印太战略背景下美澳安全与防务合作 - Joshua Monroe Mayfield

2021 届研究生硕士学位论文
分类号：学校代码：10269
密级：学号: 51182200059
Eаst Chinа Normаl University

硕士学位论文
MАSTER’S DISSERTАTION
论文题目: 印太战略背景下美澳安全与防务合作
院系：国际关系与地区发展研究院
专业：国际关系
研究方向：当代中国研究
指导教师：汪诗明教授
学位申请人： Joshua Monroe Mayfield
2021 年 5 月26 日
Dissertation for master degree in 2021 University code:10269
Student ID: 51182200059
East China Normal University
Title：United States-Australia Defense and

Security Cooperation Under the Backdrop of
the Indo-Pacific Strategy
Department： School of Advanced International and Area Studies
Major： International Relations
Research direction： Contemporary Chinese studies
Supervisor： Professor Wang Shiming
Candidate： Joshua Monroe Mayfield
MAY, 2021
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Mayfield Joshua Monroe 硕士学位论文答辩委员会成员
姓名（NAME）职称（TITLE）单位备注（NOTE）

（WORKING
UNIT）
潘兴明教授
华东师范大学主席
王铁军副教授华东师范大学
王海燕副研究员华东师范大学
华东师范大学硕士学位论文
Abstract
This thesis examines the United States’ and Australia’s Indo-Pacific strategy, as it relates to the Free and
Open Indo Pacific (FOIP) policy and China’s rise. During the Cold War, the ANZUS alliance was defined
as a key contributor of defense capabilities within the context of Asia-Pacific regional security. Historically,
defense and security cooperation interests of the United States and Australia have promoted a networking of
alliances in the Asia-Pacific region. Today, the two critical areas of the Indo-Pacific strategy are the
development of the FOIP policy and China’s rise. Due to the high stakes of China’s rise, conceptualizing the
main actors and threats to the FOIP policy should hold as a point of departure for any assessment of United
States-Australia defense and security cooperation in the Indo Pacific. Countries in the alliance network will
need to assess their security interests with the United States and Australia against their own economic
interests with a rising China. Even though the prospects for defense and security cooperation are very likely
in the case of the United States and Australia under the FOIP policy, the other Indo-Pacific countries’
capabilities and intentions are uncertain at this juncture of the Indo-Pacific Strategy’s development.
Keywords: [United States, Australia], [Indo-Pacific Strategy], [Free and Open Indo Pacific
(FOIP) policy]
DocuSign Envelope ID: 35902B45-8D39-455D-BF10-D2227C12AFE2
摘要
当前的美澳同盟已经被赋予新的时代内涵。冷战期间，《澳新美同盟条约》被定义为亚太地区
安全防御能力的关键因素。从历史上看，美国和澳大利亚的防务和安全合作利益促进了亚太地区联
盟的网络化。如今，“印太战略”的两个关键因素是自由开放的印太政策的建立和中国的崛起。由
于中国的崛起事关重大，对自由开放的印太政策的主要参与者和威胁的概念界定应该成为评估美澳
在印太地区开展防务和安全合作的出发点。这一同盟网络中的国家将需要评估它们与美国和澳大利
亚的安全利益，以及它们与崛起的中国的经济利益。本文据此认为，尽管美国和澳大利亚在自由开
放的印太政策下的防务和安全合作前景很好，但是其他印太国家的能力和意图目前仍存在不确定
性。
关键词：美国，澳大利亚，印度-太平洋战略，自由开放的印太政策
华东师范大学硕士学位论文
CONTENTS
Introduction…………………………………………………………………………….6
Part 1.1 Background………………………………………………………………..6
Part 1.2 Literature Review ……………………………….………………………...7
Part 1.3 Research Objectives……………………………………..……………….10
Part 1.4 Research Question………………………………………………………..11
Part 1.5 Methodology……………………………………………………………..11
Part 1.6 Research Limitations……………………………………………………..12
Part 1.7 Research Structure……………………………………………………….13
Chapter II: United States-Australia Defense and Security Cooperation During the Cold
War……………………………………………………………………………………14
Part 2.1 Origins of the ANZUS Alliance………………………………………….14
Part 2.2 Issues Within the ANZUS Alliance………………………………………19
Chapter III: Scope and Context of the United States’ and Australia’s Indo-Pacific
Strategy……………………………………………………………………………….23
Part 3.1: Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) Policy………………………………23
Part 3.2: Australia’s Key Role in the Global Rules-Based Order…………………27
Chapter IV: Critical Issue-Areas of US-Australia Defense and Security Cooperation in
the Indo-Pacific…………………………………………………………………….....32
Part 4.1 Main Focus on Maritime Security Cooperation and SLOC Defense Strategy
Part 4.2 Wider Collaboration on Cybersecurity and Information-Sharing……….36
Part 4.3 Ongoing Problems with Military Infrastructure…………………………..41

Chapter V: Key Concepts and Prospects for the Implementation of the FOIP Policy
Part 5.1 Guam and Western Australia as a Strategic Point in the Indo-Pacific…….44
Part 5.2 ASEAN as a Variable to China’s Influence in the Indo-Pacific…………..47
Part 5.3 Scenario Planning: Conceptual Development Framework of the FOIP
Policy……………………………………………………………………………...52
Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………….58
References…………………………………………………………………………….63
Appendix……………………………………………………………………………...68
Acknowledgement…………………………………………………………………….73
4
1. Introduction
1.1. Background
The Indo-Pacific region has become an important area of contemporary international affairs. The
United States and Australia are two of the crucial actors in the region. The development of the Indo-
Pacific strategy likewise underscores the value of the United States-Australia alliance in the 21st
century. The Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) alliance was defined as a key component
of the Asia-Pacific regional security architecture during the Cold War era. Often referred to as a hubs
and spokes system, the alliance sought to ensure regional stability by deterring the Soviet Union’s
expansion through a network of countries throughout the Asia-Pacific region who were incapable of
defending themselves militarily. This truth does not however reflect the same kind of security
environment in the Indo-Pacific today: it is now a region which is evolving with contemporary
international affairs, notably with the rise of China.
The Asia-Pacific region has had a long-standing history of security alliances. These alliances are
made up of the Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, among other, in the Asia-
Pacific region. The Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) policy reinforces the pursuit of partnership
between these countries by stimulating economic activity and defense cooperation throughout the
whole region. Since the ANZUS Treaty signed in September 1951, a strategy has been in place to deter
and protect against any form of regional instability that might threaten the interests of the United States
and allies in the region.
The United States and Australia relationship is growing stronger in support of defense and security
cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. On July 4, 2018, the United States and Australia held their 100-year
Mateship which signified to the international community that the United States-Australia bilateral
5
partnership has preserved through a centenary of tumultuous political events, international conflicts
and strategic challenges. Now, the two countries seem to be growing stronger both politically and
strategically as evidenced by their enhanced military cooperation through what has been known as the
“Indo-Pacific Strategy.”
As the main proponents of the FOIP policy, this thesis asserts that the United States and Australia
will continue to play major role in the developments of an Indo-Pacific security framework. Moreover,
defense and security cooperation is significant to United States’ and Australia’s Indo-Pacific Strategy
because the networking of alliances serves as a foundation for the implementation of the FOIP policy.
For example, the Indo-Pacific Strategy calls for a networking of alliances by reinforcing forward
posture agreements and building on new partnerships with countries in the Indo-Pacific.1
1.2 Literature Review
In the words of the 22nd Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser, “foreign policy needs to be
seen in the context of its time.”2 In the context of the Cold War, the ANZUS alliance sought to develop
defense and security cooperation through a network of alliances in the Asia-Pacific region, due to the
superpower competition between the United States and Soviet Union. The international system no
longer contains this bipolar nature of international politics, however, which allowed for the United
States to secure alliances across the globe by assuring defense of those countries against the Soviet
threat.
For instance, a panel of international relations experts at the United States Studies Centre in Sydney
1
“Indo-Pacific Strategy Report—Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region,” published
June 1, 2019, pp. 1-55.
2
Former Australian Prime Minister Malcom Fraser spoke at Australia National University in an interview
with Asia and Pacific Policy Studies.
6
reached a consensus that in contemporary international affairs this networking of alliances must face
“managed multi-polarity” in the Indo-Pacific.3 This idea of managed multi-polarity was defined by
Zack Cooper, one in which the two primary goals are maritime security and networking of alliances in
the Indo-Pacific. The same panel highlighted in their Report Launch “The ANZUS Alliance in an
Ascending Asia” that the rise of trilateral security initiatives directed by Australia, Japan and India
would pose significant challenges for each countries’ defense cooperation with the United States,
notably with issues concerning interoperability and defense budgeting. 4 Moreover, each country
within the alliance network now faces an enhanced risk from a rising China, which could impact the
long held efficacy of the alliance network in the Indo-Pacific. Though this fact remains uncertain for
now, and thus it is not the subject of this thesis.
Take ASEAN as an example. China’s role as a key investor in ASEAN infrastructure projects could
put it at an advantageous position for bargaining power forcing ASEAN countries to choose over their
security and economic interests.5 In fact, according to Yang Xiuping, the links between innovation
and development at the level of ASEAN-China regional cooperation are to promote policy
coordination and tap new potential for cooperation; improve the mechanism and build more innovative
cooperation platforms; and promote and encourage exchanges among technological personnel,
scientific research institutions and innovative-minded personnel.6
To this end, Susan Shirk and Orville Schell outlined a variety of policy recommendations for the
former Trump Administration in their “Task Force Report.” For instance, on cybersecurity and policies
3
Zack Cooper, “The ANZUS Alliance in an Ascending Asia,” report launch broadcasted on the Australia’s
Public Affairs Channel.
4
Cooper, “The ANZUS Alliance in an Ascending Asia”
5
Jean-Marc F. Blanchard. “China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI) and Southeast Asia: A Chinese
‘pond’ not ‘lake’ in the Works,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 21:111. 329-343.
6
“Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference 2018 Session Summary,” published by the Asia Regional
Cooperation on 11 April 2018, pp.1-8.
7
they noted that a divergence of interests and normative views could makes cooperation extremely
difficult in the emerging environment of cyber relations.7 On Internet governance of cyber relations,
the United States and China’s views are not compatible. According to the Task Force Report, the United
States reserves the right to issue a free flow of content across borders while China promotes their right
to control the flow of information and Internet networks within their national boundaries. Thus, at the
most fundamental level, cybersecurity cooperation between China and the United States is very
unlikely. This signifies the critical aspects of how cyber cooperation will be viewed in the Indo-Pacific
Strategy.
The former Singaporean leader Lee Kuan Yew held a rather realist description of international
relations when he said that China would not likely fight for military competition, but for economic
competition in its sphere of influence.8 Susan Shirk added to this idea that economic competition from
a regional perspective, when she noted that the way state-actors behave and interact in the era of
globalization might be construed by adversaries as geo-political competition instead of engagement.9
Wang Jisi also pointed out the factors “that pose a serious threat to China’s national security are
the issues that may turn ‘external troubles’ into ‘internal troubles.’” 10 Thus, the nature of the key
concepts and prospects for the implementation of the FOIP policy will most likely revolve around
conflicting positions of geopolitical interests and soft power diplomatic engagement between
adversaries—with the rise of China becoming one of the most critical issues of the 21st century.
University of Sydney’s Brendon O’Connor highlights that the United States-Australia alliance, as
7
Orville Schell and Susan Shirk, U.S. Policy Toward China: Recommendations for a New Administration,
(Asia Society: Task Force Report, 2017).
8
Lee Kuan Yew quoted in Susan Shirk, China Fragile Superpower: How China’s Internal Politics Could
Derail Its Peaceful Rise, (Oxford University Press, 2007).
9
Ibid, Susan Shirk, pp.10
10
Wang Jisi quoted in Susan Shirk. Ibid.
8
it’s developing under the backdrop of the Indo-Pacific, "need[s] a serious discussion within our politics
and our nation about whether a bigger US military presence is a good idea or not. We shouldn't fall
into the ritualistic description of the special relationship when hard thinking about the pros and cons
of closer military relations is necessary.”11 That’s where this thesis begins. The United States’ and
Australia’s Indo-Pacific Strategy must be conceptualized by certain specifications and values, in which
a proof of concept can be tested and implemented, in order to determine the effects of China’s rise in
the Indo-Pacific.
1.3 Research Objectives
Since the strategic context of the United States-Australia relationship has changed immensely since
the end of the Cold War, Australia has the opportunity to play a bigger role in what has historically
been considered Asia-Pacific affairs.12 The United States and Australia alliance is not just a relic of
the Cold War security system, it proves to be growing stronger as evidenced by the United States’ and
Australia’s Indo-Pacific Strategy. Nevertheless, the United States and Australia face a multitude of
critical areas of defense and security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. The FOIP policy ushered
in by the United States and Australia will be key in determining whether the historically shared-value
system can still have a major impact on building-up the networking of alliances in the Indo-Pacific.
Furthermore, the crucial assessment of the United States’ and Australia’s Indo-Pacific strategy
revolves around the FOIP policy and its ability to engage or compete with China. The capabilities of
11
Brendan O’Connor quoted in Emily Cheng. “US, Australia military get closer,” China Daily, 2011,
http://language.chinadaily.com.cn/cdaudio/2011-11/17/content_14112201.htm.
12
“10 telling quotes from former PM Malcolm Fraser, who died this morning,” Business Insider: Australia.
March, 20, 2015, https://www.businessinsider.com.au/here-are-10-of-the-most-inspiring-quotes-from-former-
pm-malcolm-fraser-who-died-this-morning-2015-3.
9
Indo-Pacific countries to maintain ties to China while increasing defense and security ties with United
States and Australia is also a matter of concern to the Indo-Pacific Strategy. By causing tensions with
China, this might result in further deteriorating the networking of alliances in the Indo-Pacific. It’s one
thing to adhere to the concept of FOIP; it’s another to assume that Indo-Pacific countries will cooperate
with Australia and United States over issues averse to their economic interests with a rising China.
1.4 Research Question
The United States and Australia must face new critical areas and challenges in the Indo-Pacific.
Two of the major obstacles of the Indo-Pacific Srategy comprise the policy of a Free and Open Indo-
Pacific (FOIP) and the rise of China. Throughout this thesis, the concept of FOIP serves two functions；
it is highlighted as a value system, and as a way to promote the networking of alliances under the
framework of the Indo-Pacific Strategy. Under the FOIP policy, will the relationship between countries
in the Indo-Pacific be critical in evaluating the rise of China in the Indo-Pacific?
The priority issue of concern for this thesis is whether actions taken by the United States and
Australia will receive support from other Indo-Pacific countries, specifically in regards to the FOIP
policy. In other words, will the networking of alliances strategy, as developed by the ANZUS alliance
during the Cold War, remain valuable to the Indo-Pacific Strategy? Under the circumstances of China’s
rise, how will United States-Australia defense and security cooperation unfold in the Indo-Pacific
region in relation to the FOIP policy? Lastly, how much power and influence will the FOIP policy have
in determining the Indo-Pacific security framework?
1.5 Methodology
The origins of the ANZUS alliance traces back to September 1951, when the ANZUS Treaty was
10
adopted, up until the Raegan Administration when the alliance came under scrutiny from New Zealand
and the international community. After an introspective look at how the alliance is shifting from
defense and security cooperation in Asia Pacific to Indo-Pacific, the main aspects of the FOIP policy—
preparedness, partnerships and promotion of networked region—are conceptualized and structured to
analyze the United States’ and Australia’s alliance Indo-Pacific Strategy. I look at both primary
government documents and secondary sources from experts on the United States, Australia, China,
Southeast Asia, and others.
The information from government documents gives the perspectives from both the Australia and
United States vantage point for defense and security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. Many of the two
countries’ values converge on the topic the FOIP policy and are compatible with upgrading defense
capabilities and weapons technology on the Australian continent. Moreover, the secondary information
points out critical areas of concern regarding the history of the ANZUS alliance, as well as the
objectives of the United States-Australia alliance in the Indo-Pacific.
After conceptualizing and explaining the FOIP policy and its impact on United States’ and
Australia’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, the focal point of this thesis turns to critical areas of defense and
security cooperation within the alliance network in the Indo-Pacific. To this end, I look at three critical
areas: maritime security and sea lines of communication (SLOC); cyber security and information-
sharing; and military infrastructure. Utilizing a variety of primary and secondary sources to discuss
these critical areas, as well as identify which defense capabilities are being employed in the Indo-
Pacific, is one method used to analyze how the Indo-Pacific Strategy is promoting a networking of
alliances under the FOIP policy.
11
1.6 Research Limitations
Since there are no specific case studies on Southeast Asian countries, such as the Philippines and
Indonesia, greater focus on maritime security and military modernization is limited in this thesis. These
areas are a key feature of the alliance network in the Indo-Pacific, and therefore the question of where
is the impetus to expand on security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific cannot be answered. I conclude
from the analysis that issues concerning military infrastructure, strategic points and military
modernization share a commonality to the broader effects of geopolitical and soft power issues in the
Indo-Pacific region.
Geopolitical and soft power issues are part of a broader issue in international politics, though in
the Indo-Pacific it has crucial implications for how state-actors will behave, interact and publicize
themselves to the international community. Information and publicity have become a convenient tool
in the Information Age that can be manipulated for political motives. Therefore, geopolitical and soft
power issues should be analyzed together in order to share the links between ethnic groups, territorial
disputes and resource conflicts—the main drivers of war in the 21st century. The study of ethnic
conflicts and cultural issues is an overall under-studied challenge and prospect for regional security.
With the rise of maritime and cyber threats in the Indo-Pacific, ethnic conflicts have the potential to
test the rise of China’s effect on the networking of alliances as well as the strength of defense and
security cooperation within United States-Australia alliance.
1.7 Research Structure
The first section of this thesis (Chapter 2) provides information on the background of the United
12
States-Australia alliance, also known as the Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) alliance.
Research about the Indo-Pacific Strategy needs a historical context, for which the ANZUS alliance is
the most rational place to start. The second section (Chapter 3) analyzes the development the Free and
Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) policy, looking at some of the official doctrine and statements made
concerning the FOIP Policy, Global Rules-Based Order and Military Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.
The third section (Chapter 4) gives attention to critical issue areas of the United States-Australia-Japan
defense and security cooperation interests in the Indo-Pacific. Japan’s role in cybersecurity is a case in
point, while the developments in Okinawa are still uncertain. In the fourth and final section (Chapter
5), the key concepts and prospects for the implementation of the Indo-Pacific Strategy are analyzed
from the perspective of International Relations Theory, for which a model and scenario based on the
Conceptual Development Framework of FOIP Policy is provided for further academic studies about
United States-Australia defense and security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.
2. United States-Australia Defense and Security

