CRIMLAW1 WEEK 6 CASES
the person defending himself.
Manaban v. CA
Doctrine: Paragraph 1, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code,
the three requisites to prove self-defense as a justifying
circumstance which may exempt an accused from criminal
liability are: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;
(2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel the aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the accused or the person defending himself.
Facts: At around 1:25 o’clock in the morning, Joselito Bautista,
a member of the UP Police Force, took his daughter, Frinzi, to
the UP Health Center because of difficulty in breathing. The
doctors prescribed certain medicines to be purchased for
Frinzi. Needing money therefore, Joselito Bautista, who had
taken alcoholic drinks earlier, proceeded to the BPI Kalayaan
Branch to withdraw money from its Automated Teller Machine
(ATM).
Upon arrival at the bank, Bautista proceeded to the ATM booth
but because he could not effectively withdraw money, he
started kicking and pounding on the machine. For said reason,
the bank security guard, herein petitioner Ramonito Manaban,
approached and asked him what the problem was.
Bautista complained that his ATM card was retrieved by the
machine and that no money came out of it. After Manaban had
checked the receipt, he informed Bautista that the Personal
Identification Number (PIN) entered was wrong and advised
him to just return the next morning. This angered Bautista all
the more and resumed pounding on the machine. Manaban
then urged him to calm down and referred him to their
customer service over the phone. Still not mollified, Bautista
continued raging and striking the machine.
When Manaban could no longer pacify him, he fired a warning
shot. That diverted the attention of Bautista. Instead of venting
his ire against the machine, he confronted Manaban. After
some exchange of words, a shot rang out fatally hitting
Bautista.
Manaban claimed that he acted in self-defense. Manaban said
that he feared that Bautista would pull his gun first and might
kill him, since Bautista showed his gun tucked on his waist by
raising his shirt. Petitioner said that it seemed that Bautista
was about to draw his gun when he turned back and put his
hand on his waist. So, he fired his gun and shot Bautista.
The trial court found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Homicide. This decision was later
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Issue/s: WON the act of petitioner Manaban is meritorious of
self-defense.
Ruling: NO. When the accused invokes self-defense, he in
effect admits killing the victim and the burden is shifted to him
to prove that he killed the victim to save his life. The accused
must establish by clear and convincing evidence that all the
requisites of self-defense are present. Under paragraph 1,
Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, the three requisites to
prove self-defense as a justifying circumstance which may
exempt an accused from criminal liability are: (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity
of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression; and
(3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused or
Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault or at least a
threat to attack or inflict physical injury upon a person. A mere
threatening or intimidating attitude is not considered unlawful
aggression, unless the threat is offensive and menacing,
manifestly showing the wrongful intent to cause injury. There
must be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent
danger thereof, which puts the defendant’s life in real peril.
In this case, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim. First, Bautista was shot at the back as evidenced by
the point of entry of the bullet. Second, when Bautista was
shot, his gun was still inside a locked holster and tucked in his
right waist. Third, when Bautista turned his back at Manaban,
Manaban was already pointing his service firearm at Bautista.
Fallo: WHERFORE, the Court affirms with modification the
Decision of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner Ramonito
Manaban is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Homicide.
Senoja v. People
Doctrine: The right of self-defense proceeds from necessity
and limited by it. The right begins where necessity does, and
ends where it ends. There is, however, a perceptible difference
between necessity and self-defense, which is that, self-defense
excuses the repulse of a wrong; necessity justifies the invasion
of a right. Hence, it is essential to self-defense that it should be
a defense against a present unlawful attack.
Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden,
unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a
threatening or intimidating attitude. Hence, when an
inceptual/unlawful aggression ceases to exist, the one making
a defense has no right to kill or injure the former aggressor.
After the danger has passed, one is not justified in following up
his adversary to take his life. The conflict for blood should be
avoided if possible. An assault on his person, he cannot punish
when the danger or peril is over. When the danger is over, the
right of self-defense ceases. His right is defense, not
retribution.
Facts: Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in People v. Exequiel
Senoja, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 26564, affirming with
modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Baler, Aurora, Branch 96, in Criminal Case No. 2259, for
homicide.
On April 16, 1997, petitioner Exequiel Senoja, Fidel Senoja,
Jose Calica, and Miguel Lumasac were drinking gin in the hut
of Crisanto Reguyal in Barangay Zarah, San Luis, Aurora.
An angry Leon Lumasac suddenly arrived at the said place,
holding a bolo in his right hand and looking for his brother
Miguel. Petitioner and Jose tried to pacify Leon.
But when petitioner approached Leon, the latter tried to hack
him so he embraced Leon and Jose took Leon’s bolo. Then,
Leon and petitioner talked things out and later reconciled.
Subsequently, Leon walked out of Crisanto’s hut followed by
petitioner.
Suddenly, about ten meters from the hut, petitioner stabbed
Leon at the back.
When Leon turned around, petitioner continued stabbing him
until he fell to the ground. Then, petitioner ran towards the
barangay road and threw away the "kolonial" knife he used in
stabbing Leon. The latter died on the spot.
Dr. Pura Deveza Valenzuela-Uy, San Luis Municipal Health
Officer, examined the cadaver of Leon and found multiple
lesions on his body and five fatal wounds on his chest. Dr. Uy
issued a medico-legal report and death certificate.
On August 13, 1997, an Information was filed charging
petitioner Exequiel Senoja with homicide.
The petitioner admitted killing the victim but invoked the
affirmative defense of self-defense. His version of the fatal
incident is set forth in his petition at bar:
1. On April 16, 1997 at about 11 o’clock in the morning,
Crisanto Reguyal, Fidel Senoja, Jose Calica, Miguel Lumasac,
and Exequiel Senoja were in the hut of Crisanto Reguyal in
Barangay Zarah, San Luis, Aurora, drinking gin;
2. Leon Lumasac suddenly arrived holding a bolo and hacked
the doorpost of Crisanto’s hut, angrily demanding for his
brother, Miguel Lumasac, whom he suspected of drying up the
ricefield he was plowing;
3. At this time, Miguel Lumasac was no longer inside the hut
but fetching water;
4. To prevent Leon Lumasac from entering the hut, Exequiel
Senoja (appellant) and Jose Calica stood by the door while
simultaneously trying to pacify Leon Lumasac;
5. Exequiel Senoja with a knife then went outside and tried to
pacify Leon Lumasac but the latter angered by the gestures of
the former tried to hack Exequiel Senoja;
6. To avoid any injury, Exequiel Senoja embraced Leon which
gave an opportunity to disarm the duo. Jose Calica got the
bolo of Leon and threw it away while Fidel Senoja took the
"colonial" knife of Exequiel;
7. Jose Calica and Fidel Senoja were able to pacify Leon
Lumasac so they invited him to get inside the hut. Inside the
hut, Leon Lumasac tried to box Fidel Senoja for siding with his
brother, Miguel, but was prevented by Exequiel Senoja who
held Leon’s hands;
8. After a while, Leon Lumasac left but returned and angrily
demanded for his bolo. Jose Calica gave his own bolo with a
sabbard to replace the bolo of Leon which he threw away;
9. With Jose Calica’s bolo in him, Leon Lumasac left but only
after leaving a threat that something will happen to Exequiel
Senoja for siding with his brother;
10. After walking for about 10 meters away from the hut, Leon
Lumasac turned around and saw Exequiel Senoja on his way
home following him;
11. Leon Lumasac walked back to meet Exequiel Senoja and
upon reaching him, the former suddenly and treacherously
hacked the latter at the left side of his head and right thigh;
12. Unable to evade the treacherous attack by Leon Lumasac
who persisted in his criminal design, Exequiel Senoja drew his
"colonial" knife and stabbed Leon Lumasac in self-defense,
inflicting upon him multiple wounds which caused his death.
