WDS Orel ‘43

Design and Campaign Notes

Dedicated to my wife Olga, and my daughter Lidia, I have stolen too many moments from
you because of battles in faraway places.

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Contents

Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 3
Design Notes ................................................................................................................................. 6
Scenario Design Notes ................................................................................................................ 11
Scenario Planning .................................................................................................................... 11
The Campaign and Operational Phases Scenarios .................................................................. 14
Kursk, The Northern Flank: #43_0705_03: Zitadelle, The Northern Flank ......................... 14
Operation Kutuzov, The Campaign: #43_0712_01: Operation Kutuzov ............................. 15
Orel, The First Phase: #43_0712_18: Orel Offensive Operation ......................................... 17
Orel, The Battle for the City: #43_0725_01: The Reconquest of the City of Orel ............... 18
Kutuzov, Operations in August: #43_0806_01: Operation Kutuzov, 2nd Phase................. 19
Optional Rules ............................................................................................................................ 20
Order of Battle Notes ................................................................................................................. 21
The Soviet Order of Battle ....................................................................................................... 22
The German Order of Battle.................................................................................................... 28
Map Notes .................................................................................................................................. 32
Operation Kutuzov, The Campaign ............................................................................................ 33
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 33
The Operation Kutuzov, The Beginning .................................................................................. 36
Battle for The City of Orel ....................................................................................................... 42
The Pursuit, Capture of the Towns of Khotynets and Karachev ............................................. 45
Conclusions ............................................................................................................................. 50
List of Scenarios .......................................................................................................................... 52
Appendices ................................................................................................................................. 61
Selected Bibliography .............................................................................................................. 61
Articles And Books............................................................................................................... 61
NARA Rolls ........................................................................................................................... 62
Russian Army Staff Documents ........................................................................................... 63
Websites Axis History Factbook .......................................................................................... 63
Credits ......................................................................................................................................... 63

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Introduction
The battle for the Orel salient, codified by the Soviet high command as Operation Kutuzov, was
one of the four large operations designed by STAVKA to respond to the Zitadelle operation
that began on July 5, 1943, in the Kursk salient. The Kutuzov operation is part, together with
the Rumyantsev operation (fourth battle of Kharkov), the Suvorov operation (second battle of
Smolensk) and the Strategic Offensive Operation in Donbas (liberation of Donbas to the banks
of the Dnieper). This is known from the Soviet point of view as the offensive phase of the
Battle of Kursk. This important battle on the Eastern Front was conceived by STAVKA in two
phases, one defensive and one offensive. The defensive phase was Operation Zitadelle, where
the Soviets intensely fortified the Kursk salient with the objective of exhausting and wearing
down the two axes of German advance both in the north, carried out by Model's 9.Armee, and
in the south of the salient, executed by General Hoth's 4.Panzerarmee and the Armee-
Abteilung Kempf. The second phase of the Battle of Kursk, the offensive phase, was planned by
STAVKA as a series of counterattacks along the entire Eastern Front in the areas of Orel,
Smolensk, Kharkov, and the Donbas. The objective being the destruction of Army Group Center
and South that defended a front of more than 1000 km and achieved a resounding victory that
would allow the Soviets to overwhelm the entire eastern front and thereby liberate large areas
of the USSR that were also the richest industrial and agricultural resources.

Operation Zitadelle, the German attack on the Kursk salient, began on its northern front on
July 5, 1943 with the attack of General Model's 9.Armee, which belonged to Army Group
Center, the objective was to break through the fortified Soviet front and advance south to
meet the 4.Panzerarmee of General Hoth and the Armee-Abteilung Kempf of the general of
the same name who belonged to Army Group South and who were advancing from the south.
The plan was to form a pocket to destroy the Soviet units in the salient. Apart from the
destruction of a significant number of Russian troops, the aim was to shorten the front and
free units that could be used later as required.

The Zitadelle operation, which was known to the Soviets, made it possible to organize an
extraordinarily fortified defensive front in the German advance axes. This had two objectives,
the first to resist the German attack and the second to attrite it and launch later
counterattacks with reserves already prepared in advance. The advance of the 9.Armee was
slow and costly. In addition, General Model distrusted the operation and its future results but
also wary of Soviet intentions, he kept a series of armored units in reserve that he did not use
in Operation Zitadelle. This allowed him to have ready reserves once the Soviets began their
own counteroffensive, Operation Kutuzov, north of the 9.Armee area of operations

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Figure 1, Situation Kursk-Orel-Kharkov área in July 1943

source: Soviet Military Review, No 7 (July 1968) p.2

To stop and take advantage of the expected failure of Operation Zitadelle (see WDS Kursk '43),
STAKVA planned two counterattacks north and south of the Kursk salient (see WDS
Rumyantsev '43 for the southern attack). The first of them, Operation Kutuzov, was to begin
on July 12, 1943, after a defensive battle in an area heavily fortified by the Soviet side, as the
high command of the Red Army knew of the German intention to attack this sector of the
front. The other two operations carried out by the Soviets would be carried out in August,
these are the Suvorov operation in the Smolensk-Roslav area and the Donbas strategic
offensive operation.

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The objective of the armies of Rokossovsky's Central Front was to wear down the units of
General Model's 9.Armee. After this defensive phase, the Western Front was to go on the
attack together with General Popov's Bryansk Front and part of the Western Front of
Sokolovski. Due to the heavy attrition that the Central Front suffered at the hands of 9.Armee
units, it would not be ready to attack until July 15, three days after the Kutuzov operation had
begun.

Figure 2, The Orel Salient, 12 de Julio 1943

The objective of the Fronts involved during the Kutuzov operation was the destruction of
2.Panzerarmee and part of 9.Armee, this Soviet effort in the Orel salient, which subsequently
had to act in conjunction with other operations planned by STAVKA elsewhere of the immense
Russian front, such as the Rumyantsev operation in the Belgorod-Kharkov area, Suvorov in the
Smolensk-Roslav area and the liberation of the Donbas, had the objective of overwhelming the
entire front of Army Groups Center and South to drive back and destroy large numbers of
German units and liberate large areas of the USSR.

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Design Notes
Previously in the Panzer Campaign series, operations during 1943 on the Eastern Front had
been sparsely represented in the series, only the Kursk campaign attracted the attention of an
extraordinary group of designers who came up with WDS Kursk '43 and its vision of the battle
for the Kursk salient. It was a long hiatus before Wargame Design Studio released the next
campaign during 1943 on the Eastern front, WDS Kiev '43 was launched to explore and offer a
very interesting vision of the
operations carried out by the Red
Army during the last third of the year
in Kiev and the Dneiper River area.
Last year we had the pleasure of
offering our players WDS Rumyantsev
'43 which described the operations in
the Belgorod-Kharkov area against the
4.Panzerarmee and the Armee-
Abteilung Kempf. This operation was
part of the crucial offensives carried
out by the Soviets after the Zitadelle
operation during the summer of 1943
and it is no coincidence that the title
we are currently launching is WDS
Orel '43 because it is part of the same story and is a whole with what has come and what will
come later. Our objective is to fill the gaps on the eastern front but at the same time, connect
each of the games that simulate the offensives unleashed by the STAVKA to overwhelm and
destroy the German Central and
Southern Army Groups. Our aim is
that a player of all these past and
future campaigns have a solid basis to
understand the titanic struggle to
which the German and Soviet armies
were subjected, probably making the
summer of 1943 and its offensives
the largest battle that has been
fought in history.

We are talking about the largest

campaign in history because from July
to October 1943 they fought
continuously and without rest from
Smolensk to the Sea of Azov, a front
of more than 1,000 km, beginning with the German offensive in the Kursk salient on 5th July to
then fighting in the Orel salient, the Belgorod-Kharkov area, Smolenk-Roslav and the Donbas or
the defense and evacuation of the Kuban through the Kerch Strait, all these operations, of
which millions of men and thousands of vehicles or planes meant an intense and extraordinary
effort on the part of both armies, the battle of battles.

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Figure 3, Orel area of operations

And why Orel '43? basically because it is the first of the offensives planned by STAVKA to
respond to the Zitadelle operation unleashed by the Army Groups Center and South against
the Kursk salient. After the launch of WDS Rumyantsev '43, which describes the operations
south of the Kursk area of operations, the Kutuzov operation appeared as the next project to
be brought to reality, the battle for
the Orel salient began on July 12,
1943, before the Rumyantsev
operation that began on August 3. In
fact, the operation in the Belgorod-
Kharkov area as launched almost at
the same time as the Suvorov
operation, just north of the Orel
salient, in the Smolensk-Roslav area
and the Donbas strategic offensive
operation that began on August 13.

Operation Kutuzov posed great

challenges for its design, but it has
been a great challenge that has been
worth it to capture the operations of this interesting campaign in which three Soviet Fronts
and two German armies took part with the participation of numerous armored units, including
the famed PanzerGrenadier Division Grossdeutschland.

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The existing bibliography on the Kutuzov operation is rather scarce, the battle is mentioned
countless times in works on the Zitadelle operation
but to date no one has appeared that addresses
the battle for the Orel salient alone. A general
description of the battle of Orel can be found in
the classic by David M. Glantz and Jonathan M.
House but it receives little attention from the
author who focuses on his study on the Zitadelle
operation in great detail on the northern front,
with which the study to begin the scenario that
covers the northern front during operation
Zitadelle. This work was already followed by the
original authors of WDS Kursk '43 and although
more current works have appeared, Glantz and
House achieve a clear and concise account of the
operations in the northern sector of the Kursk
salient, so apart from being considered a classic, it
is a fundamental work to begin any study that
recreates the 9.Armee combats against the
Western Front.

The main work of Glantz and House has been complimented by the study carried out by the
Soviet general staff and translated and published by
David M. Glantz and Harold S. Orestein, although like any
study published in Soviet times, great care must be taken
with the published data. They have to be reviewed and
contrasted with primary sources or other works by other
current authors, but it is a great companion to the
previous book by Glantz and House to follow the events
that occured on the northern front during Zitadelle due
to the level of detail it includes. Much of the detail
offered in this work already appear in the previous one
but there is always data of interest that can give the
necessary push to understand the action somewhere on
the front, but yes, with care and always contrasting the
information that you can get out of it. In short, both
works complement each other very well and are a great starting point to understand the
beginning of the Zitadelle operation on the northern front of the Kursk salient.

The Northern Front during the Zitadelle operation has not, in my opinion, been treated as
much in current literature as the operations in the south with the 4.Panzerarmee and the
SS.PzK, battles such as that of Provorovkha have caused rivers of ink to flow and many authors
have reviewed the titanic combats that occurred south of the Kursk salient, however, there is a
lot of material that deals with operations in the north in the form of articles or books that
follow certain units on their journey along the Kursk front, a list of this minor bibliography is
given at the end of this designer notes.

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Also, from the Soviet point of view, another study has been created by the Soviet general staff.
This study translated and edited by Richard W. Harrison, was also used during the making of
WDS Rumyantsev '43. This work has been
useful to study the Soviet tactical and
strategic planning that led to the Soviet
offensives after Operation Zitadelle. As
the editor and translator explains in his
prologue, that the data that appears in
the study must be taken and used with
great care and caution and must be
verified and contrasted with other
sources. So all the data used in WDS Orel
'43 has been reviewed with the
bibliography or existing accounts that I
have collected during the extensive
planning and investigation phase of the
Kutuzov operation. I must say that the
study has been more useful than I initially
thought, and that it could be very useful
for anyone who wants to delve into a
detailed account of this exciting
campaign. So apart from exposing it as
one of the sources of the game, I also
recommend it for anyone who wants to
start knowing the facts it tells.

The German counterpart to the previous book that recounts facts about both Zitadelle and
Kutuzov is the book translated and edited by Steven H. Newton that recounts the experiences
of German commanders during the battles in the
Kursk and Orel salient. These reports were made for
the department history of the US Army after the war,
andthe data offered in the book is not as precise as
they could be, since the protagonists did not have
access to official material to support their conclusions
or account of the events. In some cases, they have
some inaccuracies since most wrote with the help of
their memory and perhaps a map. In any case, many
of them kept personal files or notes that they could
use in their stories or conclusions and the book has
many interesting tidbits on unknown aspects of the
campaign. Examples such as the 6.Luftflotte air
campaign or the railway traffic during the campaign,
and yes, you must also verify and contrast any data
that might be used to understand the facts of the
campaign and the editor cautions on this in his
prologue.

