IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, PETITIONER, VS.

COMMISSION

ON ELECTIONS AND CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, RESPONDENTS.

G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995

FACTS: The 1987

Constitution requires an
aspirant for election for the
House of Representatives to
be a registered voter of the
desired district as well as a
resident of the said district for
not less than
one year prior the election.
The petitioner, Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos filed her
Certificate of
Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First
District of Leyte stating that
she have lived
therein as a resident for the
last seven months. Montejo,
an opposition, filed a
petition for
cancellation and
disqualification of her
candidacy with the grounds of
Romualdez-Marcos does not
have the residency
requirement mandated by the
constitution. She then
amended her candidacy
changing her residency from
seven months to since birth
indicating that it was an
honest
misrepresentation and that she
have maintained domicile in
Tacloban ever since.
ISSUE: W/N Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos is a
resident of the First District
of Leyte and if the
petitioner have had the
residency requirement therein.
RULING: Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos is indeed
a resident therein and
possesses the necessary
residence qualifications to
run for a seat in the House
of Representatives in the
First District of
Leyte.
HELD: The essential
distinction between residence
and domicile in law is that
residence
involves the intent to leave
when the purpose for which
the resident has taken up his
abode ends.
One may seek a place for
purposes such as pleasure,
business, or health. If a
person's intent be to
remain, it becomes his
domicile; if his intent is to
leave as soon as his purpose
is established it is
residence.
FACTS:

The 1987 Constitution requires an aspirant for election for the House of Representatives to

be a registered voter of the desired district as well as a resident of the said district for not less than

one year prior the election. The petitioner, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of

Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte stating that she have lived

therein as a resident for the last seven months. Montejo, an opposition, filed a petition for

cancellation and disqualification of her candidacy with the grounds of Romualdez-Marcos does not

have the residency requirement mandated by the constitution. She then amended her
candidacy changing her residency from seven months to since birth indicating that it was an
honest misrepresentation and that she have maintained domicile in Tacloban ever since.

ISSUE: W/N Imelda Romualdez-Marcos is a resident of the First District of Leyte and if the

petitioner have had the residency requirement therein.

RULING: Imelda Romualdez-Marcos is indeed a resident therein and possesses the necessary

residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of

Leyte.

HELD: The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence
involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode
ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's
intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is
established it is residence.

AGAPITO A. AQUINO, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MOVE MAKATI, MATEO BEDON and JUANITO ICARO, respondents.

G.R. No. 120265 | 248 SCRA 400 | September 18, 1995

FACTS:

Petitioner Aquino was a resident of Concepcion, Tarlac for over 50 years. He, in fact, indicated in his
Certificate of Candidacy for the 1992 congressional elections that he was a resident of thereof for 52
years immediately preceding that election. His birth certificate also places Concepcion, Tarlac as the
birthplace of both his parents.

For the 1995 elections, Aquino ran for the Congress representing the new 2nd district of Makati City.
He stated in his Certificate of Candidacy that he has resided “in the constituency where” he sought
“to be elected” for only “10 months.” He in fact has just transferred to a leased condominium in
Makati from his residence in Tarlac. Private respondents filed a petition to disqualify him on the
ground that he lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman mandated in Art
VI, Sec 6 of the Constitution. The following day, Aquino amended his Certificate of Candidacy,
indicating he has been a resident in said place for 1 year and 13 days. Meanwhile, elections were
held and he garnered the highest number of votes. However, COMELEC, acting on the private
respondents’ petition, suspended his proclamation permanently. Hence this instant petition for
certiorari.

ISSUE:

Did Aquino satisfy the constitutional residence requirement in the 2nd district of Makati City as
mandated by Art VI, Sec 6?

RULING:
No. The essence of representation is to place through the assent of voters those most cognizant and
sensitive to the needs of a particular district. Clearly, Aquino’s domicile of origin was Concepcion,
Tarlac, and the same is not easily lost. That coupled with the fact that Aquino himself claims to have
other residences in Metro Mla. and that he claims to be resident of the condominium unit in Makati
for only a short length of time “indicate that” his “sole purpose in transferring his physical residence”
is not to acquire a new residence of domicile “but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative
of the 2nd district of Makati City.” The absence of clear and positive proof showing a successful
abandonment of domicile under the conditions stated above, the lack of identification—
sentimental, actual or otherwise—with the area, and the suspicious circumstances under which the
lease agreement [of the condominium unit in Makati (instead of buying one)] was effected all belie
his claim of residency for the period required by the Constitution.

Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs. COMELEC (2013)

G.R. No. 203766 • April 2, 2013.

FACTS:

The Comelec disqualified 52 party-list groups and organizations from participating in the 13 May
2013 party-list elections, particularly those that did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national,
regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented” sectors; AND (2) all nominees must belong to the “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector they represent.

Aggrieved by the disqualification, said part-list groups via Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for
Certiorari and Prohibition, alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the Comelec.

ISSUES:

(1)

Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections;

(2)

Whether or not the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani
and Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections
(BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.

RULING:

1)
No. We cannot, however, fault the COMELEC for following prevailing jurisprudence in disqualifying
petitioners. In following prevailing jurisprudence, the COMELEC could not have committed grave
abuse of discretion.

However, for the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, we must now impose and mandate the
party-list system actually envisioned and authorized under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
—

NEW RULE (abandoning BANAT doctrine):

In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections,
the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize
along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented” sector.

BANAT vs COMELEC GR No 179271 21 April 2009

Facts: The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives. The
COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List System. BANAT filed
petition as quoting the COMELEC of using the Panganiban formula used in Veterans case in allocating
party-list seats. BANAT contend that Article 6 Section 5 should be followed and that 20%of party-list
representatives shall be proclaimed. COMELEC denied said petition. BANAT filed mandamus for
certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives provided in Article 6 Section 5
(2) of the Constitution mandatory?

Decision: Petition has partial merit. The party-list election has four inviolable parameters stated in
Veterans. First, the twenty percent allocation the combined number of all party-list congressmen
shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including
those elected under the party list; Second, the two percent threshold only those parties garnering a
minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a
seat in the House of Representatives; Third, the three-seat limit each qualified party, regardless of
the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one
qualifying and two additional seats; Fourth, proportional representation the additional seats which a
qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in proportion to their total number of votes.

Trillanes vs. Pimentel (G.R. No. 179817)

FACTS:

Petitioner Trillanes IV is on trial for coup d’etat in relation to the “Oakwood Incident.” In the 2007
elections, he won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007.
Petitioner now asks the Court that he be allowed to attend all official functions of the Senate,
alleging mainly that his case is distinct from that of Jalosjos as his case is still pending resolution
whereas that in the Jalosjos case, there was already conviction.
ISSUE:

Whether or not valid classification between petitioner and Jalosjos exists

RULING:

The petition is bereft of merit.

 No, it is impractical to draw a line between convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees for
the purpose of maintaining jail security; and while pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their
constitutional rights upon confinement, the fact of their detention makes their rights more
limited than those of the public.

 When a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the custody of
the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer
for the commission of the offense. He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the
case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail or on
recognizance.

RULE 115 TRILLANES IV vs. PIMENTEL, SR. [G.R. No. 179817] (January 27, 2008) FACTS: a group of
more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the
resignation of the President and key national officials. President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued
Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the
Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion.1 Petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with
his comrades, with coup d’etat defined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati. Petitioner, who has remained in detention won a seat in the
Senate with a six-year term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007. Before the commencement of
his term or on June 22, 2007, petitioner filed with the RTC, Makati City, Branch 148, an “Omnibus
Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests” By Order
of July 25, 2007,6 the trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner who is charged with coup d’ etat is entitled to bail RULING: NO. The
petition is dismissed. The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action. That the cited provisions
apply equally to rape and coup d’état cases, both being punishable by reclusion perpetua, is beyond
cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable

penalties, there is clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved
in the crime charged. It is uncontroverted that petitioner’s application for bail and for release on
recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether
ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial court’s judgment of
conviction, justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional
liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is “regardless of
the stage of the criminal action.” Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of
public self-defense applies equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisoners-
appellants like Jalosjos. As the Court observed in Alejano v. Cabuay, 468 SCRA 188 (2005), it is
impractical to draw a line between convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees for the purpose of
maintaining jail security; and while pretrial detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon
confinement, the fact of their detention makes their rights more limited than those of the public.
Petitioner cannot find solace in Montano v. Ocampo, 49 O.G. No. 5 (May 1953), 1855, to buttress his
plea for leeway because unlike petitioner, the therein petitioner, then Senator Justiniano Montano,
who was charged with multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder, was able to rebut the strong
evidence for the prosecution. Notatu dignum is this Court’s pronouncement therein that “if denial of
bail is authorized in capital cases, it is only on the theory that the proof being strong, the defendant
would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than face the verdict of the jury.” At the time Montano
was indicted, when only capital offenses were nonbailable where evidence of guilt is strong, the
Court noted the obvious reason that “one who faces a probable death sentence has a particularly
strong temptation to flee.” Petitioner’s petition for bail having earlier been denied, he cannot rely on
Montano to reiterate his requests which are akin to bailing him out.

OSMENA V. PENDATUN
109 Phil 863

Osmeña vs. Pendatun

G.R. No. L-17144 October 28, 1960

FACTS:

Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., in a privilege speech delivered before the House, made the serious
imputations of bribery against the President.

A special committee, composed of Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen other

congressmen, was created by virtue of House Resolution No. 59, to investigate the truth of the
charges against the President.

Osmeña failed to produce evidence in support of his remarks about the President. He was, by
Resolution No. 175, suspended from office for a period of fifteen months for serious disorderly
behaviour.

Osmeña submitted to the SC a verified petition for “declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction” against the members of the special committee.

He asked for annulment of Resolution No. 59 on the ground of infringement of his parliamentary
immunity.

Several respondents challenged the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the petition, and defended
the power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension.

ISSUES:

1. What is parliamentary immunity?

2. Whether or not the delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly
conduct.

RULING:
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that “for any speech or debate” in Congress, the
Senators or Members of the House of Representative “shall not be questioned in any other place.”

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in

every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose “is
to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness
and success” for “it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and
that he should be protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom
exercise of that liberty may occasion offense.”

Osmeña v. Pendatun (G.R. No. L-17144)

Facts:

Congressman Sergio Osmeña Jr., herein petitioner, delivered his privilege speech before the House
making serious imputations of bribery against the President of the Philippines. Because of this, a
Resolution was issued authorizing the creation of special House Committee to investigate the truth
of the charges made against the President, to summon petitioner to substantiate his charges, and in
case petitioner fails to do so, to require petitioner to show cause why he should not be punished by
the House.

Petitioner then resorted to the Court seeking for the annulment of said resolution on the ground
that it infringes his constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the
House. Meanwhile, the Special Committee continued with its proceeding, and after giving petitioner
a chance to defend himself, found the latter guilty of seriously disorderly behavior. A House
resolution was issued and petitioner was suspended from office for 15 months.

Thereafter, respondents filed their answer challenging the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the
petition, and defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension.

Issue:

Whether the House Resolution violated petitioner’s constitutionally granted parliamentary immunity
for speeches

Ruling: NO.

Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that “for any speech or debate” in Congress, the
Senators or Members of the House of Representative “shall not be questioned in any other place.”
This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United
States. In that country, the provision has always been understood to mean that although exempt
from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may,
nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe that “they shall not be questioned in any
other place” than Congress.

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in

every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose “is
to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness
and success” for “it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and
that he should be protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom
exercise of that liberty may occasion offense.” It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of
expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or
any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility
before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter
disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof.

On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly
conduct for which Osmeña may be discipline, We believe, however, that the House is the judge of
what constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction
upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House
knows best but which cannot be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by
the Courts.

Accordingly, the petition has to be, and is hereby dismissed.

Dante Liban, et al. vs. Richard Gordon - GR No. 175352 Case Digest

I. THE FACTS

Petitioners Liban, et al., who were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross
Chapter, filed with the Supreme Court what they styled as “Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon
as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate” against respondent Gordon, who was elected Chairman
of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors during his incumbency as Senator.

Petitioners alleged that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors,
respondent Gordon ceased to be a member of the Senate pursuant to Sec. 13, Article VI of the
Constitution, which provides that “[n]o Senator . . . may hold any other office or employment in
the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat.”
Petitioners cited the case of Camporedondo vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 129049, decided August 6, 1999,
which held that the PNRC is a GOCC, in supporting their argument that respondent Gordon
automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate when he accepted and held the position of Chairman
of the PNRC Board of Governors.

Formerly, in its Decision dated July 15, 2009, the Court, voting 7-5, [1] held that the office of the
PNRC Chairman is NOT a government office or an office in a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition
in Sec. 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Chairman is elected by the PNRC Board of
Governors; he is not appointed by the President or by any subordinate government official.
Moreover, the PNRC is NOT a GOCC because it is a privately-owned, privately-funded, and
privately-run charitable organization and because it is controlled by a Board of Governors four-
fifths of which are private sector individuals. Therefore, respondent Gordon did not forfeit his
legislative seat when he was elected as PNRC Chairman during his incumbency as Senator.

The Court however held further that the PNRC Charter, R.A. 95, as amended by PD 1264 and 1643,
is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation since Section 7, Article XIV of the
1935 Constitution states that “[t]he Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the
formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are owned
or controlled by the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof.” The Court thus
directed the PNRC to incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and
Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation. The fallo of the Decision read:

WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not
a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of
the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. We also declare that Sections 1,
2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, or
Republic Act No. 95, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID because
they create the PNRC as a private corporation or grant it corporate powers.

Respondent Gordon filed a Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration of the Decision.
The PNRC likewise moved to intervene and filed its own Motion for Partial Reconsideration. They
basically questioned the second part of the Decision with regard to the pronouncement on the
nature of the PNRC and the constitutionality of some provisions of the PNRC Charter.

II. THE ISSUE

Was it correct for the Court to have passed upon and decided on the issue of the constitutionality
of the PNRC charter? Corollarily: What is the nature of the PNRC?

III. THE RULING

[The Court GRANTED reconsideration and MODIFIED the dispositive portion of the Decision by
deleting the second sentence thereof.]

NO, it was not correct for the Court to have decided on the constitutional issue because it was not
the very lis mota of the case. The PNRC is sui generis in nature; it is neither strictly a GOCC nor a
private corporation.

The issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the parties, and was not among the
issues defined in the body of the Decision; thus, it was not the very lis mota of the case. We have
reiterated the rule as to when the Court will consider the issue of constitutionality in Alvarez v.
PICOP Resources, Inc., thus:

This Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota. It is a well-
established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be
unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised,
if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may [rest] its judgment, that
course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until such
question will be unavoidable.

[T]his Court should not have declared void certain sections of the PNRC Charter. Instead, the Court
should have exercised judicial restraint on this matter, especially since there was some other
ground upon which the Court could have based its judgment. Furthermore, the PNRC, the entity
most adversely affected by this declaration of unconstitutionality, which was not even originally a
party to this case, was being compelled, as a consequence of the Decision, to suddenly reorganize
and incorporate under the Corporation Code, after more than sixty (60) years of existence in this
country.

Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several times, particularly on June 11, 1953,
August 16, 1971, December 15, 1977, and October 1, 1979, by virtue of R.A. No. 855, R.A. No.
6373, P.D. No. 1264, and P.D. No. 1643, respectively. The passage of several laws relating to the
PNRC’s corporate existence notwithstanding the effectivity of the constitutional proscription on
the creation of private corporations by law is a recognition that the PNRC is not strictly in the
nature of a private corporation contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional ban.

A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like it[,] not just in terms of
structure, but also in terms of history, public service and official status accorded to it by the State
and the international community. There is merit in PNRC’s contention that its structure is sui
generis. It is in recognition of this sui generis character of the PNRC that R.A. No. 95 has remained
valid and effective from the time of its enactment in March 22, 1947 under the 1935 Constitution
and during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Charter
and its amendatory laws have not been questioned or challenged on constitutional grounds, not
even in this case before the Court now.

[T]his Court [must] recognize the country’s adherence to the Geneva Convention and respect the
unique status of the PNRC in consonance with its treaty obligations. The Geneva Convention has
the force and effect of law. Under the Constitution, the Philippines adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land. This constitutional provision must be
reconciled and harmonized with Article XII, Section 16 of the Constitution, instead of using the
latter to negate the former. By requiring the PNRC to organize under the Corporation Code just
like any other private corporation, the Decision of July 15, 2009 lost sight of the PNRC’s special
status under international humanitarian law and as an auxiliary of the State, designated to assist it
in discharging its obligations under the Geneva Conventions.

The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, can
neither “be classified as an instrumentality of the State, so as not to lose its character of
neutrality” as well as its independence, nor strictly as a private corporation since it is regulated by
international humanitarian law and is treated as an auxiliary of the State.

Although [the PNRC] is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the government, nor a
GOCC or a subsidiary thereof so much so that respondent, under the Decision, was correctly
allowed to hold his position as Chairman thereof concurrently while he served as a Senator, such a
conclusion does not ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a “private corporation” within the
contemplation of the provision of the Constitution, that must be organized under the Corporation
Code.

[T]he sui generis character of PNRC requires us to approach controversies involving the PNRC on a
case-to-case basis.

In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary of the government in
the humanitarian field in accordance with its commitments under international law. This Court
cannot all of a sudden refuse to recognize its existence, especially since the issue of the
constitutionality of the PNRC Charter was never raised by the parties. It bears emphasizing that
the PNRC has responded to almost all national disasters since 1947, and is widely known to
provide a substantial portion of the country’s blood requirements. Its humanitarian work is
unparalleled.

The Court should not shake its existence to the core in an untimely and drastic manner that would
not only have negative consequences to those who depend on it in times of disaster and armed
hostilities but also have adverse effects on the image of the Philippines in the international
community. The sections of the PNRC Charter that were declared void must therefore stay.

[Thus, R.A. No. 95 remains valid and constitutional in its entirety. The Court MODIFIED the
dispositive portion of the Decision by deleting the second sentence, to now read as follows:

WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not
a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of
the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.]

DANTE V. LIBAN, vs. RICHARD J. GORDON, G.R. No. 175352,

July 15,2009

Doctrine:

A government-owned or controlled corporation must be owned by the government,and in the case

of a stock corporation, at least a majority of its capital stock must be owned by the government. In
the case of a non-stock corporation, by analogy atleast a majority of the members must be
government officials holding suchmembership by appointment or designation by the government.
Under thiscriterion, and as discussed earlier, the government does not own or control PNRC.

Facts:

Liban and other petitions filed a Petition to Declare Gordon as having forfeited his seat in theSenate.
They allege that respondent ceased to be a member of the Senate by accepting thechairmanship of
the PNRC Board of Governors as provided under Section 13, Article VI of theConstitution

Petitioners cite Camporedondo v. NLRC ,which held that the PNRC is agovernment-owned or
controlled corporation.

Issue:

whether the office of the PNRC Chairman is a government office or an office in agovernment-owned
or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition inSection 13, Article VI of the Constitution.

Ruling:

No.
To ensure and maintain its autonomy, neutrality, and independence, the PNRCcannot be owned
or controlled by the government. Indeed, the Philippinegovernment does not own the PNRC. The
PNRC does not have government assetsand does not receive any appropriation from the Philippine
Congress.

The PNRCis financed primarily by contributions from private individuals and private entitiesobtained
through solicitation campaigns organized by its Board of Governor

The government does not control the PNRC. Under the PNRC Charter, asamended,

only six of the thirty members of the PNRC Board of Governors areappointed by the President of
the Philippines.

Clearly, an overwhelmingmajority of four-fifths of the PNRC Board are elected or chosen by the
privatesector members of the PNRC

Final Legislative Action. After both houses have given final approval to a bill, a final copy of the bill,
known as the “enrolled bill,” shall be printed, and certified as correct by the Secretary of the Senate
and the Secretary General of the House of Representatives.