On June 7, 2002, the trial court rendered judgment against the
petitioner, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Homicide with a penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor
as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of
reclusion temporal as maximum; (b) to pay the heirs of the
victim the amount of Fifteen (sic) Thousand Pesos (Php
50,000.00) by way of civil indemnity; and (c) to pay the costs.
In due course, the petitioner appealed the decision to the CA
which rendered judgment affirming, with modification, the
decision of the RTC.
The petitioner now seeks relief from this Court, contending
that:
The Honorable Court of Appeals failed to appreciate vital facts
which, if considered, would probably alter the result of this
case on appeal finding appellant’s plea of self-defense
credible.
Issue/s: WON Senoja merely acted in self-defense.
Ruling: No. Senoja is guilty of HOMICIDE.
The SC said that the victim had already left the hut. At that
point in time, the victim was simply walking toward his home;
he had stopped being an aggressor. It was Senoja who wanted
a confrontation this time. It was Senoja who was now the
unlawful aggressor in this second phase of their confrontation.
The affirmative defense of self-defense may be complete or
incomplete. It is complete when all the three essential
requisites are present; it is incomplete if only unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim and any of the two
essential requisites were present. Unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim is a condition sine qua non to self-defense,
complete or incomplete. The right of self-defense proceeds
from necessity and limited by it. The right begins where
necessity does, and ends where it ends. There is however, a
perceptible difference between necessity and self-defense.
Self-defense excuses the repulse of a wrong; necessity
justifies the invasion of a right. Hence, it is essential to self-
defense that it should be a defense against a present unlawful
attack.
Self-defense is an act to save life; hence, it is right and not a
crime. It is a settled rule that to constitute aggression, the
person attacked must be confronted by a real threat on his life
and limb; and the peril sought to be avoided is imminent and
actual, not merely imaginary. Hence, when an inceptual /
unlawful aggression ceases to exist, the one making a defense
has no right to kill or injure the former aggressor. After the
danger has passed, one is not justified in following up his
adversary to take his life.
Fallo: IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is
DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
People v. Decena
Facts: George Decena was convicted with murder for
allegedly stabbing to death Jaime Ballesteros in San Fabian,
Pangasinan on December 25, 1990
He filed a petition for review claiming the lower court erred in
disregarding his claim of self-defense and in not appreciating
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Testimony of the Prosecution (by Lyzviminda Ballesteros, 14
y/o daughter of the victim)On Dec 25, 1990, 4pm, Luzviminda
was asked by her mother to fetch her father Jamie Ballesteros,
who was watching a basketball game. On her way to the
hardcourt, she met her father walking home in an intoxicated
state. Suddenly, she saw Decena rushing towards her father
with a long bladed weapon, prompting Luzviminda to warn her
father to run for safety by shouting in the vernacular “Batik kila,
Tatay! Jamie was stabbed on the right chest just below the
nipple. Decena then fled from the crime scene. Luzviminda
called her mother for help and they rushed Jamie to the
hospital, but he was Dead on Arrival.
Testimony of the defense
On Dec 25, 1990, 4pm, Decena was watching a basketball
game. The victim, Jaime Ballesteros, went around the
basketball court, walking in a wobbly manner due to
drunkenness. Jaime stopped near the place where Decena
was sitting and, for no apparent reason, held him by the neck
with one arm and, at the same time, poking a fork against it
with the other arm. A Barangay Tanod who was also watching
the basketball game, intervened. He took the fork from Jaime
and advised Decena to go home. Decena left and was followed
later by Jaime.
Fernando Biala, Decena’s Uncle adds that he saw Jaime
attacking Decena with a balisong. He claims Decena was able
to block the stabbing blow and a struggle ensued between
them. Decena overpowered Jaime and succeeded in twisting
him and thrusting the knife into his body.
Issue/s: Whether or not appellant acted in complete self-
defense in killing Jaime Ballesteros, thus absolving him from
criminal liability.
Ruling: No, in criminal cases, the burden of proof is on the
prosecution which may rely on the strength of its evidence and
not on the weakness of the defense. However, upon invoking
self-defense, the accused admits that he killed the victim and
the burden of proof is upon him in proving that he really acted
in self-defense.
Basic requirement for self-defense as a justifying circumstance
is unlawful aggression against the person defending himself. It
must be shown that there was a previous unlawful and
unprovoked attack that placed the life of the accused in danger
forcing him to inflict wounds upon his assailant According to
the defense, the unlawful aggression started when the victim
started poking the appellant with a fork
Elementary rule: when the aggressor leaves, the aggression
ceases. It follows that when appellant and Jaime heeded the
advice of the barangay tanod, the unlawful aggression had
ended. Since the aggression no longer existed, the appellant
had no right to kill or even wound the former aggressor. The
defense failed to establish that the victim persisted in his
design to attack the appellant.
Fallo: Wherefore, the appealed judgment of the court a quo is
hereby MODIFIED by finding accused-appellant George
Decena y Rocaberte guilty of the crime of homicide, and
imposing upon him an indeterminate sentence of eight years of
prision mayor, as a minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight
months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. In all other
respects, the said judgment is hereby AFFIRMED.
People v. Dela Cruz
Doctrine: The Court explained that invocation of self-defense is
only merited when the killing has been legally justified.
Self-defense to be justified requires that there be:
An unlawful aggression by the person injured or killed by
the offender.
Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent
or repel that unlawful aggression.
Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.
Facts: In November 27, 1996, accused-appellant Roberto Dela
Cruz was sentenced to death by the RTC of Cabanatuan City
for “Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition
with Homicide” penalized under PD 1866, Sec. 1.·
The incident that led to the RTC’s conviction of Dela Cruz is as
followed:
In May 27, 1996, the victim named Daniel Macapagal—a
married man—have been a live-in partner of prosecution
witness Ma. Luz Perla San Antonio for about 2 to 3 years
before San Antonio took accused-appellant Dela Cruz—a
widower—as her lover and live-in partner.
In the evening of the same date, while Dela Cruz and San
Antonio were resting in their bedroom, Macapagal arrived and
came knocking on their door. San Antonio opened the door
unbeknownst to her that it would be Macapagal, thereby
allowing Macapagal to enter their house while carrying a gun.
Macapagal then went to the bedroom where Dela Cruz was
resting. Dela Cruz, however, saw him and instantly closed the
door, provoking Macapagal to bang at the door yelling for Dela
Cruz to “come out”.
As Macapagal continued banging on the door, Dela Cruz finally
came out carrying with him a .38 caliber revolver. The two
grappled for each other’s firearm. A few moments later, shots
were heard and Macapagal fell dead on the floor.
Dela Cruz immediately instructed San Antonio to call the
police. Dela Cruz—in his defense—told the police that he shot
Macapagal in self-defense and went with them to the police
station.
Issue/s: W/N the RTC erred in their rendered decision against
Dela Cruz.
Ruling: NO, the Court explained that invocation of self-
defense is only merited when the killing has been legally
justified.
Self-defense to be justified requires that there be:
An unlawful aggression by the person injured or killed by the
offender.
Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel that unlawful aggression.
Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.
The Court emphasized that there is only unlawful aggression
that would call for SELF-DEFENSE when there is an actual,
sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger on the life
of a person—NOT just mere threat or intimidation.
In this case, while it is true that Macapagal had barged into the
house of San Antonio and Dela Cruz while carrying a gun,
Dela Cruz, however—upon seeing Macapagal approaching—
was able to prevent the aggression by closing the door. Dela
Cruz could have stopped there. Instead, he opened the door
carrying a gun with him and fought with Macapagal, which
eventually led to Macapagal’s death. Hence, the Court says
that Dela Cruz’s actions can hardly be put as self-defense.
