The Case for Sartrean Freedom

Author(s): Hans Herlof Grelland

Source: Sartre Studies International , 2006, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2006), pp. 18-32
Published by: Berghahn Books

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/23511221

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 The Case for Sartrean Freedom

Hans Herlof Grelland

Human existence implies a variety of activities. We perceive, we act

communicate with others, we feel, we think, we imagine. How m
of this activity is determined by given conditions, be it perma
traits of character or external physical or social conditions, and
much is an expression of freedom? What do we choose, for what
we be considered responsible? When I sit and let my thoughts wand
freely, one after another emerges. Is it I who choose which thought
think? Could I have chosen to think other thoughts? Am I responsib
for the fact that this thought and not another emerges? If I am
responsible, will there be any responsibility left at all? Is it not pos
to trace also the deliberate and reflected choices that I make back to an
origin of thoughts which spontaneously occur?
What about emotions? I become sad: is sadness something th
happens to me, similar to being surprised by rain when I am wa
in the street? Or is it rather that I can be said to choose my sadness
choosing, for example, the way in which I relate to the object of
sadness? If I am sorry when my favourite soccer team loses a match
it not because I have chosen to support this particular team? On
other hand, such choice may be a result of given conditions; I may,
instance, have been brought up in Manchester and not in Liverp
We are well aware of how we become influenced by internal a
external conditions, how inherited traits of character and
upbringing, culture and language determine what we think, mean a
behave. How much is left for freedom and individual responsibility
Such questions are fundamental in philosophy, particularly in
domain of ethics. It is even a fundamental issue in ontology, in
sense that Heidegger gave to that term: concerning 'the being
Dasein\ Jean-Paul Sartre is among the philosophers who
contributed the most to a thorough examination of these probl
but he has at the same time a reputation for taking an extreme pos
concerning human freedom by saying that everything we do is
considered as an expression of freedom, and that we, in this se

Sartre Studies International, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2006 - 18 -

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 The Case for Sartrean Freedom

create ourselves, that is, create our character and the way in which we
exist in the world. Sartre thus makes strong statements about freedom,
implying that not only do we choose our character and behaviour, but
even the appearance and meaning of the world in which we act, are, in
a profound sense, our choice, and something for which we are
responsible. He even makes apparently absurd statements, like 'I
choose being born' or, in the context of World War II, that 'we are all
guilty'.
In this article I will discuss the tenability and relevance of Sartre's
contributions. I will restrict myself to the 'early' Sartre, up to and
including L'Etre et le néant. 1
Since Being and Nothingness appeared in 1943, many authors have
presented their criticism of the early Sartre's conception of freedom.
One of the earliest and best known is of course that of Merleau-Ponty.
Among recent criticisms are those by Gregory McCulloch (1994),
Neil Levy (2002), and Nik Farrell Fox (2003).2 However, an earlier
article by D. Follesdal represents a particularly important contribution,
presenting a very thorough discussion, based on an attempt to give a
precise interpretation of Sartrean freedom by relating it to
fundamental notions of phenomenology.3 In this article I will try to
meet Follcsdal's criticism by discussing his three main arguments. In so
doing, I intend both to defend Sartre's position and at the same time
to contribute to the interpretation of his philosophy. The arguments
that I am presenting will also answer the main objections raised by the
other aforementioned authors.
Before I turn to the discussion of Follesdal's arguments, I would
like to make two introductory comments that are relevant to the
subsequent discussion and to the understanding of Sartre's concept of
freedom in general. I first want to point out the connection between,
and the interdependence of the meaning of a concept and the theory
in which it is applied, and second, to make the reader aware of the
significance of counter-intuitive ideas in philosophy - as in science.
My first comment is that the meaning of a concept, like 'freedom',
is relative to the theory of which it is a part. Thus, the Sartrean concept
should not without reservation be identified with the common-sense
notion of freedom. Sartre establishes and develops his philosophy in a
way that can be compared to the development of a theory in physics.
Physics and philosophy have the common feature of dealing both with
which beings there are in the world to consider, and which properties
these beings have. Most other sciences have a given ontology of
reference, dealing with beings that are considered as givens (for
chemistry, molecules; for social sciences, human beings). Now, both in

