GR. No. L-50550-52.

October 31, 1979

CHEE KIONG YAM, AMPANG MAH, ANITA YAMJOSE Y.C. YAM AND RICHARD YAM,
petitioners,<i>vs.i> HON. NABDAR J. MALIK, Municipal Judge of Jolo, Sulu (Branch I), THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ROSALINDA AMIN, TAN CHU KAO, and LT. COL. AGOSTO SAJOR,
respondents.

Facts:

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with preliminary injunction
against the respondent Municipal Judge Nadbar J. Malik. The petitioners also alleged that the said
respondent acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion.

Comments by the respondent judge and the private respondents pray for the dismissal of the
petition but the Solicitor General has manifested that the People of the Philippines have no
objection to the grant of the reliefs prayed for, except the damages. The Supreme Court granted the
petition in order to prevent manifest injustice and the exercise of palpable excess of authority.

There are three different criminal complaints filed against the petitioners alleging them to have
committed estafa through misappropriation.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the acts of the petitioner constitute estafa through misappropriation.

2. Whether or not the respondent judge act in excess of its jurisdiction.

Held:

1. No, it is not estafa. The Supreme Court agree with the petitioners that the three criminal
complaints do not constitute estafa through misappropriation. In order that a person be convicted
of Swindling (Estafa) under Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code, it must be proven that he has the
obligation to deliver or return the same money, goods or personal property that he received. As
being stated in the criminal complaints, the related civil complaints and the supporting sworn
statements, the sums of money that petitioners received were loans. Hence, the petitioners had no
such obligations to return the same money.

The Supreme Court defined the nature of simple loan in Articles 1933 and 1953 of the Civil Code. In
U.S. vs. Ibañ ez, 19 Phil. 559, 560 (1911), the Supreme Court held that it is not estafa for a person to
refuse to pay his debt or to deny its existence. Here, the SC reiterated that when the relation is
purely that of debtor and creditor, the debtor cannot be held liable for the crime of estafa, under
said article, by merely refusing to pay or by denying the indebtedness.

2. Yes, the respondent judge acted in excess of its jurisdiction. He failed to appreciate the distinction
between the two types of loan, mutuum and commodatum, when he performed the questioned acts
and mistook the transaction between petitioners and private respondents to be commodatum
wherein the borrower does not acquire ownership over the thing borrowed and has the duty to
return the same thing to the lender. Moreover, the Municipal Court of Jolo has no jurisdiction to try
criminal cases.