Cooperation During the Cold War
2.1 Origins of the ANZUS Alliance
The Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) alliance was formally established in San
Francisco under the ANZUS Treaty of 1951. After World War Two, the British empire could no longer
uphold the responsibilities to provide security to Australia and thus were replaced by the United States
“as a kind of guarantor of regional stability and as a new type of geopolitical patron.”13 This new type
of alliance system ushered in a new role for the United States in the Asia-Pacific as a key security
13
Joseph A Camilleri, The Australia-New Zealand-US Alliance: Regional Security in the Nuclear Age,
(Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1987), pp. 1-273.
13
partner for Australia and New Zealand. Against the backdrop of the Cold War, the alliance also put
defense capabilities to the top of Australia’s political, economic and security agenda—a fact that
remains true for United States-Australia defense and security cooperation under the backdrop of the
Indo-Pacific Strategy.
In other words, the motives to secure Asia Pacific were designed by the United States to establish
the legitimacy of Australia’s security needs on the one hand, and to the extent that Australia could
apply the containment doctrine in Asia Pacific on the other hand. 14 The United States thereby was
determined to ensure regional stability through its defense and security cooperation with Australia in
Asia-Pacific. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union’s expansion into the Pacific and Indian Ocean
region served as a legitimate interest of Australia to maintain the ANZUS Treaty. As for Australia’s
security needs and defense capabilities, the containment doctrine was implemented by the United
States to deter Soviet and other Communist-led nations from acting aggressively towards other
countries in the Asia-Pacific. The doctrine also sought to contain any of the expansionist tendencies
being flouted by the Soviet Union in Asia-Pacific. Due to this emerging threat, Australia’s ability to
provide the United States with strategic deterrence goals in the Asia-Pacific should not be
underestimated. From the perspective of the United States, Australia’s role in the ANZUS alliance was
twofold: achieve the United States’ foreign policy and geopolitical objectives in Asia Pacific as well
as for maintaining international peace, security and order under the threat of Soviet-Communism.
The evolution of the Cold War and the impact of the Soviet threat on the ANZUS alliance in Asia
Pacific led to three crucial developments on the Australian continent—the Joint Geological and
Geophysical Research Station, North West Cape and Pine Gap. The Joint Geological and Geophysical
14
Camilleri, The Australia-New Zealand-US Alliance, pp. 6-7
14
Research Station was set up in Alice Springs for the purpose of monitoring Soviet activities in the
Indian and Pacific Oceans while the military facilities at North West Cape became a crucial link in the
United States Global Defense Network.15 At Pine Gap, where Article II of the ANZUS Treaty—to
maintain and develop their individual capacity to resist armed attack—was invoked by deploying
military personnel, equipment and weapons, the United States used the military facility for intelligence
and surveillance.
Today, Pine Gap is still an important military facility of the United States in Australia. Former
Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser said that Pine Gap was crucial to the development of the ANZUS
alliance during the Cold War because it provided the alliance with key defensive capabilities in
information and surveillance technology.16 This also added legitimate interests for continental defense
and regional security in Australia based on their own foreign policy and strategic objectives in the
Indian and Pacific oceans.
These critical events allowed for what Spender called “a suitable voice in the determination of
policy and the shaping of events” 17 by Australia in the Asia Pacific region. The convergence of
American and Australian perceptions to international order, peace, security carried on through the Cold
War, which called for substantially improving Australia’s defense capabilities to meet those ends. A
case in point is the Guam Doctrine of 1969, which entails that countries in Asia must bear their own
responsibility to defend itself from adversaries in the Asia-Pacific region.18 This moment led to what
might be seen as a revitalization of the ANZUS alliance in response to the Soviet threat. Australia’s
15
Camilleri, Ibid.
16
An Interview with Malcolm Fraser, 22nd Prime Minister of Australia at the Lowy Institute for International
Policy.
17
Percy Spender, former Australia Minister for External Affairs, quoted in Camilleri, Ibid, pp.44.
18
Paul Dibb, Review of Australia’s Defense Capabilities: Report to the Minister for Defense, (Australian
Government Publishing Service: Canberra, 1986), pp.1-175.
15
defense community expressed to the United States that their shared interests in preserving international
order, peace and security in Asia-Pacific should emphasize improvement in the defense capabilities of
Australia—exemplified by a strengthened form of strategic cooperation between Australia and the
United States including exchange training, joint military exercises, standardization of military
procurement policies, close collaboration between the Australian and American intelligence
communities and upgrades to United States defense facilities in Australia.19
Though the Guam Doctrine of 1969 reflects the international context of the Cold War, the doctrine
is a suitable example of how the ANZUS alliance had become stronger through a convergence of
foreign policy interests and geopolitical objectives between the ANZUS alliance in the Asia Pacific
region. It was even more pronounced as a way to promote the concept of the “free world”. The Guam
Doctrine of 1969 had expressed to the international community that the ANZUS alliance not only
represented military capabilities but also the common cultures, history and traditions shared by the
alliance. The values shared by United States and Australia had placed the “free world” concept as their
guiding principle for international order, peace and security in Asia Pacific—for which the ANZUS
alliance sought to provide the military cooperation, defense capabilities and strategic deterrence to
achieve the “free world” ideal in Asia-Pacific.
Moreover, the Guam Doctrine of 1969 expressed that the United States would not continue to
provide a guarantor security role for the entire Asia Pacific region—a notion that Australia possibly
took as a sign of the United States reexamining the ANZUS alliance objectives for regional security in
Asia-Pacific. As Australia has historically viewed its own security in relation to regional security, such
as in Asia-Pacific and South Pacific, so the Guam Doctrine of 1969 rightfully declared all countries in
19
Dibb, Review of Australia’s Defense Capabilities, pp. 25.
16
Asia-Pacific to seriously asses their security needs and defense capabilities in the context for protecting
the “free world.”
This thinking on the situation of Asia Pacific was tested by two examples of conflict following
the implementation of the doctrine in Indonesia and the Philippines—the former where actual conflict
broke out over West New Guinea and the latter where conflict between ethnic groups caused tensions
in the whole region. In both cases, the United States had not assured any of the countries in Asia-
Pacific that it would be willing to go to war to maintain regional stability in the name of protecting the
“free world.”
However, the United States support for regional stability through enhanced defense and security
cooperation with Australia should have been a sign to those countries that it seriously committed to
the security interests in Asia-Pacific. For instance, the Asia Pacific region had become a focal point of
regional competition and geopolitical rivalry between the United States and Soviet Union in the 1980’s.
This meant a stronger reliance on strategic cooperation and shared interests between the United States
and Australia to maintain international order, peace and security in Asia-Pacific. The inclination
generated by the Reagan Administration’s peace through strength policy had led to certain measures
of strategic deterrence, including nuclear capabilities on the Australian continent, which ultimately led
to the ANZUS treaty being challenged by New Zealand for not allowing the United States nuclear
ships to pass through its territory.20
In the 1980’s the ANZUS Alliance was becoming more vigorous in its military cooperation and
policies. In March 1980, the United States and Australia signed a Memorandum of Understanding
20
Amy L. Catalinac. “Why New Zealand Took Itself out of ANZUS: Observing ‘Opposition for Autonomy’
in Asymmetric Alliances,” Foreign Policy Analysis (2010). 317-338,
https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/amycatalinac/files/catalinac_fpa.pdf
17
(MoU) in order to provide logistical support to the Australian Defense Forces (ADF). This was
followed by an agreement relating to the operation of United States military flights through Royal
Australia Air Force (RAAF) Base Darwin in 1981 and a MoU concerning the exchange of service
personnel between the U.S. Marine Corps and the RAAF.21
Thus, the successive military agreements between the United States and Australia coincided with
the ANZUS context of enhanced defense capabilities and strategic cooperation to provide for
Australia’s security needs. The ANZUS alliance also was subjected to the United States’ military forces
being stationed in Australia, which proved that strategic deterrence and cooperation of the two
countries’ collective interests to deter Soviet actions in the Indian and Pacific Ocean regions. In other
words, the ANZUS alliance grew stronger with the expanding threat of the Soviet Union into the Indian
and Pacific Ocean. This was met with increased defense and security cooperation protect the “free
world” from the Communist threat. Thus, the ANZUS alliance had strong motives as a result of the
Cold War.
2.2 Issues within the ANZUS Alliance
The Asia-Pacific region has a long-standing history of security alliances. These alliances are made
up of the Japan, South Korea at one end and the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand at the
other end of Asia-Pacific. The Indo-Pacific Strategy reinforces the pursuit of partnership between
these countries by forging alliances and stimulating economic activity between them throughout the
whole region. In effect, the ANZUS Treaty signed in September 1951, echoes such strategy as an
insurance policy to deter and protect against any form of regional instability that might threaten the
21
“Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States in Force on
January 1, 2019,” last modified 16 May, 2019, pp.1 -506, https://www.state.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2019/05/2019-TIF-Bilaterals-web-version.pdf
18
interests of the United States and allies in the region. With the growing trend of strategic deterrence
capabilities in Australia, however, New Zealand had positioned itself as a nuclear-free country. This
“meant that the US Navy would only be able to visit New Zealand if it provided the New Zealand
government with an unambiguous assurance that its ships were nuclear free. This challenged the US
Navy’s policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons aboard visiting
vessels.
The ANZUS alliance had encountered its first real test when New Zealand refused to renege on its
nuclear-free policy. As a result, Deputy Assistant Secretary for State William Brown outlined four
broad consequences for New Zealand’s actions: all intelligence-sharing with New Zealand would be
ceased, military exercises and other forms of defense cooperation with New Zealand would stopped,
access from the United States State Department to New Zealand would be restricted and the July 1985
ANZUS Council meeting would be postponed.22
In her personal interviews with former New Zeland government officials, Catalinac discovered that
former New Zealand Prime Minister David Lange was consistent about “getting the United States to
publicly assure the New Zealand government that its ship was not nuclear-armed... What had been
important to Lange from the beginning was the US assurance that whatever ship it wanted to send was
not nuclear-armed. As we have seen, the US did not want to give this assurance.” 23 Then-Deputy
Prime Minister of New Zealand also added: ‘‘I didn’t think ANZUS was something that you needed to
die in a ditch in preservation of. It was a desirable policy for New Zealand, but not one that you should
support at all costs.’’24
22
Catalinac’s insightful analysis on the ANZUS alliance derives from her personal interviews with former
New Zealand government officials.
23
Former New Zealand Prime Minister David Lange quoted in Catalinac, Ibid, pp. 321-322.
24
Former New Zealand Prime Minster Sir Geoffrey Winston Russel quoted in Catalinac, Ibid, pp. 323.
19
Catalinac argues that there are three reasons why New Zealand took on the ANZUS alliance by
asserting its nuclear-free policy. Firstly, it made New Zealand relevant in international affairs; secondly,
it gave New Zealand a separate identity from the ANZUS alliance; and finally, it allowed New Zealand
to assert leadership for its own values. The idea purported by Catalinac that autonomy was a key driver
in New Zealand’s opposition to the United States’ navy ship is an obvious conclusion when reading
the interviews with government officials. Though autonomy does not explain how nuclear deterrence
affected the ANZUS crisis from the vantage point of regional security.
As Richard Pipes argued, the United States objectives in Asia-Pacific boils down to strategic
deterrence as part of a global strategy to deter the Soviet threat from interfering in the “free world” 25.
On this topic, NSC staffer, Allen J. Lenz, echoed this notion that the United States could not afford to
destroy neither its position nor credibility with allies in the Asia-Pacific region nor attempts to restrain
economic relations between countries in the region.26
Therefore, it’s not certain whether New Zealand’s disapproval of the US Navy Ship is matter of
expressing the country’s autonomy needs since the issue of strategic deterrence was a global issue. The
threat of Soviet nuclear capabilities still had an effect on New Zealand’s security needs, which was
still a concern of the whole Asia-Pacific region. Notwithstanding the consequences of their actions,
New Zealand’s autonomy needs weren’t directly impacted by their relations with Australia and the
United States which means that the security needs of the ANZUS alliance could have changed New
Zealand’s nuclear free policy.
25
Tyler P. Esno, “Trading with the Enemy: U.S. Economic Policies and the End of the Cold War” (PhD
diss.,College of Arts and Sciences at Ohio University, 2017), 1-497,
https://etd.ohiolink.edu/apexprod/rws_etd/send_file/send?accession=ohiou1486807359479029&disposition=i
nline.
26
Esno, “Trading with the Enemy,” pp.150-151.
20
Under the backdrop of New Zealand’s nuclear-free policy, the Raegan Administration was
bolstering the United States commitments to Asia-Pacific security. Former United States President
Ronald Raegan believed the United States military preparedness and capabilities had become inferior
to the Soviet Union whose “biggest military buildup in the history of man” forced the United States to
conduct its own military buildup to assure the United States’ alliances. Furthermore, an effective build-
up of military capabilities would strengthen the security of the United States’ alliance and deter the
Soviet threat in the Asia-Pacific.
In his PhD dissertation on the Reagan Administration’s Cold War policy, Tyler Esno asserted that
it was not the Raegan Administration’s intention to pursue a military buildup as a way to destroy to the
Soviet Union but rather as a means to assure United States allies that it would deter the Soviet Union.27
This policy was referred to by the former President Raegan as peace-through strength policy, which
gave way to a series of increased defense cooperation initiatives. Between 1980 and 1986, defense
spending increased from $35 to $93 billion, along with funding maintenance and repairs that amounted
to a 600 ship fleet, including 15 aircraft carrier task forces. 28 As Esno points out though, the most
important part of the military buildup was the modernization of United States nuclear capabilities, as
well as the research and development of new weapons systems.
It’s obvious that New Zealand’s nuclear-free policy and the Raegan Administration’s peace-
through-strength policy were completely divergent in its aims to ensure allies a means to fulfil the
security needs in Asia-Pacific. The ANZUS crisis revealed how the United States can provide security
needs to its allies in the Asia-Pacific while focusing on strategic deterrence in the region regardless of
any allies’ criticism thereof. As for the Raegan Administration’s peace-through-strength policy, the
27
Esno, Ibid, pp. 160-161.
28
Esno, Ibid, pp.164-165.
21
dichotomy of providing strategic deterrence to assure allies diverged from the conventional stance of
New Zealand to avoid war at-all-costs in the Asia-Pacific. In the United States’ view, under the peace-
through-strength policy, the greater the strategic deterrence in the region, the less likely to avoid war
in the Asia-Pacific.
Nevertheless, neither the nuclear-free policy nor the peace-through-strength policy deteriorated the
United States-Australia defense cooperation during the Cold War. Like former Australian Prime
Minister Malcolm Fraser said, Australia may have the “constitutional capacity to say no, but not the
practical capacity” to provide for its own security needs. 29 This statement suggests that the United
States-Australia alliance is a questionable way to supply a means to achieve security in Asia-Pacific.
New Zealand’s ability to autonomously reject the United States for its nuclear capabilities proves that
each country has such capacity to give up the ANZUS alliance. Therefore, this historical moment
referred to as the “ANZUS Imbroglio” is foretelling for what could potentially happen in the Indo-
Pacific. This time, more countries are involved, making it more likely for misunderstandings in the
future. That’s why conceptualizing the FOIP policy, based on specifications and values, is a necessity
for understanding the context of United States-Australia defense and security cooperation under the
backdrop of the Indo-Pacific Strategy.
3. Scope and Context of the United States’ and