The enrolled bill rule is a principle of judicial interpretation of rules of procedure

in legislative bodies. Under the doctrine, once a bill passes a legislative body and is signed into law,
the courts assume that all rules of procedure in the enactment process were properly followed. That
is, "[i]f a legislative document is authenticated in regular form by the appropriate officials, the court
treats that document as properly adopted."
Arroyo v. De Venecia
GR No. 127255

Facts:

Petitioners are members of the House of Reps, challenging the validity of

RA 8420 amending certain provisions of the NIRC by imposing so-called
“sin taxes” on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes. Petition is
against Speaker of the House Jose De Venecia, Deputy Speaker Raul
Daza, Majority Floor Leader Rodolfo Albano, Executive Secretary,
Secretary of Finance, and Commissioner of Internal Revenue, charging
violation of the riles of the House which are “constitutionally mandated”, so
their violation is tantamount to a constitutional violation.

The law originated in the House of Reps as HB 7198, was approved on 3rd
reading on September 12, 1996, and transmitted to the Senate on
September 16, 1996 which approved it with certain amendments on third
reading on November 17, 1996. A bicameral conference committee was
formed to reconcile disagreeing provisions of both Houses. The bicam
committee submitted its report to the House at 8AM on November 21,
1996. Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of the committee on ways and
means proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech and was interpellated.
When Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento was interpellating, he was interrupted when
petitioner moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. The motion was objected
and a roll call was done. Deputy Speaker Raul Daza decalred the presence
of a quorum. Petitoner appealed but was defeated when put to a vote. The
interpellation proceeded.

Petitioner registered to interpellate and was 4th in order. Petitioner

announced that he was going to raise a question on the quorum, never did.
The transcript on the session on November 21, 1996 as published by
Congress in the newspaper issues shows that when petitioner was asking
the Speaker a question, the Speaker outright approved the bill acting on
the motion by Rep. Albano. When petitioner tried to clarify, session was
suspended by the Speaker. On the same day, the bill was signed by the
Speaker and the Senate President and certified by the secretaries of both
Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President
Ramos on November 22, 1996.

Petitioners claim that there are 4 different versions of the transcript:

The transcript of audio-sound recording of the proceedings immediately

after the session adjourned at 3:40pm.

The transcript of proceedings from 3:00pm – 3:40pm of November 21,

1996 as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November
21.

The transcript of proceedings from 3:00pm – 3:40pm on November 21,

1996 as certified by the Chief of Transcription Division on November 28.

The published version in the newspapers.

Petitioners claim that the four versions differ on 3 points:

In the audio-sound, the word “approved” cannot be heard

.
In the transcript certified on Nov 21, the word “no” appears only once, while
in other versions it is repeated 3 times.

The published version does not contain “you better prepare for a quorum
because I will raise the question of the quorum.”

Petitioners argue that RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in
violation of the rules of the House:

The chair, in submitting the conference committee report to the House, did
not call for the yeas or nays, but simply asked for its approval by motion in
order to prevent petitioner from questioning the presence of a quorum (in
violation of Rule VIII 35 and Rule XVII 103).
The Chair ignored petitioner’s question (in violation of Rule XIX 112).

The Chair refused to recognize petitioner and proceeded to act on motion

of Rep. Albano (in violation of Rule XVI 97).

The Chair suspended the session without first ruling on petitioner’s

question which was allegedly a point of order or privileged motion.

Respondents argue that the Court is not the proper forum for the
enforcement of the rules of the House and that there is no justification for
reconsidering the enrolled bill doctrine. Respondents also argue that in
passing the bill, the rules of the house were faithfully observed.

Issue:

WON the House of Reps committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting

RA 8240.

Ruling:
No. The Court finds no ground for holding that Congress committed a grave
abuse of discretion in enacting RA 8240. It is clear that what is alleged to
have been violated are merely internal rules of procedure of the House
rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law.
In Osmena v. Pendatun, the Court ruled that rules adopted by deliberative
bodies are subject to revocation, modification, or waiver at the pleasure of
the body adopting them. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and
with their observance, the courts have no concern.

In US v. Ballin, Joseph, & Co., the rule stated was the Constitution (US)
empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings.

In City Loan & Savings Co. v. Moore, the SC of Ohio rules that the
provision for consideration is no part of the Constitution and is therefore
entirely within the control of the General Assembly. Having made the rule, it
should be regarded, but a failure to regard it is not subject-matter of judicial
inquiry.
According to Chief Justice Fernando, mere failure to conform to the rules of
proceedings of Congress does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken
if the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.
In the instant case, the matter complained of concerns a matter of internal
procedure of the House which the Court should not be concerned about.
The claim was not that there was no quorum, but only that petitioner was
prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum.

Also, under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of HB 7198 by the
presiding officers and certification by the secretaries of both Houses that it
was passed on November 21, 1996 is conclusive of its due enactment.
When there is no evidence to the contrary, the Court will respect the
certification of the presiding officers of both Houses that a bill has been
duly passed. To disregard the enrolled bill doctrine would be to disregard
the respect due the other departments of the government.
Petitioners have not advanced any argument that warrants departure from
the doctrine. The due enactment of the law is likewise confirmed by the
Journal of the House of November 21, 1996 which shows that the
conference committee report on HB 7198 which became RA 8240 wa
sapproved on that day. The keeping of the Journal is required by Section
16 Article VI of the Constitution. The Journal is regarded as conclusive with
respect to matters that are required by the Constitution to be recorded
therein. With respect to other matters, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, the Journals have also been accorded conclusive effect.

Arroyo vs De Venecia GR No 127255 14 August 1997

Facts: RA 8240 which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing
so-called ”sin taxes” on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes were challenged by
Representative Joker Arroyo. The bicameral committee after submitting its report to the House, the
chairman of the committee proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech and was interpellated.
Arroyo also interrupted to move to adjourn for lack of quorum. His motion was defeated and put to
a vote. The interpellation of the sponsor proceeded and the bill was approved on its third reading.

Issue: Whether or not Arroyo should have been heard for his call to adjourn for lack of quorum?

Decision: Petition dismissed. It is unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department

of the Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has
disregarded its own rules of procedure or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a
rematch in the judicial forum when the petitioners can find their remedy in their own department
LIWAYWAY VINZONS-
CHATO V. COMELEC &
RENATO J. UNICO
G. R. No. 172131, April 02, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioner Chato and
Respondent Unico were among
the candidates for the lone
congressional district of
Camarines Norte during the
May 10, 2004 synchronized
national and local elections.
The petitioner filed with the
COMELEC, alleging manifest
errors or obvious
discrepancies in the election
returns from various precincts
in the
Municipality of Labo. The
MBC of Labo gave her 24
hours to prove her
allegations.
Before the expiration of the
period granted to Chato to
prove her
allegations, the MBC
concluded the canvassing of
votes and hastily
forwarded the results to the
Provincial Board of
Canvassers (PBC) of
Camarines Norte. Her counsel
was thus constrained to appear
before the PBC and
moved for the suspension of its
proceedings on the ground that
there were still
pending incidents before the
MBC Labo.
The PBC, however, denied her
motion and upon the former’s
instruction, petitioner
Chato filed a letter-petition for
reconsideration of the denial of
her request, which
was also subsequently denied
by the PBC. The PBC ruled
that pre-proclamation
controversy was not allowed
for the election of members
of House of
Representatives, that the
matters raised by petitioner
Chato were proper for an
election protest before the
competent tribunal, and that the
PBC had no authority to
direct the MBC Labo to
reconvene for the purpose of
receiving petitioner Chato’s
written objections and
supporting documents and re-
canvassing the election
returns.
On May 14, 2004, the PBC
proclaimed respondent Unico as
representative-
elect of Camarines Norte.
Subsequently, petitioner Chato
filed with the COMELEC a
petition alleging manifest
errors in the election returns. The
COMELEC dismissed the
petition for lack of merit.
It stated that the MBC is
precluded from entertaining pre-
proclamation controversies
on matters relating to the
preparation, transmission,
receipt, custody, and
appreciation of the election
returns or certificates of canvass
involving the positions
of President, Vice-President,
Senators, and Members of
the House of
Representatives and Party-List.
Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration before the
COMELEC en banc which
was also denied. It ruled that the
Commission already lost
jurisdiction over
the case in view of the fact that
respondent Unico had already
taken his
oath as a Member of the
th
Thirteenth (13 ) Congress.
The COMELEC en banc cited
Aggabao v COMELEC where the
SC held that:
LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO V. COMELEC & RENATO J. UNICO

G. R. No. 172131, April 02, 2007

FACTS:

Petitioner Chato and Respondent Unico were among the candidates for the lone

congressional district of Camarines Norte during the May 10, 2004 synchronized

national and local elections.

The petitioner filed with the COMELEC, alleging manifest errors or obvious

discrepancies in the election returns from various precincts in the

Municipality of Labo. The MBC of Labo gave her 24 hours to prove her

allegations.

Before the expiration of the period granted to Chato to prove her

allegations, the MBC concluded the canvassing of votes and hastily

forwarded the results to the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) of

Camarines Norte. Her counsel was thus constrained to appear before the PBC and

moved for the suspension of its proceedings on the ground that there were still

pending incidents before the MBC Labo.

The PBC, however, denied her motion and upon the former’s instruction, petitioner

Chato filed a letter-petition for reconsideration of the denial of her request, which

was also subsequently denied by the PBC. The PBC ruled that pre-proclamation

controversy was not allowed for the election of members of House of

Representatives, that the matters raised by petitioner Chato were proper for an

election protest before the competent tribunal, and that the PBC had no authority to

direct the MBC Labo to reconvene for the purpose of receiving petitioner Chato’s

written objections and supporting documents and re-canvassing the election

returns.

On May 14, 2004, the PBC proclaimed respondent Unico as representative-

elect of Camarines Norte.

Subsequently, petitioner Chato filed with the COMELEC a petition alleging manifest

errors in the election returns. The COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

It stated that the MBC is precluded from entertaining pre-proclamation controversies

on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody, and

appreciation of the election returns or certificates of canvass involving the positions

of President, Vice-President, Senators, and Members of the House of

Representatives and Party-List.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc which

was also denied. It ruled that the Commission already lost jurisdiction over

the case in view of the fact that respondent Unico had already taken his
oath as a Member of the Thirteenth (13th) Congress.

The COMELEC en banc cited Aggabao v COMELEC where the SC held that:

The HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to

the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of

Representatives. Thus, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed,

taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of

Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to

his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own

jurisdiction begins. Considering that the respondent has already taken his oath

and assumed office as a member of the 13th Congress, the COMELEC had already

lost jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it

ruled that it had already been divested of jurisdiction upon respondent

Unico’s assumption of office as a Member of the House of Representatives.

RULING:

No, COMELEC did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that it

had already been divested of jurisdiction upon the respondent’s assumption of

office as a member of the HoR.

Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution reads:

SEC. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an

Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to

the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each

Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be

Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the

remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as

the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation

from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the

party-list system represented therein. The Senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal

shall be its chairman.

With respect to the House of Representatives, it is the House of

Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) that has the sole and exclusive

jurisdiction over contests relative to the election, returns, and

qualifications of its members. The use of the word “sole” in Section 17, Article VI

of the Constitution and Section 250 of the Omnibus Code underscores the

exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunal’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to its

members.

The Court has invariably ruled that once a winning candidate has been

proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a member of the House

of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests

relating to his election, returns,

and qualifications ends, and the
HRET’s
own jurisdiction begins.
In the present case, it is not
disputed that respondent
Unico has already been
proclaimed and taken his
oath of office as a Member
of the House of
Representatives. Hence,
COMELEC correctly ruled that it
had already lost jurisdiction
over petitioner Chato’s petition.
In view of the foregoing,
the instant petition is
DISMISSED for lack of
merit
relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s

own jurisdiction begins.

In the present case, it is not disputed that respondent Unico has already been

proclaimed and taken his oath of office as a Member of the House of

Representatives. Hence, COMELEC correctly ruled that it had already lost jurisdiction

over petitioner Chato’s petition.

In view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of

merit

LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO V. COMELEC & RENATO J. UNICO

G. R. No. 172131, April 02, 2007

LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO V. COMELEC & RENATO J. UNICO

G. R. No. 172131, April 02, 2007

FACTS:

Petitioner Chato and Respondent Unico were among the candidates for the lone

congressional district of Camarines Norte during the May 10, 2004 synchronized

national and local elections.

The petitioner filed with the COMELEC, alleging manifest errors or obvious

discrepancies in the election returns from various precincts in the

Municipality of Labo. The MBC of Labo gave her 24 hours to prove her

allegations.
Before the expiration of the period granted to Chato to prove her

allegations, the MBC concluded the canvassing of votes and hastily

forwarded the results to the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) of

Camarines Norte. Her counsel was thus constrained to appear before the PBC and

moved for the suspension of its proceedings on the ground that there were still

pending incidents before the MBC Labo

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it

ruled that it had already been divested of jurisdiction upon respondent

Unico’s assumption of office as a Member of the House of Representatives.

RULING:

No, COMELEC did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that it

had already been divested of jurisdiction upon the respondent’s assumption of

office as a member of the HoR.

Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution reads:

SEC. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an

Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to

the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each

Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be

Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the

remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as

the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation

from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the

party-list system represented therein. The Senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal

shall be its chairman

The single-subject rule is a rule in the constitutional law of some jurisdictions that stipulates that
some or all types of legislation may deal with only one main issue. One purpose is to avoid
complexity in acts, to avoid any hidden provisions that legislators or voters may miss when reading
the proposed law. Another is to prevent legislators attaching an unpopular provision ("rider") to an
unrelated popular one, whether in the hope of sneaking the unpopular one through, or in the hope
of causing the popular one to be rejected (a type of wrecking amendment).

Scope of a bill[edit]
In English law, the long title of a bill or act of parliament states its purpose; this may enumerate
multiple purposes, or end with a vague formula like "and for other purposes". A proposed
amendment to a bill may be rejected if it is outside the scope defined in its long title; alternatively,
the title may be amended to increase its scope. An omnibus bill covers a number of diverse or
unrelated topics.
 Ang Nars Party-List vs. The Executive Secretary, et al, G.R. No. 215746, October 8,
2019
Facts
On 21 October 2002 PGMA approved RA 9173, the Sec. 32 of which provides that
the minimum base pay of nurses working in the public health institutions shall not be lower
than salary grade 15 prescribed under RA 6758. On 28 July 2008, Congress approved Joint
Resolution No. 4, authorizing the President of the Philippines “Modify the Compensation and
Position Classification System of Civilian Personnel and the Base Pay Schedule of Military
and Uniformed Personnel in the Government, and For Other Purposes.” The said Joint
Resolution was approved by PGMA on 17 June 2009. Joint Resolution No. 4 provides for an
amendment of existing laws including, among others, RA 9173. On 17 June 2009, PGMA
signed EO No. 811 to implement Joint Resolution No. 4 which provides that entry level
Nurse I shall have a salary grade of 11.

ISSUE
WON Joint Resolution No. 4 (Series of 2009) of the Senate and the House of
Representatitves amended Section 32 of the Philippine Nursing Act of 2002 (RA 6758).
RULING:
Under the Constitution, only a bill can become a law. Before a bill can become a law,
it must pass three readings on three separate days, unless the President certifies that its
enactment is urgent. (Section 26, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution) The purpose for which
three readings on separate days are required is two-fold: (1) to inform the members of
Congress of what they must vote on, and (2) to give the members of Congress notice that a
measure is progressing through legislative process, allowing them and others interested in
the measure to prepare their positions on the matter. The Senate Rules of Procedure
enumerate the types of legislation as follows: Types of Legislation The types of measures
that Congress may consider and act upon (in addition to treaties in the Senate) include bills
and three kinds of resolutions. They are: 1. Bills - these are general measures, which if
passed upon, may become laws. A bill is prefixed with S., followed by a number assigned
the measure based on the order in which it is introduced. The vast majority of legislative
proposals – recommendations dealing with the economy, increasing penalties for certain
crimes, regulation on commerce and trade, etc., are drafted in the form of bills. They also
include budgetary appropriation of the government and many others. When passed by both
chambers in identical form and signed by the President or repassed by Congress over a
presidential veto, they become laws.

2. Joint Resolutions - A joint resolution, like a bill, requires the approval of both houses and
the signature of the President. It has the force and effect of a law if approved. There is no
real difference between a bill and a joint resolution. The latter generally is used when dealing
with a single item or issue, such as a continuing or emergency appropriations bill. Joint
resolutions are also for proposing amendments to the Constitution. Xxx

The Senate’s definition of a joint resolution states that it is no different from a bill. However,
under Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, only a bill can be enacted into law
after following certain requirements expressly prescribed in the Constitution. A joint
resolution is not a bill, and its passage does not enact the joint resolution into a law even if it
follows the requirements expressly prescribed in the Constitution for enacting a bill into a
law. Section 64 of the Rules of the Senate states that “prior to their final approval, bills and
joint resolutions shall be read at least three times.” However, Section 68 of the Same Rules
provides that “no bill shall be passed by the Senate unless it has passed three (3) readings
on separate days xxx.” There is no express provision in the Rules of the Senate that applies
Section 68 to Joint Resolutions. The approval process under Section 68 only applies to bills
and not to joint resolutions. In short, there is no express language in the Rules of the Senate
that a Joint Resolution must pass three readings on separate days. In contrast, Section 58 of
the Rules of the House of Representatives states that “no bill or joint resolutions shall
become law unless it passes three (3) readings on separate days and printed copies thereof
in its final form are distributed to the Members three (3) days before its passage except
when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public
calamity or emergency. In any event, neither the Rules of the Senate nor the Rules of the
House of Representatives can amend the Constitution which recognizes that only a bill can
become a law. However, a joint resolution can be part of the implementation of a law as
provided in the law itself. A joint resolution can also be treated as recommendation to the
Executive on how the law can be implemented. The Position Paper for the Senate of the
Philippines states that bills and joint resolutions, for all practical purposes, are treated alike
procedurally. According to the Senate, it is not uncommon to find a proposed piece of
legislation, in identical language, introduced in the Senate as a Senate bill and in the House
as a joint resolution, and vice versa. The Senate added that while at one time or another,
there might have been definite distinctions between the two types of proposed legislation,
they have for all practical purposes been lost. On the other hand, the House of
Representatives asserts that a joint resolution possesses the force of law if it resembles a
bill as to form and procedure for adoption. The house of Representatives states that the
legislative intent to accord to a joint resolution the same effect as a law should be deemed
controlling, notwithstanding the form and style of enactment. In addition, a joint resolution is
treated in the same way as a bill under the Rules of the House of Representatives. The
Rules of the Senate and the Rules of the House of Representatives can change since a new
Congress is not bound to adopt the rules of the previous Congress. In fact, the Senate and
the House of Representatives of every Congress can amend their own Rules of Procedure
at any time. In Neri v. Senate

Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, the Court sustained the
OSG that “every Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it. Since Senatorial
elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of the Senate’s membership, the
composition of the Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each Senate may thus
enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit.” Thus, in that case, the Court required the
publication of the rules of Procedure of the Senate Governing the Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation for the 14th Congress. The same rule applies to the House of Representatives.
The House of every Congress must adopt its own rules at the start of its term. In particular,
the House is admittedly not a continuing body since the terms of all Members of the House
end at the same time upon the expiration of every Congress. Thus, upon the expiration of
every Congress, the Rules of Procedure of the House also expire. That is why Section 1,
Rule 1 of the Rules of the House of Representatives of the 17th Congress, adopted on 25
July 2016, provides: “After the oath-taking of the newly-elected Speaker, the body shall
proceed to the adoption of the rules of the immediately preceding Congress to govern its
proceedings until the approval and adoption of the rules of the current Congress.” Again, the
Constitution provides that only a bill can become a law. When a bill is proposed, either in the
Senate or in the House of Representatives, the public is immediately informed that there is a
proposal being considered which, if it becomes a law, can bind them. It is imperative for the
public to know when a bill is being considered so that they can send their comments,
proposals, or objections to the bill. This is in consonance with the requirement on
transparency in public transactions under Section 28, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
which provides that “subjects to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts
and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest.” If a joint resolution is proposed instead of a bill, the public will not be alerted that
there is a proposed legislation, and a law can pass stealthily without notice to the public. Xxx
The veto power of the President applies expressly only to bills, not to joint resolutions. If a
joint resolution is given the effect of, and treated as, a law, Congress will be taking away the
veto power of the President since the Constitution only provides for the President’s veto
power over a bill. In short, Congress can enact a joint resolution into a law that is not subject
to the President’s veto power, a stipulation that clearly violates the Constitution. Re
Assertion of Justice Benjamin S. Caguioa Justice Caguioa asserts that the Philippine
Congress’ concept of joint resolution is equivalent to the US Senate’s characterization of
joint resolution as a piece of legislation that requires the approval of both chambers and is
submitted to the President for possible signature as a law.