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As for air operations, both for the Zitadelle scenario and for the Orel battle, what can already
be considered a classic on this specific engagement has been used. Christen Bergstrom's work
is perhaps one of the few that exist that deals with the fight between the Luftwaffe and the
Soviet air force over the skies of Kursk and Orel.
The air war on the Eastern Front has been
considered a secondary asset due to the gigantic
ground fights between the German army and its
allies against the Red Army, but both during
Operation Zitadelle and Kutuzov, and to a lesser
extent during Rumyantsev and Suvorov, the most
intense and complex period was experienced for
both air forces with multiple missions of all kinds.
For example, in support of the ground forces such
as denial of the use of air space and the search for
air superiority with respect to the enemy and the
losses on both sides they attest and in the case of
the Soviet air force they were disastrous. The air
campaign in the skies of Kursk and Orel is
ultimately a rarity for the parameters of the
Eastern Front and it is here that the air component
was sought to be a fundamental part of the effort
of both contenders in the search for their
objectives, both tactical and strategic.

Additional bibliography is offered at the end of this document so that the player can expand
the knowledge on this exciting battle.

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Scenario Design Notes
Scenario Planning
The Kutuzov operation took place between July 12 and August 18 with the advance of
Sokolovski’ Western Front and the M.M Popov’ Bryansk Front and later of the Rokossovsky’
Central Front on July 15 against the Orel Salient defended by the 2.PanzerArmee and the
9.Armee’ Both were under the command of General Model, who had inherited 2.Panzerarmee
after the Gestapo arrested General Schmidt, the previous commander before Zitadelle was
launched.

WDS Orel '43 includes a scenario on the northern front during the Zitadelle operation as a
prologue to the Kutuzov operation, this scenario covers the operations of 9.Armee against the
formidable positions of Rokossovsky's Central Front. I
considered that to understand the campaign that was
undertaken later, this should be included, since among
other reasons, the Soviet strategy was to wear down the
German advance and then counterattack from the north,
east and the south into the salient of the 9.Armee and the
2.PanzerArmee. Ultimately, the attritional losses of the
Soviets from the German attacks caused the Soviet
counterattack to be delayed until July 15. General Model
did not trust the intent of the Zitadelle operation, and
foresaw a possible Soviet reaction to his attack, so chose
not to involve all his units. Having an unused armored
reserve was very useful later to stop the Soviet vanguards
that were trying to make their way through the defensive
positions of the 2.Panzerarmee.

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WDS Orel '43 includes a 417-turn campaign scenario that simulates all the engagements of this
exciting battle, one of the counteroffensives designed by STAVKA after Operation Zitadelle and
which aimed at the destruction and recovery of a large part of the territory of the USSR
occupied by the German army since 1941. This scenario ranges from the initial battles to
breakthroughs both north, east and south of the Orel
salient, to the German retreat to the Hagen line, where
the player will be able to recreate the hard and decisive
decisions, they had to take the Soviet and German high
command in the defense of the salient. Also, in Orel '43 it
has been decided, as in WDS Rumyantsev '43, to divide
the campaign into two large phases that are clearly
delimited by the events that occurred during the entire
Kutuzov operation, these two phases are separated only
by the battle and Soviet capture of Orel at the end of July
by the Bryansk Front. The decision to divide the
campaign into two phases is to give the player the
possibility of enjoying the entire campaign without
having to play the 417 turns. The two phases have
different objectives and strategies, so the player will be
able to enjoy situations different and attractive from
both sides.

The first phase of Operation Kutuzov, also known as the Orel Offensive Operation, was a
concentric attack carried out from the north by the Western Front, northeast and east by the
Bryansk Front and south by the Central Front, the objective was isolate the salient with the
capture of the city of Orel, a large logistical center that
fed the entire German front through the railway line and
the road that linked the city of Bryansk with Orel. The
first phase of Operation Kutuzov describes the fighting
that led to the breakup of the 2.Panzerarmee front in
the north by the Western Front and the Bryansk front
and that culminated in the battle and capture of the
fortified city of Bolkhov. It also includes the attack by the
Bryansk Front from the Novosil area east of Orel and the
advance by the Bryansk Front towards Orel. On July 15,
the Western Front was added from the south of the
salient towards Orel, emulating the German attack
during Zitadelle but in reverse, since the roles had been
exchanged. This first phase of the Kutuzov operation
concludes right at the gates of Orel due to the
exhaustion of Soviet units during the Bolkhov offensive operation and the breakthrough
battles east and south of Orel, in the latter case, Rokossovsky's armies paid a great toll during
the defensive battles during Zitadelle, as it was unable to recover from the fighting against the
9.Armee

After a series of scenarios that describe the battle and capture of the city of Orel, an important
logistics center for both 9.Armee and 2.Panzerarmee, the player will find the second large
scenario that describes the battle for the Orel salient.

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The scenario for the second phase of the Kutuzov operation describes the operations during
the month of August after the capture, and German withdrawal from the city of Orel. In the
second phase of the Kutuzov operation, the player will find the Soviet attacks against the cities
of Khotinets and Karachev. Both locations were fortified and had to be conquered as a
preliminary step towards the great Soviet objective, the city of Bryansk, another large logistical
center that supplied the entire German front in the area. General Model conceived the battle
for the city of Orel to contain and buy time against the red armies, aware that a fortified line
had been built further west known as the Hagen line and which would serve the German army
as a containment dam for the worn-out units of Soviet troops that had been fighting in the
Orel salient since mid-July.

With the prelude scenario about the Zitadelle operation, the first phase of the Kutuzov
operation, the battle for the city of Orel or the second phase of the Kutuzov operation will give
the player a complete experience that describes the events that occurred during the period
between 12 from July to August 18, 1943. That said, you will also be able to enjoy a complete
experience with the grand campaign scenario with all the fighting during the battle for the Orel
salient.

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The Campaign and Operational Phases Scenarios
Kursk, The Northern Flank: #43_0705_03: Zitadelle, The Northern Flank
The operations on the northern flank during Operation Zitadelle were carried out by
Generaloberst Model's 9.Armee. The plan consisted of crossing the three fortified lines that
Rokossovsky's Central Front had built for months, whose armies had been reinforced by the
STAVKA and reach the city of Kursk, where it would join the troops of the 4.Panzerarmee of
the Heeresgruppe Süd that were advancing from the south and in this way they would cut off
the Kursk salient. The main effort of the 9.Armee would be carried out in the XXXXI.PzK and
XXXXVII.PzK sectors, although Model would not use all his available armored units and unlike
the attack carried out by the 4.Panzerarmee it would begin the advances with heavily
reinforced infantry that would make way for panzer divisions. The Soviets were aware of the
Zitadelle operation, so they reinforced and fortified their positions for a long time, especially in
the number of mines and anti-tank guns and notably in the 13th Army sector. The Central
Front had to resist and wear down the 9.Armee and then counterattack with armored reserves
already prepared previously, for this, Rokossovsky had the 2nd Tank Army in the rear for this
mission. The Luftwaffe was given the order to cooperate closely with the ground units, but
they had to face the 16th Air Army that would compete for the skies in this sector of the front,
so the confrontation was one of the most intense so far in the war on the ostfront. Model,
despite the resources placed at his disposal, did not trust too much in the Zitadelle operation,
so he ordered that only eight of his fifteen armored units be used during the advance through
the Soviet positions north of the salient. The rest of the units he kept in reserve to collaborate
closely with the 2.Panzerarmee in the defense of the Orel salient, which was currently devoid
of armored units. Model, who during the Zitadelle operation, put maximum effort into
achieving its objectives, did not hesitate to send units to the north reinforcement as soon as
the Kutuzov operation was launched.

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Operation Kutuzov, The Campaign: #43_0712_01: Operation Kutuzov
The Kutuzov operation was one of the counterattacks planned by the STAVKA after the
Zitadelle operation and was the Soviet response to take the strategic initiative during the
summer of 1943. With the Kutuzov operation, the Soviet high command hoped to destroy the
Orel salient and the units enemy forces that defended it, cutting off the salient in a concentric
attack from the north, east and south in the direction of Orel. This plan corresponded to what
the Soviets call the Battle of Kursk and which consisted of two phases, a defensive phase that
consisted of the defense of the Kursk salient during the German offensive coded as Zitadelle
where the Soviet armies also had the objective of wearing down the the German armies that
would carry the weight of the offensive, the 9.Armee, the 4.Panzerarmee and to a lesser
extent the Armee-Abteilung Kempf, after this defensive phase the offensive phase would begin
in charge of the reserves that the STAVKA had accumulated in the Kursk salient and the Orel
salient. The Kutuzov operation was the first to be launched and for this the STAVKA planned to
launch a concentric attack with three Fronts in the direction of Orel. The attack from the north
was carried out by the Western Front under the command of General Sokolovsky. The mission
was to advance south to cut the Bryansk-Orel railway line and cooperate in the capture of
Bolkhov, which had been fortified by the Germans, and the same city of Orel, for this it had the
reinforced 11th Guards Army as the main actor in the area. The Bryansk front under the
command of General M.M Popov had a double mission to capture the city of Bolkhov and
advance from the east towards Orel, for this, the STAVKA granted Popov the 3rd Guards Tank
Army, originally destined for the Central Front, to support the advance towards Orel that was
to be general once Bolkhov had been captured. Rokosovsky's Central Front had already been
fighting since the beginning of Zitadelle on July 5 and had planned to begin the
counteroffensive with the other two fronts on July 12, but due to the heavy losses suffered
during the defense it could not join the attack until the 15th of July. Even with this delay, it

15
could not recover from the fighting during Operation Zitadelle, fortunately, the 9.Armee also
withdrew units to send them to the north so the forces were equalized.

After the capture of Orel, the Bryank and Central Fronts would advance towards Bryansk, a
first-order logistical center. This advance would be carried out in parallel to the Suvorov
operation in the Smolensk area to the north and simultaneously with the Rumyantsev
operation in the Belgorod-Kharkov area and the strategic offensive operation in the Donbas, all
these operations are part of the general offensive that sought to destroy the Heeresgruppes
Mitte and Süd and liberate large areas of the USSR.

This 417-turn scenario encompasses the entire campaign from the breakout combats on July
12 by the Western Front, Bryansk Front and Central Front from July 15, the battles for Bolkhov
and Orel and the subsequent ones of Kothinets, Karachev and the advance towards Bryansk
through the Hagen line in which we will be able to relive the difficult decisions that Model or
the Soviet commanders had to make.

16
Orel, The First Phase: #43_0712_18: Orel Offensive Operation
The Kutuzov operation lasts from July 12 to August 18, but is clearly differentiated into two
phases with an interlude between the two, which is the battle for the city of Orel by the
Bryansk front. The first phase of Operation Kutuzov begins on July 12 with the attack of the
Western and Bryansk Fronts against the
defenses of the 2nd Panzerarmee around
the perimeter of the Orel salient, these
defenses were built during the relatively
quiet months preceding Operation
Kutuzov. The operations of the Western
Front had as their objective the railway
line that supplied supplies to the salient
between Bryansk and Orel and also had to
support the operations of the Bryansk
Front against Bolkhov, the armies of M.M
Popov also had to advance from the east
towards the city of Orel, the great
objective of the first phase of the Kutuzov
operation since it was the great logistics
center that fed the entire Orel salient.
Rokossovsky's Central Front had planned
to begin the counteroffensive against Orel
on July 12, but the heavy fighting during
Zitadelle, in which it suffered heavy losses,
had to suspend the start of its attack until
July 15 against the 9.Armee, its the
objective was to advance north to support
the Bryansk Front's attack on Orel.

Like the previous title on the Soviet counteroffensives after the Zitadelle operation, WDS
Rumyantsev '43, we decided to divide the great campaign on the Kutuzov operation into two
phases, these phases apart from making more understandable the events that happened in a
campaign of one A little more than a month is useful for those players who do not want or do
not have time to play complete campaign scenarios, which makes WDS Orel '43 more flexible
for those players who want to enjoy all the weapons events that occurred during the battle for
the Orel salient, which in this case, is limited to the breaking battles and the battles of Bolkhov
and Orel.

17
Orel, The Battle for the City: #43_0725_01: The Reconquest of the City of Orel
After a brief stop in operations on the Bryansk front, Major General Popov ordered both the 3rd
Army and the 63rd Army to regroup to attack and capture the city of Orel, the main
communications and logistics center that fed the entire salient. To do this, Popov planned a
concentric attack against the city that would be carried out from the north by General Gobatov's
3rd Army and from the south by General Kolpahchi's 63rd Army. Both armies had suffered heavy
losses in the battles to break through the German defenses at the Okay River and later in the
advance towards Orel, as the German high command reinforced the area to protect the
approaches to Orel. General Model was perfectly aware of the military value of the city of Orel,
but at the same time he built and reinforced the German positions in the rear, these positions
started some time ago were known as the Hagen line, with this defensive line built at the base
of the outgoing, Model hoped to shorten the front and then free up units that could be very
useful in other places. General Model conceived the defense of Orel as a defensive battle with
which to gain time to evacuate wounded and material from the city's enormous supply
warehouses and at the same time gain time to prepare an orderly withdrawal towards the
positions already prepared in the area german rearguard.

