NATIONAL LAW INSTITUTE UNIVERSITY, BHOPAL

[LL.M.]

COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

PROJECT ASSIGNMENT ON
UNICAMERALISM AND BICAMERALISM: COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
SYSTEMS IN INDIA, USA AND DENMARK

UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF

DR. SUSHMA SHARMA

SUBMITTED BY
MITALI KHATRI
Roll No. - 2023LLM62

TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................4
REVIEW OF LITERATURE........................................................................................................6
STATEMENT OF PROBLEM.....................................................................................................8
OBJECTIVES OF STUDY..........................................................................................................8
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY..................................................................................................8
HYPOTHESIS............................................................................................................................9
LIMITATION AND SCOPE.........................................................................................................9
RESEARCH QUESTIONS.........................................................................................................9
CHAPTER 2 - BICAMERAL SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT AND ITS PROBLEMS....................10
CHAPTER 3 - UNDERLYING ISSUES IN UNICAMERAL SYSTEM..........................................12
CHAPTER 4 - ADVANTAGES OF BICAMERALISM AND UNICAMERALISM...........................15
CHAPTER 5 - THE EFFECTIVE SYSTEM.................................................................................17
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS.........................................................................................19
BIBLIOGRAPHY..........................................................................................................................20
 LIST OF ABBREVIATION

ABBREVIATION FULL FORM

Art/s Article/s

s/ss Section/s

V. Versus

etc. Etcetera
 CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

The relative merits of bicameral and unicameral legislatures have been the subject of extensive
debate among academics, political scientists, and students. One of the most important aspects of
any constitution is how the legislature is organized. Depending on whether it is unicameral or
bicameral, it may have one or two chambers. Very tiny nations or nations with unitary systems of
government usually have unicameral legislatures. Federal states, regardless of size, frequently
have bicameral legislatures, with one house typically representing the principal territorial
subdivisions.

The United States Congress serves as a prime example, with the Senate having two senators
elected by the people of each state and the House of Representatives having 435 members
elected from single-member districts with about equal populations. Except for Nebraska, all 50
US states have bicameral legislatures. In the 49 U.S. states with bicameral legislatures, both
houses have the authority to adopt legislation, but the upper houses also have the special
responsibility of approving the governors' appointments. Although one chamber has more
authority than the other, bicameral legislatures are found in the majority of countries with unitary
systems. The House of Lords and the House of Commons, for instance, make up the bicameral
legislature in the UK under a unitary system.

Simple majority rule is encouraged by the unicameral system, whereas the founders established
the bicameral system on purpose to prevent it. Double representation in a bicameral democracy
promotes the balanced representation of competing interests, which is a more equitable and
inclusive goal than the use of the simple majority rule. Numerous academics have praised the
bicameral system of government, however there are some flaws that, if fixed, would allow it to
meet the needs of any federal state.
We can see that policy stability is a likely result of bicameralism: Although the process of
enacting legislation is complex, once a policy has become law, opponents of that policy face
significant challenges when they try to enact alternative policies.1

1 John Uhr, Bicameralism Chapter 24, 474, 475.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

1. Saul Levmore, in his work, discussed the advantages of Bicameralism over

Unicameralism. According to his opinion, bicameralism might be able to address the
agenda-manipulating setter's authority, one problem with cyclical majorities.
Bicameralism also offers a means of preventing some government engagement based on
the consent of the majority of lawmakers. Bicameralism is seen in this context as a
substitute for some forms of super majoritarianism. He explains why in legislative
circumstances one dominates over the other but not in other situations. He thinks that we
need a deeper understanding of the relative choice costs of bicameralism and other
arrangements in order to develop a general theory explaining why and when we adopt
specific conservative institutions. However, he doesn't think that two decisions are
always better than one when it comes to political decision-making; rather, he thinks that
bicameralism is used when an additional check on legislative involvement is desired. 2

2. Stephen Ansolabehere, James Synder and Michael Ting in their work explained that how
bicameralism depicts unequal bargains and biases especially in America. There are three
different sets of outcomes, as they have stated. First off, it's incredible that all House
members expect to receive the same compensation when legislation originates in the
House and is then evaluated by the Senate in a closed system. Second, they attempted to
show how small state biases can manifest themselves when supermajority requirements
are put in place in the improperly divided houses, legislation is introduced in the Senate,
resulting in improperly distributed proposal probabilities, and third, the distributive goods
are "lumpy". Bicameral legislatures that have unequal representation distribute public
revenues unfairly.3