Furthermore, the Court finds that Dela Cruz by inflicting 4
gunshot wounds at Macapagal—into his upper left jaw, below
his left shoulder and the right side of his waist, and on the left
side of his chest penetrating his heart that led to his instant
death—negates the second element of self-defense. This is
because the wounds sustained by Macapagal CANNOT be
considered reasonable and necessary to stop the aggression.
In fact, as the Court stated, it indicated a determined effort to
kill on the part of Dela Cruz
Finally, Dela Cruz, upon opening the door of the bedroom to
confront Macapagal, instead of merely taking precautionary
measures, brought his own gun and fought with him. As such,
the third element of self-defense—such that there should be a
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself—cannot be invoked because Dela Cruz’s
action of fighting Macapagal and much more so by bringing his
own gun is a direct provocation on Dela Cruz’s part.
The Court further affirmed that Dela Cruz indeed illegally
possessed a firearm. Wherein, Dela Cruz and San Antonio
have all the while kept the .38 caliber revolver in their house
without a corresponding license for it.
What the RTC erred, however, was imposing death penalty on
Dela Cruz since PD 1866 was already amended by RA No.
8249, paragraph 3: “if homicide or murder is committed with
the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed
firearm would be considered as an aggravating circumstance.”
And since Dela Cruz had voluntarily surrendered, the
aggravating circumstance—in this case the use of an
unlicensed firearm—is effectively offset by the mitigating
circumstance of Dela Cruz’s voluntary surrender.
Fallo: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed is modified.
Accused-appellant ROBERTO DELA CRUZ, is hereby guilty of
HOMICIDE with the used of unlicensed firearm, an aggravating
circumstance that is offset by the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender, is accordingly sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of 9 years and 1 day of prision mayor as
minimum to 16 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
People v. Jaurigue
Doctrine: Justifying circumstances are those wherein the acts
of the actor are in accordance with law and, hence, he incurs
no criminal and civil liability. The justifying circumstances such
as:
Self-defense: Anyone who acts in defense of his person or
rights (Art. 11 par. 1) The scope included self-defense not only
of life, but also of rights like those of chastity, property and
honor.
Facts: Avelina Jaurigue and Nicolas Jaurigue, her father, were
prosecuted for the crime of murder for which Nicolas was
acquitted while Avelina was found guilty of homicide. She
appealed to the Court of Appeals for Southern Luzon on June
10, 1944 to completely absolve her of all criminal responsibility
for having acted in defense of her honor.
Prior to that drastic happened these are the facts of the case:
One month before that fatal night, Amado Capina snatched
Avelina’s handkerchief bearing her nickname while it was
washed by her cousin. 7 days prior to the incident (September
13, 1942), Amado approached her and professed his love for
her which was refused, and thereupon suddenly embraced and
kissed her and touched her breasts. She then slapped him,
gave him fist blows and kicked him. She kept the matter to
herself, until the following morning she informed her mother
about it. Since then, she armed herself with a long fan knife
whenever she went out, evidently for self-protection.
2 days after (September 15, 1942), Amado climbed up the
house of Avelina and entered the room where she was
sleeping. She felt her forehead evidently with the intention to
abuse her, and she immediately screamed for help which
awakened her parents and brought them to her side. Amado
came out from where he had hidden under a bed of Avelina’s
room and kissed the hand of Avelina’s father, asking for
forgiveness.
Avelina received information in the morning and again at 5:00
PM on the day of the incident (September 20, 1942) that
Amado had been falsely boasting in the neighborhood of
having taken liberties with her person.
At about 8:00 PM of September 20, 1942, Amado Capina,
deceased victim, went to the chapel of Seventh Day Adventists
to attend religious services and sat at the front bench facing
the altar. Avelina Jaurigue entered the chapel shortly after the
arrival of her father for the same purpose and sat on the bench
next to the last one nearest the door. Upon seeing Avelina,
Amado went and sat by Avelina’s right side from his seat on
the other side of the chapel, and without saying a word, placed
his hand on the upper part of her right thigh while observing
highly improper and offensive conduct of Amado.
Avelina Jaurigue, thereafter, pulled out with her right hand the
fan knife which she had in a pocket of her dress with the
intention of punishing Amado’s offending hand. Amado seized
her right hand but she quickly grabbed the knife on her left
hand and stabbed Amado once at the base of the left side of
the neck inflicting upon him a wound about 4 ½ inches deep,
which is mortal.
Nicolas saw Capina bleeding and staggering towards the altar,
and upon seeing his daughter approached her and asked her
the reason for her action to which Avelina replied, “Father, I
could not endure anymore”. Amado Capina died a few minutes
after. Barrio lieutenant Casimiro Lozada was there and Avelina
surrendered herself. Lozada advised the Jaurigues to go home
immediately for fear of retaliation from Capina's relatives.
Issue/s: Whether or Not the defendant should be completely
absolved of all criminal responsibility because she is justified in
having acted in the legitimate defense of her honor.
Ruling: Conviction of defendant is sustained and cannot be
declared completely exempt from criminal liability. To be
entitled to a complete self-defense of honor, there must be an
attempt to rape. To provide for a justifying circumstance of self-
defense, there must be;
a) Unlawful aggression
b) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent
or repel it,
c) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.
Attempt to rape is an unlawful aggression. However, under the
circumstances of the offense, there was no possibility of the
defendant to be raped as they were inside the chapel lighted
with electric lights and contained several people. Thrusting at
the base of Capino’s neck as her means to repel aggression is
not reasonable but is instead, excessive.
Mitigating circumstances are considered in her favour as well,
Circumstances include her voluntary and unconditional
surrender to the barrio lieutenant, provocation from the
deceased which produced temporary loss of reason and self-
control of the defendant and lack of intent to kill the deceased
evidenced by infliction of only one single wound.
Fallo: The law prescribed the penalty of reclusion temporal for
the crime of homicide, Avelina is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from 2mos and 1 day of arresto
mayor as minimum to 2 years, 4 months, and 1 day of prision
correccional as maximum; to indemnify heirs of Capina in the
sum of 2,000; with corresponding subsidiary imprisonment not
to exceed 1/3 of principal penalty and to pay costs. She is
given the benefit of ½ of her preventive imprisonment, and the
knife marked Exhibit B ordered confiscated. So ordered.
People v. Narvaez
(see also dissents of J. Abad Santos and J. Gutierrez, Jr.)
Doctrine: Justifying Circumstances - Unlawful Aggression
against property rights: Defense of property can be invoked as
a justifying circumstance only when it is coupled with an attack
on the person of one entrusted with said property.
Facts:
A.Narvaez was formerly convicted of murder for the death of
Fleischer and Rubia. Defendant claimed that he shot the two
as an act of self-defense as a means to protect himself and
his property therefore he should be exempt from criminal
liability. The two were building a fence around his property
and asked them to stop but did not and was thereby
provoked by Fleischer’s unlawful aggression. While the two
requirements for invoking self-defense were present
(unlawful aggression and lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person defending himself), Narvaez’s act was
considered as an incomplete self-defense because it lacked
reasonable necessity of the means employed.
B. (In case Atty Lexie asks as to why the incident is intertwined
with the long-drawn-out legal battle between the parties)
1. It is believed that the incident is intertwined with the long-
drawn-out legal battle between Fleischer and Co., Inc. and the
land settlers of Cotobato among whom was Narvaez.
2. At the time of the shooting, the civil case between the
parties was still pending for annulment where the settlers
wanted granting of property to Fleischer to be annulled. At the
time of the shooting, Narvaez had leased his property from
Fleischer to avoid conflict.
3. Narvaez received a letter terminating the contract because
he has not paid rent for six months to the company. He was
given 6 months to remove his house, rice mill, bodega, and
water pitcher pumps. The shooting happened barely 2 months
after the letter.