To shore up the German defenses against the imminent Soviet attack on Orel, General Model
reinforced General Rendulic's XXXV.AK with the 12.Panzer Division right in the place where the
most direct attack on the city was expected. This movement was not detected by Soviet
intelligence which had painful results for the 63rd Army units involved in the advance.

This scenario describes the Soviet capture of the city of Orel and can be considered a "bridge"
scenario between the first phase of the Kutuzov operation and the second phase of the Kutuzov
operation, which began practically after the end of the capture of Orel by the Red Army.

18
Kutuzov, Operations in August: #43_0806_01: Operation Kutuzov, 2nd Phase
The second phase of the Kutuzov operation began just after the capture by the Red Army of the
city of Orel, in this case, the Bryansk Front had to capture two important towns that had been
fortified by the Germans, the cities of Khotynets and Karachev. The two places were on the main
road that linked and until then fed the entire Orel salient, the road and railway between Bryansk-
Orel. These two cities
had to be captured as a
preliminary step to the
great objective of the
Western and Bryansk
Fronts, for the advance
and capture of the
great logistical center
that was the city of
Bryansk. To do this,
General M.M Popov
planned an attack,
which, coming from the
north, had to capture
Khotynets and
Karachev and achieve,
among other
objectives, deprive the
Germans of the two
support points and cut
off the retreat of the units that were retreating from Orel. For this task, the commander of the
Bryansk Front used the 11th Guards Army for breakout operations and in second echelon the
4th Tank Army and had the support of up to three tank corps. Also, the 61st, 3rd and 63rd armies,
would cooperate at the time with the pressure they could exert on their advance from the east.
After the success of this operation, the Bryansk Front could advance towards the city of Bryansk
with the support of the left wing of the Western Front, which would converge from the north
towards Bryansk, the plan was to overwhelm the 9.Armee from the north, east and south In
addition, this last phase of the Kutuzov operation would be carried out in parallel to the Suvorov
operation that was taking place further north in the Smolensk area, and which was the third
major summer offensive planned by STAVKA. This operation had as its objective the destruction
of the 4.Armee that defended the approaches to the city of Smolensk and which resulted in the
German high command being forced to send reinforcements from the Orel area, removing more
units than Model needed.

Both the scenarios of the first phase and the second phase have the purpose of offering the
player the possibility of playing the complete campaign in shorter scenarios. However, both
include the main offensives and movements, tacticals and strategics, of both sides, with which
the player will be able to experience the decisions and events that both, German and Soviet
commanders had to face and offer an overview to understand the exciting and intense battle
for the Orel salient.

19
Optional Rules
Below are the suggested optional rules for WDS Orel ’43, A detailed description can also be
found in the briefing for each scenario.

20
Order of Battle Notes
As in WDS Rumyantsev '43, WDS Orel '43 has several orders of battle to adapt to the different
phases in which the Kutuzov operation takes place, it also has an order of battle for the scenario
on the northern flank during the Zitadelle operation.

The order of battle Orel '43 for both the first phase of Operation Kutuzov and the great
campaign. Orel '43 Late July is used in the bridge scenario between the first phase and the
second phase in which the battle for the city of Orel. In this order of battle I focused on the study
of the Bryansk Front and the 2.Panzearmee, since these two units are the protagonists of the
fight for the city. The last order of battle of the Kutuzov operation is the one that corresponds
to Orel '43 August, this order of battle is designed and studied for the second phase of the
Kutuzov operation, in this scenario, the Soviet army completes the conquest of the two points
fortified area that connects Bryansk-Orel and which was the previous step for the preparation
of the offensive towards the city of Bryansk.

Finally, there is also an Order of Battle for the scenario on the northern flank during Operation
Zitadelle, this scenario, like its counterpart on the southern front available in WDS Rumyantsev
'43, has been created with the latest available literature that has emerged since WDS Kursk '43
was made, with this, we wanted to offer the player the possibility of playing this scenario that
serves as a prologue to the Kutuzov operation with maximum fidelity and historical precision.

21
The Soviet Order of Battle
As in previous games, the Soviet order of Battle has been made based on the publication
“Boyevoy Sostav Sovetskoy Armii - Combat Strength of the Soviet Army (BSSA), this series of
books, lists month by month the
composition of the Soviet armies
that participated in the Second
World War at an incredible level of
detail, even at the battalion level, so
it is mandatory to review to begin
any order of battle on the ostfront,
in the case of Operation Kutuzov,
the status of the Battle Fronts was
reviewed Bryansk, Western and
Central for the months of July and
August 1943. These lists not only
detail the land units but also the air
units that supported ground
operations and that experienced
one of the most intense campaigns
of the entire Eastern Front.

Figure 3, Western front, July 1, 1943

However, despite the great level of detail that these lists offer, it is only the beginning to
develop a more precise and in-depth Soviet order of battle, but it is the best start to start
working on offering the player maximum historical fidelity.

22
Figure 4, Western Front, July 1, 1943

Figure 5, Bryansk Front, July 1, 1943

23
Figure 6, Central Front, July 1, 1943

24
As if they were layers of an onion, the Soviet order of battle must be delved into to offer
maximum fidelity and historical precision at a specific moment in the campaign, in addition, by
dividing the Kutuzov operation into phases to allow the player to have flexibility to be able to
play shorter and more enjoyable campaign scenarios, the information that is available in the
“Boyevoy Sostav Obshchevoyskovykh Armiy - Combat Strength of the Combined Armies
(BSOA) is extremely useful, this list of the composition of the Soviet armies every ten days and
offers the level of detail necessary to configure the organization of the different forces
involved in the campaign and more in the case of the Kutuzov operation whose duration is so
long.

Figure 7, 3rd Army, July 1-10-20, 1943

During the first years of the German invasion, the Red Army suffered catastrophic casualties at
the hands of the expert German army. Among other reasons, one of the causes was the lack of
military expertise that they had at all levels of the Soviet army. The year 1943 is the moment in
which the balance between the German and Soviet armies begins to change. These changes
were not only due to the wear and tear produced in the units of both armies, but also to
changes in Soviet military doctrine due to learning that the two years of preceding conflict
entailed. The Soviet commanders acquired levels of skill that pushed the STAVKA to be
increasingly ambitious in the planning and objectives of the operations to be carried out
against the German army. Which culminated in the summer of 1943, to carry out a series of
counteroffensives with the undisguised objective of overwhelming the two most powerful
German army groups, General Kluge's Center Army Group and General Von Manstein's
Southern Army Group.

To reach this point during 1942, a reorganization was carried out that sought to simplify the
command structure of the large units of the Red Army by simplifying the size of its units, in this
way, a more flexible organization based on brigades was reached and these are grouped
together in bodies formed by them. The same thing happened in the infantry units, with the

25
practical disappearance of army bodies to move from organized armies with divisions, ignoring
that intermediate level.

The year 1943 was the culmination of the hard learning that the Soviet army had undergone
after the years 1941 and 1942. During this year, the ability of the Soviet leaders reached a
point at which it began to be seen that the
gap between the The Red Army and the
German Army were increasingly smaller,
so large units began to be formed again,
both at the level of army corps and large
armored armies with which to face both
offensive and defensive operations, the
high operational levels that the German
mobile units had.

In the preparation of the defensive phase

of the Zitadelle operation, like the
differents offensives phases that STAVKA
had planned to respond to the German
plans in the Kursk salient, armored
operations played a crucial role, assigning
a Tank Army for each Front involved in the
Kutuzov operation. In addition, there was
not only the increasing quality in the levels
of command that the Soviet leaders had
acquired, but also the amount of means
that were made available to these armies
by the already powerful Soviet industry
and Allied aid. These formations were
rested armies and duly supplied with tanks and equipment almost up to their full number, Also
during the Zitadelle and Kutuzov operation, a significant number of Soviet self-propelled guns
such as the SU-76 or SU-152 began to be seen, which were the Soviet response to the German
self-propelled models such as the StuG and which demonstrates the evolution and degree of
adaptability that The Soviet Army already had in 1943.

Another aspect in which the Soviet doctrine influenced was the artillery support for large
operations. For this, large
artillery units began to be
created at the corps and
divisional level with which to
support the armies of the fronts,
both in their defensive phases
as offensive. These large
artillery units operated jointly
and massively, bringing together
hundreds of artillery pieces of
different calibers and roles in
relatively small sectors of the
front. In German sources there

26
are multiple examples of the effectiveness of these units in the phases of breaking and the
shock they produced in the German vanguard units.

Another specific aspect, both of the Zitadelle and Kutuzov operations, and to a lesser extent in
the later Rumyantsev and Suvorov operations, was the air war, since it reached a degree of
intensity unknown to date and that aspects such as ground support or the suppression of the
opponents capabilities, isolating and denying local air superiority in both the northern sectors
of the Kursk salient and the Orel salient. Operation Zitadelle and Kutuzov resulted in a massive
use of air power by both armies. In Operation Kutuzov, the Soviet air force attempted to
achieve superiority with an initial campaign of attacks on airfields and an attempt to suppress
the fighter squadrons that The Luftwaffe sent to eliminate the waves of red fighter-bombers
that daily supported the Soviet ground units, suffering heavy losses that hindered the
subsequent success of the Soviet advances.

All these aspects of the Soviet military organization have been reflected in the different orders
of Battle of the Kutuzov and Zitadelle operation, in them, the player will be able to find not
only a description of the units that were involved in these operations but also the doctrinal
changes that were experienced in the Soviet army during the two years of fighting on the
front. During which they tried to reach the level already available to the experienced German
troops, who, however, still had great tactical and material quality advantages.

All these changes have been verified and contrasted both with the available Soviet
documentation and with the bibliography that has been appearing during all these years and
which in the case of Zitadelle is quite extensive but not so much in the case of Kutuzov,
although the German sources, they already reflect the different way of fighting, and above all,
the damage caused to their units by the red army.

27
The German Order of Battle
The orders of Battle on the German side have been studied from primary sources, more
specifically with the German archives deposited in NARA, for this. They were collected through
the large units involved in the Zitadelle and Kutuzov operation, the 9.Armee and the
2.Panzerarmee. In order to configure a precise and historical order of battle, thousands of
microfilm documents belonging to these two armies and all their army corps must be read and
studied, which are the ones that will be most useful in configuring the order of battle that in In
this case, there are four, since various moments of the campaign are represented.

In WDS Orel '43 there are also two large units that we wanted to represent in the game due to
their great defensive values and number of subunits, these two units are the 12.Flak Division
and the Korück.532, the first of them is a large unit of the Luftwaffe that had the mission not
only of protecting the skies and German bases in the salient but also adopted a secondary role
which was to
support the ground
units with their anti-
tank fire and also in
the case of lower
caliber anti-
personnel weapons.
In the investigation
of this unit we not
only had to
determine its
composition during
the month of July
1943 but also the
location of the
battalions within the
Orel salient. The
12.Flak Division was
made up of five Flak
Regiments that were
in charge of various
sectors and airfields
throughout the
salient and its most
important places, such as Bryansk, Bolkhov, Orel, Karachev or Khotynets, but it also had
various units in support of the German ground units that defended the front line, as the player
might suspect. It was a real nightmare to deploy battalions representing hundreds of pieces
and self-propelled guns in their historic positions over an area as large as the Orel salient. It
has really been a challenge but at the same time a great satisfaction to be able to offer the
player a great historical precision and realism. We believe that by providing this important unit
to the German player, he will have tools for defense that were widely used by the various
German commanders in the sectors in their charge. Providing them with more flexibility when
planning retreats with the protection of the fires of the 12.Flak Division as it was in reality.

28
Figure 8, 12.Flak Division, July 10th 1943

Figure 9, positions 12.Flak Division, July 19th 1943

29
The other great challenge within the large units assigned in this case to the 2.Panzerarmee was
the Korück.532. This unit was in charge of rearguard security within the sectors entrusted to
9.Armee and the 2.Panzearmee. Its mission was mainly anti-partisan fighting, where they were
involved in several large-scale operations during the months prior to the Kutuzov operation.
Unlike other games like WDS Minsk '44, Orel '43 has not taken into account the campaigns that
the Red Army undertook with its partisan brigades in the German rear. Although these
campaigns involved thousands of men and consumed German resources that were not
available on the front line, their overall results were never completely satisfactory, and they
did not manage to paralyze the vital supply line that linked Bryansk with Orel. So, we decided
not to include it within the campaign mechanics of WDS Orel '43, this was due to the effective
anti-partisan fight of the Korück.532.