2 Saul Levmore, ‘Bicameralism: When Are Two Decisions Better than One?’(1992) 12 International
Review of Law and Economics 145.
3 Stephen Ansolabehere, James M. Synder and Michael M. Ting,‘Bargaining in bicameral legislatures’
(2003) 97 (3) American Political Science Review.
 3. William Riker explains the advantages of the Bicameral system, along with the fact that
this concept was being highly appreciated in the mid 18th century. He bases his argument
on contemporary descriptive political theory. Unlike unicameralism, which aims to
increase majority tyranny, bicameralism aims to lessen it. In contrast to other delay
methods, it allows majority decision when there is a clear majority preference. By doing
this, it accepts the majority rule's advantages while avoiding its disadvantages.4

4. The Senator from Nebraska, George Norris, explains the advantages of Unicameral
Legislature over Bicameral Legislature. No authority would be transferred from the
House to the Senate or the Senate to the House, he claims. A conference committee
wouldn't take on any responsibilities. The Speaker's election would not matter much.
After the law was introduced, the committee had a chance to review it, hearings had
taken place, and the one-house legislature had finished debating the matter, voting would
take place. Any proposed amendments would be thoroughly discussed and put to a vote.
Instead of one house acting as a check on the other, the double barrel system is obviously
a cover for corruption, concealing the record of undeserving members and making it
impossible for a critical public to know what record there is.5

5. Nirmalendu Rakshit explains how the powers between different houses in India are
unequally distributed. He has noted that in bicameral legislatures, the division of power
between the two chambers is a constant source of contention. Of course, the authority
may be split in one of three ways: equally between the two chambers, as in the Soviet
Union under the Stalin constitution of 1936; more power for the upper chamber, as in the
US; or the opposite, as in Britain. Our Lok Sabha has been given much more power than
the other house of parliament, similar to the British House of Commons, because the
Indian Constitution has, in this case, predominantly embraced the British model. In other
words, both houses have an equal say on these important matters. The Rajya Sabha
therefore has more authority than the British Parliament. It is firmly argued that the Rajya
Sabha is, in a number of ways, an inferior partner to the Lok Sabha since it lacks the
4 William H. Riker, ‘The Justification of Bicameral’ (1992) 13(1) International Political Science Review
101.
5 George W. Norris, ‘The One-House Legislature’(1935) 181 Sage Publications Inc in association with the
American Academy of Political and Social Science 50.
 absolute and unqualified power that the Lok Sabha possesses over the passage of a
Money Bill and, for the most part, in all matters.6

STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

A comparison of the legislative systems in India, America, and Denmark reveals that bicameral
legislatures, which have two houses, suffer most from the problem of unequal power distribution
between them, whereas unicameral legislatures, which have only one house, are at risk from
majoritarianism.

OBJECTIVES OF STUDY

The following are the Primary objectives of the study -

1. To study the consequences of having Bicameralism in India and USA.
2. To study the benefits and drawbacks of Unicameralism in Denmark.
3. To compare and study both the types of Legislatures.
4. To find out a better mechanism for the above mentioned countries.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This research has been undertaken by using Doctrinal Approach as well as Collative Research
approach.

HYPOTHESIS

The hypothesis will test that:

6 Nirmalendu Bikash Rakshit, ‘Power and Position of the Lok Sabha’ (2004) 39(40) Economic and
Political
Weekly 4410.
Bicameral legislatures with equal powers can be shown to be more effective since each house
will act as a check on the other, preventing the majority tyranny that occurs in one-house
legislatures from making arbitrary decisions.

LIMITATION AND SCOPE

Due to paucity of time and a wider perspectives of the topic w.r.t. different countries (also
depending on the sizes and population), the researcher hereby restricts and limits her scope to the
comparative study of three countries only. Also, due to the availability of limited resources and
data, the researcher will study and compare from whatever reliable sources are available.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The research will emphasize and try to find out the answers of the following -
1. What are the major problems faced by Bicameral Legislatures?
2. What are the major issues underlying the Unicameral System?
3. What are the advantages of both the Legislative Systems?
4. Which one of the two legislative systems is better and effective?
 CHAPTER 2 - BICAMERAL SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT AND ITS
PROBLEMS