Ang Nars Party-List vs. The Executive Secretary, et al, G.R. No. 215746, October 8, 2019

FACTS:

On 21 October 2002 PGMA approved RA 9173, the Sec. 32 of which provides that the
minimum

base pay of nurses working in the public health institutions shall not be lower than salary
grade

15 prescribed under RA 6758.

On 28 July 2008, Congress approved Joint Resolution No. 4, authorizing the President of the

Philippines “Modify the Compensation and Position Classification System of Civilian

Personnel

and the Base Pay Schedule of Military and Uniformed Personnel in the Government, and For

Other Purposes.” The said Joint Resolution was approved by PGMA on 17 June 2009.

Joint Resolution No. 4 provides for an amendment of existing laws including, among others,
RA

9173.

On 17 June 2009, PGMA signed EO No. 811 to implement Joint Resolution No. 4 which
provides

that entry level Nurse I shall have a salary grade of 11.

ISSUE

WON Joint Resolution No. 4 (Series of 2009) of the Senate and the House of
Representatitves amended

Section 32 of the Philippine Nursing Act of 2002 (RA 6758).

RULING:
 Under the Constitution, only a bill can become a law. Before a bill can become a law, it must
pass three

readings on three separate days, unless the President certifies that its enactment is urgent.
(Section 26,

Article VI of the 1987 Constitution)

The purpose for which three readings on separate days are required is two-fold: (1)
to inform the

members of Congress of what they must vote on, and (2) to give the members of Congress
notice that a

measure is progressing through legislative process, allowing them and others interested in
the measure to

prepare their positions on the matter

A joint committee is a committee made up of members of the two chambers of

a bicameral legislature. In other contexts, it refers to a committee with members from more than
one organization.

As provided by the 1987 Constitution, the country’s legislature shall have the Senate and the House
of Representatives. This makes it a bicameral legislative body. Both chambers are in-charge
of creating laws and performing other significant functions, such as maintaining the principle of
checks and balances with its co-equal branches of government—the executive and the judiciary,
respectively.

As two separate chambers, the Senate and the House of Representatives determine their own rules
of proceedings as well as the imposition of punishment or sanction to their own members.

Despite this, they are mandated to consult and agree with each other. For instance, it is
prohibited in the Constitution for either of them to adjourn sessions for more than three days
nor to hold session other than its plenary halls without the consent of the other.
A bicameral conference committee (often shortened as "bicam" by the people in legislation)
is a joint panel composed of Representatives and Senators who are appointed by their
respective chambers to convene in order to resolve disagreements on a particular measure
such as, for example, the general appropriations bill or the national budget as it is commonly
known. This panel is just temporary and is just created for the purpose. Members are often
called conferees.

When It Is Needed

Although they might be perceived as separate entities, both the Senate and the
House of Representatives are actually just under one single structure—the Congress
of the Philippines. Therefore, both houses shall endeavor to produce a single and
unvarying output. By principle, the President cannot approve a law for
implementation if it is not yet finalized by Congress.
A bill is only considered final when it has the signature the President of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives as well as the Secretary of the
Senate and Secretary-General of the House of Representatives.

Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance

G.R. No. 115455 October 30, 1995
Freedom of the Press
FACTS:

These are motions seeking reconsideration of our decision dismissing the petitions filed in
these cases for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as
the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. Now it is contended by the Philippine Press Institute
(PPI) that by removing the exemption of the press from the VAT while maintaining those
granted to others, the law discriminates against the press. At any rate, it is averred, “even
nondiscriminatory taxation of constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional.”

ISSUE:

Does sales tax on bible sales violative of religious and press freedom?

RULING:

No. The Court was speaking in that case of a license tax, which, unlike an ordinary tax, is
mainly for regulation. Its imposition on the press is unconstitutional because it lays a prior
restraint on the exercise of its right. Hence, although its application to others, such those
selling goods, is valid, its application to the press or to religious groups, such as the
Jehovah’s Witnesses, in connection with the latter’s sale of religious books and pamphlets, is
unconstitutional. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, “it is one thing to impose a tax on income
or property of a preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax on him for delivering a
sermon.”

The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of a
privilege, much less a constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or exchange
of goods or properties or the sale or exchange of services and the lease of properties purely
for revenue purposes. To subject the press to its payment is not to burden the exercise of its
right any more than to make the press pay income tax or subject it to general regulation is not
to violate its freedom under the Constitution
Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance G.R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994

. Facts: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and
properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base
of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal
Revenue Code. There are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on
various grounds. One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House
of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the
result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a
contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required by the Constitution. Issue:
Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution. Art. VI,
Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public
debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. Art. VI, Section
26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings
on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its
Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of
its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a
bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately
thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

Held:

The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in theHouse of Representatives as
required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not
the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in
the House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which
initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be
the same as the House billwould be to deny the Senate’s power not only to concur with
amendmentsbut also to propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is
that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the
public debt, private bills and bills of localapplication must come from the House of
Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the
House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the
Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of
the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt
of the House bill. The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3
readings on separate days as required by the Constitution because the second and third
readings were done on the same day. But this was because the President had certified S. No.
1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of
printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a bill
by the President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and
distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice.
MA. CAROLINA P. ARAULLO ET AL. v. BENIGNO SIMEON
C. AQUINO III ET AL., G.R. NO. 209287, July 1, 2014
In a Decision dated July 1, 2014, the Supreme Court partially granted the
consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition and declared the
following acts and practices under the Disbursement Acceleration Program
(DAP), National Budget Circular No. 541 and related executive issuances
unconstitutional for violating Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and the doctrine of separation of powers, namely:

(a) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing agencies,

and the declaration of the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased
appropriations as savings prior to the end of the fiscal year and
without complying with the statutory definition of savings contained in the
General Appropriations Acts;

(b) The cross-border transfers of the savings of the Executive to augment the
appropriations of other offices outside the Executive; and

(c) The funding of projects, activities and programs that were not covered by
any appropriation in the General Appropriations Acts.

The Court further declared void the use of unprogrammed funds despite the
absence of a certification by the National Treasurer that the revenue
collections exceeded the revenue targets for non-compliance with the
conditions provided in the relevant General Appropriations Acts (GAAs).

Remedial law; Certiorari and prohibition. The remedies of certiorari and

prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ
of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of
jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right,
undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions. Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are
appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or
prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials.
Remedial law; Locus standi. Citing De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, the
Supreme Court ruled that the assertion of a public right as a predicate
for challenging a supposedly illegal or unconstitutional executive
or legislative action rests on the theory that the petitioner represents
the public in general. Although such petitioner may not be as
adversely affected by the action complained against as are others, it is
enough that he sufficiently demonstrates in his petition that he is entitled to
protection or relief from the Court in the vindication of a public right. The
Court likewise cited Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co.,
Inc., to explain that “[s]tanding is a peculiar concept in constitutional law
because in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been
personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act but
by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public
interest.”
Transcendental importance as a ground to waive locus standi. Each of the
petitioners has established sufficient interest in the outcome of the
controversy as to confer locus standi on each of them. In addition,
considering that the issues center on the extent of the power of the Chief
Executive to disburse and allocate public funds, whether appropriated by
Congress or not, these cases pose issues that are of transcendental
importance to the entire Nation, the petitioners included. As such, the
determination of such important issues call for the Court’s exercise of its
broad and wise discretion “to waive the requirement and so remove
the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious
constitutional questions raised.”
Administrative law; Budget process; Implementation and funding of the
Disbursement Allocation Program (DAP). Four phases comprise the
Philippine budget process, specifically: (1) Budget Preparation; (2) Budget
Legislation; (3) Budget Execution; and (4) Accountability.

The DAP was to be implemented and funded (1) by declaring “savings”

coming from the various departments and agencies derived from pooling
unobligated allotments and withdrawing unreleased appropriations; (2)
releasing unprogrammed funds; and (3) applying the “savings” and
unprogrammed funds to augment existing [program, activity or project] or to
support other priority PAPs.

Administrative law; Nature of the DAP. The DAP was a government policy
or strategy designed to stimulate the economy through accelerated
spending. In the context of the DAP’s adoption and implementation being a
function pertaining to the Executive as the main actor during the Budget
Execution Stage under its constitutional mandate to faithfully execute the
laws, including the GAAs, Congress did not need to legislate to adopt or to
implement the DAP.
Constitutional law; The DAP is not an appropriation measure and does not
contravene Section 29(1), Article VI. The President, in keeping with his duty
to faithfully execute the laws, had sufficient discretion during the execution
of the budget to adapt the budget to changes in the country’s economic
situation. He could adopt a plan like the DAP for the purpose. He could pool
the savings and identify the PAPs to be funded under the DAP. The pooling of
savings pursuant to the DAP, and the identification of the PAPs to be funded
under the DAP did not involve appropriation in the strict sense because the
money had been already set apart from the public treasury by Congress
through the GAAs. In such actions, the Executive did not usurp the power
vested in Congress under Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution [that no
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of
an appropriation made by law].
Requisites of a valid transfer of appropriated funds under Section 25(5),
Article VI. The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25(5),
[Article VI of the Constitution], must be made upon a concurrence of the
following requisites, namely: (1) There is a law authorizing the President,
the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads
of the Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within their respective
offices; (2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from
the appropriations for their respective offices; and (3) The purpose of the
transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices.

It is then indubitable that the power to augment was to be used only when
the purpose for which the funds had been allocated were already satisfied, or
the need for such funds had ceased to exist, for only then could savings be
properly realized. This interpretation prevents the Executive from unduly
transgressing Congress’ power of the purse.

Savings, defined. The definition of “savings” under the 2011, 2012 and 2013
GAAs refer to portions or balances of any programmed appropriation in this
Act free from any obligation or encumbrance which are: (i) still available
after the completion or final discontinuance or abandonment of the work,
activity or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized; (ii) from
appropriations balances arising from unpaid compensation and related costs
pertaining to vacant positions and leaves of absence without pay; and (iii)
from appropriations balances realized from the implementation of measures
resulting in improved systems and efficiencies and thus enabled agencies to
meet and deliver the required or planned targets.

The Court agreed with petitioners that respondents were forcing the
generation of savings in order to have a larger fund available for
discretionary spending. Respondents, by withdrawing unobligated allotments
in the middle of the fiscal year, in effect deprived funding for PAPs
with existing appropriations under the GAAs.

The mandate of Section 28, Chapter IV, Book VI of the Administrative Code
is to revert to the General Fund balances of appropriations that remained
unexpended at the end of the fiscal year. The Executive could not circumvent
this provision by declaring unreleased appropriations and
unobligated allotments as savings prior to the end of the fiscal year.

Augmentation is valid only when funding is deficient. The GAAs for 2011,
2012 and 2013 set as a condition for augmentation that the appropriation
for the PAP item to be augmented must be deficient, to wit: – x x x
Augmentation implies the existence in this Act of a program, activity, or
project with an appropriation, which upon implementation, or subsequent
evaluation of needed resources, is determined to be deficient. In no case
shall a non-existent program, activity, or project, be funded by augmentation
from savings or by the use of appropriations otherwise authorized in this Act.
The President cannot substitute his own will for that of Congress. The Court
held that the “savings” pooled under the DAP were allocated to PAPs that
were not covered by any appropriations in the pertinent GAAs. Although the
[Office of the Solicitor General] rightly contends that the Executive was
authorized to spend in line with its mandate to faithfully execute the laws
(which included the GAAs), such authority did not translate to unfettered
discretion that allowed the President to substitute his own will for that of
Congress. He was still required to remain faithful to the provisions of the
GAAs, given that his power to spend pursuant to the GAAs was but a
delegation to him from Congress. Verily, the power to spend the public
wealth resided in Congress, not in the Executive. Moreover, leaving the
spending power of the Executive unrestricted would threaten to undo the
principle of separation of powers.
Cross-border transfers or augmentations are prohibited. By providing that the
President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the Heads of
the Constitutional Commissions may be authorized to augment any item in
the GAA “for their respective offices,” Section 25(5) has delineated borders
between their offices, such that funds appropriated for one office are
prohibited from crossing over to another office even in the guise of
augmentation of a deficient item or items. Thus, we call such transfers of
funds cross-border transfers or cross-border augmentations.

Regardless of the variant characterizations of the cross-border transfers of

funds, the plain text of Section 25(5) disallowing cross-border transfers was
disobeyed. Cross-border transfers, whether as augmentation, or as aid, are
prohibited under Section 25(5).

No violation of equal protection. Petitioners claim that the Executive

discriminated against some legislators on the ground alone of their receiving
less than the others could not of itself warrant a finding of contravention of
the Equal Protection Clause. The denial of equal protection of any law should
be an issue to be raised only by parties who supposedly suffer it, and, in these
cases, such parties would be the few legislators claimed to have been
discriminated against in the releases of funds under the DAP. The reason for
the requirement is that only such affected legislators could properly and fully
bring to the fore when and how the denial of equal protection occurred, and
explain why there was a denial in their situation. The requirement was not
met here.
Operative fact doctrine. The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the
existence of the law or executive act prior to the determination of its
unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced consequences that
cannot always be erased, ignored or disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void
law or executive act but sustains its effects. It provides an exception to the
general rule that a void or unconstitutional law produces no effect. But its
use must be subjected to great scrutiny and circumspection, and it cannot be
invoked to validate an unconstitutional law or executive act, but is resorted
to only as a matter of equity and fair play. It applies only to cases where
extraordinary circumstances exist, and only when the extraordinary
circumstances have met the stringent conditions that will permit its
application.

The operative fact doctrine applies to the implementation of the DAP. To

declare the implementation of the DAP unconstitutional without recognizing
that its prior implementation constituted an operative fact that produced
consequences in the real as well as juristic worlds of the Government and the
Nation is to be impractical and unfair. Unless the doctrine is held to apply, the
Executive as the disburser and the offices under it and elsewhere as the
recipients could be required to undo everything that they had implemented in
good faith under the DAP. That scenario would be enormously burdensome
for the Government. Equity alleviates such burden.

Maria Carolina P. Araullo, et al. v. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, et al. G.R. No., 209287,
728 SCRA 1, July 1, 2014, En Banc [Bersamin])

Facts:

On September 25, 2013, Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada delivered a privilege speech in the Senate

of the Philippines to reveal that some Senators, including himself, had been allotted an additional 50
₱ Million each as "incentive" for voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief Justice Renato C.
Corona.

Responding to Sen. Estrada’s revelation, Secretary Florencio Abad of the DBM issued a public
statement entitled Abad: Releases to Senators Part of Spending Acceleration Program,1 explaining
that the funds released to the Senators had been part of the Disbursement Acceleration Program
(DAP), a program designed by the DBM to ramp up spending to accelerate economic expansion.

The DBM soon came out to claim in its website that the DAP releases had been sourced from savings
generated by the Government, and from unprogrammed funds; and that the savings had been
derived from (1) the pooling of unreleased appropriations, and (2) the withdrawal of
unobligated allotments also for slow-moving programs and projects that had been earlier released
to the agencies of the National Government. Petitioners filed certiorari and prohibition under Rule
65.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the cases brought to challenge DAP’s constitutionality are mooted given that

DAP as a program, no longer exists.

2. Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to sue.

3. Whether or not Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable to the adoption and implementation of

DAP.
Rulings:

1. No. The court did not agree that the termination of the DAP as a program was a supervening

event that effectively mooted these consolidated cases. A moot and academic case is one that
ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration
thereon would be of no practical use or value. It is true that Sec. Abad manifested during the
January 28, 2014 oral arguments that the DAP as a program had been meanwhile discontinued
because it had fully served its purpose. The Solicitor General then quickly confirmed the termination
of the DAP as a program, and urged that its termination had already mooted the challenges to the
DAP’s constitutionality, viz: DAP as a program, no longer exists, thereby mooting these
present cases brought to challenge its constitutionality.

Bengzon v Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Digest

G.R. No. 89914 November 20, 1991

Padilla, J.:

Facts:
1. Petitioner was one of the defendants in a civil case filed
by the government with the Sandiganbayan for the alleged
anomalous sale of Kokoy Romoaldez of several
government corporations to the group of Lopa, a brother-
in-law of Pres. Aquino.
 2By virtue of a privilege speech made by Sen. Enrile
urging the Senate to look into the transactions, an
investigation was conducted by the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were
subpoenaed by the Committee to appear before it and
testify on "what they know" regarding the "sale of
thirty-six (36) corporations belonging to Benjamin
"Kokoy" Romualdez."
3. 3. At the hearing, Lopa declined to testify on the
ground that his testimony may "unduly prejudice"
the defendants in civil case before the Sandiganbayan.
4. Petitioner filed for a TRO and/or injunctive relief
claiming that the inquiry was beyond the jurisdiction of
the Senate. He contended that the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative
purpose. One of the defendants in the case before the
Sandiganbayan, Sandejas, filed with the Court of motion
for intervention. The Court granted it and required the
respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to comment on
the petition in intervention.
ISSUE: W/N the Blue Ribbon inquiry was in aid of
legislation
NO.
1. There appears to be no intended legislation
involved. The purpose of the inquiry to be conducted
is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of
Congress, it was conducted to find out whether or not
the relatives of President Aquino, particularly Mr.
Lopa had violated RA 3019 in connection with the
 alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to
Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group.
2. The power of both houses of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not absolute
or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the
Constitution. As provided therein, the investigation
must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its
duly published rules of procedure" and that "the
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the
rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be
respected, including the right to due process and the
right not to be compelled to testify against one's self.
3. The civil case was already filed in the
Sandiganbayan and for the Committee to probe and
inquire into the same justiciable controversy would be an
encroachment into the exclusive domain of judicial
jurisdiction that had already earlier set in. The issue
sought to be investigated has already been pre-empted by
the Sandiganbayan. To allow the inquiry to continue
would not only pose the possibility of conflicting
judgments between the legislative committee and a
judicial tribunal.
4. Finally, a congressional committee’s right to inquire is subject to all relevant limitations
placed by the Constitution on governmental action ‘including the relevant limitations of the Bill of
Rights. One of these rights is the right of an individual to against self-incrimination. The right to
remain silent is extended to respondents in administrative investigations but only if it partakes of
the nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding. Hence, the petitioners
may not be compelled by respondent Committee to appear, testify and produce evidence before it
only because the inquiry is not in aid of legislation and if pursued would be violative of the
principle of separation of powers between the legislative and the judicial departments of the
government as ordained by the Constitution.
BENGZON VS SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE EN BANC
Posted by kaye lee on 5:46 PM

G.R. No. 89914 November 20, 1991 [Section 21, Article 6:

Aids in Legislation: On Legislative Investigation]

FACTS:
PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan against Benjamin
Romualdez, et al for engaging in devices, schemes and
stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of
plaintiff and the Filipino people.
The Senate Minority Floor Leader Enrile delivered a speech
before the Senate on the alleged take-over personal privilege
before the Senate on the alleged "takeover of SOLOIL Inc,"
the FlagShip of the First Manila Management of Companies
or FMMC by Ricardo Lopa and called upon the Senate to
look into the possible violation of the law in the case with
regard to RA 3019 (Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers [SBRC]) started its
investigation on the matter. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa
were subpoenaed by the SBRC to appear before it and testify
on what they know regarding the sale of 36 corporations
belonging to Benjamin Romualdez. Lopa and Bengzon
refused to testify, invoking their rights to due process, and that
their testimony may unduly prejudice the defendants and
petitioners in case before the Sandiganbayan.
SBRC rejected the petitioner's plea to be excused from
testifying and the SBRC continued its investigation of the
matter.