Figure 10, positions Korück.532, July 12th 1943

This large unit was made up of more than twenty battalions distributed within the Orel salient,
the first challenge was to determine the composition of this unit in July 1943, but the great
challenge was to know the locations of its subunits. To do this, we had to immerse ourselves in
the NARA archives to learn about the functioning of these units. The German command
distributed the rearguard units basically to protect large logistical points and their supply

30
routes, which in the case of the Salient of Orel, included Bryansk, Orel and the vital railway line
that connected both cities. Among other missions, the battalions assigned to those areas had
to defend and safeguard all facilities from partisan attacks. Once the modus operanti of these
units was known, the second challenge was to know the location of their battalions to
determine their positions within the salient. Once this milestone was achieved, we can
recognize that the level achieved in WDS Orel '43 is one of the deepest. Within the world of
wargames and in this particular case, there is no representation of the Kutuzov operation with
such precision and detail.

Figure 11, Order Of Battle LIII.AK, July 10th 1943

Despite the search for data that can be carried out in the NARA archives, sometimes there are
holes in the different orders of battle because the available archives are not complete. To fill in
these holes, we must use secondary sources. For WDS Orel '43, the existing bibliography has
been used, which in the case of Zitadelle is quite extensive and in the case of Kutuzov more
limited, even so, it has been very useful to fill those small gaps that leave the creator of any
order of battle with the feeling that the work was not completely finished.

31
Map Notes
The WDS Orel '43 map is the product of the union of several maps from our series that have
been updated to offer the most accurate 1 km=1 Hexagon cartography to date. The maps are
based on those used during the time, faithfully representing all the geographical features,
communication routes and towns where both armies fought during the months of July and
August of 1943.

Figure 12, Orel map, 1:250000

The map measures 332x230 km, it represents a terrain very suitable for mechanized
operations, the Neruch River and especially the Oka River represent the main river barriers
that run from north to south.
The Soviet road-network of
the time was very poor but
the road and railway line
that connects Bryansk with
Orel was one of the most
important in the area with
the towns of Karachev and
Khotynets halfway between
the two, Bolkhov, Msensk,
Zhizdra or Kromi were also
important local centers
within the salient, as did
Svesk a little further south.

32
Operation Kutuzov, The Campaign
Introduction
As I explained in previous points, the summer of 1943 gave birth to a series of offensives that
were designed by the Soviet high command in response to the German offensive in the Kursk
salient. The first phase planned by the STAVKA was defensive, for this, the Red Army fortified
the Kursk salient to wear down as much as possible the German armies that would carry out
the Zitadelle operation,
which in the case of the
northern front, would be in
charge of the 9th. .Armee
of Colonel General Walter
Model. After this first
phase, the Soviet army
would unleash a second
offensive phase with the
objective of overwhelming
the central and southern
army groups to destroy
them and thus liberate
large areas of the USSR.
The second offensive phase
was made up of several operations in vast areas of the USSR Eastern Front, the first of them,
Operation Kutuzov began on July 12, 1943, when fighting was still ongoing on the northern
front of the Kursk salient during Operation Zitadelle. The rest of the operations during that
summer began in August, the Soviet Army launching up to three large simultaneous operations
to put maximum pressure on the stretched German front. These operations were the
Rumyantsev Operation in the Belgorod-Kharkov area (August 3, 1943), Suvorov in the
Smolensk-Roslav area (August 7, 1943) and the Donbas strategic offensive operation (August
13, 1943), in addition, minor operations were also launched in the Kuban bridgehead and in
the Army Group North area. All of these operations together made the summer of 1943
perhaps the largest battle in history in which no less than two German army groups and nine
Soviet Fronts were involved, including the fighting in the Kuban.

33
Operation Kutuzov was the first offensive to be launched after Operation Zitadelle. The Soviet
plan was to first wear down the 9.Armee, whose objective was to advance through the
northern front of the Kursk salient and meet the advances of the 4.Panzerarmee, advancing
from the south of the salient towards the town of the same name. To attrite the 9.Armee, the
Soviet armies built up to
three fortified lines,
garrisoned with rifle
divisions almost one
hundred percent strong
and which defended the
defensive lines with an
unusually high number of
anti-tank pieces, since
they had been reinforced
with regiments brought
from the STAVKA
reserves. The Soviet high
command then planned a
counteroffensive that had
to begin on July 12, 1943, this offensive, Operation Kutuzov, was to be carried out in the Orel
salient that was defended by the 2.Panzerarmee. This army had been transferred almost all its
armored forces in favor of the 9.Armee, which attacked from the south of the Orel salient
towards Kursk. The only armored unit in reserve for the 2.Panzerarmee was the 5.Panzer
Division that had been positioned in the Krapvina area, behind LIII.AK. The Soviet plan was to
launch a concentric attack with three Fronts, the Western Front of General Sokolovsky, would
attack from the north in the direction of Orel and would support the Bryansk Front in its
advance to Bolkhov, the Bryansk Front of General M.M. Popov would attack from the north
and east in the direction of Bolkhov and Orel and finally the Central Front of General
Rokossovsky after his defensive battle against the 9.Armee, would counterattack from the
south in the direction of Orel. he Central Front could not commence its offensive with the
other two Fronts, the losses suffered by the Central Front at the hands of the 9.Armee during
the Zitadelle operation, prevented it from starting the Kutuzov operation on July 12. It had to
wait until July 15 to begin its assault. After this first phase, an advance was planned with the
objective of capturing Bryansk, both the Western and Bryansk Fronts would cooperate in the
capture of this important population, the communications and logistics center of the entire
area. This second phase, would occur simultaneously with the two offensives launched both
north and south of the Orel salient, the operations Suvorov and Rumyantsev.

34
The Germans, like the Soviets in the Kursk salient, had fortified the entire Orel area, the
relative tranquility in this sector of the Ostfront facilitated the construction of solid defensive
positions, in addition, after the first line of defense, others were built. Further back, taking
advantage of the courses of the rivers, especially the Oka, this river flowed from north to south
and bathed with its waters the city of Orel, a very important logistical center because from
there, the German
army nourished the
entire salient. The
most important cities
of the Orel salient had
been fortified, this is
the case of Bolkhov, a
population that shored
up the defenses to the
northeast of the
salient and defended
the approaches to Orel
from the north. To the
east of Orel, the
XXXV.AK supported its
defenses on the
Neruch river and fortified the city of Msensk, where General Martinek, in command of the
corps, identified the main routes of Soviet advance, maximizing its resources in the defense of
the approaches from the east to Orel. To the south, the 9.Armee continued to advance, albeit
very cautiously, since General Model foresaw the possible counterattack to the north of his
positions, so from the beginning of Zitadelle, he did not commit all his reserves in the advance
towards the south, so that at the time of the Soviet attack he was able to send several Panzer
units in support of the 2.Panzerarmee.

35
The Operation Kutuzov, The Beginning
The idea of dealing a blow against the Orel salient, was already forged in the Soviet camp in
April 1943, finishing its planning in early June and giving its last touches while the German
Zitadelle offensive was already underway.
Supervised by Zhukov and N. N. Voronov (the head
of the ER artillery), Sokolovsky (commander of the
Western Front) and M.M. Popov (commander of the
Bryansk Front) were to launch three powerful
attacks against the flanks and east of the Orel
salient.

Sokolovsky's front deployed two armies (the 11th

Guards of Lieutenant General I. Kh. Bagramian and
the 50th Army of Lieutenant General I. V. Boldin)
and two tank corps (the 1st of Major General V. V.
Butkov and the 5th of Major General M. S. Sakhno).
The total force was 211,458 men, 745 tanks and self-
propelled guns, and 4,285 guns and mortars, a force
that was supposed to attack in a southerly direction
east of Zhizdra to cut the Bryansk-Orel railway line
near Karachev and to isolate and destroy the
German forces in Orel in conjunction with the
attacks of the Bryansk Front and, later, Central Front from the east and south.

Sokolovsky's attack vanguard would consist of Bagramian's 11th Guards Army, with three full-
strength rifle corps (12 Divisions), two tank corps, and a good contingent of supporting
artillery. In addition, the STAVKA kept in reserve the 11th Army of Lieutenant General I. I.
Fediuninsky and the newly formed 4th Tank Army (652 tanks and assault guns) of Lieutenant
General V. M. Badanov to support the Bagramian attack at the opportune moment.

36
For its part, Popov's front was to launch two separate attacks against the east of the Orel
salient. The main attack with the 3rd Army (Lieutenant General Gorbatov) and 63rd Army
(Lieutenant General Kolpakchi), and a secondary one by the 61st Army. Gorbatov and
Kolpakchi, supported by Major General Pankov's 1st Guards Tank Corps and the 25th Rifle
Corps, were to advance from the Novosil region directly west through the nose of the German
salient towards the crucial transport and logistics center of Orel. Both armies raised about
170,000 men and more than 350 tanks and self-propelled guns. In addition, STAVKA kept
General Rybalko's newly formed 3rd Guards Tank Army (731 tanks and self-propelled guns) as
a reserve behind the Popov front to exploit the Novosil-Orel axis.

As for Popov's secondary attack, he tasked Lieutenant General P. A. Belov's 61st Army,
supported by Major General I. G. Lazarov's 20th Independent Tank Corps, to launch an
onslaught against the German defenses east of the critical Bolkhov communications center and
overwhelm the German defenses of Orel from the north. Ultimately, Popov's Bryansk Front
would commit 433,616 men to combat during the Orel operation.

Finally, on July 15 the right wing of the Central Front (70th, 13th and 48th armies) would attack
north out of the Kursk salient to link up with the attack of the Bagramian 11th Guards Army
and help cut off the Germans in Orel. This delay, as explained before, was due to the losses
suffered during the Zitadelle operation.

The German forces defending the Orel salient were made up of the LV.AK, LIII.AK and XXXV.AK
of the 2.Panzerarmee. This “Panzer” army was only in name, as it commanded 14 weak
infantry Divisions and the 5.Panzer Division as a reserve. Furthermore, on April the
commander of 2.PanzerArmee, Rudolf Schmidt, was relieved of command due to a shady affair
regarding his brother and certain letters written by Schmidt to him criticizing Hitler's conduct
of the war. Afterwards, for a brief period General der Infanterie Heinrich Clössner was acting
commander of the 2.PanzerArmee. At the beginning of the Soviet offensive in the Orel salient,
Model would temporarily assume command (while he had to do the same with the Ninth
Army). The OKH only had the following, as reserves to send to the aid of the 2.Panzerarmee;

37
the 8.Panzer Division and two Security divisions that were deeply committed to combatting
the partisan actions against the supply bases and communications networks. In total, taking
into account these OKH reserves, the 2.Panzerarmee raised about 160,000 men and 325 tanks
and assault guns.

The Russians began artillery preparation for Kutuzov at 03:30 am on 12 July, firing at the
German tactical defenses for two hours and forty minutes. During the last ten minutes of this
artillery preparation, the battalions of the first echelon of the Rifle Divisions advanced,
accompanied by tank sections and companies of the army tank regiments and brigades
covered by the support of bombing and assault aviation. At 06:05 am all the forces of the first
echelon of the Western and Bryansk fronts joined the attack.

The 11th Guards Army in the north soon broke through the German defenses, with six Guards
Rifle Divisions (concentrated in a 10-mile sector at the junction of the 211.Infanterie Division
and 293.Infanterie Division) crushing two German infantry regiments. In the afternoon
Bagramian began to commit the Rifle Divisions of his second echelon to widen the penetration,
while the 1st and 5th Tank Corps entered the gap and prepared to explode to the south. Then
the 5.Panzer Division came into play, counterattacking and slowing down the Soviet attack. At
nightfall, the armor of Sakhno's tank corps penetrated 10 kilometers into the German
defenses, reaching the second German defensive belt of Ulianov, only to be thwarted again by
the actions of the 5.Panzer Division, Bagramian stopped the attack and prepared to continue
the next morning.

On July 13, the Soviet attack was refocused, this time involving Boldin's 50th Army on
Bagramian's left flank. At 14:30 pm Bagramian launched Butkov's 1st Tank Corps into the
breakthrough along with Major General N. A. Kropotin's 1st Guards Rifle Division. Although
Boldin's initial attack faltered, the 1st and 5th Tank Corps managed to destroy the German

38
second defensive belt, speeding up their advance. By the end of the day, the Soviets had
managed to penetrate 15 kilometers into the German defenses along a 23-kilometre front.

