......61
APPENDIX 4 ………………………………………………………………...……......62
APPENDIX 5 ………………………………………………………………...……......63
APPENDIX 6 ………………………………………………………………...……......64
APPENDIX 7 ………………………………………………………………...……......65
APPENDIX 8 ………………………………………………………………...……......66
 The historic distinction between a cognitive mediation approach to complex
human behaviour and a functional behavioural account that focuses on learning
principles of readily observable behaviour (often studied in non-humans), has become
less apparent throughout the last century (Stewart, 2016). As evidence for the
applicability and in some cases uniqueness of these general learning principles in more
complex human behaviour emerged (Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2016, p.131),
researchers shifted their attention towards an integration of a functional approach and
the study of human language and cognition (see De Houwer, 2011 and De Houwer,
Hughes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2017 for a discussion). Building on Skinner’s account of
human language as operant behaviour, Relational Frame Theory (RFT) has attempted to
conceptualize human language and cognition as arbitrarily applicable relational
responding (AARR) (Stewart, 2016).

Relational Frame Theory: General Background

Recently RFT has been gaining more attention in its attempts to articulate an
overarching framework of language and cognition which aims to connect research and
clinical practice (Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Luciano, & McEnteggart, 2017;
Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2016, p.130; O’Connor, Farrell, Munnelly, McHugh, 2017;
see Stewart, 2016, for an overview). RFT conceptualizes language and cognition as
generalized operant behaviours operating under contextual control, that are learned
through a history of multiple exemplars (see Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2016 for a
more detailed description). The basic argument is that through extensive verbal
interactions and experiences, an individual learns to derive relations between and
among stimuli in a manner that does not rely only on the physical properties of those
stimuli (Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2016). Such responding is referred to as arbitrarily
applicable relational responding (AARR) or relational framing, and this derived effect
was first established by Sidman (1971) during his seminal work on stimulus
equivalence (see Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2016, for a more detailed description;
Stewart, 2016). There are multiple ways to relate stimuli arbitrarily, and RFT identifies
particular patterns of such relational responding as relational frames, such as
coordination (see e.g., Alonso-Álvarez & Pérez-Gonzalez, 2017; Lipkens & Hayes,
2009; Ninness et al., 2009; Ruiz & Luciano, 2011), opposition (Alonso-Álvarez &

1
Pérez-Gonzalez, 2017; Lipkens & Hayes, 2009; Ninness et al., 2009), distinction (see
Ming & Stewart, 2017, for a review), hierarchy (Foody, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-
Holmes, Rai, & Luciano, 2015; Griffee & Dougher, 2002; Slattery, Stewart, & O’Hora,
2011) and perspective-taking or deictic relations (Heagle & Rehfeldt, 2006; McHugh,
Barnes-Holmes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2004; McHugh, Barnes, Holmes, Barnes-Holmes,
& Stewart, 2006; McHugh, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Stewart, & Dymond,
2007). Detailed descriptions of these frames are unnecessary in the context of the
current research; instead the focus will be on the frames referred to as perspective-
taking or deictic relations (see Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2016, for a more detailed
description).

Relational Frame Theory and Deictic Relations

According to RFT, deictic relational responding is presumed to develop later than more
basic or simple forms, such as frames of “same”, “difference” and “opposition”
(Barnes-Holmes, Foody, Barnes-Holmes, & McHugh 2013). Furthermore, the deictic
relations do not appear to have a clear basis in non-arbitrary relational responding, but
instead rely upon a speaker’s perspective functioning as a constant “location” in an
ever-changing environment (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2013; Hughes & Barnes-Holmes,
2016). In other words, as a child learns to use a given language, speaking for the child is
always from his or her perspective. Research in RFT has indicated that there are three
fundamental deictic relations: the interpersonal (I-YOU), the spatial (HERE-THERE)
and the temporal relations (NOW-THEN) (Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2016; see
Montoya-Rodríguez, Molina, & McHugh, 2016, for a review). As such, these relations
combine to create the basic relational frame of perspective-taking, which locates an
individual language-user in a time and place relative to others.
Perhaps the earliest attempt to study perspective-taking within RFT involved
developing a verbal protocol that was designed to assess the deictic/perspective-taking
relations (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2013). Although there have been several adaptations
and refinements of this protocol (e.g., Gilroy, Lorah, Dodge, & Fiorello, 2015;
Vilardaga, Estévez, Levin, & Hayes, 2012; McHugh, et al., 2004), the original version
has led to a significant body of research examining and training these deictic frames in
both non-clinical and clinical populations (Kavanagh, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes,

2
McEnteggart, & Finn, 2018; see e.g., McHugh et al., 2004; Weil, Hayes, & Capurro,
2011).
The original protocol was developed to target the three key deictic relations in
young children across three different levels of complexity (Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-
Holmes, Roche, & Smeets, 2001; Barnes-Holmes et al., 2013; Hendriks et al., 2016a,
b). The first level considers simple relations, for example, “If [hypothetically speaking]
I (experimenter) have a red brick and YOU (participant) have a blue brick: Which brick
do I have?” (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2013, p.9). The second, level involves reversing the
relation, for example, “If I had a red brick and YOU have a blue brick. If I were YOU
and YOU were me. Which brick would I have? Which brick would you have?” (Barnes-
Holmes et al., 2013, p.11). Increased levels of complexity may involve double reversals
in multiple deictic relations, for example, “I am sitting here on the blue chair and you
are sitting there on the black chair. If I were YOU and YOU were me, and if HERE was
THERE and THERE was HERE: Where would you be sitting? Where would I be
sitting?” (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2013, p. 12). As will be noted later, this type of
protocol was developed specifically for research with children rather than adults and
focused on determining if specific relational skills were present or absent rather than
how fluid or flexible those skills were (Kavanagh et al., 2018).

Sense of Self: Definition and Clinical Findings

Developing a sense of self as distinct from others is vital to each human
individual. The next section will provide a relational frame conceptualisation of self and
its importance for our wellbeing.
Defining sense of self. There are numerous conceptualizations of the self, and
its importance as a concept has been highlighted in many psychological theories.
Reflecting its importance as a psychological construct, there is a large range of self-
report measures that were designed to assess specific conceptualisations of self, for
example, self-esteem or self-schemas (Atkins & Styles, 2016). The current research
focuses on a functional account of the verbal self, which according to RFT is uniquely
human and is perceived to be functionally different from a non-verbal self, which is
associated with pre-verbal children and non-humans (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2001;
McHugh, 2015). According to RFT, learning to use a human language helps to create a

3
verbal sense of self, and thus the verbal self cannot be explained using the types of
learning principles associated with nonhumans (e.g., Pavlovian and direct operant
conditioning; see Atkins & Styles, 2016; Barnes-Holmes et al., 2001).
As noted above, RFT argues that through our verbal interactions with others we
acquire a sense of self as distinct from the perspective of others. As Skinner (1974)
previously described, we learn this through questions and interactions that make us
aware of ourselves and of our inner experiences (e.g., “Are you angry?”, “Are you
playing with a toy?”) (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2001). In addition, RFT suggests that we
thus learn to respond from an I-HERE-NOW perspective relative to YOU-THERE-
THEN (McHugh, 2015); for example, “It’s five o’clock and I am at home cooking”,
“On Monday at ten o’clock you were at school”. As one’s sense of self further
develops, an individual is able to use these deictic frames in a more flexible manner and
in increasingly elaborate verbal interactions. According to RFT, initially these relational
verbal abilities are quite limited such that a young child may initially assume that
everything that they know is also what another person knows (McHugh et al., 2007;
McHugh et al., 2006). As such, the distinction between I-HERE-NOW and YOU-
THERE-THEN is not firmly established, though of course most children seem to
acquire the ability to make this distinction quite readily and without any form of
structured or programmed training (Atkins & Styles, 2016; Barnes-Holmes et al., 2001).
Clinical findings on sense of self. Numerous researchers suggested that there is
a link between human psychological suffering and a dysfunctional sense of self, such as
a negative or disturbed self-concept in depression, personality pathology and psychosis.
(e.g., Cohen, Leibu, Tanis, Ardalan, & Galynker, 2016; Foody, Barnes-Holmes, &
Barnes-Holmes, 2012; Nelson, Thompson & Yung, 2012; Rimes & Watkins, 2005).
Indeed, it has been argued that a sense of self as distinct from others could have
important implications for our psychological functioning. For example, McEnteggart,
Barnes-Holmes, Dillon, Egger and Oliver (2017) recently offered a functional-analytic
account of the relationship between the self, dissociation and voice hearing.
Interestingly, the authors argued that the development of a sense of self and a sense of
other, in terms of the deictic relations, are often impacted upon by a traumatic history.
Specifically, according to RFT the I-HERE-NOW may be strongly coordinated with
OTHERS, and thus the normal boundaries between self and others (as differentiated)

4
are somewhat less distinct. Furthermore, a study by Atkins and Styles (2016) found
exploratory evidence that a “strong” sense of a verbal self predicted well-being. Taken
together, it seems that the role of language in establishing a strong or coherent verbal
sense of self, as distinct from others, is essential in achieving relatively adequate levels
of psychological health and stability.

Perspective-taking: Definition and Clinical Findings

The ability to adopt the perspective of others relative to self appears to be
essential in establishing a stable sense of self. Therefore, a large part of the literature on
the self is devoted to perspective-taking. The next section will outline perspective-
taking as deictic relational responding and its relevance to the clinical domain.
Defining perspective-taking as deictic relational responding. For some time,
the dominant paradigm on perspective-taking has been the theory of mind (ToM), which
explains this as acquiring an understanding of one’s own internal state compared to that
of others (see Baron-Cohen, Tager, Flusberg, & Cohen, 2000, for a more detailed
description of this account). Recently, there has been increasing interest in perspective-
taking from a relational frame perspective (see Montoya-Rodríguez et al., 2016, for a
review). RFT conceptualizes perspective-taking as relational responding based on the
previously described deictic relations (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2013; Hendriks et al.,
2016a). Broadly speaking, the basic idea is that through deictic relational responding, an
individual makes inferences on the mental states and behaviour of others (McHugh &
Stewart, 2012). It is important to note that the specific labels typically used to denote
the three core deictic relations (I, Here, and There) are not the critical stimuli (Barnes-
Holmes et al., 2001; Barnes-Holmes et al., 2013). For example, “I” can also be
represented by a name such as “Louis”, and “HERE” can be represented by a place
such as “library”. In other words, through our verbal interactions with others regarding
our perspective we learn to abstract these relational properties (spatial, temporal and
interpersonal) which serve as a contextual “constant” upon which an ever-changing
environment operates and can be understood (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2001; Hendriks et
al., 2016a). There are several ways in which these deictic frames can interact resulting
in a multitude of possible relational networks (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2001; e.g., YOU-
HERE-NOW, I-HERE-NOW, YOU-THERE-THEN and so on). These elaborate

5
relational networks allow more complex forms of perspective-taking/deictic framing
(Hendriks et al., 2016a). More precisely, because of these interactions it is not only
possible to respond to either our own or another’s behaviour, but we can actually adopt
a multitude of other perspectives (Villatte et al., 2010). We can for example, imagine
how someone must feel in a given situation even though we may not have had a similar
experience. If for example, “Sam is currently feeling sad because he lost his dog”, I can
imagine how he feels by switching from an I-HERE-NOW perspective to an I-THERE-
NOW perspective. In so far as humans are social beings, these perspective-taking skills
seem to be crucial to our social functioning, and most importantly impairments may
therefore negatively impact our interactions with others.
Clinical findings on perspective-taking. Impairments in the ability to take
another’s perspective have frequently been implicated in a large part of the literature on
psychological suffering. A large part of this research has focused specifically on young
children with autism and developmental delays, however perspective-taking most likely
also plays an important role in several forms of psychological suffering in adults. As
mentioned previously, there seems to be a developmental trend in the acquisition of
these deictic relations (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2013; McHugh et al., 2004). Therefore,
the nature of the impairment, as measured using a developmental protocol of the
presence or absence of these relations, may differ in verbally-sophisticated adults
compared to children who have not yet fully developed the skills. Although RFT
research in this domain is still quite limited, there are a few studies examining the role
of perspective-taking in adults with psychological pathologies (see Montoya-Rodríguez
et al., 2016, for a review); for example, in adult populations with pathologies
implicating social impairments (Janssen et al., 2014; Villatte et al., 2008, 2010a, b ).
Overall, there seem to be some important differences between non-clinical and clinical
populations, with clinical samples performing more weakly on tasks that appear to
require more complex deictic relational responding (HERE-THERE and NOW-THEN;
Hendriks et al. 2016a). Hendriks and colleagues (2016a) also suggest diverging
development of perspective-taking in clinical samples. These impairments may be more
specific to certain pathologies than others, and as this line of research has been gaining
more attention, future research may even identify particular patterns of impairment.