The petitioners filed for prohibition with a prayer for TRO

and/or injunctive relief, claiming that the SBRC in requiring
their attendance and testimony, acted in excess of its
jurisdiction and legislative purpose.
The Supreme Court intervened upon a motion for
reconsideration filed by one of the defendants of the civil
case.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the case.
2. Whether or not the SBRC's inquiry has valid legislative
purpose.
3. whether or not the civil case of Sandiganbayan is beyond
the power of the SBRC to inquire into.
4. Whether or not the inquiry violates the petitioners' right to
due process.
RULING:

1. Yes. In Angara vs Electoral Commission, the Constitution

provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to
secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government. The Court has provided that
the allocation of constitutional boundaries is a task which the
judiciary must perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as
held in a recent case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither
interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival
claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries
has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation
mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision
by no means does away with the applicability of the principle
in appropriate cases."
The Court is thus of the considered view that it has
jurisdiction over the present controversy for the purpose of
determining the scope and extent of the power of the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee to conduct inquiries into private
affairs in purported aid of legislation.

Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006

FACTS: On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued
invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as resource
speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation
with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project). On
September 28, 2005, the President then issued Executive Order 464, “Ensuring Observance
of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and
Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes,” which, pursuant to Section 6
thereof, took effect immediately.
ISSUES: 1. Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress; 2.
Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern; and 3. Whether respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they
implemented E.O. 464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.

HELD: 1. The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI

of the Constitution. This power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive
branch; it is co-extensive with the power to legislate. The matters which may be a proper
subject of legislation and those which may be a proper subject of investigation are one. It
follows that the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a
proper subject for investigation. 2. Yes. Although there are clear distinctions between the
right of Congress to information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the
people to information on matters of public concern, any executive issuance tending to unduly
limit disclosures of information in investigations in Congress necessarily deprives the people
of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter
of public concern. 3. Yes. While E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it
does not follow that the same is exempt from the need for publication. It has a direct effect
on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. Due process requires
that the people should have been apprised of its issuance before it was implemented.

Validity of Sections 1 and 2(a) •

The Supreme Court declared Section 1 and Section 2(a) of Executive Order 464 valid while
Sections 2(b) and 3 are void.

Section 1 specifically applies to department heads. The requirement then to secure

presidential consent under Section 1 is limited only to appearances in the question hour.
Under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the
question hour is discretionary on their part.

Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in

aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the
department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently
made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary

On Section 2(a) No infirmity, can be imputed to as it merely provides guidelines, binding only
on the heads of office mentioned in Section 2(b), on what is covered by executive privilege.
It does not purport to be conclusive on the other branches of government. It may thus be
construed as a mere expression of opinion by the President regarding the nature and scope
of executive privilege.

Unconstitutionality of Sections 2 (b) and 3 •

Section 3 requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of
the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress.

Whenever an official invokes E.O. 464 to justify his failure to be present, such invocation
must be construed as a declaration to Congress that the President, or a head of office
authorized by the President, has determined that the requested information is privileged, and
that the President has not reversed such determination. There is an implied claim of
privilege, which implied claim is not accompanied by any specific allegation of the basis
thereof.

The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is invalid as it is
merely implied. It does not provide for precise and certain reasons for the claim, which
deprives the Congress to determine whether the withholding of information is justified under
the circumstances of each case.

The salient provisions of the Executive Order 464 are as follows: SECTION 1. Appearance
by Heads of Departments Before Congress. – In accordance with Article VI, Section 22 of
the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional provisions on the separation of powers
between co-equal branches of the government, all heads of departments of the Executive
Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing
before either House of Congress. When the security of the State or the public interest so
requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall only be conducted in
executive session.

SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege. – (a) Nature and Scope. –
The rule of confidentiality based on executive privilege is fundamental to the operation of
government and rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution (Almonte vs.
Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995). Further, Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides that Public
Officials and Employees shall not use or divulge confidential or classified information
officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public to
prejudice the public interest. Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified
information between the President and the public officers covered by this executive order,
including: Conversations and correspondence between the President and the public official
covered by this executive order (Almonte vs. Vasquez G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995;
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002); Military, diplomatic and
other national security matters which in the interest of national security should not be
divulged (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Presidential
Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998). Information
between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive
agreements (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9
December 1998); Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings (Chavez v. Presidential
Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998); Matters affecting
national security and public order (Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9
July 2002). (b) Who are covered. – The following are covered by this executive order: Senior
officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered
by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the
executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief
superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP
are covered by the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment
of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other
officers as may be determined by the President. SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public
Officials Before Congress. – All public officials enumerated in Section 2 (b) hereof shall
secure prior consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress to
ensure the observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on
executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of
legislation.

Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by issuing
E.O. 464 “Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on
Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in
Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes”. Petitioners pray for its
declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate
Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the
attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including
those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for
them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues
of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the so-
called “Gloriagate Scandal”.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O.
464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress.

ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure
the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and
constitutional?

RULING:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege.
The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter
of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition,
an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity
must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a
particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in
aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is
privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional
requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its
reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.

Ulpiano Sarmiento III vs Salvador Mison

G.R. No. 79974 – 156 SCRA 549 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – The Executive Department –
Powers of the President; Appointment Powers – Appointment of “Heads of Bureaus” – Officers
Requiring Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments

This is the 1st major case under the 1987 Constitution. In 1987, Salvador Mison was appointed as the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by then president Corazon Aquino. Ulpiano Sarmiento III
and Juanito Arcilla, being members of the bar, taxpayers, and professors of constitutional law
questioned the appointment of Mison because it appears that Mison’s appointment was not
submitted to the Commission on Appointments (COA) for approval. Sarmiento insists that under the
new Constitution, heads of bureaus require the confirmation of the COA.

Meanwhile, Sarmiento also sought to enjoin Guillermo Carague, the then Secretary of the
Department of Budget, from disbursing the salary payments of Mison due to the unconstitutionality
of Mison’s appointment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of “heads of bureaus” needed confirmation by the
Commission on Appointment.

HELD: No. In the 1987 Constitution, the framers removed “heads of bureaus” as one of those officers
needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointment. Under the 1987 Constitution, there are
four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups are:

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President
alone.

The first group above are the only public officers appointed by the president which require
confirmation by the COA. The second, third, and fourth group do not require confirmation by the
COA. The position of Mison as the head of the Bureau of Customs does not belong to the first group
hence he does not need to be confirmed by the COA.
Sarmiento vs Mison

G.R. No. 79974 December 17, 1987

ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III AND JUANITO G. ARCILLA, petitioners,

vs.

SALVADOR MISON, in his capacity as COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, AND

GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET,
respondents, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, intervenor.

FACTS:

In this petition for prohibition, the petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and professors of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin the respondent
Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs and the respondent Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget, from
effecting disbursements in payment of Mison’s salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Mison’s
appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not
having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand,
maintain the constitutionality of respondent Mison’s appointment without the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments.

ISSUE: W/N all appointments made by the president require approval of the Commission on
Appointments to be valid?

HELD: NO. Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint
the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers
of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may
be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers
lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of the departments, agencies,
commissions or boards.

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress,
whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by
the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.

Anuncios

INFORMA SOBRE ESTE ANUNCIO

It is apparent, that there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four
(4) groups are:

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President
alone.

The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, the President appoints.

The second, third and fourth groups of officers are the present bone of contention. By following the
accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects
excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to positions
expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments.

The position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within
the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required.
As a matter of fact, as already pointed out, while the 1935 Constitution includes «heads of bureaus»
among those officers whose appointments need the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
the 1987 Constitution on the other hand, deliberately excluded the position of «heads of bureaus»
from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

Consequently, we rule that the President of the Philippines acted within her constitutional authority
and power in appointing respondent Salvador Mison, Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs,
without submitting his nomination to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. He is thus
entitled to exercise the full authority and functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and
emoluments pertaining thereto.

ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III AND JUANITO G. ARCILLA, petitioners,

vs.
SALVADOR MISON, in his capacity as COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, AND
GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET,
respondents, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, intervenor.
G.R. No. 79974. December 17, 1987.
PADILLA, J.

I. Nature

Petition for prohibition.

Issue and ruling

DOES MISON’S APPOINTMENT AS COMMISSIONER OF BUREAU OF CUSTOMS REQUIRE THE

CONFIRMATION/APPROVAL OF THE COA?
HELD – NO.

Under Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are 4 groups of officers whom the President
shall appoint:

—1. First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
—2. Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided
for by law;
—3. Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
—4. Fourth, officers lower in rank 4 whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.

Only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. Appointments made by the President for the
second, third and fourth groups do not require the consent of the COA.

The position of BOC Commissioner is not included in those positions requiring prior consent of the
COA by statutory construction. An express enumeration of subjects excludes others not
enumerated, it follows then that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first
group require the consent of the COA.

It is the intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution to exclude the second, third and fourth
groups of Presidential appointments from requiring the consent of the COA. The 1935 Constitution
required the consent of COA for all Presidential appointments, which rule has transformed the
commission into a venue of “horsetrading” and similar malpractices. Under the 1973 Constitution,
the absolute power of appointment is vested in the President without hardly any check from the
legislature. The 1987 Constitution tried to strike a balance between the two extremes by requiring
COA’s consent on appointments for the first group and dispensing it for the appointments in the
other groups. The use of the word ‘also’ in the second sentence does not mean ‘in the same
manner’. The appointments for the second group need not be done in the same manner as the first
group. So, consent is not required.

NERI VS. SENATE COMMITTEE

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY
G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008

FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered
into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment
and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290
(approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007 hearing
Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their
influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in
one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of
COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further
narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him
not to accept the bribe.

However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to
answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that the
communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in
Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order for
his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.

ISSUE:
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive privilege?

HELD:

The communications are covered by executive privilege

The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the
Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita
when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way diminish the
concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings.

The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a
power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and
foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief,
appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers,
the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential
power.”
2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the
President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational
proximity” with the President.

3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by
a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains important evidence”
and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground
that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions “fall under conversation and
correspondence between the President and public officials” necessary in “her executive and policy
decision-making process” and, that “the information sought to be disclosed might impair our
diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.” Simply put, the bases
are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy
or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three
(3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications
relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into
an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive
agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in
Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the
President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor,
being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a
compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner’s claim of executive privilege
violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern.50 We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not appear before them at
all. But petitioner made himself available to them during the September 26 hearing, where he was
questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly manifested his willingness to answer
more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of
executive privilege.

The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III
provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions,
as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008

Facts:

Petitioner Romulo Neri, then Director General of the National Economic and Development
Authority (NEDA), was invited by the respondent Senate Committees to attend their joint
investigation on the alleged anomalies in the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project. This
project was contracted by the Philippine Government with the Chinese firm Zhong Xing
Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE), which involved the amount of US$329,481,290. When he
testified before the Senate Committees, he disclosed that then Commission on
Elections Chairman Benjamin Abalos, brokering for ZTE, offered him P200 million in exchange for his
approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However,
when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer,
invoking “executive privilege.” In particular, he refused to answer the questions on 1.) whether or
not the President followed up the NBN Project, 2.) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it,
and 3.) whether or not she directed him to approve it.

Later on, respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to petitioner, requiring him
to appear and testify on 20 November 2007. However, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita sent a
letter dated 15 November to the Committees requesting them to dispense with Neri’s testimony on
the ground of executive privilege. Ermita invoked the privilege on the ground that “the information
sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s
Republic of China,” and given the confidential nature in which these information were conveyed to
the President, Neri “cannot provide the Committee any further details of these conversations,
without disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.” Thus, on 20 November, Neri
did not appear before the respondent Committees.

Issue:

Whether or not the three questions that petitioner Neri refused to answer were covered
by executive privilege, making the arrest order issued by the respondent Senate Committees void.

Discussion:

Citing the case of United States vs. Nixon (418 U.S. 683), the Court laid out the three elements
needed to be complied with in order for the claim to executive privilege to be valid. These are: 1.)
the protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential power;
2.) it must be authored, solicited, and received by a close advisor of the President or the President
himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the President;
and, 3.) it may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely
contains important evidence,” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority.

Abayon v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 189466, 189506,

[February 11, 2010]

FACTS In GR 189466, Petitioner Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list
organization that won a seat in the House of Representatives during the 2007 elections.
Respondents filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET against Aangat Tayo and its
nominee, petitioner Abayon. They claimed that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in
the House of Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors. Respondents pointed out that petitioner Abayon herself was not qualified to sit in the House
as a party-list nominee since she did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
she being the wife of an incumbent congressional district representative. Petitioner Abayon
countered that the COMELEC had already confirmed the status of Aangat Tayo as a national multi-
sectoral party-list organization representing the workers, women, youth, urban poor, and elderly
and that she belonged to the women sector. Abayon also pointed out that respondent HRET had no
jurisdiction over the petition for quo warranto since it fell within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC. It
was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of Representatives, and not Abayon who was
just its nominee. All questions involving her eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon, were internal
concerns of Aangat Tayo. HRET issued an order, dismissing the petition but upholding its jurisdiction
over the qualifications of petitioner Abayon. In G.R. 189506, petitioner Palparan is the first nominee
of the Bantay party-list group that won a seat in the 2007 elections. Respondents are members of
some other party-list groups. Respondents filed with HRET a petition for quo warranto against
Bantay and its nominee. Respondents alleged that Palparan was ineligible to sit in the House of
Representatives as party-list nominee because he did not belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors that Bantay represented, namely, the victims of communist rebels,
CAFGUs, former rebels, and security guards. Respondents said that Palparan committed gross
human rights violations against marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations.
Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was actually
the party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected. Palparan claimed that he was just Bantay's nominee
and that any question involving his eligibility as first nominee was an internal concern of Bantay.
Such question must be brought, he said, before that party-list group, not before the HRET. HRET
issued an order dismissing the petition against Bantay. HRET, however, defended its jurisdiction over
the question of petitioner Palparan's qualifications. Since the two cases raise a common issue, the
Court has caused their consolidation. ISSUE Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over
the question of qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan as nominees of Aangat Tayo
andBantay party-list organizations. RULING Yes, HRET has jurisdiction over the question of
qualification of petitioners. Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the qualifications
and grounds for disqualification of party-list nominees. Section 9 of R.A. 7941, echoing the
Constitution, states: Sec. 9. Qualification of Party-List Nominees. — No person shall be nominated as
party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a
resident of the Philippines for a

period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and
write, bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety
(90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of
the election. In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not
more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who
attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue until the expiration of his
term.

It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a nominee — the need
for him or her to be a bona fide member or a representative of his party-list organization — in the
context of the facts that characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparan's relation to Aangat Tayo and
Bantay, respectively, and the marginalized and underrepresented interests that they presumably
embody. Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of
all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are "elected members" of the
House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to
hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once
the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken
his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction
over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins.
Abayon V. HRET, Palparan
V. HRET
FACTS:

In G.R. 189466, petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list
organization that won a seat in the House of Representatives during the 2007 elections. Respondents
filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET against petitioner Abayon. They claimed that
Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the House of Representatives, since it did not
represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors since she did not belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an incumbent congressional district
representative.

It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of Representatives, and not Abayon who was
just its nominee. All questions involving her eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon, were internal
concerns of Aangat Tayo.

In G.R.
189506, petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay party-list group that won a
seat in the 2007 elections for the members of the House of Representatives. Lesaca and the others
alleged that Palparan was ineligible to sit in the House of Representatives as party-list nominee
because he did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that Bantay
represented, namely, the victims of communist rebels, Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units
(CAFGUs), former rebels, and security guards.

Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was actually
the party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected to and assumed membership in the House of
Representatives. Palparan claimed that he was just Bantay’s nominee. Consequently, any question
involving his eligibility as first nominee was an internal concern of Bantay. Such question must be
brought, he said, before that party-list group, not before the HRET.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners
Abayon and Palparan.
HELD:

although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that
sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution,5 identifies who the “members” of that House are:

Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and
those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a partylist system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Underscoring supplied)

If there are certain differences, a Bicameral Conference Committee

is called to reconcile conflicting provisions of both versions of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives. Conference
committee submits report on the reconciled version of the bill, duly
approved by both chambers.
But what happens when the Senate and the House of Representatives approve a bill on the Third
and Final Reading that has disagreeing provisions?

This is where the bicameral conference committee comes in.

Bicameral Conference Committee

A bicameral conference committee (often shortened as "bicam" by the people in legislation) is a joint
panel composed of Representatives and Senators who are appointed by their respective chambers
to convene in order to resolve disagreements on a particular measure such as, for example, the
general appropriations bill or the national budget as it is commonly known. This panel is just
temporary and is just created for the purpose. Members are often called conferees
G.R. No. 193237 October 9, 2012 DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS, JR., Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and AGAPITO J. CARDINO, Respondents.

x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 193536 AGAPITO J. CARDINO, Petitioner, vs. DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS, JR.,
and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.

DOCTRINE: The disqualification of a convict to run for public office under the Revised Penal
Code, as affirmed by final judgment of a competent court, is part of the enforcement and
administration of "all laws" relating to the conduct of elections. Even without a petition under
either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or under Section 40 of the
Local Government Code, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of
candidacy of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction.

FACTS: 1. Both Jalosjos and Cardino were candidates for Mayor of Dapitan City,
Zamboanga del Norte in the May 2010 elections a. Jalosjos was running for his third term 2.
Cardino filed a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to deny due course
and to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Jalosjos alleging that: a. Jalosjos made a false
material representation in his COC when he declared under oath that he was eligible for the
Office of Mayor b. long before Jalosjos filed his certificate of candidacy, Jalosjos had already
been convicted by final judgment for robbery and sentenced to prisión mayor by the RTC c.
Jalosjos has not yet served his sentence 3. Jalosjos admitted his conviction but stated that
he had already been granted probation 4. Cardino countered that the RTC revoked Jalosjos’
probation in an Order 5. Jalosjos refuted Cardino and stated that the RTC issued an Order
declaring that Jalosjos had duly complied with the order of probation and that during the
2004 elections, the COMELEC denied a petition for disqualification filed against him on the
same grounds 6. COMELEC First Division granted Cardino’s petition and cancelled Jalosjos’
certificate of candidacy  Jalosjos "is not eligible by reason of his disqualification as provided
for in Section 40(a) of Republic Act No. 7160." a. "Jalosjos has indeed committed material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy when he declared, under oath, that he is
eligible for the office he seeks to be elected to when in fact he is not by reason of a final
judgment in a criminal case, the sentence of which he has not yet served."

b.

7.

