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The Charter of the United Nations recognizes both individual self-defense and
collective self-defense. Each kind of self-defense has its own characteristic. Individual
self-defense can be referred to unilateral use of force by a state to repel any unlawful
attack. Collective self-defense is the collective number of states to protect the
common interest in international community. The same point is that both types of
self-defense activate only if the armed attack occur.
2.1 Role of Security Council
The Security Council was intended to operate as an efficient organ of limited
membership, functioning continuously. It was given primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security.1
In theory the Security Council has a central role with regard to individual and
collective self-defense: States must report their use of force in self-defense to the
Security Council immediately and the right of the State to self-defense is temporary
until the Security Council takes the measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security. In practice the Security Council does not generally make
pronouncements on the legality of claims to self-defense.2
There is no authoritative statement as to whether the reporting requirement in
Article 51 of the UN Charter should be classified as mandatory or directory. 3 The
reporting requirement’s original raison d’etre in 1945 was rooted in the goal of
centralizing the use of military force with the newly created UN Security Council
following the atrocities of World War II. The requirement was intended to enable the
Council to respond effectively to any threat that an attack (or forcible defensive
1
Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, Cambridge University Press, 8th Ed, 2017, pp.925-926.
2
Malcolm D.Evans, International Law, Oxford University Press, 1st Ed, 2003, p.606.
3
D.W. Greig, Self-Defense and the Security Council: What Does Article 51 Require, The
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Apr. 1991, Vol.4o, No.2, p.368.
13
response) may pose to international peace and security. The reporting obligation was
also designed to provide the council with information with which it could begin to
assess the validity of state’s self-defense claim, irrespective of whether it felt it
necessary to respond under Chapter VII. Reporting was supposed to give the Council
the opportunity to scrutinize claims of self-defense. Viewed in this light, the
requirement can be seem as, at least be seemed as being intended to be, “a most
important safeguard for…the proper scrutiny and control of circumstances when self-
defense is invoked…is essential to the maintenance of peace.” 4
However, the judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the
Nicaragua case can offer some lead in this regard. The Court, while noting that the
requirement to report measures taken in self-defense to the Security Council pursuant
to Article 51 does not constitute a part of customary international law, held that “the
absence of a report may be one of the factors indicating whether the state in question
was itself convinced that it was acting in self-defense”. The Court was of the view
that where the plea of self-defense is raised to justify actions which would otherwise
be in violation of both customary international law and the UN Charter, it is to be
expected that the provision of the Charter to be observed. However, the Court failed
to determine whether, if the Charter provisions were applicable, a non-compliance
with the reporting requirements vitiates the action taken in self-defense. The effect of
the pronouncement of the ICJ is that a failure on the part of a state to adhere to this
reporting requirement would affect the genuiness of a State’s claim to be acting in
self-defense.5 Moreover, Article 51 UN Charter does not stipulate the format that
victim States must use when reporting self-defense action to the SC. Providing self-
defense action is brought to the attention of the SC , the reporting obligation is
discharged. Usually, reports take the form of a written letter to the President of the SC
or to the UN S-G but, exceptionally, States have given notice of their resort to self-
defense orally during SC debates.6
4
James A.Green, The Article 51 Reporting Requirement for Self-Defense Actions, Virginia Journal
Of Law, 2015, pp.7-8.
5
Eustace Chikere Azubuike, Probing the Scope of Self-Defense in International Law, Annual
Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol.17, Issue 1, Article 8, p.148.
6
Russell Buchan and Nicholas Tsagourias, Regulating The Use of Force In International Law,
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2021, P.75.
14
7
Rebecca M.M. Wallace, International Law, Thomson, 2002, 4th Ed, p.266.
8
Article.52 , The Charter of the United Nations, 1945.
9
Rebecca M.M. Wallace, International Law, Thomson, 2002, 4th Ed, p.266.
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid.p.267.
15
12
Rebecca M.M. Wallace, International Law, Thomson, 2002, 4th Ed, p.267.
13
Abdul Gahfar Hamid@ Khin Maung Sein, Public International Law: A Practical Approach,
Thomson Reuters Malaysia Sdn Bhd, 3rd Ed, 2011, p.416.
14
Jan Kittrich, The Right of Individual Self-Defense in Public International Law, Logos Verlag Berlin
GmbH 2008, pp.17-18.