6
The Role of Perspective-Taking in Psychosis Symptomatology
One of the clinical domains gaining more attention is the role of deictic
relational responding in schizophrenia and psychosis symptomatology. First, the current
research will look more closely at symptoms of psychosis to then explain how
perspective-taking may be implicated in these phenomena.
General background. Psychosis symptoms indicate an impaired relation with
reality and can, for example, take form as hallucinations or delusions. (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2014). Psychosis, however, is quite a broad term that has been implicated in
several psychological pathologies such as schizophrenia, dissociative disorder (see
Renard et al., 2017, for a review), borderline disorder (e.g., Niemantsverdriet et al.,
2017), as well as in some non-clinical populations (see Van Os, J., Linscott, R.J., Myin-
Gemeys, L., Delespaul, P., & Krabbendam, L., 2009, for a review). As a continuum-
perspective on these symptoms has been gaining more support (e.g., Shevlin, McElroy,
Bentall, Reininghaus, Murphy, 2017; Unterrassner, Wyss, Wotruba, Haker, & Rössler,
2017), recent reflection on the conceptualization of psychosis symptomatology and its
classification has led to an adjustment of the DSM-IV criteria (see Allardyce, Gaebel,
Zielasek, & Van Os, 2006, for a review; e.g., Demjaha et al., 2009).
The DSM-V outlines five symptom domains of psychosis spectrum disorders:
delusions, hallucinations, disorganized speech, disorganized or catatonic behaviour, and
negative symptoms such as apathy (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2014). A large part of the
research that has focussed on the link between these symptoms and perspective-taking
was undertaken by ToM-researchers, indicating impairments on ToM-tasks in
individuals with psychosis symptoms/disorders (e.g., Achim, Ouellet, Roy, & Jackson,
2011; Bora, Yucel & Pantelis, 2009; Langdon & Coltheart, 2001; Langdon & Ward,
2008; Pijnenborg, Spikman, Jeronimus, & Aleman, 2013). Recently, RFT researchers
have shifted their attention towards this clinical domain and have attempted to further
understand its links with perspective-taking as derived relational responding (Hendriks
et al., 2016b).
A relational frame approach. As stated previously, some RFT researchers have
been examining a potential link between impairments in adopting the perspective of
others with the symptoms of schizophrenia (e.g., Villatte et al., 2010b) and specifically
social anhedonia (e.g., Vilardaga et al., 2012; Villatte, et al., 2008, 2010a). For example,

7
a study by Villatte et al. (2008) indicated weaker performances among participants with
high-anhedonia on ToM tasks and a RFT deictic-relations protocol. That is, the high-
anhedonia group performed significantly weaker on a deictic relations task (I-YOU
reversals) relative to a low-anhedonia group, indicating an impaired flexibility in
perspective-taking. Villatte et al. (2010a) replicated the previous findings with
participants with high social anhedonia producing more errors when making attributions
about another relative to a comparable performance when making attributions to self
(the errors when making attributions to self were comparable to the errors produced by
a control group). In another study, Villatte et al. (2010b) compared non-clinical
participants with a clinical population diagnosed with schizophrenia and found that the
clinical group made significantly more errors on a perspective-taking task, specifically
on I-YOU relations. The clinical group also performed significantly weaker on both
simple and reversed relations relative to the non-clinical group, thus indicating a
diminished ability to correctly make attributions of false-beliefs to others in individuals
with schizophrenia. Overall, these studies suggest an impaired flexibility in deictic
framing involving interpersonal relations for individuals reporting symptoms of
psychosis, with differences emerging between clinical and non-clinical samples, at least
using the RFT-based deictic protocol.

Assessing Perspective-Taking from an RFT Approach

Exploring alternative methodologies. Clearly, there has been a growing
amount of research into perspective-taking from a relational frame theory point of view,
especially in the clinical field (Montoya-Rodríguez et al., 2016). Critically, as noted
earlier, RFT-based measures of perspective-taking were mostly verbally delivered
protocols specifically developed for children and as such were viewed as a skill that was
either present or not. However, a small number of studies have provided evidence that
perspective-taking might be better considered as lying on a continuum ranging from less
to more flexible/evolved (DeBernardis, Hayes, & Fryling, 2014; Kavanagh et al., 2018;
McHugh et al., 2004). Building on this idea, RFT has attempted to develop a measure
that assesses perspective-taking as a verbal ability on which individuals differ in how
fluidly or flexibly they can apply this in their everyday lives (McEnteggart, Barnes-
Holmes, Hussey, & Barnes-Holmes, 2015). Another development was the shift in

8
attention from children towards adults focusing in particular on how a lack of flexibility
might be related to certain forms of psychological suffering in adults (e.g., Villatte et
al., 2010a, b).
Although the original protocol, and its variants, provided some key insights into
perspective-taking and its development, as pointed out by Hussey et al. (2014), it has
also shown to be lacking in certain areas when applied to adults (Kavanagh et al., 2018).
Firstly, the original deictic protocol was designed to test and train the previously
mentioned deictic relations in children and cannot simply be generalized to adults.
Secondly, as previously mentioned, RFT views deictic relational responding as a skill
that lies on a continuum of flexibility, rather than a skill that is simply present versus
absent. A “deficit” approach to perspective-taking does not, therefore, facilitate an
explanation of psychological suffering in terms of flexibility in perspective-taking or the
development of the self generally (Kavanagh et al., 2018; McEnteggart et al., 2017).
Thirdly, although the original protocol aimed to assess the basic skills underpinning
deictic relational responding by targeting the deictic frames, several factors such as IQ
and cognitive functioning seem to impact performances on the protocol (Gore, Barnes-
Holmes, & Murphy, 2010; Hendriks et al., 2016a; McHugh et al., 2004; Vitale, Barnes-
Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Campbell, 2008). Finally, because the protocol was
designed to study deictic responding primarily in children with specific relational
deficits (Barnes-Holmes et al. 2013; see e.g., Rehfeldt, Dillen, Ziomek, & Kowalchuk,
2007), it might not be sensitive enough to assess subtle differences in clinical
psychological suffering. Thus, while there are some studies on psychological suffering
which demonstrate deficits, a more sensitive and age-adjusted measure might deliver a
more precise understanding (Kavanagh et al., 2018; Villatte et al., 2008, 2010a, b).
The implicit relational assessment procedure (IRAP). One way in which
flexibility in relational responding, in general, has been studied within RFT involved
developing the implicit Relational assessment procedure (IRAP; Barnes-Holmes,
Barnes-Holmes, Stewart, & Boles, 2010). The IRAP is a computer-based procedure that
aims to assess the relative strength of previously established relational frames, rather
than their mere presence or absence in an individual’s behavioural repertoire (Barnes-
Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Hussey, & Luciano, 2015; Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes,
Stewart, & Boles, 2010).

9
 An IRAP typically presents participants with both target and label stimuli along
with two response options; for example, a picture of a snake with the word “pleasant”
and the words, ‘True’ and ‘False’ as response options. The participant then confirms
(presses ‘True’) or disconfirms (presses ‘False’) the relationship between the two types
of stimuli by pressing one of two response keys. The presented stimulus-response
mappings can either be consistent or inconsistent with expected response biases. During
a consistent trial, the correct response will likely cohere with the pre-experimentally
established relationship between the two stimuli. For example, if “unpleasant” is shown
with a picture of a snake, the participant should confirm this relationship by pressing the
‘True’ key. If, however the participant chooses the incorrect response (denies that a
snake is unpleasant) a red ‘X’ appears and the participant has to answer correctly in
order to move on. During an inconsistent trial, the correct response is incoherent with
the pre-experimentally established verbal relationship. For example, if the label
“pleasant” is presented with a picture of a bunny, the participant should disconfirm this
by pressing ‘False’. Participants are first presented with blocks of practice trials until
they reach certain criteria before they move on to the test blocks. The combination of
the two categories yields four trial-types (e.g., Bunny-Pleasant-True/False; Bunny-
Unpleasant-True/False; Snake-Pleasant-True/False; Snake-Unpleasant-True/False).
The difference in response latencies between the consistent and inconsistent blocks is
then transformed into DIRAP-scores to reduce contamination by factors related to non-
experimental variables. This DIRAP-score can then be used as an index for the relative
strength of a specific pattern of relational responding.
In most of the previous studies, the IRAP has been used as a measure of implicit
attitudes across a range of domains (see e.g., Roddy, Stewart, & Barnes-Holmes, 2010;
Scanlon, McEnteggart, Barnes-Holmes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2014). As noted above,
however, the IRAP was in fact developed originally as a measure of relational framing,
a point that has been reiterated in recent conceptual and empirical articles (see Barnes-
Holmes et al., 2015 and Hussey, Barnes-Holmes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2015a, for a more
detailed account). Another recent development is the more frequent use of this
procedure to assess more complex relational responses in the clinical domain (Vahey,
Nicholson, Barnes-Holmes, 2015), for example, to assess body image (Parling,
Cernvall, Stewart, Barnes-Holmes, & Ghaderi, 2012), self-esteem (Remue, De Houwer,