COMELEC First Division found that Jalosjos’ certificate of compliance of probation was
fraudulently issued; thus, Jalosjos has not yet served his sentence c. The penalty imposed
on Jalosjos was the indeterminate sentence of one year, eight months and twenty days of
prisión correccional as minimum, to four years, two months and one day of prisión mayor as
maximum COMELEC En Banc denied Jalosjos’ motion for reconsideration a. With the
proper revocation of Jalosjos’ earlier probation and a clear showing that he has not yet
served the terms of his sentence, there is simply no basis for Jalosjos to claim that his civil
as well as political rights have been violated b. Having been convicted by final judgment,
Jalosjos is disqualified to run for an elective position or to hold public office c. His
proclamation as the elected mayor in the May 10, 2010 election does not deprive the
Commission of its authority to resolve the present petition to its finality, and to oust him from
the office he now wrongfully holds

ISSUE: WON JALOSJOS IS PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED IN RUNNING FOR A PUBLIC

OFFICE BECAUSE OF HIS CRIMINAL CONVICTION BY FINAL JUDGMENT RULING:
YES. The law itself bars the convict from running for public office, and the disqualification is
part of the final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of the court is addressed not only
to the Executive branch, but also to other government agencies tasked to implement the final
judgment under the law.

The perpetual special disqualification against Jalosjos arising from his criminal conviction by
final judgment is a material fact involving eligibility which is a proper ground for a petition
under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy was void
from the start since he was not eligible to run for any public office at the time he filed his
certificate of candidacy Jalosjos was never a candidate at any time, and all votes for Jalosjos
were stray votes hence VOID AB INITIO  Cardino, as the only qualified candidate, actually
garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor A false statement in a
certificate of candidacy that a candidate is eligible to run for public office is a false material
representation which is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the OEC Section 74
requires the candidate to state under oath in his certificate of candidacy "that he is eligible
for said office."

A candidate is eligible if he has a right to run for the public office so if a candidate is not
actually eligible because he is barred by final judgment in a criminal case from running for
public office, and he still states under oath in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to
run for public office, then the candidate clearly makes a false material representation that is
a ground for a petition under Section 78 A sentence of prisión mayor by final judgment is a
ground for disqualification under Section 40 of the Local Government Code and under
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code

The penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law, the accessory
penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification. ART.
30 RPC Temporary absolute disqualification produces the effect of "deprivation of the right
to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be elected to such office."

ART. 32 RPC perpetual special disqualification means that "the offender shall not be
permitted to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification," which is
perpetually.

The duration of the temporary absolute disqualification is the same as that of the principal
penalty. Both constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public office. A person suffering from
these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public office, and commits a false material
representation if he states in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to so run. 


The word "perpetually" and the phrase "during the term of the sentence" should be applied
distributively to their respective antecedents; thus, the word "perpetually" refers to the
perpetual kind of special disqualification, while the phrase "during the term of the sentence"
refers to the temporary special disqualification The duration between the perpetual and the
temporary (both special) are necessarily different because the provision, instead of merging
their durations into one period, states that such duration is "according to the nature of said
penalty" — which means according to whether the penalty is the perpetual or the temporary
special disqualification

The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes effect immediately once the
judgment of conviction becomes final. 

The effectivity of this accessory penalty does not depend on the duration of the principal
penalty, or on whether the convict serves his jail sentence or not

The last sentence of Article 32 states that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any
public office during the period of his perpetual special disqualification."  Once the judgment
of conviction becomes final, it is immediately executory Any public office that the convict may
be holding at the time of his conviction becomes vacant upon finality of the judgment, and
the convict becomes ineligible to run for any elective public office perpetually

In the case of Jalosjos, he became ineligible perpetually to hold, or to run for, any elective
public office from the time his judgment of conviction became final. 

Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code because this accessory penalty is an ineligibility, which means that the convict
is not eligible to run for public office, contrary to the statement that Section 74 requires him
to state under oath the false material representation may refer to "qualifications or eligibility”

One who suffers from perpetual special disqualification is ineligible to run for public office. If
a person suffering from perpetual special disqualification files a certificate of candidacy
stating under oath that "he is eligible to run for (public) office," as expressly required under
Section 74, then he clearly makes a false material representation that is a ground for a
petition under Section 78. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the
constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the
candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the
COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such
certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo
warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or
qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section 78" petition
is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the
winning candidate.  A candidate for mayor during the 2010 local elections certifies under
oath four statements: (1) a statement that the candidate is a natural born or naturalized
Filipino citizen; (2) a statement that the candidate is not a permanent resident of, or
immigrant to, a foreign country; (3) a statement that the candidate is eligible for the office he
seeks election; and (4) a statement of the candidate’s allegiance to the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines  

What is indisputably clear is that the false material representation of Jalosjos is a ground for
a petition under Section 78 However, since the false material representation arises from a
crime penalized by prisión mayor, a petition under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code
or Section 40 of the

Local Government Code can also be properly filed The petitioner has a choice whether to
anchor his petition on Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or on Section
40 of the Local Government Code. The law expressly provides multiple remedies and the
choice of which remedy to adopt belongs to the petitioner

The COMELEC properly cancelled Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy. 



A void certificate of candidacy on the ground of ineligibility that existed at the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy can never give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less
to valid votes Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible from
the start to run for Mayor Even without a petition under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code, or under Section 40 of the Local Government Code, the COMELEC
is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from the
accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a
final judgment of conviction To allow the COMELEC to wait for a person to file a petition to
cancel the certificate of candidacy of one suffering from perpetual special disqualification will
result in the anomaly that these cases so grotesquely exemplify The COMELEC will be
grossly remiss in its constitutional duty to "enforce and administer all laws" relating to the
conduct of elections if it does not motu proprio bar from running for public office those
suffering from perpetual special disqualification by virtue of a final judgment

FALLO: WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 193237 is DENIED, and
the Petition in G.R. No. 193536 is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated 10 May 2010 and 11
August 2010 of the COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC En Bane, respectively, in
SPA No. 09-076 (DC), are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Agapito J. Cardino ran
unopposed in the May 2010 elections and thus received the highest number of votes for
Mayor. The COMELEC En Bane is DIRECTED to constitute a Special City Board of
Canvassers to proclaim Agapito J. Cardino as the duly elected Mayor of Dapitan City,
Zamboanga del Norte. Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Secretaries of the
Department of Justice and the Department of Interior and Local Government so they can
cause the arrest of, and enforce the jail sentence on, Dominador G. Jalosjos, Jr. due to his
conviction for the crime of robbery in a final judgment issued by the Regional Trial Court
(Branch 18) of Cebu City in Criminal Case No. CCC-XIV140-CEBU. SO ORDERED.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

These are two special civil actions for certiorari questioning the resolutions of the Commission on
1

Elections (COMELEC) in SPA No. 09-076 (DC). In G.R. No. 193237, Dominador G. Jalosjos, Jr.
(Jalosjos) seeks to annul the 10 May 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division and the 11
2

August 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, which both ordered the cancellation of his
3

certificate of candidacy on the ground of false material representation. In G.R. No. 193536,
Agapito J. Cardino (Cardino) challenges the 11 August 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC En
Banc, which applied the rule on succession under the Local Government Code in filling the
vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte created by the
cancellation of Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy.

The Facts

Both Jalosjos and Cardino were candidates for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte in
the May 2010 elections. Jalosjos was running for his third term. Cardino filed on 6 December
2009 a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to deny due course and to
cancel the certificate of candidacy of Jalosjos. Cardino asserted that Jalosjos made a false
material representation in his certificate of candidacy when he declared under oath that he was
eligible for the Office of Mayor.

Cardino claimed that long before Jalosjos filed his certificate of candidacy, Jalosjos had already
been convicted by final judgment for robbery and sentenced to prisión mayor by the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 18 (RTC) of Cebu City, in Criminal Case No. CCC-XIV-140-CEBU. Cardino
asserted that Jalosjos has not yet served his sentence. Jalosjos admitted his conviction but
stated that he had already been granted probation. Cardino countered that the RTC revoked
Jalosjos’ probation in an Order dated 19 March 1987. Jalosjos refuted Cardino and stated that
the RTC issued an Order dated 5 February 2004 declaring that Jalosjos had duly complied with
the order of probation. Jalosjos further stated that during the 2004 elections the COMELEC
denied a petition for disqualification filed against him on the same grounds. 4

The COMELEC En Banc narrated the circumstances of Jalosjos’ criminal record as follows:

As backgrounder, Jalosjos and three (3) others were accused of the crime of robbery on January
22, 1969 in Cebu City. On April 30, 1970, Judge Francisco Ro. Cupin of the then Circuit Criminal
Court of Cebu City found him and his co-accused guilty of robbery and sentenced them to suffer
the penalty of prision correccional minimum to prision mayor maximum. Jalosjos appealed this
decision to the Court of Appeals but his appeal was dismissed on August 9, 1973. It was only
after a lapse of several years or more specifically on June 17, 1985 that Jalosjos filed a Petition
for Probation before the RTC Branch 18 of Cebu City which was granted by the court. But then,
on motion filed by his Probation Officer, Jalosjos’ probation was revoked by the RTC Cebu City
on March 19, 1987 and the corresponding warrant for his arrest was issued. Surprisingly, on
December 19, 2003, Parole and Probation Administrator Gregorio F. Bacolod issued a
Certification attesting that respondent Jalosjos, Jr., had already fulfilled the terms and conditions
of his probation. This Certification was the one used by respondent Jalosjos to secure the
dismissal of the disqualification case filed against him by Adasa in 2004, docketed as SPA No.
04-235.
This prompted Cardino to call the attention of the Commission on the decision of the
Sandiganbayan dated September 29, 2008 finding Gregorio F. Bacolod, former Administrator of
the Parole and Probation Administration, guilty of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 for issuing a
falsified Certification on December 19, 2003 attesting to the fact that respondent Jalosjos had
fully complied with the terms and conditions of his probation. A portion of the decision of the
Sandiganbayan is quoted hereunder:

The Court finds that the above acts of the accused gave probationer Dominador Jalosjos, Jr.,
unwarranted benefits and advantage because the subject certification, which was issued by the
accused without adequate or official support, was subsequently utilized by the said probationer
as basis of the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and to Lift Warrant of Arrest that he filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, which prompted the said court to issue the Order dated
February 5, 2004 in Crim. Case No. CCC-XIV-140-CEBU, declaring that said probationer has
complied with the order of probation and setting aside its Order of January 16, 2004 recalling the
warrant or [sic] arrest; and that said Certification was also used by the said probationer and
became the basis for the Commission on Elections to deny in its Resolution of August 2, 2004
the petition or [sic] private complainant James Adasa for the disqualification of the probationer
from running for re-election as Mayor of Dapitan City in the National and Local Elections of 2004. 5

The COMELEC’s Rulings

On 10 May 2010, the COMELEC First Division granted Cardino’s petition and cancelled Jalosjos’
certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC First Division concluded that "Jalosjos has indeed
committed material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy when he declared, under
oath, that he is eligible for the office he seeks to be elected to when in fact he is not by reason of
a final judgment in a criminal case, the sentence of which he has not yet served." The6

COMELEC First Division found that Jalosjos’ certificate of compliance of probation was
fraudulently issued; thus, Jalosjos has not yet served his sentence. The penalty imposed on
Jalosjos was the indeterminate sentence of one year, eight months and twenty days of prisión
correccional as minimum, to four years, two months and one day of prisión mayor as maximum.
The COMELEC First Division ruled that Jalosjos "is not eligible by reason of his disqualification
as provided for in Section 40(a) of Republic Act No. 7160." 7

On 11 August 2010, the COMELEC En Banc denied Jalosjos’ motion for reconsideration. The
pertinent portions of the 11 August 2010 Resolution read:

With the proper revocation of Jalosjos’ earlier probation and a clear showing that he has not yet
served the terms of his sentence, there is simply no basis for Jalosjos to claim that his civil as
well as political rights have been violated. Having been convicted by final judgment,

Jalosjos is disqualified to run for an elective position or to hold public office. His proclamation as
the elected mayor in the May 10, 2010 election does not deprive the Commission of its authority
to resolve the present petition to its finality, and to oust him from the office he now wrongfully
holds.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is denied for utter lack of
merit. Jalosjos is hereby OUSTED from office and ordered to CEASE and DESIST from
occupying and discharging the functions of the Office of the Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga.
Let the provisions of the Local Government Code on succession apply.

SO ORDERED. 8

Jalosjos filed his petition on 25 August 2010, docketed as G.R. No. 193237, while Cardino filed
his petition on 17 September 2010, docketed as G.R. No. 193536.

On 22 February 2011, this Court issued a Resolution dismissing G.R. No. 193237.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. The
assailed Resolution dated May 10, 2010 and Resolution dated August 11, 2010 of the
Commission on Elections in SPA Case No. 09-076 (DC) are hereby AFFIRMED. 9

Cardino filed a Manifestation on 17 March 2011 praying that this Court take judicial notice of its
resolution in G.R. No. 193237. Jalosjos filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 22 March 2011.
10

On 29 March 2011, this Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 193536 with G.R. No.
11

193237.Jalosjos then filed a Manifestation on 1 June 2012 which stated that "he has resigned
from the position of Mayor of the City of Dapitan effective 30 April 2012, which resignation was
accepted by the Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Norte, Atty. Rolando E.
Yebes." Jalosjos’ resignation was made "in deference with the provision of the Omnibus Election
12

Code in relation to his candidacy as Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur in May 2013." 13

These cases are not rendered moot by Jalosjos’ resignation. In resolving Jalosjos’ Motion for
Reconsideration in G.R. No. 193237 and Cardino’s Petition in G.R. No. 193536, we address not
only Jalosjos’ eligibility to run for public office and the consequences of the cancellation of his
certificate of candidacy, but also COMELEC’s constitutional duty to enforce and administer all
laws relating to the conduct of elections.

The Issues

In G.R. No. 193237, Jalosjos argues that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it (1) ruled that Jalosjos’ probation was revoked;
(2) ruled that Jalosjos was disqualified to run as candidate for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga
del Norte; and (3) cancelled Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy without making a finding that
Jalosjos committed a deliberate misrepresentation as to his qualifications, as Jalosjos relied in
good faith upon a previous COMELEC decision declaring him eligible for the same position from
which he is now being ousted. Finally, the Resolutions dated 10 May 2010 and 11 August 2010
were issued in violation of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

In G.R. No. 193536, Cardino argues that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it added to the dispositive portion of its 11
August 2010 Resolution that the provisions of the Local Government Code on succession should
apply.

This Court’s Ruling

The perpetual special disqualification against Jalosjos arising from his criminal conviction by final
judgment is a material fact involving eligibility which is a proper ground for a petition under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy was void from the
start since he was not eligible to run for any public office at the time he filed his certificate of
candidacy. Jalosjos was never a candidate at any time, and all votes for Jalosjos were stray
votes. As a result of Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy being void ab initio, Cardino, as the only
qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor.

The dissenting opinions affirm with modification the 10 May 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC
First Division and the 11 August 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc. The dissenting
opinions erroneously limit the remedy against Jalosjos to disqualification under Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code and apply the rule on succession under the Local Government Code.

A false statement in a certificate of candidacy that a candidate is eligible to run for public office is
a false material representation which is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the same
Code. Sections 74 and 78 read:

Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. – The certificate of candidacy shall state that the
person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for
said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component
cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to
which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election
purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal
orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent
resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed
voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the
certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. – A verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under
Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days
from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice
and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 74 requires the candidate to state under oath in his certificate of candidacy "that he is
eligible for said office." A candidate is eligible if he has a right to run for the public office. If a
14

candidate is not actually eligible because he is barred by final judgment in a criminal case from
running for public office, and he still states under oath in his certificate of candidacy that he is
eligible to run for public office, then the candidate clearly makes a false material representation
that is a ground for a petition under Section 78.

A sentence of prisión mayor by final judgment is a ground for disqualification under Section 40 of
the Local Government Code and under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code. It is also a
material fact involving the eligibility of a candidate under Sections 74 and 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code. Thus, a person can file a petition under Section 40 of the Local Government Code
or under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. The pertinent provisions
read:

Section 40, Local Government Code:

Sec. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective
local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after
serving sentence;

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;

(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;

(d) Those with dual citizenship;

(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;

(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to
reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and

(g) The insane or feeble-minded.

Section 12, Omnibus Election Code:

Sec. 12. Disqualifications. — Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane
or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or
for any offense for which he was sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a
crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office,
unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.

The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the
declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after
the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same
period he again becomes disqualified.

Section 68, Omnibus Election Code:

Sec. 68. Disqualifications. — Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is
declared by final decision by a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having
(a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or
public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his
candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code;
(d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104;
or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-
paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from
holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign
country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person
has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with
the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.

Revised Penal Code:

Art. 27. Reclusion perpetua. — x x x

Prisión mayor and temporary disqualification. — The duration of the penalties of prisión mayor
and temporary disqualification shall be from six years and one day to twelve years, except when
the penalty of disqualification is imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case, it shall be that
of the principal penalty.

xxxx

Art. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification. — The
penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification for public office shall produce the
following effects:

1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may have
held, even if conferred by popular election.

2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to
be elected to such office.

3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise of any of
the rights mentioned.

In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised in paragraphs

2 and 3 of this article shall last during the term of the sentence.

4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly held.
Art. 31. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification. — The
penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for public office, profession or calling
shall produce the following effects:

1. The deprivation of the office, employment, profession or calling affected.

2. The disqualification for holding similar offices or employments either perpetually or

during the term of the sentence, according to the extent of such disqualification.

Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise
of the right of suffrage. — The perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of
the right of suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or during the term of the sentence,
according to the nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in any popular election for any public
office or to be elected to such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold any
public office during the period of his disqualification.

Art. 42. Prisión mayor — its accessory penalties. — The penalty of prisión mayor shall carry with
it that of temporary absolute disqualification and that of perpetual special disqualification from the
right of suffrage which the offender shall suffer although pardoned as to the principal penalty,
unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. (Emphasis supplied)

The penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law, the accessory
15

penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification. Under

Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code, temporary absolute disqualification produces the effect of
"deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be elected to
such office." The duration of the temporary absolute disqualification is the same as that of the
principal penalty. On the other hand, under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code perpetual
special disqualification means that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office
during the period of his disqualification," which is perpetually. Both temporary absolute
disqualification and perpetual special disqualification constitute ineligibilities to hold elective
public office. A person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public
office, and commits a false material representation if he states in his certificate of candidacy that
he is eligible to so run.

In Lacuna v. Abes, the Court, speaking through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, explained the import of the
16

accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification:

On the first defense of respondent-appellee Abes, it must be remembered that appellee’s

conviction of a crime penalized with prisión mayor which carried the accessory penalties of
temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification from the right of
suffrage (Article 42, Revised Penal Code); and Section 99 of the Revised Election Code
disqualifies a person from voting if he had been sentenced by final judgment to suffer one year or
more of imprisonment.

The accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification disqualifies the convict for public
office and for the right to vote, such disqualification to last only during the term of the sentence
(Article 27, paragraph 3, & Article 30, Revised Penal Code) that, in the case of Abes, would have
expired on 13 October 1961.

But this does not hold true with respect to the other accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage. This accessory penalty deprives the
convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office perpetually, as distinguished
from temporary special disqualification, which lasts during the term of the sentence. Article 32,
Revised Penal Code, provides:
Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise
of the right of suffrage. — The perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of
the right of suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or during the term of the sentence,
according to the nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in any popular election for any public
office or to be elected to such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold any
public office during the period of disqualification.

The word "perpetually" and the phrase "during the term of the sentence" should be applied
distributively to their respective antecedents; thus, the word "perpetually" refers to the perpetual
kind of special disqualification, while the phrase "during the term of the sentence" refers to the
temporary special disqualification. The duration between the perpetual and the temporary (both
special) are necessarily different because the provision, instead of merging their durations into
one period, states that such duration is "according to the nature of said penalty" — which means
according to whether the penalty is the perpetual or the temporary special disqualification.
(Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, Lacuna instructs that the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification
"deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office perpetually."