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 Hans Herlof Grelland

philosophy and physics, one has to take as a starting point an

established 'every day' language and a more-or-less implicit, more-or
less consistent, 'common sense' theory, consisting of beliefs that are
generally accepted as obviously true. Then, through research effort,
the philosopher or physicist creates a new theory, modifying or even
radically changing not only our views on things, but even the meaning
of the concepts posited. This is often done to obtain greater precision,
but also to adapt the concepts to the changed conceptual structure
introduced by the new theory.
An example from physics is the distinction in Newtonian mechanics
between inertial and gravitational mass, which are both based on our
everyday notion of heavy and light objects. By introducing the terms
inertial and gravitational mass, we can provide a more precise meaning
to our common sense notion of heaviness. But the meaning of and
distinction between these more precise concepts depends on the
context of the Newtonian mechanics, where the inertial mass goes
into the general expression of Newton's Second Law, and the
gravitational mass determines the strength of the force exercised on a
body by a gravitational field. These 'new' and 'abstract' concepts are,
however, not completely disconnected from our common sense notion
of heaviness, but carry with them much of its original meaning. It is
therefore more appropriate to talk about a modification or a shift of
meaning rather than a complete change or a replacement of meaning.
In fact, it is the close relation between these more precise physical
concepts and the everyday notions which connect the abstract theories
of physics to our life-world and makes physics an extension (although
also sometimes a correction) of our common sense view of the world.
Something similar is done by Sartre in his development of ontological
concepts, among them his concept of freedom. It too needs to be
incorporated into a new, abstract and more precise theory of
consciousness and being, and this will inevitably lead to a shift of
meaning of'freedom'.
I would like to interject here an experience of my own, one which
I think relevant. In my student days I discovered that my familiarity
with Sartre's philosophy turned out to be a great help in my later
study of mathematics and abstract mathematical physics. I saw
immediately the similarity in the way Sartre and the mathematicians
developed a conceptual structure. For this reason, I have generally
thought of Sartre as the 'mathematician' among modern continental
philosophers, although I am very much aware of the difference in style
and presentation between mathematical texts and Sartre's
philosophical ones. And it is quite clear that the Sartrean framework

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 The Case for Sartrean Freedom

has its weak spots. Nevertheless, my opinion there is generally a strong

logical and conceptual consistency in Sartre's early philosophical
works. To see this, one has to look for the abstract structure
underlying Sartre's thinking and to avoid being distracted by the
literary aspects of his style.
My second introductory comment is that the counterintuitive
consequences of a theory may be not only acceptable but even
desirable. This concerns the possible conflicts that arise between what
we regard as 'obvious' and 'reasonable', and what the theory states. A
theory is considered counter-intuitive when it runs counter to a
habitual, commonsensical way of thinking, when what the theory says
is in conflict with what seems obvious or reasonable. Einstein's theory
of relativity is counter-intuitive in many ways, e.g., by stating that size
and distance depend on the motion of the observer. So, too, is the
philosophically disturbing but widely applicable quantum mechanics,
which is fully accepted as a valid theory by the physics community.
Counter-intuitive theories like these represent the most significant
steps in the evolution of human understanding. Sartre's concept of
freedom may appear as counter-intuitive because we tend to think that
when a choice is the result of external influences, or is unpremeditated,
then it is not a free choice. This way of thinking about freedom can in
fact be explained by Sartre's theory - as an instance of bad faith. Our
bad faith strategies always lead to an underestimation of our freedom.
Therefore, we, who are always in bad faith in one way or another, will
always tend to look upon ourselves as less free than we are. Many of
Sartre's radical and provoking expressions can be understood as
motivated by an urge to wake up the reader and tear him out of his
habitually illusionary state. This explains Sartre's occasionally
provocative rhetoric - an example of which is examined at the end of
this article.
Having made these remarks, I would now like to turn to Follesdal's
article on Sartrean freedom. In his discussion there seems to be a
tension between an initially sympathetic attitude towards Sartre's
theory of freedom and a highly critical and negative conclusion. In his
introduction, Follesdal warns the reader that 'When considerable parts
of a philosopher's thought seem incomprehensible or obviously
unreasonable, there is a strong possibility that we have misunderstood
that what [sic] we think we understand' (SF 393). He continues that
'In this paper I shall argue that there is more coherence in his
[Sartre's] philosophy than one might think, that his apparently
extreme assertions concerning freedom and responsibility make good
sense when this philosophy is interpreted in a certain way, and that his