10
Barnes-Holmes, Vanderhasselt, & De Raedt, 2013; Vahey, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-
Holmes, & Stewart, 2009), and of particular interest for the research presented in the
current thesis, perspective-taking (Barbero-Rubio et al., 2016; Kavanagh et al., 2018).
The IRAP and perspective-taking. Barbero-Rubio and colleagues (2016) were
the first researchers to adapt the IRAP as a measure of perspective-taking, along with
more explicit measures of perspective-taking. In their study, they assessed only two
deictic relations: interpersonal (I-YOU) and spatial (HERE-THERE). During the IRAP,
participants were asked to confirm (‘yes’) or disconfirm (‘no’) a relation between a
target and label stimulus. These statements concerned either the participant (self) or the
researcher (other) and participants were required to confirm or disconfirm statements
pertaining to the self versus the other. For example, “Kim” (participants name) was
presented at the top of the screen with a statement underneath pertaining to a property of
either the participant or researcher, such as ‘holding a pen’. If the researcher was
holding a pen, and not the participant (“Kim”), during simple or consistent blocks,
participants had to disconfirm the relation by pressing the ‘no’ key. During reversed
blocks, participants were required to respond in accordance with the instruction, “If I
were YOU and YOU were ME”, and thus ‘yes’ (“Kim is holding a pen”) was the correct
choice. Results indicated differential IRAP performances across simple and reversed
blocks with participants responding more slowly on the reversed trials. The IRAP
performances also correlated with an explicit measure of perspective-taking, with lower
DIRAP-scores being associated with greater accuracy on specific types of reversed trials.
These findings have been partially replicated by Kavanagh et al. (2018), but a
number of differences also emerge. The details of these differences are not critical for
the current research because they may have been related to a range of procedural
differences across the two studies (see Kavanagh, et al., for a detailed discussion). A
more important issue in the context of the current research is that the studies by both
Barbero-Rubio et al. (2016) and Kavanagh, et al. could be criticized on the basis that the
IRAP performances were not driven by perspective-taking per se. Rather, it is possible
that participants simply completed the IRAP by responding in accordance with current
events during simple blocks (i.e., confirming that the researcher was holding and pen)
and then responded in the opposite direction during trials that putatively required
perspective-taking (i.e., simply disconfirming that the researcher was holding a pen). In

11
other words, participants could complete the IRAP without necessarily having to
imagine or think of themselves as literally being the researcher. One way in which it
may be possible to circumvent this interpretive problem with the IRAP is to employ a
version that allows for the presentation of stimuli that require perspective-taking on a
trial-by-trial basis.
The IRAPs employed by Barbero-Rubio et al. (2016) and Kavanagh, et al.
(2018) presented relatively simple stimuli, such as a picture of the researcher holding a
pen, and thus perspective-taking during the actual task may have been limited or
completely absent. If each IRAP trial contained a statement that asked participants to
produce a response that reflected either their own perspective or that of another, with
regard to a specific internal state, then perhaps such a procedure would better capture
perspective-taking during the actual task. Beginning to explore this possibility was the
primary purpose of the research reported in the current thesis.

The Current Study

In aiming to develop an IRAP that may capture perspective-taking more
effectively than previous IRAP studies, it may be wise to employ a new version of the
procedure that allows for the presentation of relatively complex statements. In doing so,
perspective-taking stimuli pertaining to internal states could be employed. Using the
traditional IRAP can accommodate the use of sentences, however, they would still have
to be separated into target and label stimuli which may come across as unnatural
(Kavanagh, Hussey, McEnteggart, Barnes-Holmes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2016). This issue
led to the development of the natural language IRAP (NL-IRAP; see Kavanagh et al.
2016). In a NL-IRAP both the label and target stimuli are simultaneously presented in
the format of a single sentence or statement, similar to everyday language use or verbal
interactions. As Kavanagh, et al. (2016) point out, this may allow researchers to insert
questionnaire-based items that might have otherwise been difficult to assess separately
using the traditional IRAP. On balance, the NL-IRAP is still a very recent development
and thus it seems important to explore its potential as a research tool; this was a
secondary purpose of the current research.
The general aim of the research reported in the current thesis is to determine if
the NL-IRAP can be used to differentiate between taking your own perspective versus

12
taking the perspective of another. This study will thus seek to extend the findings
reported by Kavanagh and colleagues (2018), only using a deictic NL-IRAP. By doing
so this study will attempt to develop an IRAP that assesses perspective-taking
pertaining to the internal states of self versus other. The current study will employ two
separate NL-deictic IRAPs, one which targets self-related responses to positive and
negative events and a second that targets other-related responses to such events. The
research will be largely exploratory, in part because the NL-IRAP is relatively new and
thus it is difficult to predict exactly what it will yield in the domain of perspective-
taking. On balance, a general aim of the study will be to determine if the two types of
NL-IRAP (self versus other perspective) produce any differences in the observed
performances. In particular, if the IRAPs are sensitive to perspective-taking we may
expect to observe generally larger IRAP effects for the self- relative to the other-focused
IRAP. Specifically, one might expect that individuals should be more certain in drawing
conclusions about their own internal states than that of others, and this would be
reflected in stronger IRAP effects for the self-related IRAP. The current study also
involved specifying that the ‘other’ was deemed to be particularly different to the self
and thus there was a reasonable expectation that differences in the two IRAP
performances should emerge.
In addition, the current study also included a range of self-report measures of
psychotic-like experiences and the self, as well as self-report measures of interpersonal
closeness/ boundaries. The main purpose in adding these self-report measures was to
explore whether the ability to take one’s own perspective versus that of another relates
to psychosis symptomology in the general population. Previous studies have
consistently shown an impaired flexibility to take another’s perspective in individuals
with symptoms of psychosis. Thus, if the NL-IRAPs employed in the current research
are tapping in perspective-taking, they should correlate in some manner with such
measures. As noted above, however, this is the first study using a relatively new
procedure (NL-IRAP) and thus no specific hypotheses were formulated.

13
 Method

Participants
Thirty-two participants took part in the current study, eight males and twenty-
four females, and ranged from 17 to 32 years old (M = 21,44). The sample size was
decided based upon a meta-analysis on the use of the IRAP in the clinical domain
(Vahey, Nicholson, & Barnes-Holmes, 2015). The experiment took on average an hour
and a half to complete and each participant was paid 15 euro. Participants were selected
through random convenience sampling from the participant pool of the Department of
Experimental, Clinical and Health Psychology of the Ghent University. Participants
were invited to the university research facility to complete the experiment and all
participants signed informed consent prior to commencing the experiment. All
participants consented to take part in all aspects of the study, however the data from two
participants were excluded from the final analysis (see procedure section). The final
sample comprised thirty participants. In addition, during the process of analysing the
data, an interesting three-way interaction effect was observed that approached
significance, so in order to investigate this trend further and to increase statistical
power, the data from a closely related study was combined with the current dataset (i.e.,
see Experiment 6 from Kavanagh et al., in press). In this study, thirty-four participants
participated, four males and thirty females, and ranged from 18 to 50 years old (M =
21.29), and a total of thirty participants were retained after exclusions were applied,
leading to a final combined sample size of sixty participants, 12 males and 48 females,
ranging from 17 to 32 years old (M = 20.75). Both studies were approved by the ethical
committee of the Ghent university. And all procedures were executed conform its
ethical standards and those of the 1964 Helsinki Declaration and its later amendments.

Design
The current experiment was a 2x4 (NL-IRAP x trial-type) within-subjects
design. The order of the NL-IRAPs was counterbalanced across participants and the
four trial-types were presented randomly within each test block. A more detailed
description of the procedure is provided subsequently.

14
Materials and Apparatus
Two computer-based NL-IRAPs and six questionnaires were employed in the
current study. The two NL-IRAPs comprised of a self-focused IRAP and an other-
focused IRAP. The six questionnaires comprised of the Community Assessment of
Psychic Experiences (CAPE), the Psychological Flexibility Indicator (PFI), the
Relationship Structures questionnaire of the Experiences in Close Relationships –
Revised (ECR-RS), the Experiencing of Self Scale (EOSS), the Inclusion of the Other
in the Self Scale (IOS), and the self-warmth thermometer that were all presented by
means of the computer program ‘PsychoPy2’ (v1.83.01, Peirce, 2007, downloaded from
http://www.psychopy.org/index.html). The current study was part of a larger research
project on perspective-taking conducted by the Contextual Behavioural Science (CBS)
research group (see Kavanagh et al., in press). Thus, these specific questionnaires were
employed across all studies in this series in an effort to measure phenomena that are
often considered to be related to perspective-taking and the concept of the self, such as
attachment, relationships, psychological flexibility, and psychosis. All questionnaires
and their instructions (with the exception of the CAPE which has a validated Dutch
version) were translated through a backward-forward method according to the World
Health Organization guidelines (WHO, 2017) by two Dutch speaking colleagues in the
Department of Experimental Clinical and Health Psychology at Ghent University. All
aspects of the study (NL-IRAPs and self-report measures) were conducted on a standard
Dell laptop computer (17.3 inches).
Natural language-implicit relational assessment procedure (NL-IRAP). The
two NL-IRAPs were presented using the Ghent Odysseus GO-IRAP software which is
written in Java (v1.0, downloaded from https://go-rft.com/go-irap/). The statements
used for both IRAPs1 were designed to reflect differential functional properties of
responding from the perspective of the self and from the perspective of another (e.g.,
positive/negative reactions to positive/negative events). A pilot study indicated that
these stimuli produced differential responding across the trial-types and thus were also
employed in the current study (see also, Kavanagh et al., in press). The format used in
the current study is presented in Figure 1.

1
To accommodate the reader, from this point on when referring to the NL-IRAPs used in the current
study, we will simply refer to them as ‘IRAPs’.

15
Figure 1. Examples of the four trial-types in the self-focused IRAP. The stimulus valence
(e.g., Positive Event) is presented in brackets but was not presented on-screen.
Note. The presented format is displayed in English, but all experimental stimuli were
presented in Dutch.

Self-focused NL-IRAP. The self-focused IRAP measures the ability to take your
own perspective. The self-focused IRAP presented participants with a sentence
concerning their reaction (positive or negative) in a given situation (positive or
negative). There were four statements for each trial-type resulting in a total of 16
statements (see Table 1). The four trial-types were as follows: Positive event-Positive
reaction (e.g., “When someone says I look good I feel confident.”), Negative event-
Negative reaction (e.g., “When someone I love dies I feel distraught.”), Positive event-
Negative reaction (e.g., “When someone says I look good I feel ugly.”) and Negative
event-Positive reaction (e.g., “When someone I love dies I feel happy.”) that were
presented randomly. Participants were required to respond with either ‘yes’ or ‘no’ by
pressing either ‘d’ or ‘k’. The response options (i.e., ‘yes’ or ‘no’) were displayed at the
bottom left- and right-hand corners of the screen on each trial. Since this is one of the
first studies using this IRAP, there are no psychometric properties available at this
instance.

16
Table 1
Stimuli employed in the self-focused IRAP’s statements for each trial-type
Trial-type Stimuli

Positive Event-Positive Reaction When someone says I look good I feel confident.
If my enemy dies I am relieved.
If I win the lottery I am delighted.
Passing my exams makes me feel proud.

Positive Event-Negative Reaction When someone says I look good I feel ugly.
If my enemy dies I am upset.
If I win the lottery I am disappointed.
Passing my exams makes me feel frustrated.

Negative Event-Positive Reaction When someone I love dies I feel happy.

Getting a fine makes me feel pleased.
Failing an exam is great.
If someone I hate wins the lottery I feel amazing.

Negative Event-Negative Reaction Getting a fine makes me angry.

