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Toward a Theoretical Framework of Corporate Social Irresponsibility: Clarifying

the Gray Zones Between Responsibility and Irresponsibility
Article in Business & Society · June 2021

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Clarifying the Gray Zones

Between Responsibility
and Irresponsibility
Cynthia E. Clark1 , Marta Riera2,

and María Iborra3
Abstract
In this conceptual article, we argue that defining corporate social
responsibility (CSR) and corporate social irresponsibility (CSI) as opposite
constructs produces a lack of clarity between responsible and irresponsible
acts. Furthermore, we contend that the treatment of the CSR and CSI
concepts as opposites de-emphasizes the value of CSI as a stand-alone
construct. Thus, we reorient the CSI discussion to include multiple aspects
that current conceptualizations have not adequately accommodated. We
provide an in-depth exploration of how researchers define CSI and both
identify and analyze three important gray zones between CSR and CSI: (a)
the role of harm and benefit, (b) the role of the actor and intentionality, and
(c) the role of rectification. We offer these gray zones as factors contributing
to the present lack of conceptual clarity of the term CSI, as a concept in its
own right, leading to difficulties that researchers and managers experience
in categorizing CSI acts as distinct from CSR.
1
Bentley University, Waltham, MA, USA
2
Valencian International University, Valencia, Spain
3
University of Valencia, Spain
Corresponding Author:
Cynthia E. Clark, Bentley University, 175 Forest Street, Waltham, MA 02452, USA.
Email: cclark@bentley.edu
2 Business & Society 00(0)
Keywords
corporate social irresponsibility (CSI), corporate social responsibility (CSR),
harm, intentionality, rectification
Companies engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR) by undertaking

actions that further some social good beyond those required by law (Aguinis
& Glavas, 2012; Baumann-Pault et al., 2013; McWilliams & Siegel, 2011;
Orlitzky et al., 2003; Price & Sun, 2017). Disclosure of these acts by large,
global firms has become a widespread, nearly ubiquitous, practice (KPMG,
2017). Despite its prominence, researchers have yet to clearly identify the
differences between CSR and corporate social irresponsibility (CSI) resulting
in troubling gray zones. Clarifying these gray zones is timely and relevant
because they are being used strategically by companies to construct dis-
courses that shape the very idea of responsibility in ways that may be in direct
opposition to the firm’s actual behavior, leading to inconsistencies and even
CSR cynicism (Milne et al., 2009; Skarmeas & Leonidou, 2013).
And while CSI is a key stand-alone construct for business and society alike,
research has not articulated a clear and useful threshold between a responsible
act and an irresponsible one because underlying most of the well-known defi-
nitions that analyze CSR and CSI is the idea that irresponsible behaviors are
simply the opposite of CSR, as if existing on the same continuum (Campbell,
2007, 2018; Ferry, 1962; Kang et al., 2016; Kotchen & Moon, 2012; McMahon,
1999). As a result, there remains little consideration for the variability of CSI
acts or the precision of the term leading to questions of when and under what
conditions corporations are irresponsible or not, often resulting in firms claim-
ing CSR even when they knowingly engaged in harmful CSI.
Being able to differentiate between which corporate behaviors are irre-
sponsible or not is vital for managers, practitioners and society. However,
scholars’ definitions of both CSR and CSI are not only vast but also vary
widely. While CSR covers seemingly everything (Aguinis & Glavas, 2012)
being “a concept, a construct or a theory” (Crane et al., 2008, p. 7), CSI cov-
ers comparatively little territory (Lange & Washburn, 2012). The lack of defi-
nitional clarity provides a meaningful threat to the validity and usefulness of
the CSI construct (Lave & March, 1993), making it difficult for researchers
to develop valid measures (Jain & Zaman, 2020) and inhibiting the develop-
ment of a stand-alone theory of CSI. To date, CSI remains an under-researched
and under-theorized phenomenon.
We argue that perhaps misguidedly, researchers assume the more they
advance and improve their knowledge of CSR, the more they will know and
be able to prevent CSI. But empirical evidence seems to contradict this
Clark et al. 3
assumption (Capelle-Blancard & Petit, 2017; Kotchen & Moon, 2012); like-
wise, theoretical and professional efforts aimed at increasing social responsi-
bility have not reduced the prevalence of irresponsible acts (Harris Insights &
Analytics, 2018).
In this conceptual article, we argue that defining CSR and CSI as opposite
constructs produces a lack of clarity between responsible and irresponsible
acts. Furthermore, we contend that the treatment of the CSR and CSI con-
cepts as opposites de-emphasizes the value of CSI as a stand-alone construct.
Thus, we reorient the CSI discussion to include multiple aspects—benefit
versus harm, unintentionality versus Intentionality, and voluntary or forced
rectification—that current conceptualizations have not adequately accommo-
dated and argue that the antithesis of CSI is not CSR but “no CSI.” Therefore,
when CSI is no longer conceptualized as simply the opposite of CSR but is
fashioned as a broader construct, one that relies on specific and idiosyncratic
elements of harm, intentionality and rectification, it follows that both
researchers and practitioners need a better understanding of the importance
of these unique characteristics of CSI.
Analyzing CSI definitions reveals to us that viewing these concepts in a
continuum is also problematic. Doing so creates unclear boundaries, or gray
zones, between CSR and CSI. A gray zone is a label we extend from previous
research into questionable practices of academic researchers that have a simi-
lar ethical element and ambiguity in the demarcation between acceptable and
unacceptable (Butler et al., 2017; Fanelli, 2012), like CSR and CSI, respec-
tively. We chronicle the emergence of gray zones derived from the prevailing
definitions which fall into three overarching themes (a) differences between
the meaning of harm and benefit, (b) the conduct/behavior of the firm (i.e.,
knowingly causing harm and intending to do so) and (c) whether and how the
act is rectified.
The existence of these gray zones, we argue, is troubling for two related
reasons: (a) they reveal the imprecise dimensions that make up the construct
of CSI as well as the unclear relationship between CSI and CSR and (b) they
have the potential to lead to the perception that the firm is claiming to be, or
to be doing, what it is not actually doing (Carlos & Lewis, 2018; Effron et al.,
2015), thereby compromising the authenticity of CSR (F. Wang et al., 2020)
and the clarity of the CSI construct. Thus, these gray zones are at the root of
confusion over how to identify and conceptualize irresponsible acts on their
own, in both research and practice.
Indeed, given that firms are ever more scrutinized for their actions, and
calls for greater responsibility and accountability continue unabated, research-
ers and practitioners alike need a better understanding of the CSR/CSI con-
cepts and boundaries. Our study contributes to theory and practice by defining
the gray zone boundaries and offering a clearer conceptualization of CSI. In

doing so, we illustrate the need for a model of irresponsibility in which the
firm’s intention and the harmful consequences of the act are central.
We provide a conceptual model of CSI, while also articulating the differ-
ences between CSR and CSI, designed to both advance the current literature
and facilitate the ease in identifying consistent operationalizations of CSI for
future empirical research. First, we articulate the emergence of each of the
three gray zones separately and in depth. Next, we formulate a CSI frame-
work followed by a discussion of how this framework informs future research
and managerial practice.
CSR and CSI: Blurred Lines and the Emergence of

Gray Zones
Given the comparative nature of the prevailing literature, we sought first to
identify what corporate irresponsibility means on its own. To do this, it was
necessary to look at the existing definitions in the literature and clarify its
relationships to other constructs, specifically with CSR. It is through this
exercise that we identified three main gray zones. For an analysis of CSI defi-
nitions, we extended both the time frame (i.e., 1956–2020) and the breadth of
search words from Lin-Hi and Müller (2013), given their search led to a defi-
nition of CSI. We too limited our search to peer-reviewed scholarly articles.
Specifically, we conducted a Boolean search of all studies related to CSI
through the following terms “CSI,” “CSIR,” “Corporat* Social Irresp*,” and
“Corporat* Irresp*” “Social Irresponsibility” or “Social Irresponsible
Behavior” or “Greenwashing” or “Fraud” or “Bribery” or “Corruption” or
“Corporate Accounting Scandal” or “Environmental Damage” or “Employees
Abuses” in journals belonging to the “Business, Management and Accounting”
category from 1956 to September 2020.
In the next step, we read the abstracts and excluded from the initial set
articles that do not define CSI, resulting in 80 articles that define CSI alone
or in relation to CSR from which 26 articles provide original definitions of
CSI (see Table 1).1 And, although we tried to capture the concept of CSI
using only the CSR and CSI literature, we found that for proper concept cul-
tivation, this list was incomplete necessitating further study into literature
beyond CSR/CSI to philosophy, for example, to construct a normative model.
Historically, CSI definitions have been comparatively limited to those
focused on CSR (Herzig & Moon, 2013; Murphy & Schlegelmilch, 2013;
Sun & Ding, 2020). And, while there are multiple authors focused on one or
the other alone, there are only a few authors defining both of them or focused
on the relationship between CSR and CSI (Campbell, 2007; Godfrey, 2005;
Table 1. CSI Definitions.
Gray zones
Harm Articles that provide a definition