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 Hans Herlof Grelland

apparently more ordinary and traditional statements concerning

freedom must be reinterpreted when he is interpreted in the manner
which I propose' (Idem). Contrary to what one might expect after this
introduction, Follesdal concludes at the end of his article that 'the
phenomenological-existential philosophy of freedom which Sartre
propounded in Being and Nothingness and in some of his plays and
novels of the 1940s, is full of inconsistencies and difficulties' (SF 406).
The discussion leading up to this conclusion is based on three
arguments, which I will discuss systematically. However, before I
consider each of these, I wish to give a presentation and an assessment
of Follcsdal's interpretation ofSartrean freedom in general.
Follesdal suggests that what Sartre understands as the fundamental
freedom of the subject, the pour-soi, is basically the freedom associated
with constitution. This word is used very often by Sartre without
precise definition, and is inherited from Husserl's phenomenology.
Husserl assumes that consciousness is characterised by intentionality,
being always directed towards something, the intentional object. This
applies in particular to the act of perception. Furthermore, an object of
such a perception is neither created by the subject, nor simply given
from the outside to a passively receiving subject; it is constituted in the
moment the perception is made. In this constitution the experiencing
subject is active and is exercising a certain interpretative freedom. This
freedom, this power of influencing the appearance of the perceived
object, is, according to Follesdal, essentially the freedom expressed in
Sartre's philosophy.
As an example of the freedom involved in constitution, Follesdal
mentions ambiguous drawings, for example, fastrow's famous duck
rabbit4, which can also be found in Wittgenstein,5 a drawing which can
be perceived either as a duck or as a rabbit. Which one of the two is
obviously decided on by the subject, since the drawing is the same in
both cases. This could be taken as an example of a subjective freedom
of interpretation, which determines how the drawing is perceived, how
it is constituted in our perception. In an analogous way each of us
chooses our own situation, its meaning and possibilities of action,
when it is constituted in the conscious experience. Is this an acceptable
and convincing interpretation of the freedom of Sartre's philosophy? I
think it is, provided we take into account the two ways in which Sartre
modifies and develops Husserl's theory of constitution.
The first contribution is the appreciation of the role of
'nothingness'. Although this idea originated from Sartre's reading of
Heidegger and Kierkegaard, he extends the concept much further than
these authors. 'Nothingness' (le néant, Sartre's French rendering of

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 The Case for Sartrean Freedom

Heidegger's 'Das Nichtf and Kierkegaard's ' Intef) is an aspect of the

phenomenal world which has its origin in the pour-soi, and which is
essential in making the sensory experience appear structured and
meaningful. For instance, the separation of a visual object from its
background is made possible by a subjective 'nihilation' ( néantisation)
of the background (that which is not the object). Another example is
the experience of a lack, of something missing or something not being
the case, which furthermore is a condition for experiencing possibilities,
since the possible is not (yet) something actually realised or fulfilled.
And the concept of the possible is in turn essential to the motive (the
aim of realising something that is not yet the case) behind an action.
Since nothingness is a subjective contribution and at the same time a
necessary ingredient in the constitution of the meaning and
possibilities of a situation and of the motives of the subject, it implies
that there is a greater weight on subjectivity and choice in the
constitution in Sartre's phenomenology than in Husserl's.
Sartre's second contribution is that of the 'project', especially the
fundamental project. When a situation is constituted, it is constituted
relative to some human project. Here we have a mutual interaction -
the project is related to the possibilities of a situation, and the situation
is constituted in the light of the project. Again, this leads to a greater
emphasis on the aspect of choice in Sartre's concept of constitution.
Having thus conditionally accepted Follesdal's interpretation of
Sartrean freedom as the freedom associated with constitution, the next
question is whether this interpretation is sufficient to make Sartre's
statements about freedom and responsibility consistent and
acceptable? To Follesdal, the answer turns out to be wo, and he
presents three arguments in support of this conclusion.
Follesdal's first argument concerns the necessity of alternative lines
of action if we are to speak about choice, and hence freedom.
Although there are special situations of ambiguity where the
constitution appears to contain what one might call a choice, as in the
rabbit-duck case, in most cases this is not so: 'When one constitutes
the world, one does not usually choose between alternatives. ... The
idea of choice among various alternatives seems to be as out of place
in connection with constitution as it is in connection with induction.
When one has seen 100 ravens which are all black, does one then
choose to believe that the next raven will be black?' (SF 402).
Follesdal's argument can be interpreted in two ways, depending on
what is meant by his use of the word 'alternatives'. In one
interpretation there is (except for special cases) not more than one
thematised alternative to choose between. There may still be