When someone I love dies I feel distraught.
Failing an exam is disappointing.
When someone I hate wins the lottery I feel
bitter.
Note. The IRAP statements used in the experiment were presented in Dutch but are
presented here in English to accommodate the reader. The statements were presented
randomly within each block.

Other-focused NL-IRAP. The other-focused IRAP was similar to the self-

focused IRAP, but required participants to respond to several statements about a
specific other who they were close to, but perceived as very different to them. Once
again, the other-focused IRAP presented participants with a sentence concerning the
others’ reaction (positive or negative) in a given situation (positive or negative) (see
Table 2). Once, again there were four trial-types each comprising of four natural
language statements, leading to a total of 16 statements similar to those of the self-
focused IRAP. The four trial-types were as follows: Positive-Positive2 (e.g., “When

2
To accommodate the reader, from this point on, we will occasionally use a shorter formulation for the
trial types (e.g., Positive-Positive). The first part always describes the valence of the event (positive or
negative), and the last part describes the valence of the emotional response (positive of negative).

17
(name) is told they are good looking they feel confident.”), Negative-Negative (e.g.,
“When someone close to (name) dies they feel distraught.”), Positive-Negative (e.g.,
“When (name) is told they are good looking they feel upset.”) and Negative-Positive
(e.g., “When someone close to (name) dies they feel happy.”) that were presented
randomly. Again, participants were required to respond with either ‘yes’ or ‘no’.

Table 2
Stimuli employed in the other-focused IRAP’s statements for each trial-type
Trial-type Statement

Positive Event-Positive Reaction
When X is told they are good looking they
feel confident.
If X’s enemy dies they feel relieved.
If X wins the lottery they are delighted.
If X passes an exam they feel proud.

Positive Event-Negative Reaction When X is told they are good looking they
feel upset.
If X’s enemy dies they feel upset.
If X wins the lottery they feel disappointed.
If X passes an exam they feel unsatisfied.

Negative Event-Positive Reaction When someone close to X dies they feel

happy.
Getting a fine makes X feel pleased.
When X fails an exam they are delighted.
If X’s enemy wins the lottery they feel
overjoyed.

Negative Event-Negative When someone close to X dies they feel

Reaction distraught.
Getting a fine makes X angry.
If X fails an exam they feel disappointed.
If X’s enemy wins the lottery they feel bitter.

Note. The ‘X’ represents the name of the specified other which was defined by each
participant individually.

18
 The community assessment of psychic experiences (CAPE; Stefanis et al.,
2002). The community assessment of psychic experiences is a self-report questionnaire
adapted from the Peters Delusions Inventory (PDI-21; Peters, Joseph, & Garety, 1999)
in combination with items originating from the SANS (Andreasen, 1989) and SENS
(Selten, Gernaat, Nolen, Wiersma, & Van den Bosch, 1998) scales. The CAPE intends
to measure the life-time occurrence of subclinical psychotic-like experiences in the
general population. The CAPE comprises 42 items across three symptom dimensions: 8
items to measure depressive symptoms (e.g., “Do you ever feel pessimistic about
everything?”); 14 items measuring negative symptoms (e.g., “Do you ever feel that your
feelings lack intensity?”); and 20 items measuring positive symptoms (e.g., “Do you
ever feel that as if you are being followed in some way?”). The CAPE measures both
the frequency and distress of symptoms, each on a four-point Likert scale from 0
(frequency: never; distress: not distressed) to 3 (frequency: nearly always; distress: very
distressed). These can then be summed into separate frequency and distress scores of
psychic experiences, and for each of the three dimensions, that are all weighted to
control for partial non-responses (i.e., dividing the sum score by the total amount of
valid responses). Scores on the CAPE can range from 42 to 168, with lower scores
indicating lower frequency and/ or distress, and higher scores indicating higher
frequency and/ or distress. There are no clinical cut-offs for this measure. All three
dimensions have been shown to be independent, and have shown to have good internal
consistencies (Stefanis et al., 2002, Verdoux, Sorbara, Gindre, Swendsen, & Van Os,
2003, Brenner et al., 2007).The Dutch version has an adequate reliability: depressive
dimension (a = 0.62); negative dimension (a = 0.64); positive dimension (a = 0.63)
(Konings, Bak, Hanssen, Van Os, & Krabbendam, 2006), high internal stability (a =
0.6-0.8), and sufficient discriminant validity with coherent dimensions of interview-
based measures of psychosis (Konings et al. 2006). The current study employed the
Dutch version based on Van Os, Verdoux, and Hanssen (1999).
The psychological flexibility index (PFI; Bond et al., in preparation). The
psychological flexibility index assesses psychological flexibility and of which the
development currently still ongoing (Bond et al., 2017). The PFI is adapted from the
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-II (AAQ-II) developed by Bernaerts, De Groot
and Kleen (2012). The version used in the current study consists of 82 items, each rated

19
on a 6-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (disagree strongly) to 6 (agree strongly).
Overall scores on the PFI can range from 82 to 492. Some items used reversed scoring.
Overall scores are calculated by summing scores on all the items. Low scores indicate
lower levels of psychological flexibility, while high scores indicate high psychological
flexibility. There are no psychometrical properties available at present, nor are there
clinical cut-offs. However, both to the English (a = .85; Bond et al., 2011) and Dutch
version (a = .85) (Bernaerts et al., 2012) of the original measure (AAQ-II) on which the
PFI is based, has proven to have good internal consistency. Participants in this study
were presented with a Dutch version of the PFI, which was translated through
backward-forward translation.
The experiences in close relationship structures questionnaire – revised
(ECR-RS; Fraley, Heffernan, Vicary, & Brumbaugh, 2011a). The experiences in
close relationships structures questionnaire (revised version) is a self-report
questionnaire which measures adult attachment across multiple contexts, namely the
relationship with mother, father, romantic partner, and best friend. The ECR-RS had
been adapted from the experiences in close relationships questionnaire (ECR)
developed by Brennan, Clark and Shaver (1998). It consists of 9 items across two
subscales: an anxiety subscale and an avoidance subscale. The anxiety subscale consists
of 3 items assessing the extent to which an individual is concerned the specified other
may reject them (e.g., “I often worry that this person doesn’t really care for me.”), and
the avoidance subscale consists of 6 items assessing how individuals regulate their
attachment related behaviours (e.g., “I usually discuss my problems and concerns with
others.”), each rated on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to
7 (strongly agree). Scores on the anxiety dimension can range from 3 to 21, with higher
scores indicating high attachment related anxiety. Scores on the avoidance dimension
can range from 6 to 42, with higher scores indicating high attachment related avoidance.
A total score for the anxiety and avoidance subscales can be calculated by averaging
scores on each scale separately across the four targets (mother, father, partner and best
friend). A general attachment score can also be calculated by summing the average
score on each scale across targets (mother, father, romantic partner and best friend).
There are no clinical cut-offs for this measure. The internal consistency of both the
anxiety and avoidance subscales has proven to be highly reliable (all as’ = > .80) for

20
each of the four contexts separately, as well as across the four contexts (overall anxiety/
avoidance score) (Fraley et al., 2011a). The test-retest reliability has proven to be
adequate for two domains, the parental (a = .80) and romantic (a = .65) domain, for
each subscale (Fraley, Vicary, Brumbaugh, & Roisman, 2011b). There are no properties
available for the other two domains. As Fraley et al. (2011a) described, both subscales
have shown to be only modestly correlated. Participants in this study were presented
with a Dutch version of the ECR-RS, which was translated through backward-forward
translation.
Experiencing of self scale (EOSS) (Parker, Beitz, & Kohlenberg, 1996). The
experiencing of self scale is a self-report questionnaire that measures the influence of
others on the experience of self. The EOSS scale is comprised of 20 items across four
subscales, each consisting of five items. Participants are presented with self-experience
statements referring to different types of self-experiences (e.g., attitude, feelings), and
are asked to indicate the influence of others along two dimensions that are combined
across: type (casual acquaintance or close relationship) and proximity (present or
absent). These four subscales represent an increasing salience of others on the
experience of self, ranging from least to most salient: casual acquaintances-absent (CA-
A, e.g. “My attitudes are influenced by casual acquaintances when I am alone”), casual
acquaintances-present (CA-P, e.g. “My feelings are influenced by casual acquaintances
when I am with them”), close relationships-absent (CR-A, e.g., “My actions are
influenced by close relationships when I am alone), close relationships-present (CR-P,
e.g. “My wants are influenced by close relationships when I am with them). All items
are rated on a seven-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (never true) to 7 (always true).
Scores per dimension can range from 5 to 35, with low scores indicating low influence
of others over the experience of self. And high scores indicating a greater influence of
others over the experience of self. There are no clinical cut-offs for this measure. Both
the EOS total score as well as the four subscales have shown to have high internal
consistency (Total a = .91, CA-A a = .87, CA-P a =.83, CR-A a = .93, CR-P a = .88)
(Kanter, Parker, & Kohlenberg, 2001). Participants in this study were presented with a
Dutch version of the ECR-RS, that was translated through backward-forward
translation.

21
 Inclusion of the other in the self scale (IOS; Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992).
The inclusion of other in the self scale is a pictorial measure of relational
interconnectedness with specified others. It consists of a single item on which
participants are asked to choose one of seven Venn diagrams that depicts two circles
which represent the level of closeness between oneself (diverging overlap) and
“someone who they have a significant relation to, such as their best friend” or “someone
who they have no significant relation to, such as other people generally”. A separate
score is calculated for each subscale (best friend and other people generally) and can
range from 1 (no overlap) to 7 (almost completely overlapping). A low score on score
on this scale indicates a low accordance with the specified other, while a higher score
indicates a high accordance with the specified other. There are no clinical cut-offs for
this measure. The IOS has shown to have adequate alternate-form (a = .93) and test-
retest reliability (r = .83) (Aron et al., 1992). It has also shown to have significant
convergent validity, however, correlations with similar measures were low to moderate
(Aron et al., 1992). Although, a more recent study conducted by Gächter, Starmer and
Tufano (2015) found it to be highly correlated with related measures such as the
Relational Closeness Index across three studies. Participants in this study were
presented with a Dutch version of the ECR-RS, which was translated through
backward-forward translation.
Feelings about self thermometer (Vahey, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes,
& Stewart, 2009). The feelings about self thermometer is a subjective measure of self-
esteem which has been adapted from Greenwald and Farnham (2000). The feelings
about self thermometer consists of a single item. Participants are asked to indicate on a
horizontal thermometer how warmly they feel towards themselves, ranging from 0
(cold) to 100 (warm) on a continuous scale with balanced intervals of ten. Lower scores
indicate that one feels generally cold towards themselves, while higher scores on this
measure indicates that one feels warm or positive toward themselves. There are no
clinical cut-offs for this measure, nor a standardized version. Therefore, there are little
to no psychometric properties available. Although, as indicated by Vahey et al. (2009)
and Nelson (2008), research supports their utility, as well as the moderate to high
convergent validity with self-report measures, such as the Rosenberg Self-esteem scale
(r = .74, Greenwald & Farnham, 2000; r = .68, Karpinski, 2004). Participants in this

22
study were presented with a Dutch version of the ECR-RS, which was translated
through backward-forward translation.

