: Sui aeChapter 12 FREEDOM OF RELIGION ‘THE RIGHT TO WORSHIP is one of the basic liberties of man that has been the subject of official repression and punishment since the beginning of recorded gov- ernment. Secular and spiritual matters were in the past, directed by the same authorities, with the religious leader, as high priest, performing an influential and even predominant role in the determination of official policies. The annals of ancient civilizations like Egypt and Babylon attest to this. So too do the temples erected by the State in reverence of the Greek and Roman gods. The slaughter of the Christians in the Coliseum was decreed by the imperial Caesars. More subtle but no less vicious was the notorious Court of the Inquisition, es- tablished by the Supreme Pontiff and supported by the King of Spain, which convicted countless innocents in the name of Jesus Christ, Who died for His religious belief. During the Middle Ages, national sovereignties were subject to the absolute authority of the Pope. Even after the Reformation, which was an offshoot of the pro- test against the dictation of the Vatican, governments continued to impose on religious freedom. Sir Thomas More was executed because he refused to recognize Henry VIII as the head of the Church of England. The official witchhunts of Salem fanned the fires of religious bigotry among the American colonists, who had gone to the New World in search of freedom. Rizal was perse- cuted by the clergy with the acquiescence and active cooperation of the government. Through the centuries, 428FREEDOM OF RELIGION 429 State and Church worked hand-in-glove to impose an official religion upon the people and thus deprived the individual of the fundamental liberty to worship as he pleased, if he pleased at all. Reacting to this age-old oppression, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights now affirms: Every one has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with othe and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.’ Religion Religion may be defined as “any specific system of belief, worship, conduct, etc., often involving a code of ethics and a philosophy.” This is a more comprehensive description than that given in Aglipay v. Ruiz’ to the effect that it is “a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator.” The exis- tence of a Divine Being is not necessarily inherent in religion; the Buddhists, for example, merely espouse a way of life without reference to an omnipotent God. Mere belief in karma, or destiny, is a religion notwith- standing the absence of an Almighty to direct it. In the context of the constitutional provision, relig- ion also includes a rejection of religion, a refusal to be- lieve in a hereafter or in the supremacy of a supernatu- ral person with powers over life and death. One man’s religion may instruct him that there is a God while an- other’s may tell him there is no God; and both of them, * Article 18. * Webster's New World Dictionary, p. 1228. * 64 Phil. 201,430 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW under the Constitution, are entitled to their respective beliefs. In other words, religion embraces matters of faith and dogma, as well as doubt, agnosticism and atheism, Religion in the Constitution ‘The basic provisions of the Constitution on religion are the following: No law shall be made respecting an establishment of ligion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No rei ious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or politial rights” ‘The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable? The other pertinent provisions are as follows: (Charitable institutions, churches, parsonages or convents ‘appurtenant thereto, mosques, and non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements actually, directly and exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational pur poses shall be exempt from taxation.” No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, paid or used, directly or indirectly, forthe use, benefit or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institu tion, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, oF support of ‘any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such except when such priest, preacher, minister or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal in- stitution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.” “Art. Il, See. 5. * Art I, See. 6. “Art VI, See. 28(9) * Art. VI, See. 291).FREEDOM OF RELIGION 431 Educational institutions, other than those established by cligious groups and mission boards, shall be owned solely by citizens of the Philippines, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens. The Congress may, however, require increased equity participation in all educational institutions ‘The control and administration of educational institu. tions shall be vested in citizens of the Philippines. No educational institution shall be established exclu- sively for aliens, and no group of aliens shall comprise more than one-third of the enrollment in any school. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to schools established for for- ‘eign diplomatic personnel and their dependents and, unless otherwise provided by law, for other foreign temporary resi- dents.” ‘At the option expressed in writing by the parents or guardians, religion shall be allowed to be taught to their chil- dren or wards in public elementary and high schools within the regular class hours by instructors designated or approved by the religious authorities of the religion to which the children or wards belong, without additional cost to the Government.” Moreover, under Section 3(1) of Article XV of our Constitution, the “State shall defend the right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their reli- gious convictions and the demands of responsible par- enthood.” It is noteworthy also that the Preamble to the Con- stitution begins with an invocation for “the aid of Al- mighty God,” under the notion that “in so far as it in- stills into the mind the purest principles of morality, the influence of religion is deeply felt and highly appreci- ated” * Art, XIV, See. 4(2), * Art. XIV, Sec. 3(3). Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201,432 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW In Imbong v. Ochoa,” the Supreme Court empha- sized that — [At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a hetero: geneous society. It is made up of people of diverse ethnic, eul- tural and religious belies and backgrounds. History has shown us that our government, in law and in practice, has allowed these various religious, cultural, social and racial groups to thrive in a single society together. It has embraced minority groups and is tolerant towards all ~ the religious people of dif- ferent sects and the non-believers. The undisputed fact is that ‘our people generally believe in a deity, whatever they con- ceived Him to be, and to whom they call for guidance and enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law. Separation of Church and State ‘The separation of Church and State was originally, and quite adequately, expressed in the first sentence of Article III, Section 5, providing that “no law shall be ‘made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibit ing the free exercise thereof.” It is now rendered more emphatic by Article II, Section 6, which says that the separation shall be “inviolable.” ‘The rationale of the rule is summed up in the fa- miliar saying, “Strong fences make good neighbors.” The idea is to delineate the boundaries between the two institutions and thus avoid encroachments by one against the other because of a misunderstanding of the limits of their respective exclusive jurisdictions. The demarcation line calls on the entities to “render there- fore unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's.” The doctrine cuts both ways. It is not only the State that is prohibited from interfering in purely ecclesiasti- » G.R.No, 204819, April 8, 2014, 721 SCRA 146,FREEDOM OF RELIGION 433 cal affairs; the Church is likewise barred from meddling in purely secular matters. And the reason is plain. A union of Church and State, as aptly remarked, “tends to destroy government and to degrade religion.” It is also likely to result in a conspiracy, well nigh irresistible because of its composite strength, against the individ- ual’s right to worship. The wall of separation between Church and State is, not a wall of hostility. The State in fact recognizes the beneficent influence of religion in the enrichment of the nation’s life. “In so far as it instills into the mind the purest principles of morality," so said Justice Laurel, “the influence of religion is deeply felt and highly appre- ciated” by the