The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes effect immediately once the
judgment of conviction becomes final. The effectivity of this accessory penalty does not depend
on the duration of the principal penalty, or on whether the convict serves his jail sentence or not.
The last sentence of Article 32 states that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public
office during the period of his perpetual special disqualification." Once the judgment of conviction
becomes final, it is immediately executory. Any public office that the convict may be holding at
the time of his conviction becomes vacant upon finality of the judgment, and the convict becomes
ineligible to run for any elective public office perpetually. In the case of Jalosjos, he became
ineligible perpetually to hold, or to run for, any elective public office from the time his judgment of
conviction became final.

Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code because this accessory penalty is an ineligibility, which means that the convict is
not eligible to run for public office, contrary to the statement that Section 74 requires him to state
under oath. As used in Section 74, the word "eligible" means having the right to run for elective
public office, that is, having all the qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to run for public
office. As this Court held in Fermin v. Commission on Elections, the false material representation
17

may refer to "qualifications or eligibility." One who suffers from perpetual special disqualification
is ineligible to run for public office. If a person suffering from perpetual special disqualification
files a certificate of candidacy stating under oath that "he is eligible to run for (public) office," as
expressly required under Section 74, then he clearly makes a false material representation that is
a ground for a petition under Section 78. As this Court explained in Fermin:

Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based
on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation
that is false, which may relate to the qualifications required of the public office he/she is running
for. It is noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she
seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and
statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently
states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is
empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already
likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the
OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction
mainly in the fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo
warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate. (Emphasis supplied)
18
Conviction for robbery by final judgment with the penalty of prisión mayor, to which perpetual
special disqualification attaches by operation of law, is not a ground for a petition under Section
68 because robbery is not one of the offenses enumerated in Section 68. Insofar as crimes are
concerned, Section 68 refers only to election offenses under the Omnibus Election Code and not
to crimes under the Revised Penal Code. For ready reference, we quote again Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code:

Sec. 68. Disqualifications. — Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is
declared by final decision by a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having
(a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or
public officials performing electoral functions;

(b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an
amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution
prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86
and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as
a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent
resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office
under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of
a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.
(Emphasis supplied)

There is absolutely nothing in the language of Section 68 that will justify including the crime of
robbery as one of the offenses enumerated in this Section. All the offenses enumerated in
Section 68 refer to offenses under the Omnibus Election Code. The dissenting opinion of Justice
Reyes gravely errs when it holds that Jalosjos’ conviction for the crime of robbery under the
Revised Penal Code is a ground for "a petition for disqualification under Section 68 of the OEC
and not for cancellation of COC under Section 78 thereof." This Court has already ruled that
offenses punished in laws other than in the Omnibus Election Code cannot be a ground for a
petition under Section 68. In Codilla, Sr. v. de Venecia, the Court declared:
19

The jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those enumerated in

Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of
COMELEC jurisdiction.They are criminal and not administrative in nature. (Emphasis supplied)

A candidate for mayor during the 2010 local elections certifies under oath four statements: (1) a
statement that the candidate is a natural born or naturalized Filipino citizen; (2) a statement that
the candidate is not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country; (3) a statement
that the candidate is eligible for the office he seeks election; and (4) a statement of the
candidate’s allegiance to the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. 20

We now ask: Did Jalosjos make a false statement of a material fact in his certificate of candidacy
when he stated under oath that he was eligible to run for mayor? The COMELEC and the
dissenting opinions all found that Jalosjos was not eligible to run for public office. The COMELEC
concluded that Jalosjos made a false material representation that is a ground for a petition under
Section 78. The dissenting opinion of Justice Reyes, however, concluded that the ineligibility of
Jalosjos is a disqualification which is a ground for a petition under Section 68 and not under
Section 78. The dissenting opinion of Justice Brion concluded that the ineligibility of Jalosjos is a
disqualification that is not a ground under Section 78 without, however, saying under what
specific provision of law a petition against Jalosjos can be filed to cancel his certificate of
candidacy.

What is indisputably clear is that the false material representation of Jalosjos is a ground for a
petition under Section 78. However, since the false material representation arises from a crime
penalized by prisión mayor, a petition under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code or Section
40 of the Local Government Code can also be properly filed. The petitioner has a choice whether
to anchor his petition on Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or on Section
40 of the Local Government Code. The law expressly provides multiple remedies and the choice
of which remedy to adopt belongs to the petitioner.

The COMELEC properly cancelled Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy. A void certificate of

candidacy on the ground of ineligibility that existed at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy can never give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. Jalosjos’
21

certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible from the start to run for Mayor.
Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial
because the cancellation on such ground means he was never a valid candidate from the very
beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. Jalosjos’ ineligibility existed on the day
he filed his certificate of candidacy, and the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy retroacted
to the day he filed it. Thus, Cardino ran unopposed. There was only one qualified candidate for
Mayor in the May 2010 elections – Cardino – who received the highest number of votes.

Decisions of this Court holding that the second-placer cannot be proclaimed winner if the first-
placer is disqualified or declared ineligible should be limited to situations where the certificate of
22

candidacy of the first-placer was valid at the time of filing but subsequently had to be cancelled
because of a violation of law that took place, or a legal impediment that took effect, after the filing
of the certificate of candidacy. If the certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, then legally the
person who filed such void certificate of candidacy was never a candidate in the elections at any
time. All votes for such non-candidate are stray votes and should not be counted. Thus, such
non-candidate can never be a first-placer in the elections. If a certificate of candidacy void ab
initio is cancelled on the day, or before the day, of the election, prevailing jurisprudence holds
that all votes for that candidate are stray votes. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is
23

cancelled one day or more after the elections, all votes for such candidate should also be stray
votes because the certificate of candidacy is void from the very beginning. This is the more
equitable and logical approach on the effect of the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy that
is void ab initio. Otherwise, a certificate of candidacy void ab initio can operate to defeat one or
more valid certificates of candidacy for the same position.

Even without a petition under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or
under Section 40 of the Local Government Code, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel
the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction. The final
judgment of conviction is notice to the COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from
running for public office. The law itself bars the convict from running for public office, and the
disqualification is part of the final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of the court is
addressed not only to the Executive branch, but also to other government agencies tasked to
implement the final judgment under the law.

Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to implement the
disqualification, it is assumed that the portion of the final judgment on disqualification to run for
elective public office is addressed to the COMELEC because under the Constitution the
COMELEC is duty bound to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election." The disqualification of a convict to run for public office under the
24

Revised Penal Code, as affirmed by final judgment of a competent court, is part of the
enforcement and administration of "all laws" relating to the conduct of elections.

To allow the COMELEC to wait for a person to file a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy
of one suffering from perpetual special disqualification will result in the anomaly that these cases
so grotesquely exemplify. Despite a prior perpetual special disqualification, Jalosjos was elected
and served twice as mayor. The COMELEC will be grossly remiss in its constitutional duty to
"enforce and administer all laws" relating to the conduct of elections if it does not motu proprio
bar from running for public office those suffering from perpetual special disqualification by virtue
of a final judgment.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 193237 is DENIED, and the Petition
in G.R. No. 193536 is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated 10 May 2010 and 11 August 2010 of
the COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC En Bane, respectively, in SPA No. 09-076 (DC),
are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Agapito J. Cardino ran unopposed in the May 2010
elections and thus received the highest number of votes for Mayor. The COMELEC En Bane is
DIRECTED to constitute a Special City Board of Canvassers to proclaim Agapito J. Cardino as
the duly elected Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Secretaries of the Department of Justice and the
Department of Interior and Local Government so they can cause the arrest of, and enforce the
jail sentence on, Dominador G. Jalosjos, Jr. due to his conviction for the crime of robbery in a
final judgment issued by the Regional Trial Court (Branch 18) of Cebu City in Criminal Case No.
CCC-XIV-140-CEBU.

SO ORDERED.

ROMEO G. JALOSJOS vs.

COMELEC
G.R. No. 205033 June 18, 2013
FACTS
Jalosjos was convicted by final
judgment for the crime of wo (2)
counts of statutory rape and
six (6) counts of acts of
lasciviousness and he he was
sentenced to suffer the
principal
penalties of reclusion perpetua
and reclusion temporal5 for each
count, respectively, which
carried the accessory penalty of
perpetual absolute
disqualification pursuant to
Article 41 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
However, his penalty was
commuted by then President
Arroyo and was issued a
Certificate of Discharge from
Prison.
On April 26, 2012, Jalosjos
applied to register as a voter in
Zamboanga City but because of
his previous conviction, his
application was denied by the
Acting City Election Officer of
the
Election Registration Board
(ERB). He filed a Petition for
Inclusion in the Permanent List of
Voters before the MTCC of
Zamboanga City. Pending
resolution, he filed a COC on
October
5, 2012, seeking to run as
mayor for Zamboanga City in
the upcoming local elections
scheduled on May 2013
Elections. In his CoC, her stated
that he is eligible for the said
office
and that he is a registered voter of
Barangay Tetuan, Zamboanga
City.
MTCC denied his Petition for
Inclusion on account of his
perpetual absolute
disqualification
which in effect, deprived him of
the right to vote in any election.
The denial was also affirmed
by the RTC in Zamboanga City
pursuant to Section 138 of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 881, as
amended, otherwise known as
the "Omnibus Election Code"
was immediately final and
executory.
The COMELEC resolved to
cancel and deny his certificate of
Candidacy on the ground of his
perpetual absolute
disqualification as well as his
failure to comply with the voter
registration
requirement.
ISSUE
WON erred in denying his
Certificate of Candidacy
RULING
The Court ruled that the petition
was bereft of merit.
In Jalosjos, Jr. and Cardino, the
Court held that the COMELEC’s
denial of due course to and/or
cancellation of a CoC in view of
a candidate’s disqualification to
run for elective office based
on a final conviction is subsumed
under its mandate to enforce and
administer all laws relating
to the conduct of elections.
Even without a petition under
either Section 12 or Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code,
or under Section 40 of the Local
Government Code, the
COMELEC is under a legal duty
to
cancel the certificate of candidacy
of anyone suffering from the
accessory penalty of perpetual
special disqualification to run for
public office by virtue of a final
judgment of conviction. The
final judgment of conviction is
notice to the COMELEC of the
disqualification of the convict
from running for public office.
The law itself bars the convict
from running for public office,
and
the disqualification is part of the
final judgment of conviction. The
final judgment of the court
is addressed not only to the
Executive branch, but also to
other government agencies tasked
to implement the final judgment
under the law.
ROMEO G. JALOSJOS vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 205033 June 18, 2013

FACTS

Jalosjos was convicted by final judgment for the crime of wo (2) counts of statutory rape and

six (6) counts of acts of lasciviousness and he he was sentenced to suffer the principal

penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal5 for each count, respectively, which

carried the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification pursuant to Article 41 of

the Revised Penal Code (RPC). However, his penalty was commuted by then President

Arroyo and was issued a Certificate of Discharge from Prison.

On April 26, 2012, Jalosjos applied to register as a voter in Zamboanga City but because of

his previous conviction, his application was denied by the Acting City Election Officer of the

Election Registration Board (ERB). He filed a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of

Voters before the MTCC of Zamboanga City. Pending resolution, he filed a COC on October

5, 2012, seeking to run as mayor for Zamboanga City in the upcoming local elections

scheduled on May 2013 Elections. In his CoC, her stated that he is eligible for the said office

and that he is a registered voter of Barangay Tetuan, Zamboanga City.

MTCC denied his Petition for Inclusion on account of his perpetual absolute disqualification

which in effect, deprived him of the right to vote in any election. The denial was also affirmed

by the RTC in Zamboanga City pursuant to Section 138 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881, as

amended, otherwise known as the "Omnibus Election Code" was immediately final and

executory.

The COMELEC resolved to cancel and deny his certificate of Candidacy on the ground of his

perpetual absolute disqualification as well as his failure to comply with the voter registration

requirement.

ISSUE

WON erred in denying his Certificate of Candidacy

RULING

The Court ruled that the petition was bereft of merit.

In Jalosjos, Jr. and Cardino, the Court held that the COMELEC’s denial of due course to and/or

cancellation of a CoC in view of a candidate’s disqualification to run for elective office based

on a final conviction is subsumed under its mandate to enforce and administer all laws relating
to the conduct of elections.

Even without a petition under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code,

or under Section 40 of the Local Government Code, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to

cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual

special disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction. The

final judgment of conviction is notice to the COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict

from running for public office. The law itself bars the convict from running for public office, and

the disqualification is part of the final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of the court

is addressed not only to the Executive branch, but also to other government agencies tasked

to implement the final judgment under the law.

Under the Constitution the COMELEC is duty bound to "enforce and administer all laws and

regulations relative to the conduct of an election." The disqualification of a convict to run for

public office under the Revised Penal Code, as affirmed by final judgment of a competent

court, is part of the enforcement and administration of "all laws" relating to the conduct of

elections. To allow the COMELEC to wait for a person to file a petition to cancel the certificate

of candidacy of one suffering from perpetual special disqualification will result in the anomaly

that these cases so grotesquely exemplify

It is clear that the COMELEC En Banc did not exercise its quasi-judicial functions when it

issued Resolution No. 9613 as it did not assume jurisdiction over any pending petition or

resolve any election case before it or any of its divisions. Rather, it merely performed its duty

to enforce and administer election laws in cancelling petitioner’s CoC on the basis of his

perpetual absolute disqualification, the fact of which had already been established by his final

conviction.

On the one hand, Section 40(a) of the LGC, applicable as it is to local elective candidates,

provides: SEC. 40. Disqualifications. – The following persons are disqualified from running for

any elective local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense

punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving

sentence;

Also, Article 41 of the RPC provides that:

ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal – Their accessory penalties. - The

penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil

interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and that of

perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to

the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.

Petitioner was sentenced to suffer the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion

temporal which, pursuant to Article 41 of the RPC, carried with it the accessory penalty of

perpetual absolute disqualification and in turn, pursuant to Article 30 of the RPC, disqualified

him to run for elective office. As discussed, Section 40 (a) of the LGC would not apply to cases

wherein a penal provision – such as Article 41 in this case – directly and specifically prohibits

the convict from running for elective office. Hence, despite the lapse of two (2) years from

petitioner’s service of his commuted prison term, he remains bound to suffer the accessory

penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification which consequently, disqualifies him to run as

mayor for Zamboanga City.

The accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification disqualifies the convict

for public office and for the right to vote, such disqualification to last only during the

term of the sentence (Article 27, paragraph 3, & Article 30, Revised Penal Code). But this

does not hold true with respect to the other accessory penalty of perpetual special

disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage. This accessory penalty deprives the

convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office perpetually, as distinguished

from temporary special disqualification, which lasts during the term of the sentence.

G.R. No. 205033 June 18, 2013

ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, Petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MARIA ISABELLE G. CLIMACO-SALAZAR, ROEL B.
NATIVIDAD, ARTURO N. ONRUBIA, AHMAD NARZAD K. SAMPANG, JOSE L. LOBREGAT,
ADELANTE ZAMBOANGA PARTY, AND ELBERT C. ATILANO, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for certiorari1 file under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court is the Commission on Elections' (COMELEC) En Bane Resolution No. 9613 2 dated
January 15, 2013, ordering the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of petitioner Romeo
G. Jalosjos' certificate of candidacy (CoC) as a mayoralty candidate for Zamboanga City.

The Facts

On November 16, 2001, the Court promulgated its Decision in G.R. Nos. 132875-76, entitled
"People of the Philippines v. Romeo G. Jalosjos," convicting petitioner by final judgment of two
(2) counts of statutory rape and six (6) counts of acts of lasciviousness. 4 Consequently, he was
sentenced to suffer the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal 5 for each
count, respectively, which carried the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification
pursuant to Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).6 On April 30, 2007, then President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued an order commuting his prison term to sixteen (16) years, three
(3) months and three (3) days (Order of Commutation). After serving the same, he was issued a
Certificate of Discharge From Prison on March 18, 2009.7

On April 26, 2012,8 petitioner applied to register as a voter in Zamboanga City. However,
because of his previous conviction, his application was denied by the Acting City Election Officer
of the Election Registration Board (ERB), prompting him to file a Petition for Inclusion in the
Permanent List of Voters (Petition for Inclusion) before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of
Zamboanga City, Branch 1 (MTCC).9 Pending resolution of the same, he filed a CoC10 on
October 5, 2012, seeking to run as mayor for Zamboanga City in the upcoming local elections
scheduled on May 13, 2013 (May 2013 Elections). In his CoC, petitioner stated, inter alia, that he
is eligible for the said office and that he is a registered voter of Barangay Tetuan, Zamboanga
City.

On October 18, 2012,11 the MTCC denied his Petition for Inclusion on account of his perpetual
absolute disqualification which in effect, deprived him of the right to vote in any election. Such
denial was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Branch 14 (RTC) in its
October 31, 2012 Order12 which, pursuant to Section 13813 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881, as
amended, otherwise known as the "Omnibus Election Code" (OEC), was immediately final and
executory.

Meanwhile, five (5) petitions were lodged before the COMELEC’s First and Second Divisions
(COMELEC Divisions), praying for the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of petitioner’s
CoC. Pending resolution, the COMELEC En Banc issued motu proprio Resolution No. 9613 14 on
January 15, 2013, resolving "to CANCEL and DENY due course the Certificate of Candidacy
filed by Romeo G. Jalosjos as Mayor of Zamboanga City in the May 13, 2013 National and Local
Elections" due to his perpetual absolute disqualification as well as his failure to comply with the
voter registration requirement. As basis, the COMELEC En Banc relied on the Court’s
pronouncement in the consolidated cases of Dominador Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC and Agapito
Cardino v. COMELEC15 (Jalosjos, Jr. and Cardino).

Hence, the instant petition.

Issues Before the Court

Submitted for the Court’s determination are the following issues: (a) whether the COMELEC En
Banc acted beyond its jurisdiction when it issued motu proprio Resolution No. 9613 and in so
doing, violated petitioner’s right to due process; and (b) whether petitioner’s perpetual absolute
disqualification to run for elective office had already been removed by Section 40(a) of Republic
Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC).

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

At the outset, the Court observes that the controversy in this case had already been mooted by
the exclusion of petitioner in the May 2013 Elections. Nevertheless, in view of the doctrinal value
of the issues raised herein, which may serve to guide both the bench and the bar in the future,
the Court takes this opportunity to discuss on the same.

A. Nature and validity of motu

proprio issuance of Resolution No.
9613.

Petitioner claims that the COMELEC En Banc usurped the COMELEC Divisions’ jurisdiction by
cancelling motu proprio petitioner’s CoC through Resolution No. 9613, contrary to Section 3,
Article IX-C of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) which reads:

SEC. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate
its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division,
provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en
banc. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Concomitantly, he also claims that his right to procedural due process had been violated by the
aforementioned issuance.

The Court is not persuaded.

The above-cited constitutional provision requiring a motion for reconsideration before the
COMELEC En Banc may take action is confined only to cases where the COMELEC exercises
its quasi-judicial power. It finds no application, however, in matters concerning the COMELEC’s
exercise of administrative functions. The distinction between the two is well-defined. As illumined
in Villarosa v. COMELEC:16

The term ‘administrative’ connotes, or pertains, to ‘administration, especially management, as by

managing or conducting, directing or superintending, the execution, application, or conduct of
persons or things. It does not entail an opportunity to be heard, the production and weighing of
evidence, and a decision or resolution thereon. While a ‘quasi-judicial function’ is a term which
applies to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required
to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from
them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

Crucial therefore to the present disquisition is the determination of the nature of the power
exercised by the COMELEC En Banc when it promulgated Resolution No. 9613.