In a bicameral system, there are two legislative chambers, and while the powers between them
may or may not be evenly distributed, they typically aren't in the context of India and America.
The Articles of Confederation provided for a single house, but subsequently, after the first
system failed miserably, they created a two-house legislature modeled after that of Britain. 7 In
contrast to India, where the Lok Sabha has unlimited and unrestricted powers granted by the
constitution, the upper chamber is more powerful in the United States. An impressive one-third
of countries in the world use the bicameral system, which is highly popular. According to
historical standards established by legislative studies, the upper chamber or house is seen as
"secondary" in contrast to the lower body, which is more democratic in its core. In the context of
the presidential form of government, namely when it comes to the USA, this is not true. On the
basis of the historical tradition of "upper class" representation in the upper houses, many
commentators have deliberated and treated bicameralism as an anti-democratic system. In the
end, these commentators served their privileged minority interests.8

A. CORRUPTION AND ACCOUNTABILITY

In context of American Constitution
Recent widespread corruption scandals and a surge in the State debt have cast doubt on the
accountability of state legislators across the United States. 9 The sustainability of the current
bicameral system is being questioned in light of the rise in corruption problems. 14 US states
have proposed unicameral legislatures; the two most recent ones were in California and New
York in 2006 and 2010, respectively. 10 Out of all the states in the United States, only Nebraska
became a unicameral one in 1934, despite some skepticism on the part of the public because the
7 Emma Estill, ‘A Single House Legislature’ (1922) 2(4) Wiley 312.
8 John Uhr, Bicameralism Chapter 24, 474-493.
9 As reported by the Centre for Public Integrity, over one billion dollars was spent in 2005 to lobby state
politicians. Moreover, of the 2000 investigations on public corruption undertaken by the F.B.I, in 2006,
most involved states and local officials (The New York Times May 11, 2006, ‘F.B.I, 's Focus on Public
Corruption Includes 2,000 Investigations).
10 California unicameral legislature, October 4 2006, Attorney General File number 2600-034 State of
New York Bill 9875, February 5 2010.
data shows that Nebraska is the state with the lowest level of corruption. As a result, we will
observe how corruption permeates the system as substantive powers are exercised and possessed
by the legislatures. In this situation, lobby can effectively profit from the policies that the
legislatures frame and pass, which places the legislatures' accountability in a negotiating
position. Therefore, if the complex two-house organizational structure has an impact on the
bargaining power of legislative bodies, it could exacerbate the collusion issue, which would
ultimately result in corruption in the system.11

In Context of India -
When we examine the power dynamics in the Indian bicameral system, we find that there is a
significant power imbalance between the two houses caused by the Indian Constitution. As a
result, the system essentially functions as a unicameral one, with the power of the majority of
one house predominating. This results in non-arbitrary decision-making because the upper house
lacks the authority to exercise checks and balances on such decisions made by the lower house,
which ultimately leads to corruption.

B. ASYMMETRICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION

In the context of America -
The idea that a bicameral system of government would foster high public confidence in the
absence of an equitable power structure or a balanced transfer of authority between the houses is
dubious. A bicameral system can function when there is a convergence of power and a
divergence of representation, however in America, the Senate exercises the dominant role
relative to the lower chamber. In addition, the two-house system has encouraged two opposing
legislative processes, regardless of the objectives of the American constitution's authors,
resulting in policy differences between the houses.12

In the context of India -

The legislative and power structure of the Indian constitution were largely modeled after the
British system. Thus, our lower house, the Lok Sabha, operates similarly to the House of
Commons in the United Kingdom in that it has been granted more authority than the other house
11 Giovanni Facchini and Cecilia Testa, ‘Corruption and bicameral reforms’ (2016) 47(2) Springer 387.
12 John Uhr, Bicameralism Chapter 24, 474.
of parliament, leading to an uneven allocation of power. The constitution clearly states this.
There is no question about the Lok Sabha's superiority in the legislative process. A bill must first
be introduced, then it must be approved by both houses, and finally it must receive the
president's signature before it can become law. For instance, the Lok Sabha has complete power
and control over money bills. A money bill cannot be introduced in the Council of States or
Rajya Sabha, according to article 109(1), which means that Rajya Sabha can only take action
after the lower house, or House of People, has approved it. The bill also cannot be introduced in
the Council of States' chamber. Additionally, article 109(2) specifies that the Rajya Sabha is
unable to reject the proposed legislation, and even if it does, it will ipso facto be forwarded to the
President for assent after 14 days.13

The prime minister must resign or abandon his position in the event that the central cabinet is
rejected, as stated in Article 75(3) of the Indian Constitution, which states that "The council of
ministers shall be collectively responsible to the Lok Sabha." This has led to the resignation of a
number of our prime ministers at different times. SL Sikri stated correctly that "the council of
ministers is responsible to the Lok Sabha and not to the Rajya Sabha" as a result. 14 Thus, in the
bicameral legislative system of India, it can be convincingly stated that the lower house has
played a crucial role in making it powerful in contrast to the Rajya Sabha.