Australia’s Indo-Pacific Strategy
3.1 Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) policy
According to the United States Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report,”
29
An interview with Malcolm Fraser at the Lowy Institute is a good example of how foreign policy thinkers
from the Cold War have changed their views on the United States-Australia alliance.
22
the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) policy is one “in which all nations, large and small, are secure
in their sovereignty and able to pursue economic growth consistent with accepted international rules,
norms, and principles of fair competition.”30 The report is based on defending and enhancing a shared-
value system of nations in adherence to a rules-based international order under the FOIP policy. The
FOIP policy implies that the countries of this rules-based order agree to work with one another;
however, the United States National Defense Strategy also directs the DOD to increase lethality, to
strengthen alliances, and to expand the competitive space.31 In the context of the DOD’s Indo-Pacific
Strategy, the doctrine of FOIP fundamentally translates into three major objectives—Preparedness,
Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region. These objectives represent the core values of the
FOIP policy, as it serves as a guide for defense and security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region.
To this end, the United States has implemented a variety of methods to conduct Foreign Military
Sales (FMS) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) as crucial tools for reassuring alliances and
attracting other countries to the Indo-Pacific Strategy under the FOIP policy. For example, there have
been new agreements for conventional arms transfers and security cooperation whereby the focus has
been on the ability to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of FMS through reducing financial
constraints, improving the processes of implementation and alleviating top-priority policy concerns
with regard to the Indo-Pacific.32
Likewise, the United States has funded countries through its International Military Education and
Training (IMET) programs.33 The United States government describes the FMS program as a “top
30
“Indo-Pacific Strategy Report—Preparedness,Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region,” June 1,
2019, pp. 1-55, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-
INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF
31
“Indo-Pacific Strategy Report,” Ibid, pp. 10
32
“Indo-Pacific Strategy Report,” Ibid, pp. 15
33
See Appendix B for table including the data from the Foreign Military Training Report of IMET in Asia-
Pacific.
23
priority in strengthening alliances and attracting new countries to its side.” 34 On the other hand,
according to the IMET framework, the purpose of the program is to advance the goal of regional
stability.
The IMET also explains how the program achieves this objective through effective, mutually
beneficial military to-military relations, increased understanding of security issues and the means to
address them and improved defense cooperation among the United States and foreign countries. 35
According to data released by the U.S. Department of State for FY 2017-2018, the level of investment
in military training from the United States has seen an increase in the total investment of military
education and training for Indonesia ($26,378,530), Philippines ($13,228,697) .36
Table 1. FY2017-2018 Change of US IMET investment in Asia-Pacific
Recipients FY 2017 FY 2018 Total (YoY) Change
(YoY)
Indonesia $10,717,678 $15,660,852 $26,378,530 +4,943,174
Philippines $5,316,874 $7,911,823 13,228,697 +2,594,949
Laos $0 $321,552 $321,552 +321,552
Thailand $913,960 $1,218,926 $2,132,886 +304,966
34
“Foreign Military Sales: Process and Policy,” published by United States Department of State and Bureau
of Political-Military Affairs on 15 June 2017, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-
115hhrg25841/pdf/CHRG-115hhrg25841.pdf .
35
John A. Cope, “International Military Education and Training: An Assessment,” National Defense
University: Institute for National Strategic Studies, McNair Paper 44 (October 1995), pp. 1-70,
https://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED406567 .
36
“Foreign Military Training Report,” published by United States Department of Defense and State on 27
November 2017, pp. 1-73, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/fmt_vol1_17_18.pdf.
24
In consideration of the data above on military investment and training, there are evident declines
in the number of recipients such as Singapore, Republic of South Korea and Vietnam. Thus there is
clearly a disparity in the increasing trend of investment in military training between recipients in
Southeast Asia.
Furthermore, according to the 2018 Foreign Military Training Report, the United States
Department of Defense and Department of State define security cooperation as the goal in “achieving
U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives by helping allies and partners to improve their
defense capabilities and enhance their ability to participate alongside U.S. forces.” In addition, foreign
military sales (FMS) are “government-to-government sales of U.S. defense articles, services, and
training” while foreign military financing (FMF) accounts for the “financing of the acquisition of U.S.
defense articles, services, and training through grants.
Both of the United States’ FMS and FMF programs are strategically carried out for the outcome of
achieving security cooperation through enhancing military relationships, of which interoperability
plays a large factor in the process. In the Fiscal Year (FY) 2017, the United States Congress had spent
$41.93 billion on Foreign Military Sales (FMS), more than $462.4 billion on security cooperation and
training and $115.2 million to 114 allied nations for International Military Education and Training
(IMET).37
In view of the content above, from the aspect of the United States-Australia military relationship,
defense policies are a key link to the enhanced military cooperation, which have effectively spilled
over into investments in the defense sector and military training programs. While the United States
looks to increase the defense capabilities of the alliance network in the Indo-Pacific, Australia is also
37
“Foreign Military Training Report,” Ibid, pp. 30.
25
searching for a path to upgrades in its own military and defense programs. Yet, it remains clear that
the United States will play a major role in Australia’s military development, programs and training.
3.2 Australia’s Key Role in the Global Rules-Based Order
The relationship between the FOIP policy and the global rules-based order is quintessential to the
United States’ and Australia’s Indo-Pacific Strategy. Any hindrance to the United States military
personnel going to, from or within the Australian continent is critical to regional security. In the event
of a crisis in the sea lines of communication (SLOC), for example, the United States and Australia is
committed to the FOIP policy—i.e., open maritime access and Freedom of Navigation (FON) exercises
designed to protect the SLOC. This is one example of how the United States and Australia are
conceptualizing the global rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific.
Because of the global rules-based order, the networking of alliances has also become an essential
feature of the United States’ and Australia’s Indo-Pacific Strategy. This alliance seeks to deter
adversaries over the FOIP policy and promote regional security therein. In this case, disadvantaged
Indo-Pacific countries—i.e. lacking the defense capabilities to protect their own security needs—have
been reassured by the United States and Australia that regional security is tantamount to ensuring Indo-
Pacific security. To this end, the FOIP policy represents the foundation of a network of alliances in the
Indo-Pacific.
The strategic importance of this bilateral relationship has been reinforced by statements released
by members of the United States Department of Defense. In his statement on US-Australia relations at
the IIS S Shangri-La Dialogue 2019, Acting U.S. Secretary of Defense Patrick M. Shanahan reinforced
the idea that “relationships matter” and he also noted that the United States and Australia share a certain
26
strategic vision in today’s security environment. The United States and Australia share a “priority
theater” in the Indo-Pacific.38
At the APEC CEO Summit in Vietnam on November 10, 2017, United States President Donald
J. Trump offered his vision of the Indo-Pacific Strategy, on in which the region is “free and open”
compounded with “robust trade relationships rooted in the principles of fairness and reciprocity.”39
Although the focus of this paper is on military cooperation, it’s impossible to ignore some of the
economic aspects, especially the defense and resource sectors of the United States and Australia
economies.
The Indo-Pacific strategy thus became an important part of the rules and relationship, with
enhanced military cooperation discussed earlier, in which both countries agree on the main principles
of the emerging Indo-Pacific—that is, Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region.
In addition to those ideals however, they both agree to and share in the same principles for the conduct
of international order: sovereignty and independence; peaceful resolution of disputes; free, fair and
reciprocal trade; and adherence to international rules and norms.
Even though the United States-Australia military relationship emphasizes this concept of a stable
rules-based global order, ideals for the Indo-Pacific Strategy are also likened to military cooperation
engagements from Iraq and Afghanistan as well as natural disaster relief in the Philippines, Japan and
Pakistan. Other than government officials of the United States and Australia, some of the governments
have declared their enthusiasm for this idea on global order, such as Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo
38
“Acting Secretary Shanahan’s Remarks at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 2019,” published by US
Department of Defense on 1 June, 2019, accessed on 8 April, 2020,
https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/1871584/acting-secretary-shanahans-
remarks-at-the-iiss-shangri-la-dialogue-2019/.
39
“Remarks by President Trump at APEC CEO Summit, Da Nang, Vietnam,” published by The White House
on 10 November 2017, accessed on 10 April, 2020, https://asean.usmission.gov/remarks-president-trump-
apec-ceo-summit-da-nang-vietnam/.
27
Abe, French President Emmanuel Macron, and Indian Prime Minister Narenda Modi.40
On that note, the 29th Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) held on August
4, 2019, revealed three focus areas for the emerging rules-based order. The 29th AUSMIN collectively
defined interoperability and trust as the core of its commitments to security challenges and threats in
the Asia-Pacific region, outlined in bold terms how both countries would strive to maintain
partnerships with other countries in the Pacific and to gather their support in enhancing and building
upon the capabilities, resilience and self-reliance to mutually protect the security environment of the
Pacific.41
Table 2. Australian Defense Force’s Defense Capability Upgrades
Australia’s Six Streams of Defense Capability Percentage Upgrades
 Maritime and Anti-Submarine Warfare 25%
 Sustainment and Operations
 Land Combat and Amphibious Warfare 18%
 Strike and Air Combat 17%

 Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Space,
9%
Electronic Warfare and Cyber
 Air and Sea Lift 6%
Source: Australian Government Department of Defense, 2016 Defence White Paper;
compiled by author
40
“Indo-Pacific Strategy Report,” Ibid, pp. 35.
41
“Joint Statement: Australia-U.S. Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) 2019,” published by US Department
of Defense on 4 August, 2019, accessed on 8 April, 2020,
https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/1925222/joint-statement-australia-us-
ministerial-consultations-ausmin-2019/.
28
Australia’s 2016 Defence White Paper also states cooperation and competition among the United
States and China as a crucial variable in the development of Australia’s security environment. Australia
chose the pathway to economic prosperity by trading substantially with China regardless of fears to
their national security—for instance in their maritime domain whereby investment opportunities have
been sought by both the United States and China in Western and Northern Australia. Due to this kind
of maritime focus of Australia, the United States encourages the participation of military allies and
partners to enhance military cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. This is a core strategy of the networking
of alliances.
According to the International Trade Administration (ITA): “Every US business active in the
defense sector and looking to pursue international business opportunities should include Australia on
its shortlist of potential export markets.”42 The ITA also cites Australia’s ten-year, USD 145 billion
acquisition strategy and strong domestic support for US export promotion agencies to explain the
crucial defense relationship.
Moreover, Australia’s 2016 Defence White Paper (DWP) alludes to making improvements in the
defense industry in connection with the integrity of the United States-Australia military relationship—
e.g., strategy, capabilities and resources, all of which are linked up to the 2016 Integrated Investment
Program—i.e., major acquisitions of advanced weapons, investment in information and
communications, infrastructure and an enabling workforce.43 In the 2016 DWP, Australia’s important
combat capabilities, including fighter and transport aircraft, naval combat systems and helicopters are
42
“International Trade Administration’s Australia Commercial Guide,” last modified on 15 February, 2021,
https://www.trade.gov/knowledge-product/exporting-australia-market-overview.
43
Australian Government Department of Defense, 2016 Defence White Paper, (Commonwealth of Australia:
2016), pp. 1-189, https://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/Docs/2016-Defence-White-Paper.pdf.
29
sourced from the United states; the cost to Australia of developing these high-end capabilities would
be beyond Australia’s capacity without the military relationship. United States-Australia military
relationship serves to increase the level of activity in the defense industry—precisely measured by the
Australian Government for percentage upgrades in its defense capabilities.44
The Six Streams of Defense Capability measure the upgrades that are necessary for interoperability
in military hardware and combat methods with the United States. The Six Streams of Defense
Capability are intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, space, electronic Warfare and cyber
capabilities at 9%; maritime and anti-submarine warfare capabilities at 25%; strike and air combat
capabilities at 17%; land combat and amphibious warfare capabilities at 18%; key enablers of
sustainment and operation at 25%; and air and sea lift capabilities at 6%.45
The trends discussed above on the US-Australia military cooperation in the context of the defense
industry show that there is a relationship in the content of the defense industry cooperation and military
cooperation. This a sign that stronger military cooperation between the United States and Australia are
a key component of the Indo-Pacific Strategy by which defense capabilities play a formidable role in
the process.
The data reveals that not only is the United States spending a significant amount of funds to
improve the military capabilities of other countries, but it is also relying on its defense industry as a
platform to maintain bilateral relationships and a source of achieving foreign policy objectives. It also
is helpful in strengthening military cooperation between the United States and Australia in addition to
military exercises, education and training.
44
See Appendix A for table.
45
Australian Government, 2016 Defense White Paper, pp. 40
30
4.Critical Issue Areas of US-Australia Defense and
Security Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific
4.1 Main Focus of Maritime Security Cooperation and SLOC Defense Strategy
As the main proponents of the FOIP policy, the United States and Australia will continue to play
major role in the Indo-Pacific. Defense and security cooperation is significant to the Indo-Pacific
Strategy in that the networking of alliances serves as a foundation of the FOIP policy. Take the ASEAN
Regional Forum (ARF) as an example. According to United States Department of Defense and
ASEAN’s ministers of foreign affairs, the ARF not only agrees with the concept of a networked region
in the Indo-Pacific. The ARF also has enhanced the necessary and vital defense and security
relationship between the United States, Australia, and member-countries of ASEAN in which a
networking of alliances builds onto better information-sharing as well as the focus on the critical issues
of maritime security.46
As the example of ASEAN shows, maritime security is one of the critical differences between the
security of environment of Asia-Pacific and Indo-Pacific regions. The United States-Australia alliance
is also tailoring to increase defense and security cooperation with Southeast Asia countries in the region
through the promotion of maritime security and safety via shared awareness, technical cooperation,
and sharing of knowledge and expertise between the United States and ASEAN. In addition, improving
defense cooperation among Indo-Pacific countries is critical to regional security. That means that the
defense capabilities of Indo-Pacific countries should be a top priority of the Indo-Pacific Strategy.
46
Jonathan Stromseth, DON’T MAKE US CHOOSE: Southeast Asia in the Throes of US-China rivalry,
(Brookings Institute: October 2019), pp. 1-34, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2019/10/FP_20191009_dont_make_us_choose.pdf
31
The United States Maritime Security Initiative (MSI) is another example of maritime security
cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. One of MSI’s primary goals is to enhance interoperability through
common platforms, such as the Singapore’s Information Fusion Centre (IFC). The IFC is also an
example of how countries in the region are collaborating with one another through information-sharing
initiatives that enhance maritime security in the Indo-Pacific. Singapore’s IFC was established in 2009
as a maritime information hub, contributing actionable information to regional and global navies and
coast guards in response to maritime threats such as piracy and drug smuggling. The IFC is critical to
the United States-Australia alliance in the Indo-Pacific as the initiative promotes information-sharing
for the purpose of dealing with non-traditional threats to maritime security.
Maritime security is significant issue to the networking of alliances in the Indo-Pacific. As in the
Cold War, The United States-Australia defense and security cooperation to protect the “free world”
grew stronger with the expanding threat of the Soviet Union into the Indian and Pacific Ocean. This
was exemplified by the Raegan Administration’s peace-through-strength policy, which provided
strategic deterrence to assure allies in Asia-Pacific region—notwithstanding New Zealand’s nuclear-
free policy. A core part of the Indo-Pacific Strategy then is how the FOIP policy is driving the
networking of alliances and using the FOIP as a guide for United States-Australia defense and security
cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. The IFC serves as a key example to this ideal. The networking
of alliances collaborate with one another through information-sharing initiatives to (1) enhance
maritime security in the Indo-Pacific and (2) promote the networking of alliances.
As the example of ASEAN shows, maritime security is one of the critical differences between the
security of environment of Asia-Pacific and Indo-Pacific regions. Therefore, the United States-
Australia alliance is also tailoring to increase defense and security cooperation with Southeast Asia
32
countries in the region through the promotion of maritime security. In addition, improving defense
cooperation among Indo-Pacific countries is critical to regional security. That means that the defense
capabilities of Indo-Pacific countries should be a top priority of the United States’ and Australia’s Indo-
Pacific strategy.
Maritime security is significant issue to the networking of alliances in the Indo-Pacific. As in the
Cold War, the United States-Australia defense and security cooperation to protect the “free world”
grew stronger with the expanding threat of the Soviet Union into the Indian and Pacific Ocean. This
was exemplified by the Raegan Administration’s peace-through-strength policy, which provided
strategic deterrence to assure allies in Asia-Pacific region—notwithstanding New Zealand’s nuclear-
free policy.
A core part of the Indo-Pacific Strategy then is how the FOIP policy is driving the networking of
alliances and using the FOIP as a guide for United States-Australia defense and security cooperation
in the Indo-Pacific region. Rory Medcalf argues that the economic activity of the countries in the Indo-
Pacific region depend on the sea lanes of the Indian Ocean for energy and trade.47 The countries of
the Indo-Pacific share these characteristics when they conduct state behavior and interaction; they also
share these characteristics when thinking about regional security. The economic development Indo-
Pacific countries has increased as a result of more economic activity traversing the Indian and Pacific
Ocean. The security of the Indo-Pacific thus contains high stakes for the countries conducting trade in
the region—this brings the United States-Australia alliance closer to Indo-Pacific countries for geo-
strategic purposes to defend the sea-lines of communication (SLOC).
47
Rory Medcalf, “The evolving security order in the Indo-Pacific,” in Indo-Pacific Maritime Security:
Challenges and Cooperation, ed. David Brewster. (1st ed. Australian National University: National Security
College, 2016), pp. 8-14.
33
Does alliance network in the Indo-Pacific create or alleviate major problems of maritime security
derived from defending the SLOC? One symptom of this problem is the United States commitment to
defense and security cooperation with Australia and Japan. In his paper “A new dimension to Australia-
Japan maritime security cooperation” Akimoto Kazumine notes that since the economic
interdependence of globalization has taken hold, that that stability of the sea lanes has become an
indispensable form of deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. 48 The SLOC, Kazumine argues, provide the
world with vital economic interests of trading and shipping and that should be on the radar of the
alliance network going forward.
That’s why the objectives of the United States and Australia must be considered in the context of
their relationships with the relevant Indo-Pacific countries. If the aim of the alliance network is to
cooperate on matters of defending the SLOC, then maritime security should be a top concern for the
security agenda of the Indo-Pacific Strategy. In particular, this agenda should be analyzed from the
perspective of Japan’s role in the region as an essential part of the FOIP policy in the Indo-Pacific.
Indeed, the alliance network should prosper through their joint-commitments to protect the SLOC,
which provides a link between maritime security and the United States-Australia alliance’s Indo-
Pacific Strategy. The discussion of Japan’s role in the Indo-Pacific is another important factor. The
Japanese perspective of the Indo-Pacific Strategy is likely contribute more on sovereignty claims over
maritime disputes in the region, including tensions from Freedom of Navigation (FON) exercises, land
reclamation, illegal fishing and deep-sea drilling.49
48
Akimoto Kazumine, “A new dimension to Australia-Japan maritime security cooperation,” in Indo-Pacific
Maritime Security: Challenges and Cooperation, ed. David Brewster, (1st ed. Australian National University:
National Security College, 2016), pp. 16-18.
49
Jingdong Yuan, “Managing tensions in East Asian waters: challenges and responses,” in Indo-Pacific
Maritime Security: Challenges and Cooperation, ed. David Brewster, (1st ed. Australian National University:
National Security College, 2016), pp. 20-22.
34
All of these issues could spark a severe crisis in the Indo-Pacific, and therefore The FOIP concept
is a perhaps the most critical topic for the United States, Australia and Japan regarding the SLOC
defense. The United States views the protection of the SLOC in tandem with the FOIP policy. To what
extent is the alliance network willing to protect the SLOC? For which adversaries or threats to the
FOIP policy? These are important questions as to evaluating the efficacy of the alliance network in the
Indo-Pacific.
4.2 Wider Collaboration on Cybersecurity and Information-Sharing
Since the Indo-Pacific is becoming the center of this century’s geopolitical competition, then
strategic cooperation over the protection of the SLOC is a benchmark for testing the alliance network.
Whether it’s faced with Japan, the United States, Australia India, or any other capable state-actor in
the Indo-Pacific, the effect of the FOIP policy on China’s state behavior will not translate to mutual
maritime security interests. In the words of one Japanese scholar, maritime security cooperation in the
Indo-Pacific occurs against the backdrop of countries with replete territorial conflicts and economic
disputes layered over by fierce enmity and historical mistrust for one another.50
In what ways could there be shared-interests in maritime security cooperation for the SLOC? Given
the nature of non-traditional maritime threats, the maritime domain is a interest for greater security
cooperation among Indo-Pacific countries. Rear Admiral James Goldrick believes that the Indo-Pacific
Strategy calls on more countries to act collectively for the sake of maritime security and protection of
the SLOC from non-traditional threats. For instance, the complex features of managing economic
50
Hitoshi Nasu, “Managing tensions in East Asian waters: challenges and responses,” in Indo-Pacific
Maritime Security: Challenges and Cooperation, ed. David Brewster (1st ed. Australian National University:
National Security College, 2016) pp. 32-42.
35
activity on the seas is vulnerable to cyber security issues. Citing his statement at length below,
Goldrick’s ideals on the SLOC highlight the issues that will affect all countries with economic interests
in the Indo-Pacific.
Resource management requirements are having similar effects on fisheries and other marine industries, a trend not
only manifesting within national maritime zones, but on the high seas. Yet, while computers, beacons and remote
sensors have promised increasing transparency and the end of an era in which ships could operate where eyes ‘never
looked’, cyber capabilities open to both state and non-state actors suggest that the ideals of ‘domain awareness’ may
never be realised and will often be significantly compromised.51
According to this statement, not only is information-sharing essential to maritime and cyber
security in the Indo-Pacific; the ability to share information is more limited in scope and demands that
countries cooperate to ensure that threats are neutralized. To this end, the United States-Australia
alliance seeks closer cooperation over the SLOC for the purposes of deterring maritime and cyber
threats.
For example, both the United States and Australia are already working to strengthen cooperation
in the cyber domain. This has become a key feature of their defense and security cooperation in the
Indo-Pacific. Cyber defense and security is a staple of the Indo-Pacific Strategy to protect the SLOC
from non-traditional threats.
As countries become more vulnerable to maritime and cyber threats, so the rise in non-traditional
state actors will be unavoidable. This means that there indeed is lots of space for maritime and cyber
cooperation for the SLOC—its protection is vital to the maritime and cyber security of the Indo-Pacific
51
James Goldrick, “The future of the maritime domain: challenges and opportunities,” in Indo-Pacific
Maritime Security: Challenges and Cooperation. ed. David Brewster (1st ed. Australian National University:
National Security College, 2016) pp. 89-91.
36
countries as well as the inter-connected economic activity derived from globalized supply chains and
commercial networks. Maritime and cyber security are two sides of SLOC’s maritime security
architecture where the intersection of non-traditional security threats make state-actors particulary
vulnerable in the Indo-Pacific. On the one hand, that closer cooperation over the SLOC entails greater
interests for the alliance network to build-up a shared information architecture base in the Indo-Pacific
through enhanced defense capabilities.
Writers from the Australia Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) argue that Australia’s advantage in the
alliance network is its maritime surveillance capability derived from P-8 maritime patrol aircraft and
MQ-4C drones in addition to Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR) platforms such as the F-
35 Joint Strike Fighter from the United States.52
On the other hand, multi-lateral intelligence and surveillance initiatives such as the Five Eyes
Alliance—United States, Australia, United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand—reveal how relevant
information-sharing activities from the past could reshape in the Indo-Pacific Strategy into a
battleground for information or a platform for cooperation.
ASPI writers agree that the Five Eyes Alliance is beneficial to cooperation in the cyber, space and
intelligence domains. Does this mean that multi-lateral initiatives should play a significant role in the
maritime security and protection of SLOC in the Indo-Pacific? Obviously there are many issues about
maritime security, especially in the Indo-Pacific region.
Moreover, the issues concerning the SLOC imply that much broader measures of cooperation
should be contemplated, such as information-sharing, cyber threats and non-traditional state-actors. If
52
Andrew Davies, Peter Jennings, Daniel Nichola and Benjamin Schreer, “The cyber, space and intelligence
domains,” Australia Strategic Policy Institute (1 December, 2014): pp. 1-34,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep04209.4
37
the alliance network is important to the Indo-Pacific Strategy, then the center of attention should not
be on geopolitical completion. As this section has attempted to argue, maritime security is a driving
motivation for Indo-Pacific countries to cooperate with the United States-Australia alliance and the
FOIP policy.
Given that cooperation with the United States is important for the Asia-Pacific security relationship,
it’s not surprising that Japan seemingly be reaching closer to the United States under the backdrop of
the Indo-Pacific Strategy by accelerating security dialogues, reinforcing deterrence through Japan-U.S.
Security Arrangements, further strengthening partnership with the U.S. through information-sharing
and response mechanisms to cyber threats, and cooperation to ensure security of the shared systems
between the two countries.
Jeffrey Hunker writes about the five issues in cyberspace that should demand special attention from
the United States: (1) improve the governance structure for the Internet, (2) build norms for cyber
Behavior by nations and individual users, (3) expand multilateral cooperation against cyber crime, (4)
outline an evolutionary path toward a “new” Internet, and (5) define the justification for and forms of
military action for cyberspace.53
Other writers on cybersecurity issues for the United States in the international community define
“cyber insecurity” as a result of vulnerabilities of cyber systems, including flaws or weaknesses in
both hardware and software, and from the conduct of states, groups, and individuals with access to
them.54 It takes the forms of cyber warfare, espionage, crime, attacks on cyber infrastructure, and
exploitation of cyber systems. The United States Department of Defense defines the main threats of
53
Aaron F. Brantly, “Beyond Hyperbole: The Evolving Subdiscipline of Cyber Conflict Studies,”The Cyber
Defense Review Vol. 5 No. 3 (Fall 2020): pp. 99-120, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26954875.
54
David Clark, Abraham D. Sofaer and Diffie Sofaer, “Cyber Security and International Agreements,”
National Academy of Sciences (2021): pp.179-206. https://www.nap.edu/read/12997/chapter/13.
38
cybersecurity as actions aimed at and intended to damage or destroy cyber systems, seek to exploit the
cyber infrastructure for unlawful or harmful purposes without damaging or compromising that
infrastructure for long-term effects to national security.55
In order to combat against cybersecurity, Japan’s role in cyber security is foretelling of the strategic
interation between United States, Australia and Japan in the Indo-Pacific. For example, the strategic
objectives mutually reinforce the idea that states must compete, deter and win in the cyberspace domain
with the help of allies and friends in the region. Under the backdrop of cybersecurity, the United States-
Australia military cooperation could have forceful implication on the strategic context for engaging
adversaries in the cyber domain. As the three state-actors seem to be growing stronger both politically
and strategically, as evidenced by their enhanced military cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, the two
countries share the same ideas for joint-action implementation of the Indo-Pacific Strategy—e.g.
Preparedness, Partnerships and Promotion of a Network Region.
To this end, the Japan Revitalization Strategy and the Cybersecurity Strategy established in 2013
promotes Japan’s basic policy and its priority areas for international cooperation and mutual assistance
in the field of cybersecurity. Japan’s strategy for cybersecurity cites other foreign law enforcement
agencies such as the G8 Rome-Lyon Group High-Tech Crime Subgroup and the Counter-cybercrime
Technology Investigation Symposium (CTINS) as key examples. 56 In order to more effectively
exchange information on specific issues of cybercrime and digital forensics, Japan’s strategy shows
that the country is willing and ready to engage with the international community on affairs in
55
“Cyber Strategy 2018,” published by US Department of Defense on 18 September, 2018, pp.1-10,
https://media.defense.gov/2018/Sep/18/2002041658/-1/-1/1/CYBER_STRATEGY_SUMMARY_FINAL.PDF
56
“Japan’s Approach Towards International Strategy on Cyber Security Cooperation,” published by Japan
Science and Technology Agency (JST)/Research Institute of Science and Technology for Society (RISTEX) in
2013, pp.1-10, https://cybersummit.info/sites/cybersummit.info/files/Japan_edited%20v2.pdf-FINAL.pdf.
39
cyberspace.
Japan’s call to increase the level of activity in cyberspace is a clear sign to other countries in the
Indo-Pacific region. This strategy also signifies to the international community the need for Japan to
take a leading role in cybersecurity matters. Japan asserts itself as a pioneer in cybersecurity. It’s not
conclusive to say whether Japan’s confident role on cybersecurity issues is directly a result of its close
security relationship with the United States in the Asia-Pacific. It’s also not conclusive to take this as
a sign that Japan is accepting the United States’ strategy in the Indo-Pacific as a new norm for their
security relationship in the Asia-Pacific.
If anything can be taken from the Japan Revitalization Strategy and Cybersecurity Strategy, other
than the fact that Japan isn’t going to step down as a leader in the Asia-Pacific, it’s that cybersecurity
is becoming a top priority for Japan’s security—and hence a top priority for their security relationship
with the United States. In this case, Australia and Japan could be developing their own particular roles
in the Indo-Pacific. Australia providing the United States with military capabilities for maritime
security while Japan contribute more of an information-sharing position in its cybersecurity policies
with Australia and the United States.
4.3 Ongoing Problems with Military Infrastructure
The focus of this section is on the links between the enhancing military capabilities of the United
States and Australia and the impact on the Okinawa and Guam in the Indo-Pacific. Military
infrastructure involves a variety of actors, and in the case of the Indo-Pacific, a multi-actor approach
to resolving issues in the future certainly will not be an overstatement as evidenced by trilateral and
multilateral security arrangements in the region.
40
Moreover, the Indian and Pacific Oceans are integral to shipping and military communications that
are subject to the geopolitical competition between state-actors, which means that the integrity of
protecting commercial interests—i.e., supplies for construction and building—as well as military
interests are a source of regional instability in the Indo-Pacific. Thus, the enhanced military capabilities
of United States-Australia military cooperation are poised to develop deterrence measures and promote
regional stability in the Indo-Pacific.
In regards to United States-Australia military cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, Guam and Okinawa
are vital to the integration of military personnel, equipment and logistics as “strategic points”—refuel
points for the United States Air Force to go to countries throughout Asia-Pacific in order to (1.) rally
around for countries based in that part of the world; (2.) contribute supplies, fuels, troops or
equipment.57
According to Chris Rahman, the aspects of physical geography “can create potential political
headaches in different parts of the Indo-Pacific, particularly once political and legal frameworks are
laid atop physical features.”58 That means that once political factors are added to physical geography,
the prospects for maritime security collaboration often are made considerably worse. Rahman brings
the geopolitical factors of the Indo-Pacific strategy into play of the United States-Australia alliance.
By the same token, the local Okinawa community in Japan has expressed their dismay in recent
decades over the burdens of stationing United States on their soil. They’ve called for the return
ofcontrol of the Futenma land to local authorities as a way to boost economic development in
57
Anonymous USAF Veteran, personal interview with former Air Force member about Guam and Strategic
Points with author,” 1 January 2020; see transcript notes on Appendix C.
58
Chris Rahman, “The limits to maritime security collaboration in the Indo-Pacific region,” in Indo-Pacific
Maritime Security: Challenges and Cooperation, ed. David Brewster (1st ed. Australian National University:
National Security College, 2016), pp. 37
41
Okinawa.59
A 2006 agreement between the United States and Japanese governments to relocate the Futenma
base from its current location in the crowded city of Ginowan to a less crowded area of Camp Schwab
in Henoko was envisioned as the centerpiece of a planned realignment of U.S. forces. 60 The
anticipated air station is often referred to as the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF). The FRF was
first articulated at the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee on October 20, 2005. It was
discussed for the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation with Secretary of
State Rice and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Minister of Foreign Affairs Aso and Minister of State
for Defense Nukaga where they vowed to maintain a level of unit integrity between U.S. forces and
Japanese Self Defense Forces as well as investments for facilities.61
By removing US marines from Okinawa, is Japan more susceptible to vulnerabilities in maritime
defense? With the decrease of Okinawa’s significance to preserving Japan’s maritime security, the
United States still plays a role as security provider for Japan, both economically and militarily, though
in the future it seems that actions will be taken based on events yet to be determined.
Take the 2006 U.S.-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation as an example. The 2006
Roadmap endorsed three actions around the relocation initiative of United States military personnel
from Okinawa to Guam. First, the third Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) was to relocate from
Okinawa to Guam and was dependent on “tangible progress toward completion” of the Henoko base
at Camp Schwab in addition to the status of Japanese financial contribution to the development of
59
Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian E. Rinehart, “The U.S. Military Presence in Okinawa and the Futenma Base
Controversy,” Congressional Research Service (20 January 2016), pp. 1-18.
60
See Appendix E for a map of Okinawa’s U.S. military facilities including Relocation Plan.
61
Donald Rumsfield quoted in Emma Chanlett-Avery, Ibid, pp. 5.
42
facilities on Guam.62
According to the roadmap, Japan’s financial assistance was paramount to the successful
implementation of the realignment strategy. Japan’s role as financial contributor to United States
military activities cannot be underestimated. It’s not clear whether United States military personnel
would leave Okinawa in the near future. If so, then Guam would become the main strategic point for
the United States military infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific. That’s why Australia’s geographical
location is critical to the implementation of the FOIP policy.
Australia’s geographical location also reveals that geopolitics should be taken into consideration
when conceptualizing the specifications and values of the Indo-Pacific security framework. With the
United States’ and Australia’s strong emphasis on maritime security cooperation, it’s clear that
geography is a significant factor in their Indo-Pacific Strategy. Therefore, when coming to an
understanding of how the key concepts and prospects for the implementation of the FOIP policy will
unfold, there should be an understanding among academics and researchers about the crucial factors
of geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific security framework.
5. Key Concepts and Prospects for the Implementation