Articles with original definitions Definitions Benefit Intention Rectification based on the work cited
Articles providing definitions of corporate social irresponsibility

Armstrong (1977, p. 185) “A socially irresponsible act is a decision to accept an H I n.a. Armstrong & Green (2013); Herzig
alternative that is thought by the decision maker & Moon (2013); Murphy &
to be inferior to another alternative when the Schlegelmilch (2013); Windsor
effects upon all parties are considered. Generally, this (2013); Wu (2014); Alcadipani
involves a gain by one party at the expense of the & Rodrigues (2019); Luque &
total system” Herrero-García (2019); S. L. Wang
& Li (2019); Vollero et al. (2020)
Greenwood (2007, p. 324) “Corporate irresponsibility occurs when the strategic H I n.a.
management of stakeholders does not remain
responsibility-neutral practice but becomes an
immoral practice based on the deception and
manipulation of stakeholders”
Pearce & Manz (2011, p. 563) “CSIR as unethical executive behavior that shows H I n.a. Pearce & Manz (2014)
disregard for the welfare of others, that at its
extreme is manifested when executives seek personal
gain at the expense of employees, shareholders and other
organization stakeholders, and even society at large”
Lange & Washburn (2012, pp. “an observer makes an attribution of social H I Ra Herzig & Moon (2013); Murphy &
303,304) irresponsibility, he or she not only is judging that the Schlegelmilch (2013); Antonetti
corporation effected some social harm but also is and Maklan (2016, 2018); Antonetti
concluding that the company has a moral responsibility (2020); Scheidler & Edinger-Schons
and should be held in contempt for the harm” . . . ”we (2020); Nardella et al. (2020)
model three primary factors as underlying corporate
social irresponsibility attributions: (1) assessments of
effect undesirability, (2) assessments of corporate
culpability for the effect, and (3) assessments that the
affected party has a low level of complicity in the effect”
5
(continued)
6
Table 1. (continued)
Gray zones

Mena et al. (2016, pp. 725, 728) “Corporate irresponsibility involves a firm doing H I Rb Alcadipani & Rodrigues (2019);
harm to its environment, intentionally or not” . . . Hamann (2019); Yngfalk (2019)
“Firms can also accept responsibility and address issues
through either substantive action (King, 2008; Pfarrer
et al., 2008) or symbolic action (MacLean & Behnam,
2010). Firms might apologize following a scandal, ask for
forgiveness, and undertake substantive changes to their
controversial practices (Pfarrer et al., 2008). Substantive
changes can also be forced on them by regulators”
Riera & Iborra (2017, p. 157) “CSIR is the result of an intentional strategy—and H I n.a.
is more than an isolated event of failure of the
company’s socially responsible behavior—that
damages the interests of its stakeholders,
provoking individual and subjective perceptions of
observers with partial interest in the company”
Lee et al. (2018, p. 146) “Irresponsible conduct in the corporate world, whether H n.a. n.a.
centered around corruption, bribery, fraud, or other
greed, tends to have negative consequences such
as the damage to shareholders’ long-term interests
and firm reputation”
Corciolani et al. (2020, p. 675) “We conceptualised CSIR as business-related human H n.a. n.a.
rights violations in which the sample firms were
involved”
(continued)
Gray zones

Articles that define CSI in relation with CSR

Ferry (1962, p. 66) “By responsible is mainly meant the capability to B n.a n.a. Alcadipani & Rodrigues (2019)
distinguish right from wrong, and also accountability,
both legal and moral, for actions taken and actions
not taken [ . . . ] accountability is nonpersonal and
has to do with the corporation duty to the
common good”
“By irresponsible is mainly meant the antithesis of H n.a. n.a.
responsible. Irresponsibility is characterized as
unethical and morally distasteful behavior.
Irresponsibility is marked by short views, self-
righteousness, hypocrisy, and disdain for the
common good.”
Mahon (1999, p. 108) “Social irresponsibility should be seen as an antonym H n.a. n.a.
of social responsibility [ . . . ]. As an antonym of
social responsibility, social irresponsibility (while
not defined per se by ethicians) might well accept
the notion that it includes such ideas as showing no
sense of responsibility, as being undependable,
unreliable or even untrustworthy.”
(continued)
7
8
Gray zones

Godfrey (2005, pp. 777,787) “I hope to establish three core assertions: (1) that B I Rc Brammer & Pavelin (2005); Muller &
Godfrey et al. (2009) corporate philanthropy can generate positive moral Kräussl (2011); Kölbel et al. (2017);
capital among communities and stakeholders, (2) that Groening & Kanuri (2018); Fu et
moral capital can provide shareholders with “insurance- al. (2019); Walker et al. (2019);
like” protection for many of a firm’s idiosyncratic Nardella et al., (2020)
intangible assets, and (3) that this insurance-like
protection contributes to shareholder wealth. These
three assertions and the constructs and relationships
they embody constitute one pathway that leads from
philanthropic activity (a manifestation of CSR) to
shareholder wealth (a measure of CFP)”
“A bad act requires that some action or conduct H n.a.
be performed that creates harm or adverse
impact on another, be it an individual, group, or
community. Bad acts must be accompanied by a bad
mind in order to constitute an offense, for “actus not
facit reum nisi mens sit rea (an act does not make
one guilty unless his mind is guilty)”
Strike et al. (2006, p. 852) “CSR is the set of corporate actions that positively B n.a. n.a. Muller & Kräussl (2011); Ormiston
affects an identifiable social stakeholder’s interests & Wong (2013); Block & Wagner
and does not violate the legitimate claims of another (2014); Keig et al. (2015); Tang et al.
identifiable social stakeholder (in the long run).” (2015); Kölbel et al. (2017); Bouslah
et al. (2018); Fu et al., (2019);
“In turn, we define corporate social irresponsibility H n.a. n.a. Walker et al. (2019); Hawn (2020);
(CSiR) as the set of corporate actions that Jain & Zaman (2020); Kanuri et al.
negatively affects an identifiable social (2020); Küberling-Jost (2019);
stakeholder’s legitimate claims (in the long run).” Yuan et al. (2020)
(continued)
Gray zones

Campbell (2007, p. 951) “I view corporations as acting in socially responsible H I R Mazzei et al. (2015); Shea & Hawn
ways if they do two things. First, they must not (2019); Atay & Terpstra-Tong
knowingly do anything that could harm their (2019); Jain & Zaman (2020); Kim
stakeholders notably, their investors, employees, et al. (2020); Sun & Ding (2020)
customers, suppliers, or the local community within
which they operate. Second, if corporations do cause
harm to their stakeholders, they must then rectify
it whenever the harm is discovered and brought to
their attention. Rectification could be done voluntarily
or in response to some sort of encouragement, such
as moral suasion, normative pressure, legal threats,
regulatory rulings, court orders, and the like. This is
a definition that sets a minimum behavioral standard
with respect to the corporation’s relationship to
its stakeholders, below which corporate behavior
becomes socially irresponsible.”
Matten & Moon (2008, pp. 405, “CSR is an umbrella term overlapping with some, B n.a. n.a. Fu et al. (2019)
415) and being synonymous with other, conceptions of
business- society relations . . . At the core of CSR
is the idea that it reflects the social imperatives and
the social consequences of business success. Thus
CSR (and its synonyms) empirically consists of clearly
articulated and communicated policies and practices
of corporations which reflect business responsibility
for some of the wider societal good.”
“we argue that what is customarily perceived as H n.a. n.a.
corporate irresponsibility is deeply embedded in
the National Business System of a country in which
the company operates.”
9
(continued)
10
Gray zones