16
3) When another state that has been subjected to an unlawful armed attack by a
third state requests armed assistance in repelling that attack;
4) When a third state has unlawfully intervened with armed force on one side of
an internal conflict and the other side has requested counter intervention in
response to the illegal intervention; or
5) When its nationals in a foreign country are imminent peril of death or grave
injury and the territorial sovereign grounds is unable and unwilling to protect
them.15
A right to self-defense isn’t absolute in nature. The conditions are:
a) Use of force must be in response of an armed-attack,
b) State needs to fulfill elements like necessity, proportionality and immediacy,
c) Reporting needs to be done to Security Council.16
The armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of The Congo (DRC) is the
most serious and protracted of any since the Second World War. Since the conflict
began in 1994, it has directly involved on different sides, the armies of DRC
(formerly Zaire) Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Zimbabwe, and Namibia. Three other
States (Angola, Sudan, and Chad) have also been indirectly involved. Uganda’s own
involvement in the conflict dates back to 1996 when it, along with Rwanda, gave
support to the Congolese rebel group Alliance of Democratic Forces for the
Liberation of the Congo (ADFL) under the leadership of Laurent Kabila. On 28 July
1998 President Kabila asked all foreign troops to leave, but Uganda refused to
withdraw. In the period following the expulsion of foreign troops, the DRC
consistently maintained the Uganda was giving military support to Congolese rebel
groups with the aim of overthrowing Kabila’s Government. It maintained that its
support for these groups was consistent with its right of self-defense, because these
rebel movements were acting as de facto governments in the areas under their control
without any challenge from the established government. 17 The Court would first
observe that in August and early September 1998 Uganda did not report to the
Security Council events that it had regarded as requiring it to act in self-defense. 18
15
Oscar Schachter, The Lawful Resort to Unilateral Use of Force, Yale Journal of International Law,
Vol.10:291, 1985, p.291.
16
Pukar Dahal, Right to Self-Defense of States under International Law: A Conceptual
Understanding, INT’I J..MGMT. & HUMAN. 1107(2020), p.1110.
17
Phoebe N.Okowa, Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic
Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), 55INT’I & COMP. L.Q. 742 (2006), pp.743-744.
18
Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of Congon (Democratic Republic of the Congo
v.Uganda0, Judgement of 19 December 2005, Para 145,p.222
17
The Court has also found that the events attested to by Uganda did not justify
recourse to the use of force in self-defense.19
In summing up, individual self-defense is not unilateral use of force prohibited
under the UN Charter. Unilateral use of force means unauthorized use of force
against another state. For individual self-defense, reporting to the Security Council is
unnecessary. On the other hand, the Victim State needs to declare under being an
unlawful attack.
2.3 Collective Self-Defense
The term reflects the collective interest and endeavor of states to advert an
armed attack by an aggressor state or states. State can unite for the protection of their
territories against external aggression and conclude treaties of mutual assistance.
Theses treaties supplement the right of collective self-defense with the duty of
collective self-defense; every aggression becomes a matter for the whole international
community and its prevention is a “common interest”, a common “defense” or “self-
defense” against aggressor. For the exercise of the right of collective self-defense,
however, the consent of the attacked state is important.20
As regards the lawfulness of the exercise of collective self-defense, the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that the State which was the victim of an
armed attack had to form and declare the view that it had been so attack. 21 In the
Nicaragua case, the ICJ emphasizes this principle: “There is no rule permitting the
exercise of collective self-defense in the absence of a request by the State which
regards itself as the victim of an armed attack”. To permit other states to assist in a
collective self-defense action, the state for whose benefit the action is taken must
consider itself to be the victim of an armed attack.22
Nicaragua applied to the ICJ, alleging that the United States had laid mines in
Nicaraguan waters and engaged in unprovoked attacks on ports. Nicaragua also
alleged that the US trained, funded and supported a group of anti-government rebels
in their struggle against the incumbent ruling regime of Nicaragua. It was argued that
the US had violated the sovereignty of Nicaragua, thereby violating the principle of
19
Ibid, Para.149,p.224.
20
Josef Mrazek, Prohibition of the Use of Force and Threat of Force: Self-Defense and Self-Help in
Intrnational Law, 27 CAN. Y.B. INT’I L.81(1989), p.93.