of the FOIP Policy
5. 1 Guam and Western Australia as a Strategic Point in the Indo-Pacific
The maritime domain provides even more conclusive information about Guam as a strategic point.
For instance, in the ocean and urban areas of responsibilities military personnel are vulnerable to the
62
“United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation,” published by Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Japan: United States- Japan Security Consultative Committee on 1 May, 2006,
https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/doc0605.html
43
uncertainties in the maritime domain, so for Air Force and Navy members of the United States military
forces, any “contact”63—which could be hostile or friendly—with submarines or aircraft of another
country becomes questionable as to intent and motive in establishing deterrence measures and
promoting regional stability on the maritime domain of the Indo-Pacific.
Two of the most basic features that have made Guam a strategic point for the United States and
Australia can be identified by (1) its close location to Australia and (2) the essence of Guam a logistics
hub—i.e., missions, exercises and refueling—as an integral variable of military cooperation in the
Indo-Pacific region. On Guam, military missions are “operation that works towards one result;
anything that has a military involvement.”64 Diego Garcia and Guam both have served the interests of
the United States military as clear examples where these missions take place for the sake of military
cooperation in the Pacific and Indian Ocean.
A “support mission” refers to using other non-U.S. military personnel for combined support for
a military mission in the region. For instance, tankers are needed to rally aircraft into a certain area,
and Guam, the strategic point, serves as the main refuel station for them to continue to the next mission.
In other words, Guam is a refuel point that facilitates the movement of military personnel, equipment
and logistics from point A to B by supplying fuel from a halfway distance—a strategic point—by
which the refuel tankers and supplies are stationed in Guam.
Another example of strategic points in the Indo Pacific is Western Australia—of which the HMAS
Stirling Redevelopment program is a case in point. The HMAS Stirling, located on the west coast of
Australia, is a primary operational support base for the Australian Navy which includes command,
administration, training, live-in-accommodation, ship replenishment, repair, maintenance and logistics
63
Anonoymous United States Air Force Veteran, Ibid.
64
Anonoumous United States Air Force Veteran, Ibid.
44
of which the primary objective of the redevelopment program “is to upgrade and refurbish existing
key infrastructure and facilities at HMAS Stirling.65
The HMAS Stirling opens up the links between maritime defense and infrastructure investment in
the Indo-Pacific, especially under enhanced military capabilities derived from United States-Australia
military cooperation in the region. While Okinawa and Guam played central roles to maritime security
in the past, Western Australia is poised to become a new strategic point in the Indo-Pacific. Located
on the launching point of Australia’s Indian Ocean coastline, it’s rational to believe that the
redevelopment program of HMAS Stirling is part of the process of enhanced military capabilities of
the United States and Australia with intent to establish an extra military deterrent in the Indo-Pacific.
If Western Australia becomes a prominent military base in the Indo-Pacific it will give the United
States closer access to the Indian Ocean than Guam or Okinawa. This also means that if the geostrategic
focus changes from Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean, then Western Australia will have a strong
advantage in providing military facilities access to the Indian Ocean. According the to the
redevelopment program of the HMAS Stirling, “the project will contribute significantly to Defence
preparedness and Navy capability by ensuring facilities at HMAS Stirling remain fit for purpose and
operational” by which the United States had increased its commitment “to one submarine every one to
two years to four in the period since November 2014.”66
Historically speaking, fears over Australia’s maritime security have persisted due to its isolation
from allies and uncertainty over neighbors in the region. Western Australia is a centerpiece to this
65
“HMAS Stirling Redevelopment, Stage 3A,” published by Australian Department of Defense in 2015, pp.
1-2.64, https://www.aph.gov.au/-
/media/02_Parliamentary_Business/24_Committees/244_Joint_Committees/PWC/Report_9-
2015/Chapter_2.pdf?la=en&hash=D85095E79924CD40DC6B0837549035377AB330D7
66
“HMAS Stirling Redevelopment,” Ibid, pp. 1.
45
paper’s emphasis on the links between maritime security and cyber security for United States-Australia
military cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. For example, the C-band radar is a space surveillance radar
system operated in conjunction with the United States which allowed for the relocation of a United
States optical space surveillance telescope to Western Australia. Moreover, from a geographical
location standpoint, Western Australia is located on the Eastern Indian Ocean coast, which makes it a
strategic location for maritime domain awareness (MDA).
5.2 ASEAN as a Variable to China’s Influence in the Indo-Pacific
Evelyn Goh takes an in-depth look at China’s growing influence and power resources vis-a-vis
Southeast Asia (SEA) countries and how China’s ability to convert its power resources into preferable
outcomes measured against China’s structural power. 67 Goh pursues this framework in order to
measure the extent of which China translates its power resources into specific outcomes in SEA. As a
result of divergent and convergent preferences with China, the framework intends to outline how China
might be achieving influence in SEA through indirect means of influence.68. To examine which of the
extent preferences were converted by China’s influence, Goh categorized three particular outcomes—
e.g., ideal outcomes derived from intensification, inducement and persuasion (aligned); mixed
outcomes derived from argumentation, inducement and demonstration (undecided); and unpredictable
outcomes derived from coercion, inducement and persuasion (opposed).
The research findings from this analysis find that “preference-multiplying” typology is most salient
to the study of China converting its power resources into outcomes. In fact, China often enjoys the
67
Evelyn Goh, “The Modes of China’s Influence: Cases from Southeast Asia,” Asian Survey Vol. 54 No. 5
(September/October 2014): pp. 825-848, https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2014.54.5.825.
68
Goh, “The Modes of China’s Influence,” pp. 826-827.
46
same preferences for a particular outcome with any given SEA country (i.e. aligned). At times, the
“preference-multiplying” and “persuasion” typologies will share combined elements of influence, such
as a mixture of persuasion and argumentation, so that “identifying common imperatives, initiating joint
policy action, and committing resources” allows China more leverage over those countries (i.e.
undecided) who wish to be more aligned with China’s preferences.69
Kai He’s article analyses more broadly about the strategic implications derived from ASEAN-
China relations, namely in the military and economic realms, when studying their behavior in
institutional arrangements. The strategic challenges are categorized under the “taking-sides dilemma,”
the “irrelevance worry,” and the “flash-point danger.” These three strategic challenges can be identified
through concrete examples such as the Asian Regional Forum (ARF) (i.e., “taking-sides”), the East
Asia Summit (EAS) (i.e. “irrelevance worry”) and the Mischief Reef Incident and Declaration of
Conduct in 1995 and 2002 respectively (i.e. “flash-point danger”).70
In accordance with institutional balancing theory, any given state has two strategies when dealing
with external threats: inclusive institutional balancing or exclusive institutional balancing. The former
refers to the use of institutions to shape behavior around shared norms and rules and the latter results
from imposing pressure by exclusion from an institution in order to alter a behavior of any given state.
These two strategies, He argues, have been applied simultaneously by ASEAN to deal with China’s
influence since the end of the Cold War.71
One example of inclusive institutional balancing mentioned in this paper is the ARF. He argues
that the ARF serves as a mechanism for the ASEAN to wedge against the United States and China. He
69
Goh, Ibid, pp. 834.
70
Kai He, Facing the challenges: ASEAN’s institutional responses to China’s rise (Routledge: 2014), pp. 1-
18.
71
He, Facing the challenges, pp. 149.
47
points out that the ASEAN utilizes the ARF for two strategic goals, (1) ensuring that American strategic
interests are preserved and (2) engaging and socializing China through rules and norms.72
Therefore, He’s analysis reveals that the competition between the United States and China is a
decisive factor in how the ASEAN responds to China’s behavior through the institutional arrangements.
Meanwhile, the significance of China-ASEAN trade cannot be underestimated as it allows for ASEAN
states to develop their own economies while promoting a shared-interest with China in intra-regional
economic development.73 One example of exclusive intuitional balancing exemplifies this argument
in the ASEAN-Plus-Three (APT), where the United States has been excluded from joining the
institution.
Even though Kai He believes that ASEAN must utilize institutional arrangements as a wedging
strategy to deal with powerful actors in the region, since the ASEAN will also be pressured by other
big powers such as the United States to follow another course other than what China prefers. The
analysis also indicates that China prefers to use the institutional arrangements for pursing common
interests in spite of the United States’ influence. In fact, Evelyn Goh’s research findings are that China
and SEA countries have more in common, and when preferences are aligned, China puts more
emphasis on making those outcomes become a reality.
Kai He employs institutional balancing theory to asses China’s power and to what extent
ASEAN’s institutional frameworks work to constrain and shape China’s behavior.74 According to He,
threat perceptions among ASEAN members are not consistent, as some of them see China as an
72
Kai He alludes to the US’s Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base in the Philippines as an example of
security interests while the Tiananmen Incident invokes regional suspicions about China’s power.
73
He, Ibid, pp. 162.
74
He, Ibid, pp. 168.
48
opportunity for economic engagement while others view China’s military modernization with fearful
consequences for how it could be used against them.75 For this reason, the United States’ influence in
ASEAN’s institutional arrangements are an important factor in how ASEAN responds to China’s
behavior.
Evelyn Goh argues that in most instances China does not coerce SEA countries into convergent
preferences, since China takes more indirect actions in getting those countries to align with China’s
interests. 76 Moreover, Goh finds that unintended consequences over the South China Sea (SCS)
dispute explain why the “ability to prevail” typology has led to undesirable outcomes for China. 77 In
sum, not only do some SEA countries (i.e. opposed) feel threatened by China’s influence, but some of
them might use that pressure as a way to force China to reconsider undesirable behaviors through
ASEAN’s institutional arrangements.
Aileen Baviera’s work on the “balance of influence” between China and SEA neighbors indicate
that contradictions do exist at the domestic level of analysis as well. While many believe they are too
small and economically dependent to pose as a threat, on the contrary, China tends to view SEA
countries as susceptible to the United States in ways that goes against China’s interests in the region.78
On relations between China and ASEAN, Huang Haitao argues that China’s growing influence in
SEA should not only result in higher degrees of mistrust over China’s intentions but also between the
75
He, Ibid, pp. 161.
76
Goh, Ibid, pp. 848.
77
Goh identifies the Philippines’ and Vietnam’s request for U.S. in managing the SCS dispute, increased
rhetoric about the U.S. support in the region, renewed security cooperation from regional allies, and a new
presence of U.S. naval forces as the unintended consequences of China’s influence.
78
Aileen Baviera, “Domestic Interests and Foreign Policy in China and the Philippines Implications for the
South China Sea Disputes,” Philippines Studies: Historical and Ethnographic Viewpoints Vol. 62. No. 1
(March 2014): pp. 133-143, https://www.jstor.org/stable/24672289.
49
ASEAN members themselves at the domestic level.79 Another author believes that this type of trust-
deficit criteria can explain the shared values and strategic preferences of ASEAN and when they are
conducive to China’s interests, for example when the SEA countries use the ARF as a platform to
advance China-ASEAN maritime cooperation and cooperation over China’s Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI).80
In-depth studies on the element of trust at the domestic level of analysis might be perceived as a
way for China to exploit those countries with high degrees of economic interdependence. In other
words, the amount of economic trade, the severity of stopping trade and the strength of the vested
interests created by trade dependence with China would deter SEA countries from politicizing their
relations with China. 81 Recent reports from the mass media have followed developments of the
Chinese-built High Speed Railway (HSR) in Thailand and the United States’ presence at Cam Ranh
Bay naval port in Vietnam.82
As Thailand’s HSR is getting off-the-ground, China could use this project as a way to increase the
level of convergent perceptions on intra-regional economic development and pushing forward with the
BRI. The recent American naval excursions in Vietnam is another concrete example for He’s analysis
on ASEAN’s institutional balancing strategies. ASEAN members would certainly use an American
79
Huang Haitao. “The Role of Trust in China-ASEAN relations—Towards a Multi-level Trust Building for
China and ASEAN,” International Journal of China Studies Vol. 8 Issue 1 (April 2017): pp.45-59,
https://www.proquest.com/openview/8b1f19c906ce17cdab9cd08e77f36604/1.pdf?pq-
origsite=gscholar&cbl=1316366
80
Lai Yew Meng, “Sea of Cooperation or ‘Sea of Conflict?’: The South China Sea in the Context of China-
ASEAN Maritime Cooperation,” International Journal of China Studies Vol. 8 Issue 3 (December 2017): pp.
321-345, https://www.proquest.com/openview/4535fd1a67d1208c33fecfa36bd0da47/1.pdf?pq-
origsite=gscholar&cbl=1316366.
81
Wen Zha,“Personalized Foreign Policy Decision-making and Economic Dependence: A Comparative Study
of Thailand and Philippines’ China Policies,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 37 No. 2 (August 2015): pp.
242-268, https://www.jstor.org/stable/24916581.
82
Pechnipa Dominique Lam. “Will Thailand’s Chinese High-Speed Railway Be Worth It?” The Diplomat
March 6, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/will-thailands-china-built-railway-be-worth-it/.
50
naval presence off the coast of Vietnam as a method to check China’s undesirable behaviors at the door.
The findings of this small-sample literature suggest that all levels of analysis offer insights into the
effectiveness of China’s influence in SEA. However, recent events reveal that economic regionalism
is still one of, if not the driving force behind China’s influence in SEA and the behavioral dynamics in
China-ASEAN relations. Though analyses at the domestic level might explain why China behaves
differently in institutional arrangements, Goh and He use economic regionalism as a basis for their
studies in order to explain how China’s influence shapes the outcomes and behaviors of SEA countries.
As of May 29, 2020, ASEAN is China’s largest trading partner in spite of the COVID-19
pandemic.83 China, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam have also used the outbreak of
COVID-19 to push forward on the development agenda of the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC)
Special Fund.84 As China’s power resources expand with time, making the country more capable of
pursuing its imperatives, tensions at the international level will reveal the extent and constraints of
China’s influence in SEA. This means that in order to conclude the impact China’s rise will have on
the United States’ and Australia’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, tensions between SEA countries and ASEAN
are going to play a key role in such analyses.
5.3 Scenario Planning: Conceptual Development Framework of the FOIP
Policy
In his monumental paper on power and security in international affairs, Arnold Wolfers wrote in
83
Author Unknown, “China-ASEAN trade ties remain resilient despite COVID-19 pandemic: ambassador”
Xinhua News, May, 29, 2020, http://www.china.org.cn/world/Off_the_Wire/2020-
05/29/content_76106791.htm.
84
Author Unknown, “Lancang-Mekong cooperation to boost people’s benefits: Chinese state councilor.”
Xinhua News, February 2, 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-02/21/c_138806174.htm.
51
1952 that the “impact of cold war and threats of external aggression rather than depression and social
reform” have led to an emphasis on national security in the pursuit of a state’s national interest.85
Wolfers defined national interest as a policy not only designed to promote the design and direction of
policy but to emphasize the subordination of certain policies to the national interest. In the context of
the cold war, by this definition Wolfers is discussing how policies centered on national security were
replacing those of former arguments with less attention to the security of a nation or state.
One of the authors duly noted in Wolfer’s paper was Walter Lippman whose thesis—that security
rises and falls with the ability of a nation to deter or defeat an attack—was influential on Wolfer’s own
thesis about national security. For instance, both of those authors write about the values of power and
wealth within the state-society relationship. Power being the ability to control the actions of others,
and wealth as the amount of a nation’s material possessions. In addition to this, both Wolfer and
Lippman discuss the objective and subjective aspects of security. On the one hand, security acts where
the absence of threats is measured against acquired values; on the other hand, security plays a
formidable role whenever the absence of fear that values will be attacked is impressed in the minds of
the society. Underlying these factors are the variables of exaggeration and underestimation in national
security. Plus, Wolfers notes that, an increase in security aspirations, follows a higher probability that
a state seeks to hide aggressive aims to secure the society—the security as a cloak metaphor.
David Baldwin’s work The Concept of Security goes much further analytically than Wolfers or
Lippman by conceptually applying the meaning of security in international relations. Baldwin posed
three modes of thinking for the usefulness of security studies: (1.) of what is security an instance to
85
Arnold Wolfers, “ ‘National Security’ as an Ambiguous Symbol,” Political Science Quarterly Vol. 67 No. 4
(1952): pp. 481-502, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2145138.
52
the study of international politics? (2.) rational policy analysis calls for a deeper comparative analysis
of security policy and (3.) scholarly communication about security studies seeks common ground in
understanding more about the polarization of international politics.
Wolfers’ work in 1952 was very important to Baldwin’s paper when he clarified the two reasons
for questioning the defining security as a neglected concept. He also took from Wolfer’s study on the
objective and subjective aspects of national security to formulate two specifications for measuring
security— Security for whom? Security for which values? —based on the idea that absolute security
is unattainable in international affairs. However, Baldwin’s use of the neo-realist’s champion analogy
merits more attention for this paper on the Indo-Pacific Strategy. According to this analogy, states are
the teams who compete for their own security as if it were the championship game.
For neo-realists who study international security, most follow Kenneth Waltz’s theory in that
security by its nature is the primary motivation for how states behave in the international system.
Table 3. Neo-Realist Version of the Zero-Sum Game
Anarchy
1. Security 2. Survival
3. Goals 4. Assurance
The zero-sum concepts of security rationalize a state’s security as more security for one state
results in less security for another state. In other words, the “winner” in the game, or the dominant
state in the international community, has competed for security in the international system; thus the
security dilemma has ensued whereby insecure neighbors begin to compete more fiercely due to their
53
lack of security.
This understanding of international relations is relevant to the United States’ and Australia’s Indo-
Pacific strategy because they need the networking of alliances in order to effectively carry out the FOIP
policy. Take the United States Department of Defense’s official stance on the Indo-Pacific Strategy as
an example. The three major objectives are (1) “Preparedness,” (2) “Partnerships,” and (3) “Promoting
a Networked Region.”
These three objectives represent the core part of the Indo-Pacific Strategy in relation to the FOIP
policy. The core aspects of the FOIP policy of which can be summarized into three elements: the
element of alliance sustainment for strategic deterrence (preparedness); the element of alliance
strengthening for regional stability (partnerships); and the element of shared-values for a greater
United States presence within the alliance network (promotion of a networked region). I argue that
these three elements are driving United States-Australia defense and security cooperation under the
backdrop of the Indo-Pacific strategy.
Based on the three elements, Baldwin’s two specifications for national security—security for
whom?; security for which values?—could be applied for the Indo-Pacific security framework.86 In
reference to the table below, I’ve added two of my own specifications to go alongside with Baldwin’s.
These specifications—Security against whom? Security against which values?— are intended to
emphasize the adversarial perspectives of the FOIP policy. This is intended to expand on and offer a
new angle on potentially diverging perceptions of the Indo-Pacific security framework among the
relevant actors in the region.
86
David A. Baldwin, “The Concept of Security,” Review of International Studies Vol. 23 No. 1 (January 1997):
pp.5-26, https://www.jstor.org/stable/20097464.
54
According to the chart below, the specifications on the left side correspond to the actors/policy on
the right side. For example, in the case of the United States and Australia, both countries should
approve of security for Indonesia and the FOIP policy; and thus against non-traditional threats such as
piracy in waters surrounding or in Indonesian territory. Moreover, Indonesia, United States and
Australia would at the same time collaborate in defending against these type of threats under the FOIP
policy.
Table 4. Conceptual Development Framework of the FOIP Policy
Conceptual Development Framework of the FOIP Policy
Core Aspects of the FOIP Policy:
(1) Preparedness
 the element of alliance sustainment for strategic deterrence
(2) Partnerships
 the element of alliance strengthening for regional stability
(3) Promoting a Networked Region
 the element of shared-values for a greater United States presence within the
alliance network
Specifications and Values:
Baldwin: Security for whom? Security for which values?
My own: Security against whom? Security against which values?
55
Specifications Values
Security for whom? Actors A, B, C
Security for which values? Policy A
Security against whom? Actor D
Security against which values? Response A to Actor D due to Policy A
Source: compiled by author