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 Hans Herlof Grelland

ambiguities that do not occur to the constituting subject, but this is

irrelevant regarding the question of choice. We can only choose
between alternatives that are thematised and available for a conscious
decision. It is thus assumed that it is only meaningful to speak of a
proper choice (and hence of a freedom of choice) when one has at least
two thematised alternatives.
The answer to the argument thus interpreted is that it operates with
a much too restricted concept of choice, and hence of freedom. In
Sartrean terms, it is limited to reflective choices. It is meaningful, and
for Sartrean philosophy also necessary, to include in the concept of
choice also prereflective choices, for which we never thematise
alternatives. An example is when I see the rabbit-duck as a rabbit, and
the alternative interpretation as a duck does not occur to me.
By introducing prereflective choices we get an example of a theory
induced shift of meaning, in this case the meanings of the words 'choice'
and 'freedom'. This shift is dependent on Sartre's concept of
prereflective consciousness, which corresponds to phenomena which are
marginalised in common-sense thinking about human consciousness,
often associated with Freudian or pseudo-Freudian labels like
'unconscious' or 'subconscious'. Usually, we think only of deliberate
and hence reflective choices when we talk about 'choosing', and the
word 'freedom' is associated primarily with such reflective choices. In a
reflective choice more than one possible act is considered and hence
thematised. However, in a prereflective act such a thematisation of
alternatives does not occur.
It can be argued that Sartre's break with common sense is not as
radical as it may seem at first sight. Even in common sense thinking
there exist notions similar to that of prereflective freedom. If we use
the example mentioned earlier of the person who sits and lets his
thoughts wander freely, Sartre would say that he prereflectively
chooses each of the thoughts which appear. But it is clear that prior to
each thought that appears there is no process in which the person
imagines a set of alternative thoughts and then chooses one. In a
normal mode of speaking one might say that the thought just 'appears'
or 'pops up' 'out of the blue', as if it were some autonomous or
external process producing it. But this does not imply that common
sense always precludes the possibility of considering such an
appearance as a choice. The opposite can be demonstrated in situations
in which someone reproaches another. Reproach assumes implicitly
that a choice has been made; that the person reproached could have
acted differently from the way he did, and hence that he had a choice.
People are often reproached for non-reflective thoughts or acts. A

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 The Case for Snrtrean Freedom