State. Thus— When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Con- stitution, implored the aid of Divine Providence, in order to e tablish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the bles ings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and de- mocracy, they thereby manifested their intense religious na~ ture and placed unfaltering reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of relig- ion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to re- ligious sects and denominations. Our Constitution and laws exempt from taxation properties devoted exclusively to reli- gious purposes. Sectarian aid is not prohibited when a priest, Preacher, minister or other religious teacher or dignitary as such is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage or leprosarium. Optional religious instruction in the Public schools is by constitutional mandate allowed. Thursday and Friday of Holy Week, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day, and Sundays are made legal holidays because of the secular idea that their observance is conducive to beneficial moral re- * Engel v. Vitale, 970 U.S. 421 Aglipay v, Ruiz, supra434 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW sults, The law allows divorce but punishes polygamy and big- amy; and certain erimes against religious worship are consid- tered crimes against the fundamental laws of the state According to the U.S. Supreme Court in Everson v. Board of Education,” the establishment clause simply means “that the state cannot set up a church; nor pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religion, or prefer one religion over another nor force nor influence a per- son to go to or remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any relig- ion; that the state cannot punish a person for entertai ing or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance; that no tax in any ‘amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activity or institution whatever they may be called or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion; that the state cannot openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organization or group and vice versa.” Stated otherwise, it connotes “sponsorship, finan- cial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.” Or to put it still another way, there will be no violation of the establishment clause if, first, the statute has a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect is one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and third, it does not foster an “excessive government entanglement with religion.” ‘Thus, in Jmbong v. Ochoa," the Supreme Court emphasized that the “establishment clause principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or f “3g0US.1. "Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S, 602; cited in Estrada v. Beet tor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003, 456 Phil. 411, 506 (2008) * GR, No, 204819, April 8, 2014, 721 SCRA 146,FREEDOM OF RELIGION 435 voring any religion as against other religions. It man- dates a strict neutrality in affairs among religious groups. Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state religion and the use of public resources for the support or prohibition of a religion.” “The government is neutral, and while protecting all, it prefers none, and it disparages none.” All here applies both to the believer and the non-believer. Free- dom of religion includes freedom from religion; the right to worship includes the right not to worship. Applying these criteria, the U.S. Supreme Court, in the famous School Prayer Case,” declared as unconsti- tutional the recitation by the students in public schools in New York of a prayer composed by the board of re- gents, concededly for the purpose of setting the spiritual tone of the schoolday. The Court, with only one member dissenting, declared that “it is no part of the business of government to compose official prayers for any group of the American people, to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by the government.” While welcome to the believer, the prayer was not acceptable to the non-believer, although, significantly, he was not re- quired to recite it. The State thus aligned itself with the worshiper as against the atheist and violated its obliga- tion to maintain an attitude of strict neutrality in reli- gious matters. The fact that the prayer was addressed to a non-denominational “Almighty God,” without any sectarian identification, did not excuse the State from this duty of impartiality. ‘The Engel Case served as the main basis of School District of Abington Township v. Schempp," decided a ® Engel v. Vitale, 970 US. 421 “374 US. 203.436 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW year later, where the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a Pennsylvania statute that required that “at least ten verses from the Holy Bible” be read daily, without com- ment, in all public schools of the state, The requirement, was held to be a “religious exercise” that violated the establishment clause. In the earlier ease of Tudor v. Board of Education,” it was shown that the Gideon Society, a religious group engaged in the distribution of free copies of the Bible in obedience to the scriptual mandate to “go forth and spread the word of God,” enlisted the services of public school teachers who, among other things, distributed the request forms among the students, collected them after they had been accomplished by the students’ par- ents, returned them to the Society, later received the copies requested and then delivered these to the stu- dents. The U.S. Supreme Court declared that the teach- ers, employing government time, were participating ina religious activity as they were an essential cog in the machinery of distribution of the Bibles. But in Zorach v. Clauson,” the U.S. Supreme Court, held that the wall of separation between Church and State had not been breached by a released-time ar- rangement which enabled the students in a public school to attend religious instruction classes in a nearby private building. At their request, they had been ex- cused from their classes by the school authorities during the time of the religious instruction, but subject to their obligation to make up for the time lost during another period. The Court ruled that the State had merely bent over backward to accommodate the religious needs of "14NJ.31. * 343 US, 306FREEDOM OF RELIGION 437 the students and had not thereby actually involved itself in a religious activity in violation of the Constitution. It will be recalled that, under Section 3(3) of Article XIV of our Constitution, “at the option expressed in writing by the parents or guardians, religion shall be allowed to be taught to their children or wards in public elementary and high schools within the regular class hours by instructors designated or approved by the reli- gious authorities of the religion to which the children or wards belong, without additional cost to the Govern- ment.” In Board of Education v. Allen,” a law required the petitioner to lend textbooks free of charge to all students from grades 7 to 12, including those attending private schools. Attacked on constitutional grounds insofar as it, extended its benefits to parochial schools, the statute was sustained by the U.S. Supreme Court. “The law merely makes available to all children the benefits of a general program to lend school books free of charge. Books are furnished at the request of the pupil and ownership remains, at least technically, in the State. Thus, no funds or books are furnished to parochial schools, and the financial benefit is to parents and chil- dren, not to schools. Perhaps free books make it more likely that some children choose to attend a sectarian school, but that was true of the state-paid bus fares in Everson and does not alone demonstrate an unconstitu- tional degree of support for a religious institution.” In the above-cited Everson Case, the law sustained by the U.S. Supreme Court provided free transportation for all schoolchildren without discrimination, including those attending parochial schools. “Of course, books are * 992 U.S. 236.438 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW different from buses,” the Supreme Court observed in Allen. “However, the language of (the statute) does not authorize the loan of religious books, and the State claims no right to distribute religious literature, Al- though the books loaned are those required by the paro- chial schools for use in specific courses, each book loaned must be approved by the public school authori ties; only secular books may receive approval.” In both Everson and Allen, it should be noted, the government aid was given directly to the student and his parents, not to the church-related school. In the