In so doing, the scenario outlined in the chart above explains how the United States and Australia
should come to the aid of Indonesia in response to (1) security for the FOIP policy, (2) security against
non-traditional security threats and (3) security against threats to the FOIP policy such as pirates in
Indonesian waters. This assumes that a piratical attack would contain enough scale and magnitude to
Specifications Values
Security for whom? United States, Australia and Indonesia
Security for which values? Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)
Security against whom? Pirates in Indonesian waters
Security against which values? Onboard ship seizure due to threats to FOIP
disrupt these three elements of Indo-Pacific security. The adversarial aspects of the Indo-Pacific
Security Framework conceptualize the threats to Indo-Pacific security as well as illustrate how the
FOIP policy fits into such a scenario. This methodology should work as a point of departure for any
assessment on the FOIP policy’s relationship to Indo-Pacific security environment.
This scenario was built from the ideals of Henry Kissinger on geopolitical competition between
56
China and the United States in the 21st century.87 Non-traditional security threats affect all actors in
the region irrespective of their national and geopolitical interests. Thus for China and the United States
the Indo-Pacific could be a flashpoint for enhanced security cooperation for the purpose of non-
traditional security threats in the Indo-Pacific—a “safety net” approach.88
As noted in the charts above, this type of security cooperation would be compatible to the mutual
interest of the United States and Australia. In the event that China and the United States will view each
other as geopolitical rivals in the Indo-Pacific, then the value of the FOIP policy should be tested (1)
for the cohesiveness of the alliance network and (2) against the threats to regional security that are
likely to spill-over into the wider framework of international security.
6. Conclusion: Towards a Proof of Concept for the