CHAPTER 3 - UNDERLYING ISSUES IN UNICAMERAL SYSTEM

The term "Unicameralism" describes a single-house legislative system in which the majority of
the members of the house vote to determine policy. The term first became well-known in the
14th century, when Britain adopted a bicameral system of government, while single-house
legislatures had previously dominated in all other countries. In the past, proponents of the

13 Nirmalendu Bikash Rakshit, ‘Power and Position of the Lok Sabha’(2004) 39(40) Economic and
Political
Weekly 4410.
14 Indian Government and Politics 17.
unicameral form have argued that unity and sovereignty cannot be separated between the two
houses.15

"My definition for the single house or unicameral legislature is that it is a system composed of
one house, a certain number of members, elected for a stated length of time, to receive a
remuneration for that work and that work only, to give their undivided time to the interest of the
state, to be on the job every minute, to be qualified to hold that position, as law-makers of the
state," says Emma Estill, who proposed the definition of unicameral legislature.
However, the majority's unrestricted authority in the single-house system, which has the
potential to become a dictatorial type of governance, paints a bleak image. 16

Majoritarianism -
Intellectuals and liberals have argued that majorities can occasionally act in a tyrannical manner
because even if the majority wants something done, that does not entitle it to be done at the
expense of private rights that are intended to realize the autonomy of an individual or of every
single person who is not a member of the majority. The unicameral system's fundamental
premise is a homogeneous body politic; in countries with heterogeneous populations, for
example, the majority does not always speak for the minority. The populist representative
system, which demands that the proportion of electors to representatives be uniformly the same
across the entire nation, harms minorities in a pluralistic democracy.

The majority population system may rule the parliament where there is a distinct split and
demarcation between regional entities and racial, religious, or linguistic groupings, as occurred
in Northern Nigeria between 1963 and 1966. Thus, the minority does not receive representation
in such a diversity-based society with multi-religious, racial, or linguistic minorities instead
experiencing oppression by the majority.17

In the context of Denmark -

15 Emma Estill, ‘A Single House Legislature’(1922) 2(4) Wiley 311, 313.

16 William H. Riker, ‘The Justification of Bicameral’ (1992) 13(1) International Political Science Review
101.
17 Miguel Herrero de Minon, ‘The Passing of Bicameralism’ (1975) 23(2) Oxford University Press 236,
241.
Denmark's highest house, the Landsting, was long ago disbanded. In terms of functional
equivalent, one can assume that the lower house has taken on the role and authority of Landsting.
The constitution already mentions five different types of referenda, but a sixth was added to fill
the upper house's absence. To defend the interests of the minority, Section 42 was added, giving
them the right to hold a referendum on a law enacted by the Folketing, the lower house of
parliament, which is currently the only house, but with at least one-third of minority members.

The Danish democracy suffered in 1997 as a result of several ominous clouds floating above it.
In an investigation commissioned by Folketing to ascertain the cause of the deterioration, it was
discovered that one explanation was an expanding divide between a competent and resourceful
majority and a servile and disadvantaged minority. Therefore, while it had some impact, majority
rule was not primarily to blame for the decline of democracy.18

18 Asbjorn Skjaeveland, ‘Unicameralism in Denmark: Abolition of the senate, current functioning and
debate’ (2019) Reforming Senates; Upper Legislative Houses in North Atlantic Small Powers 1800-
present Nikolaj Bijleveld 232.
 CHAPTER 4 - ADVANTAGES OF BICAMERALISM AND
UNICAMERALISM

Advantages of Bicameralism -
The number of members is proportional to the size of the population of the particular
geographical area, demonstrating the equality of representation of the state's citizens. Members
of the houses are elected using a single transferable vote on the basis of geographical
constituencies.19 The second house of the legislature has the power to review laws approved by
the other chambers, protecting hasty and ill-considered choices.