Wagner et al. (2008, pp. 124,125) “CSR refers to both companies’ responsibility to exert B n.a. n.a Wagner et al. (2009); Scheidler &
a positive impact and minimize its negative Edinger-Schons (2020)
impact upon society, whereby consumers’
perception of CSR builds upon “all the information
about a company that a person holds,” including both
positive as well as negative information.”
CSI: “Dark side of corporate behavior.” H n.a. n.a
Jones et al. (2009, pp. 302,304) “CSR can be seen to be a construct that is individual to B n.a. n.a Murphy & Schlegelmilch (2013);
the stakeholder that defines it, and has been referred Tench & Jones (2015); Sulphey
to as the social contract organizations have (2017); Alcadipani and Rodrigues
with their stakeholders” (2019); Vollero et al., (2020)
“CSI is about being reactive as opposed to H I n.a
proactive in addressing corporate issues and the ways
and means by which they relate to wider society.”
Kotchen & Moon (2012, pp. 1,2) “Corporate social responsibility is a program of B I Rd Bouslah et al., (2018); Yuan et al.
actions to reduce externalized costs or to avoid (2019); Yuan et al. (2020)
distributional conflicts [ . . . ] CSR implies that
companies have an incentive to act more socially
responsible in order to offset actions that are perceived
as socially irresponsible”
“Corporate social irresponsibility is a set of actions H n.a. n.a.
that increases externalized costs and/or
promotes distributional conflicts.”
(continued)
Gray zones

Lin-Hi & Müller (2013, pp. 1928, “CSR in the sense of “doing good” can contribute to B n.a. n.a Lin-Hi et al., (2015); Price & Sun
1932, 1934) a fruitful interplay between business and society. In (2017); Lin-Hi & Blumberg (2018);
addition, “doing good” offers corporations a variety Alcadipani & Rodrigues (2019);
of opportunities to benefit from CSR—ranging from Ferguson et al. (2019); Malik et al.
enhanced customer loyalty to the penetration of new (2019); Yngfalk (2019); Salaiz et al.,
markets” (2020); Scheidler & Edinger-Schons
“we define CSI as corporate actions that result in H I n.a (2020); Sun & Ding (2020); Vollero,
(potential) disadvantages and/or harm to other et al. (2020)
actors. On the one hand, an act of CSI involves the
violation of law. On the other hand, the violation of
law is to be conceived of as a sufficient, but not a
necessary condition for defining CSI . . . In general, it
is possible to distinguish between the two forms of
CSI: intentional and unintentional CSI. Intentional CSI
implies that corporations deliberately perform actions
that disadvantage and/or harm others.”
Hoi et al. (2013, p. 1) CSR definition is based on Godfrey (2005) B n.a. R Chiang et al. (2017)
“irresponsible CSR activities include corporate actions H n.a.
that are widely regarded as damaging to corporate
governance, employee relations, communities, public
health, human rights, diversity, the environment, etc.”
(continued)
11
12
Gray zones

Popa & Salanţă (2014, pp. “CSR best describes the many ways in which B I n.a.
137,141) companies choose to manage their business and
conduct their efforts to create a positive and
desirable impact on society in general”
CSI as “a connection of the concept to unethical H n.a. n.a.
behavior and to failing CSR expectations.”
CSI “refers to the dark side, as it investigates the
wrongful and damaging business decisions that
managers might take”
Kang et al. (2016, p. 60) Based on McWilliams and Siegel (2001) B n.a n.a Lenz et al. (2017); Friske et al. (2019);
“We define CSI as firm-induced incidents that appear H I n.a. Kanuri et al. (2020); Sun & Ding
to hurt the social good, that is, the antithesis of CSR” (2020)
Fiaschi et al. (2017, p. 548) “We use two alternate concepts of CSR: (i) B I n.a.
philanthropic initiatives, donations, and other
strategies in favor of different types of stakeholders
which we refer to here as ‘social policies’, and (ii)
reporting initiatives which refer to publication of
CSR reports (or sections in annual reports referring
to sustainability) that account for and communicate
to interested stakeholders the firm’s social and
environmental commitment and impact”
“We understand CSIR as referring to involvement in H I n.a.
specific controversies or events where the focal firm
is alleged to have been involved in human rights
abuses”
(continued)
Gray zones

Oh et al. (2018, p. 325) “CSR involves a firm’s proactive social initiatives B I n.a.
beyond regulatory requirements, which can
be achieved through effective stakeholder
management (Freeman, 1984)”
“CSIR involves a firm’s violations of regulatory H n.a. n.a.
guidelines and a failure to meet minimum
standards”
Asmussen and Fosfuri (2019, “Responsible behavior consists of strictly B n.a. n.a.
p. 897) substantive actions that are consistent with the
social brand”
“whereas the irresponsible behavior violates these H n.a. n.a.
principles and has negative (or less positive) social
consequences”
Volgger & Huang (2019, p. 2527) “CSR refers to “actions that appear to further some B I n.a.
social good, beyond the interests of the firm and that
which is required by law” “(McWilliams & Siegel, 2001)
“Irresponsible behavior is conceptualized as a type H n.a. n.a.
of behavior which is perceived as inappropriate
within the respective social system and ends up
disadvantaging and/or harming other actors”
Note. In bold are references to harm (H) and benefit (B); underlined references to intentionality (I); italics for reference to rectification (R); n.a.= not available at the definition.
CSIR = centrality and corporate social ir-responsibility; CSI = corporate social irresponsibility; CSR = corporate social responsibility; CFP = corporate financial performance.
a
Lange and Washburn (2012) note if a company identified and fired employees associated with the CSI behavior, the firm’s moral responsibility for the act would be
perceived to be low. b To Mena and colleagues (2016) rectification is similar of accepting responsibility and addressing issues through either substantive action or symbolic
action. c For Godfrey and colleagues, it is important to build moral capital as an insurance policy against future bad acts. If a company has built moral capital among
stakeholders, through positive acts, when it commits an irresponsible act and then apologizes later, it would become a socially responsible act. d Kotchen and Moon (2012)
considered CSR as a way to offset or to rectify CSI.
13
Jones et al., 2009; Kotchen & Moon, 2012; Lin-Hi & Müller, 2013; Matten &
Moon, 2008; Strike et al., 2006). Still, there is no consensus about the defini-
tion of CSI (Herzig & Moon, 2013; Lin-Hi & Müller, 2013), nor on the rela-
tionship and boundaries between CSI and CSR. Likewise, a predominant
CSR definition clouds the meaning of CSR by accepting merely the appear-
ance of responsibility. Specifically, McWilliams and Siegel (2001, p. 117)
define CSR as “actions that appear to further some social good, beyond the
interests of the firm and that which is required by law” (emphasis added). All
told, there are multiple blurred lines leading to our uncovering of the three
gray zones discussed in detail in a later section.
Armstrong (1977), who was one of the first to formalize the idea of CSI,
proposed that a
socially irresponsible act is a decision to accept an alternative that is thought by

the decision maker to be inferior to another alternative when the effects upon
all parties are considered. Generally, this involves a gain by one party at the
expense of the total system. (Armstrong, 1977, p. 185)
In addition, an act is “irresponsible if a vast majority of unbiased observ-

ers would agree that this was so” (Armstrong, 1977, p. 185). This definition
informs several others in the CSI space as shown in Table 1.
Only recently have scholars begun providing additional research into CSI,
all of which overarchingly focus on harm (Fiaschi et al., 2017; Hoi et al.,
2013; Lange & Washburn, 2012; Mena et al., 2016). But, the lack of clarity
remains. For example, Lange and Washburn (2012, p. 303), note that when
an observer makes an attribution of social irresponsibility, he or she not only is

