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Global Discourse: An Interdisciplinary

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On empire and strategy: a reply to

Alexandros Koutsoukis
a b
Constantinos Koliopoulos
a
Panteion University , Athens , Greece
b
Hellenic National Defense College , Athens , Greece
Published online: 08 Jul 2013.

To cite this article: Constantinos Koliopoulos (2013) On empire and strategy: a reply to Alexandros
Koutsoukis, Global Discourse: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Current Affairs and Applied
Contemporary Thought, 3:1, 31-33, DOI: 10.1080/23269995.2013.808849

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 Global Discourse, 2013
Vol. 3, No. 1, 31–33, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23269995.2013.808849

REPLY
On empire and strategy: a reply to Alexandros Koutsoukis
Constantinos Koliopoulos*

Panteion University, Athens, Greece; Hellenic National Defense College, Athens, Greece
Downloaded by [Newcastle University], [Russell Foster] at 08:17 14 August 2013

This is a reply to:

Koutsoukis, Alexandros. 2013. “Building an empire or not? Athenian imperialism and
the United States in the twenty-first century.” Global Discourse. 3 (1): 12–30. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1080/23269995.2013.808847

During the Cold War, it was not uncommon for both scholars (e.g. Lebow and Strauss
1991) and laypeople to draw parallels between Athens and the United States on the one
hand, and Sparta and the Soviet Union on the other. True, the analogy could not be
pushed too far. As regards domestic politics and society, one can point out, among
others, that the concept of the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ would have startled the
Spartans, whereas modern American (and Soviet) women would have been equally
startled by the low social and even lower political status of their Athenian counterparts.
Regarding international relations, the degree of freedom the allies of Sparta were
enjoying in both their domestic and foreign affairs was comparable to the freedom
enjoyed by the United States’ NATO allies, whereas Athenian behaviour to their own
allies arguably surpassed the worst Soviet excesses towards Warsaw Pact members. Still,
having in mind Sparta’s defeat of Athens in the Peloponnesian War, many of those
Westerners pursuing this analogy seemed to fear that the brilliant yet erratic democracies
are at an inherent disadvantage in protracted struggles against gray yet persistent
autocracies. Although the outcome of the Cold War showed that this need not be the
case, the anxiety was real enough and at times did seem justified.
The point of these introductory remarks is that historical analogies can be inspiring
and useful to scholars and policy-makers alike, but their use should be coupled with
awareness of their limits and be done with strict adherence to the historical record – even
slight factual errors or distortions will totally invalidate the results or ‘lessons’ derived
from the analogy (Jon Sumida, quoted in Lynn 2001, 366). Judging from ‘Building an
empire or not?’ by Alexandros Koutsoukis (2013) the analogy between fifth-century-BC
Athens and the contemporary United States retains both its appeal and its usefulness. Still,
in the present reviewer’s opinion, a couple of points should be made.
To start with, there was nothing predetermined in the collapse of the Athenian Empire.
The Athenian Empire did not collapse due to having become an empire, but due to
eventually adopting a flawed strategy in the Peloponnesian War (Platias and Koliopoulos
2010). When that war began in 431 BC, Athens was adequately equipped to deal with the
Spartan challenge. At that time, Sparta was still an agrarian economy. This meant that it

*Email: drmodel44@hotmail.com

© 2013 Taylor & Francis

 32 C. Koliopoulos

could not substantially increase its power without territorial acquisitions that would
enable it to sustain a larger population, or without a complete remodelling of its socio-
political system, tapping its underutilized manpower. For various reasons, neither was
forthcoming. Athens, on the other hand, had built an economy based on maritime
commerce and manufacture, with the revenues of imperial mines and imperial tribute
also thrown in for good measure. The Athenian navy sustained the maritime commerce
and the empire of Athens; maritime commerce and the empire brought revenues;
revenues sustained the navy, thus sustaining maritime commerce and the empire, and
so on. This meant that every year Athens was becoming stronger relative to Sparta. As a
result, the Athenians were perfectly happy with the status quo (i.e. their empire),
whereas the Spartans were bent on overthrowing it. During the initial phase of the
Downloaded by [Newcastle University], [Russell Foster] at 08:17 14 August 2013