4. Narvaez claimed that he acted in defense of his person and
property but the Court of First Instance of Cotabato ruled that
he was guilty of murder. He was originally sentenced to
reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs, and to pay for moral
damages.
Issue/s: WON the lower court erred in convicting Narvaez of
murder despite the fact the he acted in defense of his rights.
WON the lower court erred in convicting Narvaez of murder
despite the fact the he acted in defense of his person.
Ruling: The court ruled in the affirmative.
Defense of one’s person or rights is treated as a justifying
circumstance under Art. 11, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code,
but in order for it to be appreciated, the following requisites
must occur:
1. Unlawful aggression;
2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it;
3. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself” (Art. 11, par. 1, Revised Penal Code, as
amended).
In the first instance, When the appellant woke up to the sound
of the chiseling on his walls, his first reaction was to look out of
the window. Then he saw the damage being done to his
house, compounded by the fact that his house and rice mill will
be shut off from the highway by the fence once it is finished.
He therefore appealed to his compadre, the deceased Rubia,
to stop what they were doing and to talk things over with him.
But the deceased Fleischer answered angrily with “gademit”
and directed his men to proceed with what they were doing.
There is no question, therefore, that there was aggression on
the part of the victims: Fleischer was ordering, and Rubia was
actually participating in the fencing. This was indeed
aggression, not on the person of appellant, but on his property
rights.
Second, the reasonableness of the resistance is also a
requirement of the justifying circumstance of self-defense or
defense of one’s rights under paragraph 1 of Article 11,
Revised Penal Code. In this case, however, when the
appellant fired his shotgun from his window, killing his two
victims, his resistance was disproportionate to the attack.
While the court is not convinced that the killing was
unjustifiable, they believe that the third element of defense of
property is present, i.e., lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the appellant who was defending his property. As a
matter of fact, there was no provocation at all on his part, since
he was asleep at first and was only awakened by the noise
produced by the victims and their laborers. His plea for the
deceased and their men to stop and talk things over with him
was no provocation at all.
Considering the facts stated above, the court finds that passion
and obfuscation attended the commission of the crime. The
appellant awoke to find his house being damaged and its
accessibility to the highway as well as of his rice mill bodega
being closed. Not only was his house being unlawfully violated;
his business was also in danger of closing down for lack of
access to the highway. These circumstances, coming so near
to the time when his first house was dismantled, thus forcing
him to transfer to his only remaining house, must have so
aggravated his obfuscation that he momentarily lost all reason
causing him to reach for his shotgun and fire at the victims in
defense of his rights. Considering the antecedent facts of this
case, where appellant had thirty years earlier migrated to this
so-called “land of promise” with dreams and hopes of relative
prosperity and tranquility, only to find his castle crumbling at
the hands of the deceased, his dispassionate plea going
unheeded—all these could be too much for any man—he
should be credited with this mitigating circumstance.
The Court also emphasized that considering that the majority
of the requirements for defense of property are present, the
penalty may be lowered by two degrees, i.e., to prision
correccional. And under paragraph 5 of Article 64, the same
may further be reduced by one degree, i.e., arresto mayor,
because of the presence of two mitigating circumstances and
no aggravating circumstance.
Dissenting Opinion:
ABAD SANTOS, J. - The self-defense of the Revised Penal
Code refers to unlawful aggression on persons, not property.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J. – It is true that Art. 429, Civil Code of the
Philippines, provides that the owner or legal possessor of a
thing may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to
repel or prevent an actual or unlawful physical invasion or
usurpation of his property.
However, an attack on the person defending his property is an
indispensable element where an accused pleads self-defense
but what is basically defended is only property.
Defense of property is not of such importance as the right to
life and defense of property can only be invoked when it is
coupled with some form of attack on the person of one
entrusted with said property. The defense of property, whether
complete or incomplete, to be available in prosecutions for
murder or homicide must be coupled with an attack by the one
getting the property on the person defending it.
In the case now before Us, there is absolutely no evidence that
an attack was attempted, much less made upon the person of
appellant. The mere utterance “No, gademit, proceed, go
ahead” is not the unlawful aggression which entitles appellant
to the plea of self-defense. I agree with the majority opinion
that the crime is homicide but without any privileged mitigating
circumstance.
Fallo: WHEREFORE, finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of only two (2) homicides, mitigated by the
privileged extenuating circumstance of incomplete self-defense
as well as by two (2) generic mitigating circumstances of
voluntary surrender and obfuscation, without any aggravating
circumstance, appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment of four (4) months of arresto mayor, to indemnify
each group of heirs of davis fleischer and of flaviano rubia in
the sum of four thousand (p4,000.00) pesos, without subsidiary
imprisonment and without any award for moral damages and
attorney’s fees.
Considering that appellant has been under detention for almost
fourteen (14) years now since his voluntary surrender on
August 22, 1968, his immediate release is hereby ordered. No
costs. So, ordered.
**** The crime committed is now homicide and his sentence
was lowered but because he has been under detention longer
than the prescribed period of his imprisonment for said new
crime, the court ordered for his immediate release.
Sabang v. People
Doctrine: In order to successfully claim that he acted in
defense of a relative, the accused must prove the concurrence
of the following requisites: (1) unlawful aggression on the part
of the person killed or injured; (2) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression;
and (3) the person defending the relative had no part in
provoking the assailant, should any provocation have been
given by the relative attacked. Unlawful aggression is a primary
and indispensable requisite without which defense of relatives,
whether complete or otherwise, cannot be validly invoked.
Facts: At around 6:30 p.m. on that fateful night, petitioner and
Butad were having drinks together with spouses Cruz and
Andresa Villamor outside the store of Melania Sombilon in Sitio
Landing, Barangay Liloan.
A civilian agent with the Philippine National Police, was then
armed with a .38-caliber revolver which was tucked in his
holster.
In the midst of the drinking spree, Randy Sabang suddenly and
unexpectedly appeared before the group. His appearance
triggered a negative reaction from Butad, who then uttered the
words “I will shoot you” to Randy Sabang.
At this point, Butad was not holding any gun. Andresa Villamor,
another eyewitness to the incident, confirmed Payud’s
testimony that Butad was holding a glass and not a gun when
he uttered those words.
Petitioner reacted to Butad’s statement saying, “Just try to
shoot my child because I’ll never fight for him because he is a
spoiled brat.”
Unexpectedly, a person appeared on the scene and punched
Butad causing the latter to fall down lying partially on his back.
Petitioner, who was then sitting across Butad, stood up and
pulled the gun tucked in Butad’s waist. He pointed the gun at
Butad and fired a shot at the latter’s chest.
In a Judgment dated November 22, 1999, the trial court
convicted petitioner principally on the strength of the testimony
of Dr. Edilberto P. Calipayan, the physician who conducted the
post mortem examination of Butad’s body, to the effect that the
absence of powder burns indicates that the gunshots were
fired at a distance of more than 10 inches from the victim’s
body and not close range as claimed by petitioner. Hence, the
petition for certiorari on the ruling of CA.
Issue/s: Whether or not petitioner’s insistence on the justifying
circumstance of defense of relative deserves merit.
Ruling: No. Unlawful aggression must be clearly established
by the evidence. In this case, there is a divergence in the
testimonies of the prosecution and defense witnesses as to
whether Butad aimed a gun at the petitioner's son as he
uttered the words “I will shoot you.” With this conflict emerges
the question of whether the petitioner sensed an imminent
threat to his son’s life. Payud unequivocally testified that
petitioner even dismissed Butad’s utterance saying, “Just try to
shoot my child because I’ll never fight for him because he is a
spoiled brat.” This indicates to the court that the petitioner did
not consider Butad’s words a threat at all. Furthermore, the
presence of four (4) gunshot wounds on Butad’s body negates
the claim that the killing was justified but instead indicates a
determined effort to kill him. Even assuming that it was Butad
who initiated the attack, the fact that petitioner was able to
wrest the gun from him signifies that the aggression which
Butad had started already ceased. Petitioner became the
unlawful aggressor when he continued to shoot Butad even as
he lay defenseless on the ground.