judging that the corporation effected some social harm but also is concluding
that the corporation has a moral responsibility and should be held in contempt
for the harm.
These authors also note the firm can still be perceived as less culpable—
even when it caused the harm—when it has a low level of perceived moral
responsibility (e.g., when it identifies and fires those associated with the bad
behavior). Here, one’s moral responsibility for the harm is restored once the
bad actor is fired, muddying the water in defining CSI.
Also, a few scholars have recently attempted to provide definitions of both
concepts trying to establish some boundary between them (Campbell, 2007;
Kotchen & Moon, 2012; Lange & Washburn, 2012; Lin-Hi & Müller, 2013).
In fact, Campbell (2007)—the more prevalent work in delineating the limits
between CSR and CSI—is the primary advocate for the idea that responsible
and irresponsible behaviors relate to one another as opposite constructs in a
Clark et al. 15
continuum (Campbell, 2007, 2018), a conceptualization we respectfully chal-

lenge and one that we feel has contributed to the existing ambiguity of the
term CSI. For example, Campbell (2007, p. 951) states the precise problem
of blurred lines because his definition “sets a minimum behavioral standard
with respect to the corporation’s relationship to its stakeholders, below which
corporate behavior becomes socially irresponsible.” Thus, we also challenge
the idea that all CSI is equal, if below this minimum standard, inferring that
all harm is the same regardless of degree. In doing so, we also question
whether harm is only significant in relation to benefit.
First Gray Zone: The Difference Between Benefit and Harm

The first gray zone emerges as a result of the way researchers have discussed
harm and benefit historically, namely that if a firm is not causing harm it is,
in effect, providing a benefit—an idea we note adds to the lack of conceptual
clarity. The bulk of the CSR and CSI definitions bear this out as can be seen
in Table 1 with respect to CSI; 85% of the definitions include terms related to
harm, as hurt, harm, damage, or violation between others. Likewise, harm is
a multifaceted construct (Nardella et al., 2020) experienced in different
degrees (Barnett, 2014; Mena et al., 2016; Schrempf-Stirling et al., 2016).
Finally, researchers often disconnect the concept of harm from ethics and the
role-played by hypernorms (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994), an oversight we
believe is central to the conceptualization of CSI.
In terms of benefit, over the course of 60 years, the focus has been on the
idea that social responsibility implies meeting the expectations of society to do
good things (Freeman, 1984, emphasis added). Starting with Bowen (1953):
The term social responsibilities . . . refers to the obligations of businessmen to

pursue those policies, to make those decisions, or to follow those lines of action
which are desirable in terms of the objectives and values of our society.
(Bowen, 1953, p. 6)
and up to the most recent work in Table 1, the literature illustrates much
the same point about desirable acts.2
In contrast, Armstrong (1977, p. 185) conducted what is now a well-used
teaching tool—the Panalba role-play case—to consider what a manager
should not do, offering it as the easier way to look at the problem. In his
research, he found that managers assuming certain roles were overwhelm-
ingly willing to inflict harm in situations where they felt it was consistent
with the role they were playing. Armstrong found that many of the surveyed
managers agreed with the statement:
A socially irresponsible act is a decision to accept an alternative that is thought

by the decision maker to be inferior to another alternative when the effects
upon all parties are considered. Generally, this involves a gain by one party at
the expense of the total system. (Armstrong, 1977, p. 185).
Campbell’s (2007) work—widely known, cited and followed by many

others—sets the stage for our first gray zone because it creates ethical ambi-
guity between acceptable and unacceptable behaviors, by equating not caus-
ing a harm with providing a benefit. While harming stakeholders implies no
benefit, trying to avoid harm does not imply providing benefits. Campbell
(2007, p. 951) proposed a continuum approach and tried to determine if there
was a line between these two concepts, stating:
I view corporations as acting in socially responsible ways if they . . . not

knowingly do anything that could harm their stakeholders notably, their
investors, employees, customers, suppliers, or the local community within
which they operate.
Therefore, according to Campbell (2007, 2018), a firm’s responsibility

can simply result from not doing harm. This creates a problem because avoid-
ing a harm is not the same as providing a benefit. For example, abstaining
from selling a product with hidden negative characteristics is indeed avoiding
a harm, but it is not providing a benefit (Lin-Hi & Müller, 2013). A similar
continuum approach appears in Kotchen and Moon’s (2012) study, who
define CSR as actions engaged in to reduce externalized costs or to avoid
distributional conflicts while CSI increases externalized costs and/or pro-
motes distributional conflicts.
Furthermore, although two firms may share a similar approach to “doing
good,” they can differ in terms of how much they invest in or take into con-
sideration avoiding harm (Minor & Morgan, 2011). For example, firms might
engage in “do-no-harm,” often involving measures to mitigate risk or limit
the social costs of business (Crilly et al., 2016). And while this “do-no-harm”
approach may deter a firm’s socially risky behavior; it is not an example of a
firm adopting a proactive stance to ensure benefits. Crilly and colleagues
(2016) show the difference between do-good and do-no-harm through a case
study of pharmaceutical MNCs that can have positive and negative externali-
ties. Under their scenario of a do-good approach, “the company will under-
take initiatives to support the local environment through technologies that it
will also make available to other local firms, to invest in employee training
and development, and to contribute positively to the local community” and,
Clark et al. 17
in the do-no-harm, “the company will undertake initiatives to limit the nega-
tive effects of its activities on the environment, to restrict unsafe treatment of
its workers, and to reduce disruption to the local community from its manu-
facturing.” (Crilly et al., 2016, p. 1324).
However, recent scholarship has begun to consider harm as a stand-alone
construct that, by definition, generates significant negative consequences
(Mena et al., 2016). For example, current conceptualizations of CSI involve
immoral and unlawful corporate actions. This is consistent with a recent anal-
ysis of the CSI literature by Lin-Hi and Müller (2013) who noted that the
current discussion of CSI involves illegal and sometimes immoral corporate
actions with negative consequences for others. Notably, Lange and Washburn
(2012), the most frequently cited definition, harm is determined by percep-
tions of the magnitude of the harm, the firm’s role in the harm and whether
the firm has moral responsibility for the harm. Harm is also spoken of as
causing losses or damage to the interests and expectations of a group of peo-
ple (Mayes et al., 2013; Mena et al., 2016). Pearce and Manz (2011) similarly
define harm as focusing on the disregard for the welfare of others.
Recent scholarship has also considered that harm is best conceptualized in
degrees. Mena and colleagues (2016) highlight that an event can cause a
range of diverse and complex harm. They state that harm may vary from the
loss of human life (e.g., Johnson and Johnson’s talcum powder linked to
ovarian cancer or Monsanto accused of causing cancer with its Roundup her-
bicide), to the loss of nonhuman life (e.g., BP and its Deepwater Horizon oil
spill), or to the loss of livelihoods in local communities (e.g., consequences
of the Enron case).3 Schrempf-Stirling and colleagues (2016) argue that the
magnitude and durability of the harm may impact the legitimacy of the stake-
holder’s claims: harm can affect few or many people, be systemic or locally
limited, impact a specific historic moment or lead to ongoing suffering for
generations. Despite these promising new directions, scholars are still calling
for empirical research to examine how the heterogeneity and complexity of
irresponsible events are interpreted and responded to (Nardella et al., 2020).
In addition, a theoretical framework for CSI research may be better
informed by normative concepts, that is, by ideas that guide us to what firms
should not do. Armstrong’s approach, that an act is “irresponsible if a vast
majority of unbiased observers would agree that this was so” (Armstrong,
1977, p. 185), follows this normative approach.4
From this view, a behavior would be judged as clearly irresponsible, as
Barnett (2014) states, when it violates prevailing laws; and, in those cases,
criminal and civil courts will provide a formal means of punishing violators.
However, as Barnett (2014) highlights, there are many acts that impose harm
on society and although not illegal, they are difficult to control through legal
proceedings. Yet, these acts still violate general societal norms or principles.
But, due to the incompleteness of contracts and the deficiency of legal regula-
tions on a global scale (Lin-Hi & Müller, 2013), corporate actions can
adversely affect others even if corporations do not break the law. This problem
has led to the idea of general norms or principles, or hypernorms. They entail
“principles so fundamental to human existence that they serve as a guide in
evaluating lower level moral norms” (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994, p. 265).
For example, the United Nations global compact principles can be thought of
as hypernorms which help to judge behaviors that are irresponsible (e.g., not
respecting human rights, use of child labor, forced labor or slavery). Corciolani
et al. (2020) call for a universal framework that overcomes concerns about
international differences in legal and cultural systems in an empirical study of
135 multinational firms defining irresponsibility through a firm’s involvement
in human rights violations. Also, for Küberling-Jost (2019) irresponsible
behavior is noncompliance with applicable laws and ethical standards, a
behavior that violates generally accepted norms, standards and principles in
society, and harms or disadvantages others and the environment. And, thus,
harm cannot be disconnected from these hypernorms.
In sum, we undercover three main points relating to harm, that is, harm is
not the same as benefit, harm occurs in degrees and harm is viewed in relation
to hypernorms. To be sure, harm is a good indicator that something wrong is
going on (Mena et al., 2016) and thus a main aspect of irresponsibility, not of
responsibility. Therefore, we argue harmful acts do not belong to the sphere of
responsibility. Our conceptual framework suggests that all types of harmful
acts are better classified as irresponsible and not as responsible acts, but that
the degree of harm is often related to the degree of irresponsibility (e.g., loss
of life being the most harmful).
Despite the importance of the concept of harm, to date, researchers can-
not adequately determine the degree in which a company is socially irre-
sponsible based on harm alone. For example, a harmful act can be
unintentionally irresponsible which is not the same as one that is intention-
ally irresponsible. In this way, the role of intentionality is a key element to
evaluate irresponsibility.
Second Gray Zone: The Role of Intentionality