driver who has been stopped for driving 70 mph in a 50 mph zone
could not successfully defend himself by saying that the possibility of
driving at another speed never occurred to him. According to the
common-sense view, such a non-reflective driver has made a choice.
So, in the common-sense way of thinking, one may sometimes look
upon an act as being freely chosen, even if there had never been any
consideration of alternative ways of acting.
An additional argument in favour of accepting non-thematised
prereflective choices is that if one does not accept them as valid choices,
one may then run into trouble with regard to the reflective choices,
since reflective thoughts may be initiated by prereflective thoughts.
When you choose between two alternatives, both must occur to you.
For example, you may be thinking of buying a car, say a Rover. Then,
as you are walking along the street, you start thinking about a visit you
made to Rome last summer, and suddenly you remember an Alfa
Romeo you saw parked there, and it occurs to you that you could buy
an Alfa instead of a Rover. By having two alternatives present in your
mind, you make a reflective, deliberate choice. But the alternatives
themselves were not brought into existence by a reflection, but rather
by a spontaneous line of free association. Sometimes such an occurrence
of an alternative choice may be a result of another reflection, but sooner
or later you get to the point where the occurrence of a thought is
prereflective. If freedom were only about reflective choices, human
freedom would be very limited indeed.
Until now I have considered one particular interpretation of
Follesdal's argument. However, a different (second) interpretation can
be made by assuming that Follesdal allows also non-thematised
alternatives. In this case his argument may be phrased as: Except for a
few exceptions, like the duck-rabbit drawing, there are generally no
(thematised or non-thematised) alternative ways of constituting the
world. This implies that the given external conditions behind the
experience allow for only one possible way of constituting the
situation, which is then forced upon consciousness. A simple example
could be that when one sees a sheep, it has to be constituted as a
sheep; the constituting subject has no other choices (except by
misinterpretation, which is not acceptable as a relevant exercise of
freedom). Another example, discussed by Sartre, is the situation of the
French after the outbreak of the Second World War, where most of us
would think that they had no other choice but to accept the war as a
fact, except, again, through misinterpretation of the situation.
Follesdal's argument thus interpreted rests on the assumption that
there (sometimes) exists a unique mapping from the externally given

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 Hans Herlof Grelland

conditions to the finally constituted object or situation. The existence

of such a rigid determination is difficult to sustain even in a Husserlian
framework. It becomes impossible when one takes into account
Sartre's modification of Husserl's theory of constitution, as I have
sketched above.
As a test, let us apply this conclusion to the cases of the sheep or to
the outbreak of the Second World War. Is there any freedom left in the
interpretation of the given conditions? The answer is yes, but these two
cases are examples in which freedom is hidden by what we may call
'socio-linguistic inertia', a general tendency to behave in accordance
with social conventions and common habits, as well as personal habits
which can make individual behaviour quite predictable. This is
described in various ways in Being and Nothingness, for example,
applied to the man who 'apprehends [his choice] ... in its plenitude of
being and because he cannot even imagine that he can exist in it
otherwise' (EN 434). In the post-Sartrean era we have become
increasingly aware of the extent to which this inertia is sustained
through use of language, including the concept of a sheep, the
application of which seems to control our way of perceiving objects.
The effect of language can easily be incorporated in the general
phenomenon of inertia which is implied in Sartre's philosophy.
Commonly accepted theories which are part of our world view or
background knowledge, such as the Ptolemaic theory of the universe
before the Renaissance or Newtonian physics today, also belong to the
field of inertia. The early Sartrean position with respect to such
collective tendencies is that they are the result of a number of individual
decisions. For each individual, the strategy of behaving according to a
collective tendency is an instance of bad faith. It is another futile
attempt to become an en-soi. This point of view is similar to that found
in Heidegger associated with his concept of 'Das Man' and in
Kierkegaard associated with the despair of die 'Spidsborger' (philistine).
The problem of socio-linguistic inertia is neatly illustrated through
its similarity to induction, which is suggested by Follesdal as an
analogy of constitution. According to him, if you see 100 ravens that
are black, you would expect the next raven also to be black. You would
have no choice. In a similar fashion one would have no choice but to
behave in accordance with the general habits of the society in which
one lives. I will question this in the case of induction, and, for similar
reasons, also in the case of socio-linguistic inertia. Consider Follesdal's
example more closely. Assume that instead of observing 100 ravens,
you make three throws of a die and that the die comes up six each
time. According to the principle of induction we would expect a six the

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 The Case for Sartrean Freedom