In the final analysis, petitioner failed to demonstrate any
reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of the trial court
and the Court of Appeals. His conviction of the crime of
homicide is certain. Under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code,
homicide is punished by reclusion temporal. There being one
(1) mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the penalty
shall be imposed in its minimum period. Applying the benefits
of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the trial court correctly
imposed an indeterminate penalty ranging from eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12)
years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
The court agree with the Office of the Solicitor General that
consistent with pertinent jurisprudence, the award of moral
damages should be reduced from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00.
Finally, in the absence of any aggravating circumstance, the
trial court correctly withheld the award of exemplary damages.
Fallo: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
August 16, 2004 and its Resolution dated July 6, 2005,
affirming the Judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court
dated November 26, 1999, are AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is reduced
to P50,000.00. Costs against petitioner.
Palaganas v. People
Doctrine: ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. —The following
do not incur any criminal liability:
Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided
that the following circumstances concur;
First. Unlawful aggression
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.
As an element of self-defense, unlawful aggression refers to an
assault or attack, or a threat thereof in an imminent and
immediate manner, which places the defendant’s life in actual
peril
It is an oft-repeated rule that the nature and number of wounds
inflicted by the accused are constantly and unremittingly
considered important indicia to disprove a plea of self-defense.
The reasonableness of the means employed by the person
defending himself may take into account the weapons, the
physical condition of the parties and other circumstances
showing that there is a rational equivalence between the
means of attack and the defense.
Where an accused admits killing the victim but invokes self-
defense, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that he acted in self-defense.
Facts: Two groups, one was composed of the Ferrer brothers
Servillano, [Melton] and Michael, and the other group
composed of (Jaime Palaganas, Ferdinand Palaganas and
Virgilio Bautista) were in a bar called Tidbits Videoke to drink
and to sing.
When Jaime Palaganas started singing the lyrics of the
infamous song “My Way”, Melton Ferrer sang with him. This
initiated an exchange of words between the two and Jaime
Palaganas in rage hit the back of Ferrer’s head with the
microphone.
A rumble then ensued inside the bar. Virgilio Bautista did not
join the fray, leaving his companions Jaime and Ferdinand
Palaganas to fight with the three Ferrer brothers.
In the midst of the rumble, Ferdinand Palaganas ran outside of
the bar. The other brothers wanted to run after him, but
decided to go back inside the bar to fight Jaime Palaganas
instead.

The owner of the bar and the sister of Jaime Palaganas, Edith
Palaganas, came out and pacified the fight. When the fight was
over, Servillano noticed that his wristwatch was missing and
when they did not find the watch inside the bar, they decided to
continue the search outside.
When they got out, they saw Ferdinand Palaganas pointing at
them and saying to his companion, Rujjeric Palaganas
(petitioner of this case): "They are the ones, shoot them."
Petitioner then shot them hitting Servillano first at the left side
of the abdomen, causing him to fall on the ground, and
followed by [Melton] who also fell to the ground.
When Servillano noticed that [Melton] was no longer moving,
he told Michael "Bato, bato." Michael picked up some stones
and threw them at the petitioner and Ferdinand. The latter then
left the place.
Afterwards, the police officers came and the Ferrer brothers
were brought to the Manaoag Hospital and later to Villaflor
Hospital in Dagupan. Servillano later discovered that [Melton]
was fatally hit in the head while Michael was hit in the right
shoulder.
On 28 October 1998, the trial court rendered its Decision
finding (Rujjeric Palaganas) petitioner guilty only of the crime of
Homicide and two (2) counts of Frustrated Homicide. On the
other hand, Ferdinand was acquitted of all the charges against
him. Aggrieved, the petitioner appealed the foregoing Decision
of the RTC dated 28 October 1998, before the Court of
Appeals. In its Decision dated 30 September 2004, the Court
of Appeals affirmed with modifications the assailed RTC
Decision.
On 16 November 2004, petitioner lodged the instant Petition
for Review before the Supreme Court on the basis of the
following argument: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON
THE GROUND OF LAWFUL SELF-DEFENSE.
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT petitioner is correct in his
contention that he should be acquitted on the ground of lawful
self-defense.
Ruling: Held in the negative.
Article 11, paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code provides
for the elements and/or requisites in order that a plea of self-
defense may be validly considered in absolving a person from
criminal liability, viz:
ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. – The following do not incur
any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights,
provided that the following circumstances concur;
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself.
As an element of self-defense, unlawful aggression refers to an
assault or attack, or a threat thereof in an imminent and
immediate manner, which places the defendant's life in actual
peril. It is an act positively strong showing the wrongful intent of
the aggressor and not merely a threatening or intimidating
attitude. It is also described as a sudden and unprovoked
attack of immediate and imminent kind to the life, safety or
rights of the person attacked.
In the case at bar, it is clear that there was no unlawful
aggression on the part of the Ferrer brothers that justified the
act of the petitioner in shooting them. There was no actual or
imminent danger to the lives of petitioner and Ferdinand when
they proceeded and arrived at the videoke bar and saw the
Ferrer brothers. It appears that the Ferrer brothers then were
merely standing outside the videoke bar and were not carrying
any weapon when the petitioner arrived with his brother
Ferdinand and started firing his gun. Furthermore, the fact that
petitioner sustained injuries in his left leg and left shoulder,
allegedly caused by the stones thrown by the Ferrer brothers,
does not signify that he was a victim of unlawful aggression or
that he acted in self-defense. There is no evidence to show
that his wounds were so serious and severe. The superficiality
of the injuries sustained by the petitioner is no indication that
his life and limb were in actual peril.
Without unlawful aggression, self-defense will not have a leg to
stand on and this justifying circumstance cannot and will not be
appreciated, even if the other elements are present. Unlawful
aggression, as an element of self-defense, is wanting in the
instant case.
The second element of self-defense requires that the means
employed by the person defending himself must be reasonably
necessary to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression of the
victim. The reasonableness of the means employed may take
into account the weapons, the physical condition of the parties
and other circumstances showing that there is a rational
equivalence between the means of attack and the defense. 50 In
the case at bar, the petitioner's act of shooting the Ferrer
brothers was not a reasonable and necessary means of
repelling the aggression allegedly initiated by the Ferrer
brothers. As aptly stated by the trial court, petitioner's gun was
far deadlier compared to the stones thrown by the Ferrer
brothers.
Moreover, we stated earlier that when the Ferrer brothers
allegedly threw stones at the petitioner, the latter had other
less harmful options than to shoot the Ferrer brothers. Such
act failed to pass the test of reasonableness of the means
employed in preventing or repelling an unlawful aggression.
Fallo: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 is
hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
People v. Ricohermoso
Doctrine: Severro Padernal and Juan Padernal appealed from
the decision of the Circuit Criminal Court at Lucena City,
convicting them of murder, sentencing each of them to
reclusion perpetua and ordering them to pay solidarily the sum
of twelve thousand pesos to the heirs of Geminiano De Leon
and to pay to the costs.
Facts: At about nine o’clock in the morning of January 30,1965
Geminiano De Leon, together with his thirty-three-year-old
common law wife Fabiana Rosales, his twenty-four-year-old
son Marianato de Leon and one Rizal Rosales, upon a chance
Geminiano asked Ricohermoso about his share of the palay
harvest. Ricohermoso answered that Geminiano could go to
his house anytime and he would give the latter palay.