Our second gray zone centers around the role that the firm’s intention has
played in CSI definitions. As can be observed in Table 1 in almost two thirds
of the definitions of CSI, a reference to the intentionality of the act is
included. As a result of our research, the issue of firm intention needs further
clarification between (a) the different terms used by researchers and the
Clark et al. 19
subsequent need to clarify the implications of defining CSI by the firm’s

knowledge or the firm’s intentionality (including its controllability, negli-
gence, or recklessness) and (b) the implications of allowing CSI to become
CSR when the firm has nevertheless caused harm (Campbell, 2007; Godfrey,
2005).
The firm’s intention is central to the definitions of CSI since the intention
of the firm shapes how the act is categorized. For example, what happens
when the firm’s intention is to avoid causing harm? Or, even having tried
everything possible to avoid it, the harm still occurs? Intentionality is an issue
that is greatly debated (Monge, 2015). Yet, people judge intentional behavior
differently than unintentional, or inadvertent, behavior by holding those who
engage in intentional behaviors more accountable (Malle, 1999). According
to the Harris Poll Reputation Quotient, intentional wrongdoing (i.e., malfea-
sance, lying) is the most toxic to a firm’s reputation.
The definition and analysis of CSI and CSR is largely at the firm level,
that is, it focuses on the act, its harm or benefit, as it is attributed to the com-
pany and not to an individual. As Armstrong (1977) stated, CSI is the result
of intentional conduct through which the manager harms others in his or her
role as a manager. In terms of Lange and Washburn (2012), the attribution of
CSI depends on three primary factors—the assessments of effect undesirabil-
ity, the assessments of corporate culpability for the effect and the assessment
that the affected party has a low level of complicity. Thus, in these latter two
factors, corporate culpability is central to CSI, and our second gray zone
encapsulates these as discrepancies in intentionality. At the firm level, as
Table 1 also illustrates, intentionality lies at the very core of CSI definitions.
Some works focused on the harm that can be caused by nonintentional
conduct (Lin-Hi & Müller, 2013; Mena et al., 2016). Strike and colleagues
(2006) offered an early indication that unintentionally causing harm matters
by suggesting companies “may act irresponsibly, not out of malice or ill will,
but because they have to stretch their resources and capabilities to coordinate
and monitor subsidiaries” (Strike et al., 2006, p. 853).
Campbell (2007) and Godfrey (2005), in their definitions of CSR/CSI, are
the most often cited attempts to evaluate the conduct of the corporation.
Campbell (2007) argues companies act in a socially responsible way if they
do “not knowingly do anything that could harm” (Campbell, 2007, p. 951),
that is, he introduces the idea of not only considering the harm but also how
much knowledge the corporation has about the situation prior. Knowing
something is to be aware of the act, the behavior and the consequences, and
companies may not always know (Lange & Washburn, 2012).
For example, there are cases in which the corporate behavior entails a
harm, but the company is unaware of the harmful consequences before
carrying out the act. Harmful behavior, without prior knowledge, may be an
event caused by external forces such as an earthquake releasing noxious gas-
ses from a company’s plant, despite proper storage (Lin-Hi & Müller, 2013).
For Campbell (2007), under his continuum proposal, causing harm without
knowing belongs to CSR. Alternatively, we offer that, although the act has
been done without knowing it will cause harm, it is not CSR since the behav-
ior is still causing damage or losses. But, should it be considered CSI?
Armstrong (1977) was the first to state CSI was the result of intentional
conduct, specifically that the manager may be expected to harm others in his
role as a manager. When CSI re-emerged in the 2000’s, some subsequent
works continued this focus, considering that any harm caused is the result of
the intentional conduct of the executives, that is, executives deliberately
intend to cause damage to others (Fiaschi et al., 2017; Jones et al., 2009; Keig
et al., 2015; Kotchen & Moon, 2012; Lange & Washburn, 2012; Pearce &
Manz, 2011; Riera & Iborra, 2017).
Godfrey (2005) introduces the relevance of a psychological construct: the
guilty mind that we state can be used for defining which acts belongs to CSI.
Godfrey uses the mens rea doctrine for evaluating irresponsible behaviors
and noted two elements must be included: (a) a bad act (i.e., as an action or
conduct that creates harm or adverse impact to others) and (b) a bad mind
(i.e., the guilty mind of an actor). For Godfrey (2005) some events that cause
loss or damage may be accidental or unintentional but many of the events that
negatively impact stakeholders are conscious and deliberate decisions.
Therefore, when both a harmful act and firm intentionality exist, CSI exists,
similar to Lange and Washburn (2012).
The guilty mind concept is important to corporate irresponsibility because
the firm could carry out a bad act not only because the firm does know about
the harmful consequences but also because they intentionally meant to cause
harm, through negligence (i.e., a failure to take proper care over something)
or recklessness (i.e., a lack of regard for the danger or consequences of one’s
actions). While these intentions might be judged differently (Lange &
Washburn, 2012), they both carry aspects of a guilty mind (Godfrey, 2005).
Based on Godfrey’s (2005) guilty mind of the actor, we state that the inten-
tionality of the firm includes, knowing, negligence, or recklessness. The
intentionality of irresponsibility in the behavior of a firm relies not only in the
knowledge about the likelihood of causing harm but in the lack of care or
regard of the potential harmful consequences for stakeholders through the
firm’s decision-making processes.
For example, some have argued the sale of mortgage products during the
financial crisis in 2007–09 illustrates this situation. The motivation of the
world’s largest banks may not have been to intentionally hurt their clients; in
Clark et al. 21
fact, many publicly espoused values such as trust and integrity as banks often
do. However, for some, there was harm and a guilty mind (through negli-
gence and recklessness) on the part of both managers and firms; thus, it was
considered irresponsible to sell these products to vulnerable people without
adequate financial background (Devlin, 2010).
Our approach, focusing on the intentionality of the firm, accounts for the
assessment of culpability as suggested by Lange and Washburn (2012) and
assumes the act has great impact on an affected party because the act has been
intentionally planned by the firm, through a volitional choice (Grover et al.,
2019). The term intentionality focuses on the idea that management is an
activity that involves decisions that impact others, and thus it is a moral activ-
ity (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008). Similarly, Grover and colleagues
(2019) state, intentional acts are volitional, planned, and fall under the
responsibility of the actor. Thus, we use the term intentionality in a broad
sense that includes all guilty mind features (i.e., knowing, negligence, and
recklessness).
The second gray zone between CSR and CSI stems also from the implica-
tions of the firm’s intentions in allowing CSI to become CSR when the firm
has nevertheless caused harm (Campbell, (2007; Godfrey, 2005). Under a
continuum view of CSR/CSI, which we do not hold, the unintentionally dam-
aging act remains in the CSR realm (Campbell, (2007). Instead, we argue that
the harmful nature of an act varies and it is not part of the CSR umbrella.
They are, instead, underneath the CSI umbrella.5 We stress that the opposite
of irresponsibility is not responsibility but, rather, no irresponsibility (“no
CSI”). Our argument parallels conceptual research on satisfaction and dis-
satisfaction where the opposite of satisfaction, is no satisfaction and the
opposite of dissatisfaction, no dissatisfaction (Herzberg, 1968). We argue,
then, that the opposite of CSI is not CSR but “no CSI.”
Third Gray Zone: The Role of Rectification