21
Josef Mrazek, Prohibition of the Use of Force and Threat of Force: Self-Defense and Self-Help in
International Law, 27 CAN. Y.B. INT’I L.81(1989), p.93
22
Gideon Boas, Public International Law: Contemporary Principles and Perspectives, Edward Elgar,
2012, p.332.
18
matter passed into hands of the General Assembly because agreement no longer
possible in the Security Council.25
There have been arguments put forward that the Korean action was not
legitimate under the UN Charter on the basis that USSR’s absence should not be
counted as a vote. A similar argument was mounted against Security Council
Resolution 678 (1990) which imposed a deadline on Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait or
face military action. In that case was it was China that abstained. The majority of
opinion seems to suggest that an abstention should not be considered to be a veto. It
was also disputed as to whether the Security Council could instigate the use of armed
force outside the Article 42 and 43procedure. The action in Korea has therefore been
characterized by some commentators as an example of the collective self-defense of
South Korea.26
The arrangements of states concluded on the basis of the right to collective
self-defense should not be confused with the collective security system of the United
Nations itself. These arrangements are lawful provided they fulfill requirements of
Article 51. But they are not part of the United Nations Machinery for the preservation
or restoration of international peace and security. 27 Bowett identified six differences
between collective self-defense and collective measures under Chapter VII.
(1) Collective self-defense needs no authorization from the Security Council. A
salient and fundamental different between collective measures of the kind
contemplated in Chapter VII, and collective self-defense, is that only the
Security Council can authorize the former, but the latter no authorization.
(2) The circumstances which ‘trigger’ the Council’s powers under Chapter VII (a
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression under Article 39)
are not identical to an ‘armed attack’ which is a precondition for the exercise
of the right of self-defense as recognized in Article 51. “The collective
measures under Chapter VII could be taken when no possibility of collective
self-defense existed”.
(3) ‘In collective measures under Chapter VII it is for the Security Council to
determine which Member State may participate.’ In the case of collective self-
25
Tim Hillier, Source Book on Public International Law, Cavendish Publishing Limited, 1998, p.616.
26
Ibid
27
Max Sorensen, ed. Manual of Public International Law, Palgrave Macmillan, 1968, p. 770.
20
defense ‘it is essentially for the State to determine which states shall
participate.
(4) Measures in self-defense must be proportionate. The limitations on the choice
of collective measures are quite different, and are governed by the aim of
maintain and restoring international peace and security.
(5) The aim of self-defense (the protection of the state) and collective security
(maintenance and restoration of international peace and security) are very
different, with the latter permitting measures of ‘far greater scope’.
(6) The timing of the response differs, in that action in self-defense depends on
proof on immediacy.28
Collective self-defense may be exercised either spontaneously (as an
unplanned response to an armed attack after it has become a reality) or premeditatedly
(on the footing of a prior agreement contemplating a potential armed attack). There
are those who deny one possibility or the other. It has been contended that support of
a State in the grip of an armed attack is contingent on the existence of a collective
treaty. Conversely, it has been maintained that Article 51 precludes Member States
(acting outside the pale of the United Nations) form elaborating strategic plans, or
coordinating their military forces under an integrated high command, before an armed
takes place. In reality, there is no sustenance in the text for either interpretation. The
latter position has been rightly termed ‘astonishing’, and so is the former. States are
entitled to invoke the right of collective self-defense either on the spur of the moment
or after thorough preparation for a rainy day.29
The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq30 on 2August 1990 raised the issue of
collective self-defense in the context of the response of the states allied in the
31
coalition to end that conquest and occupation. The invasion was almost universally
condemned and the Security Council passed a series of resolutions relating to the
situation. On the day of the invasion the Security Council passed Resolution 660
which determined that situation constituted a breach of international peace and
security and demanded immediate Iraqi withdrawal. Following Iraq’s failure to
withdrawal, Resolution 661 was passed which imposed comprehensive economic
28
Marc Weller (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law, Oxford
University Press, 2015, p.652.
29
Yoram Dinstein, War, Agrression and Self-Defense, Cambridge University Press, 2011, 5 th Ed,
pp.281-282.
30
Invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, August.1999, S/Res/660.
31
Malcolm N.Shaw, International Law , Cambridge University Press, 8th Ed, 2017, p.873.
21
32
Tim Hillier, Source Book on Public International Law, Cavendish Publishing Limited, 1998, p.617.
33
Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law , Cambridge University Press, 8th Ed, 2017, p.873.