Procedure
The experiment was completed on an individual basis in separate, sound-proof
test rooms at the research facility of the Department of Experimental, Clinical, and
Health Psychology at Ghent University. Participants were recruited through random
sampling from the Ghent University participant pool. Participants could not have
participated in experiments using the same/ an associated protocol to eliminate practice
effects. Both studies were conducted by female researchers, and the procedure was
automated to minimize influence caused by the experimenter (the first study was carried
out by L. Van Raemdonck and the second added study by D. Kavanagh). Informed
consent was obtained from all participants. Each participant was presented with the self-
focused and the other-focused IRAPs, of which the order was counterbalanced across
participants (was done manually by the researcher through the use of a counter-
balancing sheet). Finally, participants completed the self-report measures presented in
the following order: CAPE, PFI, ECR-RS, IOS, EOS, and self thermometer.
Self-focused NL-IRAP. The self-focused IRAP comprised a minimum of one
(i.e., one consistent and one inconsistent block) and a maximum of eight pairs of
practice blocks. Followed by three pairs of test blocks (i.e., six test blocks in total). On
each trial, a self-related statement was presented in the middle of the screen (e.g.,
“Getting a fine makes me angry”, see Table 1), with two response options (‘yes’ and
‘no’) displayed at the bottom left- and right-hand corner of the screen. After a brief
introduction of the task (see Appendix 1) in which the importance of responding both
accurate and fast was stressed. The self-focused IRAP commenced with the practice
blocks. Participants were instructed to work out the setup of the task based on the
provided trial feedback. During each trial, participants received feedback on the
computer screen on their relative accuracy and median latency levels as well as
additional feedback by the researcher if necessary (see Appendix 1). If participants did
not meet the set trial-type criteria, which are described subsequently, before completing
a maximum of eight practice blocks, the experiment would be terminated to minimize
practice-effects.

23
 Participants were required to respond to each statement with either ‘yes’ or ‘no’
by using either the “d” key corresponding with the response option presented at the
bottom left of the screen or the “k” key corresponding with the response option
presented at the bottom right. The position of the response options (i.e., ‘yes’ and ‘no’)
alternated across trials in a quasi-random order to ensure participants were responding
to the actual content rather than simply matching response options and their orientation.
Hence, the response options were never presented in the same position (i.e., ‘yes’
presented on the left) for more than three consecutive trials. Between selecting a correct
response and presenting the next trial within each block, an inter-trial interval of 400 ms
occurred. When participants answered incorrectly a red ‘X’ would appear on the screen
along with the statements. In order to move on to the next trial, participants were
required to select the correct response. The pattern of trial presentation followed this
model for all 32 trials comprising a block, along with corrective feedback on each trial
(i.e., a red ‘X’ when answering incorrectly). Trials within a block were presented in a
quasi-random order, and each statement was presented twice in each block. Participants
always commenced with a consistent block which required a response coherent with the
experimentally established history/ provided feedback, more precisely positive events
produce positive reactions and negative events produce negative reactions (i.e.,
Positive-Positive/yes, Negative-Negative/yes, Positive-Negative/no, Negative-
Positive/no). After which an inconsistent block followed requiring an opposing
response which was indicated by a standardized instruction (“The previously correct
and incorrect answers have now been reversed”) presented at the beginning of each
inconsistent block. More precisely, positive events produce negative reactions and
negative events produce positive reactions (i.e., Positive-Positive/no, Negative-
Negative/no, Positive-Negative/yes, Negative-Positive/yes). After each block
participants were presented with feedback on their accuracy and speed during that
specific block presented on the computer screen.
After each block of trials, the IRAP program provided feedback on participants’
accuracy and median latency during that block. In contrast to many previous IRAP
studies the current study set the required criteria on trial-type level rather than block
level. Their accuracy level reflected the percentage of correctly emitted first responses
(required no correction). Participants needed to achieve an average accuracy of

24
minimum 75% on each trial-type (i.e., a minimum of 2 errors were allowed per trial
type). The average latency was calculated by averaging the interval between presenting
the statement and the first correctly emitted response across all 32 trials within a block.
Participants also needed to achieve a maximum median latency of maximum 5000 ms
on each trial-type. These criteria were based on previous studies using this procedure
(Kavanagh et al., in press). After participants met the set trial-type criteria (latency of
<= 5,000 and accuracy level of >= 75%) on either pair of practice blocks, they
immediately moved on to the first pair of test blocks. Though, there were no accuracy or
latency requirements in order to proceed to the following test blocks. The IRAP
program continuously provided participants with feedback on their performance at the
end of each block, to maintain accurate and fast responding.
Other-focused NL-IRAP. Before completing this IRAP, participants were first
asked to name someone they consider being close to yet who they perceive to have a
personality that is very different from theirs. This person’s first name was then inputted
in the NL-IRAP program by the researcher. Again, followed by a brief instruction (see
Appendix 1) to stress responding both accurate and fast. All aspects of the format of the
other-focused IRAP were identical to the self-focused IRAP, but with statements
regarding the specified, different other, rather than statements regarding self (e.g.,
“Getting a fine makes Lisa angry.”).
Self-report questionnaires. After completing the IRAPs, participants were
asked to complete the six self-report measures in the following order: CAPE, PFI, ECR-
RS, EOSS, IOS, and the feelings about self thermometer.

Results

The Results section is divided into three sections. The first section presents the
data and analyses from the two NL-IRAPs. The initial set of analyses that were
conducted revealed an interaction effect that approached significance, so in order to
determine if the interaction effect was relatively robust, additional data that had been
collected by another researcher, but using the same IRAPs, were added to the current
data set (details presented below). The remaining analyses were then conducted with the
combined data sets. The second section presents the data from the self-report

25
questionnaires; and the third section presents a set of correlational analyses between the
NL-IRAPs and the questionnaires.

IRAP Data
Data preparation and preliminary analyses. Thirty-two participants
completed the study, but one participant was excluded after failing to meet the trial-type
criteria (see below), and one participant was excluded due to software failure during the
Other-focused NL-IRAP. The final sample consisted of 22 females and 8 males (N =
30) and ages ranged from 17 to 32 years (M = 21,3). All aspects of data processing for
the IRAPs adhered to standard conventions (e.g., Nicholson & Barnes-Holmes, 2012),
with one modification. Specifically, all participants were required to meet pre-
determined performance criteria, which involved maintaining a median latency of
<=5,000 and an accuracy level of >= 75% correct across each of the trial types of the
test blocks. These stricter performance criteria are consistent with a general strategy that
was being employed within the research group within which the current study was
conducted.
The primary focus of the analyses conducted on the IRAP data involved
comparing within and between the two IRAPs. As such, effects for each of the four
trial-types for each of the two IRAPs were calculated, the results of which are presented
in Figure 2. Specifically, the IRAP latency data were converted into D-scores using a
standardized D algorithm for transforming the difference in response latencies between
consistent and inconsistent test blocks (see Appendix 2 for all steps in this procedure).
We used the D algorithm as formulated by Greenwald Nosek and Banaji (2003), which
as described by Hussey, Thompson, McEnteggart, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes and
(2015b) is used in most IRAP studies (e.g., Vahey et al., 2015). Following this data
transformation, positive scores indicated that during history-consistent blocks
participants responded ‘yes’ more quickly than ‘no’ during Positive-Positive and
Negative-Negative trial-types; and responded ‘no’ more quickly than ‘yes’ during
Positive-Negative and Negative-Positive trial-types. Negative DIRAP-scores indicated the
opposite pattern (e.g. responding ‘no’ more quickly than ‘yes’ during Positive-Positive
or Negative-Negative trial-types).

26
 Descriptive analyses. As illustrated in Figure 2, both IRAP’s produced positive
DIRAP-scores across each of the four trial-types, although the effects for the Negative-
Positive trial-type were close to zero. The size of the effects was similar across the two
IRAPs for three of the trial-types but differed dramatically for the Positive-Negative
trial-type, with a relatively large effect for the self-focused IRAP and a relatively weak
effect for the other-focused IRAP. In general, therefore, both IRAPs yielded effects that
were consistent with what might be predicted based on conventional assumptions,
except for the very weak effects observed for the Negative-Positive trial-type. The
relatively weak effect for the Positive-Negative trial-type for the other-focused IRAP
could also be seen as somewhat unexpected.

0.35
*
0.3
* * *
0.25
*
Mean DIRAP-scores

0.2
0.15
Self-focused
0.1
Other-focused
0.05
0

-0.05
Positive Event - Positive Event- Negative Event- Negative Event-
Positive Reaction Negative Reaction Positive Reaction Negative Reaction
Trial type

Figure 2. Mean DIRAP-scores on the self-focused NL-IRAP trial types and the other-
focused trial types for the single study (N=30). Positive DIRAP-scores indicate a
tendency towards history consistent responding and negative DIRAP-scores indicate
scores indicate a tendency towards history-inconsistent responding.
*Specifies mean DIRAP-scores that differ significantly from zero.

Statistical analyses. The data were subjected to a repeated measures 2 (self

versus other IRAP) x 2 (Positive versus Negative Event) x 2 (Positive versus Negative
Reaction) analysis of variance (ANOVA). The critical three-way interaction approached
significance [F(1,29) = 3.658, p = .066, !"# = 0.11], which appears to be driven largely
by the dramatic difference between the two IRAPs for the Positive event-Negative
reaction trial-type. Eight one-sample t-tests (see Table 3) indicated that three of the four

27
trial-types for the self-focused IRAP (Positive-Positive: M = .16, SD =.24, t(29) =
3.696, p <.001; Positive-Negative: M = .17, SD = .31, t(29) = 3.026, p < .05; Negative-
Negative: M = .19, SD = .27, t(29) = 3.806, p < .001) differed significantly from zero
(all ps < .05), whereas this was the case for only two of the trial-types for the other-
focused IRAP (ps < .01) (Positive-Positive: M = .19, SD = .26, t(29) = 3.968, p < .001;
Negative-Negative: M = .23, SD = .37, t(29) = 3.370, p < .05); remaining ps > .61. The
trend towards significance for the three-way interaction, combined with the pattern of
significant and non-significant one-sample t-tests, suggests that the self- and other-
focused IRAPs were differentially sensitive for only one particular trial-type (Positive
event- Negative reaction).

Table 3
One sample t-tests for the single study (self versus different other)

Trial-type Mean P

Self Positive Event-Positive Reaction .160 < .001*

Self Positive Event- Negative Reaction .173 <.05*

Self Negative Event- Positive Reaction .018 .678

Self Negative Event-Negative Reaction .188 < .001*

Other Positive Event-Positive Reaction .187 < .001*

Other Positive Event- Negative Reaction .029 .610

Other Negative Event- Positive Reaction .021 .662

Other Negative Event-Negative Reaction .227 <.05*

* Specifies significant p values (p < .05).