FOIP Policy
In the 21st century, soft power has an unprecedented role in the evolution of state behavior in the
international system. More importantly, this phenomenon is occurring under the backdrop of China’s
Rise and the Indo-Pacific Strategy. Kenneth Waltz asserted that bipolarity had defined the international
system of the Cold War since it "is firmly rooted in the structure of postwar international politics and
will last as long as that structure endures”89; and as long as the U.S. and the Soviet Union sustained
the bipolar system, it makes power competition easier to distinguish among all the other less influential
87
Henry Kissinger, Does American Need A Foreign Policy?: Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century, (New
York: Simon & Schuster, 2001).
88
Henry Kissinger adopts the idea that the United States’ “safety net” is a better option for China’s security
interests rather than as an “innate adversary”.
89
Kenneth Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” International Security (2000): pp. 1-37,
http://www.columbia.edu/itc/sipa/U6800/readings-sm/Waltz_Structural%20Realism.pdf.
57
state-actors in the international system. 90 He also noted that the postwar foreign policies of those
superpowers entail a structural change in the international system, whereby a similarity of military
forces and doctrines deter self-interested superpowers from expansion and attack.91
On the contrary, Joseph Nye Jr. believes that the Cold War model of public diplomacy is no longer
relevant. His theory of “soft power” and the elements for projecting a positive image to the
international community, have restructured the international system. 92 In the 21st century, the
Information Age has led to emerging, interdisciplinary academic discourses in political sciences and
communication studies. Joseph Nye Jr. has been one of those voices in international politics by
developing his theory of soft-power for international relations in the post-Cold War era. In his essay,
Nye Jr. discussed the importance of promoting positive images under the new dynamics of the post-
Cold War era.
The expansion of the media in the political domain has extended the scope of projecting soft-power,
thus Nye Jr. referred to a new source of power in international politics—the power of focus—which
has resulted in a “paradox of plenty.”93 In this “paradox of plenty” attention and focus are two keys to
projecting political influence by means of soft-power, directing an audience to focus on any given
discourse that is advantageous to politicians in communicating their message.
The explanation of this phenomena underscores the valuable lessons of political communication
and diplomacy in the 21st century and serves as a good example of the impact soft power capabilities
90
Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Philippines: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979):
pp. 1-129, https://dl1.cuni.cz/pluginfile.php.pdf
91
Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 15.
92
Joseph S. Nye, Jr, “Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2004),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/2004-05-01/soft-power-means-success-world-politics
and International Affairs, 1-28 (2004).
93
Nye, “Soft Power,” pp. 5.
58
have on geopolitics. For example, it’s significant to recall back to after the Belgrade Embassy bombing
in 1999 when Chinese movie theaters banned American films and radio stations all the while refusing
to play American music to follow suit with internal dissatisfaction towards the U.S.94 At that time,
Chinese filmmakers Zhang Yimou and He Shang had portrayed America in a positive light through
their films, prior to the Chinese Embassy bombing in 1999, which implies the Chinese embassy
bombing in Belgrade not only affected Sino-American relations politically, but also had led to an
overall decline in America’s image in Chinese popular culture.95 With the cyber dimensions of today,
especially social media, this type of mass resentment sets a very dangerous line for relations between
the United States, China and others.
The United States’ and Australia’s Indo-Pacific Strategy should be analyzed as a point of departure
for understating the future direction of 21st century contemporary international affairs, along with the
importance of China’s rise. At this juncture of the 21st century, a country’s ability to utilize soft power
against its geopolitical disadvantages, gives that country a means to overcome those geopolitical
constraints.
In the context of the Indo-Pacific Strategy, sharper competition from the United States and
Australia originates from the two countries’ hard power capabilities, within their defense and security
cooperation, for which they intend to compete with China from the vantage point of their geopolitical
advantages. That means China, on the other hand, must adopt superior soft power strategies—in lieu
of expanding its hard power—in the areas where they will potentially face geopolitical constraints.
94
Li Cheng, “China in 1999: Seeking Common Ground at a Time of Tension and Conflict,” University of
California Press (2000), https://www.jstor.org/stable/3021226.
95
Peter Hays Griers, “Tears of Rage: Chinese Nationalist Reactions to the Belgrade Embassy
Bombing,” The University of Chicago Press( 2001).
59
Table 5. Analysis Outline for a Proof of Concept
Towards a Proof of Concept for the FOIP policy:
1. Specifications: Calculate Geopolitical Disadvantages
2. Values: Translate into Soft Cower Capabilities
3. Result: Overcome Geopolitical Constraints
4. Outcome: More or Less International Security?
Source: compiled by author
For this reason, more studies should be conducted on how to analyze and view the nature of
international politics from the perspective of soft power and geopolitics in the 21 st century. How do
they correlate with one another? What are the main theories? Why are they being applied? To which
circumstances are they applied? These are some of the key questions that should be answered in regards
to the theoretical, conceptual and academic frameworks.
This should be done in order to convey how the relevant variables, concepts and policies are
contributing to international peace and security. That’s not to say that all of the actors in the
problematique share the same specifications, values, results and outcomes. In fact, it’s essential that
the variables be viewed in the context of historical factors and contemporary policies and issues in
international affairs for each country/actor. Context is just as important as the concept; the context
itself should reinforce the value of the concept in question.
Once there are more studies on the links between soft power and geopolitics, then historical
analyses should be conducted for richer case studies and evidence from Cold War international affairs
and other timelines. Conceptualizing the specifications and values of the Indo-Pacific Strategy will
lead to a more descriptive and prescriptive analyses on the implementation of the FOIP policy. In other
60
words, a proof of concept for the FOIP policy would be valuable to the study of International Relations
and how it has affected, is affecting, or will affect the momentum of China’s rise.
61
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67
Appendix A
Australia Defense Forces’ Six Streams of Defense Capabilities96
Six Streams of Defense Capability Percentage Upgrades
1. Intelligence, Surveillance, 9%
Reconnaissance, Space, Electronic
Warfare and Cyber
2. Maritime and Anti-Submarine 25%
Warfare
3. Strike and Air Combat 17%
4. Land Combat and Amphibious 18%
Warfare
5. Sustainment and Operations 25%
6. Air and Sea Lift 6%
96
Adapted from the Australian Government Department of Defense’s 2016 Defence White Paper.
https://www.defence.gov.au/WhitePaper/
68
Appendix B
United States’ Investments in International Military Education and Training (IMET)97
Recipients FY 2017 FY 2018 Total Change
Cambodia $659, 680 $328,187 $987,867 331,493
Indonesia $10,717,678 $15,660,852 $26,378,530 4,943,174
Republic of $3, 556,858 $2,874,057 $6,430,915 682,801
Korea, South
Laos $0 $321,552 $321,552 321,552
Malaysia $2,521,006 $2,387,222 $4,908,228 133,784
Mongolia $2,003,024 $1,460,049 $3,463,073 1,856,975
Philippines $5,316,874 $7,911,823 13,228,697 2,594,949
Singapore $35,503,134 $6,701,828 $42,204,962 28,801,306
Thailand $913,960 $1,218,926 $2,132,886 304,966
Timor-Leste, $407,812 $445,128 $852,940 37,316
Democratic
Republic
Vietnam $3,189,952 $1,612,993 4,802,945 1,570,959
97
Adapted from United States Department of State’s 2017-2018 Foreign Military Training Report.
Countries from the Pacific Islands were excluded from table as a result of low investments. See
United States Department of Defense & State, Foreign Military Training Repor tat
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/fmt_vol2_17_18.pdf; and more information from
the United States Government Accountability Office at https://www.gao.gov/assets/590/585950.pdf.
69
Appendix C
Transcript Notes from Personal Interview with Anonymous United States Air Force
Veteran98
1. Timeline (history)
Pity bomb-holes
Best beach
2. Refueling (“strategic point”)
Guam: refuel point for USAF to go to countries throughout Asia-Pacific
- A rally point for any countries based in that part of the world
- Supplies, fuels, troops, equipment
- Strategic point*
3. Missions (multilateral)
- “operation that works towards one result; anything that had military involvement.”
- Diego Garcia – bombing site
- Individual mission vs overall goal
- Personnel, pilots, commanders
Support mission: using other personnel to support a mission to make sure they complete their
mission. “They depend on other branches to support them…air force, navy, marines.”
- Tankers to rally aircraft into a certain area; refuel them to continue to next mission
- Refuel point: help troops to get from point A to B by supplying fuel halfway
 where the tanks initiate out of Guam
Ocean and urban areas of responsibilities – “vulnerable because we were out in the middle of
ocean”
98
This interview was conducted in one session due to the lack of available time and long-distance
communication issues. I’ve included all of the information that I obtained from the interview into an
outline format.
70
Appendix D
Map of Guam and Western Australia as Strategic Points99
Source: https://www.britannica.com/place/Guam
99
This map displays the strategic points of Guam and Western Australia from the vantage point of
the Indo-Pacific. The map was accessed from Britannica online at
https://www.britannica.com/place/Guam.
71
Appendix E
United States Military Relocation Plan in Okinawa Facilities100
Source:https://www.nippon.com/en/currents/d00157/the-futenma-relocation-controversy-and-
okinawa%E2%80%99s-gubernatorial-election.html
100
This a detailed map and released from a Japanese Government source. This map also suggests
that a vital part of the Relocation Plan is to move military facilities from the south of Okinawa Island
to the northern part of the island. The map was accessed from Nippon Communications Foundation
at https://www.nippon.com/en/currents/d00157/the-futenma-relocation-controversy-and-
okinawa%E2%80%99s-gubernatorial-election.html.
72
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to have the opportunity to study at East China Normal University (ECNU). As for the
SAIAS program, I’ve learned so much about the nature of international politics and security. The
students in this program also love to study Chinese language, culture and history. So I must
acknowledge that I wouldn’t be here had it not been for this passion of language and culture.
I am honored to have Professor Wang Shiming as my academic advisor. He is a very generous and
kind person who exudes such awesome patience when talking with his students. I’m also very
enthusiastic every time I talk to Prof. Liu Jun about life in China. I enjoyed his class on China’s
Opening-Up and Reform so much that I hope to teach a similar class like it one day.
If it not for patience and understanding of Prof. Liu Jun, I don’t know if I could’ve made it through
this program successfully. His constant encouragement and support is so important to me. When I look
back on my experiences at the SAIAS program at ECNU, I will surely think of him every time. I’m
also very pleased with all of the support I’ve received from the ECNU Department of Publicity’s Ms.
Joey Liu, Wicky Xu and Guo Wenjian. Thankfully, I know that I can rely on them for advice at any
time.
I also thank the teachers at the Department of English on Minhang campus and all members of
ECNU Circle. What an awesome job they all do by interacting with their students and faithfully passing
along the knowledge of their skill. I wish I could be more like them—devoted to a life of teaching for
language, culture and harmony.
Lastly, I want to thank all of the staff and teacher faculty at SAIAS, especially secretary Zhang
Huali. Her work in the office is crucial to everyone in the department. Without her help, I couldn’t
have made it through the program successfully. I know that after two years of diligent work that I have
73
learned so much about international polities, Chinese history, language and culture, and the humanities
in general. I’m so happy that I have the sound-mind and health to be able to pursue my higher education
at East China Normal University.
I also wish the whole world health, safety and happiness. I don’t know whether it’s an omen or a
blessing that I had to stay at home while working on my Master’s Thesis. As the cases from the
COVID-19 outbreak multiplied across the world, I sat in my grandparent’s house working away on
my master’s thesis from dusk until dawn. I must thank my grandparents for their loving spirit and
humor. Most of all, for giving me a place to stay so that I could work on my thesis without disturbances.
Next acknowledgments go out to my mother and her husband for their strong moral and emotional
support during the time I was working on the thesis. I especially thank my mother for her cooking,
NetFlix, funny jokes and songs, weird ‘80s American dancing and lovely gardening tips.
In the future, I hope to further my studies either by going in for a second master’s degree or
committing to a PhD program. I know that I have had so many people along the way encourage me
through the process of my life. Thanks to my former professors and advisors at the University of
Central Arkansas for their compassion to the study of international politics. I was so amazed every
time I stepped into the classrooms of Dr. Mark Mullenbach, Dr. John Passe Smith, Dr. Michael Yoder
and Dr. Stephen O’Connell. I have such great memories when I think back to my days as an
undergraduate in the International Studies program at UCA. At that time, I was very confused, working
a full-time job, while failing to juggle it all with my school work. I’ll never forget the advice they gave
me to quit my job and focus solely on my undergraduate studies—what a burden lifted off my shoulders!
To this day, I feel like their motivations still have the biggest impact on my life.
74