The foregoing matter is not without established precedent. In Jalosjos, Jr. and Cardino, the Court
held that the COMELEC’s denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC in view of a
candidate’s disqualification to run for elective office based on a final conviction is subsumed
under its mandate to enforce and administer all laws relating to the conduct of elections.
Accordingly, in such a situation, it is the COMELEC’s duty to cancel motu proprio the candidate’s
CoC, notwithstanding the absence of any petition initiating a quasi-judicial proceeding for the
resolution of the same. Thus, the Court stated:17

Even without a petition under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or
under Section 40 of the Local Government Code, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel
the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction. The final
judgment of conviction is notice to the COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from
running for public office. The law itself bars the convict from running for public office, and the
disqualification is part of the final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of the court is
addressed not only to the Executive branch, but also to other government agencies tasked to
implement the final judgment under the law.

Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to implement the
disqualification, it is assumed that the portion of the final judgment on disqualification to run for
elective public office is addressed to the COMELEC because under the Constitution the
COMELEC is duty bound to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election." The disqualification of a convict to run for public office under the Revised
Penal Code, as affirmed by final judgment of a competent court, is part of the enforcement and
administration of "all laws" relating to the conduct of elections.

To allow the COMELEC to wait for a person to file a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy
of one suffering from perpetual special disqualification will result in the anomaly that these cases
so grotesquely exemplify. Despite a prior perpetual special disqualification, Jalosjos was elected
and served twice as mayor. The COMELEC will be grossly remiss in its constitutional duty to
"enforce and administer all laws" relating to the conduct of elections if it does not motu proprio
bar from running for public office those suffering from perpetual special disqualification by virtue
of a final judgment. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In Aratea v. COMELEC (Aratea),18 the Court similarly pronounced that the disqualification of a
convict to run for public office, as affirmed by final judgment of a competent court, is part of the
enforcement and administration of all laws relating to the conduct of elections. 19

Applying these principles to the case at bar, it is clear that the COMELEC En Banc did not
exercise its quasi-judicial functions when it issued Resolution No. 9613 as it did not assume
jurisdiction over any pending petition or resolve any election case before it or any of its divisions.
Rather, it merely performed its duty to enforce and administer election laws in cancelling
petitioner’s CoC on the basis of his perpetual absolute disqualification, the fact of which had
already been established by his final conviction. In this regard, the COMELEC En Banc was
exercising its administrative functions, dispensing with the need for a motion for reconsideration
of a division ruling under Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the same being required only
in quasi-judicial proceedings.

Lest it be misunderstood, while the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of one’s CoC
generally necessitates the exercise of the COMELEC’s quasi-judicial functions commenced
through a petition based on either Sections 1220 or 7821 of the OEC, or Section 4022 of the LGC,
when the grounds therefor are rendered conclusive on account of final and executory judgments
– as when a candidate’s disqualification to run for public office is based on a final conviction –
such exercise falls within the COMELEC’s administrative functions, as in this case.

In this light, there is also no violation of procedural due process since the COMELEC En Banc
would be acting in a purely administrative manner. Administrative power is concerned with the
work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental
organs.23 As petitioner’s disqualification to run for public office had already been settled in a
previous case and now stands beyond dispute, it is incumbent upon the COMELEC En Banc to
cancel his CoC as a matter of course, else it be remiss in fulfilling its duty to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.

Equally compelling is the fact that the denial of petitioner’s Petition for Inclusion as a registered
voter in Zamboanga City had already attained finality by virtue of the RTC’s Order dated October
31, 2012. In this accord, petitioner’s non-compliance with the voter registration requirement
under Section 39(a) of the LGC24 is already beyond question and likewise provides a sufficient
ground for the cancellation of his CoC altogether.
B. Petitioner’s right to run for
elective office.

It is petitioner’s submission that Article 30 of the RPC was partially amended by Section 40(a) of
the LGC and thus, claims that his perpetual absolute disqualification had already been removed.

The argument is untenable.

Well-established is the rule that every new statute should be construed in connection with those
already existing in relation to the same subject matter and all should be made to harmonize and
stand together, if they can be done by any fair and reasonable interpretation. 25

On the one hand, Section 40(a) of the LGC, applicable as it is to local elective candidates,
provides:

SEC. 40. Disqualifications. – The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective
local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

And on the other hand, Article 30 of the RPC reads:

ART. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification. - The
penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification for public office shall produce the
following effects:

1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may have
held, even if conferred by popular election.

2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular office or to be
elected to such office.

3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise of any of
the rights mentioned.

In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised in paragraphs

2 and 3 of this Article shall last during the term of the sentence.

4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly held.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Keeping with the above-mentioned statutory construction principle, the Court observes that the
conflict between these provisions of law may be properly reconciled. In particular, while Section
40(a) of the LGC allows a prior convict to run for local elective office after the lapse of two (2)
years from the time he serves his sentence, the said provision should not be deemed to cover
cases wherein the law26 imposes a penalty, either as principal or accessory,27 which has the
effect of disqualifying the convict to run for elective office. An example of this would be Article 41
of the RPC, which imposes the penalty of perpetual28 absolute29 disqualification as an accessory
to the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal:

ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal – Their accessory penalties. - The penalties
of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life
or during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual absolute
disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to the principal penalty,
unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

In this relation, Article 30 of the RPC, as earlier cited, provides that the penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification has the effect of depriving the convicted felon of the privilege to run for
elective office. To note, this penalty, as well as other penalties of similar import, is based on the
presumptive rule that one who is rendered infamous by conviction of a felony, or other base
offense indicative of moral turpitude, is unfit to hold public office, 30 as the same partakes of a
privilege which the State grants only to such classes of persons which are most likely to exercise
it for the common good.31

Pertinently, it is observed that the import of Article 41 in relation to Article 30 of the RPC is more
direct and specific in nature – insofar as it deprives the candidate to run for elective office due to
his conviction – as compared to Section 40(a) of the LGC which broadly speaks of offenses
involving moral turpitude and those punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment without
any consideration of certain disqualifying effects to one’s right to suffrage. Accordingly, Section
40(a) of the LGC should be considered as a law of general application and therefore, must yield
to the more definitive RPC provisions in line with the principle of lex specialis derogat generali –
general legislation must give way to special legislation on the same subject, and generally is so
interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the special provisions are not applicable. In other
words, where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one
specially designed therefor should prevail.32

In the present case, petitioner was sentenced to suffer the principal penalties of reclusion
perpetua and reclusion temporal which, pursuant to Article 41 of the RPC, carried with it the
accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification and in turn, pursuant to Article 30 of the
RPC, disqualified him to run for elective office. As discussed, Section 40(a) of the LGC would not
apply to cases wherein a penal provision – such as Article 41 in this case – directly and
specifically prohibits the convict from running for elective office. Hence, despite the lapse of two
(2) years from petitioner’s service of his commuted prison term, he remains bound to suffer the
accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification which consequently, disqualifies him to
run as mayor for Zamboanga City.

Notably, Article 41 of the RPC expressly states that one who is previously convicted of a crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal continues to suffer the accessory penalty
of perpetual absolute disqualification even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless
the said accessory penalty shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.33 In this case, the
same accessory penalty had not been expressly remitted in the Order of Commutation or by any
subsequent pardon and as such, petitioner’s disqualification to run for elective office is deemed
to subsist.

Further, it is well to note that the use of the word "perpetual" in the aforementioned accessory
penalty connotes a lifetime restriction and in this respect, does not depend on the length of the
prison term which is imposed as its principal penalty. Instructive on this point is the Court’s ruling
in Lacuna v. Abes,34 where the court explained the meaning of the term "perpetual" as applied to
the penalty of disqualification to run for public office:

The accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification disqualifies the convict for public
office and for the right to vote, such disqualification to last only during the term of the sentence
(Article 27, paragraph 3, & Article 30, Revised Penal Code) that, in the case of Abes, would have
expired on 13 October 1961.

But this does not hold true with respect to the other accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage. This accessory penalty deprives the
convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office perpetually, as distinguished
from temporary special disqualification, which lasts during the term of the sentence. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

Likewise, adopting the Lacuna ruling, the Court, in the more recent cases of Aratea, 35 Jalosjos,
Jr. and Cardino,36 held:

Clearly, Lacuna instructs that the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification
"deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office perpetually."

The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes effect immediately once the
judgment of conviction becomes final. The effectivity of this accessory penalty does not depend
on the duration of the principal penalty, or on whether the convict serves his jail sentence or not.
The last sentence of Article 32 states that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public
office during the period of his [perpetual special] disqualification." Once the judgment of
conviction becomes final, it is immediately executory. Any public office that the convict may be
holding at the time of his conviction becomes vacant upon finality of the judgment, and the
convict becomes ineligible to run for any elective public office perpetually. (Emphasis
underscoring supplied)

All told, applying the established principles of statutory construction, and more significantly,
considering the higher interests of preserving the sanctity of our elections, the Court holds that
Section 40(a) of the LGC has not removed the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification
which petitioner continues to suffer. Thereby, he remains disqualified to run for any elective
1âwphi1

office pursuant to Article 30 of the RPC.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Lagman vs Medialdea

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a sufficient factual basis for the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privelege of writ of habeas corpus

FACTS: On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216,
declaring Martial Law in the whole island of Mindanao and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus therein. On May 25, the president submitted a
written report to Congress on the factual basis of the Martial Law declaration (as
required by the Constitution). The main basis of the declaration was the attack of the
Maute terrorist group in Marawi City. According to the report, the Maute group is an
affiliate of ISIS which is aiming to establish an Islamic caliphate in Marawi City (and
might spread its control in all the other parts of Mindanao). It also cited the ongoing
rebellion and lawless violence that has plagued Mindanao for decades.
DECISION: Yes
RATIO DECIDENDI: In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation or suspension, the Court considers only the information and data
available to the President prior to or at the time of the declaration. The
determination by the Court of the sufficiency of factual basis must be limited only to
the facts and information mentioned in the Report and Proclamation. The Court
held that the President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual bases
tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The President only has to ascertain if
there is probable cause for a declaration of Martial Law and the suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus. The petitioners’ counter-evidence were derived solely from
unverified news articles on the internet, with neither the authors nor the sources
shown to have affirmed the contents thereof. As the Court has consistently ruled,
news articles are hearsay evidence, twice removed, and are thus without any
probative value, unless offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of the
matter asserted. The alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are just pieces
and parcels of the Report; along with these alleged false data is an arsenal of other
independent facts showing that more likely than not, actual rebellion exists.

FACTS

● Proclamation No. 216 cited the following justifications for the declaration of martial law

and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus:

x·x xx

WHEREAS, today 23 May 2017, the same Maute terrorist group has taken over a hospital in

Marawi City, Lanao dcl Sur, established several checkpoints within the City, burned down certain

govermnent and private facilities and inflicted casualties on the part of Govermnent forces, and

started [the] flying [ofJ the flag of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in several areas, thereby

openly attempting to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government this part of
Mindanao and deprive the Chief Executive of his powers and prerogatives to enforce the laws of

the land and0 to maintain public order and safety in Mindanao, constituting the crime of rebellion;

and

WHEREAS, this recent attack the capability of the Maute group and other rebel groups to sow

terror, and cause death and damage to property not only in Lanao del Sur but also in 1other parts

of Mindanao.

● On May 25, 2017, within the 48-hour period set in Section 18, Article VII of the 1987

Constitution, the President submitted to the Senate and the House of Representatives

his written Report, citing the factual events and reasons that impelled him to issue the

said Proclamation.

● Both Houses expressed their full support of the Proclamation, under the Senate P.S.

Resolution No. 388 and House Resolution No. 1050, finding no cause to revoke the

same.

● Three consolidated petitions assailing the sufficiency of the factual basis of Proclamation

No. 216 were filed before this Court.

In a Decision dated July 4, 2017, the Court in Representative Edcel C. Lagman, et al. v.

Hon. Salvador C. Medialdea, et al., found sufficient factual bases for the issuance of

Proclamation No. 216 and declared it constitutional.

● On July 18, 2017, the President requested Congress to extend the effectivity of

Proclamation No. 216. In a Special Joint Session on July 22, 2017, the Congress

adopted Resolution of Both Houses No. 2, which extended Proclamation No. 216 until

December 31, 2017.

● Acting on the recommendations of the Department of National Defense (DND) Secretary

Delfm N. Lorenzana (Secretary Lorenzana) and the then Armed Forces of the

Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff General Rey Leonardo Guerrero (General Guerrero) in a

letter dated December 8, 2017, the President again asked both the Senate and the

House of Representatives to extend the Proclamation of martial law and the suspension

of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year, from

January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018.

● Four consolidated petitions were filed before this Court assailing the constitutionality of

the second extension of Proclamation No. 216.

● In a Decision dated February 6, 2018, this Court in Representative Edcel C. Lagman, et

al. v. Senate President Aquilino Pimentel III, et al., found sufficient factual bases for the

second extension of the Proclamation from January 1 to December 31, 2018, and

declared it constitutional.

● Secretary Lorenzana in a letter to the President, recommended the third extension of

martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire

Mindanao for one year from January 1, 2019 up to December 31, 2019.

● Lorenzana wrote the recommendation to the President primarily to put an end to the

continuing rebellion in Mindanao waged by the DAESH-inspired groups and its local and

foreign allies, particularly the Daulah Islamiyah (DI), and the threat posed by the

Communist Party of the Philippines-New People's Army Terrorists (CNTs).

● The AFP Chief of Staff General Carolito G. Galvez, Jr. (General Galvez) and Chief of the

Philippine National Police (PNP) Director-General Oscar D. Albayalde (Director-General

Albayalde) recommended the further extension of martial law and the suspension of the

privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year beginning

January 1, 2019 up to December 31, 2019, based on current security assessment for the

total eradication of the Local Terrorist Groups (LTG), ASG, Bangsamoro Islamic

Freedom Fighters (BIFF), DI, and other lawless armed groups and the CNTs, their

foreign and local allies, supporters, financiers, in order to fully contain the continuing

rebellion in Mindanao and to prevent it from escalating to other parts of the country, and

to ensure complete rehabilitation and reconstruction of the most affected areas, as well

as to attain lasting peace and order, and to preserve the socio-economic growth and

development of the entire Mindanao.

● Acting on these recommendations, the President, in a letter dated December 6, 2018 to

the Senate and the House of Representatives, requested for the third extension of

Proclamation No. 216 from January 1, 2019 to December 31, 2019.

● The President stated in his letter that, although there has been significant progress in

putting rebellion under control and ushering in substantial economic gains in Mindanao

the joint security assessment submitted by General Galvez of the AFP and

Director-General Albayalde of the PNP highlighted essential facts indicating that

rebellion still persists in Mindanao and that public safety requires the continuation of
martial law in the whole of Mindanao.

● Private sectors, Regional and Provincial Peace and Order Councils, and local

government units in Mindanao were also clamoring for a further extension of the

proclamation.

The President cited the following essential facts to extend the proclamation:

The Abu Sayyaf Group, Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, Daulah Islamiyah (DI), and other
terrorist

groups (collectively labeled as LTG) which seek to promote global rebellion, continue to defy the
government by

perpetrating hostile activities during the extended period of Martial Law.

At least four (4) bombings/ Improvised Explosive Device (IED) explosions had been cited in the AFP
report. The

Lamitan City bombing on 31 July 2018 that killed 11 individuals and wounded 10 others, the Isulan,
Sultan

Kudarat IED explosion on 28 August and 02 September 2018 that killed five (5) individuals and
wounded 45

others, and the Barangay Apopong IED explosion that left eight (8) individuals wounded.

The DI forces continue to pursueitheir rebellion against the government by furthering the conduct oft
eir

radicalization activities, and continuing to recruit new members, esp cially in vulnerable Muslim
communities.

Major Abu SayJilaf Group factions in Sulu contim1e to pursue kidnap for ransom activities to finance
their

operations. As of counting, there are a total of 8 kidnappings that have occurred involving a Dutch, a

Vietnamese, 2 Indonesians, and four 4 Filipinos.

● A further extension of the implementation of Martial Law and suspension of the privilege

of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao will enable the AFP, the PNP, and all other law

enforcement agencies to finally put an end to the on-going rebellion in Mindanao and

continue to prevent the same from escalating in other parts of the country.

● On December 12, 2018, the Senate and the House of Representatives, in a joint

session, adopted Resolution No. 6, entitled "Declaring a State of Martial Law and

Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao for

another period of 1 year from January 1, 2019 to December 31, 2019." Joint Resolution

No. Resolution No. 6 state:

xx xx

WHEREAS, on December 10, 2018, the I-louse of Representatives received a communication

dated December 6, 2018 from President Rodrigo Roa Duterte, informing the Senate and the

House of Representatives, that on December 5, 2018, he received a letter from Secretary of

National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana, as Martial Law Administrator, requesting for further

extension of Martial Law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in

Mindanao up

to December 31, 2019;

WHEREAS, in the same letter, the President cited the joint security report of the Armed Forces

of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff, General Carlito G. Galvez, Jr., and the Philippine

National Police (PNP) Director- General, Oscar D. Albayalde, which highlighted the

accomplishment owing to the implementation of Martial Law in Mindanao, particularly the

reduction o f the capabilities o f different terrorist groups, the neutralization of six hundred

eighty-five (685) members o f the local terrorist groups (L TGs) and one thousand seventy-three

(1,073) members of the conununist terrorist' group (CTG); dismantling of seven (7) guerilla

fronts and weakening of nineteen (19)

others; surrender of unprecedented number of loose firearms; nineteen percent (19%) reduction

of atrocities comniitted by CTG in 2018 compared to those inflicted in 2017; twenty-i1ine percent

(29%) reduction of terrorist acts committed by LTGs in 2018 compared to 2017; and substantial

decrease in crime incidence;

WHEREAS, the President nevertheless pointed out that notwithstanding these gains, there are certai
rebellion

still persists in the whole of Mind nao and that public safety requires the continuation of Martial
Law, ong others:

(a) the Abu Sayyaf Group, Bangsamoro Islamic Freedo Fighters, Daulah Islamiyah (DI), and other
terrorist

groups, collectively abeled as LTGs which seek to promote global rebellion, continue to defy the
government by

perpetrating hostile activities during the exte ded period of Martial Law that at least four (4)
bombing incidents

had een cited in the AFP report: (1) the Lamitan City bombing on July 31, 018 that killed eleven (11)
individuals
and wounded ten (10) others; (2 the Isulan, Sultan Kudarat improvised explosive device (IED) expl
sion on

August 28 and September 2, 2018 that killed five (5) indivi uals and wounded forty-five (45) others;
and (3) the

Barangay Apopong ED explosion that left eight (8) individuals wounded; (b) the DI forces lso
continue to pursue

their rebellion against the government by the conduct of their radicalization activities and continuing
.Ito recruit

new members especially in vulnerable Muslim communitif:s; and (c) the CTG, which publicly
declared its

intention to seize power through violent means and supplant the country's democrat c form of
government with

communist rule which posed serious security concerns;

WHEREAS, the President also report d that at least three hundred forty-two (342) violent incidents,
rangin from

harassments against government installations, liquidation ope ations and arson attacks occurred in
Mindanao,

killing eighty-seven (87) military personnel and wounding four hundred eight (408) others c using
One Hundred

fifty-six million pesos (P156,000,000.00) worth of pr perty damages;

WHEREAS, the Senate and the of Representatives are one n the belief that the security assessment
stibmitted

by the AFP and the , PNP to the President indubitably confirmsi the continuing rebellion in Mindanao
which

compels further extensiof1 of the implementation of Martial Law and the suspension of the priyilege
of the writ of

habeas corpus for a period of one (1) year, from January 1, 2019 to December , 31, 2019, to enable
the AFP,

the PNP, all other law enforcement agencies, to finally put an end to the ongoing rebellion and to
continue to

prevent the san1e from escalating in other parts ofthe country;