The third gray zone arises as a result of the way CSR/CSI researchers have
conceptualized rectification. As Table 1 shows, rectification is only included
in seven definitions of CSI, or almost 27% of the cases. However, the concept
and operationalization of rectification is far more complex, as we have dis-
covered through additional research. As a result of this inquiry, the issue of
rectification needs further clarification in terms of (a) substantive versus
symbolic rectification; (b) voluntary or forced rectification, and (c) the plau-
sibility of a CSI act becoming CSR when rectified.
Not unlike when firms engage in impression management (MacLean &
Behnam, 2010), they too can approach rectification of an act either
symbolically or substantively. For example, firms might engage in symbolic

gestures, making only surface-level change with the intention of merely sig-
naling compliance. Yet their actual business practices remain unchanged
(MacLean & Behnam, 2010; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). As we noted above,
this type of behavior occurred during the global financial crisis of 2008, when
firms publicly espoused values such as trust and integrity while privately sell-
ing mortgages to unsuspecting customers. Later these same banks adopted
ethics training programs but openly argued that high-risk credit was an indus-
try-level problem (Admati & Hellwig, 2013).
According to Mena and colleagues (2016), firms could apologize follow-
ing a scandal or ask for forgiveness. But, apologizing, according to Schweitzer
et al. (2015, p. 48) needs to be accompanied by substantial change to avoid
being perceived as symbolic rectification: “In assessing whether or not to
apologize, organizational leaders must also focus on the extent to which they
are willing—and able—to change the company’s behavior.” Interestingly,
substantive changes can also be forced on firms by regulators, in a compul-
sory fashion (Mena et al., 2016); however, this results in problems associated
with long-term forgetting.
Apology and restitution are closely related, especially when substantive
change is the goal. While an apology can simply be the acknowledgment of
responsibility for an offense and an expression of remorse, restitution is a
form of reparation whereby compensatory action seeks to mend damage
caused by a past offense (Lazar, 2008).
Furthermore, the complexity of the term also involves ethical and legal
interpretations, not generally found in the CSI or CSR literature. On the legal
side, researchers have noted that rectification involves some form of financial
compensation and a formal apology (Lazar, 2008). However, compensation
according to Lazar (2008, p. 357) merely
provides the victim with a benefit to offset the harm, but it cannot make the
world as though the harm had never taken place: a harm is not a hole in the
beach, that when filled in with sand simply disappears.
In terms of ethics, many scholars evoke Aristotle’s notion of rectification

in that the one who caused the harm, the offender, must be the agent of the
rectification. And, the offender must pay, in some form, for the harm caused
in proportion to the harm caused. In other words, the level of rectification
must correlate with the level of loss (Aristotle, 2009; Lazar, 2008).
Thus, to achieve substantive rectification, firms would need to offer at
least a formal apology but perhaps more along the lines of reparation or
restitution.
Clark et al. 23
Relatedly, the way the consequences of rectification come about (volun-

tary or forced) is a second meaningful nuance of the concept. Simply put, we
question whether and how these rectifications—voluntary or forced—are the
same, and we offer that they, too, are a factor leading to CSR cynicism. To
consider voluntary rectification and forced rectification as equals, since a
forced correction is the result of external pressure and that without such pres-
sure, the company may not have rectified it, seems to water down the very
notion of a socially responsible act.
For example, in September 2015, accusations against the German com-
pany Volkswagen (VW) and its acceptance of the fraud carried out on more
than 11 million vehicles became front page news. VW’s behavior involved
damaging consequences: however, once the case was publicly discovered,
the company rectified it. Following Campbell’s (2007) CSR definition, VW
was socially responsible, since there has been a rectification, even though
there were legal threats as well as public and media pressure to do so. Despite
the existence of long-term forgetting by VW (Mena & Rintamäki, 2020), we
also question whether substantive change is truly realized when forced on
firms by regulators, in a compulsory fashion (Mena et al., 2016). Thus, we
argue, at a minimum, determining the degree of irresponsibility involves con-
sidering whether the rectification was voluntary or forced.
The third aspect of this gray zone arises from the role that some see recti-
fication playing in shifting the categorization of what once was a CSI act and
turning it into a CSR act. Campbell (2007), who is the principal advocate of
rectification, states
. . . if corporations do cause harm [], they must then rectify it whenever the
harm is discovered and brought to their attention. Further, rectification could be
done voluntarily or in response to some sort of compulsory encouragement,
such as moral suasion, normative pressure, legal threats, regulatory rulings,
court orders, and the like (2007, p. 951).
Therefore, based on Campbell (2007), although harm is done, an act

would be considered responsible if the company rectifies it, even when
forced, making no distinction between voluntary or forced.
In a similar vein, Godfrey (2005, p. 778) states it is important for compa-
nies to build moral capital as an insurance policy against future bad acts.
However, this goodwill is generated by engaging in positive acts in the first
place—those that are other-regarding and made by genuine actors. Still,
somewhat similarly to Campbell, if a company has built moral capital among
stakeholders, through positive acts, when it commits an irresponsible act and
then apologizes later, it would become a socially responsible act according to
Godfrey (2005). In a similar vein, Lange and Washburn (2012) note if a com-
pany identified and fired employees associated with the CSI behavior, the
firm’s moral responsibility for the act would be perceived to be low. Likewise,
researchers have recently begun to explore how certain corrective actions,
such as providing an explanation, delivering an equitable punishment and
making policy changes (Hersel et al., 2019; Pfarrer et al., 2008), might restore
some goodwill.6 Campbell (2007) highlights that rectification can be volun-
tary or forced, but in both cases, he argues, the consequences would be the
same: the company’s act then becomes a socially responsible one.
In our view, these assessments of rectification raise some important ques-
tions, given the lack of clarity surrounding the company’s act becoming,
almost automatically, CSR after a rectification. The intentionality of any rec-
tifying attempt should also be taken into consideration because “to know it
during or after the commission of an act . . . can only be imputed after the act
or conduct has occurred” (Godfrey, 2005, p. 788). For companies that have
done something harmful, perhaps even intentionally, trying to rectify it
through press releases does not magically transform their irresponsibility into
responsibility, as simply as filling a hole with sand.
Used as a way to change the assessment of an intended harmful act into a
socially responsible behavior may explain the increase of societal skepticism
about firms’ social responsibility behavior (Skarmeas & Leonidou, 2013).
This skepticism exists when companies engage in CSR solely for the sake of
compensating for a negative event and when they claim CSR when rectifying
after the act has occurred (Alhouti et al., 2016; Popa & Salantă, 2014 ; Wagner
et al., 2009). Likewise, companies have more opportunity to alter the public’s
memory of an irresponsible act in the short term (Mena et al., 2016) because
managerial discretion generally recedes over time (Mahon, 1989). A firm can
also try to change perceptions and divert attention away from CSI activities by
employing CSR advertising that discloses its social and/or environmental pro-
grams (Perks et al., 2013). Research has documented firms using CSR to
cover up for previous (CSI Capelle-Blancard & Petit, 2017; Kotchen & Moon,
2012). While these practices are certainly viewed with skepticism (Baumann-
Pault et al., 2013), they are also likely to lead to perceptions of hypocrisy as
they carry with them a feeling of being deceived (Jordan et al., 2017).
Taken together, this research suggests all forms of rectification are not
equal, suggesting, in turn, that discrepancies in definitions of CSI and CSR are
problematic in terms of how they are talked about, the decisions surrounding
them, and the ultimate actions taken by firms. After all, it is the harm caused
that engages the need for rectification, and we have argued that if harm is
caused it cannot be considered CSR. If a firm makes no attempt to rectify a
bad act, or rectifies it by force, coupled with firm intentionality, it then
Clark et al. 25
suggests a more proactive effort to deceive where the lack of morality takes
center stage. On the contrary, if a firm voluntarily rectifies a bad act, engages
in it without intentionality, and then puts in place preventive measures and
actively engages in restorative attempts, it would suggest a different level of
irresponsibility. It follows that there may be degrees of irresponsibility based
on how the firm handles the rectification leading to meaningful differences in
how the CSI is perceived.
Toward a Model of CSI