Upon Geminiano’s return he stopped by Ricohermoso’s place,
it was about 2:00 in the afternoon, Geminiano sat back beside
Fabiana Rosales in front of the house while Marianito stood
about three meters behind his father. A 22-caliber rifle was
slung on Marianito’s right shoulder. Ricohermoso stood near
the door of his house while Severo Padernal was stationed
near the eaves of the house. Geminiano asked Ricohermoso
about the palay. The latter no longer conciliatory and evidently
hostile, answered in a defiant tone: Whatever happens: I will
not give you palay, Geminiano remonstrated: Why did you tell
us to pass by your house, if you’re not willing to give the palay?
As if pre-arrangement,Ricohermoso unsheathed the bolo and
approached Geminiano from the left,while Severo Padernal
(Father-in-law of Ricohermoso
) got an axe and approached Geminiano from the right, The
latter looked up to sexagenarian Severo Padernal,with both
hands raised and pleaded: Mamay (Granpa),why will you do
this to us ? We will not fight you, while Geminiano was still
looking up to Severo Padernal on his right, Ricohermoso
walked to Geminiano’s left and when about one meter from
him, stabbed him on the neck with his bolo. Geminiano fell face
downward on the ground. While in helpless position, he hacked
on the back with an axe by Severo Padernal. Juan Padernal
ricohermoso’s brother-in-law and son of severo suddenly
embraced Marianito de Leon from behind, with his right arm
locked around marianito’s neck and left hand pressing
marianito’s left forearm, they grappled and rolled downhill
towards a camote patch.
When he regains consciousness, he walked uphill and
embrace geminiano and he carried geminiano for a short
distance.
Issue/s: Whether or not appellant Juan Padernal can invoke
the justifying circumstance of avoidance of a greater evil or
injury.
Ruling: NO. Juan Padernal’s reliance on the justifying
circumstance is erroneous because his act in preventing
Marianito from shooting Ricohermoso and Severo Padernal
who were the aggressors, was designed to ensure killing of
Geminiano de Leon without any risks to the assailants and not
act to prevent greater evil or injury. Treachery was appreciated
also in the case. The charged againts the appellants were
attempted murder with respect to Marianito De Leon, the trial
court convicted them LESIONES LEVES.
Fallo: The judgement of the lower court as to appellant Juan
Padernal is AFFIRMED with costs against him.
People v. Norma Hernandez
Doctrine: A party has the right to avoid to himself or herself
the evil of going through a loveless marriage pursuant to Article
11, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
Art 11. The following do not incur any criminal liability:
4. Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does not
act which causes damage to another, provided that the
following requisites are present;
1. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;
2. That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it;
3. That there be no other practical and less harmful means of
preventing it.
Facts: Vivencio Lascano started courting appellant Maria
Norma Hernandez and after months of courtship, appellant
finally accepted Vivencio. On the same date, she asked him to
bring his parents over to her home so that they could talk about
their marriage. When Vivencio and his parents went to her
house, they brought chickens and goats and they agreed to
buy a wedding dress, 2 vestidas, shoes, P20 for the sponsors
and to repair the uncle’s roof. While the celebration was going
on, the appellant was nowhere to be found. Vivencio and his
parents waited but she never showed up thus causing them
great shame and humiliation.
Norma Hernandez averred that Vivencio was really courting
her but that she wasn’t really in love with him. Her parents
tried to persuade her to accept the proposal and that she only
accepted it out of obedience to her parents and the uncle’s
insistence. Before Vivencio’s parents came to their home, she
already counseled them not to bring the chickens and that they
should not regret whatever may happen later.
Appellant said she felt torture because she wasn’t honestly in
love with Vivencio and so she decided to leave home as last
recourse to prevent the marriage. Her parents also
corroborated her testimony.
The Regional Trial Court convicted her of serious slander by
deed because she purposely and deliberately fled to prevent
celebration of marriage.
Motion for Reconsideration ensued but was denied. Thus, this
appeal
Issue/s: Is Norma Hernandez criminally liable for slander by
backing out from a marriage agreement?
Ruling: NO. A party to an agreement to marry who backs out
cannot be held liable for the crime of slander by deed, for then
that would be an inherent way of compelling said party to go
into a marriage without his or her free consent, and this would
contravene the principle in law that what could not be done
directly could not be done indirectly; and said party has the
right to avoid to himself or herself the evil of going through a
loveless marriage pursuant to Article 11, paragraph 4 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Norma Hernandez does not incur criminal liability as all the
requisites of Art. 11 par.4 of the Revised Penal Code are
present.
Art 11. The following do not incur any criminal liability:
4. Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does not
act which causes damage to another, provided that the
following requisites are present;
1. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;
2. That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it;
3. That there be no other practical and less harmful means of
preventing it.
She was merely exercising her right not to give her consent to
the marriage after mature consideration. Norma Hernandez
had the right to avoid to herself the evil of going through a
loveless marriage.
Fallo: Wherefore, the Court hereby reverse the lower court’s
judgment and Norma Hernandez is acquitted from the crime of
slander by deed.
Case: People v. Lagata
Doctrine: Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. — The following
do not incur any criminal liability:
Paragraph 5. Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or
in the lawful exercise of a right or office.
Requisites:
a. The accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the
lawful exercise of right or office;
b. The injury caused or the offense committed is the
necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or
the lawful exercise of such right or office.
Mitigating Circumstances are those which, if present in the
commission of the crime, do not entirely free the actor from
criminal liability, but serve only to reduce the penalty.
Incomplete justification is a special or privileged mitigating
circumstance, which, not only cannot be offset by aggravating
circumstances but also reduces the penalty by one or two
degrees than that prescribed by law.
Applies, when all the requisites necessary to justify the act or
to exempt from criminal liability are NOT attendant.
It is considered a privileged mitigating circumstance, provided,
majority of the elements required to justify or exempt are
present.
Facts: The accused, Ignacio Lagata, a provincial guard of
Catbalogan, Samar, was in charge of 6 prisoners (Jesus,
Tipace, Eusebio, Mariano, Labong & Abria) assigned to work in
the capitol plaza of Samar.
Lagata ordered the prisoners to go to the nursery to pick up
gabi. Not long afterwards, they were called to assemble.
Epifanio Labong was missing so Lagata ordered the 5
remaining prisoners to go look for him.
Eusebio Abria said that while they were gathering gabi, he
heard 3 shots. He was wounded by the 2nd one. They were
already assembled by the 1st shot and that he did not see
Tipace being shot. He said he ran away because he was
afraid that he might be shot again and that his companions
were also probably scared and that is why they ran.
Another prisoner, Mariano Ibañez stated that Epifanio Labong
did not answer their call so Ignacio Lagata ordered to go look
for him in the mountain. He said that Abria went to the camote
plantation and found footprints and called on Lagata to inform
him about the footprints. When Abria told Lagata of the
flattened grass and that he was unable to look for Labong,
Ignacio Lagata fired at him and he was hit on his left arm.
Abria told Lagata he was wounded and in turn, Lagata told
them to assemble. Once they were assembled, Lagata cocked
his gun and shot Ceferino Tipace. Mariano said that when he
saw Tipace was shot, he ran away because he also could have
been shot.
Eustaquio Galet, another detainee, received good treatment
from Lagata though his testimony corroborated those of the
other prisoners.
Pedro Mayuga, chief of Samar Provincial Hospital & Gilberto
Rosales, Sanitary Division president, verified the gunshot
wound and that the death of Tipace resulted therein.
Ignacio Lagata, however, said that he fired his gun because
the prisoners were running far from him when he already
ordered them to stop. He said that he would be the one in jail
if a prisoner escaped under his custody. Furthermore, he
would be discharged from duty like the others. Moreover, the
picking up of gabi was not part of the prisoner’s work.