East of Orel, Rendulic's XXXV.AK, which had better prepared defenses, dealt harsh punishment
to Popov's forces. The Russian engineers managed with difficulty to bridge the Susha, the
attack that followed by the
forces of the Soviet 3rd and
63rd armies against the
56.Infanterie Division and
262.Infanterie Division of
the XXXV.AK was almost a
disaster. Gorbatov and
Kolpakchi initially attacked
with six Rifle Divisions
concentrated along a 14-
kilometre front with
support from army tank
regiments, with three rifle
divisions behind in second
echelon. But during the
initial attack the KV-1s, without infantry support, fell victim to German anti-tank guns and
mines. By the end of the 12th, the Soviets had barely made any progress, losing six tanks
against the loss of three German anti-tank guns. And at this point Rendulic committed the
reserve of his corps, 36.Infanterie Division, to contain the limited Soviet penetration, with the
8.Panzer Division and 2.Panzer arriving shortly after to block any further Soviet attempt. In
response, Gorbatov and Kolpakchi attacked with the Rifle Divisions of their second echelon,
while ordering Pankov's 1st Guards Tank Corps (207 tanks) into the fray at noon on the 13th.
Rendulic's corps successfully defended itself during the following days.

To the north, east of Bolkhov, Belov's attack against the German LIII.AK wasn't expected either,
and Lazarov's 20th Tank Corps crashed into the tenacious defense of the German
112.Infanterie Division and then into elements of the 12.Panzer Division. Lazarov's Corps was
removed by Belov for refitting.

39
Popov, who had been asking for it from the beginning, managed to get STAVKA to give him
control of Rybalko's powerful 3rd Guards Tank Army on the night of July 13, but it took Rybalko
two days to deploy his units in the Orel salient, and by then the train had already passed
through the gate to the 3rd and 63rd armies, since the Germans had already managed to
reinforce their defenses. On the other hand, under pressure from STAVKA, Popov changed
Rybalko's objective in the last minute. Instead of attacking to envelop Orel from the north and
west, and as the Central Front failed to advance (this was obvious from the beginning) in its 15
July attack north towards Orel, Rybalko now had to turn south of Orel to envelop the city from
the southwest.

Rybalko's 12th and 15th tank corps attacked from the march at 10:30 a.m. on July 19,
managing, thanks to coordinated artillery and fighter-bomber fire, to cross the Oleshen river
and advance 12 kilometers by nightfall. Major General Rudkin's 15th Tank Corps was stopped
at dusk by the 8.Panzer Division, although Major General Zinkovich's 12th Tank Corps
continued its advance on the northern flank. The next morning Popov ordered Rybalko to
exploit Zinkovich's penetration by attacking northwest to capture the town of Otrada,
throwing the 2nd Mechanized Corps behind the two tank corps, which, however, was unable
to cross the Oka River.

40
At 03:00 am on July 21, Popov split Rybalko's army in two by assigning a new objective. While
the 15th Tank Coprs and 2nd Mechanized Coprs were engaged around Otrada, northeast of
Orel, the remainder of the 3rd Guards Tank Army was to turn south and advance across the
southern shoulder of the penetration. By 25 July the railway line between Kursk and Orel had
been cut, but subsequent attempts by Rybalko to penetrate the German defenses were
unsuccessful. Despite their true "failure" to achieve their assigned decisive objectives,
Rybalko's three corps received the honorary “Guards” distinction for their actions during
Operation Kutuzov.

41
Seeing that he could lose the entire Orel salient, on July 16 Model ordered the Hagen Line
positions to be prepared along the Desna River, but four days later Hitler issued an order from
the Führer prohibiting any further withdrawal by the 9.Armee and 2.Panzerarmee, although
Model managed to get Kluge to make Hitler's order more flexible. This saved Model, because
on July 21, Fediuninsky's 11th Army entered the fray, which was deployed between the 50th
Army and the 11th Guards Army, and in the face of this terrible threath, on July 21 the
2.Panzerarmee was to the left (north) of Orel, while the 9.Armee was fighting to the right
(south) of Orel. That entire sector of Orel protruded like a funnel in the direction of Novosil.
Well, the Second Panzer was threatened with envelopment on its left by the 11th Guards Army
and the 11th and 50th armies, with the 4th Tank Army in the rear, while on its right it had the
3rd Army, 3rd Tank Army and 63rd Army. While the German Ninth Army had the 8th Army on
its left, facing the 2nd Tank Army and the 13th Army and on its right, penetrated, the 70th
Army], he said that before this general threat of envelopment and encirclement, Hitler allowed
Model execute an “elastic defense” on July 22, 1943.

Battle for The City of Orel

On the morning of July 19, 1943, the offensive of the 3rd and 63rd armies resumed. After
artillery preparation, the 25th Rifle Corps advanced 3 to 4 km, expanding the advance towards
the flanks. German troops withdrew from the Oleshnya River line, allowing tank units to be
brought into battle. Deepening the enemy defenses, the 12th and 15th Tank Corps turned
southeast and had to advance south of Orel,
behind the 9th Army, however, there was no rapid
advance towards the German rear. The Germans
were only pushed away from the river, their
defensive positions did not collapse but little by
little the tank units began to break the German
defense where they suffered heavy losses. Despite
everything, the attack of the 3rd Guards Tank Army
was an unpleasant surprise for the German
command, the left wing of the 35.AK near Msensk
was threatened, therefore the German command
decided to withdraw the troops to the Oka line, at
the closest access to the city of Orel.
This situation forced the Soviet command to take
an immediate response to try to seize the various
places to cross the Oka River. The consolidation
and recovery of German troops at this time
seriously complicated the subsequent offensive of
the Red Army, the decision was made by the Supreme Command, Rybalko's 3rd Guards Tank
Army would be deployed and launched towards the Oka, the task of the 3rd Guards Tank
Army, was facilitated by the fact that the 3rd Mechanic Corps had not yet entered battle and
was easily deployed on the river, the 15th Tank Corps also advanced in the same direction. The
tank corps advanced across the road where they defeated several German columns starting
from a bridgehead on the western bank of the Oka and soon units of Gorbatov's army reached
the river.

42
On the afternoon of July 20, Rybalko's army received the order from the headquarters of the
Bryansk Front to move its actions to the south, to the offensive zone of the 63rd Army. The 3rd
Guards Tank Army was to attack again towards Stanovy Kolodez, at which time the German
command concentrated large forces to expel the Soviet troops from the bridgeheads on the
Oka. The first German attacks defeated Rybalko's army units, the situation of the 3rd Army
became seriously complicated, constant shelling, air strikes, infantry and tank attacks caused
heavy losses, Soviet troops resisted but in the end, by order of the command, they were forced
to retreat to the east bank of the Oka.

At this time, the German command reassigned new reinforcements to the Orel area, including
the 12th Panzer Division and the 78th Sturm Division. The German troops suffered heavy
losses, but they held off the attacks of the Soviet tank units and after several unsuccessful
attempts to break through the German defense, the 3rd Guards Tank Army and the 1st Guards
Tank Corps They were taken to the rear to rest.

The battle for Orel continued with the leading role of the forces of the 3rd and 63rd armies, on
the morning of July 25, under the cover of artillery fire and air attacks, part of the right flank of
the 3rd Army forced the Oka, the Sappers crossed the river through the available passes
through which tanks and infantry began to deploy. The Soviet offensive on Orel and the crisis
situation in other areas forced the German command on July 26 to order the withdrawal of
troops from the Orel salient, on August 1, the advanced units of the 3rd Army discovered the
withdrawal of the enemy to the west and Soviet troops began to pursue the enemy.

It cannot be said that the advance of the Soviet troops from that moment on was easy, the
German troops put up stubborn resistance in the intermediate lines to allow the evacuation of
the hospitals and warehouses of Orel, also to destroy the city's infrastructure. Furthermore,
the 3rd Army was bled dry as heavy losses were inflicted on it and the number of troops in the
Divisions advancing in the first echelon was reduced to 3,500 soldiers, however, the loss of a
strong defense line in the Oka River prevented the Germans from creating a sustainable
defense system and they continued to retreat. On August 3, units of General Rendulic's
XXXV.AK in the Orel region were covered by a defensive half ring. To save the city from

43
complete destruction, a special group of tank units of the 3rd Army was formed for the
liberation of the city, at 16.00 on August 4, Soviet troops liberated the eastern part of the city
and on the morning of August 5, Orel was completely liberated from the German army.

44
The Pursuit, Capture of the Towns of Khotynets and Karachev
On July 15, the formations of the Central Front also began to join offensive operations with
the rest of the Orel salient, the troops of the Central Front, under the command of Konstantin
Rokossovsky, where since July 5 they were engaged in intense battles defensive. The Central
Front lost around 34,000 soldiers during these battles, but it cannot be said that these fierce
battles completely bled the Central Front, depriving it of offensive power. In mid-July 1943, the
Central Front numbered about 675,000 soldiers, about 1,500 tanks and self-propelled guns and
about 700 combat aircraft.
It is clear that it was
unreasonable to remain in
the role of a spectator
during the Kutuzov
operation, moreover, the
front It was located near
the southern part of the
Orel salient, which allowed
it to take an active part in
the planned liquidation of
the Germans in the salient.
The headquarters tasked
the right wing of the 48th,
13th and 70th Armies, with the support of the 2nd Tank Army and the 16th Air Army, with the
task of eliminating enemy troops that had entered their defenses during the operation.
Zitadelle, and then advance in the general line in the direction of Kromy, further to the
northwest, to cover the Orlov group from the south and southwest. The most important
instrument of the offensive forces of the Central Front was a powerful artillery group, which
numbered about 7,000 guns and mortars, in the offensive zone of the 13th Army, under the
command of Nikolai Pukhov, a corps of advance artillery, and the 2nd Tank Army (3rd and 16th

Tank Corps, 348 tanks) would be the second step to exploit the success of the 13th Army.

45
On the morning of July 15, artillery preparation began, the morning was expected to be rainy,
so it rained heavily, which meant that the actions of the Soviet aviation were limited. Despite
the powerful artillery preparation, it was not possible to immediately break through the
German defenses, General Model had begun to transfer many mobile units of the 9th Armee
to other sectors of the front but the remaining German troops in the sector were sufficient to
maintain the stability of the defense. Until July 18 there were no significant successes, the
Soviet troops suffered heavy losses when trying to break through the German defensive
positions, however, the offensive of the Central Front forces forced General Model to decide
to withdraw the forces of the 9th Armee to the initial positions from which the Wehrmacht
began Operation Zitadelle, in them, the old defensive fortifications from where the operations
began on July 5 could be used. The withdrawal of troops shortened the front line, facilitating
its defense and freeing several divisions for reserve; the exit was staggered, from one
intermediate line to another.

The lack of rapid advance in the offensive zone of the 13th Army forced the command of the
Central Front on July 17 to regroup the 2nd Tank Army and move it to the offensive zone of the
70th Army. The Central Front received the order to attack Kromy, the most important logistics
center in the rear of the German 9th Army, so since July 19, the 70th Army was advancing
towards the town, the 2nd Tank Army It was about to be used to enter the gap in the German
defense, which the infantry of the 70th Army had to break with the support of the 19th Tank
Corps. On July 20, the 19th Tank Corps was launched to attack, during the first day of the
battle, the corps lost almost half of its tanks.

The 2nd Tank Army concentrated in the area of the 70th Army on 19 July and expecting the
possible success of the 70th Army in its attack, the entry of the 2nd Tank Army into the battle
was postponed until July 22. This delay had a negative effect as German intelligence
discovered the group of tanks and motorized infantry, from July 21 to the night of July 22, the

46
German command brought reserves to the defense zone of the LVI.PzK, the defensive
positions of the German Infantry Divisions on the outskirts of Kromy were reinforced by the 4.
Panzer Division, as a result, when the Soviet 2nd Tank Army launched the attack, it
encountered strong anti-tank defenses, including minefields and strong armored
counterattacks. Germans. During the day, the Central Front advanced only 2-4 km, the losses
were so significant that in the evening the front command issued an order to withdraw troops
to their initial positions, the offensive of the 13th, 70th and 2nd armies’ tanks was stopped.

Rybalko's 3rd Guards Tank Army, which previously had been part of the Bryansk Front, moved
to the Central Front. The 3rd Guards Tank Army already suffered heavy losses in the battles for
the approaches to Orel, but still retained its attack potential; in its composition on July 28,
there were about 350 tanks and 27 self-propelled guns. General Rokossovsky, after the failure
of the 13th and 70th armies and having encountered a strong German defense in his front
areas, decided to use Rybalko's army in the 48th army area, at 14.00 on July 28, 3rd Guards
Tank Army launched the attack, but could not achieve decisive success, for three days the
unsuccessful attacks of the 48th Army and the 3rd Guards Tank Army continued but on the
afternoon of 30 July, the command of the Central Front stopped the offensive on its right
flank. The headquarters of the 3rd Guards Tank Army noted that the main reason for the
failure of the offensive was the small number of motorized infantry available and the lack of
artillery to support the rifle units, as a result, the units of tanks suffered heavy losses from
enemy artillery and once they seized some defensive line, they could not hold it due to the
small number of infantry, so the Front command decided to send Rybalko's army to the area
south of Krom.