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2021 届研究生硕士学位论文

密级： 学号: 51182200059

Eаst Chinа Normаl University

East China Normal University

Title：United States-Australia Defense and

Department： School of Advanced International and Area Studies

Major： International Relations

Research direction： Contemporary Chinese studies

Supervisor： Professor Wang Shiming

Candidate： Joshua Monroe Mayfield

／ 博士 （ 请 勾 选 学位 期 间 ） ， 在 导师 的 指 导 下进行 的研宄 工作 及取 得 的 研宄成 果 。 除文 中 己经 注 明 引 用

姓名（NAME） 职称（TITLE） 单位 备注（NOTE）

Part 1.1 Background………………………………………………………………..6

Part 1.2 Literature Review ……………………………….………………………...7

Part 1.3 Research Objectives……………………………………..……………….10

Part 1.4 Research Question………………………………………………………..11

Part 1.5 Methodology……………………………………………………………..11

Part 1.6 Research Limitations……………………………………………………..12

Part 1.7 Research Structure……………………………………………………….13

Part 2.1 Origins of the ANZUS Alliance………………………………………….14

Part 2.2 Issues Within the ANZUS Alliance………………………………………19

Part 3.1: Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) Policy………………………………23

Part 3.2: Australia’s Key Role in the Global Rules-Based Order…………………27

Chapter IV: Critical Issue-Areas of US-Australia Defense and Security Cooperation in

Part 4.2 Wider Collaboration on Cybersecurity and Information-Sharing……….36

Part 4.3 Ongoing Problems with Military Infrastructure…………………………..41

Part 5.2 ASEAN as a Variable to China’s Influence in the Indo-Pacific…………..47

Part 5.3 Scenario Planning: Conceptual Development Framework of the FOIP

international affairs, notably with the rise of China.

and allies in the region.

1.2 Literature Review

now, and thus it is not the subject of this thesis.

scientific research institutions and innovative-minded personnel.6

globalization might be construed by adversaries as geo-political competition instead of engagement.9

1.3 Research Objectives

1.4 Research Question

in the Indo-Pacific be critical in evaluating the rise of China in the Indo-Pacific?

in determining the Indo-Pacific security framework?

preparedness, partnerships and promotion of networked region—are conceptualized and structured to

Southeast Asia, and others.

objectives of the United States-Australia alliance in the Indo-Pacific.

alliances under the FOIP policy.

security cooperation within United States-Australia alliance.

1.7 Research Structure

United States-Australia defense and security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.

2. United States-Australia Defense and Security

Indian and Pacific oceans.

Australia—exemplified by a strengthened form of strategic cooperation between Australia and the

communities and upgrades to United States defense facilities in Australia.19

achieve the “free world” ideal in Asia-Pacific.

the “free world.”

ships to pass through its territory.20

personnel between the U.S. Marine Corps and the RAAF.21

2.2 Issues within the ANZUS Alliance

ANZUS Council meeting would be postponed.22

support at all costs.’’24

economic relations between countries in the region.26

Zealand’s nuclear free policy.

Soviet threat in the Asia-Pacific.

well as the research and development of new weapons systems.

States-Australia alliance is a questionable way to supply a means to achieve security in Asia-Pacific.

backdrop of the Indo-Pacific Strategy.

3. Scope and Context of the United States’ and

密级：学号: 51182200059

／博士（请勾选学位期间），在导师的指导下进行的研宄工作及取得的研宄成果。除文中己经注明引用

姓名（NAME）职称（TITLE）单位备注（NOTE）