fourth time. But a well-informed person would instead expect any

value from one to six with equal probability the fourth time. He would
choose not to apply induction at all. In the case of ravens, he would be
expected to apply induction for the specific reason that it would be in
accordance with the background theory that colours of birds within a
species tend not to vary. We see here how socio-linguistic inertia in the
form of commonly accepted theories and concepts (i.e., language)
come into play to obscure the choices which are implicitly made.
When we think differendy with respect to dice than with respect to
birds, it is because we have a different theory about the behaviour of
dice. It is possible to consider our choice of language and theories as
choices made explicidy or made by adapting to the common uses of
the surrounding society. Like many choices, the choice of one
particular language implies that many ways of acting become fixed, like
interpreting a sheep as a sheep and nothing else. This concludes my
discussion of the second interpretation of Follesdal's first argument.
I would now like to turn to another of Follesdal's arguments, in
which he argues that a choice in the ethical sense, which implies moral
responsibility, requires that the action chosen has an aim, an intention
in the non-technical sense of the word, and that this does not apply to
the act of constitution. He criticises Sartre for not being aware of the
clear distinction in Husserl between the two uses of the word
'intention'. Intention (a) has the strict theoretical meaning of the
word in phenomenology, when one says that consciousness is
intentional. The other, intention (b), has the everyday meaning of the
word as the aim motivating an action, for instance when I say that it is
my intention to convince the reader by my arguments. Follesdal
implies that since an intention (b) is a necessary condition for assuming
moral responsibility for an action, one cannot attribute such a
responsibility to the freedom which is exercised in constitution, which
implies only intentionality (a).
In answering this argument, I turn to the alleged confusion by
Sartre of the two intentionalities. To Sartre, an activity exercised by a
human being is only an action if it is intentional. He does not specify
in which of the two senses it has to be intentional. A possible reason
for this is that this distinction would interfere with his line of
reasoning, since Sartre is actually modifying Husserl's concept of
intentionality when applying it to an action, i.e. when a person is doing
something actively. It is interesting to note that while Husserl places
his main emphasis on the study of the observing and thinking subject,
Sartre is more concerned with the acting subject. To Sartre the
conscious subject is certainly intentional (a), as in Husserl, but it is also

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 Hans Herlof Grelland

something that exists through its projects, and a project is essentially the
same as an intention (b). This fact does not imply that the distinction
between intentionality (a) and (b) disappears entirely, but it suggests
that they become closer in meaning, which can explain why Sartre is
less inclined to keep them apart.
The traditional view of intention (b) of an action implies that the
action itself is a kind of object in the world, an en-soi, while the
intention (b) is an attitude of the acting subject towards the action. We
say that there is an intention (b) behind the action. However, an action
as Sartre understands it is something that points beyond itself towards
the project or aim associated with it or the lack which motivates the
change which the act is designed to achieve. This 'pointing beyond' is
part of the action's meaning as it is constituted. In this way the
intentional action as a phenomenon is a manifestation or projection of
the intentional (a) consciousness. Similar to consciousness, which
points beyond itself through intentionality (a), the action points
beyond itself, and is constituted as having this intentional meaning
through the human project of which it is a part. Therefore, the
intentionality of an action contains something of both intentionality
(a) and intentionality (b). We see that to Sartre the distinction between
the two kinds of intention is less distinct than to Husserl. This follows
from Sartre's philosophy, and is not due to any confusion of terms.
Having clarified this, I shall now turn to the central point of
Follesdal's argument. Follesdal claims that a choice in the ethical sense,
i.e., a choice implying ethical responsibility, requires that the action
chosen has an aim, i.e., an intention (b), and therefore one cannot
associate any such choice or responsibility with constitution, which does
not have any such intention (b). In other words, since a constitution is
not motivated by a specific aim, it is not a proper action in the sense of
Sartre. However, the situation is not that clear-cut. Although it must be
admitted that in a Husserlian framework it may be true that the
constitution has no aim, in a Sartrean framework this is no longer the
case, because the situation is constituted relative to human projects
which couple constitution with aims and thus with intentions (b).
Furthermore, Follesdal's suggested restriction of what can be
accepted as ethical choice and responsibility is, in my opinion, difficult
to sustain. If a driver causes an accident while driving too fast, his
intention (b) may not be to cause this accident. Does this imply that
the driver is not subject to ethical criticism for being responsible for
the damage caused? Many people feel properly responsible for having
caused harm they never intended when they chose a certain course of
action. Are such choices outside the realm of ethics? I think not. Even