28
 On balance, it is important to recognize that the three-way interaction only
approached significance and therefore the effect should be interpreted with caution. In
order to determine if the effect was relatively robust it was decided to add data from a
closely related study that was conducted within the research group. The additional data
were taken from a study that was similar in all respects to the current study, except the
other-focused IRAP targeted an individual the participants disliked (rather than
someone who was simply different; see Appendix 1 for the instructions for this IRAP).
A total of 30 participants had completed this study and all of these data were simply
added to the existing data set and then the analyses were re-run once only, thereby
avoiding potential “p-hacking” issues.
The data were subjected to a mixed four-way 2x2x2x2 ANOVA with the three
same within-participant variables as specified previously, but with a single between-
participant variable (Liked versus Disliked other) added to the analysis. The critical
three-way interaction was now significant, [F(1,58) = 5.224, p = .026, !"# = .08];
however, the four-way interaction, with Liked versus Disliked other was not [F(1,58) =
.002, p = .963, !"# = 3.74-05]. Thus, the original three-way interaction appeared to be
robust, with little if any suggestion that it was moderated by whether or not participants
liked or disliked the individual targeted by the other-focused IRAP. To further examine
which effect drove this three-way interaction, we conducted four separate paired t-tests
(see Table 4). Results were in line with our previous findings indicating the three-way
interaction was driven by the difference between Self (M = .16, SD = .32) and Other (M
= .03, SD = .33) on the Positive event-Negative reaction trial-type (t(59) = 2.195, p <
.05); none of the other paired t-tests were significant (ps >.12) . Eight one-sample t-tests
(see Table 5) yielded the same pattern of significant versus non-significant effects for
both IRAPs, as was observed for the original data set. Again, three of the four trial-
types for the self-focused IRAP (Positive-Positive: M = .18, SD =.30, t(59) = 4.713, p
<.001; Positive-Negative: M = .16, SD = .32, t(59) = 3.924, p < .001; Negative-
Negative: M = .18, SD = .27, t(59) = 5.233, p < .001) differed significantly from zero
(all ps < .05), whereas this was the case for only two of the trial-types for the other-
focused IRAP (ps < .01) (Positive-Positive: M = .16, SD =.30, t(59) = 4.144, p <.001;
Negative-Negative: M = .20 SD = .34, t(59) = 4.538, p < .001); remaining ps > .20. A
graphical representation of the three-way interaction from the combined sample of 60

29
participants is presented in Figure 3; the pattern of effects is broadly similar to those
obtained from the original sample of 30 participants, with the most substantive
difference between the two IRAPs being observed for the Positive-Negative trial-type.
Given that a clearly significant interaction effect was only obtained from the combined
data set, all subsequent analyses of the questionnaire data, and the correlations, were
conducted using this final combined data set.

0.3
*
0.25 * * *
*
0.2

0.15
Mean DIRAP-scores

0.1

0.05 Self-focused
Other-focused
0

-0.05

-0.1

-0.15
Positive Event - Positive Event- Negative Event- Negative Event-
Positive Reaction Negative Reaction Positive Reaction Negative Reaction
Trial type

Figure 3. Mean DIRAP-scores on the self-focused NL-IRAP trial-types and specified,

different other-focused trial-types for the combined sample (N=60). Positive DIRAP-
scores indicate a tendency towards history consistent responding and negative DIRAP-
scores indicate scores indicate a tendency towards history-inconsistent responding.
*Specifies mean DIRAP-scores that differ significantly from zero.

30
 Table 4
Paired t-tests for the combined sample

Trial-type Mean Difference P

Self Positive Event-Positive Reaction/

.019 .717
Other Positive Event–Positive Reaction
Self Positive Event- Negative Reaction/
.132 <.05*
Other Positive Event-Negative Reaction
Self Negative Event- Positive Reaction/
.080 .119
Other Negative Event-Positive Reaction
Self Negative Event-Negative Reaction/
-.019 .726
Other Negative Event- Negative Reaction
* Specifies significant p values.

Table 5
One sample t-tests for the combined study (self versus different and disliked other)

Trial-type Mean P

Self Positive Event-Positive Reaction .179 < .001*

Self Positive Event- Negative Reaction .164 < .001*

Self Negative Event- Positive Reaction .029 .396

Self Negative Event-Negative Reaction .181 < .001*

Other Positive Event-Positive Reaction .160 < .001*

Other Positive Event- Negative Reaction .032 .458

Other Negative Event- Positive Reaction -.051 .197

Other Negative Event-Negative Reaction .199 < .001*

* Specifies significant p values (p < .05).

31
Questionnaire Data
A summary of the means and standard deviations of each questionnaire and
relevant subscales is provided in table 6. Given that there are no clinical cut-offs for
most questionnaires we will be interpreting them in terms of how high or low the scores
are relative to the mid-range/mean. The weighted overall and subscale scores on the
CAPE, ranging from 1.54 to 2.60, were relatively low compared to a maximum
weighted score of 4.00, thus indicating a low to average presence of psychotic-like
symptoms in the current study sample.
The mean overall PFI score in this sample was relatively high at 360.62 (/492),
indicating high psychological flexibility.
The ECR-RS scores for both the avoidance and anxiety subscales ranged from
11.55 to 23.55 (/42) for the former, and from 5.47 to 9.77 (/21) for the latter. These data
indicate participants’ scores were low to average for both avoidant and anxious
attachment-related behaviours.
The mean overall EOSS score of 75.77 was at the mid-way point (/140),
indicating average control by others over the experience of self. The EOSS subscale
scores ranged from 11.85 to 25.2 (/35), indicating low to average control by others over
the experience of self. Scores for casual acquaintances and close relationships that were
present were higher than for relations that were absent (casual acquaintances: 17.75 vs
25.2; close relationships: 11.85 vs 20.97). Thus, others that were present seemed to have
greater impact on participants’ feelings, wants, opinions, attitudes, and actions than
absent others.
Finally, the IOS scores for best friend at 4.77 were around mid-way point (/7),
while the scores for other people (2.92) were at the lower end. The higher scores for
best friend imply a closer relationship with respect to other people.
In line with previous study samples (see Vahey et al., 2009), the mean score on
the Feelings toward Self Thermometer was situated in the mid-range (48.27/100),
indicating that on average participants did not feel particularly cold, nor warm towards
themselves.
Overall, therefore, and consistent with the use of a non-clinical sample, no
unexpected or atypical findings emerged from the questionnaires.

32
Table 6
Descriptive statistics for the questionnaires for the combined sample (N = 60)
Questionnaire M SD

CAPE (weighted scores)

Overall Frequency 1.81 .36
Frequency of Positive Symptoms 1.54 .36
Frequency of Negative Symptoms 1.98 .49
Frequency of Depressive Symptoms 2.18 .54
Overall Distress 2.19 .46
Distress associated with Positive Symptoms 1.77 .51
Distress associated with Negative Symptoms 2.07 .55

Distress associated with Depressive 2.60 .69

Symptoms
Psychological Flexibility Index (PFI) 360.62 24.42
ECR-RS
Attachment-related avoidance (Mother) 16.98 8.41
Attachment-related anxiety (Mother) 5.47 3.37
Attachment-related avoidance (Father) 23.55 9.93
Attachment-related anxiety (Father) 7.23 5.11
Attachment-related avoidance (Partner) 11.55 4.91
Attachment-related anxiety (Partner) 9.77 4.98
Attachment-related avoidance (Best Friend) 12.92 5.59
Attachment-related anxiety (Best Friend) 6.92 4.18
EOSS
Overall EOSS 75.77 14.91
Casual Acquaintances-absent 17.75 5.89
Casual Acquaintances-present 25.2 3.91
Close relationships-absent 11.85 6.04
Close relationships – present 20.97 6.27
IOS
Best Friend 4.77 1.36
Other people 2.92 1.15
Feelings about Self Thermometer 48.27 26.45
Note. None of the questionnaires and their subscales have fixed clinical cut-offs. All
CAPE subscales have a maximum weighted score of 4.00. The PFI has a maximum score
of 492. All of the ECR-RS attachment related avoidance subscales have a maximum score
of 42. The maximum score for all the Attachment related anxiety subscales is 21. The
EOSS has a maximum score of 140 for the overall score, and a maximum score of 35 for
each subscale. Both IOS scales have a maximum score of 7. Finally, the Feelings about
Self Thermometer has a maximum score of 100.

Correlations between IRAP Scores and Self-Report Measures

A range of correlational matrices were calculated to explore the relationships
between performance on the self and other IRAPs and the self-report measures. The

33
results of these correlational analyses are presented across Appendix 3 to 8, with the
correlational analyses divided according to the six different self-report measures. The
correlational analyses involved five correlations for each IRAP, one correlation for the
overall score and four correlations for each of the trial-type scores for each IRAP (i.e., a
total of 10 correlations across the two IRAPs (self and other). A total of 21 correlations
were calculated across the six self-report measures for each of the IRAP performance
measures. In presenting the results of the correlational analyses, the r value for each
correlational is presented in the Tables. Correlations that were significant at p < .05
(without correction) and at p < .002 (with Bonferroni correction) are presented. The
correction involved dividing .05 by 21 because each IRAP performance score was
correlated with 21 different self-report measures.
The general strategy that was adopted in reporting on and discussing these
correlational analyses involved focusing on those correlations that were significant at p
< .002 and/or clustered together for a particular IRAP trial-type and specific self-report
measure. The clearest example of such clustering (i.e. five out of the eight correlations
were significant at the .05 level) may be observed in Table 6 for the correlations
between the CAPE and Negative-Negative trial-type for the Other-focused IRAP (see
Appendix 3). Interestingly, no correlations between this trial-type and the Cape scores
were recorded for the Self-focused IRAP. The correlational analyses thus suggest that
increased levels of psychological suffering, as a result of psychotic-like symptoms, was
associated with a reduction in confirming that others react negatively to negative events
in their lives.
The only other evidence of a clustering of significant correlations involving a
highly significant effect was with the ECR-RS and the Positive-Negative trial-types and
the Self-Focused IRAP (see Appendix 5). Specifically, the results suggest that increased
levels of psychological suffering in attachment-related self-reports were associated with
a reduction in denying that positive events produce negative reactions (with regard to
self).
Although a number of other significant correlations were recorded across the six
Tables, these were all at the .05 level with no evidence of clustering on a particular trial-
type for those measures that involved multiple subscales.

34
 Discussion

The general aim of the research reported in the current thesis was to explore the
extent to which a NL-IRAP may be sensitive to perspective-taking in terms of how self
versus others react to positive versus negative events. Another aim was to examine
whether IRAP performances related to self-report measures assessing clinical concepts
often linked to perspective-taking in general, such as self-warmth and psychotic
symptoms. A potentially interesting interaction effect emerged when analysing the
original data set that was collected by the author of the current research. When the data
were combined with a data set that was collected by a different researcher, the original
pattern of effects remained largely unchanged, and thus the analyses and subsequent
discussion will focus on the combined data set.