In order to protect the people from the arbitrary use of monopolistic power that a unicameral
legislature would have, supporters of this system highlight the Checks and Balances that one
chamber is allowed to have over the other. Similar to a single chamber system, a small group of
elected officials oversee and control authority, which can be restrained by the other house's use
of checks when bills are sent to them for approval.

The bicameral system of government reduces majority tyranny while simultaneously maximizing
the power of the majority, allowing for decisions to be made by the majority when there is an
unambiguous majority option.20

The system also shields society from the impact of serious constitutional democratic flaws, as
majority dictatorship occasionally skips elections. Because the system makes it simpler for
legislators in unicameralism, they tend to hold onto their positions more frequently, flagrantly
flouting fundamental constitutional obligations.21

Advantages of Unicameralism -

19 Elliot Bulmer, ‘Bicameralism’ (2nd edn, International IDEA Constitution-Building Primer 2 2017).
20 William H. Riker, ‘The Justification of Bicameral’ (1992) 13(1) International Political Science Review
101, 114.
21 ibid.
There would be no significance attached to the speaker's election because in a one-house
legislature, after hearings and discussions, voting occurs and any proposed amendments are also
discussed, debated, and voted on. Logrolling and shifting of responsibilities to one another do
not occur as they do in bicameral legislatures. The constituents would be able to comprehend
each phase of the legislative process thanks to the system's methodology. Voters would be able
to punish deserving public workers and reward unworthy ones in such a system. People must
therefore take responsibility for their official activities and maintain a record of them for the sake
of openness in cases where this shifting is not practicable.22

In comparison to the bicameral system, this one is also less expensive because it relieves the
taxpayers of paying taxes for an additional house or chamber that performs essentially redundant
duties. The state would then have extra funds to satisfy the needs of the general populace.

Additionally, the process of passing laws takes less time since, unlike in a two-house legislative
system, it only involves discussions, debates, and additional reservations from members in a
single chamber.

Because the members of both houses are chosen by and represent the same constituencies,
unicameralists contend that two houses in state legislatures are no longer necessary for
representation.

22 George W. Norris, ‘The One-House Legislature’(1935) 181 Sage Publications Inc in association with
the
American Academy of Political and Social Science 50, 55.
 CHAPTER 5 - THE EFFECTIVE SYSTEM

Emma Estill contends that rather than acting as checks on one another and safeguarding the
public from the arbitrary nature of legislative activities, the partition of the legislature into two
chambers slows down the legislation-making process. Even though the American and Indian
governments, as required by their constitutions, have bicameral legislatures that function
effectively, unicameral legislatures are superior because they are more cost-effective and easier
for the general public to understand.

Since Britain adopted the bicameral system, which is essentially unicameral because all the
major powers are concentrated in the lower house, the American Constitution adopted the
bicameral system, whereas the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union had the
unicameral system, which failed.23 Therefore, the bicameral legislature was not intended to be
adopted in America; rather, it was done so to bring together larger and smaller states rather than
for its limited advantages, such as checks and balances. States became envious of one another
because of this, and the establishment of the senate, the higher chamber, was seen necessary to
ensure equality among them. However, a bicameral legislature can function more effectively if
both houses are given equal authority.

Whereas, when we examine the constitutional debates from the period when our nation's
founding fathers were drafting the Constitution of India, we discover that Professor K. T. Shah
stated, "Sir, I do not believe in a bicameral Legislature at least for the States," during a
discussion about the inclusion of an amendment to Article 148(1). In my opinion, a second
chamber is not only not representative of the people as a whole, but even when it has been
designed to represent something other than the pure popular vote, it still serves more as a dilatory
mechanism than as a tool for capturing public sentiment on important legislative issues.

He continues by using the House of Lords of the British Parliament as an example to illustrate
how this hereditary, non-elected body obstructs the legislative process, aids party leaders in

23 Emma Estill, ‘A Single House Legislature’ (1922) 2(4) Wiley 311, 316.
spreading patronage, and delays laws that the general public needs or wants. Professor had
fiercely disputed and opposed bicameralism since it only impedes or delays the passage of
important legislation, undermining the public's ability to exert its will. He had highlighted the
importance of eventually spreading the second chamber to both England and America.