Appellant was charged with murder, serious physical injuries
and evasion through negligence in three separate cases which
have been tried jointly. Finding him guilty, the trial court
sentenced him as follows:
“(a) For Murder (Case No. 809)—Reclusion Perpetua with civil
interdiction for life and perpetual absolute disqualification,
indemnify the heirs of Ceferino Tipace Two Thousand
Pesos(P2,000) and pay the costs of this action;"
(b) For serious physical injuries (Case No. 810)—An indeter-
minate imprisonment of two (2) years and four (4) months
asmimum to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days
of prisión correccional as maximum and to pay the costs of
thisaction; and “
(c) For evasion through negligence (Case No, 811)—An
indeterminate imprisonment of two (2) months and one (1) day
of arresto mayor as minimum to one (1) year, one (1) month
and ten (10) days of prisión correccional as maximum, and to
pay the costs," (p.45, rec.)"
Issue/s: WON the appellant can invoke the justifying
circumstance of fulfillment of duty.
Ruling: NO. The court said, “as regards to the shooting of
Abria and Tipace, we are convinced that the facts were as
narrated by the witnesses for the prosecution.” Abria was shot
when he was only three meters away from appellant and the
latter has not even shown that Abria attempted to escape.
Tipace was also shot when he was about four or five meters
away from appellant. The latter's allegation that Tipace was
running, conveying the idea that said prisoner was in the act of
escaping, appears to be inconsistent with his own testimony to
the effect that Tipace was running side-wise, with his face
looking towards appellant, and with the undisputed fact that
Tipace was hit near one axilla, the bullet coming out from the
opposite shoulder. If Tipace's purpose was to escape, the
natural thing for him to do would have been to give his back to
appellant.
The court said that it is clear that Lagata had absolutely no
reason to fire at Tipace. Lagata could have fired at him in self-
defense or if absolutely necessary to avoid his escape. The
record does not show that Tipace was bent on committing any
act of aggression or that he attempted to escape. According to
Lagata, "he was running towards and then around me"
There is no question that the escape of Labong scared
appellant, according to him, because of the experience of other
guards who were dismissed from office or even prosecuted
because of prisoners who had escaped under their custody,
and that it was his duty to fire against the prisoners if he
wanted to be exempt from any responsibility. Even if appellant
sincerely believed, although erroneously, that in firing the shots
be acted in the performance of his official duty, the
circumstances of the case show that there was no necessity
for him to fire directly against the prisoners, so as to seriously
wound one of them and kill instantaneously another. While
custodians of prisoners should take all care to avoid the latter's
escape, only absolute necessity would authorize them to fire
against them. Theirs is the burden of proof as to such
necessity. The summary liquidation of prisoners, under flimsy
pretexts of attempts of escape, which has been and is being
practiced in dictatorial systems of government, has always
been and is shocking to the universal conscience of humanity.
Fallo: As recommended by the prosecution however, the
appellant was entitled to the benefit of the mitigating
circumstance of incomplete justifying circumstance defined in
paragraph 5 of Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code.
Consequently, the appellant was sentenced for homicide to an
indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision
mayor to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal and,
in the case of serious physical injuries, to an indeterminate
penalty of four months and one day of arresto mayor to two
years, four months and one day of prision correccional.
Modified as above stated, the appealed decision was affirmed
with costs against appellant.
Mamangun v. People
Doctrine: The justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty
under paragraph 5, Article 11, of the Revised Penal Code may
be invoked only after the defense successfully proves that: (1)
the accused acted in the performance of a duty; and (2) the
injury inflicted or offense committed is the necessary
consequence of the due performance or lawful exercise of
such duty.
Facts: Accused Rufino S. Mamangun, a police officer (PO2),
along with two other police officers, responded to a telephone
call that a robbery-holdup was in progress in Brgy Calvario,
Meycauayan, Bulacan.
The three policemen, each armed with a drawn handgun,
searched the rooftop of the house where the suspect was
allegedly taking refuge. There, they saw a man whom they
thought was the robbery suspect. At that instance, petitioner
Mamangun, who was walking ahead of the group, fired his
handgun once, hitting the man. The man turned out to be
Gener Contreras who was not the robbery suspect. Contreras
died from the gunshot wound.
According to the lone eyewitness who accompanied the 3
policemen, he was beside Mamangun when they saw a man
whom the witness recognized as Gener Contreras. Mamangun
pointed his pistol at the man, who instantly exclaimed, "Hindi
ako, hindi ako!," to which Mamangun replied, "Anong hindi
ako?" Before the witness could say anything, Mamangun fired
his gun, hitting the man who turned out to be Contreras.
After due proceedings, the Sandiganbayan came out with its
decision finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of only the crime of Homicide. But even as the said court
rejected the petitioner’s claim that the shooting was justified by
self-defense, it nonetheless ruled that the crime of Homicide
was attended by an incomplete justifying circumstance of the
petitioner having acted in the performance of his duty as a
policeman.
Petitioner alleged that the Sandiganbayan erred in failing to
apply par. 5, Article 11 of the RPC (Fulfillment of a Duty) which
would have absolved him from criminal liability.
Issue/s: WON the Sandiganbayan erred in failing to apply par.
5, Article 11 of the RPC (Fulfillment of a Duty) in the case of
Mamangun.
Ruling: The Court ruled in the negative.
Having admitted the fatal shooting of Contreras, petitioner is
charged with the burden of adducing convincing evidence to
show that the killing was done in the fulfillment of his duty as a
policeman.
The justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty under
paragraph 5, Article 11, of the Revised Penal Code may be
invoked only after the defense successfully proves that: (1) the
accused acted in the performance of a duty; and (2) the injury
inflicted or offense committed is the necessary consequence of
the due performance or lawful exercise of such duty.
Concededly, the first requisite is present in this case.
Petitioner, a police officer, was responding to a robbery-holdup
incident. His presence at the site of the crime was in
accordance with the performance of his duty. However, proof
that the shooting and ultimate death of Contreras was a
necessary consequence of the due performance of his duty as
a policeman is essential to exempt him from criminal liability.
Acts in the fulfillment of a duty, without more, do not completely
justify Mamangun's firing the fatal gunshot at the victim. There
was the absence of the equally necessary justifying
circumstance that the injury or offense committed be the
necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty.
There can be no quibbling that there was no rational necessity
for the killing of Contreras.
Fallo: IN VIEW THEREOF, the instant petition is DENIED and
the assailed decision of the Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED in
all respects. Accused Rufino Mamangun is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide.
People v. Dagani
Doctrine: Fulfillment of duty as a justifying circumstance
Facts: A group composed of the victim, Ernesto Javier,
Lincoln Miran, and two others were drinking in a canteen.
All of a sudden, appellants, who were security officers of the
PNR, entered the canteen and approached the group.
Appellant Dagani shoved Miran then held the victim
while the appellant Santiano shot the victim twice, killing the
latter.
The appellants testified that they were ordered by their desk
officer to investigate a commotion at the canteen. They
claimed that appellant Dagani grappled with the victim after the
latter pulled out a gun and during the commotion fired two
shots. Upon hearing the gun shots, appellant Santiano went
inside the canteen and shot the victim. They voluntarily
surrendered after the incident. Investigation showed that there
were no bullet holes anywhere in the canteen which will
support the claim of the defense that the victim’s gun went off
twice and no bullet casings were found.
The trial court found them guilty of murder and now they
appeal to the Court invoking the justifying circumstance of self-
defense and lawful performance of duty as PNR security
officers.
Issue/s: WON the justifying circumstance of lawful
performance of duty is applicable.
Ruling: Appellants set up the defense that they were in the
lawful performance of their official duties. Two requisites must
concur before this defense can prosper: 1) the accused must
have acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right or office; and 2) the injury caused or the
offense committed should have been the necessary
consequence of such lawful exercise.
The defense failed to prove that the security officers were
in fact on duty at the time they were at the canteen.