Researchers have amassed a large amount of study, reflection and analysis in
the field of CSR and have only recently begun to focus directly on CSI. Many
of these studies have been firm or performance focused (Q. Wang et al.,
2016). In the analysis provided here, we focus on the harm relative to the
firm’s action, intention and rectification as key elements in the discussion of
CSI. We have also illustrated the need to reconsider each concept—the con-
sequential nature of harm and benefit, the intentionality of the firm and the
effect of a firm’s rectification of the act. Having identified the literature gaps
in the form of three gray zones, in this section, we outline a CSI model result-
ing from our analysis and then offer a path forward for future research.
Fundamentally, the current opaqueness is due to researchers’ approach to
CSR and CSI as opposite constructs in a continuum (Campbell, 2007).
Perhaps misguidedly, researchers assumed the more they advance and
improve their knowledge of CSR, the more we will know and be able to pre-
vent CSI. But, as noted, empirical evidence seems to contradict this assump-
tion (Capelle-Blancard & Petit, 2017; Kotchen & Moon, 2012); likewise,
theoretical and professional efforts aimed at increasing social responsibility
have not reduced the degree and prevalence of irresponsible firms (Harris
Insights & Analytics, 2018). At present, research suggests harmful acts can
be considered both CSR and CSI while rectification can change an irrespon-
sible act into a responsible one—even when it was engaged in knowingly and
the rectification of the act was forced. As noted above, we argue describing
CSI and CSR this way has led to confusion over proper categorizations of
both, resulting in more widespread CSR critiques.
Importantly, we challenge the notion that CSR and CSI should be on a
continuum of opposite actions and suggest the dimensions involved in defin-
ing CSI are distinct from the dimensions that define CSR.
Unlike previous treatments of CSI, our conceptualization accommo-
dates degrees of CSI. As Figure 1 depicts, there exists a range of CSI acts
moving from no irresponsibility to the highest level of CSI. The figure
includes the degree of harm (i.e., harm to one’s livelihood, harm
Figure 1. CSI framework.

Note. CSI = corporate social irresponsibility.
to nonhuman life, harm to human life, cf. Mena et al., 2016), the intention-
ality of the firm and the rectification of the act—all necessary for qualify-
ing the degree of CSI.
This figure incorporates previous research in CSI as well as extends it to
capture the full range of CSI characteristics. For example, the highest form of
CSI would be when the act includes an intentional loss of human life where
the firm did not attempt to rectify it. Accordingly, Figure 1 illustrates that a
zig-zag is possible, meaning that a firm can unintentionally cause harm to
human life while also rectifying it. Importantly, we differentiate previous
research wherein CSI is defined as the opposite or antithesis of CSR
(Campbell, 2007; 2018; Ferry, 1962; Kang et al., 2016; Kotchen & Moon,
2012; McMahon, 1999). Our model also differentiates from researchers who
argue that regardless of the degree of harm caused intentionally—even the
loss of human life—an act can be considered CSR if it is rectified voluntarily
or by force (Campbell, 2007) such as firing the employees involved in the act
(Lange & Washburn, 2012). Therefore, this conversation about CSI, advanced
by Campbell (2007), Lange and Washburn (2012), and several others follow-
ing their lead, is occurring outside of our conceptualization and in doing so
serves to underscore the real problem of the current theorization of CSI—that
a firm can intentionally cause harm to someone, later rectify it, and then be
perceived as being socially responsible.
In sum, we define the highest form of CSI as a corporate act that causes a high
degree of harm, intentionally, whereby the firm does not employ rectification.7
Clark et al. 27
We also reframe CSI away from being a part of CSR and toward the acknowledg-
ment that the firm’s intention and the harmful consequences of the act are central
to understanding irresponsibility. Doing so may help to prevent future misunder-
standings or reduce the occurrence of irresponsible acts, specifically by extend-
ing our knowledge on the various conditions of irresponsibility.
Managerial Implications
In this article, we offer managers a way to understand and perhaps begin
to see through the gray zones such that understanding CSR and CSI as
coexisting concepts is a main reason for corporate crises (Herzig & Moon,
2013) and, as outlined here, a factor that contributes to misperceptions of
what is or is not CSR. Managers would benefit by being able to recognize
the importance of both CSI and CSR acts and view them as distinct
practices.
To date, management efforts have been focused on investing and develop-
ing CSR, with comparatively little consideration for dealing with CSI. Our
conceptual approach highlights that increasing CSR does not ensure the
absence of intentional, harmful acts. Decreasing CSI requires managers to
pay more attention to their own intentions and the culture they establish. The
top management team must also be cognizant of forced rectification and its
effect on heightening perceptions of hypocrisy.
Research has found that organizations making claims perceived as super-
ficial following negative events or wrongdoing, experience an increase in
negative media coverage (Zavyalova et al., 2012). The cause of the firm’s
negative event is also a factor in the perception of whether the CSR act is
authentic, especially when it is due to neglect (Alhouti et al., 2016; Stuart
et al., 2020) and whether or not the company has put in place preventive
measures that are designed to avoid and prevent future transgressions
(Gillespie & Dietz, 2009).
Given the potentially damaging consequences, organizations should want
to avoid the reputational harm. Therefore, effectively managing CSI and CSR
acts and the correct perception of them by the media and public becomes a
necessary skill for all managers because any publicized CSI may damage the
firm’s image, resulting in weaker performance, and any publicized CSR act
will be scrutinized for any inauthenticity or skepticism. Likewise, managers
should also be mindful that the threat of these types of misperceptions is
amplified for firms with stronger reputations (Carlos & Lewis, 2018), per-
haps counterintuitively.
Our research further brings to light the importance for firms in under-
standing CSI in degrees and as a distinct practice to be avoided. More
poignantly, our research helps managers to understand the problematic nature

of thinking about CSR as an act that can cause harm but be rectified later
voluntarily or by force.
Limitations and Future Directions