If that's the case, why don't we embrace a better and more productive legislative system, such as
a unicameral legislature, instead of continuing with our current dilatory mechanism? I think that
because India and America were British colonies before gaining their independence, the British
Parliament had an influence on their decision to adopt the bicameral system. In reality, India has
adhered to the British so slavishly that it gave the House of People, its lower house, total power
and became a dominant one.

Furthermore, when we examine Denmark's political system, it is apparent that, following the
removal of Landsting, the upper chamber, through a change in the constitution in 1953,
Folketing (now known as the Danish Parliament; from 1849 to 1953, it went by that name) has
handled it quite well. Local interests are also being represented through the Folketing, as 90% of
Danish voters were happy and satisfied with the way things were going.24

As a result, even if the countries that practice bicameralism are fundamentally unicameral in
nature, giving their one house greater authority, I think the unicameral system is superior and
more effective than the bicameral system of legislation that we observed. Furthermore, since the
second chamber is not even an elected entity, the argument regarding diversity and
representation in the Parliament is likewise pointless. Therefore, adding a second chamber will
ultimately increase the cost, take more time, and decrease public support and interest.

24 Emma Estill, ‘A Single House Legislature’ (1922) 2(4) Wiley 311, 316.
 CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS

CONCLUSION
The Unicameral Legislative System is a better and effective form of legislature as compared to
Bicameral Legislature. Hereby, the hypothesis is disproved.

SUGGESTIONS
To avoid a slow and expensive system, we must create a unicameral legislature made up of
elected representatives who take into account the needs and percentage of the various,
multicultural, and regional groups.

1. As we saw in Denmark, referendums (by a large number of eligible voters) can effectively
replace the checks and balances provided by the second house. In essence, this will mean that the
entire people will act as a check on the majority in the legislature.

2. Giving minority groups the ability to veto legislation will solve the issue of majority tyranny
in a single-house legislature (such as article 81 of the Kosovo Constitution of 2008).

3. Minority communities' reservations in the legislature would also aid in lowering

majoritarianism.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Ansolabehere S, Synder JM and Ting MM,‘Bargaining in bicameral legislatures’ (2003)

97 (3) American Political Science Review
2. As reported by the Centre for Public Integrity, over one billion dollars was spent in 2005
to lobby state politicians. Moreover, of the 2000 investigations on public corruption
undertaken by the F.B.I, in 2006, most involve states and local officials (The New York
Times May 11, 2006, F.B.I, 's Focus on Public Corruption Includes 2,000 Investigations)
3. California unicameral legislature, October 4 2006, Attorney General File number 2600-
034; State of New York Bill 9875, February 5 2010.
4. Einhorn E, ‘Denmarks’s Stormy Passage’(1976) 70(415) University of California Press
5. Elliot Bulmer, ‘Bicameralism’ (2nd edn, International IDEA Constitution-Building
Primer 2 2017).
6. Estill E, ‘A Single House Legislature’ (1922) 2(4) Wiley
7. Facchini G and Testa C, ‘Corruption and bicameral reforms’ (2016) 47(2) Springer
8. Grofman B, Brunell T and Feld SL, ‘Towards a Theory of Bicameralism: The Neglected
Contributions of The Calculus of Consent’ (2012) 152(1/2) Springer
9. John Uhr, Bicameralism Chapter 24
10. Levmore S, ‘Bicameralism: When Are Two Decisions Better than One?’(1992) 12
International Review of Law and Economics
11. Minon MHD, ‘The Passing of Bicameralism’ (1975) 23(2) Oxford University Press
12. Norris GW, ‘The One-House Legislature’(1935) 181 Sage Publications Inc in association
with the American Academy of Political and Social Science
13. Rakshit NB, ‘Power and Position of the Lok Sabha’(2004) 39(40) Economic and Political
Weekly
14. Riker WH, ‘The Justification of Bicameralism’ (1992) 13(1) International Political
Science Review Sage Publications Ltd
15. Robak K, 'The Nebraska Unicameral and Its Lasting Benefits' (1997) 76 Nebraska Law
Review
16. Rogers JR, ‘The Impact of Bicameralism on Legislative Production’ (2003) 28(4)
Washington University
17. Skjaeveland A, ‘Unicameralism in Denmark: Abolition of the senate, current functioning
and debate’ (2019) Reforming Senates; Upper Legislative Houses in North Atlantic
Small Powers 1800-present Nikolaj Bijleveld