Discussion of the Current Findings

The main finding arising from a comparison of the two IRAPs (self versus other)
was the difference on the positive-negative trial-type. Specifically, participants showed
a relatively strong bias towards denying that the self reacted negatively to positive
events, but this bias was absent for others. This difference indicates that the two IRAPs,
as expected based on the findings of Kavanagh et al. (2018), were tapping into separate
reactions to self versus others, at least with regard to one trial-type. At the current time
it remains unclear why this trial-type yielded a clear difference, but one possible
interpretation is as follows. Denying that you react negatively to positive events may be
relatively easy with regard to self (because you are very familiar with your own
reactions in this regard). With respect to others, however, participants may be less
certain. For example, some individuals, particularly those who are deemed to be
different or disliked relative to self, might be seen as generally negative and “never
happy,” even when good things happen to them. Or to put it another way, if you
consider yourself to be a generally positive and happy individual, others who are
deemed to be different/disliked might be seen as more negative relative to you (e.g.,
Chen et al., 2014; Suls, Lemos, & Stewart, 2002; Trafimow, Armendariz, & Madson,
2004; Zuckerman & O’Loughlin, 2006).
If the foregoing interpretation is correct how might we explain the absence of
any clear differences for the other three trial-types? For the positive-positive and

35
negative-negative trial-types, perhaps these trial-types failed to evoke relatively strong
reactions to self versus other because they required responses that either confirmed or
disconfirmed ‘common-sense’ reactions. Or in other words, the IRAPs simply asked the
participants to relate positive to positive and negative to negative, and the psychological
impact of self versus other was greatly diminished for these trial-types. But how might
we interpret the relatively weak effects obtained for both the self and other IRAPs on
the Negative-Positive trial-type? Similar to the Positive-Negative trial-type, it may have
been more difficult to respond in terms of basic common-sense, and thus it produced far
weaker effects. On balance, the trial-type could be interpreted as asking how resilient
you and others are to negative events. Or in other words, how well do you and others
cope when negative events occur in your lives. Given that reacting positively to
negative events may be seen as relatively difficult for everyone (i.e., self and others),
any difference between self and other IRAPs might be expected. On balance, it remains
unclear why the effect was relatively weak for both IRAPs (why did participants find it
difficult to simply deny that self and others tend to react positively to negative events?).
At this point, the foregoing interpretations could be seen as excessively
speculative and post-hoc, and thus it may be wise to consider an alternative perhaps
simpler interpretation of the IRAP effects. One possibility is to use a recently proposed
model of IRAP performances that might be relevant. The model was developed to
account for differential arbitrarily applicable relational responding effects (DAARRE)
that are often observed in IRAP performances. In contrast to an earlier model of IRAP
effects (see Barnes-Holmes et al., 2010), the DAARRE model focuses on both the
relationship between each element within a trial-type (e.g., between the event and the
reaction in the current research), and also on the psychological functions of the
individual elements, including the response options (i.e., ‘yes’ and ‘no’ in the current
study). Within the DAARRE model, the relationship between the elements (event-
reaction) is referred to as a “Crel” property and the psychological functions of the
individual elements is referred to as a “Cfunc” property. The reader should note that the
response options (yes and no) also are seen as possessing “Cfunc” properties; in the
current case ‘yes’ would have a generally positive “Cfunc” property and ‘no’ would
have a generally negative “Cfunc” property. A detailed description of the model and
how it has been used to interpret a range of IRAP effects that have been reported in the

36
recent literature is not necessary here (see, Finn, Barnes-Holmes & McEnteggart, 2018,
for more detail), but the basic model as applied to the current findings is described
subsequently.
According to the DAARRE model, when participants complete an IRAP their
responses will be influenced to a greater or lesser degree by the relations that are
presented within each trial-type and by the extent to which each of the elements within
the trial-type cohere with each other (e.g., in the current study, self with positive, self
with negative, yes with positive, no with positive and so on). Thus, for example, when
responding on the positive-positive or the negative-negative trial-types in the current
study, the relationship between the events and the reactions would be highly coherent
(i.e., positive events usually produce positive reactions and negative events usually
produce negative reactions). In this case, therefore, the relationship between the event
and the reaction would be highly dominant in determining participants’ responses for
both self and other IRAPs. The patterns observed in the current research accord with
this interpretation in that they produced relatively strong tendencies to confirm highly
coherent relations (i.e., positive-positive and negative-negative).

Figure 4. Application of the basic DAARRE model. Implementing two types of stimulus
sets: the labels ‘Events’ (top) and the target stimuli ‘Reactions’ (bottom). Displayed at
the bottom there are two response options (‘Yes’ and ‘No’). The negative and positive
labels indicate the valence of each function (Cfunc): Crel (relational properties) and
Cfunc (functional properties).

37
 In turning to the Positive-Negative and Negative-Positive trial-types the relative
dominance of the relationship between the event and the reaction may be much reduced
(because they do not cohere). Given that the IRAPs targeted self or a different/disliked
other, the coherence between the positive or negative reaction (of self or other) could be
a dominating influence. Thus, when responding on the Positive-Negative trial-type,
denying negativity with regard to self would be relatively strong (at least for a
normative sample of participants); this response bias would be considerably weaker
with regard to others, particularly if they are defined as different/disliked. Again, this is
the pattern observed in the current research (i.e., participants showed a significant bias
for responding ‘no’ more quickly than ‘yes’ on the self-focused IRAP, but not on the
other-focused IRAP). In turning to the Negative-Positive trial-type, the reaction is
specified as positive and thus the bias for responding ‘no’ with regard to self would be
much reduced, and indeed this is the pattern observed on this trial-type. In fact, this is
the only trial-type that fails to produce a significant bias for both self and other.
Of course, the foregoing interpretation of the current findings remain post-hoc,
and somewhat speculative, but at least they are consistent with a formal model of IRAP
performances, and thus there is some basis for future research to formulate specific
hypotheses that may be tested empirically. For example, if the two IRAPs targeted liked
versus disliked others, perhaps the difference observed on the Positive-Negative trial-
type would be much reduced or absent for the liked other IRAP (see Kavanagh, et al., in
press, for indirect evidence consistent with this prediction).

38
Figure 5. Application of the DAARRE model to the current research design using two
separate deictic NL-IRAPs. Implementing two types of stimulus sets: the labels ‘Events’
(top) and the target stimuli ‘Reactions’ (bottom). Displayed at the bottom there are two
response options (‘Yes’ and ‘No’). The negative and positive labels indicate the valence
of each function (Cfunc): Crel (relational properties) and Cfunc (functional properties).
The dotted arrow indicates the pull produced by possible contamination of the response
option.

In turning to the correlations obtained between the IRAP performances and the
self-report measures, two key clusters were identified. The clearest of these was
recorded between the Negative-Negative trial-type and the CAPE, but only for the
other-focused IRAP. In accordance with our expectations there appeared to be several,
though few, significant relations between performance on the deictic IRAPs and the
occurrence of psychosis symptomatology in our non-clinical study sample. The
correlations were negative, and thus a reduced bias towards confirming that others react
negatively to negative events was associated with increased levels of self-reported
psychotic-like symptoms. In simple terms, it appears that as level of distress (in terms of
psychotic-like experiences) increases it becomes more difficult to judge the negative
reactions of others to negative events. This could be seen as largely consistent with the
literature on psychosis and its links with perspective-taking. That is, symptoms of
psychosis have been associated with impairments in the ability/ flexibility of
perspective-taking or deictic framing, such as social anhedonia (e.g. Vilardaga et al.,
2012; Villatte, et al., 2008,2010a). On balance, it remains unclear why performances on
the other trial-types (e.g. Positive-Negative) did not correlate with the CAPE. One
possibility is that the relative dominance of the control by Crel versus Cfunc properties
(according to the DAARRE model) differed across individuals who were high versus
low in distress. That is, perhaps those high in distress were dominated more by Cfunc
properties and as such found it more difficult to confirm that others were negative. Or to

39
put it more simply, “I am damaged, but others are not.” To further explore these
correlations, it may be useful to consider employing a clinical sample to determine if
they produce different trial-type patterns on IRAPs similar to those employed in the
current study.
Another, less apparent cluster appeared for the Positive-Negative trial-type and
the ECR-RS questionnaire assessing attachment related behaviours, but only for the
self-focused IRAP. The correlations were again negative, and thus a reduced bias
towards denying that others react negatively to positive events was associated with
increased levels of self-reported attachment related avoidant/anxious behaviours. In
simple terms, it appears that as psychological suffering in attachment-related self-
reports increases, individuals have more difficulty denying that the self reacts in a
negative manner to positive things. If the DAARRE model offered previously is correct,
then this interpretation could be simplified as problems in attachment are associated
with self-negative bias (e.g., Dewitte, De Houwer, Buysse, 2008; Passanisi, Gervasi,
Madonia, Guzzo, & Greco, 2015; Wearden, Peters, Berry, Barrowclough, & Liversidge,
2008). Once again, it may be useful for future research to pursue this tentative
interpretation with a clinical sample.

Clinical and Theoretical Implications

In reflecting upon the findings reported in the current thesis and those reported
by Kavanagh, et al. (in press), it is interesting to note that in Experiments 1-4 there was
no evidence of a clear difference between the self and other IRAP performances for the
positive-negative trial-type. The critical point here is that in those first four
Experiments, the other was either unspecified or specified as liked. It appears therefore
that only when the specified other is defined as dissimilar or disliked do you obtain
clear evidence of different response patterns across the self-focused and other-focused
IRAPs. Although this finding will need to be replicated in future studies it does indicate
that the IRAPs employed here, and in similar studies, may be sensitive to the diverging
boundaries between self and other, and may thus prove useful in clinical research
targeting perspective-taking in general.
At a more abstract or theoretical level, the current research may have important
implications for the on-going development of the DAARRE model. For example, in

40
attempting to explain some of the current findings the model was used in a post-hoc
fashion to interpret the idiosyncratic (trial-type) IRAP effects, and the correlations
between those effects and responses on the employed self-report measures. In future
studies it may prove useful to use the model to predict specific response biases on
particular IRAPs (e.g., people low on self-esteem may show a bias towards responding
‘yes’ on a self-focused Positive-Negative trial type and a bias towards responding ‘no’
on a self-focused Negative-Positive trial type). Ideally, the DAARRE model could be
used to predict or even guide development of effective interventions in treatment
studies, focused on ameliorating various forms of psychological suffering. For example,
would an intervention designed to increase self-worth or self-esteem reduce a bias
towards responding ‘no’ on a self-focused Negative-Positive trial-type? At the present
time there are very few studies that have attempted to use the IRAP to train specific
biases in this manner, but preliminary work in this area shows some promise (see
Murphy, Lyons, Kelly, Barnes-Holmes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2019, who used the IRAP to
train relational responding with regards to coordination and distinction relations in
children with autism spectrum disorder; see Murphy & Barnes-Holmes, 2017 for a
review).

Limitations and Future Directions

Once again, it is important to emphasize the exploratory nature of the current
research, and thus more direct tests of the NL-IRAP in the domain of perspective taking
are needed. Indeed, a number of issues would seem to require direct attention in moving
forward. First, a clear distinction between a different (liked) versus disliked other may
be one that was not particularly salient in the current study (i.e., there was little
evidence that this variable impacted IRAP performances differentially across the two
data sets that were analysed in the current thesis). Perhaps future research could attempt
to increase the salience of this variable by asking participants to engage actively with
thinking about the distinction between individuals who are deemed to be different but
liked versus those who are different but disliked. These more fine-grained ways of
processing this distinction may prove fruitful in explaining perspective-taking as a
dimensional concept, thus contrasting with some of the currently available categorical
views, which view perspective taking abilities as either present or absent.