Rokossovsky again decided to throw into the battle 2nd Tank Army, in August 1, it consisted of
222 tanks and subordinated 9th Tank Corps about 100 tanks, the defense of the German
XXXXVI.PzK was already very weak by this point only he had 35 tanks (of the 4.Panzer Division)
and 19 StuGs and they suffered heavy losses in the infantry divisions.

August 1, Soviet troops again launched an offensive, despite the heavy losses in armored
vehicles, the new attack of the Central Front was successful, Soviet troops penetrated into the
defensive positions of the XXXXVI.PzK and the Germans suffered significant losses, August 2,

47
killed the commander of the XXXXVI.AK, Hans Zorn, as a result of an air strike. The defense
system of the Orel salient was in a crisis situation, the 9.Armee did not have the reserves to
stabilize the situation, so the German command threw aircraft at the direction of the Soviet
offensive. The Krom district has become a priority for the Luftwaffe. The German air force
struck a successful blow to the command post of the 9th Tank Corps, destroying its long-range
radio communications, Soviet tank formations suffered heavy losses from the effects of
German aviation and anti-tank defense, However, the Soviet tankmen August 4, went on the
road Kromy - Dmitrovsk - Orlovsky, and units of the 9th Tank corps seized a bridgehead on the
river Krom.

While 2nd Tank Army and 9th Tank Corps rushed to Kromy, in the rear of the command of the
Central Front was preparing another tank raid. Rybalko´s 3rd Guards Tank Army received a
replenishment of the 100 new T-34 tanks. August 4, 3rd Guards Tank Army had two tank and
one mechanized corps, and its staffing was only about 40% of the state. However, around 300
combat vehicles was a serious force that could be thrown into battle. Rybalko's army was sent
to the same area where tankmen of the 2nd Tank army fought, August 3, the Guards Army was
preparing for battle.

August 4, the 3rd Guards Tank Army entered the battle, in the evening, the army reached the
line of the Krom River, the river became an important defensive line of the 9.Armee, the Crom
River was small, but with a wide flood plain, in addition, there were heavy rains, sharply
worsening the possibilities of transporting armored vehicles and heavy weapons. Under
Kromy, the German command redeployed the 383.Infanterie Division. The units of the Rybalko
army spent the evening and night in demining the fords and trying to force the river, however,
success was achieved only in the area of the bridgehead near the village of Glinka, which
captured the 9th Tank Corps, Here 6th Guards Tank Corps was shipped, 7th Guards Tank Corps
and 7th Guards Mechanized Corps did not have success in forcing the river, so they also began
to forward to the bridgehead.

July 26, the 12th Tank Corps was renamed the 6th Guards Tank Corps for its distinction in
combat operations during the Orel operation. Accordingly, the 15th Tank Corps of the 26th

48
Arrmy of July converted the 7th Guards Tank Corps and the 2nd mechanized Corps into the 7th
Guards Mechanized Corps.

The German command, trying to get rid of the Soviet bridgehead, August 5, organized a
counter attack with the 383.Infanterie Division, a new reinforcement, the 6.Infanterie Division,
was also transferred to
Kromy. The Luftwaffe
conducted air raids but the
Germans failed to knock out
the Soviet units from the
bridgehead, the bridgehead
was constantly growing,
although it cost the Soviet
troops heavy losses, the soviet
army for three days of fighting
lost more than a hundred
tanks and self-propelled guns,
at this time, Kromy
themselves were assaulted by the units of the 13th Army, the city was completely liberated on
August 6.

The command of the Central Front, in the last attempt to reach the rear of the German forces
retreating from Orel, gave the order to Rybalko's army to advance towards Shablykino. This
town was an important crossroads, and its capture would seriously complicate the withdrawal
of German troops to the Hagen Line. The German command took this threat seriously and
General Model sent the 12th Panzer Division to the area east of Shablykina.

On August 9-10, near the village of Soskovo, a battle took place with the reserves gathered by
General Model and the 3rd Guards Tank Army, here the Germans created one of the
intermediate defensive lines for a retreat organized towards the Hagenn line, the terrain had
been fortified taking advantage of the ravines and small rivers, the Germans also blocked the
most convenient passes for the tanks with anti-tank ditches and minefields, at that time, in the
3rd Guards Tank Army there were some 130 combat tanks, in addition, the artillery of the 13th
Army experienced a number of difficulties with the supply of ammunition and was unable to
provide substantial support to the armored units.

On August 9, the Germans repulsed the first attacks on Soskovo, Rybalko gathered the
remaining tanks into a shock group and decided to surround the town from the north, trying to
search for the rear of the German troops, at night, the sappers withdrew the mines in the
direction planned for the offensive and on August 10 the Soviet tanks launched the offensive
where they penetrated 2-3 km into the depths of the German defense, there, the German
units isolated the infantry of the tank group and launched the 12th Panzer Division against the
Soviet tanks that had broken the lines, there was intense fighting all day and Rybalko's army
suffered heavy losses without having achieved a decisive result, the 3rd Guards Tank Army,
which during the fighting had lost its shock potential, was taken to the rear, and then
transferred to the reserve.

49
The 65th Army, commanded by Pavel Batov, also took part in the offensive of the Central
Front, which had been in charge of the defense of the extreme south since the spring of 1943
and almost did not participate in the defensive operation of the Battle of Kursk, the army de
Batov was in a secondary sector, so its attack potential was weak, it had only a separate tank
regiment (19 KV) at its disposal, in addition, German intelligence discovered the preparations
of the 65th Army for the offensive.
On August 7, the 65th Army
launched an attack and broke the
German defenses in the sector,
soon liberating the city of
Dmitrovsk-Orlovsky, but that was
the end of all his successes.

At the final stage of the struggle

for Orlovsky bulge, a fierce fighting
turned around for the city of
Karachev and Khotynets, which
covered the approaches to the city
of Bryansk. The battle for Karachev
began on August 12, an important
role in the attack on Karachev here
was played by engineering units,
which restored and cleared the
roads destroyed by German troops
during the retreat. And also
repaired roads in a swampy-
wooded area. By the end of August
14, Soviet troops broke through
the German defenses east and
northeast of Karachev and on
August 15 liberated the city from
the enemy, with the release of
Karachev from the German troops,
the Orel offensive operation was almost completed.

Conclusions
After August 9 and 10, the command of the Central Front took into reserve all mobile units
that suffered significant losses in battles, attempts to encircle and destroy parts of the 9.
Armee and the 2. Panzerarmee failed, on August 18 August, the German command evacuated
almost the entire vast Orel salient and withdrew troops to the Hagen line.

During the battles from July 15 to August 18 in the Orel salient, the Central Front lost 165,000
soldiers, of which 48,000 were killed and missing, so Rokossovsky recognized that Kutuzov's
plan was erroneous, in his opinion, the troops of the Central and Western Front should have
been given time to prepare converging attacks towards Orel. In reality, the Soviet troops had
to push the enemy out of the Orel salient and then carry out intense positional battles. It must
also be taken into account that German intelligence revealed the regrouping of tank
formations on the offensive line of the 70th Army and the preparations for the 65th Army of
the Central Front, therefore, when STAVKA decided to start converging attacks from the south

50
and north of the Orel salient in the general direction of Orel, it is most likely that the German
command could have taken measures to alleviate the movement and transfer reserves of the
dismantled attack groups to support the tasks in dangerous directions.

Total losses on the Western, Bryansk and Central Fronts amounted to more than 429,000
soldiers, of which more than 112,000 were killed and missing, more than 2,500 tanks and self-
propelled guns, about 900 guns and mortars, and more than 1,000 aircraft were lost. The
2.PanzerArmee and the 9.Armee in the period from July 10 to August 20, 1943 lost more than
88,000 soldiers and a large amount of material.

However, Kutuzov's operation must be recognized as successful, on July 29, Bolkhov was
liberated by Soviet troops, and on the morning of August 5, Orel. On August 18, Soviet troops
reached the German defensive line Hagen, east of Bryansk. With the major defeat of the
armies of the Heeresgruppe Mitte near Orel, the German command's plans to use the salient
to carry out an offensive operation in the eastern direction collapsed the Kutuzov operation
and then the Rumyantsev in the Belgorod-Kharkov sector and Suvorov in the Smolensk-Roslav
sector, gradually developed into a general offensive of the Red Army towards the west,
liberating vast Soviet territories from German occupation.

The summer campaign of 1943 was a turning point in the war on the Eastern Front, due to the
failure of Operation Zitadelle, German units suffered significant losses in manpower and
equipment, the Wehrmacht forever lost the strategic initiative and already could not gather
such important forces for an offensive, from this moment on, the German army had to defend
itself, gradually giving up the territory occupied since 1941, suffering defeats and obtaining
only local successes that could not change the outcome of the war.

51
List of Scenarios
#43_0705_01: Zitadelle, The Northern Flank

Operation Zitadelle was planned as a pincer attack from the north and south base of the Kursk
salient, the objective being to eliminate the Soviet units there. The Soviet high command had
already identified the Kursk salient as the upcoming German summer offensive. As the
Germans were slow to begin their campaign, the Soviet high command had the time it needed
to fortify the salient.

The attack on the northern front of the Orel salient, was assigned to Model's AOK.9. The plan
was to advance through the dense Soviet defenses and to link up with the German units
advancing from the south. The Soviets anticipating this, had prepared a defensive line with the
objective of weakening AOK.9, with the intention of later launching a counteroffensive in
conjunction with those executed to the north and east of Orel.

#43_0712_01: Operation Kutuzov, The Battle for the Orel Salient

Operation Kutuzov was one of the planned counterattacks following Operation Zitadelle.
STAVKA knew that the German attack would occur on the flanks of the Kursk salient, so the
plan was simple: to attrite the attacking AOK.9, especially its armoured units, and to follow this
with a concentric attack on the Orel salient.

Three Soviet fronts would participate: the Western Front under Sokolovski's command, the
Bryansk Front under Popov's command, and Rokossovsky's Central Front. The objective was
elimination of the Model's AOK.9 and PzAOK.2.

Model, anticipating a Soviet counterattack, did not to commit the full potential of his AOK.9 to
the Zitadelle operation, holding reinforcements to the north of his main effort.

The Central Front had suffered heavy losses and their counterattack to the south of Orel was
delayed until 15th July, giving Model time to confront the Soviet advances north and east of
Orel.

#43_0712_02: The Advance of the 11th Gds Army

Following some initial recon-in-force operations, Bagramyan's 11th Guards Army launched a
powerful attack on July 12th against the 211th, 293rd Infanterie Divisions and the 25th Panzer
Grenadier Division of the LIII.AK. The Germans had prepared strong fortifications in this sector
The plan was simple: the 11th Guards Army would attack with three Guards Rifle Corps, the
16th, 8th and 36th, with the 1st and 5th Tank Corps in reserve in order to exploit any holes in
the line created by the Guards infantry corps. The 16th and 8th Guards Rifle Corps would
attack southwards towards the important centers of Klsyn and Krapvina. The 36th Guards Rifle
Corps would attack south-eastwards, to support the 61st Army in its advance to Bolkhov, with
the help of the 5th Tank Corps. Meanwhile, the 1st Tank Corps would strike in a southerly
direction to support the other two Rifle corps. The 50th and 61st Armies would also support
the 11th Guards Army’s attack by providing security on the flanks. The LIII.AK, well protected in
its positions, had the 5th Panzer division in reserve, a few kilometers south of the main axis of
Soviet advance.

52
#43_0712_04: Bagramyan 's 11th Gds Army

General Bagramyan’s 11th Guards Army was the main shock group of Sokolovski’s Western
Front. It consisted of three Guard Rifle Corps, the 16th, 8th and 36th, and two Tank Corps, the
5th and 1st. Bagramyan’s main task was to break the German lines in a 14-kilometre sector
between Glinnaya and Ozhigovo and then head in the direction of Belyi Verkh, Ulyanovo and
Krapivna. The goal was to reach Bolkhov and in conjunction with the 61st Army, to pocket and
destroy the German units that were there. For this purpose, they would have the support of
1st Air Army. This scenario simulates the first moves of the 11th Guards Army and the defense
of the sector by the LIII.AK. The Germans would have part of the 5th Panzer Division in
support.

#43_0712_06: The First Steps of the 50th Army and the 11th Guards Army

The main objective of the northern attack of the Orel salient, after breaching the German lines,
was to head towards Bolkhov. The intent was to pocket the German units defending In that
sector of the Orel salient. A secondary objective was to head towards Karachev to cut the
communications between Orel and Bryansk. To achieve this breakout, the Soviet High
Command assigned the 11th Guards Army under the command of General Bagramyan. The
11th Guards Army was a powerful, fresh, and rested formation that had to penetrate the lines
of the LIII.AK of General Cloessner and the LV.AK of General Jaeschke. The LIII.AK had the 5th
Panzer Division in reserve in the Krapvina area. The 11th Guards Army was assisted by the 50th
Army, which was to support the breakout by pinning the LV.AK in place and defending the
flank of 11th Guards Army. The Western Front, which controlled the attack, also had the 1st
and 5th Tank Corps in the second echelon to support the expected breakthrough.