WHEREAS, after thorough discussi n and extensive debate, the Congress of the Philippines in a Joint
Sessio ,

by two hundred thirty-five (235) affirmative votes comprising the maj rity of all its Members, has
determined that

rebellion and lawless viole ce still persist in Mindanao1, and public safety indubitably requires further
extension
o f the Proclamation of Martial Law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
in the wholeof Minda ao: Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the Senate and the House of
Representatives in a Joint Session

assembted, To further extend Proclamation No. 216, series of 2017, entitled "Declaring a State of
Martial Law

and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Co11Jus in the Whole of Mindanao" for another
period of

one (1) year from January 1, 2019 to December 31, 2019

Petitioner's Argument

a) The Court is mandated to independently determine the sufficiency of factual

bases of the extension of martial law and it must not limit its review on the basis

of the declaration presented by the Executive and Legislative branches of the

government.

b) The present factual situation of Mindanao no longer calls for a third extension

of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus

because no actual rebellion persists in Mindanao.

c) The absence of the requirement of public safety is underscored by the very

absence of an actual rebellion consisting of an armed uprising against the

government for the purpose of removing Mindanao or a portion thereof from the

allegiance to the Republic. More so, the alleged rebellion in Mindanao does not

endanger public safety. The threat to public safety contemplated under the

Constitution is one where the government cannot sufficiently or effectively

govern, as when the courts or government offices cannot operate or perform their

functions.

d) Proclamation No. 216 has become functus officio and the extension is no

longer necessary, considering the deaths of the leaders of the ASG and the

Maute brothers, and the cessation of combat operations and the liberation of

Marawi City.

e) Congress committed grave abuse of discretion in approving the third extension

hastily despite the absence of sufficient factual basis.

f) The third extension violates the constitutional proscription against a long

duration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.30 The constitutional limitations on the period of martial law must be for a

short or limited duration, which must not exceed sixty (60) days, and should the

third extension be granted, the martial law regime would have lasted 951 days.

g) The "justifications" proffered by the President in his letter merely illustrates in

general terms, lacking in specifics to support the claim that rebellion persists in

Mindanao, and the President undertook to submit to the Congress a more

detailed report which he failed to do.

h) The resolutions and recommendations for martial law extension by the

Regional and Provincial Peace and Order Councils were due only to their desire

for peace and order, economic development, and not because rebellion persists

in Mindanao.

i) The third extension of martial law will lead to further violation of citizens'

political, civil, and human rights

RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT: (though the PSG)

a) The Court's power of judicial review under Section 18, Article VII is limited to

the determination of the sufficiency of the factual basis of the extension of martial

law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

b) There is sufficient factual basis to extend the effectiveness of Proclamation

No. 216 as rebellion persists in Mindanao, and public safety requires it. The

President and both Houses of Congress found that there is probable cause or

evidence to show that rebellion persists in Mindanao.

c) The events happening in Mindanao strongly indicate that the continued

implementation of martial law is necessary to protect and insure public safety.

d) The deaths of the leaders of the ASG, the Maute brothers and the cessation of

the Marawi siege did not render functus officio the declaration of martial law

under Proclamation No. 216. Although the Marawi siege ended, the factual

circumstances which became the basis for the second extension still exists and

continuously threaten the peace and order situation in Mindanao.

e) Congress has the sole prerogative to extend martial law and the suspension of

the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus since the 1987 Constitution does not

limit the period of extension and suspension, nor prohibit further extensions or
suspensions.

f) Congress has the absolute discretion in determining the rules of procedure with

regard to the conduct and manner by which Congress deliberates on the

President's request for extension of martial law, and therefore is not subject to

judicial review.

g) The alleged human rights violations do not warrant the nullification of martial

law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. There are

sufficient legal safeguards to address human rights abuses.

h) Petitioners failed to prove that they are entitled to injunctive relief

ISSUES

A. Whether there exists sufficient factual basis for the extension of martial law in

Mindanao.

1. Whether rebellion exists and persists in Mindanao.

2. Whether public safety requires the extension of martial law in Mindanao.

3. Whether the further extension of martial law has not been necessary to meet the

situation in Mindanao.

B. Whether the Constitution limits the number of extensions and the duration for which

Congress can extend the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege

of the writ of habeas corpus.

C. Whether Proclamation No. 216 has become functus officio with the cessation of

Marawi siege that it may no longer be extended.

D. Whether the manner by which Congress approved the extension of martial law is a

political question and is not reviewable by the Court En Banc.

1. Whether Congress has the power to determine its own rules of proceedings in

conducting the joint session under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.

2. Whether Congress has the discretion as to how it will respond to the President's

request for the extension of martial law in Mindanao - including the length of the

period of deliberation and interpellation of the executive branch's resource

persons.

E. Whether the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ

of habeas corpus or extension thereof may be reversed by a finding of grave abuse of

 discretion on the part of Congress. If so, whether the extension of martial law was

attended by grave abuse of discretion.

F. Whether the allegations of human rights violations in the implementation of martial law

in Mindanao is sufficient to warrant nullification of its extension

RULING1. The requirements of rebellion and public safety are present to

uphold theextension of martial law in Mindanao from January 1, 2019 to December 31,
2019

The sufficiency of the factual

basis for the extension of martial
law in Mindanao must be
determined from the facts and
information contained in the
President's request,
supported by reports submitted by
his alter egos to Congress. These
are the bases upon
which Congress granted the
extension.
● The Court cannot expect
exactitude and preciseness of the
facts and information
stated in these reports, as the
Court's review is confined to the
sufficiency and
The sufficiency of the factual basis for the extension of martial law in Mindanao must
bedetermined from the facts and information contained in the President's request,supported
by reports submitted by his alter egos to Congress. These are the bases uponwhich
Congress granted the extension.
● The Court cannot expect exactitude and preciseness of the facts and
informationstated in these reports, as the Court's review is confined to the sufficiency
andreasonableness thereof. While there may be inadequacies in some of the facts,i.e.,
facts which are not fully explained in the reports, these are not reasonsenough for the
Court to invalidate the extension as long as there are other relatedand relevant
circumstances that support the finding that rebellion persists andpublic safety
requires it

In determining the sufficiency of

the factual basis for the extension
of martial law, the
Court needs only to assess and
evaluate the written reports of the
government agencies
tasked in enforcing and
implementing martial law in
Mindanao.
● The quantum of proof applied
by the Presiddent in his
determination of the existence of
rebellion is probable cause.
● Court need not delve into the
accu(racy of the reports upon
which the President's
decision is based, or the
correctness of his decision to
declare martial law or
suspend the writ, for this an
executive function.
● In finding sufficiency of the
factual basis for the third
extension, the Court has to give
due
regard to the military and police
reports which are not palpably
false, contrived and
untrue; consider the full
complement or totality of the
reports submitted, and not make a
piecemeal or individual
appreciation of the facts and the
incidents reported. The
President's decision to extend the
declaration and the suspension of
the Writ, when it
goes through the review of the
Legislative branch, must be
accorded a weightier and
more consequential basis. Under
these circumstances, the
President's decision or
judgment call is affirmed by the
representatives of the People.
● Letter of the President to the
Congress is not a mere repetition
of his previous letters
requesting for extensions as
petitioners would like Us to
believe.
● These updates are periodically
reviewed by the martial law
implementers and are
presented to the President in
order to ensure the
responsiveness and suitability of
measures undertaken by the
government.
● The primary justification for
the President's request for
extension is the on-going
rebellion in Mindanao, the
situation remains the same
despite the death ofthe
leaders, and the addition of rebel
groups whose activities were
intensified and
pronounced after the first and
second extensions.
● The factual basis for the
extension of martial law is the
continuing rebellion being waged
in Mindanao by Local Terrorist
Rebel Groups (LTRG) -
identified as the ASG, BIFF, DI,
and other groups that have
established affiliation with
ISIS/DAESH, and by the
Communist Terrorist Rebel
Groups (CTRG) - the components
of which are the
Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP), New People's
Army (NPA), and the National
Democratic Front (NDF).
● Cited events demonstrate the
spate of violence of rebel groups
in Mindanao in
pursuit of the singular objective
to seize power over parts of
Mindanao or deprive
the President or Congress of their
power and prerogatives over
these areas.
● The absence of motives
indicated in several reports does
not mean that these
violent acts and hostile activities
committed are not related to
rebellion which
absorbs other common crimes.
In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis for the extension of martial law, the

Court needs only to assess and evaluate the written reports of the government agencies

tasked in enforcing and implementing martial law in Mindanao.

● The quantum of proof applied by the Presiddent in his determination of the existence of

rebellion is probable cause.

● Court need not delve into the accu(racy of the reports upon which the President's

decision is based, or the correctness of his decision to declare martial law or

suspend the writ, for this an executive function.

● In finding sufficiency of the factual basis for the third extension, the Court has to give
due

regard to the military and police reports which are not palpably false, contrived and

untrue; consider the full complement or totality of the reports submitted, and not make a

piecemeal or individual appreciation of the facts and the incidents reported. The

President's decision to extend the declaration and the suspension of the Writ, when it
 goes through the review of the Legislative branch, must be accorded a weightier and

more consequential basis. Under these circumstances, the President's decision or

judgment call is affirmed by the representatives of the People.

● Letter of the President to the Congress is not a mere repetition of his previous letters

requesting for extensions as petitioners would like Us to believe.

● These updates are periodically reviewed by the martial law implementers and are

presented to the President in order to ensure the responsiveness and suitability of

measures undertaken by the government.

● The primary justification for the President's request for extension is the on-going

rebellion in Mindanao, the situation remains the same despite the death ofthe

leaders, and the addition of rebel groups whose activities were intensified and

pronounced after the first and second extensions.

● The factual basis for the extension of martial law is the continuing rebellion being waged

in Mindanao by Local Terrorist Rebel Groups (LTRG) - identified as the ASG, BIFF, DI,

and other groups that have established affiliation with ISIS/DAESH, and by the

Communist Terrorist Rebel Groups (CTRG) - the components of which are the

Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), New People's Army (NPA), and the National

Democratic Front (NDF).

● Cited events demonstrate the spate of violence of rebel groups in Mindanao in

pursuit of the singular objective to seize power over parts of Mindanao or deprive

the President or Congress of their power and prerogatives over these areas.

● The absence of motives indicated in several reports does not mean that these

violent acts and hostile activities committed are not related to rebellion which

absorbs other common crimes.

The test of sufficiency is not accuracy nor preciseness but reasonableness of the factual

basis adopted by the Executive in ascertaining the existence of rebellion and the

necessity to quell it.

A. REBELLION EXISTS AND PERSISTS IN MINDANAO

The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is rebellion defined under Article 134: of
theRevised Penal Code

Art. 134. Rebellion or insurrection: How committed - the crime of rebellion or

insurrectionis committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the
purposeof removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of
thePhilippine Islands or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed
forces,depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of · any of theirpowers
or prerogatives.

Elements of rebellion

(1) there is a

a. Public uprising and

b. Taking arms against the Government; and

(2) The purpose of the uprising or movement is either

(a) to remove from the allegiance to the Government or its laws:

● (i) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or●

(ii) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or

(b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of anyof their powers and
prerogatives.

● Rebellion encompasses no definite time nor particular locality of actual war and.continues even
when actual fighting has ceased. Therefore, it is not restricted as to thetime and locality of actual
war nor does it end when actual fighting; has ended

.● The state of rebellion results from the commission of a series or combination of acts andevents,
past, present and future, primarily motivated by ethnic, religious, political or classdivisions which
incites violence, disturbs peace and order, and poses serious threat tothe security of the nation.

● Recognizing the political realities in the country, the geography of Mindanao, theincreasing
number of local and foreign sympathizers who provide financial support, andthe advances in
technology that have emboldened and reinforced the terrorists' andextremists' capabilities to
disturb peace and order, the declaration of martial law cannotbe restricted only to areas where
actual fighting continue to occur

As a result, rebels have become more cunning and instigating rebellion from a distance

is now more attainable, perpetrating acts of violence clandestinely in several areas of

Mindanao.

B. PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES THE EXTENSION OF MARTIAL LAW IN MINDANAO

● Expressing support for the President's declaration of martial law and its extension, reflect

the public sentiment for the restoration of peace and order in Mindanao.

● The very same people who live through the harrows of war, things and experiences that

we can only read about.

Citing the Brief of Amicus Curiae of Joaquin Bernas, SJ

The need for public safety is an issue whose existence, unlike the existence of
rebellion,is not verifiable through the visual or tactile sense. Its existence can only be
determinedthrough the application of prudential estimation o f what the consequences might be o
fexisting armed movements.The Court cannot avoid asking whether the President acted wisely
and prudently and notin grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

2. The Congress has the prerogative to extend the martial law and thesuspension o f
the privilege o f the writ o f habeas corpus as theConstitution does not limit the period for which it
can extend the same.

The only limitations to the exercise of congressional authority to extend suchproclamation or

suspension:

. The extension should be upon the President's initiative;

2. It should be grounded on the persistence of the invasion or rebellion and

the demands of public safety; and

3. It is subject to the Court's review of the sufficiency of its factual basis

upon the petition of any citizen.

● Section 18 of Article VII of the Constitution did not fix the period of the extension of

martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and granted

Congress the authority to decide its duration is fully explained in the deliberations of the

Constitutional Commission on the matter.

● The Constitutional Commission show that Commissioner Suarez's proposal to add a

similar 60-day limitation to the extension of an initial proclamation of martial law was not

adopted by a majority of the members of the Commission. The framers evidently gave

enough flexibility to Congress to determine the duration of the extension

The Constitutional limits/checks set by the Constitution to guard against the whimsical or

arbitrary use of the extraordinary powers of the Chief Executive under Section 18, Article

VII are well in place and are working.

● The evidence or basis to support the extension of martial law passed through the

scrutiny of the Chief Executive and through several more of the House of

Representatives and the Senate.

● The Supreme Court must remember that We are called upon to rule on whether the

President, and this time with the concurrence of the two Houses of Congress, acted with

sufficient basis in approving anew the extension of martial law.

● We must not fall into or be tempted to substitute Our own judgment to that of the

People's President and the People's representatives. We must not forget that the
Constitution has given us separate and quite distinct roles to fill up in our respective

branches of government.

3. Proclamation No. 216 has not become functus officio with the cessation

of the Marawi siege.

● Rebellion was not necessarily ended by the cessation of the Marawi siege.

● Rebellion in Mindanao still continues, as shown by the violent incidents stated in reports

to the President, and was made basis by the Congress in approving the third extension

of martial law.

● These violent incidents continuously pose a serious threat to security and the peace and

order situation in Mindanao.

● Martial law in Mindanao should not be confined to the Marawi siege.

● The remnants of ISIS-like group have continued to rebuild their organization through the

recruitment and training of new members and fighters to carry on the rebellion.

● Clashes between rebels and government forces continue to take place in other parts

● of Mindanao.

● The report of the military shows that the reported IED incidents, ambuscade, murder,

kidnapping, shooting and harassment in 2018 were initiated by ASG members and the

BIFF.

● Rebellion is a continuing crime. It does not1 necessarily follow that with the liberation of

Marawi, rebellion no longer exists.

● Proclamation No. 216 did functus officio with the cessation of the Marawi siege.

Considering that rebellion persists and that the public sAfety requires it, there is

sufficient factual basis to extend martial law in Mindanao for the third time.

4. The manner by which Congress approved the extension o f martial law and the

suspension o f the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is a political question that is not

reviewable by the Court.

● Section 16. (3) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its

Members for behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Mitinbers,

suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when i posed, shall not exceed

sixty days.
● The Court cannot review the rules promulgated by Congress in the absence of any

constitutional violation. Petitioners have not shown that the above-quoted rules of the

Joint Session violated any provision or right under the Constitution.

● Construing the full discretionary power granted to the Congress in promulgating its rules,

the Court, in the case of Spouses Dela Paz (Ret.) v. Senate Committee on Foreign

Relations, et al. explained that the limitation of this unrestricted power deals only with the

imperatives of quorum, voting and publication. It should be added that there must be a

reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule

and the result which is sought to be attained.

5. The allegations of human rights violations in the implementation of martial law in Mindanao is

not sufficient to warrant a nullification of its extension.

● All forms of human rights violations and abuses during the implementation of martial law

and suspension of powers should not go unpunished.

● The purported human rights abuses mentioned in the petitions fail to persuade that

these are sufficient to warrant a nullification o f the extension.

● A declaration of martial law does not suspend fundamental civil rights of individuals as

the Bill of Rights enshrined in the Constitution remain effective. Civil courts and

legislative bodies remain open.

● The declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas

corpus, the powers given to officials tasked with its implementation are susceptible to

abuses, these instances have already been taken into consideration when the pertinent

provisions on martial law were drafted.

● Safeguards within the 1987 Constitution and existing laws are available to protect the

'people from these abuses.

● "It was the collective sentiment of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that sufficient

safeguards possible misuse and abuse by the Commander-in-Chief of his extraordinary

powers are already in place and that no further emasculation of presidential powers is

called for in the guise of additional safeguards."

● Nevertheless, cognizant of such possibility of abuse, the framers of the 1987

Constitution endeavored to institute a system of checks and balances to limit the

President's exercise of the martial law and suspension powers, and to establish
safeguards to protect civil liberties. Thus, pursuant to Section 18, Article VII of the 1987

Constitution:

1. The President may declare martial law or suspend of the privilege of the writ of

the privilege of habeas corpus only when there is an invasion or rebellion and

public safety requires such declaration or suspension

2.The President's proclamation or suspension shall be for a period not exceeding60 days.

3. Within 48 hours from the proclamation or suspension, the President must submita Report in
person or in writing to Congress.

4. The Congress, voting jointly and by a vote of at least a majority of all itsMembers, can revoke the
proclamation or suspension.

5. The President cannot set aside the Congress' revocation of his proclamation orsuspension.

6. The President cannot, by himself, extend his proclamation or suspension. Heshould ask the
Congress' approval.

7. Upon such initiative or request from the President, the Congress, voting jointlyand by a vote of at
least a majority of all its Members, can extend theproclamation or suspension for such period as it
may determine.

8. The extension of the proclamation or suspension shall only be approved whenthe invasion or
rebellion persists and public safety requires it.

9. The Supreme Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis of theproclamation or
suspension or the extension thereof, in an appropriateproceeding filed by any citizen.

10. The Supreme Court must promulgate its decision within 30 days from the filing ofthe appropriate
proceeding.

11. Martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution

.● In relation to the international human rights principles established under the UniversalDeclaration
of Human Rights (UDHR), the law enforcement officials are also guided bythe principles and
safeguards declared in the International Covenant on Civil andPolitical Rights

A Final Word

While the Maute uprising was the immediate concern at that time, We must not forget

that the country was confronted with not just one or two rebel bands but several rebel

groups or anti-government entities. The country faced rebellion from several fronts.

● The extensions of Proclamation No. 216 are the Chief Executive's decisive response to
several existing rebellions throughout Mindanao. Each of these persisting challenges to

the authority of the legitimate government is certainly a basis sufficient to warrant the

declaration of martial law.

● Surely, the President does not want a repeat of the Maute experience and wait until a

city is overrun before declaring martial law.

● The Constitutional safeguards found in Section 18, Article VII does not demand that a

city be first taken over or people get killed and billions of properties go up in smoke

before the President may be justified to use his options under Section 18.

● What the Constitution asks is only that there be actual rebellion, an existing rebellion in

the territory where Martial rule is to be imposed.

The declaration should not be arbitrary or whimsical, but its basis should not also be soaccurate
that there is no room for changes or correction. Considering the volatility ofconflict, situations
may change at the blink of an eye. And the Executive is burdenedwith such responsibility to act
decisively

Wherefor, the Court FINDS sufficient factual bases for the issuance ofresolution of both houses of
Resolution of Both Houses No. 6 andDECLARES it as CONSTITUTIONAL. Accordingly, the
consolidatedpetitions are merely DISMISSED