41
 Second, the procedures employed in the current study provide limited insight
into the potential strategies employed during exposure to the IRAP. As illustrated by the
post-hoc theorizing presented above in terms of the DAARRE model, the performance
on an IRAP may be interpreted in multiple ways. For example, for some participants it
may be that Crel control dominants but for other Cfunc properties dominate, and to
complicate matters even more the relative dominance of these properties may differ
across trial-types. It will be important in future studies, therefore, that specific
predictions are made concerning what particular properties are likely to dominate for
particular types of participants and perhaps for particular trial-types.
Third, an observation made by the researcher conducting the current study was
that some participants remarked that some of the statements presented in the IRAP were
somewhat extreme (e.g., “If my enemy dies I am relieved.”), and thus perhaps hindered
relatively rapid responding compared to less extreme statements (e.g., “Failing an exam
is disappointing.”). Future studies using statements similar to those employed in the
current study should perhaps ensure that all statements are not deemed particularly
extreme and should be related to everyday experience.
Finally, the current study sample was a random convenience sample mainly
comprising college students of Ghent University. Although some researchers have
pointed out that this age group is most vulnerable to the emergence of psychosis
symptoms (see e.g., McGrath et al., 2016; Vilardaga et al. 2012), the current research
employed a non-clinical sample and therefore does not allow any decisive conclusions
to be made in terms of the clinical relevance of the findings. As previously mentioned,
therefore, future studies could consider employing deictic IRAPs in a sample of
individuals with a diagnosis of a psychosis spectrum disorder.

42
 Conclusion

In closing, the current study provides new insights into IRAP research on
perspective-taking in adults, although definitive conclusions arising from the findings
remain limited. In contrast to other studies, the current research involved implementing
two separate NL-IRAPs (self and other), which presented statements targeting
“genuine” perspective-taking, rather than simple deictic relating (e.g., Barbero-Rubio et
al., 2016 and Kavanagh, et al., 2018). The current research was also unique in
manipulating interpersonal boundaries in terms of examining perspective-taking with
regard to whether the “other” was simply different or disliked. Although clear
differences for this variable did not emerge, it may be important for future studies to
attempt to increase the salience of this variable to determine if it could in fact impact
upon IRAP performances. Overall, therefore, the current study should be seen as largely
exploratory in terms of laying the groundwork upon which future studies using the NL-
IRAP may build, as a potential measure of perspective-taking in both non-clinical and
clinical populations.

43
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 Appendix 1
Instructions Self- and Other-NL-IRAP.
Self-NL-IRAP.
“In the following task you will be
required to respond to some statements,
these statements will be about you. Even
though, these statements concern you, the
computer will tell you what is correct and
what is not. You will have to either
conform (‘yes’) or disconfirm (‘no’) the
statement by pressing ‘d’ or ‘k’, be aware
that the position of ‘yes’ and ‘no’ may
change. Try to be as accurate and fast as
you can. First you will receive a few
practice trials to make you familiar with
the task and then you will move on to the
test trials.”
Inconsistent blocks (only for the first
inconsistent block): “Now correct and
incorrect are reversed. What was correct
before is now incorrect, and what was
incorrect before is now correct.”
57
Other-NL-IRAP.
“If you could think about someone you
now well but consider to be completely
different from you. As if your
personalities are from different planets.
Then you can write down their name.”
“In the following task you will be
required to respond to some statements,
these statements will be about ‘X’. Even
though, these statements concern ‘X’, the
computer will tell you what is correct and
what is not. You will have to either
conform (‘yes’) or disconfirm (‘no’) the
statement by pressing ‘d’ or ‘k’, be aware
that the position of ‘yes’ and ‘no’ may
change. Try to be as accurate and fast as
you can. First you will receive a few
practice trials to make you familiar with
the task and then you will move on to the
test trials.”
Inconsistent blocks (only for the first
inconsistent block): “Now correct and
incorrect are reversed. What was correct
before is now incorrect, and what was
incorrect before is now correct.”
 In case their performance on either IRAP required additional feedback provided by
the researcher (below the test criteria or marginal performance).

Because they made too many mistakes: “If you start making too many mistakes it is
sometimes better to slow down a bit, the speed will come as you practice.”

Because they were too slow: “Try to respond as accurate and fast as you can.”
Note. ‘X’ indicates the specified other as defined by each participant individually.

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 Appendix 2

Explanation of the steps involved in calculating the DIRAP-scores for the current study
design, following the description of Hussy, Thompson, McEnteggart, Barnes-Holmes
and Barnes-Holmes (2015, p. 9)
Scoring

1. First there is a need to define the measurement unit. In accordance to previous

IRAP-studies, reaction times are usually defined as the time from stimulus-onset
until the first correctly emitted response.

2. Only data from the test-blocks is used.

3. To correct for ‘fast’ responding, all IRAP data for a participant were deleted if
10% of participants' response latencies on the test blocks were less than 300 ms.
4. To remove outliers, response latencies of more than 10,000 ms were deleted
for each trial-type.
5. DIRAP-scores were calculated for each trial-type (four trial-types) in each
separate block pair (six test blocks leading to a total of three block pairings),
using the following formula: D = (MB – MA)/ SDAB
Where;
MA = mean latencies block A,
MB = mean latencies block B,
SDAB = standard deviation of latencies in both blocks A and B
This included:
Calculating 24 mean latencies for each trial-type in each block.
Calculating 12 standard deviations for each trial-type across the different
pairs of test blocks (i.e., six test blocks leading to three pairs of test
blocks).
Calculating a difference score for each trial-type for each pairing of test
blocks (mean latency of a consistent versus an inconsistent block).

Processing

59
 6. Exclude all data for each participant that did not meet the set accuracy
(>=75%) and latency criteria (<= 5000 ms) during the test blocks. These mastery
criteria are set across each trial-type within the test blocks. Stating that when a
participant fails to meet these set criteria for one of the trial-types within a test
block all data for this participant is deleted.

7. DIRAP- scores for each trial-type (four trial-types) are then averaged across
block pairs.
e.g., Dpositive-positive = (Dpair1 + Dpair2 + Dpair3)/ 3
Note. The IRAP program used for this study (GO-IRAP v1.0) calculated D-scores
automatically performing steps 3 and 4. However, steps 1, 5, 6, and 7 were done
manually. 1Blocks A and B are defined by the responding contingencies within them
(e.g., in our example test block A = consistent block 1 vs. block B = inconsistent block
1) and do not refer to the order of presentation of the blocks.

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 Appendix 3

Correlations for the CAPE (Weighted scores)

Self Other

Overall Positive- Positive- Negative- Negative- Overall Positive- Positive- Negative- Negative-
Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative
Overall frequency -.127 .122 -.209 -.012 -.025 -.159 -.083 .036 -.178 -.251*
Overall distress -.236 -.061 -.135 -.173 .006 -.129 .147 .227 -.093 -.419**
Positive frequency -.075 .227 -.062 .092 .051 -.099 -.011 -.031 -.115 -.163
Depressive frequency -.149 -.078 -.176 -.078 -.087 -.211 -.106 .056 -.171 -.319*
Negative frequency -.111 .081 -.290* -.072 -.056 -.118 -.109 .078 -.169 -.191
Positive distress -.315* -.068 -.113 -.222 -.052 -.041 .200 .195 -.116 -.177
Depressive distress -.220 -.050 .054 -.265* .047 -.157 .090 .146 -.017 -.365*
Negative distress -.072 -.047 -.206 -.123 .041 -.051 .062 .116 -.041 -.386**
* Indicates significant p values (p < .05).
** Indicates significant p values after correcting for multiple testing (Bonferroni correction) (p < .002).

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 Appendix 4

Correlations for the PFI

Self Other

Overall Positive- Positive- Negative- Negative- Overall Positive- Positive- Negative- Negative-
Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative
Overall PFI -.124 .105 .032 -.096 -.142 -.289* -.201 -.190 -.004 -.309*
* Indicates significant p values (p < .05).
** Indicates significant p values after correcting for multiple testing (Bonferroni correction) (p < .002).

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 Appendix 5

Correlations for the ECR-RS

Self Other
Overall Positive- Positive- Negative- Negative- Overall Positive- Positive- Negative- Negative-
Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative
Attachment-related anxiety .036 .197 -.125 -.188 -.029 -.062 -.152 -.112 -.126 .101
(Mother)
Attachment-related -.120 .221 -.410** .036 -.160 -.094 -.058 -.125 -.161 -.152
avoidance (Mother)
Attachment-related anxiety .010 .015 -.064 -.160 .103 -.122 -.087 -.112 -.104 -.034
(Father)
Attachment-related -.046 -.007 -.016 .112 .044 -.120 .083 .025 -.197 -.179
avoidance (Father)
Attachment-related anxiety .124 .148 -.043 -.131 .311* -.059 -.039 -.090 .075 -.004
(Partner)
Attachment-related -.191 -.218 -.325* -.262* -.068 -.059 -.117 -.116 -.038 -.036
avoidance (Partner)
Attachment-related anxiety .065 .183 -.330* -.021 .016 -.039 -.101 -.064 .063 -.100
(Best -friend)
Attachment-related -.078 -.197 -.171 -.015 -.118 -.044 -.047 -.036 .132 -.313*
avoidance (Best friend)
* Indicates significant p values (p < .05).
** Indicates significant p values after correcting for multiple testing (Bonferroni correction) (p < .002).

63
 Appendix 6

Correlations for the EOSS

Self Other

Overall Positive- Positive- Negative- Negative- Overall Positive- Positive- Negative- Negative-
Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative
Overall EOSS -.198 .036 -.359* -.150 -.085 -.201 -.134 -.201 -.144 -.136
Casual -.106 .086 -.212 -.122 .160 -.143 -.170 -.249 .002 .052
Acquaintances-
absent
Casual -.082 .188 -.211 -.003 .012 -.053 .073 -.011 -.085 -.031
Acquaintances-
present
Close -.170 -.043 -.226 -.145 -.091 -.111 -.079 -.133 -.047 -.147
relationships-
absent
Close -.156 -.070 -.304* -.100 -.272* -.204 -.130 -.109 -.247 -.211
relationships –
present
* Indicates significant p values (p < .05).
** Indicates significant p values after correcting for multiple testing (Bonferroni correction) (p < .002).

64
 Appendix 7

Correlations for the IOS

Self Other

Overall Positive- Positive- Negative- Negative- Overall Positive- Positive- Negative- Negative-
Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative
Best friend -.014 .024 .008 .244 -.140 -.060 -.152 -.113 -.239 .063
Other people .094 -.002 .221 .310* -.107 -.103 -.071 -.131 -.068 -.119
* Indicates significant p values (p < .05).
** Indicates significant p values after correcting for multiple testing (Bonferroni correction) (p < .002).

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 Appendix 8

Correlations for the Feelings about Self Thermometer

Self Other

Overall Positive- Positive- Negative- Negative- Overall Positive- Positive- Negative- Negative-
Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative
Overall -.018 .035 -.146 .023 -.229 -.047 -.020 -.102 -.254* -.112
* Indicates significant p values (p < .05).
** Indicates significant p values after correcting for multiple testing (Bonferroni correction) (p < .002).

66