Appellants’ assertion that they were ordered to go on 24-hour
duty was belied by PNR Security Investigator Rolando
Marinay’s testimony that PNR security officers work in two 12-
hour shifts. Considering that the imminent danger to the life of
the appellants had been neutralized when Dagani grappled
with Javier and restrained his hands, this Court holds that the
fatal injuries that appellant Santiano inflicted on the victim
cannot be deemed to be necessary consequences of the
performance of his duty as a PNR security officer.
Moreover, it was not established that Javier fired his gun.
However, the prosecution failed to establish conspiracy
between the two appellants.
Fallo: Wherefore, appellant Santiano is found guilty of
homicide while appellant Dagani is acquitted.
Case: People v. Beronilla
Doctrine: Lawful order of superior- where the accused acted
upon orders of superior officers that they, as military
subordinates, could not question, and obeyed in good faith,
without being aware of their illegality, without any fault or
negligence on their part, the act is not accompanied by criminal
intent.
CASE SUMMARY:
Beronilla et al. were convicted of murder for the execution of
Arsenio Borjal in Abra pursuant to the memorandum issued to
all Military Mayors in Northern Luzon, authorizing them to try
persons accused of treason, espionage, or the aiding and
abetting of the enemy.
Facts: Beronilla was appointed Military Mayor of La Paz by Lt.
Col. R. H. Arnold, operating as a guerrilla unit in the province
of Abra
In a memorandum issued by Lt. Col. Arnold, it authorized them
to appoint a jury of 12 bolomen to investigate persons accused
of treason, espionage, or aiding and abetting of the enemy.
The list of those persons included elected mayor of La Paz,
Arsenio Borjal Beronilla, pursuant to his instructions, placed
Borjal under custody and asked the residents of La Paz to file
complaints against him. Charges of espionage, aiding the
enemy, and abuse of authority were led against Borjal. The
jury found Borjal guilty and imposed upon him, death penalty.
A radiogram from Col. Volckmann, overall commander, to Lt.
Col. Arnold, called the attention to the illegality of Borjal’s
conviction and sentence which was unknown to Beronilla.
Accused Manuel Beronilla, Policarpo Paculdo, Filipino
Velasco, and Jacinto Adriatico were convicted of murder for
allegedly conspiring the execution of Borjal The late President
Manuel Roxas issued Executive Proclamation No. 8, granting
amnesty to all persons who committed acts penalized under
RPC anent the resistance to the enemy against persons aiding
in the war efforts of the enemy resulting the dismissal of some
bolomen involved in the jury but still convicting Beronilla,
Paculdo, Velasco, and Adriatico because the crime was
committed after the expiration of the time limit fixed by the
amnesty proclamation, hence this appeal.
Issue/s: W/N Beronilla et al’s actions are covered by justifying
circumstances for obedience to lawful order of superior
Ruling: Lt. Col. Arnold, failed to transmit the Volckmann
message to Beronilla. And this being so, the charge of criminal
conspiracy to do away with Borjal must be rejected, because
the accused had no need to conspire against a man who was,
to their knowledge, duly sentenced to death.
The conduct of the appellants does not dispose that these
appellants were impelled by malice (dolo). The arrest and trial
of Borjal were made upon express orders of the higher
command; the appellants allowed Borjal to be defended by
counsel after finding that the late Arsenio Borjal had really
committed treasonable acts, (causing soldiers and civilians to
be tortured, and hidden American officers to be captured by
the Japanese) expressly declared that "the Court is convinced
that it was not for political or personal reason that the accused
decided to kill Arsenio Borjal"
Appearing that the charge is the heinous crime of murder, and
that the accused-appellants acted upon orders, of a superior
officer that they, as military subordinates, could not question,
and obeyed in good faith, without being aware of their illegality,
without any fault or negligence on their part, we cannot say
that criminal intent has been established
To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes
made such by statute, be accompanied by a criminal intent, or
by such negligence or indifference to duty or to consequences,
as, in law, is equivalent to criminal intent. The maxim is, actus
non facit reum, nisi mens rea-a is not committed if the mind of
the person performing the act complained of be innocent."
Fallo: Judgement appealed from is reversed and the
appellants are acquitted
Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan
Doctrine: To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain
crimes made such by statute, be accompanied by a criminal
intent, or by such negligence or indifference to duty or to
consequences as, in law, is equivalent to criminal intent. The obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful
maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea- a crime is not purpose.
committed if the mind of the person performing the act
complained of is innocent. Second. There is no denying that the disbursement, which
Tabuena admitted as out of the ordinary but this deviation is
1. Good faith in the payment of public funds relieves a public inevitable under the circumstances Tabuena was in. He did not
officer from the crime of malversation. have the luxury of time to observe all auditing procedures of
disbursement considering the fact that the MARCOS
2. Compliance to a patently lawful order is rectitude far better Memorandum enjoined his immediate compliance with the
than contumacious disobedience. directive that he forward to the President's Office the P55
Million in cash. Be that as it may, Tabuena surely cannot
In the case at bench, the order emanated from the Office of the
escape responsibility for such omission. But since he was
President and bears the signature of the President himself, the
acting in good faith, his liability should only be administrative or
highest official of the land.
civil in nature, and not criminal.
Facts: Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) owes the
Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) P99.1 Fallo: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, herein
million for the construction of the MIA. The accused are Luis A. petitioners Luis A. Tabuena and Adolfo M. Peralta are hereby
Tabuena and Adolfo M. Peralta, all public officers, being then ACQUITTED of the crime of malversation as defined and
the General Manager and Acting Manager of MIAA and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. The
accountable for public funds belonging to the MIAA, they being Sandiganbayan Decision of October 12, 1990 and the
the only ones authorized to make withdrawals against the cash Resolution dated December 20, 1991 are REVERSED and
accounts of MIAA pursuant to its board resolutions. Then SET ASIDE.
President Marcos ordered Tabuena over the phone to
withdraw P55 Million from MIAA’s accounts with PNB as partial SO, ORDERED.
payment to PNCC. Tabuena obeyed and a Presidential
Memorandum reiterating in black and white such verbal
instruction was issued. Three withdrawals were made on three
different occasions. First withdrawal was for the amount of 25
million, second was for 25 million, and third was for 5 million.
After the manager’s check was issued andencashed, the
money was delivered to Mrs. Gimenez, presidential secretary
of Marcos. The disbursement of the 55 Million was out of the
ordinary and not based on the normal procedure. Not only
were there no vouchers prepared to support the disbursement,
the P55 Million was paid in cold cash. Also, no PNCC receipt
for the P55 Million was presented. The Sandiganbayan made
the finding that Tabuena and Peralta had already converted
and misappropriated the 55 Million when he delivered the
same to Mrs. Gimenez and not to the PNCC, proceeding from
the following definitions/concepts of conversion: Conversion,
as necessary element of offense of embezzlement, being the
fraudulent appropriation to one's own use of another’s property
which does not necessarily mean to one's personal advantage
but every attempt by one person to dispose of the goods of
another without right as if they were his own is conversion to
his own use.

Both accused were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

Tabuena and Peralta filed separate petitions for review, raising
the defense of good faith and obedience to a lawful order.

Issue/s: Whether the petitioners can raise the defense of good

faith and obedience of a lawful order, given the fact that it was
the President himself who gave such order

Ruling: Yes. Tabuena and Peralta were acquitted. First.

Tabuena had no other choice but to make the withdrawals, for
that was what the MARCOS Memorandum required him to do.
He could not be faulted if he had to obey and strictly comply
with the presidential directive, and to argue otherwise is
something easier said than done. Marcos was undeniably
Tabuena’s superior, the former being then the President who
unquestionably exercised control over government agencies
such as the MIAA and PNCC. Tabuena therefore is entitled to
the justifying circumstance of Any person who acts in