Philippines, the doctrine of separation of Church and State should be read specifically with Arti- dle V1, Section 29(2), prohibiting appropriations of pub- lic funds for sectarian purposes. The language is quite strict, to wit, “No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, paid or used, directly or indi- rectly, for the use, benefit or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution or system of religion, or for the use, benefit or support of any priest, preacher, minister or other religious teacher or dignitary as such...” As explained by the Supreme Court in Imbong v. Ochoa,* “consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred over another, the Con- stitution in the above-cited provision utilizes the term ‘church’ in its generic sense, which refers to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any other house of God which metaphorically symbolizes a religious organization. ‘Thus, the ‘Church’ means the religious congregations collectively.” * GAR. No, 204819, April 8, 2014, 721 SCRA 146,FREEDOM OF RELIGION 439 If the interpretation of this provision were to be similarly strict, then the rulings in the Bverson, Allen and Zorach cases might. not be applicable here. The Supreme Court, however, employed a liberal approach in the leading case of Aglipay v. Rui,” where it was held that any benefit indirectly enjoyed by a religious institution, as long as such benefit was only incidental to a legitimate secular objective, would not violate the prohibition. In this case, the government had authorized a spe- cial stamp issue on the occasion of the observance in Manila of the 38rd International Eucharistic Congress under the sponsorship of the Catholic Church. The peti- tioner, as head of the Philippine Independent Church, assailed the measure and contended that it violated the Constitution because it benefited a particular religion. The Supreme Court, on examining the background facts, discovered that the original design of the stamp fea- tured a picture of a Catholic chalice, but this was later rejected in favor of a map of the Philippines under which appeared the caption, “Seat, 33rd International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.” As the purpose of the stamp issue was evidently to focus attention not on the Eucharistic Congress but on its site, the idea being to attract tourists to our country and not primarily to publicize the religious event, it was held that the stamp issue was not invalid. It has also been held that the above provision “does not inhibit the use of public property for religious pur- poses when the religious character of such use is merely incidental to a temporary use which is available indis- criminately to the public in general.”* Hence, a public * Supra. * People v, Fernandez, C.A, G.R, No, 1-1128 (1945).440 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW street may be used for a religious procession even as it is available for a civie parade, in the same way that a public plaza is not barred to a religious rally if it may also be used for a political assemblage. In Garces v. Estenzo,* it was held that there was no violation of the Constitution where it was shown that the money used by a barangay council for the purchase of a religious image was raised by it from private contri- butions and did not constitute public funds. True enough. But how about the fact that this government body actively involved itself in a religious activity and used its official influence for the benefit of a particular religion? In Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections," the Supreme Court upheld the right of the representa- tive of the petitioner, a bishop, to display a “tarpaulin” announcing, in a satirical manner, his preferences from among the candidates running for office during the campaign period for a particular election, and annulled the order of the respondent for him to take it down for being violative of its rules regarding election propa- ganda. The Supreme Court held — Respondents argue that the tarpaulin is election propagands, being petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted fori. ‘At the outset, the Constitution mandates the separation of church and state. ‘This takes many forms. Article I1J, Section 6 of the Constitu: tion, for instance provides: Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an es- tablishment of religion, or prohibiting the free ex- * 104 SORA 510. * GR No. 206728, January 21, 2015.FREEDOM OF RELIGION 441 ercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without diserimi- nation or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. ‘There are two aspects of this provision. The first is the non- establishment clause. Second is the free exercise and enjoy- ‘ment of religious profession and worship. ‘The second aspect is at issue in this ease. Clearly, not all acts done by those who are priests, bishops, ustadz, imams, or any other religious make such act immune from any secular regulation. The religious also have a secular existence. They exist within a society that is regulated by law. ‘The Bishop of Bacolod caused the posting of the tarpaulin. But not all acts of a bishop amount to religious expression. This notwithstanding, petitioners’ claim that “the views and posi- tion of the petitioners, the Bishop and the Diocese of Bacolod, on the RH Bill is inextricably connected to its Catholic dogma, faith, and moral teachings. ...” ‘The difficulty that often presents itself in these cases stems from the reality that every act can be motivated by moral, et cal, and religious considerations. In terms of their effect on the corporeal world, these acts range from belief, to expressions of these faiths, to religious ceremonies, and then to acts of a secu- lar character that may, from the point of view of others who do not share the same faith or may not subscribe to any religion, may not have any religious bearing, Definitely, the characterizations of the religious of their acts are not conclusive on this court. Certainly, our powers of adju- dication cannot be blinded by bare claims that acts are reli- gious in nature, As aptly argued by COMELEC, however, the tarpaulin, on its face, “does not convey any religious doctrine of the Catholic church.” That the position of the Catholic church appears to co- incide with the message of the tarpaulin regarding the RH Law does not, by itself, bring the expression within the ambit of re- ligious speech. On the contrary, the tarpaulin clearly refers to442 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW candidates classified under “Team Patay” and “Team Buhay" according to their respective votes on the RH Law. ‘The same may be said of petitioners’ reliance on papal eneyci cals to support their claim that the expression on the tarpaulin is an ecclesiastical matter. With all due respect to the Catholic faithful, the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qusl- iff the posting by one ofits members ofa tarpaulin as religious speech calely on such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with politial consequences and not religious speech Furthermore, the definition of an “ecclesiastical affair” in Aus ‘ria v. National Labor Relations Commission cited by petition- ers finds no application in the present case. The posting ofthe tarpaulin does not fall within the category of matters that are beyond the jurisdiction of civil courts as enumerated in the ‘Austria case such as “proceedings for excommunication, ordi- rations of religious ministers, administration of sacraments ‘and other activites with attached religious significance." Subject to the four exceptions specifically men- tioned, payment of public funds is prohibited to ecclesi- asties only “as such,” which means that they may be paid such funds if they serve the government in a non- ecclesiastical capacity. Thus, priests who served in the Constitutional Commission of 1986 were entitled to be paid per diems from public funds for services rendered by them not as ecclesiastics but as members of the Commission. ‘The Constitution itself also provides for the exemp- tion from property taxes of religious institutions and all, lands, buildings and improvements actually, directly and exclusively devoted to religious purposes. Significantly, the Supreme Court has likewise ruled that —FREEDOM OF RELIGION 443 In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts What the government can do with religion, it also limits what religious seets can or cannot do with the government. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular doc- trines as policy for everyone, nor can they not eause the gov- ernment to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, ‘would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establishing a state religion Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposi tion that the State cannot enhance its population contol pro. gram through the RH Law simply because the promotion of ontraceptive use is contrary to ther religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded to pursue its lsitimate secular ob- ives without being dictated upon bythe pois of any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay hs taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The demarcation line between Church and State demands that one ender unto Caesar the things that are Caesars and unto Ged the things that are God's, (Cruz, Constitutional Law, 2000 edition, p. 178-179)" Finally, it should be reiterated that by specific per- mission in the Constitution, and as an exception to the general rule, public elementary and high schools may be used for optional religious instruction in accordance with Article XIV, Section 3(3). (1) Intramural Religious Disputes It is clear that intramural disputes regarding reli- gious dogma and other matters of faith are outside the jurisdiction of the secular authorities. These are ques- tions that may be resolved by the religious authorities themselves, and among themselves only. It is also set- tled that whatever dogma is adopted by a religious group cannot be binding upon the State if it contravenes its valid laws. Thus, while the Church may provide for the dissolution of marriage by its own courts, the eccle- * Tmbong v. Ochoa, supra444 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW siastical decree cannot prevail against the Civil Code, which prohibits divorce. “Verily, the principle of separation of Chureh and State is based on mutual respect. Generally, the State cannot meddle in the internal affairs of the church, much less question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it, It cannot favor one religion and discriminate against another. On the other hand, the church cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the country." Accordingly, the Supreme Court has refrained from ruling on the morality from a religious perspective of using contraceptives or participating in activities supportive of reproductive health measures or judging them to be “right or wrong according to one’s dogma or belief,” saying that “the jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. Whatever pro- nouncement the Court makes in the case at bench should be understood only in this realm where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to determine whether the RH Law contravenes the guar- antee of religious freedom.” Moreover, it has declared that “matters dealing with faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church ... are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the eivil courts.”” * Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R, No, 204819, April 8, 2014, 721 SCRA 46. * Bid. » Botrada v. Bsertor, 455 Phil. 411, 560 (2003)FREEDOM OF RELIGION 445 Where the dispute involves the property rights of the religious group, or the relations of the members where property rights are involved, the civil courts may assume jurisdiction. Accordingly, in Fonacier v. Court of Appeals,” the Supreme Court, applying the pertinent laws and the internal rules of the Philippine Independ- ent Church, resolved the conflict between two persons claiming to be the head of the church and thus vested with control of its properties. In the earlier case of Gonzales v. Archbishop of Manila,” the Supreme Court held that “where a civil right depends upon some matter pertaining to ecclesias- tical affairs, the civil tribunal tries the civil right and nothing more, taking the ecclesiastical decision out of which the civil right has arisen as it finds them, and accepting those decisions as matters adjudicated by another jurisdiction.” In United Church of Christ in the Philippines, Inc. v. Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc.,° the Court also stressed that a church's decision “to disconnect its ties with another entity” is its ‘sole prerogative and power.” Thus, “the amendments of the constitution, restatement of articles of religion and abandonment of faith or abjuration, having to do with faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church and having reference to the power of excluding from the church those allegedly unworthy of membership, are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil courts.” ® 96 Phil. 417. © 51 Phil. 420. © G.R. No. 171905, June 20, 2012, 674 SCRA 92. * Tbid., citing Tarue v. Bishop De la Cruz, 493 Phil. 293 (2005), 453 SCRA 123.446 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Religious Profession and Worship ‘The right to religious profession and worship has a twofold aspect, viz., freedom to believe and freedom to act on one’s beliefs.” The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The sec- ond is subject to regulation where the belief is trans- lated into external acts that affect the public welfare. According to the Supreme Court in Imbong v. Ochoa,” corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one’s religion is the prineiple that the guarantee of reli- gious freedom is comprised of two parts: the freedom to believe, and the freedom to act on one's belief, The first part is absolute. As explained in Gerona v. Secretary of Education” — ‘The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and thought. So is the freedom of be- liet including religious belief, limitless and without bounds, One may believe in most anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to others, even hereti- cal when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal stan dards. But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel. ‘The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State and can be enjoyed only with proper regard to the rights of others. It is “subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare." = Cantwell v. Connecticut, infra © Supra "106 Phil. 21969), » Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent of Schools, 219 SCRA 256 (March 1, 1988).FREEDOM OF RELIGION 447 (1) Freedom to Believe ‘The individual is free to believe (or disbelieve) as he pleases concerning the hereafter. He may indulge his own theories about life and death; worship any god he chooses, or none at all; embrace or reject: any religion; acknowledge the divinity of God or of any being that appeals to his reverence; recognize or deny the immor- tality of his soul—in fact, cherish any religious convic- tion as he and he alone sees fit. However absurd his beliefs may be to others, even if they be hostile and he- retical to the majority, he has full freedom to believe as he pleases. He may not be required to prove his beliefs. He may not be punished for his inability to do so. Relig- fon, after all, is a matter of faith. “Men may believe what they cannot prove.” Every one has a right to his beliefs and he may not be called to account because he cannot prove what he believes. (2) Freedom to Act on One's Beliefs But where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions that affect the public, his freedom to do so becomes subject to the authority of the State. As great as this liberty may be, religious freedom, like all the other rights guaranteed in the Constitution, can be enjoyed only with a proper regard for the rights of oth- ers. It is error to think that the mere invocation of reli gious freedom will stalemate the State and render it impotent in protecting the general welfare. The inherent police power can be exercised to prevent religious prac- tices inimical to society. And this is true even if such practices are pursued out of sincere religious conviction and not merely for the purpose of evading the reason- able requirements or prohibitions of the law.448 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Justice Frankfurter put it suecinetly: “The constitu. tional provision on religious freedom terminated dis. abilities, it did not create new privileges. It gave reli. gious liberty, not civil immunity. Its essence is freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of religious dogma,” Accordingly, while one has full freedom to believe in Satan, he may not offer the object of his piety a hu- man sacrifice, as this would be murder. Those who liter- ally interpret the Biblical command to “go forth and multiply” are nevertheless not allowed to contract plural marriages in violation of the laws against bigamy. A person cannot refuse to pay taxes on the ground that it would be against his religious tenets to recognize any authority except that of God alone. An atheist cannot ‘express his disbelief in acts of derision that wound the feelings of the faithful. The police power can be validly asserted against the Indian practice of the suttee, born of deep religious