war, the Athenians, following the prescriptions laid down by Pericles, refused to engage
the redoubtable Spartan army, preferring to stay behind their walls and using their navy
to quell allied revolts and conduct increasingly painful reprisals against Spartan terri-
tory. On the explicit advice of Pericles, the Athenians did not seek to expand their
empire. After many adventures, including a frightful plague that infected Athens and
killed huge numbers of Athenians, the two sides concluded peace at 421 BC on the basis
of the pre-war status quo; in other words, Sparta’s attempt to overthrow the Athenian
Empire had failed. It was only after the Athenians decided to expand their empire by
undertaking the disastrous Sicilian expedition (415–413 BC) that the scales were tipped
in favour of Sparta, culminating, again after many adventures, in the surrender of
Athens in 404 BC.
The point about the collapse of the Athenian Empire has to be extended to empires in
general: no empire is predestined to collapse (Darwin 2008). It could be argued that in the
long run they do collapse. However, some runs are very long indeed: Rome was an empire by
167 BC; the eastern part of its empire survived as a great power at least until 1081, and
probably until 1204 AD. Some runs actually continue to this day: Muscovite Russia launched
its imperial career in the sixteenth century and is not expected to vanish any time soon; French
presidents ‘using networks of personal influence and patronage, had essentially run large
tracts of Africa from inside the Elysée Palace’ (IISS 2008, 145) at least until the beginning of
the twenty-first century; and the greatest example of continuing imperial longevity, the
unified Chinese state, first established in 221 BC, keeps going from strength to strength
and is on its way to challenging the United States for global primacy. All in all, even though
the idea of a ‘global’ empire is impractical – and there never has been anything approaching a
truly global empire1 – the imperial concept is still alive and well. In several regions of the
world, empires have indeed brought about ‘the end of history’, in the sense of swallowing up
the previously existing international systems, imposing their hegemonic peace, and leaving
no doubt as to the dominant political arrangement.
To recapitulate, as Athens’ collapse was solely due to its bad strategy in the
Peloponnesian War and had nothing to do with its imperial status, so the fate of the
United States or, for that matter, every great power, does not depend on its becoming an
empire, but on American strategic choices in the face of actual or potential conflict.

Note
1. The celebrated Athenian Empire would nowadays be considered a statelet, as it covered but a
small part of present-day Greece plus some coastal cities of present-day Turkey. The British
Empire at its zenith covered about one-fourth of the global landmass, whereas the Soviet Union
covered about one-sixth.
 Global Discourse 33

Notes on contributor
Constantinos Koliopoulos is an Assistant Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies
at Panteion University, Athens Greece, and Professor of Strategy at the Hellenic National
Defense College.

References
Darwin, J. 2008. After Tamerlane: The Rise and Fall of Global Empires, 1400–2000. New York:
Bloomsbury Press.
IISS. 2008. Strategic Survey 2008: The Annual Review of World Affairs. Abingdon: Routledge for
The International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Koutsoukis, A. 2013. “Building an Empire or Not? Athenian Imperialism and the United States in
the Twenty-First Century.” Global Discourse 3 (1): 12–30.
Downloaded by [Newcastle University], [Russell Foster] at 08:17 14 August 2013

Lebow, R. N., and B. S. Strauss, eds. 1991. Hegemonic Rivalry from Thucydides to the Nuclear Age.
Boulder, CO: Westview.
Lynn, J. A. 2001. “Reflections on the History and Theory of Military Innovation and Diffusion.” In
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Relations, edited by C. Elman and M. F. Elman, 359–382. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Platias, A. G., and C. Koliopoulos. 2010. Thucydides on Strategy: Grand Strategies in the
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