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 The Case for Sartrean Freedom

restricted to the Husserlian interpretation of constitution, the way in

which we constitute the situation has consequences that are ethically
relevant. Slavery in the U.S.A. was made possible not by evil intentions
(b) but by constituting the world as consisting of superior and inferior
races. And ethical criticism should have as its target this unreflected
acceptance of such a world view just as much as the individual
reflectively chosen practice of slavery. A 'good' or 'innocent' slave
owner is still properly subject to ethical criticism.
I would even suggest that an increased awareness of the choices
implied in constitution broadens the range of ethics and makes it more
relevant, realistic and fundamental. Sartre has contributed substantially
to this awareness, although he never finished his planned work on
ethics. One may still disagree with this view, but it is nevertheless a
possible and consistent one.
Having discussed Follesdal's first two arguments, I will now
consider the argument in which he criticises Sartre's approval of Jules
Romains' statement, 'In war there are no innocent victims' (EN 554).
The argument concerns how limited the freedom of constitution is,
and is therefore strictly an application of Follesdal's first argument to
a specific case. However, the case is sufficiently interesting to deserve
a separate treatment. Sartre's claim, 'We are all guilty of the war',
appears to be slightly stronger than Romains'. Although Follesdal
admits the theoretical possibility of constituting the world without the
conception of war, he asks rhetorically, 'If I constitute my world in
such a way that there is no war in it, does this reduce anybody's
suffering - except, perhaps, my own?' In other words, would it make
a difference to make such a choice? Isn't this kind of'freedom' quite
powerless in the confrontation with the real world?
It is important at this point to remind ourselves that Sartre's
concept of responsibility is not an ethical notion in any traditional,
narrow sense. Follesdal cites Sartre's own definition: 'We use the word
"responsibility" in its ordinary sense, for "consciousness of being the
uncontested author of an event or a thing". In this sense the
responsibility of the for-itself is overwhelming, since it is thanks to the
for-itself that it happens that there is a world' (SF 308; EN 639).
Applying this definition to the Second World War as being the
situation for an arbitrarily chosen Frenchman at that time, no other
interpretation of it appears to be possible but to identify 'being the
author' with 'constitution'. So the question is: is this a convincing use
of the words 'freedom' and 'responsibility'?
Again, it is important to understand the concepts in terms of the
theory of which they are a part. In this particular application of the

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 Hons Herlof Grelland

notions of freedom and responsibility one is easily misled by the usual

connotations. It seems that Follesdal assumes that if I claim 'I am
responsible for war', a convincing use of the word 'responsible' would
imply that I am in a position to eliminate it by eliminating every aspect
included in the concept of 'war', e.g. another person's suffering.
Sartre's concept of responsibility is obviously different. I cannot do
away with the suffering, but I can refrain from interpreting the
suffering in terms of a concept that can be used to justify the suffering.
Is this really an untenable interpretation of responsibility? After all, it
may have enormous practical consequences. For instance, if I do not
interpret the suffering as caused by war, I do not have to blame every
person belonging to the same country as the soldier for causing the
suffering. Or, for the persons causing the suffering, I eliminate the
excuse that their act was justified by the person's participation in the
war. This way of thinking is what every dictator and tyrant fears more
than anything. For Hitler, slogans, uniforms, military parades, songs,
speeches, violent suppression of public utterances, etc. had one
common aim: to enforce a collective bad faith and eliminate the
awareness of the freedom of constitution in each individual. He feared
the tremendous power in the people implied by being able to see
things differently to the way promoted by the oppressor.
I believe that Sartre's philosophy also provides insights into the
present-day attempts at understanding the situation we are in during
the current 'war against terrorism', a situation in which the traditional
concepts of war are difficult to apply. My country, Norway, like many
other countries, does not have a death penalty, because it is considered
inhumane. However, the government allows killing in times of war.
This moral contradiction is brought into focus in a 'terror war', where
the front lines are invisible and the distinction between military and
police operations is blurred. In my opinion, Sartre's analysis is relevant
in understanding and clarifying many aspects of this moral dilemma by
making us conscious of the possibilities implied in the freedom of
constitution.
In his introduction, Follesdal mentions Sartre's famous statement 'I
choose to be born'. Having defended Sartre's concept of freedom
against Follesdal's critique, I think it would be illuminating to
conclude with a discussion of this paradoxical claim. Follesdal starts by
pointing out the inapplicability here of traditional notions of freedom,
'For when did I choose to be born?' (SF 392). Then, after having
presented his interpretation of freedom as the freedom of constitution,
he adds, '... we now see what Sartre means by ... "I choose to be
born." He does not mean that before my birth I made a choice and