conviction, that calls on the widow to immolate herself at the funeral pile of her husband. But all this does not suggest that the authority of the State shall at all times prevail over the right of the individual to religious profession and worship. There are many instances, in fact, when the reverse is true. As long as it can be shown that the exercise of the right does not impair the public welfare, the attempt of the State to regulate or prohibit such right would be an ‘unconstitutional encroachment. In Cantwell v. Connecticut," for example, a statute made it punishable for any one to solicit money or any other form of assistance except for a religious, charitable ° W. Va. Board of Edueation v. Barnette, 219 U.S. 624. * 310US. 296FREEDOM OF RELIGION 449 or philanthropic cause as determined by the secretary of the public welfare council. The U.S. Supreme Court struck it down as censorship of religion. Noting the ex- traordinary power given to the secretary, the Court com- mented that “if he finds that the cause is not that of religion, to solicit for it becomes a crime.” Furthermore, Cantwell and his sons were soliciting in a peaceful man- ner. When one of the records they played angered some of the hearers, who asked them to leave, they immedi- ately did so. Such solicitation for religious purposes, even if abrasive, could not be validly prohibited. In Marsh v. Alabama," a woman distributed reli- gious literature in the premises of a privately-owned town against the expressed prohibitions of the town authorities. Prosecuted for trespass, she was acquitted by the U.S. Supreme Court, which upheld her religious liberty as against the property rights of the corporation that owned the town. The Court said: ‘The corporation's property interest in the town is not de- cisive of the issue. Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion, The more an owner for his advantage opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it. Whether a corporation or a munici- pality owns or possesses the town, the public in either ease has an identical interest in the functioning of the community in such manner that the channel of communication remains free. ‘The town of Chickasaw does not function differently from other towns. Its managers cannot curtail the liberty of press and re- ligion of these people consistently with the purposes of the con- stitutional guarantees, and a state statute, as the one here in- volved which enforees such action by criminally punishing those who attempt to distribute religious literature, clearly vio lates the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitu- tion. When we balance the Constitutional rights of owners of | “66 US.276,450 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW property against those of the people to enjoy freedom of the press and religion, as we must here, we remain mindful ofthe fact that the later oceupy a preferred position, In American Bible Society v. City of Manila,” a reli ‘gious corporation engaged in the sale of Bibles and other religious articles was required to obtain a license and pay the corresponding fee for being engaged in the sale of merchandise. The Supreme Court held: The constitutional guaranty of free exercise and enjy- ment of religious profession and worship carries with it the Tight to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of ‘such right can be justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on the ground that there is a clear and present anger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. In the case at bar, itis true that the price asked for religious articles was in some instances a litte higher than the actual cost ofthe same, but this cannot mean that the plaintiff ‘wat engaged in the business or occupation of selling said “mer- chandise" for profit. For this reason, the provision of the City Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, which requires the payment (of a license fee for conducting the business of general mer- chandise cannot be applied to plaintif society, for in doing so, it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship, as well as its rights of disseminating of religious beliefs ‘The above doctrine was not applied in the VAT Case because as the Supreme Court put it, the registra- tion fee of P1,000 “is not imposed for the exercise of a privilege but only for the purpose of defraying part of the cost of registration, The registration requirement is 2 central feature of the VAT system. . . The registration fee is 2 mere administrative fee, one not imposed on the exercise ofa privilege, much less a constitutional right.” © 101 Phil. 386, Tolentino v. Sec. of Finance, 235 SCRA 630.FREEDOM OF RELIGION 451 ‘The test to determine which shall prevail as be- tween religious freedom and the powers of the State is, as always, the test of reasonableness. In the majority of cases, this test is easily applied. In some borderline situations, however, the very resiliency of the criterion has provoked those deep disagreements that have made Constitutional Law a continuing debate between liberty and authority. A case in point is the flag salute contro- versy. In West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette," all students in public schools in West Virginia were required to participate in a flag ceremony at which they were made to recite an oath of allegiance and to salute the American flag while it was being raised or lowered. Those who refused were subject to expulsion and until readmitted upon compliance were to be proceeded against as “delinquents;” and their parents were liable for prosecution and punishment. Members of the sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses protested, claiming that the ceremony violated their interpretation of Exodus, Chapter 20, verses 4 and 5, of the Bible, reading: “Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of anything that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth; thou shalt not bow down to them, nor serve them.” To them the flag was an image within this com- mand and for this reason they refused to salute it. The U.S. Supreme Court sustained the challenge, holding inter alia as follows: Lastly, and this is the very heart of the Gobitis opinion, it reasons that “national unity is the basis of national security,” that the authorities have the right to select appropriate means “ Supra.452 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW for its attainment, and hence reaches the conclusion that such compulsory measures toward “national unity” are constitutional a. st 895.) Upon the verity ofthis assumption depends our an- swerin this ease. ‘National unity as an end which officials may foster by per. suasion and example is notin question. The problem is whether under our Constitution compulsion as here employed is a per. misible means fr its achievement. ‘Strugees to coerce uniformity of sentiment in support of some end thought essential to their time and country have been ‘waged by many good as wel as by evil men. Nationalism isa rela- tively ment phenomenon but at other times and places the ends hve been racial or teritorial security, support ofa dynasty or re. time, and particular plans for saving Souls. As first and moderate methods to attain unity have failed, those bent on its accom- plishment must resort to an ever-increasing severity. As govern- ‘mental pressure toward unity becomes greater, so strife becomes ‘more bitter as to whose unity it shall be. Probably no deeper divi- sion of our people could proceed from any provocation than from finding it necessary to choose what doctrine and whose program public educational officials shall compel youth to unite in embrac ‘ng. Utimate futility of such attempts to compel coherence is the lesson of every such effort from the Roman drive to stamp out Christianity asa disturber of its pagan unity, the Siberian exlee 8 2 means to religious and dynastic unity, the Siberian exiles as 1 means to Russian unity, down to the fast failing efforts of our present totalitarian enemies, Those who begin coercive elimina- tion of dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters, ‘Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard. Our Supreme Court arrived at a different conelu- sion in Gerona v, Secretary of Education,” where the flag ceremony was sustained as a valid exercise of the police power aimed at inculcating the virtue of patriot- ism in the students. This ruling was the subject of sus- tained attack from libertarians until it was finally re- versed in Ebralinag v. The Division Superintendent ofPREEDOM OF RELIGION 453 Schools of Cebu“ which upheld the religious freedom of the petitioners, who as in Gerona, were members of the Jehovah's Witnesses and believed that they should not salute the flag because it was in their view an “image” to which the Bible prohibited them from rendering obei- sance, Speaking through Justice Carolina Grifio-Aquino, the Supreme Court declared: We are not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovah's Witnesses from saluting the flag, singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge, this religious group which admittedly comprises a “small portion of the school population” will shake up our part of the globe and suddenly produce a na- tion “untaught and uninculeated in and unimbued with rever- tence for the flag, patriotism, love of country and admiration for national heroes” (Gerona vs. Sec. of Education, 106 Phil. 24). After all, what the petitioners seek only is exemption from the flag ceremony, not exclusion from the publi schools where they may study the Constitution, the democratie way of life and form of government, and learn not only the arts, sciences, Philippine history and culture but also receive training for a vocation or profession and be taught the virtues of “patriotism, respoct for hhuman rights, appreciation for national heroes, the rights and duties of citizenship, and moral and spiritual values” (Sec. 32, ‘Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution) as part of the curricula. Expelling or banning the petitioners from Philippine scheols will bring about the very situation that this Court had feared in Gerona, Forcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of the Jaw, to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious be- lief, will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for ‘duly constituted authorities In Wisconsin v. Yoder,” the US. Supreme Court, acknowledging the parents’ fundamental right to free- dom of religion which may not be “outweighed by the * 219 SCRA 256 (1998). © 406 U.S. 205 (1972).454 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW state's interest in educating its children,” ruled that Amish children could not be placed under compulsory high school education, Then there is the case of German v. Barangan," where some fifty persons who were walking to St. Jude Church to pray for “an end to violence” were barred by the military and warned against a similar march later. ‘They went to the Supreme Court to protest the prohibi- tion but their petition was denied. The plurality decision penned by Justice Escolin, while recognizing their free- dom of religion, nevertheless stressed that it was subject to regulation. Noting that they wore yellow T-shirts and chanted antiadministration invectives during their march, the ponencia held that the petitioners were not sincere in their profession of religious liberty and were using it to express their opposition to the government. Even assuming their good faith, continued Justice Escolin, there was still the necessity of protecting Mala- cafiang, the official residence of the President of the Philippines, which was near the church, in case the ‘march went out of hand Only five other justices joined in this decision, one because the issue had become moot. Two concurred in the result, one of them also dissenting in part. Outright dissents were filed by five others, to wit, Justices Tee- hankee, Makasiar, Abad Santos, Herrera, and Relova, mainly on the ground that there was no clear and pre- sent danger, Justice Techankee declared in part: ‘The burden to show the existence of grave and imminent danger that would justify prior restraint and bar a group of persons from entering the church of their choice for prayer and © 195 SCRA 514FREEDOM OF RELIGION 455 worship lies on the military or police officals who would so physically restrain them. Indeed, there is no prevedent in this time and age where churchgoers whose right of free exercise of their religion is recognized have been physically prevented from entering their church on grounds of national security. On the other hand, it does not lie within the competence nor au- thority of such officials to demand of churchgoers that they ‘show and establish their “sincerity and good faith... in invok- ing the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religious wor- ship and of locomotion” aa a precondition, as seems to be the thrust ofthe majority decision Good faith on both sides is and must be presumed. Thus, petitioners’ manifestations of their sincere intention as Chris- tians to gather together in prayer at St. Jude Church who is ‘known as the Patron of the Impossible should be taken in good faith. It would seem that no court petition should be necessary to enable a group of persons such as petitioners to freely pro- ceed and enter a church of their religion and choiee and therein hhear mass and say their prayers. We are basically a people of, peace who believe in the power of prayer and pray silently in the land, For his part, Justice Makasiar pointed out that the march was orderly, and the wearing of the yellow shirts and emblems was a form of expression that was entitled to constitutional protection. Justice Abad Santos com- mented wryly: “The Court took a big step forward in the We Forum case. It has taken another step but this time in the other direction.” ‘The petitioner in Estrada v. Bscritor, who was charged with and dismissed for immorality for living with a man other than her husband, was a widow when she entered the judiciary. She had admitted that she * A.M. No, P-02-1651, June 22, 2006, 492 SCRA 1 sce also Estrada v. Escritor, AM. No. P.02-1651, August 4, 2008, 455 Phil 4411, 506 (2003).456 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW started living with a man without the benefit of mar- riage more than twenty years before when her husband was still alive but living with another woman, “But as a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Soci- ety, she asserted that their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefS and has the ap- proval of her congregation. In fact, after ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991, a ‘Decla- ration of Pledging Faithfulness’ For Jehovah's Wit- nesses, the Declaration allows members of the congrega- tion who have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations. The Declaration thus makes the resulting union moral and binding within the congrega- tion all over the world except in countries where divorce is allowed. As laid out by the tenets of their faith, the Jehovah's congregation requires that at the time the declarations are executed, the couple cannot secure the civil authorities’ approval of the marital relationship because of legal impediments. Only couples who have been baptized and in good standing may execute the Declaration, which requires the approval of the elders of the congregation. As a matter of practice, the marital status of the declarants and their respective spouses’ commission of adultery are investigated before the dec- larations are executed. Escritor and Quilapio's declara- tions were executed in the usual and approved form prescribed by the Jehovah's Witnesses, approved by elders of the congregation where the declarations were executed, and recorded in the Watch Tower Central Office.” The Supreme Court exonerated her. In granting her petition, the Court pronounced — Our Constitution adheres to the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as Te Auired by the Free Exercise Clause. Thus, in arguing that resFREEDOM OF RELIGION 481 pondent should be held administratively liable as the ar- rangement she had was ‘illegal per se because, by universally recognized standards, itis inherently or by its very nature bad, ‘improper, immoral and contrary to good conscience,” the Solii- tor General failed to appreciate that benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests Finally, even assuming that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate thatthe state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exer- cise isnot infringed eny more than necessary to achieve the le gitimate goal ofthe state, ie, it has chosen a way to achieve its legitimate state end that imposes as litle as possible on re- ligious liberties. Escritor’s conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she thas made out a case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion. The Court recognizes {hat state interests must be upheld in onder that freedoms ~ cluding religious freedom — may be enjoyed. Inthe area of re- igious exercise as a preferred freedom, however, man stands fccountable to an authority higher than the state, and so the state interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation will erode the very fabric ofthe state that will also Protect the freedom. In the absence of a showing that such State interest exists, man must be allowed to subseribe to the Infinit, This ruling was invoked in Imbong v. Ochoa,” Where the Supreme Court stated that “the basis