As with any study, ours is subject to certain limitations that could provide
potential research directions for future studies. While we have outlined here
the lack of specificity in CSI definitions, we have not empirically looked into
the behavior of a sample of firms exploiting these gray zones. Explicit behav-
ioral inconsistencies are not uncommon in corporate life. However, these
inconsistencies may serve as objective evidence that a firm is behaving inau-
thentically (Cording et al., 2014) or even hypocritically (Hale & Pillow,
2015) and thus such should be considered in future research either through
combing corporate press releases or website accounts, or both, and then com-
paring those to their actual behavior.
Further development and empirical testing of CSI could provide answers
to key questions (e.g., why firm’s cause harm, how they cause harm, how
much harm they cause, when or where, to whom they cause harm). Also,
what are the characteristics of the firm’s decision processes by which harmful
consequences are allowed, who is involved in these decision processes?
Perhaps a review of non-peer-reviewed articles and book chapters may yield
different information than our concentration on definitions from peer-
reviewed articles only.
As these acts emanate from the corporation itself, future CSI research
should pay more attention to factors that affect managerial discretion. The
concept of management discretion implies that decision makers matter and
that they have a voice in the actions taken by a firm (Hambrick & Mason,
1984). Until now CSI research has attributed more relevance to the institu-
tional context (Surroca et al., 2013) than to the managerial when explaining
firms’ irresponsible decisions (Lee et al., 2018; Oh et al., 2018; Wu, 2014).
Thus, using existing inquiries into demographic or psychological features
may shed light on the likelihood of a guilty mind in CSI deployment
(Chatterjee & Pollock, 2017).
For a firm’s claims to be perceived inauthentically, internal and external
stakeholders must also be able to detect the inconsistency (Carlos & Lewis,
2018). And, we know little about how firms react upon the discovery of irre-
sponsibility or how they process through how to correct the inconsistency.
Since we have argued that CSR and CSI are not on the same continuum, this
means that sometimes a company can be both irresponsible and responsible,
as noted above. There are at least two possible scenarios here: irresponsibility
Clark et al. 29
and responsibility are “decoupled,” that is they occur in different areas of the
firm’s business activities (e.g., one business unit is extremely polluting, while
the other is integrating unemployed people). The other would be more tem-
poral, for example, when a firm commits an irresponsible act, rectifies it, and
years later engages in responsible activities in the same area of activity.8
These extensions provide a rich area for future research stemming from our
conceptualization.
We know the media plays a key role in whether the harmful act holds our
attention (Mena et al., 2016) and stakeholders seek to assign blame in the
media debate following an irresponsible act (Lange & Washburn, 2012), thus
the degree to which an issue resonates and is prioritized by the media will
inform the stakeholder perception of a firm’s CSR or CSI.
Relatedly, one area also in need of further development, yet beyond the
scope of this article, is the idea of evaluative harm. In this article, we focus on
the viewpoint of the firm, but the impact of the harm could be relative to the
person or people experiencing the harm and is worthy of future contempla-
tion. Perhaps such an effort can build out a series of propositions. This
approach might try to determine if the harm is attributed to the firm by con-
sumers, employees, or other stakeholders. For example, Lange and Washburn
(2012) propose a theoretical model of attribution and Schrempf-Stirling and
colleagues (2016) center their research on how long an attribution of harm
can last. As noted earlier, we lay the groundwork for this type of future work
with our focus on the conceptual development of CSI; as such, we are con-
structing a normative, rather than stakeholder attribution model.
Murphy and Schlegelmilch (2013) have identified an interesting trend in
the CSR/CSI literature that we believe warrants future attention—that CSR is
becoming more often tied directly to ethical behavior on the individual level
in addition to the level of hypernorms. Our analysis of the CSI literature sug-
gests that CSI should also be more directly tied to individual ethics. For
example, acts that are low CSI and could qualify as CSR (e.g., a CSR pro-
gram that for the most part benefits stakeholders, but harms a small number
of livelihoods in a certain region) may warrant future research attention.
Similarly, recent analysis at the specific country level of the perception of
certain moral behaviors, and their links to CSR and CSI, offer an interesting
extension for future research as well (Shea & Hawn, 2019).
Conclusion
We provide an in-depth exploration of how researchers define CSI and both
identify and analyze three important gray zones between CSR and CSI: (a)
the role of harm and benefit, (b) the role of the firm and intentionality, and (c)
the role of rectification. We offer these gray zones as factors contributing to

the present lack of conceptual clarity of the term CSI, as a concept in its own
right, leading to difficulties that researchers and managers experience in cat-
egorizing CSI acts as distinct from CSR. The complexity of these gray zones
places firms in a precarious position with respect to both practices—which
itself needs rectification.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publica-
tion of this article.
ORCID iDs
Cynthia E. Clark https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5787-2948
María Iborra https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7140-799X
Notes
1. In Table 1, we separate the articles between those that just include a CSI defini-
tion (8 original definitions) from those that define CSI in relation with CSR (18
original definitions).
2. The most cited works on CSR, from the Scopus database, share this main posi-
tive perspective of doing good or providing benefits to society. McWilliams and
Siegel (2001) define CSR as actions that appear to further some social good.
Garriga and Melé (2004) state that current CSR theories are focused between
others in meeting objectives that produce long-term profits and contributing to a
good society. Porter and Kramer (2006) also argue that strategic CSR includes to
transform value-chain activities to benefit society or Aguinis (2011) and Aguinis
and Glavas (2012) define it as actions and policies that take into account stake-
holders’ expectations of economic, social, and environmental performance.
3. It bears noting that some researchers would not necessarily compare human and
nonhuman lives. More specifically, they will see human beings and organiza-
tions as members of ecosystems whose destinies are intertwined and not hierar-
chized one above the others (Purser et al., 1995).
4. There are other views such as the case of research which focuses on stakeholders’
attribution, or harm as judged by the salience of the stakeholders. This approach,
for example, might try to determine if the harm is attributed to the firm by con-
sumers, employees, or other stakeholders. For example, Lange and Washburn
(2012) propose a theoretical model of attribution, and Schrempf-Stirling et al.
(2016) center their research on how long an attribution of harm can last.
Clark et al. 31
5. It bears noting that a company not known for doing any harm would fall into the
“No CSI” category but would not, in our estimation, appear on a CSR scale.
6. We are grateful to a reviewer for suggesting this addition.
7. We extend the definition of CSI from Riera and Iborra (2017) to more fully
incorporate degrees of harm, intentionality, and rectification.
8. We are grateful to a reviewer for suggesting this addition.
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Author Biographies
Cynthia E. Clark (PhD. Boston U., Professor at Bentley University, is the author of
two books: Giving Voice to Values in the Boardroom and Business & Society: Ethical,
Legal and Digital environments. She serves as the founding director of the Harold S.
Geneen Institute of Corporate Governance, an institute dedicated to bridging board of
director research with practice. Her research interests concern ethics and governance
issues in organizations with a particular focus on how firms do or do not address con-
flicts of interest, shareholder activism, privacy breaches, and disclosing information.
Her recently published work has appeared in Business & Society, Business Ethics
Quarterly, Business Horizons, Harvard Business Review, Journal of Business Ethics,
Management Information Systems Quarterly, and Strategic Management Journal.
She serves on the editorial board of Business & Society.
Marta Riera (PhD, University of Valencia) is the academic director of the Faculty of
Social Sciences at the Valencian International University, where she is also teacher of
Management. Her research interests focus on corporate social responsibility and irre-
sponsibility, sustainability, and management. Her PhD project was based on corporate
social irresponsibility and upper echelons, awarded with a cum laude distinction.
María Iborra (PhD, University of Valencia) is an associate professor of the Business
School at the University of Valencia. Her research interest is on strategic manage-
ment, upper echelons, and corporate social responsibility. She has published in jour-
nals as Business Research Quarterly, International Business Review, Long Range
Planning, and other outlets.
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Toward a Theoretical Framework of Corporate Social Irresponsibility: Clarifying

Article in Business & Society · June 2021

Cynthia E. Clark Marta Riera Esteve

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Clarifying the Gray Zones

Cynthia E. Clark1 , Marta Riera2,

Companies engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR) by undertaking

the gray zone boundaries and offering a clearer conceptualization of CSI. In

CSR and CSI: Blurred Lines and the Emergence of

Harm Articles that provide a definition

Articles providing definitions of corporate social irresponsibility

Harm Articles that provide a definition

Harm Articles that provide a definition

Articles that define CSI in relation with CSR

Harm Articles that provide a definition

Harm Articles that provide a definition

Harm Articles that provide a definition

Harm Articles that provide a definition

Harm Articles that provide a definition

Harm Articles that provide a definition

socially irresponsible act is a decision to accept an alternative that is thought by

In addition, an act is “irresponsible if a vast majority of unbiased observ-

an observer makes an attribution of social irresponsibility, he or she not only is

continuum (Campbell, 2007, 2018), a conceptualization we respectfully chal-

First Gray Zone: The Difference Between Benefit and Harm

The term social responsibilities . . . refers to the obligations of businessmen to

A socially irresponsible act is a decision to accept an alternative that is thought

Campbell’s (2007) work—widely known, cited and followed by many

I view corporations as acting in socially responsible ways if they . . . not

Therefore, according to Campbell (2007, 2018), a firm’s responsibility

Second Gray Zone: The Role of Intentionality

subsequent need to clarify the implications of defining CSI by the firm’s

Third Gray Zone: The Role of Rectification

symbolically or substantively. For example, firms might engage in symbolic

In terms of ethics, many scholars evoke Aristotle’s notion of rectification

Relatedly, the way the consequences of rectification come about (volun-

Therefore, based on Campbell (2007), although harm is done, an act

Toward a Model of CSI

Figure 1. CSI framework.

poignantly, our research helps managers to understand the problematic nature

Limitations and Future Directions

the role of rectification. We offer these gray zones as factors contributing to

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

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