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 The Case for Sartrean Freedom

decided that then, at a certain moment, I wanted to be born. He

means that now, at every instant in my life, I constitute a world in
which the event of my birth is included as a part. This interpretation
also fits in with Sartre's use of the present tense of the verb: I choose to
be born, not I chose to be born' (SF 397). Nevertheless Follesdal ends
up by seeing this 'remarkable' statement as the end product of an
'ethical translation' of Husserl's phenomenology, a translation of
'dubious validity' (SF 403). It is therefore worthwhile elaborating on
this statement, which will throw light on Sartre's rhetoric in general.
The statement, in French is, '... je choisis d'être né', which I will call
statement A. We have to understand why Sartre gives the statement
the form it has, a form which invites criticism from the analytical
reader. It is obviously intended to be both surprising and provocative.
It is, however, not intended to be meaningless or absurd, but rather a
part of a coherent philosophical system. To understand the rhetoric of
the passage, it is necessary to read it in context, and see that it is
formulated as a response to the common outburst, 'I didn't ask to be
born!' This statement, which we will call statement B, appears on the
surface to be obviously correct and self-evident. When Sartre seemingly
disputes it, he finds it appropriate to do so in a form that appears to be
obviously wrong, namely 'not B'. But B is not as plain and simple as it
seems, because it is more than just a straightforward statement. It has
a more subtle meaning, which can be stated as, 'I am not responsible for
the fact that I exist, and consequently not responsible for what I am.'
Statement B then is really about responsibility and disclaiming of
responsibility. And it is to this implied meaning that Sartre is
responding.
Sartre's answer is, however, not a precise negation of B, but rather
a negation of a carefully modified statement. Against the statement 'je
n'ai pas demandé à naître' ('I did not ask to be born', i.e. once in the
past), Sartre puts the statement A: ''je choisis d'être né' ('I choose to be
born', i.e. as a present fact). The English translation does not
distinguish as clearly as the French original between naître and être né,
so this small but highly significant change of tense is easily overlooked
in the (badly) translated text. Through an accurate reading of the
French text, it is no longer possible to interpret A as stating that I once
had the choice of being born. This does not imply that A becomes a
triviality. It still rests on and expresses Sartre's theory of freedom.
Anybody who rejects this theory can also be expected to reject Sartre's
response to the question B. But the statement A, although perhaps still
'remarkable' is no longer absurd. Sartre himself is obviously aware that
his rhetoric is open to misinterpretation, and he therefore adds the

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 Hans Herlof Grclland

qualification in a certain sense', to protect the statement against

naïve misinterpretation.
In this article I have tried to defend Sartre's concept of freedom by
using Follesdal's analysis against him - by accepting his precise and
beautifully elaborated interpretation of Sartre as a basis for the refusal
of his arguments for the untenability of Sartrean freedom.

Notes

Acknowledgement
I am very grateful to Dr. Richard Parr, who has read the manuscript and suggested many
changes, improving both the level of English and the clarity of the presentation.

1. Jean-Paul Sartre, L'Etre et le néant (Paris: Gallimard, 1943). English translation:

Hazel Barnes, Being and Nothingness (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956).
References in the text take die form of EN followed by a page number.
2. J. Stewart, (ed.) The Debate Between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty (Evanston, 111:
Northwestern University Press, 1988); G. McCulloch, Using Sartre. An Analytical
Introduction to Early Sartrean Themes (New York & London: Routledge, 1994);
Levy, N., Sartre (Oxford: Oneworld, 2002); N. Farrell, Fox. The New Sartre (New
York &t London: Continuum, 2003).
3. D. Follesdal. 'Sartre on Freedom' in The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre, ed. P.A.
Schilpp (La Salle 111: Open Court 'The Library of Living Philosophers', Vol. XVI,
1981), pp. 392-407.
4. J. Jastrow, Fact and Fable in Psychology (Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press,
1971 [1901]).
5. L. Wittgenstein, Philosophisches Untersuchungen, Part II: XI (1953). English
translation: G. E. M. Anscombe, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell,
1967).

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