of the fee exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience. Under this part of religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly interfering with the outside manifestations of one’s belief 8nd faith.” Quoting from Bscritor, the Court stressed — The establishment and fre exercise clauses were not designed to serve contradictory purposes. They have a single goal to Promote freedom of individual religious belie and practices. “GAR. No, 204819, April 8, 2014, 721 SORA 146458 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW In simplest terms, the free exercise clause prohibits govern ment from inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for reli ‘ious beliefs and practice, while the establishment clause pro ‘hibits government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In other words, the two relig- jon clauses were intended to deny government the power to use either the carrot or the stick to influence individual religious beliefs and practices. ‘The Court further explained the concept of religious freedom, citing Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Un- ion,’ where it explained — ‘The constitutional provision not only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the modes of worship of ‘any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship (U.S. Bal- lard, 322 US. 78, 88 L. ed. 1148, 1153), but also assures the free exercise of one's chosen form of religion within limite of ‘utmost amplitude, It has been said that the religion clauses of ‘the Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest possi- ble liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he be- ieves he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good. Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the observance of one or all religions, or to dis criminate invidiously between the religions, is invalid, even ‘though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect. (herbert v. Verner, 374 US, 398, 10 Led.2d 965, 89 S. Ct 1970) But ifthe state regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law which has for its purpose and offect to advance the state's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance, unless the state can accomplish its purpose without imposing such burden. (Braun [eld v. Brown, 268 US. 599, 6 Led. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144; ‘McGowan v. Maryland, 368 US. 420, 444-5 and 449), The Supreme Court, in annulling Section 6.24 of Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic 59 SCRA 54 (1974).FREEDOM OF RELIGION 459 Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law, which provided that “skilled health professional such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chiefs of hospital, head nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors,” further declared in Imbong — Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which ‘would limit the free exercise clause of the constientious objec tors, however few in number. Only the prevention of an imme- diate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the com- ‘munity ean justify the infringement of religious freedom. Ifthe government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy ofthe threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to be- lieve. It also means the freedom to actor not to act according to what one believes. And this freedom is violated when one is compelled to act against one's belief or is prevented from acting according to one’ belief, Apparently, in these eases, there is no immediate danger tothe life or health of an individual in the perceived scenario of the subject provisions. After all, a couple who plans the timing, ‘number and spacing of the birth oftheir children refers toa ture event that is contingent on whether or not the mother de cides to adopt or use the information, product, method or sup- ply given to her or whether she even decides to become preg- nant at all. On the other hand, the burden placed upon those Who object to contraceptive use is immediate and occurs the ‘moment a patient seeks consultation on reproductive health matters, Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the infringement of the conscientious objectors religious free- dom, the respondents have failed to demonstrate “the gravest abuses, endangering peramount interests” which could li override a person's fundamental right to religious freedom. ‘Also, the respondents have not presented any government ef fort exerted to show that the means it takes to achieve its le- fitimate state objective is the least intrusive means. Other460 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW than the assertion that the act of referring would only be mo mentary, considering that the act of referral by a conscientious abjector is the very action being contested as violative of reli- tous freedom, it behooves the respondents to demonstrate that no other means ean be undertaken by the State to achieve its objective without violating the rights of the conscientious ob- jector. The health concerns of women may still be addressed by ‘other practitioners who may perform reproductive health: rolated procedures with open willingness and motivation, Sut fice it to say, a person who is forced to perform an actin utter reluctance deserves the protection ofthe Court as the last van- guard of constitutional freedoms. In Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Ele tions, the respondent rejected the application for regis- tration of the petitioner, an organization of lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transgenders, as a political party for purposes of participating in party-list elections on, among others, “religious-based” grounds, invoking “the ‘moral condemnation of homosexuality and homosexual conduct.” Relying on the Bible and the Koran, it con- tended that the petitioner's “accreditation was denied not necessarily because their group consists of LGBTs but because of the danger it poses to the people espe- cially the youth. Once it is recognized by the govern- ment, a sector which believes that there is nothing ‘wrong in having sexual relations with individuals of the same gender is a bad example. It will bring down the standard of morals we cherish in our civilized society. Any society without a set of moral precepts is in danger of losing its own existence.” The Supreme Court rejected its contentions and said — Our Constitution provides in Article III, Seetion 6 that “ao law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, ‘or prohibiting the free exorcise thereof” At bottom, what our © GR No. 100662, April, 2010, 618 SCRA 92.FREEDOM OF RELIGION 461 rnon-establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” We ‘thus find that it was grave violation ofthe non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justifiation for its rul- ings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise stated, government must act for secular purposes and in ways ‘that have primarily secular effects. sex ‘We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, ho- ‘mosexual conduct, and perhaps homosexuals themselves, have bborne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is not difficult to imagine the reasons behind this censure — religious beliefs, convictions about the preservation of marriage, family, and procreation, even dislike or distrust of homosexuals themselves and their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall that the Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct Evidently, therefore, these “generally accepted public morals” hhave not been convincingly transplanted into the realm of law. ‘The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific covert immoral act performed by Ang Ladlad. Even the OSG agrees that “there should have been a finding by the COME LEC thatthe group's members have commited o are commit- ting immoral acts." The OSG argues: Xxx A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the same gender, ofa different gender, or ‘more than one gender, but mere attraction does not translate to immoral acts. There is a great divide between thought and action. Reduction ad absur- dum. If immoral thoughts could. be penalized, COMELEC would have its hands full of disqual cation cases against both the “straights” and the “gays” Certainly this is not the intendment of the law. Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to jus462 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW tify its position that petitioner's admission into the party-ist system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the ‘moral fabri of society. We, of course, do not suggest that the state is wholly without authority to regulate matters concern- ‘ng morality, sexuality, and sexual relations, and we recognize that the government will and should continue to restriet be- havior considered detrimental to society. Nonetheless, we can- not countenance advocates who, undoubtedly with the loftiest of intentions, situate morality on one end of an argument or nother. without bothering to go through the rigors of legal reasoning and explanation. In this, the notion of morality is rubbed of all value. Clearly then, the bare invocation of moral: ity will not remove an issue from our serutiny. ‘We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported vio: lations of our penal and civil laws Mimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance at “any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency ot ‘morality.” the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Pensl Code or any loeal ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires, proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a eriminal conviction Ithardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of vol tion of laws isnot proof, and a mere blanket invocation of pub- lie morals eannot replaee the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpa bility ‘As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The Genial of Ang Ledlad’s registration on purely moral grounds ‘amounts more to statement of dislike and disapproval of ho rmosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest. Respondents blanket justifications give rise to the in- evitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of any particular morally reprehensible ac. It is this selective targeting that implicates ‘our equal protection clause.FREEDOM OF RELIGION 463 Among the grounds invoked by the petitioner in Soriano v. Laguardia® who challenged the suspension of, his television religious program was his freedom of “re- ligious speech” which he claimed entitled him to utter the “expletives” for which he was penalized. The Su- preme Court wryly rejected his contention saying “the Court is at a loss to understand how petitioner's utter- ances in question can come within the pale of Sec. 5, Article III of the 1987 Constitution on religious free- dom.” Religious Tests ‘The constitutional prohibition against religious tests is aimed against clandestine attempts on the part of the government to prevent a person from exercising his civil or political rights because of his religious be- liefs. In In re Summers," a person was denied admission to the bar because of his inability to take in good faith an oath to support the Constitution of Illinois which contained a provision requiring service in the militia in times of war. Petitioner was a conscientious objector and was opposed to the use of force. The Illinois Su- preme Court held him morally unfit to practice law be- cause “he will not use force to prevent wrong, no matter how aggravated.” The U.S. Supreme Court sustained. ‘The majority declared: “It is said that the action of the Supreme Court of Illinois is contrary to the prin ples of that portion of the First Amendment which guarantees the free exercise of religion. Of course, under our constitutional system, men could not be excluded © GR. No, 164785, April 29, 2009, 587 SCRA 79, "325 US. 561,464 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW from the practice of law, or indeed from following any other calling, simply because they belong to any of our religious groups, whether Protestant, Catholic, Quaker or Jewish, assuming it conceivable that any state of the Union would draw such a religious line. We cannot say that any such purpose to discriminate motivated the action of the Illinois Supreme Court.” Justice Black dissented: “Under our Constitution, ‘men are punished for what they do or fail to do and not for what they think and believe. Freedom to think, to believe and to worship has too exalted a position in our country to be penalized on such an illusory basis.” An attempt to avoid military duties on the ground among others of conscientious scruples was brushed aside by our Supreme Court in People v. Zosa.” Basis of the decision was Article II, Section 4, which now read “The prime duty of the Government is to serve and pro- tect the people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by lau, to render personal military or civil service.” ‘As accommodation perhaps to his religious misgiv- ings, the conscientious objector, provided his sincerity is first established, can be assigned non-military duties in defense of the State. This might, however, raise ques- tions of equal protection as those subjected to combat duties and to the risk of death may claim discrimina- tion. The answer would probably lie in whether or not, there is a substantial distinction between these citizens and those whose religious beliefs prevent them in con- science from taking human life. 38 0.6. 1676.FREEDOM OF RELIGION 465 At any rate, “conscientious objector status” with re- spect to military conscription has been acknowledged by the Justice Department of the United States on the ba- sis of three tests, to wit: “an applicant's objection must be against participating in war in any form, not just a particular war; an applicant's objection to service in the nilitary must be based on religious training and belief, and that an applicant's objection must be sincere.”* Sections 7, 23 and 24 of the RH Law, which re- quired hospitals or medical practitioners to immediately refer a person seeking health care and services under the law to another accessible healthcare provider, and their dissemination of information regarding programs and services and in the performance of reproductive health procedures, despite their conscientious objections based on their religious or ethical beliefs, were all an- nulled by the Supreme Court in Imbong v. Ochoa,” where it declared — In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by government legislation or practice, the compelling state interest test inline with the Court's espousal of the Doc- tine of Benevolent Neutrality in Eseritor, finds application. In this ease, the conscientious objector's claim to religious free dom would warrant an exemption from obligations under the RH Law, unless the government succeeds in demonstrating @ ‘more compelling state interest in the accomplishment of an important secular objective. Necessarily so, the plea of consi entious objectors for exemption from the RH Law deserves no Tess than strict serutiny. In applying the test, the first inquiry i whether a conscion- tious objectors vight to religious feedom has bren burdened {ain Escrito, there is no doubt that an intense tugotar plagues a conscientious objector. Onesie canes him int obe- jence tothe law andthe abandonment of hs velgious bei, “ Cited in Clay v. US., 403 U.S. 698, " GRNo, 204819, April 8, 2014.466 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW while the other entices him to a clean conscience yet under the pain of penalty. The scenario is an illustration of the predica- ‘ment of medical practitioners whose religious beliefs are in. congruent with what the RH Law promotes. The Courts ofthe view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and convietion of a conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on modem repro- ductive health product, services, procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform an act beliefs, xxx. In cace of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral eon- victions of individuals, on one hand, and the interest of the State, on the other, to provide access and information on re: productive health products, services, procedures and methods to enable the people to determine the timing, number and spacing ofthe birth oftheir children, the Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of health providers, whether public or private, should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be vio- lative of “the principle of non-coercion” enshrined in the consti- tutional right to free exercise of religion. In any event, it is established that what is referred to as a “facial challenge” may be mounted for purposes of questioning the validity of statutes concerning reli gious freedom, and not only freedom of expression, As explained by the Supreme Court in Imbong, In United States (US) constitutional law, facial chal- lenge, also known aa First Amendment Challenge, is one that is Inunched to aseail the validity of statutes concerning not only protested speech, but also all other rights in the First ‘Amendment. Se United States v, Salerno, 481 US. 799 (1987) ‘These include religious freedom, fredom ofthe press, and the right ofthe people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. After ll, the fund ‘ental right to religous freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful asembly are but component rights of the right to