#43_0712_08: The 61st Army's Attack Towards Bolkhov

The Soviet 61st Army, commanded by General Belov, consisted of two rifle corps, the 46th and
9th Guards, and was supported by the 20th Tank Corps. The lead unit of the army’s attack
would be 9th Guards Rifle Corps with the 20th Tank Corps in support. These two units were to
attack in the direction of Tolkachevo and Bolkhov. The 49th Rifle Corps was to launch a
secondary attack farther north to pin the German defenders and make local gains of territory.
Once the 61st Army had captured and secured Bolkhov, it was to turn its striking power 90
degrees to the left so as to flank the important communications center of Orel from the north
and to support the 3rd and 63rd Armies that were attacking further south. The German
defense consisted of a fortified line held by the LIII Armee Korps with 112th Infanterie Division
in reserve in the city of Bolkhov.

#43_0712_11: 9th Guards Rifle Corps Crosses Oka River

On July 12, 1943, the 9th Guards Rifle Corps of General Belov’s 61st Army, had the mission to
cross the river Oka, take the towns on the west bank of the river and once established in their
bridgeheads, was to advance towards the strategic city of Bolkhov. Within the city was a large
logistics center supporting all the northern Orel front. The German high command had built
significant fortifications both along the river Oka and in the city itself. The 9th Guards Rifle

53
Corps was supported by the powerful artillery of the 7th Breakthrough Artillery Corps and had
armored support from the 68th Tank Bde. General Belov also kept the 20th Tank Corps in
reserve.

#43_0712_12: Bolkhov Offensive Operation (Entire North Salient)

Both the Western Front and the Bryansk Front started the Soviet counteroffensive after
Zitadelle on 12 July 1943, their objective was to eliminate the German units of PzAOK.2 and
AOK.9 defending in the Orel salient. The units of the Western Front and 61st Army of the
Bryansk Front were to engage the German troops defending Bolkhov and Orel. The Western
Front planned to employ the 50th Army and the 11th Guards Army to attack towards the south
and to cut communications with Bryansk. Bryansk Front, 61st Army was to advance towards
the important objective of Bolkhov, and once captured, to head towards Orel. These
operations would be complemented by the counter-offensive launched from the south of the
Orel salient by Rokossovsky Central Front three days later.

#43_0712_14: The 41st Rifle Corps Attack

The General Urbanovich's 41st Rifle Corps was part of the 3rd Army. On July 12th 1943, he had
orders to attack across the Neruch river and break through the defensive lines of the
56.Infanterie Division. The German units had fortifications on the river and in a series of towns
that were located a little further to the rear. These towns would serve as points of resistance if
the Soviet units managed to progress beyond the Neruch. This area of the front was
considered by the Germans to be a quiet area and despite the solid defenses built by
Luedecke's Division, they did not expect the Soviets to attempt to cross the river. The 41st Rifle
Corps consisted of three rifle divisions, the 235th, 308th and 380th. Of these three the 235th
had secured a small bridgehead under cover of nightfall. From these positions, the 235th Rifle
Division would lead the weight of the attack by 41st Rifle Corps.

#43_0712_15: The 63rd Army Attack Across of the Neruch'

The 63rd Army was tasked to attack along its right flank and break through the enemy's
defense in the Setukha sector. Once achieved, the army was to move toward Steproy, reach
the line of the Orel-Zmievka railroad and paved road, and subsequently turn to the north. If
successful, 63rd Army would outflank Orel from the south, and hopefully capture the city in
conjunction with the 3rd Army. In addition, 63rd Army was to also launch a supporting attack
from the line of the Optukha river further to the north and attack Orel from the east.

#43_0712_16: The Battle for Orel

The Bryansk Front of General Popov oversaw the attack east of the Orel salient, for which he
employed the 61st, 3rd and 63rd Army. Both the 11th Guards Army of the Western Front and
the 48th Army of the Central Front assisted in the broader assault. The 3rd and 63rd Army had
to launch a frontal attack to breach the solid fortifications of General Rendulic’s XXXV.AK. Once
they cleared the German positions sited on the Oskol River, they had to advance westward

54
towards the city of Orel, their main target. The 63rd Army devised its attack in two echelons,
with Bryansk Front’s 25th Rifle Corps in reserve, to be committed the following day. General
Gorbatov in command of the 3rd Army would employ the 41st Rifle Corps for the main thrust
of his army and would be supported by 1st Guards Tank Corps.

#43_0712_17: Capture of the City of Msensk

Msensk was a city on the banks of the Neruch' River that was an important part of the XXXV.AK
defensive line. General Rendulic had stationed General Hochbaum's 34.Infanterie Division in
what had been a quiet sector of the front. The Division had a bridgehead on the other side of
the river that protected the approaches that led to Msensk from the east. The bridgehead was
protected by powerful fortifications that the Germans had constructed over many months. The
positions consisted of trenches and bunkers surrounded by minefields. General Rendulic
ordered the 34.Infanterie Division to defend the town and fortifications on the east bank. For
the two divisions of the Soviet 3rd Army tasked with the assault on the city of Msensk, it was
going to be a great challenge to reduce and capture the bridgehead despite having carefully
prepared this attack and having significant artillery and air support.

#43_0712_18: Orel Offensive Operation

Operation Kutuzov was one of the planned counterattacks following Operation Zitadelle.
STAVKA knew that the German attack would occur on the flanks of the Kursk salient, so the
plan was simple: to attrite the attacking AOK.9, especially its armoured units, and to follow this
with a concentric attack on the Orel salient.

Three Soviet fronts would participate: the Western Front under Sokolovski's command, the
Bryansk Front under Popov's command, and Rokossovsky's Central Front. The objective was
elimination of the Model's AOK.9 and PzAOK.2.

Model, anticipating a Soviet counterattack, did not to commit the full potential of his AOK.9 to
the Zitadelle operation, holding reinforcements to the north of his main effort.

The Central Front had suffered heavy losses and their counterattack to the south of Orel was
delayed until 15 July, giving Model time to confront the Soviet advances north and east of
Orel.

#43_0713_01: The 50th Army Advance

The 50th Army, under command of General Boldin, had to protect the right flank of General
Bagramyan’s 11th Guards Army. The left flank of the 50th Army, with the 212th and 324th
Rifle Divisions, launched an attack on Kolpino. This move, with the support of the 64th Rifle
Division, was planned to destroy the 134.Infanterie Division. On July 13th the entire 50th Army
went on the offensive with a general attack on Zikeevo, while the 38th Rifle Corps was to pin
German units to prevent them from sending reinforcements to slow down the Soviet advance.

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#43_0713_03: The Neighbor Operation

The 50th Army protected the right flank of the General Bagramyan's 11th Guards Army. The
50th Army attacked on the morning of July 13th with two of their rifle divisions, the 212th and
324th, after a short artillery barrage in the Rechitsa-Chermyshovo sector. Its aim was to force
the river Reka Zhizdra and break the German lines in the direction of Khotlovo. The Germans
had prepared the defense with a well-organized system of trenches, wire, and minefields to
stop any attack in the sector.

#43_0714_01: Attack on Zikeevo

Due to the failure of the left wing of the 50th Army in its July 13th breach attempt, General
Boldin, commander of the 50th Army, ordered an offensive on July 14th to continue
supporting 11th Guards Army operations further to the east. Behind a small 30-minute artillery
barrage, the 64th Rifle Division began an attack in the Kremischnoe area, followed a day later
by the 49th and 413th Rifle Divisions. The target was to cross the fortified German frontline
and reach the important Zikeevo railway junction, and in tandem, advance towards towards
Bagramyan’s army to the south.

#43_0715_01: The Counterattack of Rokossovsky's Central Front

After the start of Operation Kutuzov to the north and east of Orel, Zitadelle’s operations were
paralysed. Model had already prevented a complete Soviet breakthrough and began sending
reinforcements to the north. He ordered the AOK.9 divisions to stay on the defensive and
retreat to their former positions before Zitadelle. Rokossovsky designed a battle of attrition,
with the idea of weakening the spearheads of the AOK.9 during Zitadelle. After the start of
Operation Kutuzov, Central Front launched its counterattack against the AOK.9 forming the
southern wing of Kutuzov. Central Front could not begin its attack on July 12 due to its heavy
losses during Zitadelle and had to allow its exhausted troops rest and replenish its armoured
units. This three days pause allowed Model, now commander of AOK.9 and PzAOK.2, to send
the necessary reinforcements north to face the threat of the attacking Bryansk and Western
Fronts.

#43_0724_01: Fight in the Forest of Karachev

Northwest of Bolkhov, the Soviet divisions had broken through the German lines on a width of
almost 30 kilometres and were advancing in a southwesterly direction through the almost
impenetrable forests north of Karachev. The Soviet units had already penetrated more than
forty kilometres into the German rear area and was threatening both the city as well as the
road and rail links between Orel and Karachev. These two communications lines, over which
supplies for the German units in the Orel salient flowed day and night, were directly
threatened. The mission of the Panzer-Grenadier Division Grossdeutschland and other arriving
reserve units was to prevent these links from being severed and to destroy the advancing
enemy forces.

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#43_0724_04: Clash at Alekhino

As the units of the Panzergrenadier Division Grossdeutschland were arriving in the Karachev
area, they were sent to protect the road and the railway linking Bryansk with Orel. Soviet units
had broken through the German lines at Bolkhov and were heading to the southeast. The
German command did not know where they were and began to send the first elements of
Grossdeutschland to the northeast with the intention of denying access from that direction to
the main line connecting Karachev with Orel which at that time was defended by XXXV.AK. One
of the first units available, was the Panzer Grenadier Regiment GD that was sent towards
Alekhino. This fully motorized unit began the march in the early hours of July 24 from
Karachev.

#43_0725_01: The Reconquest of the City of Orel

On the night of 23rd - 24th July, the Bryansk Front commander, Major General Popov, issued
orders for the 3rd and 63rd armies to regroup their forces as quickly as possible and capture
the city of Orel. The attack would be carried out via concentric attacks from the north (3rd
army) and south (63rd army), the two armies had to act jointly and overwhelm the group of
German forces defending Orel. These were General Rendulic's XXXV.AK and part of the Gruppe
Harpe, which guarded the heavily fortified Oka River and Optukha River from mid-July in
anticipation of the need for rear defense lines. The battle for the reconquest of Orel was an
intense fight, due to the tenacious defense by the Germans. The delay at Orel allowed General
Model to prepare an orderly withdrawal towards the Hagen line and thus protect the
important communication and supply hub that was the city of Bryansk.

#43_0725_05: The Fight for the City of Orel

The commander of the 63rd Army, General Kolpakchi, in coordination with the left wing of the
3rd Army, prepared a plan to encircle the city of Orel from the south-east while pressing a
frontal attack towards the city through the defenses of the 12.Panzer Division. For this attack,
he had two divisions of the 3rd Army's 41st Rifle Corps and Bryansk Fronts 250th and 287th
Rifle Divisions, with the 63rd Army's 397th Rifle Division as their operational reserve. General
Rendulic, the German commander of XXXV.AK, needed to delay the Soviet advance with a
forceful defense, in order to buy time to evacuate the city of Orel. The city was a large German
logistics center that, at the time, was full of wounded awaiting transfer to the rear.

#43_0725_07: The Defence of the 12th Panzer Division

After the fall of Bolkhov, it was obvious that Soviet efforts would focus on the liberation of the
city of Orel. The town was an important logistics center and communications hub that fed and
redirected the German effort to hold onto the Orel salient. By mid-July, the situation was
rapidly deteriorating after the fall of Bolkhov for the retreating German forces. General Model
ordered the defense of the city, which had been heavily fortified. The objective was to gain
time to allow his forces to withdraw and to consolidate the defenses further east. For this, he
transferred the 12th Panzer Division from the northern sector of the salient, to protect the

57
approaches to the east of the city, the most threatened, with the order to contain the Soviet
troops advancing towards it.

#43_0806_01: Operation Kutuzov, 2nd Phase

Operation Kutuzov is a massive battle spanning more than a month and a half of fighting in the
Orel salient. This campaign is clearly divided into two phases. In the first phase, the armies of
the Western Front and, from July 15th, the Central Front, attempted to isolate the Orel salient
to the north and south. The aim was to pocket the German PzAOK.2 and AOK.9 armies that
were deployed around the perimeter of the salient, while the armies of the Bryansk Front
fought for the city of Bolkhov and the eastern approaches to Orel. After a period focused on
the fight for the city of Orel and the German efforts to defend the city in late July, the German
objective was changed to gain time to withdraw to preprepared defenses further west. These
defenses were known as the Hagen Line. They would make it possible to defend the important
communications and logistics center that was the city of Bryansk. The second phase of
Operation Kutuzov begins on August 6th, 1943, when the Soviet armies of the Bryansk Front
launched attacks from the north and east towards the towns of Khotynets and Karachev. These
two cities had been heavily fortified by the Germans and have to be liberated to allow a
subsequent offensive towards Bryansk. This part of Operation Kutuzov runs parallel to another
Soviet operation further north, Operation Suvorov or the 2nd Battle of Smolensk, which forced
the German high command to send reinforcement units from the Bryansk area to the
Smolensk theater of operations, weakening PzAOK.2 and AOK.9 further. These armies had
already suffered heavy losses after more than six weeks of intense fighting, although the
Soviet armies had paid a heavy price at the hands of the German units.

#43_0806_03: The Capture of the Towns of Khotynets and Karachev

As the offensive towards Orel developed in late July, the Germans counterattacked north of
the railway line and paved road linking Bryansk with Orel. The objective was to keep this
important communication channel open, since it was the only one through which the group of
forces defending Orel could withdraw. Bryansk Front had the aspiration not only to recapture
the city of Orel, but also encircle the German defenders. This necessitated an attack on the
cities of Khotymets and Karachev, which were halfway along the road linking Bryansk and Orel.
The objective was twofold, firstly, it was to cut off the access from the west to Orel, both by
road and by rail, which could lead to the retreat of the German units defending the city. The
second objective was to have a suitable place to continue the advance to the west with the
idea of liberating the city of Bryansk, another important German logistics center that now
supported the German forces in the Orel salient. The German command, aware of the great
importance of this route to the rear of Orel, intensely prepared the towns of Khotynets and
Karachev with the aim of keeping this route open through which to evacuate the city of Orel.
The Soviet attack would be carried out by General Bagramyan's 11th Guards Army, this unit
had been reinforced with two armored corps, the 1st Tank Corps and the 25th Tank Corps. The
11th Guards Army was ordered to break through in its advance to the south with the objective
of capturing Kothynets and Karachev. The Bryansk Front also added the 4th Tank Army, this
mechanized army would advance through the gap that the 11th Guards Army had to create in
the advance to the south. After the capture of the two population centers, the rest of the
Bryansk Front, the 11th, 61st, and 3rd Armies as well as the 63rd Army of the Central Front,

58
would join the offensive with the aim of destroying the group of German forces that defended
the area around and beyond Orel.

#43_0806_06: The Fighting for Khotynets

The offensive for the capture of the towns of Karachev and Khotynets were entrusted to
Bagramyan's 11th Guards Army. The main effort fell to the left wing of the 11th Guards Army
composed of the 8th and 36th Guards Rifle Corps reinforced by two tank corps, the 1st and
25th. After breaking through the German lines, the two Guards Rifle Corps were ordered to
capture Khotynets which had been heavily fortified by the Germans. Once cleared, they were
expected to advance south with the aim of cutting off communications between Orel and
Bryansk. Following behind would be the 1st and the 25th Tank Corps. The Bryansk Front added
the 4th Tank Army which would support the initial advance of the 11th Guards Army and head
south with the aim reaching west of Orel.

#43_0807_01: 16th Guards Rifle Corps Advance Towards Karachev

The 16th Guards Rifle Corps had consolidated their positions on the line between Paseka and
the woods north of Izmorozn. The Guards Rifle Corps, which formed the right wing of the 11th
Guards Army, had the mission of covering the operations of the main attack group which was
the 8th and 36th Guards Rifle Corps and their offensive towards Khotynets in the east. General
Lapshov's objective was to reach the outskirts of Karachev. 16th Guards Rifle Corps had the
11th, 16th and 31st Rifle Division and the support of the 29th Tank Brigade. In the reserve was
the 1st Rifle Division. The Germans had entrenched the approaches to Karachev, since this city
was the last strong point before the important strategic hub that was Bryansk.

#43_0812_01: The Fall of Karachev

As a result of the 11th Guards and 4th Tank armies' successful offensive, favorable conditions
were created for further advances in the direction of Karachev and Bryansk. Capturing the
Bryansk railroad junction would result in fracturing the enemy's front. General Popov, the
Bryansk Front commander, made the following decisions: Develop the offensive by the forces
of the 11th Guards Army toward Karachev from the east. The 11th Army's left wing was to
launch an attack from the northeast, outflanking the German's Karachev group of forces. The
concentric attacks by the two armies adjoining flanks would capture Karachev and open the
approaches to Bryansk. To the left, units of the 4th Tank Army, were to cooperate in the
advance towards Karachev, pinning the local Axis forces and denying their use in the defense
of the town.

#43_0814_01: Pursuing the Enemy, The Battles for Zhizdra and Khavastovichi

As a result of the Soviet advance on Karachev and the Western Front offensive in the Spas-
Demensk area in the Smolensk sector, the situation was difficult for the German troops
defending the area east of the Bolva River. Concerned that his communications would be cut
off, General Model ordered a withdrawal during the night of August 13-14. The movement was

59
undetected by the 50th and 11th Army until the morning of August 14th. In the early hours of
that morning both armies began the pursuit of the German units, attacking in the direction of
Zhizdra and Khastovichi. On the 15th of August, the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps joined the
offensive with the objective of cutting the railway line between Bryansk and Sukhinichi. This
offensive was the first preparatory moves against Bryansk that would become a full attack
launched on August 18th and run parallel to Operation Suvorov, the liberation of Smolensk.

#43_0815_01: The Von Kurowski Defence

While the 50th Army and 11th Army's offensive was progressing against the city of Zhizdra, in
the south the 50th Army's 38th Rifle Corps had remained on the defensive. This changed on
the morning of August 15th when General Boldin ordered the 38th Rifle Corps to go on the
offensive. The German lines were solidly entrenched in various towns that were the
responsibility of General Von Kurowski's 110.Infanterie Division. The first objectives of the
38th Rifle Corps would be the towns of Bukan and Andreevo-Paliki that had been fortified by
Von Kurowski's men.

60
Appendices
Selected Bibliography
Articles And Books
7th Panzer Division: The Ghost Division, 1939-1945 – Tankwaffe Publishers

9th Panzer Division 1940-1943-Marek Kruk

9th Panzer Division 1941-1945-Marek Kruk

Air War Over Kursk: Turning Point in the East - Dmitriy B. Khazanov

Armored Bears: The German 3rd Panzer Division in World War II (Volume 2) - Veterans of 3rd
Panzer division

Battle Orders: Panzer Divisions: The Eastern Front 1941–43 - Pier Paolo Battistelli

Citadel, Prokhorovka and Kharkov: The armoured losses of the II SS Panzer Korps
Sonderverbände during the battle of Kursk, July-August 1943-Ben Wheatley

Das Reich: The Military Role of the 2nd SS Division - James Sidney Lucas

Decision in the Ukraine: German Panzer Operations on the Eastern Front, Summer 1943 -
George M. Nipe

Did Vatutin Err When Planning the Defense of the Voronezh Front While Preparing for the
Battle of Kursk-Valerii Zamulin

Drive to the Dnieper: The Soviet 1943 Summer Campaign - Steve Robert Waddell

From the Don to the Dnepr: Soviet Offensive Operations, December 1942 – August 1943 -
David M. Glantz

German Order of Battle vol 1 panzer and Panzegrenadier Divisions – G.F. Nafziger

German Order of Battle vol 2 Waffen SS - Luftwaffe - Mountain and Naval divisions – Nafziger

German Order of Battle vol 3 Artillery independient Bn, Railroad, Coastal flak – G.F Nafziger

German Order of Battle Vol 4 German infantry divisions 1-299 – G.F Nafziger

German Order of Battle Vol 5 German infantry divisions 300-999 Named and Corps
Detachment- G.F Nafziger

Ghost Division: The 11th "Gespenster" Panzer Division and the German Armored Force in
World War II - A. Harding Ganz

Grossdeutschland - Guderian's Eastern Front Elite-Michael Sharpe and Brian L. Davis

Kursk 1943: The Greatest Battle of the Second World War - Roman Töppel

Kursk 1943: The Southern Front - Robert Forczyk

Kursk: The Air Battle: July 1943 - Christer Bergstrom

Kursk: The German View - Steven H. Newton

61
Mine and Countermine Operations in the Battle of Kursk-Andrew Remson and Debbie
Anderson

Panzerkorps Grossdeutschland, Vol. 2-Helmuth Spaeter

Red Army Handbook, 1939-1945-Steven J. Zaloga and Leland S. Ness

Retribution: The Soviet Reconquest of Western Ukraine, 1943-44 - Prit Buttar

Soviet Defensive Tactics at Kursk, July 1943 (CSI Report No. 11) - Colonel David M. Glantz

Soviet Order of Battle WWII: Vol. 1 "The Deadly Beginning"

Soviet Tank, Mechanized, Motorized Divisions and Tank Brigades of 1940-1942 - Charles C.
Sharp

Soviet Order of Battle WWII: Vol. 2 “School Of Battle” Soviet Tank Corps and Tank Brigades
January 1942 to 1945 - Charles C. Sharp

Soviet Order of Battle WWII: Vol. 3 “Red Storm” Soviet Mechanized Corps and Guards Armored
Units 1942-1945 - Charles C. Sharp

Soviet Order of Battle WWII: Vol. 6 "Red Thunder" Soviet Artillery Corps, Divisions and
Brigades 1941-1945 - Charles C. Sharp

Spearhead: Grossdeutschland: Guderian's Eastern Front Elite - Michael Sharpe & Brian L. Davis

SS-Das Reich: The History of the Second SS Division, 1941-1945 - Gregory L. Mattson

Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East - Earl F. Ziemke

Surviving Prokhorovka: German armoured longevity on the Eastern Front in 1943–1944

(Journal of Intelligence History Vol. 21, 2022 - Issue 1) - Ben Wheatley

The Battle of Kursk - David M. Glantz & Jonathan House

The Battle for Kursk 1943: The Soviet General Staff Study (Cass Series on the Soviet Study of
War, No. 10) - David M. Glantz & Harold S. Orenstein

The Battle of Kursk: The Red Army’s Defensive Operations and Counter-Offensive, July-August
1943 - Richard W. Harrison

The Forgotten Battle of the Kursk Salient: 7th Guards Army’s Stand Against Army Detachment
Kempf - Valeriy Zamulin

The History of the Panzerkorps Grossdeutschland, Vol. 2 - Helmuth Spaeter

The Red Army Handbook 1939-1945 - Steven J. Zaloga & Leland S. Ness

Tigers of the Death's Head: SS Totenkopf Division's Tiger Company - Ian Michael Wood

Viking Panzers: The German SS 5th Tank Regiment in the East in World War II - Ewan Klapdor

Zitadelle: The German Offensive Against the Kursk Salient 4-17 July 1943 - Mark Healy

NARA Rolls
T-312 R-320

T-312 R-322

62
T313 R172

T313 R175

T-314 R-691

T 314 R 864

T-314 R-987

T314 R1328

T-314 R-1329

T314 R1379

Russian Army Staff Documents

Boyevoy Sostav Sovetskoy Armii - Combat Strength of the Soviet Army (BSSA), July through
September 1943 - Voroshilov Academy of the General Staff

Boyevoy Sostav Obshchevoyskovykh Armiy - Combat Strength of the Combined Armies (BSOA),
1 st - 10th - 20th July through September 1943 - Military Historical Department of the Military
Scientific Directorate of the General Staff

Websites Axis History Factbook

Axis History Factbook http://www.axishistory.com/

Combat Operations of the Red Army in WWII http://bdsa.ru/

Feldgrau: German Armed Forces Research http://www.feldgrau.com/

Generals of WWII http://www.generals.dk/

Infanterie-Divisionen http://www.diedeutschewehrmacht.de/infanterie%20division.htm

Lexicon der Wehrmacht http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/

Orders of Battle and Organisations http://niehorster.org/

Credits
Scenario Design: Daniel Asensio, César Librán Moreno

Project Coordinator: David Freer

Order of Battle: Daniel Asensio

Game Map: Dave "Blackie" Blackburn, David Freer, Bill Peters

Unit Graphics: David Freer

Playtest Coordinator: Tim Schoen

Playtesters: Martin Cole, Jeff Connor, Jamie Harmon, Paul Krystofiak, Don Lazov, Dan Moyer,
Dave Prucha, Mark Rue, Tobias Timm, David Yomtov

63